Names of famous marshals and generals who became direct blacksmiths Great Victory are known to many. Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, Malinovsky ... There is hardly anyone in Russia who is not familiar with these names. The merits of these and many other Soviet military leaders have been repeatedly described in historical and memoir literature. Much less fortunate in this regard were those Soviet military leaders (as well as ordinary officers and soldiers) who fell in the first days, weeks and months of the war, never knowing the joy of victory over the Nazis. But we all owe them as much as we owe to those who reached Berlin. After all, it was these people, the real heroes and patriots of their homeland, who fought to the last, trying to hold back the onslaught of the enemy, superior in armament and technical equipment, on the borders of the Soviet country. In this article, we will talk about one of these heroes.
Kyiv Special Military District in the period preceding the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, was considered by the high command as one of the key military districts of the country. The Kyiv military district was created on May 17, 1935, as a result of the division of the Ukrainian military district into the Kyiv and Kharkov military districts. In 1938, it was decided to transform the Kyiv Military District into the Kyiv Special Military District (hereinafter - KOVO). In the western direction, its role was decisive, since it covered strategically important territory Ukrainian SSR. By 1941, it covered the Kyiv, Vinnitsa, Zhitomir, Kamenetz-Podolsk, Stanislav, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, Rivne, Volyn, Lvov and Drohobych regions of the Ukrainian SSR.
The district was border, and this determined its strategic importance for the defense of the Soviet state. The largest grouping of Soviet troops in the western direction was stationed on the territory of the district. Naturally, a person worthy and trusted by Moscow should have commanded such an important district. Since the formation of the Kyiv Special Military District, the post of commander has been occupied by such famous Soviet commanders as the commander of the 2nd rank Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko (in 1938-1940) and General of the Army Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (1940-1941).
On February 28, 1941, Georgy Zhukov, who became the winner of two major war games that practiced the offensive of the Soviet troops in the western direction and, accordingly, the defense in the western direction, was nominated by Joseph Stalin to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. The question arose of who would replace Georgy Konstantinovich as commander of the Kyiv Special Military District. It was supposed to be no less worthy and talented military leader. Ultimately, Stalin chose Lieutenant General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos. Forty-nine-year-old Lieutenant General Kirponos, before being appointed commander of the Kyiv Special Military District, commanded the Leningrad Military District. He was a military leader with great combat experience, who received the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the Soviet-Finnish war.
From peasant son to red commander
Like many Soviet military leaders, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was, as they say, a man of the people. He was born on January 22 (January 9 according to the old style), 1892 in the town of Vertievka, Nezhinsky district, Chernigov province, into a poor peasant family. His education amounted to adolescence to the year of the parochial and three years of the zemstvo school. Since the family did not have much money, they had to stop studying and, like many peers from the village, go to work. Since 1909, Kirponos worked as a watchman, a forester in the forestries of the Chernihiv province. In 1911, he married the daughter of a saddler, Olimpiada Polyakova (later he divorced her in 1919, leaving two daughters for himself, and in the same 1919 married Sofya Piotrovskaya). When did the first World War, Mikhail Kirponos was already 22 years old.
In 1915 young man called for military service. He graduated from instructor courses at the Oranienbaum officer rifle school, after which he was assigned to the 216th reserve infantry regiment stationed in Kozlov (now - the city of Michurinsk in the Tambov region). In 1917, Kirponos changed his military specialty - he graduated from a military paramedic school, and in August of the same year he was sent to the Romanian front as part of the 258th Olgopol Infantry Regiment. Twenty-five-year-old Mikhail Kirponos becomes chairman of the soldiers' regimental committee, in November of the same year - chairman of the soldiers' council of the 26th Army Corps. 
Apparently, during these years, young Kirponos not only sympathized with the revolutionary movement, but also tried to take an active part in it. So, he organized a fraternization with Austro-Hungarian soldiers, for which he was arrested and in February 1918 demobilized from the Russian army. Then he became a member of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Returning to his homeland, where German and Austro-Hungarian troops were in charge, Mikhail Kirponos joined the partisan struggle and created a small detachment that fought both against the Germans and Austrians, and against the troops of the Central Rada. Having joined the Red Army in August 1918, Kirponos almost immediately (the next month of September), as an experienced military man, was appointed company commander in the 1st Soviet Ukrainian Rifle Division. The division, by the way, was commanded by the legendary division commander Nikolai Shchors.
In the Red Army, Kirponos' career went rapidly - in December, two months before that, having commanded a company, he became a battalion commander, and then - chief of staff and commander of the 22nd Ukrainian Rifle Regiment as part of the 44th Rifle Division. In this capacity, the regiment commander Kirponos took part in the battles for the capture of Berdichev, Zhytomyr and Kyiv. In July 1919, a new appointment came - as assistant head of the divisional school of red foremen (red commanders) of the same 44th rifle division. Here begins the temporary decline of Kirponos, apparently due to his lack of military education. So, in May 1920, he became assistant to the head of the economic team of the 2nd Kyiv school of red foremen, and in June 1921, a year later, he became the head of the economic department, then - assistant commissar of the same school. In 1922, Kirponos graduated from the 2nd Kyiv school of red foremen, thus receiving a military education without interrupting his service at school.
After receiving a military education, Kirponos continued to serve for a year at the Kharkov School of Red Starshina (October 1922 - September 1923), where he served as assistant chief for political affairs. Then followed study at the Military Academy of the Red Army. M.V. Frunze, which Kirponos graduated in 1927 and was assigned as a battalion commander to the 130th Bogunsky Rifle Regiment. However, already in December 1928, he again returned to the system of military educational institutions - this time as an assistant chief - head of the educational unit of the Kharkov military school red foremen them. VTsIK. April 1929 to March 1934 Kirponos served in the 51st Perekop Rifle Division - first, until January 1931, as an assistant, and then as division chief of staff. 
In March 1934, Mikhail Kirponos was appointed head and military commissar of the Tatar-Bashkir United Military School named after. Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR. Kirponos led this military educational institution for more than five years - from March 1934 to December 1939. During this time, the school has undergone several renames - in December 1935 it was renamed the Tatar-Bashkir Military Infantry School named after the Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR, in April 1936 - the Kazan Infantry School named after. Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR, in March 1937 - to the Kazan Infantry military school them. Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR and, finally, in March 1939 - to the Kazan Infantry School. Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR. Since March 1937, the military school became an all-Union one and young people from all the Union republics of the USSR were able to enter it. During the five years that Kirponos led the Kazan School, many worthy commanders received training and were released into the troops, some of them were awarded high awards, including the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Kirponos himself rose in ranks during the leadership of the school and college. On October 26, 1935, he was awarded the rank of brigade commander, and four years later, on November 4, 1939, the rank of division commander.
The cadets of the school remembered Kirponos as an excellent commander and educator - military pedagogical activity was his real vocation. In addition, Kirponos, being the head of the school, was also engaged in administrative and economic work - after all, at that time the organization of the normal supply of the school also seemed to be quite difficult and, at the same time, a very necessary thing. Party and political activity remained the most important for Kirponos - since the end of the First World War, when he was elected chairman of the regimental soldiers' committee, Kirponos was actively involved in social activities. A convinced communist, he took an active part in all party meetings of the school and college. Naturally, in the spirit of the times, he had to participate in the denunciation of "enemies of the people." At the same time, it should be noted that Kirponos always, as they say, "knew the measure" - where were the real opposition to the Soviet course, and where were accidentally suspected people. For some cadets, commanders and teachers of the school, he played the role of an intercessor. The fact that Kirponos was an active communist and unreservedly supported Stalinist policies, of course, also played a role in his subsequent rapid military career. Especially when you consider that in the late 1930s. many commanders of the Red Army were repressed and their positions had to be replaced by someone.
Soviet-Finnish war and promotion
Meanwhile, the military-political situation on the Soviet borders deteriorated significantly. In the northwestern direction, the Soviet Union came into conflict with Finland. On November 28, 1939, the Non-Aggression Pact was denounced, and on November 30, 1939 Soviet troops, stationed on the Soviet-Finnish border, received an order to go on the offensive. The official reason for the start of hostilities was the shelling of Soviet territory from the territory of Finland. An impressive Soviet group of troops was concentrated against Finland, consisting of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. From the first days of the beginning of the war, the need for competent and talented commanders began to be felt, in connection with which the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR turned to the practice of transferring top commanders from other military formations and military educational institutions to the active army. In December 1939, division commander Mikhail Kirponos, who at that time was head of the Kazan Infantry School, received a new appointment - commander of the 70th rifle division, which was part of the 7th army of the Red Army. Thus, the head of the school, who actually had no real experience in commanding military formations, except for a short time in the Civil War, was given high confidence and, as it were, opened up opportunities for further career advancement in the event of successful command of the entrusted rifle division. 
The Seventh Army was concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. By November 1939, it included, in addition to the army headquarters, the 19th and 50th rifle corps and in their composition the 24th, 43rd, 49th, 70th, 90th, 123rd , 138th, 142nd and 150th rifle divisions, three tank brigades, six RGK artillery regiments, three RGK high-capacity artillery battalions. Air Force armies included the 1st and 68th light bomber, 16th high-speed bomber and 59th fighter aviation brigades, consisting of 12 aviation regiments and 644 aircraft.
The 70th Rifle Division, which was to be commanded by Divisional Commander Kirponos, was part of the 19th Rifle Corps of the 7th Army and included three rifle regiments (68th, 252nd and 329th regiments), two artillery regiments (221 th light artillery regiment and 227th howitzer artillery regiment), 361st tank battalion, 204th chemical tank battalion. In February 1940, the 28th tank regiment on the T-26 was included in the division. November 30, 1939 the division entered the territory of Finland. Kirponos, who took over the division on December 25, 1939, replaced its previous commander, Colonel Fedor Aleksandrovich Prokhorov. To the credit of the latter, we can say that he prepared his fighters perfectly and the division was considered one of the best in the army. Under the command of Kirponos, on February 11, 1940, she began participating in the breakthrough of the famous "Mannerheim Line". From February 11 to February 14, division units occupied part of the field fortifications of the Karhul region, on February 17 they participated in the "battle for the islands", on February 21-23 - in the capture of the island of Liisaari (Northern Berezovy). On February 26, the division was transferred from the 19th Rifle Corps to the 10th Rifle Corps. Its fighters managed to occupy part of the Koivisto (Kiperort) peninsula, Pukinsaari (Goat) and Hannukkalansaari (Maisky) islands.
On February 29, the division was transferred to the 28th Rifle Corps, as part of which it participated in the battles for the city of Trongzund (Vysotsk), then for the island of Ravansaari (Maly Vysotsky). The most famous feat of the division was the crossing at night on the ice of the Vyborg Bay. Having made a six-day raid behind enemy lines, in March 1940 the division occupied a bridgehead on the northern coast of the bay and took control of the Vyborg-Khamina road. This throw of the division played a crucial role in the assault on Vyborg, which could not but be ignored by the higher command. The division was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the 252nd Rifle and 227th Howitzer Artillery Regiments were awarded the Orders of the Red Banner. On March 21, 1940, the division commander Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union and received the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.
The successful command of the 70th Rifle Division, which showed its prowess and combat skills in the Soviet-Finnish war, became the “finest hour” of division commander Kirponos, literally and figuratively. It was from this time that his rapid, but, unfortunately, short-lived, ascent through the steps of the command posts of the Red Army began. Prior to that, Kirponos led a military school for five years, and within four years he rose by only one rank. But the feat of the 70th Infantry Division contributed to the fact that the divisional commander was noticed. In April 1940, a month after crossing the Vyborg Bay, Mikhail Kirponos was appointed commander of the 49th Rifle Corps, which was part of the Kyiv Special Military District. However, already in June of the same year, two months after his appointment as corps commander, Kirponos was waiting for the next colossal promotion - he was appointed commander of the Leningrad Military District. June 4, 1940 Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was awarded military rank"lieutenant general" (in connection with the introduction of general ranks in the Red Army).
Kyiv Special Military District
However, Mikhail Kirponos also did not stay long in the post of commander of the Leningrad Military District. Already in February 1941, less than a year after his appointment to the LVO, Kirponos was appointed commander of the Kyiv Special Military District. On February 22, 1941, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was awarded the next military rank of Colonel General. The appointment to the Kyiv Special Military District shows that the high command trusted Mikhail Kirponos and, apparently, it was after his successful leadership of units of the 70th Infantry Division during the Soviet-Finnish War that they saw him as a promising commander capable of well preparing the troops of a strategically important districts and effectively command them.
Apparently, Stalin, appointing Kirponos as commander of the most important military district in the defense system of the western direction, expected that Kirponos would be able to prepare the district for coming war without arousing suspicion from the enemy. After all, Kirponos during the years of the Civil War had a wealth of experience in participating in the partisan movement - first commanding his own rebel detachment, and then serving in the Shchors division. The command of a partisan formation requires that creativity of thinking, versatility, and the ability to make decisions independently, which the commanders of regular army units sometimes lack. Moreover, Kirponos had to combine not only military and political leadership, but also the functions of an administrator and a supplier. In general, it should be noted that there was no mistake in choosing Kirponos for the post of commander of the district - the colonel general is really in his personal and professional qualities matched the expectations placed on it. Although, nevertheless, the new commander had one drawback - too little experience in commanding active combat units.
In fact, if you do not take into account the time of participation in the Civil War in the Shchors division, and later in the Soviet-Finnish war, most of Mikhail Petrovich's military service fell on military pedagogical activities - he held various positions in military educational institutions. Army General Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov also drew attention to this shortcoming, from whom Kirponos took command of the Kyiv Special Military District: “I was glad that the Kyiv Special Military District went to such a worthy commander. Of course, he, like many others, did not yet have the necessary knowledge and experience to lead such a large border district, but life experience, diligence and natural intelligence guaranteed that a first-class commander of the troops would develop from Mikhail Petrovich ”(Quoted by: Meretskov K. A. In the service of the people, St. Petersburg, 2003). That is, despite the lack of experience, Zhukov, nevertheless, recognized a promising commander in Kirponos and was convinced that the colonel-general would be able to fully reveal his military talent, delving into the nuances of commanding the district.
Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan, who at that time served as the head of the operations department - deputy chief of staff of the Kyiv Special Military District with the rank of colonel, recalls the appointment of Kirponos as commander of the district: “Shortly after his arrival, the new commander walked around the headquarters. Apparently, he wanted to quickly get acquainted with the state of affairs, with people. He also visited us, in the operations department. His lean, fine figure was tightly fitted by a carefully pressed tunic. A golden star of the Hero gleamed on his chest. Pale, clean-shaven face with almost no wrinkles. Black eyebrows hung over large blue eyes. Dark, thick hair carefully parted. Only a slight gray hair at the temples and deep folds in the corners of the lips betrayed that this youthful man was already under fifty ”(Quoted from: Bagramyan I.Kh. This is how the war began. M., 1971).
Commander Kirponos paid much attention to the issues of combat training of troops. Understanding perfectly well that Germany is the most likely enemy of the Soviet Union, the command of the Red Army paid great attention to the preparation of military units and formations of the Kyiv Special Military District. First of all, the task was to work out actions in the event of an enemy tank attack. On the other hand, emphasis was placed on improving the training of their own tank units. Thus, the district commander, Colonel-General Kirponos, was the most frequent guest in mechanized corps, where he tested the ability of crews to control tanks, and tank units - to act in a coordinated manner in battle.
In addition to combat training, the construction and equipping of fortifications in the border areas remained the most important area of activity for the troops of the Kyiv Special Military District. However, despite all the efforts of the commander, the district experienced a lot of problems that were typical for the entire Red Army in the pre-war period. First of all, we are talking about weak armament and lack of personnel in parts and connections. According to the memoirs of I.Kh. Bagramyan, only in the Kiev Special Military District there were not enough 30 thousand military personnel. And this is despite the fact that military schools were transferred from a three-year to a two-year period of study, junior lieutenant courses were created for accelerated training commanders. As for the provision of troops with weapons and equipment, there was a lack of communications and special equipment, vehicles everywhere. It was not possible to make up for all this overnight - the country's national economy was already working at its limit.
War
On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany and its satellites attacked the Soviet Union. Among the first to receive their blow were the military units and formations that were part of the Kyiv Special Military District. On the day the war began, the Kyiv Special Military District was transformed into the Southwestern Front. Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos was appointed commander of the Southwestern Front. The troops of the Southwestern Front numbered 957 thousand soldiers and officers. The district was armed with 12.6 thousand artillery pieces and mortars, 4783 tanks and 1759 aircraft. Hitler's Army Group "South" was concentrated against the Southwestern Front, numbering 730 thousand soldiers and officers, 9.7 thousand artillery pieces and mortars, 799 tanks and 772 aircraft. That is, at first glance, the Soviet troops had a significant superiority not only in manpower, but also in weapons. However, in reality the situation looked different. First, almost immediately after the start of the war, Army Group South received reinforcements from 19 divisions, and Hungarian, Romanian, Italian and Slovak troops also joined it. The southwestern front did not receive reinforcements in such quantities, and the state of its technical fleet, although at first glance superior to the German one in terms of the number of tanks, aircraft and artillery pieces, left much to be desired. Secondly, only a few Soviet divisions were stationed in close proximity to the border, while the enemy hit Army Group South with the entire “fist” at once, securing a numerical superiority over the Soviet troops in the border area and leveling the capabilities of the troops of the Southwestern Front by more late stages of hostilities, since they entered the hostilities one by one and, accordingly, could not use their advantages in a larger number of personnel.
On June 22, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered Colonel General Kirponos to ensure the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops with the forces of the 5th and 6th armies and take Lublin. In itself, this task seemed difficult, but Kirponos had no choice but to try to complete it. Opposite points of view emerged in the front command. Corps Commissar Nikolai Nikolaevich Vashugin, a member of the Front's Military Council, advocated the immediate execution of the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters on a counteroffensive. The opposite position was held by the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant-General Maxim Alekseevich Purkaev. He understood that the troops of the front simply would not have time to concentrate to deliver a retaliatory strike and proposed to organize a defense, holding back the enemy for as long as possible in order to create fortified areas in the inner territories of the district.
Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos came up with a slightly different idea - he proposed to strike at the base of the German grouping directed at Kyiv with the forces of three mechanized corps and rifle divisions of the 5th and 6th armies. The task of the counterattack would be the complete destruction of the enemy's vanguard and the maximum containment of the 1st Panzer Army, commanded by General Ewald von Kleist (the tank army included five Wehrmacht panzer divisions). However, the offensive strike of the Soviet troops was unsuccessful. Interaction between mechanized corps was not established. Organizational miscalculations led to the depletion of the resource part of the old armored vehicles, which were mainly equipped with mechanized corps of the front. Finally, the 34th Panzer Division was surrounded and was able to break through to its own, only having lost all its tanks. Speaking about the causes of organizational miscalculations, P.V. Burkin draws attention to the lack of practical experience of General Kirponos in leading large military formations. After all, in fact, before becoming commander of the district, he commanded only a rifle division, which, moreover, did not have tank units in its composition. Accordingly, Kirponos had no experience in organizing the interaction of mechanized units (See: Burkin P.V. General Kirponos: the experience of historical and anthropological research).
However, to a certain extent, the troops of the Southwestern Front still managed to significantly impede the enemy's advance towards Kyiv. Although the counteroffensive plan failed, the Soviet troops stopped the Wehrmacht units 20 km away. west of Kyiv. This forced the Nazis to change their offensive tactics. The command of the Wehrmacht temporarily refused to storm Kyiv and sent all its forces to the left flank of the front. The enemy pushed the 6th and 12th Soviet armies to the south of Ukraine, gradually cutting them off from the main forces of the Southwestern Front. In the Tarashchi region, a retaliatory offensive by the 26th Army was conceived, but in the end it was suppressed by the enemy. The Wehrmacht pushed back the 26th Army to the northeast, after which the position of the Southwestern Front worsened even more. Enemy formations came close to Kyiv. The High Command demanded the immediate retention of the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On August 8, Kirponos organized a counterattack on enemy positions, throwing all the forces at his disposal - the 175th, 147th rifle divisions that participated in the defense of Kyiv, the reserve 206th and 284th divisions, the 2nd and 6th airborne brigades. On August 9, the 5th Airborne Brigade and the Kiev civil uprising. As a result, the Wehrmacht began a gradual retreat from Kyiv. By August 16, the enemy was driven back to their original positions by the heroic efforts of the Soviet troops. The defense of Kyiv played a crucial role in the first stage of the Great Patriotic War, significantly slowing down the advance of the enemy troops deep into Soviet territory and forcing the Nazi command to change the trajectory of the movement of the main forces of the Wehrmacht. Thus, for a whole month, which during the war had a very great importance, the Nazi offensive towards Moscow was delayed.
Since the Nazi troops were redirected from Moscow to the south, the main task was to retreat from near Kyiv. Kirponos himself, and marshals Budyonny and Shaposhnikov insisted on this. However, Stalin did not give permission for the withdrawal of troops. As a result, by September 14, the 5th, 21st, 26th and 37th armies were surrounded. Tens of thousands of Soviet servicemen died in encirclement or when trying to break through it. The troops of the Southwestern Front were divided and surrounded by the enemy. September 20 to the farm Dryukovshchina, which is 15 km. southwest of Lokhvitsa, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front and the 5th Army approached with escort forces. Here they were attacked by units of the Nazi 3rd Panzer Division. The artillery commander of the 5th Army, Major General Sotensky, and officers of his headquarters were taken prisoner. The total strength of the headquarters column at this point was about a thousand people, including approximately 800 commanders - generals and staff officers, as well as a commandant's company.
The column withdrew to the Shumeikovo grove. The column included the commander of the front, General Kirponos, the chief of staff of the front, Tupikov, members of the Military Council of the front, Burmistenko and Rykov, the commander of the 5th Army, Potapov, and other top commanders of the front. Parts of the Wehrmacht attacked the Shumeikovo grove in three directions. The battle lasted five hours. Colonel-General Mikhail Kirponos was wounded in the leg, then fragments of a mine hit him in the chest, which is why he died. The subordinates buried the front commander here, on the territory of the grove. The chief of staff Tupikov, a member of the Military Council Burmistenko, and many other commanders also died in the battle. The commander of the 5th Army, General Potapov, was taken prisoner.
In December 1943, the remains of Colonel General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos, Hero of the Soviet Union, were reburied in Kyiv in the Botanical Garden. A.V. Fomin, and in 1957 - moved to the Park of Eternal Glory. General Kirponos did not fully manage to reveal his, of course, present military talent. He died at the very beginning of the war, catching its most tragic moments - the retreat of Soviet troops, the occupation of a huge part of the territory of Soviet Ukraine. Nevertheless, we can say with confidence that General Kirponos made a colossal contribution to the country's defense against aggression. Nazi Germany. Detaining the German troops near Kyiv, he delayed the attack on Moscow, making it possible to consolidate the forces of the Red Army in the defense of the Soviet capital. Despite all those mistakes and miscalculations in the leadership of the troops, which many modern historians pay attention to, General Kirponos honorably walked his path as a Soviet soldier and died on the battlefield, in battle, without surrendering to the enemy. It remains only to bring to the end of the article the words from the memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko about Colonel General Kirponos: good and bright memory in the hearts of those who knew him ... "(Moskalenko K.S. In the south-western direction. M., 1975).
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THE APPEARANCE OF THE COMMANDER
Ascension of Kirponos to the highest circle Soviet generals happened after the end of the Soviet-Finnish war.
In December 1939, he was appointed commander of the 70th Infantry Division, which had suffered heavy losses before and was put into reserve for reorganization.
M.P. Kirponos is the author and executor of the daring plan for the transition of Soviet troops across the ice to the rear of the Vyborg fortified area - main element most powerful "Mannerheim lines", which ensured the very early fall of Vyborg and the victorious end of the war.
The operation, carried out by division commander Kirponos, ensured the exit of Soviet troops - through the formed gap of the "Mannerheim Line" - on the Leningrad-Helsinki highway, which forced the Finnish leadership to conclude peace on the terms of the Soviet side. In fact, during that Winter War, some territories were returned that belonged to Russia for 200 years and were given away by the Bolsheviks in 1918.
The assault on the Vyborg fortified area began on March 4. And already on March 21, 1940, by the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces, the 70th division was awarded the Order of Lenin, while M.P. Kirponos and fifteen fighters and commanders of his division were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
THE WAY TO BIG STARS
Mikhail Kirponos was born into a peasant family on January 9 (according to New Style 22), 1892, in the town of Vertievka, Nezhinsky district, Chernihiv province. During the First World War, in 1915, he was mobilized and enlisted as a private in a reserve regiment in the city of Kozlov (Michurinsk), where he graduated from the military paramedic school at the 145th evacuation hospital. He didn't get to fight. Having got to the front in August 1917, he completely plunged into political passions, was elected to the Soldiers' Committee, and at the end of November 1917 he became chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the 26th Rifle Corps, where, following the line of the Bolshevik Party, he negotiated with the command Austro-Hungarian corps on the cessation of hostilities and organized fraternization with the enemy.
During the Civil War, M.P. Kirponos participated in guerrilla war against the Austro-German troops, fought with the Haidamaks. He was a regiment commander in the Shchors division, fought with the White Army and the Petliurists.
He showed an early inclination to pedagogical activity. He knew how to explain, vividly, with journalistic enthusiasm expressed his thoughts. In 1920, Kiponos became an assistant to the commissar of the Second Kyiv School of Red Starshin. Then he studied a lot himself, in 1927 he graduated military academy them. Frunze. His career was not fast-paced. He commanded a battalion, was the chief of staff of the division. In 1934, Kirponos was appointed head and commissar of the Kazan Infantry School. Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR. He was in this post until December 1939, before being appointed commander of the 70th division.
Those who knew Kirponos point to his exceptional accuracy, cordiality, courage in defending his opinion, courage in making responsible decisions, but also worldly humanity.
In 1937, he, the commander of the Kazan School, gave his Kislovodsk ticket to one of the platoon commanders, who, as he found out, needed treatment in Kislovodsk. The brigade commander spent his vacation in his small homeland.
But good man, as someone will say, this is not a profession. From the commander of the largest and, according to Stalin, the most important military district, a great military talent was required ...
Later it was said that Kirpanos ended up in the position of commander of the Kyiv Special Military District and the South-Western Front by chance, since after the repressions there was no one to choose from. To some extent, this is probably true. But only in part. Everyone finds himself in the place and at the time that fate and history have prepared for him.
There is evidence that Stalin, when appointing Kirpanos, pointed out to him his political plan - to prepare the district for war, but in such a way as not to arouse suspicion among the Germans and not provoke their attack. Kirponos carried out this verbal instruction as best he could. He tried to carry out the decision to create a strike force in the depths of the district, at the expense of the troops covering the border. But this plan was not approved.
DEFENSE OF Kyiv
The plan of the German side to take Kyiv with one blow piercing the Southwestern Front was not crowned with success. But it was coming to this. Zhytomyr fell on July 7th. Panzer group Kleist broke out on the Kiev highway. The distance to the Ukrainian capital is 130 kilometers. Four days later, on July 11, the enemy was stopped 20 kilometers from Kyiv, on the Irpin River. Heavy positional battles were imposed on the German side.
Here Kirponos won a remarkable tactical victory, which will have for further developments considerable importance. The German command will soon lose hope that it will defeat the Southwestern Front with the forces of Army Group South and use part of the forces of Army Group Center in the Kyiv operation, divert them from the Moscow direction for a month.
Leading positional battles, M.P. Kirponos showed himself to be an outstanding commander here: he showed exceptional restraint, not throwing reserves into battle, when endurance had already changed S.M. Budyonny, who demanded that reserves be brought into battle, and Stalin. When the German forces were repeatedly weakened and their pressure ceased, he brought fresh divisions into action and overturned the German units. Then the star of Colonel A.I. rose in the Golosevsky forest. Rodimtsev, commander of the airborne brigade, in the future a famous commander. A similar technique will be used two years later on a much larger scale in the Kursk Bulge. By August 16, part of the suburbs of Kyiv was cleared of the Germans, the position from which the Germans launched the offensive on August 4 was restored, and the situation stabilized.
DEATH OF THE GENERAL
The order of the Stavka to leave Kyiv was received on September 18. But even on September 11, the armies of the Southwestern Front could not have left the encirclement.
Kirponos could fly away on the last plane available at his headquarters. On it he sent the wounded.
Senior political officer V.S. Zhadovsky, who was on special assignments with a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, witnessed the death of the front commander. His story is recorded, it begins with the words: “On the night of September 20, we retreated to the east. We walked on foot, because our cars were abandoned in the Voronka area ... At about 8 o'clock in the morning on September 20, our column, not reaching 12 km to Lokhvitsa, took refuge in a deep hollow southeast and east of the Dryukovshchina farm, overgrown with dense shrubs, oak forests, hazel, maple , lindens. Its length is approximately 700 - 800 m, width 300 - 400 m and depth 25 meters ... By 10 o'clock in the morning, from the side of Lokhvitsa, the Germans opened heavy mortar fire on the grove. At the same time, up to 20 vehicles with submachine gunners under the cover of 10-12 tanks came out to the ravine. They surrounded the ravine in a dense ring, firing at it with a hurricane of fire.
Many dead and wounded immediately appeared in the grove. In this situation, the Military Council decided: to break through a gap with a counterattack and hand-to-hand combat, break out of the encirclement and leave the ravine. Generals with rifles, grenades and bottles of combustible mixture, along with everyone else, went on the attack. But the forces were unequal. Under the destroying fire of the Germans, several times we had to retreat back into the ravine. There were three or four such attacks. During one of them, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos was wounded in left leg- his tibia was broken below the knee. He had to be dragged into a ravine. There we, together with Major Gnenny, Kirponos' envoy, cut his boot, took it off his leg, and bandaged the wound. He could no longer move himself and was forced to sit in a dense bush near a crack dug in the slope of a ravine ...
Being wounded, M.P. Kirponos received information about the situation and gave appropriate instructions. The Nazis did not stop firing until dusk. At about 7 pm, near the spring near the crack, on the edge of which MP was sitting. Kirponos, an enemy mine exploded about 3-4 meters from him. Mikhail Petrovich clutched his head and fell on his chest.
One fragment pierced the helmet on the left side of the head, the second hit the chest near the left pocket of the tunic. The wounds were fatal. After 1-1.5 minutes, he died ... On October 26, 1941, Major Gnenny and I arrived at the headquarters of the front, in the city of Valuiki and verbally reported to the command of the South-Western Front (new formation) the circumstances of the death of the Military Council and M.P. Kirponos. We handed over to the front command the documents, the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union and personal belongings that belonged to M.P. Kirponos. In the memorandum, which was written the next day, we reported where the corpse of M.P. was buried. Kirponos, what he is wearing and what injuries he has.
In 1943, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos was reburied in Kyiv, in the university botanical garden, at the place where the entrance to the Universitet metro station is now located. In 1958, his ashes were again reburied - in the Park of Eternal Glory.
Remember.
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The Southwestern Front included four armies:
5th Army Commander - Major General tank troops M.I. Potapov
in September 1941, 15 kilometers southeast of Lokhvitsa was captured
6th Army Commander - Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko
in August 1941 near Uman captured
12th Army Commander Major General P.G. Monday
In early August 1941 south of Uman captured
26th Army Commander - Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko
As you can see, out of 4 commanders, three were captured. Many members of the headquarters of these armies and corps commanders were also captured.
M.I. Potapov 
Muzychenko in captivity 
prisoners Soviet generals P.G. Ponedelin and N.K. Kirillov 
The mystery of the death and burial of Colonel General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos - Commander of the South-Western Front.
The command of the southwestern direction took measures to establish contact with General M.P. Kirponos and rescue him from danger along with the front headquarters.
Recalls Major General of the Reserve V.A. Sergeev, who at that time was on special assignments under Marshal S.K. Timoshenko:
... Having handed over the main command of the western direction, on September 11, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, passing through Moscow, entered the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. He ordered us, the "guarantors", to take data from the General Staff about the situation in the south-western direction for the last hour. When we got acquainted with the situation, I was informed that "the situation on the Southwestern Front is difficult, but not hopeless" and that "with skillful and firm leadership it can be straightened out."
On September 13, we arrived at the headquarters of the southwestern direction, which at that time was located about 20 kilometers from Poltava, in the Rest House of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine. There S. K. Timoshenko met with a member of the Military Council of the direction N. S. Khrushchev. Without wasting a minute of time, they began to understand the situation, which turned out to be much more serious than it was described to us at the General Staff.
The connection of the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction with the troops of the South-Western Front was often disrupted, so it was difficult to get an accurate idea of \u200b\u200bwhat was happening at the front, and, consequently, to take radical measures to restore the situation.
Early in the morning of September 14, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko instructed me to contact the commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos and find out the situation on the spot. At this time, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front was in Priluki, where I immediately left. But it was not possible to reach Pryluky.
At the entrance to Lokhvitsa, the Germans fired on us, and I had to turn back. Not knowing the situation, I did not dare to go to Priluki. On the way back, according to information received from various people, I had some idea of the state of affairs at the front. It turned out that the troops and headquarters of the front were already surrounded. Upon returning to the headquarters of the direction, I reported this to the Commander-in-Chief.
September 15 in Poltava, at the headquarters of the direction, arrived the head of the operational department of the South-Western Front, Major General I. Kh. Bagramyan. He reported that the enemy, with formations of the 1st and 2nd tank groups, having reached the area of Lokhvitsa and Lubna, intercepted the last communications of the front. Units of the 21st, 5th, 37th and 26th armies were surrounded, having suffered heavy losses by this time. Having received the appropriate instructions, General I.Kh.Bagramyan flew to the front headquarters on September 16.
On September 17 at night, the Military Council and the headquarters of the southwestern direction left for Kharkov. Commander-in-Chief S.K. Timoshenko left me with General P.V. Kotelkov for special assignments in Akhtyrka with the task of collecting information about the situation and making decisions on the spot, depending on the circumstances. General Kotelkov remained in Akhtyrka, and on September 18 I left for the front.
In Gadyach, I saw groups of soldiers and officers who had left the encirclement. According to their stories, it turned out that our troops were somewhere near Piryatin. I took a plane at the airport and took off on the route Gadyach, Lokhvitsa, Piryatin, Lubny, Gadyach. Flying over the Piryatin area, we saw how large German tank columns were moving towards each other from the north and south. It was not possible to find out the situation, but I determined that there was a free throat in the direction of Gadyach.
Returning to Gadyach, I organized a collection point in the courtyard of the district party committee for people leaving the encirclement. From those who left the Piryatin region, I learned that the front headquarters, led by M.P. Kirponos, was making its way in the direction of the village of Sencha.
Since there was no communication with the headquarters of the direction from Gadyach, I went to Zinkov, and from there I reported to Marshal Timoshenko about the situation in Gadyach and about the alleged location of M.P. Kirponos. Immediately I received an instruction: not to stop searching for Kirponos. On the night of the 19th, Major General N.V. Feklenko arrived, sent to Gadyach by Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. I brought him up to date, and I went to the airfield myself.
Early in the morning of September 20, this time taking a liaison plane, I flew to the Senchi area. There we saw how German columns tanks and motorized infantry approached the village and the forest west of Sencha. In the forest we noticed a large group of our troops and several vehicles.
I tried to tell our troops the direction of the exit. He quickly drew on his map the direction to the Gadyach region and wrote in bold blue pencil: "Go in the indicated direction, the path is clear." Then I folded the map, tied my gun to it for weight, loosened the long tail of a white bandage and threw it into the forest west of the village of Senchi.
Returning to Gadyach, I saw that N.V. Feklenko was questioning some captain, who, as it turned out, had come out of the Sencha forest. He said that he saw in the area west of Sencha the entire command of the Southwestern Front, headed by Colonel General M.P. Kirponos.
A report was immediately sent to S.K. Timoshenko about three officers being sent at the same time to communicate with M.P. Kirponos. I still don’t know if they met Kirponos or not.
Comrade Feklenko and I called our two tanks and an armored car to our place and drove to the village of Rashevka. At about 2-3 pm in the village council where we were staying, the telephone rang (by the way, telephone communication in the regions worked). When I identified myself, someone in a frightened, trembling voice said: "...K and B (apparently, Kirponos and Burmistenko - V.S.) - in the forest near Sencha ... there is a strong battle ... the direction was reported ..." On this our the conversation was cut off. Who called and from where, we never found out.
Having found out the whereabouts of M.P. Kirponos in a similar way, we sent both of our tanks and an armored car to his rescue. All day on September 20, artillery and mortar cannonade thundered in the Senchi area. General Feklenko and I expected the return of the tanks sent by us until the evening of September 20, but they never returned.
At this time, the German motorized infantry approached Rashevka. Staying further in the village was dangerous. We left our adjutant senior lieutenant Peenchikovsky in a conditional turnout with the task: in the event of M.P. Kirponos appearing, wade him across the Psyol River to the eastern bank, where N.V. Feklenko and I would be waiting for them.
When it got completely dark, Senior Lieutenant Peenchikovsky got out of the ambush, crossed the river and, having met us, reported that no one called and no one else showed up.
In the period from September 18 to 29, more than 10 thousand people left the encirclement at our assembly points, including a group of generals I.Kh. .Skripko and many other officers. But we did not wait for M.P. Kirponos ....
Few witnessed the tragic denouement. Some of them, like M.A. Burmistenko and V.I. Tupikov, fell on the battlefield near the Dryukovschina farm, others, like M.I. Potapov, were seriously wounded and unconscious fell into enemy captivity, the third, as the personal envoy of the commander, Major A.N. Gnenny, laid down their lives in subsequent battles on the Soviet-German front.
The latter, Major Aleksey Nikitovich Gnenny, was at first considered missing and was included in the lists of irretrievable losses for the Departments and Directorates of the Southwestern Front on October 20, 1941. However, already on October 26, he left the encirclement. July 5, 1942 Lieutenant Colonel Gnenny A.N., commander of the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment training center SWF ( battalion commander of front-line junior lieutenant courses), was wounded during the bombing near the village of Petropavlovka and died in the hospital.
A fog of uncertainty shrouded the death of General Kirponos for many years. On this basis, various conjectures about his death were born. The version that Kirponos committed suicide at a critical moment turned out to be the most tenacious. Be that as it may, General M.P. Kirponos did not leave the encirclement. Meanwhile, in Kyiv, at the monument of Eternal Glory, the remains of the commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front are buried.
The only witness to the death of General M.P. Kirponos who survived to this day was senior political instructor V.S. Zhadovsky, who was on special assignments with a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front.
Below I will give three witness stories of the last hours of the life of the front commander, which raise a number of questions.
Author first - a witness to the death of General M.P. Kirponos, who was for special assignments under the member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, divisional commissar Rykov, senior political instructor (reserve lieutenant colonel) Viktor Sergeevich Zhadovsky (Award list ).
Butsecond and thirdthe stories belong to Colonel General Glebov Ivan Semenovich, who at that time was a lieutenant colonel, deputy head of the operations department of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front.
Recalls Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Sergeevich Zhadovsky : November 1943
... On the night of September 20, we retreated to the east. They walked on foot, as they abandoned their cars in the Voronka area. We went with the intention to reach Sencha and there cross the motu to the eastern bank of the Sula River. During the night we fought through Voronki and took the direction of Lokhvitsa.
At about 8 o'clock in the morning on September 20, our column, not reaching12 kmto Lokhvitsa, took refuge in a deep hollow southeast and east of the Dryukovshchina farm (Map 1:50000 ), overgrown with dense shrubs, oak, hazel, maple, linden. Its length is approximately 700 -800 m, width 300 -400 mand a depth of 25 meters.
As far as I know, the decision of the front command was as follows: to go into the ravine for a day, and after dark to make a throw and break through the encirclement. All-round defense was immediately organized, observation was put up, intelligence was sent. Soon the scouts reported that all the roads around the Shumeikovo grove were occupied by the Germans.
By 10 o'clock in the morning, from the direction of Lokhvitsa, the Germans opened heavy mortar fire on the grove. At the same time, up to 20 vehicles with submachine gunners under the cover of 10-12 tanks came out to the ravine. They surrounded the ravine in a dense ring, firing at it with a hurricane of fire. Many dead and wounded immediately appeared in the grove. In this situation, the Military Council decided: to break through a gap with a counterattack and hand-to-hand combat, break out of the encirclement and leave the ravine. Generals with rifles, grenades and bottles of combustible mixture, along with everyone else, went on the attack. But the forces were unequal. Under the destroying fire of the Germans, several times we had to retreat back into the ravine. There were three or four such attacks.
During one of them, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos was wounded in his left leg - his tibia was broken below the knee.He had to be dragged into a ravine. There we, together with Major Gnenny, Kirponos' envoy, cut his boot, took it off his leg, and bandaged the wound. He could no longer move on his own and was forced to sit in a dense bush near a crack dug in the slope of a ravine.
"Oh, and I'm not lucky on my left leg," the Colonel General said then. (Shortly before that, during a car accident near Boryspil, M.P. Kirponos also injured his left leg.)
Being wounded, M.P. Kirponos received information about the situation and gave appropriate instructions. The Nazis did not stop firing until dusk.
At about 7 pm at the spring near the crack, on the edge of which M.P. Kirponos was sitting, at about 3 -4 metersan enemy mine exploded from him. Mikhail Petrovich clutched his head and fell on his chest. One fragment pierced the helmet on the left side of the head, the second hit the chest near the left pocket of the tunic. The wounds were fatal. After 1 - 1.5 minutes, he died.At that moment, a member of the Military Council of the Front, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine M.A. Burmistenko, with a guard of three people, M.P. Kirponos’ assistant, Major A.N.
So that the Germans could not identify the corpse and establish the fact of the death of the front commander, Major Gnenny and I removed the drape overcoat from Mikhail Petrovich, cut it up and burned it, cut off the buttonholes with insignia from the tunic, removed the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union No. 91, took out documents from the pocket, comb, handkerchief, letters, and the corpse was buried in a ditch at the bottom of the ravine.I dug the grave, Major Gnenny and three officers from the security of comrade. Burmistenko in his presence. More precisely, it was not a grave, but a deepened small hole, located to the left of the path leading along the bottom of the ravine.
The next day, September 21, Major Gnenny and I gathered a group of officers, sergeants and soldiers and began to fight our way to the east with them. We left the encirclement on October 23 near the town of Fatezh, Kursk region, armed, with personal documents and party cards, in military uniforms, with insignia.
On October 26, 1941, Major Gnenny 4 and I arrived at the headquarters of the front, in the city of Valuiki, and verbally reported to the command of the South-Western Front (new formation) the circumstances of the death of the Military Council and M.P. Kirponos. We handed over documents, the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union and personal belongings that belonged to M.P. Kirponos to the command of the front. In the memorandum, which was written the next day, we reported where the corpse of M.P. Kirponos was buried, what he was wearing and what injuries he had ....
Yakubovsky Ivan Ignatievich
The earth is on fire.
The situation of our headquarters near Lokhvitsy was extremely difficult. , - recalls one of the few surviving participants in the Shumeikovsky battle, the former envoy of a member of the Military Council E.P. Rykov, now a reserve lieutenant colonel, a resident of Kiev V.S. Zhadovsky. —The headquarters of the Southwestern Front had no connection with the armies and the commander in chief. Moreover, there was no connection with the groups of generals Bagramyan and Alekseev, who were ordered to provide protection for the front and army administrations and their crossing over the Sula River in the Sencha area. Together with these groups there was also a regiment of guards of the rear of the front of Colonel Rogatin. The regiment consisted of up to a thousand fighters. They managed to break through the encirclement, but, unfortunately, they did not provide any assistance to the front headquarters.
The staff column, drawn into the Shumeikovo grove, into a deep ravine, was trapped. The enemy was nearby. Sensing important prey, he followed on his heels. On September 20, at noon, a "frame" appeared over the grove - an enemy reconnaissance aircraft. It was clear to us that the battle was unavoidable. Commanders, staff workers and Red Army soldiers, armed with pistols, rifles and grenades, took up all-round defense along the edge of the grove. Several armored vehicles, anti-tank guns and quadruple anti-aircraft machine guns were also located here.
Half an hour later the enemy made the first mortar raid on the grove. Then the tanks went, the fascist submachine gunners rushed. A bloody fight began. The Nazis managed to break into our defenses, but we threw them back. A second enemy attack followed. Her reflection cost us great sacrifices. Pisarevsky died. Potapov was seriously shell-shocked and wounded. A shell fragment broke Kirponos' leg. This time, he, along with other members of the Military Council of the front, led the counterattacks, marching in their ranks with an SVT rifle. Kirponos, Potapov and the body of Pisarevsky were taken to the bottom of the ravine and laid on the path near the spring. And the fight continued. About seven o'clock in the evening the last meeting of the Front's Military Council took place. The issue of breaking through the encirclement was being resolved. At this time, the enemy launched another mortar raid and one of the mines exploded near the spring in the center of the crowd. Many were killed. Kirponos received mortal wounds in the chest and head and died a few minutes later. By evening, the secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U M.A. Burmistenko died. At night, during an attempt to escape from the encirclement, V. I. Tupikov was killed.
Thinned our ranks. Only on the night of September 23, a group of sixty people managed to break out to the north, to their own. Among them were me and Major A.N. Gnenny. My friend died in 1942 near Voronezh, commanding a regiment.
Member of the Military Council of the South-Western Direction
EXPLANATION
Major Gnenny A.N. and Art. political instructor Zhadovsky V.S. on the death of Colonel-General comrade Kirponos M.P. 19.9.41
On September 17, the Military Council and Headquarters of the South-Western Front began marching from the city of Pyryatin to the east, and on September 19, by 11.00 (approximately), the column stopped to rest in the forest southeast of the village. Dryukovshchina (southwest of Lokhvits).
By 12.00, a concentration of tanks, vehicles with infantry, mortars and enemy guns in the area of high. 160.
The Germans began their attack on the Dryukovshchina forest area around 15.00 on 19.9.41. Up to 9 tanks, motorized infantry, artillery and mortars took part in the offensive.
The Military Council and, in particular, Colonel General Comrade Kirponos personally organized a counterattack, as a result of which the German offensive was suspended, but the fire of all types of enemy weapons increased significantly. The units that participated in the counterattack withdrew to the forest, where for the first time comrade. Kirponos was wounded in the left leg. Organizing a second counterattack and upon returning after it to the hollow of the forest Comrade. Kirponos was wounded by a fragment of a mine in the chest and, during subsequent mine explosions, was wounded in the left front part of the head, after which he died, at about 18.30 on 19.9.41.
In addition to the two of us, the witnesses of his death were: Member of the Military Council of the SWF comrade. Burmistenko with his apparatus of workers, the Military Commissar of the Air Force of the South-Western Front - divisional commissar Comrade Galtsev (
Ivan Sergeevich
- approx.), Art. political instructor Savelyev and a number of other comrades, whose names we do not remember now.
Due to the strong mortar and machine-gun fire of the enemy and soon - the appearance in the immediate vicinity of the group of comrade. Kirponos of the German infantry, we had to step aside, which made it impossible for us to bury Comrade. Kirponos immediately. The next day, i.e. On September 20, 1941, at about 7:30 a.m., we went to the place where Comrade was killed. Kirponos, and they found his corpse already turned over on its back, with pockets searched by someone before us. We managed to find from him a small notebook with personal notes, glasses, 6 pieces of handkerchiefs, a FED camera and a Gold Star medal for No. 91 on his tunic, which we removed and handed over to you on 27.X.41. Other documents and items attached to Comrade. Kirponos was not.
In addition, in order to prevent the enemy from identifying the corpses of Comrade. Kirponos, we cut off the buttonholes and insignia from his uniform.
Buried comrade. Kirponos, according to our assumptions, along with our other fighters and commanders on September 22 - 23, the local population of the nearest villages here in the forest in the Dryukovshchina region.
For special assignments of the commander of the SWF
Major (signature) Gnenny
For special orders
member
on the South-Western Front
Senior political instructor (signature) Zhadovsky
Glebov Ivan Semyonovich, version number 1:
The military council and the headquarters of the front were supposed to leave under the cover of the 289th rifle division in the direction of Piryatin, Chernukhi, Lokhvitsa, but they could not reach Chernukhi, since the roads had already been intercepted by enemy infantry and tanks. I had to move south - to Kurenki, Piski, Gorodishche. But even there the crossings were occupied by the enemy.
On September 19, in Gorodishche, the Military Council of the front decided: at nightfall, go out in the direction of Voronka, Lokhvitsa, where the troops of the Bryansk Front were to launch a counterattack from the northeast. Communication with the armies and the General Staff was lost.
By decision of General Kirponos, several groups were created under the command of Major General I.Kh. Bagramyan, Colonel Rogachev (or Rogatin) and others, who were supposed to break through the enemy encirclement towards Sencha 2.
With the onset of darkness, the movement of the column began, which included up to about 800 people, 5 - 7 armored vehicles, 3 - 4 anti-tank guns, 4 - 5 heavy machine guns.
By the morning of September 20, the column began to approach the Dryukovshchina farm southwest of Lokhvitsa. At this time, a German plane flew over the convoy twice. Colonel General M.P. Kirponos decided not to move during the day, but to wait for darkness in a ravine with a grove, which is southeast and east of Dryukovshchina. on the south and eastern slopes the ravine was organized by the forces that were at my disposal. Our reconnaissance established that a small group of German infantrymen was stationed in Dryukovshchina. Then several more motor vehicles with infantry and a group of motorcyclists arrived there from the south.
At about 10 o'clock in the morning, German tanks appeared coming from the east and northeast to the ravine. At first there were ten of them, then six more came up. After standing for 40 minutes at a distance of two to three kilometers from us, they turned around on a wide front and moved at medium speed towards the ravine, firing at its slopes and the edge of the grove, at anti-tank guns and armored vehicles. Within 20 - 30 minutes, our anti-tank guns and armored vehicles were destroyed. All of us, including Kirponos, Rykov and Burmistenko, hid in the grove. During the shelling, M.I. Potapov was seriously wounded by a shell burst.
Having destroyed our armored vehicles, anti-tank guns and part of the people, the German tanks retreated from the ravine to 800-1000 m. German machine gunners grouped around them.
A member of the Military Council, divisional commissar E.P. Rykov, believing that the Germans did not have fuel and ammunition, suggested that they immediately attack them, break through and leave to the east. Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos and M.A. Burmistenko did not object.
E.P. Rykov ordered me to raise people and attack the tanks.
At about 1 pm, everyone who could, advanced to the southeastern and eastern edges of the ravine and, firing, began to move east. We managed to pass only 300 - 400 meters. Seeing that we were suffering heavy losses, E.P. Rykov ordered to retreat back into the ravine. Having given the order to withdraw, I got up and also wanted to retreat after Rykov, but I was wounded in the leg.
During this battle, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos and a member of the Military Council M.A. Burmistenko were on the southeastern edge and observed the results of the battle.
We all retreated into the ravine. A paramedic met me at the edge of the grove and began to bandage me. At this time, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos, members of the Military Council Rykov, Burmistenko and a group of officers, including Kirponos's envoy Major Gnenny and the division commissar Rykov's envoy senior political instructor Zhadovsky, passed by. Asking me how I feel, MP Kirponos said that they would be on the other side of the ravine. Soon, enemy tanks again approached the ravine, followed by infantry with mortars and guns. A new combing of the ravine and grove with fire of all kinds began.
After that, I no longer met either the members of the Military Council or the commander of the front.
Two days later, the enemy tanks left the tract and only the infantry cordon remained. Taking advantage of this, we with a group of commanders up to 30 people escaped from the ravine, began to go east at night, bypassing settlements and big roads. We went out to our troops at Mlintsy ...
Glebov I.S. version #2, announced in 1968
In those days, I acted as the head of the operational department, since my boss I.Kh. Bagramyan was at the direction of M. Kirponos with the commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko with a special assignment.
The position of chief of the operational department of the front headquarters is high, responsible, general. But after all, I was not a bad guy either: I graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff (second set), before the academy I commanded an artillery regiment, I started the war as deputy chief of artillery, and then chief of staff of the 6th rifle corps. After the corps administrations were disbanded, I was appointed deputy chief of the operations department of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front. My boss I.Kh. Baghramyan received the military rank of major general almost on the same day as my appointment. So the new position did not scare me.
On September 14, 1941, at about 9-10 am, I was summoned to my office by the chief of staff of the front, Major General Tupikov Vasily Ivanovich - smartest person, respected by all officers of the Department. The same V.I. Tupikov, who on the eve of the war was the Soviet military attache in Germany and reported many times to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff about military preparations and preparations for the war of Germany against the USSR, about a possible attack by Hitler on our country in the 20th of June 1941. His information chief Intelligence Directorate F.I. Golikov reported to Stalin. Vasily Ivanovich recalled how he received a "dragging" from F.I. Golikov for "excessive self-confidence". He remained just as "self-confident" and resolute in the post of chief of staff of the front.
Arriving at his office, I noticed that he quickly signed some document and began to carefully examine the map lying on the table in front of him. Then he got up from the table, came up to me, silently shook hands and said firmly:
- Either now or never! You, Ivan Semyonovich, know the situation at the front. Please read this document. Sit down at the table and read it carefully.
Picking up the document, I immediately saw: " Comrade I.V. Stalin. Urgently. Of particular importance ".
Further, the most difficult situation in which the Southwestern Front found itself, and the possible actions of the Germans in the next one or two days, were described. It was concluded that if the troops are not withdrawn to the left bank of the Dnieper, then the catastrophe of the South-Western Front is inevitable, no one and nothing can prevent it.
At the end of the document, Tupikov asked Stalin to allow the front to leave Kyiv, and today, that is, September 14, to begin the withdrawal of troops across the Dnieper, to its left bank. Tomorrow will be too late.
Signature: V.Tupikov. 14.9.41
After reading the document, I raised my head and looked at the chief of staff. He walked around the office, hands behind his back, in deep thought. Then he stopped and asked:
- Do you agree, Comrade Glebov, with my letter? Or do you have doubts?
Without hesitation, I replied:
- I agree. Commander's signature required.
- The commander refused to sign. If you, Ivan Semyonovich, agree with the content of the document, then I ask you to take it, go to the control room and urgently, immediately hand it over to Moscow, to Stalin. Follow up on the submission of the document. I am going with another copy to the commander and a member of the Military Council.
Going to the control room with the document, I understood the full responsibility of what was happening: both the current critical situation in the South-Western direction, and, as it turned out, disagreements in the leadership of the front in its assessment, and therefore in the nature of our further actions. Personally, I supported General Tupikov in these matters. The telegram was sent to Moscow immediately.
Approximately a couple of hours later, MP was called to the Bodo apparatus by Steel. Kirponos, M.A. Burmistenko and V.I. Tupikov. I was also present, Glebov I.S.
Stalin.At Stalin's apparatus. Does Comrade Kirponos agree with the content of Tupikov's telegram, his conclusions and proposal? Answer.
Burmistenko. At the apparatus is a member of the Military Council, hello, Comrade Stalin. The commander and I do not agree with Tupikov's panic moods. We do not share his biased assessment of the situation and are ready to hold Kyiv at any cost.
Stalin. I demand an answer from Kirponos, the commander. Who commands the front - Kirponos or Burmistenko? Why is a member of the Military Council responsible for the commander, does he know more than anyone else? Doesn't Kirponos have his own opinion? What happened to you after our conversation with you on August 8? Answer.
Kirponos. I command the front, Comrade Stalin. I do not agree with Tupikov's assessment of the situation and proposals. I share the opinion of Burmistenko. We will take all measures to keep Kyiv. Today I am sending my thoughts on this to the General Staff. Believe us, Comrade Stalin. I reported to you and I repeat again: everything that we have at our disposal will be used for the defense of Kyiv. We will complete your task - we will not surrender Kyiv to the enemy.
(At this time, Tupikov turned pale, but restrained himself.)
Stalin. Why is Tupikov panicking? Ask him to the device. Are you still insisting on your conclusions, comrade Tupikov, or have you changed your mind? Answer honestly, don't panic.
Tupikov. Comrade Stalin, I still insist on my opinion. Front troops on the brink of disaster. The withdrawal of troops to the left bank of the Dnieper is required to begin today, September 14th. Tomorrow will be too late. A plan for the withdrawal of troops and further actions was developed and sent to the General Staff. I ask you, Comrade Stalin, to allow the withdrawal of troops today. That's all I wanted to say.
Stalin. Wait for an answer...
However, the answer from Moscow was late. Only on the night of September 18 did we receive an order from the Chief of the General Staff to withdraw troops.
How did events develop after the conversation with Stalin? Returning to his office, V.I. Tupikov, looking at the map, said thoughtfully:
- I don’t understand, do the General Staff really not understand the whole tragedy of the situation around our front? After all, we are actually in a mousetrap. The fate of the troops of the front is calculated not in days, but in hours.
I ask you, Ivan Semyonovich, to urgently contact Marshal Timoshenko and convey to him the contents of our conversation with Stalin. Tell Bagramyan to be at the front headquarters no later than September 16 with any written decision of Marshal Timoshenko. Bring to the attention of the army commanders their tasks according to the plan for the withdrawal of troops beyond the Dnieper, the execution - by order of the front commander M.P. Kirponos. Check personally the operation of the communications equipment and the entire control system. Everyone, do it. I ask the head of intelligence to me!
On the evening of September 16, I.Kh. returned to the front headquarters. Bagramyan from the headquarters of the South-Western Direction and brought an oral order from Marshal Timoshenko: "The South-Western Front is allowed to leave the Kyiv fortified area and immediately begin the withdrawal of troops to the rear defensive line."
After the stormy conversations of Kirponos, Burmistenko, Tupikov and other generals of the Directorate, the commander firmly said: “I can’t do anything without a written order from Marshal Timoshenko or Moscow. You all remember and know the conversation with Stalin. The question is too serious. We are waiting for an answer from Moscow. Oral decision Tymoshenko should be urgently handed over to the General Staff and asked what to do?
On the night of September 18, a reply came from #ff/fontffffbr in Moscow. The Chief of the General Staff said: "Stalin allows us to leave Kyiv and transfer the troops of the front to the left bank of the Dnieper."
All the armies by this time knew their tasks and the order of withdrawal. The front administration (the Military Council and the headquarters of the front) set off in a separate column on the night of September 18. In the column were the commander of the troops of the front, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos, members of the Military Council M.A. Burmistenko, E.P. Rykov, Chief of Staff Major General V.I. Tupikov, headquarters, commander of the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov, many other generals and officers.
They walked all night. The noise of aircraft engines, the rumble of tanks, the roar of explosions, the rattle of anti-aircraft guns accompanied us, but there were no enemy attacks on the column. Apparently we haven't been found yet.
On the morning of September 19, we reached the village of Gorodishchi, a beautiful village located at the confluence of the Uday and Mnoga rivers. We made a stop: it was dangerous to move on during the day. In addition, single enemy aircraft appeared, and the dangerous "frame" was especially annoying. It looks like we've been discovered. So, wait for the bombing, or even worse.
They counted the people and everything that was in the column. It turned out not to be crowded: about three thousand people, six armored vehicles of the security regiment, eight anti-aircraft machine guns and, unfortunately, only one radio station, which was destroyed by a bomb explosion during the first bombardment. We were left without communication with both the armies and the headquarters of the commander-in-chief. This was very disturbing and disturbing. General Tupikov reported the situation. The danger was obvious: aviation bombed the convoy more and more often, the enemy discovered us and began to surround us. There is no connection. It is necessary to decide: in what direction and how to break out of the ring?
M.P. Kirponos asked:
- What do we do?
Tupikov and Potapov proposed to carry out a breakthrough at Chernukh, someone insisted on going to Lokhvitsa. The commander ordered Baghramyan to lead the NKVD company and move to Sencha. One reconnaissance group was given the task of conducting reconnaissance in the direction of Lokhvitse. Bagramyan set off with his detachment immediately. I met him two or three days after the tragedy in Shumeikovo.
With the onset of darkness, our column moved in the general direction to Lokhvitsa. The night moved mostly without incident.
At dawn on September 20, we stopped for a day in the Shumeikovo grove (12 km from Lokhvitse). About a thousand people remained in the column, mostly officers. Shumeykovo Grove - 100-150 m wide, up to 1.5 km long. The grove was cut by a ravine, at the bottom of which there was a spring.
At about nine in the morning on September 20, scouts reported that all the roads around Shumeikovo were occupied by the Germans. Our detachment was discovered by fascist motorcyclists, infantry in vehicles, several tanks - and surrounded the grove. Without a team, we took up defense along the edge of the grove. Tupikov ordered me to organize the security of the Military Council of the front.
The first fire strike hit the entire grove - they fired from guns, mortars, tanks, machine guns chirped. The fire lasted forty minutes. Then tanks appeared, firing on the move from cannons and machine guns, followed by submachine gunners. Return fire was opened from our side. Two German tanks broke through close to the edge of the grove, but were hit and caught fire, the rest retreated back along with machine gunners.
The second attack of the German infantry with tanks was also repulsed by fire from machine guns, machine guns and guns. And then the attacks went one after another, which were reflected by hand-to-hand counterattacks. In one of these counterattacks, in which almost all the generals and officers took part, Commander Kirponos was wounded in the left leg. Together with his adjutant Major Gnenny and two other comrades, whose names I do not remember, we carried the commander in our arms to the ravine, to the spring.
Around 7 p.m. September 20The Germans opened mortar fire on the grove. One of the mines exploded near the commander, he was wounded in the chest and head. Kirponos clasped his head, covered with a helmet, with both hands, and without a groan clung to the ground. After 1-2 minutes, he died.All this was in front of my eyes.
Major Gnenny, with tears in his eyes, removed the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union and orders from his tunic, took documents from his pockets, cut off shoulder straps, buttonholes and other insignia. After that, we hid the corpse of Kirponos in the bushes, disguising it with branches and leaves. They reported on the work done to Burmistenko.
Member of the Military Council M.A. Burmistenko, looking at his watch, said: “It will get dark in 40-50 minutes, we will be saved. But the idea failed. When Major Gnenny and I arrived at the agreed place and time (21:00), Burmistenko was not there. Before that, he participated in repelling another counterattack and, apparently, died. We did not find his corpse, since Mikhail Alekseevich was dressed in military uniform without insignia, and it was dangerous to look for. The seriously wounded divisional commissar Yevgeny Pavlovich Rykov and the unconscious commander of the 5th Army, General Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov, fell into the hands of the Nazis.
On the night of September 21, the Germans completely surrounded the grove and shot through it. Tupikov gathered a group of officers and soldiers, all who were still alive.
- We go on a breakthrough without noise - said Vasily Ivanovich. -Follow me quietly.
Suddenly, without a shot, we rushed after the general to the enemy. The Germans did not expect this and were a little confused. And when they came to their senses, many commanders and fighters of the group escaped from the dense ring of Fritz and made their way. I was among the lucky ones. Born in a shirt.
But General Tupikov Vasily Ivanovich was not among us - he died in a shootout near the Ovdievka farm, 2 km from the Shumeikovo grove. His corpse, as it later became known, was discovered and identified during the examination only in 1943. The reason for the belated search for Tupikov's corpse was that his grave was in a field that was twice plowed and sown ...
The words of Colonel-General I.S. Glebov raise great doubts, or, more precisely, his memoirs already in 1968 - apparently, after all, this is already part of a fantasy inspired by the past. Although it is worth noting that he told all this to another colonel general, namely N. CHERVOV, also a participant in the war, who then worked in 1968 at the department of operational art of the military academy of the General Staff, the head of which was Glebov.
As can be seen from the two stories, they are completely different in one thing, namely in the presence of Glebov at the time of the death of the Commander of the SWF. Yes, and Zhadovsky in his memoirs also does not mention in any way the presence of the deputy head of the operational department of the headquarters of the front Glebov.
Based on everything, one should take the words of Zhadovsky as the only living witness of the death of the front commander who remained after the war as the truth.
But here, too, not everything is clear. If there were no documents under Kirponos, then how to understand the following document. It's written Red Army soldier of the 91st Border Regiment of the NKVD troops Kachalin in October 1941 to the head of the NKVD troops and the protection of the military rear of the Southwestern Front, Colonel Rogatin.
memorandum
On September 21, 1941, on the second day after the battle in a copse near the village of Avdievka (Ovdievka - approx.), I, left alone in the trench, at 12.00 went to look for my border guards. While searching, I found a tall general, full build, dressed in a dark gray drape overcoat, insignia - four stars, he had a gunshot wound in his head on the left side of the temporal part, on the right side his head was pierced, apparently by a large fragment .
Examining the corpse of the murdered general, I saw two Red Army soldiers of the Red Army, led by a lieutenant, to whom I reported about the discovery of the corpse of the murdered general. The lieutenant instructed me to look at the dead man's documents. In the side pocket of the jacket, I found a party card, read the name of the murdered man - Kirponos. I gave the party card to the Lieutenant of the Red Army , whose last name I do not know, only said in the presence of the whole group that he was from the 21st Army.
When I handed over my membership card, the Germans began to approach, with whom we had a shootout, during which I was wounded in the leg. When the Germans fled, the lieutenant offered to look at the orders of the deceased. Since I could not walk, the lieutenant went himself. Upon his return, he did not say whether he had removed the orders, but suggested that we prepare to leave this place. All night we moved together: I, the lieutenant, one senior political instructor and 2 Red Army soldiers, I don’t know the names and from which units they belong.
At dawn we camped out. The lieutenant soon announced that he would go to the nearest farm and bring something to eat. From this farm he did not return to us ...
Upon arrival in Akhtyrka on October 2, 1941, I wrote a report to the chief of staffing of the 21st Army, indicating the discovery of the murdered Colonel General Kirponos ...
As can be seen from the reportNoah note, the lieutenant went to the farm and did not return. But he still had MP's party card. Kirponos. And if we assume that he was captured, then it is likely that the German command became aware of the location of the corpse of the commander of the Southwestern Front.
Is it possible to trust the testimony of the border guard Kachalin? The answer is yes!!! If only because in the troops of the Southwestern Front during this period there was only one general with 4 stars, namely Colonel General M.P. Kirponos. And in the pocket of the murdered general, a party card in the name of Kirponos was found. As can be seen from the previously cited explanatory note of Gnenny and Zhadovsky, the corpse of General Kirponos was searched by someone and there were no documents with him.Was it not a group of Kachalin who searched the corpse of Kirponos?
In the newspaper “Lokhvitskoe Slovo” No. 9 dated December 3, 1941, published by the Germans in the occupied territory, an article “In the Valley of Death” was published, which says:
“... almost 500 top commanders of the Red Army, they tried on their own to find a way out of the encirclement. Among this group of generals, commissars of divisions and corps were the well-known general of the tank troops Potapov, the commissar of the corps Borisovich-Muratov - the author of valuable scientific works. Generals' attempts to escape dark night were in vain…”
Did Stalin know how he died and where Colonel General Kirponos is buried? He knew, N.S. reported to him about this. Khrushchev.
From a memorandum on the circumstances of the death
Colonel General M.P. Kirponos.
... After the death of comrade KIRPONOS, majors ZHADOVSKY and GNENNY took off his overcoat, cut off the buttonholes and insignia from his tunic, removed the gold star No. 91, and removed the contents from his pockets. The overcoat was burned, the gold star number 91 and the contents of the pocketshanded over personally by majors ZHADOVSKY and GNENNY on October 27, 1941 to comrade Khrushchev ...
Central Committee of the CPSU (b)
Comrade Stalin
I send Additional materials about the death of Colonel General Comrade. KIRPONOS M.P. …
I enclose:
1. Explanatory note, etc. Gnenny and Zhadovsky.
2. Memorandum of the Special Department of the SWF
…
4. The Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, taken by Comrade Gnenny from the corpse of Comrade Kirponos.
Sent to Comrade Stalin
10/XII-41 through comrade Vorobyov
Here is what Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev himself, a member of the Military Council of the SWF, writes in his memoirs about this:
... The Germans were already squeezing the ring around the headquarters from all sides. That's all the scarce information.
Then generals, officers and fighters began to leave from there, one by one and in groups, from the encirclement. Each endured his personal impressions and then gave his information about the situation in which he himself was directly. After some time, we received information that Kirponos had died. Some employee of the special department of the front headquarters reported to me that he saw the corpse of Kirponos and even brought his personal belongings: a comb, a mirror. I did not doubt its veracity. He said that there is an opportunity to once again penetrate those places. And I asked him, if possible, to return and remove the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union from Kirponos' jacket. He always wore it. And this man went! There were swamps, impassable for vehicles. And the man overcame them, returned and brought the Golden Star. When he handed it to me, I asked: "How is it? There must be marauders operating there?" He replied that the commander's jacket was covered in blood, the flap of the breast pocket turned away and covered the Star so that it was not visible. “I,” he says, “as you told me, tore off the Star from the service jacket” ....
In September 1943, the Sencha region was liberated from the Nazi invaders, and at the end of October, on the instructions of the General Staff, V.S. Zhadovsky, as the only survivor of the death of Colonel-General M.P. go with a group of officers of the People's Commissariat of Defense to the place of death of M.P. Kirponos and find his remains. A special commission was created, which included: a representative of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the People's Commissariat of Defense, Lieutenant Colonel and / s B.N. Borodin, a representative of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, Senior Lieutenant G.D. forensic expert doctor P.A. Golitsyn, secretary of the Senchansk district party committee V.I.Kurys, head of the Senchansk district department of the NKVD I.M.Vlasov and head of the Senchansk district hospital doctor P.A.Rossokha. Local residents assisted in the work of the commission. The commission had in its hands an extract from the memorandum of Gnenny and Zhadovsky, which indicated the burial place of M.P. Kirponos and the signs of the corpse. Arriving at the Shumeikovo tract, the commission found the grave, opened it and proceeded to examine the remains.
The act of the forensic opening of the grave (exhumation) and examination of the corpse dated November 6, 1943 states:
... the corpse "is dressed in a cream-colored knitted-silk undershirt that has not decayed in places, underpants of the same material, khaki-colored cloth breeches with red piping ... On the lower part of the left shin (near the foot) a bandage of flannel footcloths is wound ... On the surviving parts of the corpse, the following injuries can be noted: In the anterior part of the left parietal bone there is a dark bluish spot measuring 7 x 2.5 centimeter - apparently, this is the remnant of a former hematoma.In the center of this spot there is a roughness of the bone with some depression in space into a 20-kopeck coin ... The sternal end of the 2nd left rib is broken ...
In the conclusion of the examination report, the Poltava regional forensic expert, doctor P.A. Golitsyn, and the head of the Senchansk regional hospital, doctor P.A. Rossokha, indicated:
... Based on the data of the exhumation and forensic examination of the corpse of an unknown soldier, it should be concluded that this corpse belongs to a commanding officer, judging by the general physical development, at the age of 40 to 45 years. Analyzing the nature of the injuries on the corpse, it must be assumed that during the life of the deceased, shrapnel wounds were inflicted in the head, chest and left leg. Of these injuries, wounds in the chest area, containing vital organs, should be considered the cause of his death ...
In conclusion, the commission stated:
The corpse found in the grave is the corpse of the former commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front - Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General Comrade. Kirponos Mikhail Petrovich .... The corpse of Comrade Kirponos M.P. seized from the grave, placed in a coffin and handed over to the Senchansky district department of the NKVD for storage until orders were received on the procedure and place of burial ...
According tocertificates from the commission of the Main Personnel Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, the corpse of the general in Kirponos was taken from the burial place to the Senchi station, and from there by a special train to Kyiv, where he was buried with military honors on December 18, 1943. The funeral was filmed by cameramen of the film brigade of the Political Directorate of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
In the encyclopedic reference book of the city of Kyiv (Kyiv, 1981), it is said about the burial place of Colonel-General Kirponos that after the war the ashes of M.P. Kirponos was moved to Kyiv and buried in the University Botanical Garden named after Academician A.V. Fomin, and in 1958 his ashes were reburied in the Park of Eternal Glory.
There are many ambiguities and inaccuracies in Zhadovsky's testimony:
In his explanations in November 1943, he indicates that it was he who dug the grave - “I dug the grave, Major Gnenny and three officers from the guards of Comrade Burmistenko in his presence. More precisely, it was not a grave, but a deepened small hole, located to the left of the path leading along the bottom of the ravine". But in the explanation given on October 27, 12941 by him and Major Gnenny (personally to N.S. Khrushchev in the city of Valuyki with a detailed written report on the injury of General M.P. Kirponos, the circumstances and place of death) it was written - "Comrade Kirponos was buried, according to our assumptions, together with our other fighters and commanders on September 22 - 23, the local population of the nearest villages here in the forest in the Dryukovshchina region "!!! That is, they did not bury him! The guarantor is also confused in the details: in the explanatory note by N.S. Khrushchev, the date of death of General Kirponos is September 19, and in the 1943 explanation, the date is already September 20.
So when was Colonel General M.P. actually killed? Kirponos? It is still not clear where he was originally buried and who buried him: the local population and the German command?
These questions still do not have a clear answer.
In the newspaper "Kyiv Pravda" No. 80 dated July 27, 2006, an article by Doctor of Philosophy, ProfessorNinel Trofimovna Kostyuk, daughter of the Chairman of the Kyiv Regional Executive Committee Trofim Kostyuk, who died in 1941, "Truth and fiction about the defense of Kyiv". In this article, she refers to the book of Colonel General internal troops Viktor Ivanovich Alidin "Scorched Earth" (M. 1993), in which he raised the question of the burial place of General Kirponos.
Before the war, V. Alidin worked as a senior official in the Kiev Regional Committee of the Party, took part in the defense of Kyiv and, having left the encirclement, led the work on acquisition and preservation of archives coming from the occupied territories of Ukraine. In his book, V. Alidin claims that the Germans in 1942 transported the remains of Kirponos from the place of death to Kyiv and buried them in the botanical garden next to the university.
Further, N. Kostyuk writes that after some time she got acquainted with the materials of another witness - a woman who claimed to have been present at the funeral of Kirponos by the Germans. This woman seemed to have seen him in a coffin with open face. The Germans, she said, began to shoot the chronicle, but at that time the mined Khreshchatyk began to burst from explosions, and the funeral ritual was quickly squeezed and completed. The beginning of the explosions on Khreshchatyk - September 24, 1941.
On September 28, 1941, the newspaper " Ukrainian word”, which came out during the occupation in Kyiv, published a message from the Fuhrer’s main apartment that in September 1941, when clearing the battlefield, the corpse of the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General Kirponos, who died in battle, was found. It was also reported that his headquarters, as well as the headquarters of the 5th and 21st Soviet armies, were destroyed.
Why did the Soviet government hush up the fact of the funeral of General M.P. Kirponos by the German command? Apparently, the honor of the uniform for the command of the Red Army was dearer than the truth.
And in the future, all materials on this issue were classified. This led to the distortion of history and the birth of all kinds of rumors.
The question still remains open where the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel-General M.P. is actually buried. Kirponos.
Such is the truth about a man who remained devoted to military duty to the end and fell on the battlefield in the fight against the enemies of our Motherland.
On a small mound near Lokhvitsa (Poltava region) in the Shumeykovo tract stands a majestic monument. An eight-meter bronze figure of a Soviet soldier in a cap and fluttering cape. In his raised hand he holds a rifle with a fixed bayonet, in his eyes - courage and determination to win. Behind the soldier's sculpture is the stele of Glory.
The memorial complex was solemnly opened on September 18, 1976. The authors are sculptors A.Yu. Belostotsky and V.P. Vinaykin, architects T.G. Dovzhenko and K.O. Sidorov.
Photos of those who were nearby:
Kirponos Mikhail Petrovich, Commander of the Southwestern Front.
Burmistenko Mikhail Alekseevich, member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front.
... Burmistenko, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine and a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, disappeared completely without a trace. We made a lot of efforts to find his traces. Only one thing became known from people from Burmistenko's guards: they spent the last night in haystacks. In the evening they noticed how Burmistenko destroyed all the documents that he had - tore them up and buried them. Buried in shocks for the night and settled down to sleep. In the morning, when they approached the mound where Burmistenko spent the night, he was not there. Then they found documents he had buried, including an identity card. He sent secret documents with his assistant Shuisky, and we received them. I came to the following conclusion: Burmistenko destroyed the documents proving his identity. He believed that if he fell into the hands of the Germans, it would be established who he was and what position he occupied. He destroyed all such traces. We thought that he would still come out of the encirclement. After all, many generals came out, but Burmistenko did not appear. I think that he either shot himself so as not to fall into the hands of the enemy, or was killed while trying to get out of the encirclement. He did not have any documents proving his identity. That's why he died without a trace. We have been waiting for it for a long time, but our expectations, unfortunately, turned out to be in vain .... MarshalEremenko Andrey Ivanovich , commander of the Bryansk Front, in his book "At the beginning of the war" wrote:
... Under the cover of night on September 21, when the enemy completely surrounded the grove, a group of our commanders tried to break out of the enemy ring or die in an unequal battle with the enemy. This group was headed by Major General Tupikov. The group made an attempt to break through to the Avdeevka farm, which is 3 km from the Shumeikovo grove. On the way to this farm there is a deep ravine, overgrown with oaks, lindens, and shrubs. But the attempt appears to have failed. The enemy surrounded the grove in a dense ring. Only a few commanders managed to get to the Avdeevka farm and escape.
A resident of this farm, P. A. Primolenny, said that on the night of September 21, a young commander knocked on his door, and then entered the hut. He told Primolenny that he left the Shumeikovo grove with a "big boss". They made their way under heavy enemy fire. We agreed to move in turn, crawl 20 m, and then signal “Forward!” make yourself known. But when 150-200 meters were left to the forest, the young commander told the collective farmer Primolenny, the “big boss” did not respond to the agreed signal, which means he died.
In a field, in unmowed peas, not far from the forest, a few days later the collective farmers of the Avdeevka farm Netsko, Mokienko, Grinko and others found the corpse of Major General Tupikov and buried him here. Probably, this was the “big boss”, about which the young commander told the collective farmer ...
The version of Tupikov's death from local residents:
... the corpse was found by local residents in a cornfield near the village of Ovdievka. Next to him was a tablet with maps and documents, the gun was in a holster. He was killed by a shot in the back of the head. The locals were surprised by the fact that the corpse was in the middle of the field and with a full set of documents. Those. there were no attempts by those retreating with him to search the corpse and pick up the documents ...
…SurpriseThe locals were also irritated by the fact that, apart from the killed Tupikov, there were no more corpses on the field, the distance to the road was decent enough to talk about a stray German bullet from the road ....
Clarification on Tupikov: there is an act of exhumation and a survey of local residents with surnames, who found the body when, details of the burial by locals, an inventory of what was found during the exhumation in the grave. The Germans knew nothing about Tupikov's burial...
In the local history museumThe Shumeikovo tract has a copy of the act on the exhumation of Tupikov's corpse. He was buried with all the documents, nothing was removed from the body, not even a gold watch.
From the book "Time. People. Power" by Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, member of the Military Council of the SWF:
... Tupikov set to work. I liked its clarity and efficiency. Such an incident happened to him. told me about this Bagramyan, who was his deputy, head of the operational department. When once German bombers flew into the location of our headquarters (and this was repeated every day), Bagramyan, very tired, lay down on the couch and closed his eyes, but did not fall asleep. It was impossible to sleep because the earth trembled and hummed. Tupikov, meanwhile, was pacing the room and humming under his breath: "Will I fall, pierced by an arrow, or will it fly by?" He took out a bottle from under the table with something, poured himself a glass, drank it, and again continued to pace, apparently considering some questions. So then it happened more than once. Tupikov was not a coward. Alas, when the front headquarters was surrounded. Deadlock in did not return. I don't think they even found his body. For us, he remained missing ....
NPO USSR. Field management
The last time I saw Major General TUPIKOV and Major General POTAPOV was on September 18, 1941.in a grove 1 km northeast. Dryukovshchina / to the west of Sencha /.
In this grove was the Military Council of the South-Western Front and the headquarters of the 5th Army with enhanced security.
At 15:00 that day, enemy tanks and infantry appeared in front of the grove. Pr-k led the offensive and soon surrounded the grove, since it was small.
From the grove there was only one way out to the east along the hollow.
During heavy machine gun-artillery and mortar fire on the grove, Major General TUPIKOV and I were together, but at that time we lost sight of the headquarters of the South-Western Front and the Armed Forces of the 5th Army, they were about 50 meters from us and then somewhere gone. Our attempts to find someone from the Military Council of the ShF and the 5th army did not lead to anything.
I believe that they all died, including Major General POTAPOV.
Not finding anyone from the South-Western Front Armed Forces, TUPIKOV and I decided to leave this grove, with us at that time was Major General of the Signal Corps DOBYKIN and other commanders.
Passing into a neighboring grove, we had to overcome a completely open area, heavily shelled by machine-gun and mortar fire. We all scattered into a chain and literally crawled. Here I lost sight of Comrade TUPIKOV, moredidn't see him. Reaching the neighboring grove,I tried to call Comrade TUPIKOV with my voice, but to find him more could not.
I believe that while crawling through a heavily shelled area, he was killed or seriously wounded, since no one else saw him.
p.p. Major General Danilov.
Nearby, on the bank of the pond, there is a burial place of the hospital, which was killed by the Germans. Naturally, the burial is hidden ... Work on it is not foreseen at all ...
Rykov Evgeny Pavlovich, divisional commissar, member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front.
According to the report of Comrade Mizerny dated 12/26/1941. Divisional Commissar Rykov died of wounds in a hospital in enemy territory.
From the book "Time. People. Power" by Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, member of the Military Council of the SWF:
... I was informed that Rykov, a member of the Military Council, was wounded and ended up in a hospital, which remained on the territory occupied by the enemy. But you can get in there, because Soviet doctors and nurses work there. I wanted to help Rykov out, but I understood that if someone let it slip about him, he would be destroyed by the enemy. And I sent people to kidnap Rykov and transport him to the territory occupied by the Soviet troops. They left, but soon returned, saying that Rykov died in the hospital and was buried ....
senior lieutenant Basov Anatoly Grigorievich - adjutant of the commander of the SWF Kirponos.
Kyiv, 8.1941, Tupikov, Rykov, Kirponos.
Ostapenko P.D. - the driver of Kirponos.
All that remains of the old bridge across the river. Many...
Gorodishe village. The building where on September 19, 1941 the last meeting of the Military Council of the SWF was held.
After the death of the entire group, the Germans did not attempt to bury the fallen in the tract. The peasants, at their own peril and risk (the tract is still full of unexploded German mines and scattered grenades) buried the dead and groups of fighters who broke through further. Thank you so much for burying the fallen and preserving the memories...
There is a rumor among the locals that with Kirponos there was also 6 kg of gold from the Kyiv State Bank. The gold was divided into three parts and given to the outgoing groups. According to the residents, again, not a single group of gold could endure / story direof the memorial complex tractShumeikovo VyacheslavGvozdovsky/.
RSFSRsouthwestern strategic direction
See list.
Southwestern Front- operational-strategic association of the Red Army during the civil war. Formed on January 10, 1920 by directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army on the basis of the Southern Front. On December 5, 1920, by the directive of the Commander-in-Chief, the Front Office was merged with the Office of the Kyiv Military District, under whose jurisdiction all the troops of the front were transferred.
Compound
The composition of the Southwestern Front included:
- 12th Army (January 10 - August 13, 1920; September 27 - December 25, 1920),
- 13th Army (January 10 - September 21, 1920),
- 14th Army
- 1st Cavalry Army (April 17 - August 14, 1920),
- 2nd Cavalry Army (July 16 - September 25, 1920),
- 6th Army (September 8-26, 1920),
- Ukrainian Labor Army (January 30 - September 25, 1920)
- Gomel UR (February 25 - March 17, 1920).
In the operational subordination of the front were the forces of the Black and Seas of Azov. From May 19 to June 13, 1920, the Fastovskaya group of troops under the command of I. E. Yakir (44th and 45th rifle divisions and the 3rd detachment of the Dnieper flotilla) operated as part of the front.
fighting
Then the troops of the front acted in two strategic directions - the western one, against Poland, and the Crimean one, against Wrangel's army. In April-May 1920, fighting with the advancing Polish troops, they left Mozyr, Ovruch, Korosten, Kyiv and retreated to the left bank of the Dnieper. In May - June, they launched a counteroffensive and successfully carried out the Kyiv operation, after which they continued to pursue the enemy in the strip from Polesie to the Dniester. Then, during the Novograd-Volyn and Rovno operations (June - July), the troops of the front defeated the Polish troops and reached the approaches to Lublin and Lvov, but could not capture Lvov and in August 1920 were forced to retreat. Also, the troops of the front fought against the armed detachments of S. N. Bulak-Balakhovich, Petlyura, B. V. Savinkov. On October 18, after the conclusion of a truce with Poland, the combat operations of the front were stopped and the troops were withdrawn to the state border.
In the Crimean direction, under the pressure of Wrangel's army in June - July, the troops of the front withdrew to the right bank of the Dnieper, fought defensive battles at the line of Kherson, Nikopol, B. Tokmak, Berdyansk. In August, they went on the offensive and occupied the Kakhovka bridgehead. In September, the enemy was able, having pressed the troops of the left wing of the 13th Army, to take Aleksandrovsk, Orekhov, Art. Sinelnikovo, creating a threat to Donbass. In September 1920, the Crimean sector of the Southwestern Front was separated into an independent Southern Front (2nd formation).
Command staff
- I. V. Stalin (January 10 - August 17, 1920),
- R. I. Berzin (January 10 - December 31, 1920),
- L. P. Serebryakov (January 11 - February 5, 1920),
- M. K. Vladimirov (January 11 - June 19, 1920)‚
- H. G. Rakovsky (February 15 - October 9, 1920),
- S. I. Gusev (September 3 - October 15, 1920),
- S. I. Aralov (November 21 - December 31, 1920).
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Notes
Literature
- Civil war and military intervention in the USSR. Encyclopedia. M.: Soviet Encyclopedia, 1983.
- c. 213-354
An excerpt characterizing the Southwestern Front (Civil War)
The Count frowned.- Un conseil d "ami, mon cher. Decampez et au plutot, c" est tout ce que je vous dis. A bon entendeur salut! Farewell, my dear. Oh, yes, he shouted to him from the door, is it true that the countess fell into the clutches of des saints peres de la Societe de Jesus? [Friendly advice. Get out soon, I'll tell you what. Blessed is he who knows how to obey!... the holy fathers of the Society of Jesus?]
Pierre did not answer and, frowning and angry, as he had never been seen, went out from Rostopchin.
By the time he got home, it was already getting dark. man eight different people visited him that evening. The secretary of the committee, the colonel of his battalion, the manager, the butler and various petitioners. Everyone had business before Pierre that he had to resolve. Pierre did not understand anything, was not interested in these matters, and gave only such answers to all questions that would free him from these people. Finally, left alone, he opened and read his wife's letter.
“They are soldiers on the battery, Prince Andrei is killed ... an old man ... Simplicity is obedience to God. You have to suffer… the meaning of everything… you have to match… your wife is getting married… You have to forget and understand…” And he went to the bed, without undressing, fell on it and immediately fell asleep.
When he woke up the next day in the morning, the butler came to report that a specially sent police official had come from Count Rostopchin to find out if Count Bezukhov had left or was leaving.
About ten different people dealing with Pierre were waiting for him in the living room. Pierre hastily dressed, and, instead of going to those who were waiting for him, he went to the back porch and from there went out through the gate.
From then until the end of the Moscow ruin, none of the Bezukhov households, despite all the searches, saw Pierre again and did not know where he was.
The Rostovs remained in the city until September 1, that is, until the eve of the enemy's entry into Moscow.
After Petya entered the regiment of Obolensky's Cossacks and left for Belaya Tserkov, where this regiment was being formed, fear came over the countess. The thought that both of her sons are at war, that both of them have left under her wing, that today or tomorrow each of them, and perhaps both together, like the three sons of one of her acquaintances, can be killed, for the first time. once now, this summer, came to her mind with cruel clarity. She tried to get Nikolai to her, she wanted to go to Petya herself, to find him somewhere in Petersburg, but both turned out to be impossible. Petya could not be returned otherwise than together with the regiment or by transfer to another active regiment. Nikolai was somewhere in the army and after his last letter, in which he described in detail his meeting with Princess Marya, he did not give a rumor about himself. The countess did not sleep at night, and when she fell asleep, she saw her murdered sons in a dream. After many councils and negotiations, the count finally came up with a means to calm the countess. He transferred Petya from the Obolensky regiment to the Bezukhov regiment, which was being formed near Moscow. Although Petya remained in military service, but with this transfer, the countess had the consolation to see at least one son under her wing and hoped to arrange her Petya so that she would no longer let him out and always enroll in such places of service where he could not get in any way. into battle. While Nicolas alone was in danger, it seemed to the countess (and she even repented of this) that she loved her elder more than all the other children; but when the younger one, a naughty fellow who had studied badly, broke everything in the house and bored everyone with Petya, this snub-nosed Petya, with his merry black eyes, fresh blush and slightly piercing down on his cheeks, got there, to these big, terrible, cruel men who there they fight something and find something joyful in it - then it seemed to the mother that she loved him more, much more than all her children. The closer the time approached when the expected Petya was supposed to return to Moscow, the more the countess's anxiety increased. She already thought that she would never wait for this happiness. The presence of not only Sonya, but also her beloved Natasha, even her husband, irritated the countess. “What do I care about them, I don’t need anyone but Petya!” she thought.
In the last days of August, the Rostovs received a second letter from Nikolai. He wrote from the Voronezh province, where he was sent for horses. This letter did not reassure the countess. Knowing one son was out of danger, she became even more worried about Petya.
Despite the fact that already on the 20th of August almost all the Rostovs' acquaintances left Moscow, despite the fact that everyone persuaded the countess to leave as soon as possible, she did not want to hear anything about leaving until her treasure returned, adored Petya. Petya arrived on August 28. The painfully passionate tenderness with which his mother greeted him did not please the sixteen-year-old officer. Despite the fact that his mother hid from him her intention not to let him out now from under her wing, Petya understood her intentions and, instinctively afraid that he would not become tender with his mother, not get offended (as he thought with himself), he treated coldly with her, avoided her, and during his stay in Moscow exclusively kept the company of Natasha, for whom he always had a special, almost loving, brotherly tenderness.
Due to the count's usual carelessness, on August 28 nothing was yet ready for departure, and the carts expected from the Ryazan and Moscow villages to lift all the property from the house did not arrive until the 30th.
The crew of the T-26 tank of the 1933 model under the command of Lieutenant S. M. Fedorov knocked out 2 German armored personnel carriers. Southwestern Front, July 1941
Colonel General von Kleist reports to Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. Ukraine, July 1941
Commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos. In the photo, he is still in the rank of lieutenant general and in the position of commander of the Leningrad district, next to him (on the right) is Hero of the Soviet Union V. Kh. Buinitsky
German soldiers in ambush. Ukraine, July 1941
Light artillery tractor T-20 "Komsomolets", put out of action by an air strike. Ukraine, July 1941
A group of Wehrmacht light vehicles Sd.Kfz.223 conducts tactical reconnaissance. Ukraine, Army Group South, July 1941
A German Pz.Kpfw.II tank moves past a Soviet T-26 tank of the 1933 model abandoned by the crew. Southwestern Front, July 1941
A half-tracked transporter towing a crew and a 50-mm German Pak 38 anti-tank gun. Ukraine, sector of responsibility of the 48th motorized corps of the Wehrmacht, July 1941
Commander of the South-Western direction, which included the South-Western and Southern fronts, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny. Snapshot of the second half of the 30s
Major B.S. Fedoseev sets tasks for the gunners of the tank destroyer division. Ukraine, 26th Army of the Southwestern Front, late July 1941
German light tank Pz.Kpfw.II Ausf.F or Ausf.C from the 8th company of the 13th TD, shot down by Soviet troops in the Dnepropetrovsk region. Ukraine, September 1941
Senior political officer VN Avdeev distributes to the Red Army soldiers IS Bazdev and FI Astafiev gifts received from the workers of the city of Melitopol. Southwestern Front, September 1941
An artillery tractor ZiS-5 NATI with a 152-mm M-10 howitzer of the 1938 model, which fell into a ravine, is in tow. Ukraine, August 1941
Armored control car Sd.Kfz.263, shot down by soldiers of the South-Western Front. Equipped with handrail radio antenna for long range transmitter. Ukraine, August 1941
A group of commanders and political workers of the 108th Panzer Division of the Red Army, who participated in the attack on Guderian's tank group. From left to right: Astakhov, Seliverstov, Lutsenko, Grishin, Ivanov, Eremin, Perepechin. Bryansk Front, strike group of the 3rd Army of the Red Army, September 1941
Heroes of the tankers who participated in the battles with the Guderian group. From left to right: Grigory Breslavets - junior lieutenant, destroyed 3 German tanks and 2 150-mm guns with his tank; Ivan Venzhega - senior sergeant, destroyed 3 enemy tanks and up to an enemy infantry company. Bryansk Front, September 1941
Lunch at Lieutenant Colonel Gruzdev's unit. Bryansk Front, shock units of the 3rd Army of the Red Army, September 1941
A peasant woman gives the soldiers of the Red Army fresh milk to drink. Red Army soldiers are armed with 7.62 mm SVT-40 self-loading rifles. Bryansk Front, September 1941
Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, commander of the troops of the YuZN. Snapshot of the second half of the 30s
German experts inspecting a wrecked Soviet T-34-76 tank manufactured at the end of August 1941. This combat vehicle probably belongs to the 1st Tank Brigade of the Red Army, attached to the 2nd Cavalry Corps of the Red Army. Ukraine, area of the city of Romny, September 1941
The crew of the BT-7 light tank under the command of Sergeant N. Nikitin from the 129th Tank Brigade of the Red Army. South-Western Front, September 1941 Soviet soldiers who went to the location of their troops from the German encirclement. Ukraine, September 1941
Soviet soldiers who went to the location of their troops from the German encirclement. Ukraine, September 1941
Members of the heroic tank crew of the BT tank, who distinguished themselves in battles near the city of Romny. From left to right: tank commander, political officer N. T. Borovtsev, gunner-radio operator N. Dolgikh, driver Sergeant Sh. Kh. Khabibulin. Southwestern Front, 1st Tank Brigade, September 1941
Heavy tank KV abandoned by the Soviet crew. Probably, the tankers tried to tow the combat vehicle, but for some reason this was not possible. The tank went to the Germans. Ukraine, September 1941
Standard variant caponier installation of 76.2-mm guns (side and top view). The characteristics of this installation are as follows: the height of the line of fire (at an elevation angle of 0 °) is 1080 mm, the height of the axis of the pins is 880 mm, the normal length of the rollback of the barrel is 990–1040 mm, the maximum possible length of the rollback of the barrel is 1080 mm, the maximum elevation angle is 12 °, the maximum angle of declination 7°, firing sector 40–60°, maximum firing range (at an angle of 12°) 5.5 km
Typical machine-gun armored casemate of light type (top and side view)
Metal machine for the easel machine gun of the Maxim system (side view)
The device of a machine-gun machine for casemate-type armored closures (side view)
The beginning of the war on the Southwestern Front
According to the Thunderstorm plan, the southwestern strategic direction was defined as the main one, therefore more troops were concentrated on the territory of the Kyiv Special Military District than in the ZapOVO and PribOVO combined. A.M. Vasilevsky recalled: “Speaking of the alleged direction of the enemy’s main attack, B.M. Shaposhnikov believed that the most beneficial for Germany, and therefore the most likely, was the deployment of the main forces german army north of the mouth of the San River. Accordingly, the plan was supposed to deploy our main forces in the sectors of the North-Western and Western fronts ... However, when considering it, I.V. Stalin, referring to the most likely direction of the main attack of a potential enemy, expressed his point of view. In his opinion, in the event of war, Germany will try to direct its main efforts not in the center, but in the southwest, in order first of all to seize from us the richest industrial, raw materials and agricultural regions. In accordance with this, the General Staff was instructed to revise the plan, providing for the concentration of the main grouping of our troops in the South-Western direction.
Moreover, on the eve of the war, the grouping of Soviet troops in the southwestern direction was constantly increasing.
Marshal I.Kh. Bagramyan, at that time the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District, recalled: “In the second half of May, we received a directive from the General Staff, in which the command of the district was ordered to accept from the North Caucasian Military District and place in the camps the command of the 34th Rifle Corps with corps units, four 12,000-strong rifle and one mountain rifle divisions ...
At the end of May, trains after trains began to arrive in the district. The operational department turned into a kind of control center, where all the information about the movement and condition of the troops arriving from the North Caucasus Military District flowed ...
No sooner had five divisions from the North Caucasian Military District completed their concentration on the territory of our district than in the first days of June the General Staff announced that by directive People's Commissar Defense Department of the 19th Army was formed, which by June 10 will arrive in Cherkassy. The army will include all five divisions of the 34th Rifle Corps and three divisions of the 25th Rifle Corps of the North Caucasus Military District. It was headed by the commander of the troops of the North Caucasian Military District, Lieutenant General I.S. Konev.
A day later, the General Staff warned the district command to prepare to receive and deploy another one - the 16th Army of Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin, transferred from Transbaikalia. The plan provided for the concentration of General Lukin's troops on the territory of the Kyiv Special Military District in the period from June 15 to July 10.
So, we had to accept the second army as soon as possible and place it on the territory of the district. It pleased. The fear that in the event of war we would not be in the depths of the troops fell away by itself. Now it has become quite clear that the People's Commissar and the General Staff took care of this, giving the order to prepare for the advancement of all the forces of the district directly to the border.
Looking ahead, it should be noted that the head of the operational headquarters of the KOVO rejoiced prematurely. After June 22, all these troops were taken from the district. “In the very first days of the war,” wrote G.K. Zhukov, - the 19th Army, a number of units and formations of the 16th Army, previously concentrated in Ukraine and pulled up there in recent times, had to be transferred to the western direction and included on the move in battles as part of the Western Front ".
Nevertheless, there were still more troops on the Southwestern Front than on other fronts. It is not surprising that on June 22 the Germans were unable to make a deep breakthrough in this direction. And the 9th and 18th armies Southern Front, against which the significantly less combat-ready Romanian troops mainly acted, held out in Bessarabia for three whole weeks.
The troops of Army Group South, which were to act directly in the southwestern direction, included the 1st Panzer Group of Field Marshal von Kleist, the 6th and 17th armies under the command of Field Marshal von Reichenau and General Colonel von Stulpnagel. In total, they were armed with about 1,200 tanks, 1,200 combat aircraft, 16,000 guns and mortars. At the same time, the German 11th, 3rd and 4th Romanian armies and the Hungarian expeditionary force, which were subordinate to the commander of the South group, Field Marshal Gerd von Runstedt, were only supposed to hold back the Soviet troops in the southern direction, since about their Allies Hitler and his generals did not build any illusions.
The KOVO troops that opposed the invasion forces in the first echelon had the 5th, 6th, 12th and 26th armies. Together with the 9th and 18th armies, they could field 8,000 tanks, 4,500 combat aircraft, 26,500 guns and mortars on the battlefield. In manpower, the ratio with the enemy was almost equal.
The scheme of operations of the Army Group "South" in general corresponded to the plan of the "Barbarossa" plan. The Germans concentrated their strike forces in narrow areas and delivered the main blows to the vulnerable places of the enemy's defense. At the junction between the Vladimir-Volynsky and Strumilovsky fortified areas, the 1st tank group was supposed to make a breakthrough. The mobile tank-motorized units of the 17th Army were to break through at the junction between the Rava-Russky and Przemyslsky URs. At the same time, part of the German infantry divisions were allocated for frontal attacks in order to pin down the defending units of the Red Army.
On the morning of June 22, von Kleist's tanks successfully broke through at the junction of the 57th and 124th rifle divisions, which, as was the case almost everywhere, did not have time to advance to the border fortifications. So between the 5th and 6th Soviet armies a gap was formed where the German command began to quickly introduce motorized troops. By the end of the day, the Germans took Sokal. At the same time, the commander of the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov did not have the opportunity to concentrate his 22nd mechanized corps to localize the German breakthrough throughout the day, since his units were at a considerable distance from each other. As for the frontal attacks of the German infantry on the URs, they were everywhere repulsed by the fighters of the 15th Rifle Corps of Major General I.I. Fedyuninsky.
On the left flank of the Southwestern Front, the fighting developed somewhat differently. On the site of the Rava-Russian fortified area, they managed to take firing positions border detachment major Ya.D. Small, 35th and 140th separate machine-gun battalions and the 41st rifle division of Major General G.N. Mikushev. Therefore, the five German infantry divisions that stormed the UR immediately ran into fierce resistance. Rifle units were supported by two artillery regiments of the 41st division. Then, around 2 pm on June 22, the defenses organized here were strengthened by the approaching batteries of the 209th corps artillery regiment, which was armed with 152-millimeter guns. The enemy failed to complete the combat mission of the day - to take Rava-Russkaya.
The 92nd border detachment, the 52nd and 150th separate machine-gun battalions defended themselves in the zone of the Przemysl UR. Initially, the Germans had some success in this area and took Przemysl in the afternoon. But the 99th Rifle Division of Colonel N.I. was brought up to the city. Dementieva. A joint counterattack by riflemen and border guards managed to drive the Germans out of Przemysl and push them back to their original positions.
Nevertheless, at the junction of the Rava-Russian and Przemysl fortified areas, the Soviet defense was broken through. The 14th German motorized corps knocked down the 97th and 159th Russian rifle divisions from their positions. The 159th Division began a hasty retreat, exposing the flank of the 6th Army. By the end of the day on June 22, there was a gap between the 6th and 26th armies about 15 kilometers wide.
Commander of the 6th Army, Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko decided to use the forces of the 4th mechanized corps to launch a counterattack on the enemy that had broken through. But the main problem was that on June 22 the mechanized corps was stretched along the entire front of the army and it took at least a day to assemble it. Since the commander's headquarters received reports from the commanders of rifle divisions who were under a strong emotional impact of the first battles about the superior forces of the enemy, Muzychenko scattered his tanks in all threatening directions. Accordingly, the organization of the counterattack was carried out in a fire order. There was no exact information about the enemy, there was no time to conduct thorough reconnaissance, there was no air cover, communication was constantly broken. Therefore, those tanks that managed to be assembled rushed into battle without interaction and without infantry support. “Undertaken by the commander of the 6th Army, General I.N. Muzychenko's countermeasures did not improve the situation. And by the end of June 24, the gap in defense reached 40 kilometers here, ”stated G.K. Zhukov . Nevertheless, the 41st and 99th Rifle Divisions continued to successfully defend themselves in the fortified areas for another five days.
On the whole, however, the situation at the front worsened more and more. G.K. Zhukov recalled: “At 5 p.m. on June 24, I had a conversation on Bodo with the commander of the 5th Army, General M.I. Potapov.
Zhukov. Submit the situation.
Potapov. Up to five infantry divisions and up to two thousand tanks operate on the Vladova-Ustilug front [in total, Kleist had 700 of them. - Auth.]. At the junction between the 5th and 6th armies, a mechanical unit of an unidentified force. The enemy delivers the main blow in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsky - Lutsk ... I report the position of our army units at 14.20 24.6.41. The 87th Rifle Division occupies the URs in the Ustiluga area with two regiments and is fighting in the encirclement. I have no information about the 124th division since yesterday evening. After the battle, the 41st Panzer Division puts the materiel in order... The main thing I fear is an attack by enemy tank units from the south in the direction of Lutsk. I have absolutely no strength to fend off a blow in a southerly direction ... I ask you to increase assistance with the actions of bomber aircraft, attack and fighter aircraft in the destruction of the enemy’s Vladimir-Volyn grouping ... I have no reserves. The 9th mechanized corps has up to two hundred old tanks. Telephone communication has been destroyed everywhere ... I ask for instructions on further actions.
Zhukov... Muzychenko is leading successful battles north of Kamenka-Strumilovskaya, Rava-Russkaya and further along the state border. The enemy, having introduced a powerful group of tanks, tore the junction between the 5th and 6th armies and is striving to capture Brody ... Measures will be taken with regard to aviation. Nothing has been received or deciphered from you on the radio ... Close the approaches to Kovel from the north firmly, do not rush with rifle divisions into counterattacks without tanks. For this will not give anything ... Approximately how many tanks did the enemy lose on your front?
Potapov. The 14th air division is subordinate to me, which by the morning of today had 41 aircraft. The order from the front states that the 62nd and 18th bomber divisions are covering us. Where they are - I do not know, I have no connection with them. There are 30 large KB tanks. All of them without shells for 152-mm guns ... About a hundred enemy tanks were destroyed.
Zhukov. The 152 mm KB guns fire 1909-30 shells, so order the 1909-30 concrete-piercing shells to be immediately issued and put into action. You will beat enemy tanks with might and main ... Otherwise, we will organize help. Goodbye". .
On this day, the command of the Southwestern Front and the representative of the Headquarters of the High Command G.K. Zhukov planned a counter-offensive in pursuance of Directive No. 3 in order to defeat the enemy grouping in the Lutsk-Dubno-Brody region. Zhukov himself assessed this document as follows: “General N.F. Vatutin said that I.V. Stalin approved the draft Directive No. 3.
What is this directive? I asked.
The directive provides for the transition of our troops to counter-offensive operations with the task of defeating the enemy in the main directions, moreover, with access to enemy territory.
But we still don’t know exactly where and with what forces the enemy is delivering his blows, ”I objected,“ wouldn’t it be better to figure out what is happening on the fronts before morning. And then make the right decision.” Nevertheless, no one began to understand anything, on June 22 Directive No. 3 was transferred to the troops, and G.K. Zhukov was sent to monitor its implementation as a representative of the Headquarters on the Southwestern Front.
From the Soviet side, powerful forces were thrown into the battle. The 4th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps acted against the Kleist tank group. At the same time, parts of the 15th mechanized corps were already drawn into the battles, while all the rest were only concentrating or only moving forward to the areas of concentration. In the period from June 24 to July 2 inclusive, fierce tank battles broke out in the Lutsk-Dubno-Brody triangle. By the end of June 29, it became obvious to the Soviet command that the counteroffensive had failed. The mechanized corps lost 75-80 percent of the materiel, and therefore it was decided to take them out of the battle as far as possible. On June 30, the Germans captured Kovel, Lutsk and Rovno. Their troops were not weakened enough to stop further advance. Although the German advance on this sector of the front slowed down. Before moving forward, Kleist had to regroup.
Equally unfavorable was the situation on the left flank. On June 27, the rifle units of the 6th and 26th armies, being under the threat of encirclement, left the fortified areas. At the junction between these two armies, large mobile units of the enemy freely operated. On June 29, the Red Army left Lvov.
Seeing no real opportunity to create a solid defense in the border zone, the commander of the Southwestern Front, M.P. Kirponos gave the order to start preparing a defensive line along the line of the old border. But on July 2, the 14th German motorized corps made a swift breakthrough and broke into Ternopil. Thus, the Germans violated the control of the troops of the 6th Army, went to the rear of the 26th and 12th armies. The gap in the front line in this area reached almost 60 kilometers.
Taking into account the sad experience of similar cases on the North-Western and Western fronts, the Stavka sent an order to Kirponos to break away from the enemy and gain a foothold in Novograd-Volynsky, Korostensky, Starokonstantinovsky and Proskurov U Pax in order to contain the Germans on the old border. P.A. Rotmistrov recalled: “The troops of the front had to retreat 120-200 km within seven days. The retreat was planned along the lines at a rate of 25–35 km per day. The general retreat of the front troops took place in the conditions of a lack of ammunition and fuel and lubricants [the ammunition depots and fuel and lubricants were located near the border and were captured by the Germans. - Auth.], under the continuous influence of enemy aircraft. This led to the fact that our units were often forced to burn or blow up precious military equipment» .
The German command could not fail to notice the general withdrawal of the Russian troops. Rundstedt ordered Kleist to get ahead of the enemy in order not to allow him to gain a foothold on lines favorable for long-term defense. Knocking down separate Russian barriers, the German 11th Panzer Division broke into Shepetovka on July 4. At the same time, the units of the 7th Rifle Corps that advanced to the Shepetovsky UR were forced to engage in battle on the move and therefore fell under the rout. Developing a further offensive, the 11th Panzer crossed the Sluch and Teterev rivers and captured Berdichev on July 8. In the north, the German 13th Panzer Division, bypassing the Novograd-Volynsky UR, entered Zhitomir. German tanks saddled the highway to Kyiv and prepared for a direct throw. They were only 131 kilometers away from the capital of Ukraine.
The command of the Southwestern Front was well aware of the threat looming over Kyiv. Kleist's tanks, rushing into the breakthrough, managed to pass more than 100 kilometers along the Zhytomyr highway. But they ran into the first line of the Kyiv fortified area, where our troops were advanced in advance, and could not advance further. On July 9, the 5th Army launched a strong flank attack on the enemy's extended units. CM. Shtemenko noted: “The 5th Army, led by Major General M.I. Potapov, firmly held Polesie and the area adjacent to it. She offered the strongest resistance to the enemy and inflicted significant damage on him. The fascist German troops here failed to quickly break through the front. Potapov's divisions knocked them off the road Lutsk - Rovno - Zhytomyr and forced them to abandon an immediate attack on Kyiv.
From the south, Muzychenko's army, reinforced by the 16th mechanized corps, which had approached from the reserve, launched a counterattack against the German troops that had broken through. The Germans also threw cash reserves on the near approaches to Kyiv. As a result, protracted battles unfolded on the Korosten - Irpen - Skvira line with varying success, lasting almost two weeks.
By the end of July 19, the troops of Army Group South were forced to go on the defensive. They needed some time to regroup and make up for significant losses. The command of the Southwestern Front was able to buy time to further strengthen the defense of Kyiv.
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