In 1968, the Soviet Army carried out the most grandiose military action in the post-war years. More than 20 divisions of the ground forces occupied the whole country in the center of Europe in one day and with virtually no losses. Even in afghan war a much smaller number of troops participated (see the corresponding section of the book).

That year, the "counter-revolution" in Eastern Europe again had to be fought - this time in Czechoslovakia. The development of events in Czechoslovakia, the Prague Spring has long worried the Soviet leadership. L. I. Brezhnev and his associates could not allow the fall of the communist regime in this country and were ready to use force at any moment. The "Brezhnev Doctrine", formulated by that time and carefully hidden from everyone, assumed the use of military power to maintain Soviet influence in the socialist countries of Europe without regard to their sovereignty and international norms.

In January 1968, A. Novotny, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), gave up his post to A. Dubcek, who immediately assured Moscow that he would make every effort to stabilize the situation in the party and society. Being a convinced Marxist, he still considered it necessary to carry out some reforms in the economy and politics. Public opinion generally supported Dubcek's reformist aspirations - the existing model for building a socialist society did not allow him to catch up with the industrialized countries of Western Europe in terms of living standards.

N. S. Khrushchev and L. I. Brezhnev on the podium of the Mausoleum

Dubcek took the initiative to establish a "new model of socialism". At the next (April) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the so-called Program of Action of the Czechoslovak Communists was adopted. If we consider this document from modern positions, then on the whole it was sustained in the communist spirit, with the exception of two points - the party leadership abandoned the command-administrative system of government and declared freedom of speech and the press.

In the country, including in the official press, heated discussions on various socio-political problems unfolded. The most frequently heard theses were about the removal of state officials who compromised themselves from the authorities and the activation of economic relations with the West. Most of the official circles of the countries of the socialist community perceived the events taking place in Czechoslovakia only as a "counter-revolution".

Soviet political leaders were especially concerned, fearing a change in the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, which could lead to a reorientation to the West, an alliance with Yugoslavia, and then to a withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, as it almost happened with the Hungarian People's Republic.

During this period, the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine" was finally formed, which in foreign policy became the cornerstone and connecting link of the entire socialist camp. The doctrine proceeded from the premise that the withdrawal of any of the socialist countries from the Warsaw Pact or the CMEA, a departure from the agreed line in foreign policy, would disrupt the balance of power existing in Europe and inevitably lead to an aggravation of international tension.

One of the main sources of information about the internal situation in Czechoslovakia for the leadership of the USSR was the reports of informants and Soviet diplomats. Thus, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia F. Havlicek directly warned about the "inevitable rapprochement of Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia and Romania", which would lead to a weakening of the positions of the socialist bloc.

The course of thought of the Soviet leaders is clearly illustrated by the story of the Soviet “curator” in Czechoslovakia, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU K. T. Mazurov: “Despite the nuances, the general position was the same: we must intervene. It was hard to imagine that a bourgeois parliamentary republic (!) would appear at our borders, overrun by the Germans of the FRG, and after them by the Americans. This did not meet the interests of the Warsaw Pact in any way. During the last week before the introduction of troops, the members of the Politburo hardly slept, did not go home: according to reports, a counter-revolutionary coup was expected in Czechoslovakia. The Baltic and Belorussian military districts were brought to state of readiness number one. On the night of August 20-21, they again gathered for a meeting. Brezhnev said: "We will bring in troops ...".

Judging by the recollections of eyewitnesses, in December 1968, Minister of Defense Marshal Grechko, discussing the issue, pointed out that Brezhnev did not want to send troops for a long time, but Ulbricht, Gomulka, and Zhivkov put pressure on him. Yes, and our "hawks" in the Politburo (P. G. Shelest, N. V. Podgorny, K. T. Mazurov, A. N. Shelepin and others) demanded a solution to the problem by force.

The leaders of the countries of the socialist community also considered the Czechoslovak events as a "dangerous virus" that could spread to other countries. First of all, this concerned East Germany, Poland and Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent - Hungary.

From the point of view of the military (according to the memoirs of the former Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, General of the Army A. Gribkov), the main danger of Czechoslovakia's independence in foreign policy was that it would inevitably lead to the vulnerability of borders with NATO countries, the loss control over the Czech armed forces. The refusal of the Czechoslovak leadership to voluntarily deploy a group of Soviet troops on their territory seemed at least illogical and required adequate immediate measures.

Preparations for the operation "Danube" - the entry of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries into the territory of Czechoslovakia - began in the spring of 1968 and at first was carried out under the guise of the Shumava maneuvers. On April 8, the commander of the Airborne Forces, Margelov, in preparation for the exercises, received a directive from the Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko, which read: “The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, loyal to international duty and the Warsaw Pact, were to send their troops to assist the Czechoslovak People's Army in defending the Motherland from danger looming over her.

At the signal for the start of the Shumava exercises, two airborne divisions should be ready for landing in Czechoslovakia by parachute and landing methods. At the same time, our paratroopers, who recently put on at the parade in November 1967, like most units and subunits special purpose all over the world, "maroon" (red) berets, in the summer of 1968 they put on blue hats.

This "move" of the commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel-General Margelov, judging by the stories of eyewitnesses, later, already during the "Danube" operation itself, saved more than a dozen lives of our paratroopers - locals, who tried to resist the Soviet troops, at first mistook them for representatives of the UN peacekeeping forces, the so-called "blue helmets".

The commanders of regiments and divisions, which were supposed to be involved in the invasion operation, got acquainted with the roads and cities of Czechoslovakia, studying possible ways of moving troops. Joint Soviet-Czechoslovak exercises were held, after which the Soviet units lingered on Czechoslovak soil for a long time and left it only after numerous reminders from the Czech leadership.

"Early in the morning of June 18, 1968. state border Czechoslovakia was crossed by the operational group of the field command of the army, - described the events of those days, the head of the political department of the 38th army of the Carpathian military district S. M. Zolotev. - Three days later, the main forces of the army, allocated to participate in the exercise, crossed the Soviet-Czechoslovak border.

Already from the first meetings on Czechoslovak soil, it became clear that changes had taken place in the consciousness and behavior of a significant part of Slovaks and Czechs. We did not feel that fraternal warmth and friendliness that had distinguished our Czechoslovak friends before, wariness appeared. On July 22, a group of senior officers of the Czechoslovak People's Army arrived at the headquarters of our army ... On behalf of the Minister of National Defense of Czechoslovakia, they posed questions to us: why, despite the promise given by Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky to withdraw Soviet troops until July 21, they are still in the exercise area; for what reasons we are delayed and what are our future plans ... We are in a difficult situation.

Only in early August, after repeated demands from the Czech government, did units of the 38th Army return to their garrisons. Let us again give the floor to S. M. Zolotov: “Soon I received an order to return to the command post of the army. There was a lot of work to be done here to get acquainted with new units and formations ... In addition to the regular formations of the army, divisions from other regions were already deployed here. Together with the commander, I visited these formations and talked to people. Although they did not directly talk about a possible throw across the Czechoslovak border, the officers understood why such a powerful grouping of troops was being created in Transcarpathia. “On August 12, the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal Soviet Union A. A. Grechko.

But even earlier, in mid-July, the leaders of the USSR, Poland, the GDR, Bulgaria, and Hungary met in Warsaw to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia. At the meeting, a message was drafted to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, demanding the adoption of energetic measures to restore "order". It also said that the defense of socialism in Czechoslovakia is not a private affair of this country only, but the direct duty of all countries of the socialist community.

In Cerne nad Tisou, consultations and an exchange of views began between the Soviet leaders and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. As a result, by August 3, when a joint communiqué was signed at the Bratislava Conference of Communist Parties, a split had already been made in the ranks of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Czechs. In Bratislava, it was decided that “the defense of the gains of socialism. is. international duty of all fraternal parties."

The Czechs themselves also did not rule out the possibility of using their own armed forces inside the country. Thus, Minister of Defense Dzur considered the possibility of dispersing demonstrations in front of the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with the help of army armored personnel carriers, and Dubcek bluntly stated at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee on August 12: “If I come to the conclusion that we are on the verge of a counter-revolution, then I myself will call the Soviet troops.”

An analysis of the statements of Western politicians suggested that the US and NATO would not interfere in the conflict. The main reason for such optimism was the statement by US Secretary of State D. Rask that the events in Czechoslovakia are a personal matter, first of all, of the Czechs themselves, as well as other countries of the Warsaw Pact (a similar statement was made during the Hungarian crisis, then the Americans did not officially intervene) . Thus, intervention in the conflict between the armed forces of NATO and the United States was not foreseen, at least at the first stage, until there was serious resistance.

At an expanded meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on August 16, a decision was made to send troops. This decision was approved at a meeting of leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in Moscow on 18 August. The reason was a letter of appeal from a group of Czech party and statesmen to the governments of the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact for the provision of "international assistance". As a result, it was decided to change the political leadership of the country during a short-term military intervention. After completing this mission, the main group of troops was supposed to be immediately withdrawn, leaving only a few units to stabilize the situation.

On the same day, August 18, in the office of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal Grechko, the entire leadership of the Armed Forces, the commanders of the armies who were destined to go to Czechoslovakia, gathered. Further conversation is known from the words of the commander of the 38th Army, General A. M. Mayorov:

“The assembled marshals and generals have been waiting for the late minister for a long time, already guessing what will be discussed. Czechoslovakia has long been the number one topic worldwide. The minister appeared without preamble and announced to the audience:

I have just returned from a meeting of the Politburo. A decision was made to send troops of the Warsaw Pact countries to Czechoslovakia. This decision will be carried out even if it leads to a third world war.

These words hit the audience like a hammer. No one expected the stakes to be so high. Grechko continued:

With the exception of Romania - it does not count - everyone agreed to this action. True, Janos Kadar will present the final decision tomorrow morning, on Monday. He has some complications with members of the Politburo. Walter Ulbricht and the Minister of Defense of the GDR prepared five divisions for entry into Czechoslovakia. Politically, it is now inexpedient. Now is not the 39th year. If necessary, we will connect them.

After a short pause, while those present thought over what they had heard, the minister demanded a report on the readiness of the troops for the operation and gave final instructions:

Commander of the first tank!

Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Kozhanov!

Report.

The army, Comrade Minister, is ready to carry out the task.

Good. The main attention, comrade Kozhanov, is the rapid advance of the army from north to south. Bristle to the west with four divisions... Keep two divisions in reserve. KP - Pilsen. Of course, in the forests. The army's area of ​​responsibility is three northwestern and western regions of Czechoslovakia.

Commander of the twentieth!

Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Velichko.

Report.

The army is prepared for the task you have set.

Good. Commander, 10-12 hours after "Ch" with one, or better, two divisions, you should connect with the airborne division in the area of ​​​​the Ruzyne airfield southwest of Prague.

The commander of the airborne troops, Colonel General Margelov, excited by the upcoming operation, spoke most temperamentally:

Comrade Minister, the airborne division is on time… We will smash everything to smithereens to hell.”

The direct preparation of the grouping of Soviet troops for the invasion, already under the leadership of the Minister of Defense Grechko personally, began on August 17–18. Draft appeals to the people and the army of Czechoslovakia, a government statement from the five participating countries, and a special letter to the leaders of the Communist Parties of the Western countries were prepared. All prepared documents emphasized that the introduction of troops was only a forced measure taken in connection with the "real danger of a counter-revolutionary coup in Czechoslovakia."

Il-14-30D (according to NATO classification - Crate) was intended to transport 30 paratroopers or 3 tons of cargo

In the course of direct training of troops, a white stripe was applied to armored vehicles - a hallmark of Soviet and other "friendly" troops being introduced. All other armored vehicles during the operation were subject to "neutralization", and preferably without fire damage. In case of resistance, "bandless" tanks and other Combat vehicles were subject, according to the instructions brought to the troops, to defeat immediately upon opening fire on our troops. At a meeting, if this suddenly happens, NATO troops were ordered to immediately stop and "do not shoot without a command." Naturally, no "sanctions from above" were required to destroy the Czech equipment that opened fire.

The last time the date and time of the start of the operation was clarified and finally approved - August 20, approximately late in the evening. According to the general plan, during the first three days, 20 divisions of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact enter Czechoslovakia and 10 more divisions are introduced in the following days. In the event of a complication of the situation, 6 of the 22 military districts of the USSR (and this is 85-100 combat-ready divisions) are put on high combat readiness. All forces armed with nuclear weapons were to be brought to a state of full combat readiness. In Poland, the GDR, Hungary and Bulgaria, an additional 70-80 divisions were deployed to the wartime states in addition to being brought in if necessary.

By August 20, all preparatory activities were completed. Formations of the 1st Guards Tank, 20th Guards Combined Arms and 16th Air Armies of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, 11th Guards Combined Arms Army of the Baltic Military District, 5th Guards Tank and 28th Combined Arms Armies of the Belarusian Military District, 13 th, 38th combined arms armies and the 28th army corps of the Carpathian military district, the 14th air army of the Odessa military district - up to 500 thousand people in total. (of which 250 thousand were in the first echelon) and 5,000 tanks and armored personnel carriers were ready for action. Army General I. G. Pavlovsky was appointed commander-in-chief of the grouping of Soviet troops.

However, even on the eve of the introduction of troops, Marshal Grechko informed the Minister of Defense of Czechoslovakia about the upcoming action and warned against resistance from the Czechoslovak armed forces.

The political and state leadership of the country was “temporarily neutralized”, which was not in the plan approved in advance. But it was necessary to stop possible incidents like the speech of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the Prague radio. A reconnaissance company led by Lieutenant Colonel M. Seregin seized the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at seven o'clock in the morning, disarming the guards and cutting all telephone wires. A few minutes later, the paratroopers had already burst into the room where the Czechoslovak leaders were sitting. To the question of one of those present: “Gentlemen, what kind of army has come?” - followed by an exhaustive answer:

It was the Soviet army that came to defend socialism in Czechoslovakia. I ask you to remain calm and remain in place until the arrival of our representatives, the security of the building will be provided.

Fighting on the streets of Prague - the outcome is clearly a foregone conclusion ...

Soviet BTR-152 on a city street

At seven o'clock in the afternoon on August 21, the entire Czechoslovak leadership, on two armored personnel carriers, under the escort of paratroopers, was taken to the airport and taken by plane to Legnica (Poland), to the headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces. From there they were transported to Transcarpathia, and then to Moscow for negotiations with Soviet leaders.

Column T-54A with identification stripes "friend or foe"

Part of the paratroopers took up positions along the highway from the airfield to Prague in order to stop possible attempts by the Czechoslovak army to prevent the invasion. But at four o'clock in the morning, instead of Czech cars, blinding the soldiers with headlights, the first column of Soviet tanks from the 20th Guards Army rumbled.

A few hours later, the first Soviet tanks with white stripes on their armor appeared on the streets of Czechoslovak cities so that they could distinguish their vehicles from the same type of Czech tanks. The roar of tank diesel engines, the rumble of caterpillars woke up peacefully sleeping townspeople that morning. On the streets of morning Prague, even the air was infused with tank cinders. Some people, both soldiers and civilians, had an unsettling feeling of war, but in general it can be seen that for the most part the Czechs turned out to be passive - the introduction of troops aroused more curiosity than fear in them.

The main role in the operation to establish control over the situation in the country was assigned to tank formations and units - the 9th and 11th Guards Tank Divisions of the 1st Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces K. G. Kozhanov from the GSVG, 13th Guards tank division from the Southern Group of Forces, the 15th Guards Tank Division of Major General A. A. Zaitsev from the Belarusian Military District, the 31st Tank Division of Major General A. P. Yurkov from the 38th Combined Arms Army of the Carpathian Military District and tank regiments of motorized rifle divisions.

Taking into account the difference in the speed of movement, the Soviet command gave the order to the ground grouping to cross the border, when the paratroopers were still preparing for the landing. At one in the morning on August 21, 1968, units and formations of the 38th Army of Lieutenant General A. M. Mayorov crossed the state border of Czechoslovakia. There was no resistance from the Czechoslovak side. The advanced motorized rifle division of Major General G.P. Yashkin covered 120 km in 4 hours.

At 4 o'clock in the morning the loss account was opened. 200 km from the border, near the small town of Poprad, in front of a reconnaissance patrol of three T-55 tanks, the Volga stopped, in which the commander of the 38th Army, General Mayorov, was sitting. Lieutenant Colonel Shevtsov and the head of the Special Department of the Army Spirin, who were accompanied by KGB special forces, approached the car (they were assigned to the general on the eve of the invasion, and they controlled his every step). Majorov ordered Shevtsov:

Lieutenant colonel, find out the reason for stopping the tanks.

Before the general had time to finish, one tank rushed to the Volga. Spirin, grabbing Mayorov by the shoulder, pulled him out of the car. In the next moment, the Volga crunched under the tracks of the tank. The driver and radio operator sitting in the front seats managed to jump out, and the sergeant sitting next to the general was crushed.

What are you bastards doing?! - the commander yelled at the tank commander and the driver, who jumped to the ground.

We need to go to Trenchin ... Mayorov ordered, - the tankers justified themselves.

So I am Mayorov!

We didn't recognize you, Comrade General...

The cause of the accident was the fatigue of the driver.

He, having stopped the car to transfer control to the shift, left the tank on the brake without turning off the first speed, and forgot to tell about it. The driver, having started the car, took it off the brakes. The tank jumped onto the Volga in front of it. Only a lucky chance saved General Mayorov from death, otherwise the whole army could find itself without a commander in the very first hours of being in a foreign land.

By the end of August 21, the troops of the 38th Army entered the territory of Slovakia and North Moravia. Ordinary citizens began the fight against uninvited guests. In Prague, young people hastily tried to build fragile barricades, sometimes throwing cobblestones and sticks at soldiers, and removing street signs. Equipment left unattended even for a second suffered the most. During the first three days of their stay in Czechoslovakia, 7 combat vehicles were set on fire in the 38th Army alone. Although there were no hostilities, there were still losses. The most impressive and tragic feat was performed on a mountain road by a tank crew from the 1st Guards Tank Army, who deliberately sent their tank into the abyss in order to avoid running into children set there by picketers.

The Soviet BTR-40, despite obsolescence, again proved to be very good on paved roads

At five o'clock in the morning, the first Soviet T-55 tank appeared on the right bank of the Vltava. He stopped at the main entrance and turned the cannon towards the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. It was followed by dozens of other combat vehicles. The commander of the 20th Guards Motor Rifle Division was appointed commandant of the city. Several thousand tanks appeared on the streets of Czechoslovak cities, marking the end of the Prague Spring.

T-55 and next to it a German anti-tank gun from World War II Pak-37

All power in the country was in the hands of the mysterious "General Trofimov", who for some reason appeared in public in the uniform of a colonel. Only a few knew who this man was, who longed to remain anonymous. The role of a simple army general was played by a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR K. T. Mazurov. Sending his comrade-in-arms on a "combat mission", Brezhnev admonished him:

One of us must be sent to Prague. The military can do such things there ... Let Mazurov fly.

General I. G. Pavlovsky, who led the Danube operation, described the events of those days as follows: “I received the appointment on August 16 or 17, three to four days before the start of the operation. Initially, it was planned to put Marshal Yakubovsky at the head of the allied forces. He organized all the practical training. Suddenly, the Minister of Defense Grechko calls me: "You are appointed commander of the formations that will enter Czechoslovakia."

I flew to Legnica (on the territory of Poland), to the headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces. I found Yakubovsky there. He showed on the map which divisions were coming out and from which direction. The start of the operation was scheduled for August 21 at zero one o'clock. Grechko warned: "The team will be from Moscow, your job is to make sure that it is carried out." At the appointed hour, the troops went.

And then Grechko called again: “I just spoke with Dzur (Minister of National Defense of Czechoslovakia) and warned that if the Czechs, God forbid, open fire on our troops, it could end badly. I asked to give a command to the Czechoslovak units not to move anywhere, no opening of fire, so that they would not show resistance to us. After the troops left, about an hour later, Grechko calls again: “How are you?” I report: such and such divisions are there. In some places, people take to the roads, make blockages. Our troops avoid obstacles... He warned me not to leave the command post without his permission. And suddenly a new call: “Why are you still there? Fly to Prague immediately!”

We flew up to Prague, made two or three circles over the airfield - not a single person. Not a single voice is heard, not a single aircraft is visible. Sat down. With Lieutenant General Yamshchikov, who met me, we went from the airfield to the General Staff to Dzur. We immediately agreed with him: that there be no fights between our soldiers and that no one thought that we had arrived with some tasks to occupy Czechoslovakia. We brought in troops, that's all. And then let the political leadership figure it out.

The Soviet embassy recommended to meet with the President of Czechoslovakia L. Svoboda. I took with me a Hungarian general, our German one. I said: “Comrade President, you know that the troops of the Warsaw Pact states have entered Czechoslovakia. I came to report on this matter. And since you are an army general and I am an army general, we are both military men. You understand, the situation forced us to do this.” He replied: "I understand ...".

Two decades later, in 1988, I. G. Pavlovsky recognized the fact that “the attitude of the population towards us was not friendly. Why did we come there? We scattered leaflets from the plane, explaining that we entered with peaceful intentions. But you yourself understand that if I, an uninvited guest, come to your house and start disposing, it will not be very pleasant.

The Czechoslovak army did not offer resistance, showing its discipline and loyalty to the orders of the higher leadership. For this reason, large casualties were avoided.

T-55 took up position on the streets of Prague

However, there were still losses: during the introduction of troops from August 21 to October 20, 1968, 11 military personnel, including 1 officer, died as a result of hostile actions by individual citizens of Czechoslovakia. During the same period, 87 people were wounded and injured, including 19 officers. On the Czechoslovak side, from August 21 to December 17, 1968, 94 civilians were killed and 345 were seriously injured.

From a military point of view, this was a brilliantly prepared and conducted operation, which came as a complete surprise to the NATO countries.

In total, in the first three days, according to the plan, 20 foreign divisions (Soviet, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian) entered the territory of Czechoslovakia, in the next two days - another 10 divisions.

However, despite the military success, it was not possible to immediately achieve political goals. Already on August 21, a statement of the XIV Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia appeared, in which the introduction of troops was condemned. On the same day, representatives of a number of countries spoke in the Security Council demanding that the "Czechoslovak question" be brought to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, but consideration of this issue was blocked by the "right of veto" by Hungary and the USSR. Later, the representative of Czechoslovakia also demanded that this issue be removed from the agenda of the General Assembly.

Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania and China condemned the "military intervention of five states". However, most of these "protests" were purely declarative and could not have a noticeable impact on the situation.

"Striped" T-54

The heads of the major states of Western Europe, and indeed the United States, considered the Prague Spring and the resulting divisions within the Eastern Bloc to be "communist domestic quarrels" and avoided such interference in the affairs of Eastern Europe, which could be regarded as a violation of the results of Yalta and Potsdam. Another aspect was the beginning of negotiations on the limitation of armaments, which began to acquire real features (in 1972, an ABM treaty would be signed), and interference in the internal affairs of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact could nullify the entire course of these negotiations.

But, despite the "non-intervention" of the West, a quick normalization of the situation did not happen. The expectation of receiving broad support from the opposition groups also did not materialize. A successful military action, as noted in one of the documents, "was not accompanied by the mobilization of healthy forces in the CPC." Moreover, in the words of one of the Czechoslovak reformers M. Miller, the "healthy forces" were suppressed and frightened, faced with the unanimous condemnation of the "interventions" and their assistants from the Czechoslovak society.

Having found itself in a political impasse on this issue, the Soviet side was forced to return to its former policy. Since it was not possible to form a "revolutionary workers' and peasants' government", it was necessary to return to attempts to put pressure on A. Dubcek and his colleagues in order to direct him internal politics in the right direction. But now the positions of the Soviet side were already much stronger - the Czechoslovak leaders brought to Moscow signed a corresponding agreement, and the presence of allied troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia gave a certain carte blanche.

New line on "normalization" began to be carried out immediately, during the visit of the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia O. Chernik to Moscow on September 10. The Czech comrades were promised not only substantial economic assistance, but also a certain amount of political pressure. Demanding that Chernik immediately comply with the Moscow Agreement, the Politburo insisted that the precondition for the withdrawal or reduction of the Allied troops was "a complete cessation of the subversive activities of anti-socialist forces and the provision of a more active role for conservative leaders in political life."

After three weeks, the situation in Prague and other large cities of Czechoslovakia almost completely stabilized: a new government was appointed by Czechoslovakia President L. Svoboda, which immediately declared the importance of friendship and close cooperation with the countries of socialism.

Sometimes the "striped" burned

On September 10-12, the main formations and units of the Soviet troops and the troops of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact were withdrawn and headed for the places of permanent deployment. By November 4, 1968, 25 divisions were withdrawn from the country.

"We're here for a while..."

And on the territory of Czechoslovakia until 1991, the Central Group of Forces of the Soviet Army, which included the 15th Guards and 31st Tank Divisions, the 18th, 30th Guards, and 48th Motorized Rifle Divisions, lingered. When signing an agreement on the temporary stay in Czechoslovakia of a group of Soviet troops (this happened on October 16), it was determined that its number could not exceed 130 thousand people. This force was quite enough to stabilize the situation, taking into account the fact that the army of Czechoslovakia at that time numbered 200 thousand people. When confirming the post of commander, Colonel-General A. Mayorov, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, told him as parting words: “The troops of the Group under the agreement will be deployed temporarily. But it is not for nothing that they say: there is nothing more permanent than temporary. We are talking, Alexander Mikhailovich, not about months - about years.

The Central Group of Forces proved its effectiveness already at the end of 1968, when our troops managed to disrupt a major anti-government political strike. The forces of the Democrats have scheduled mass political demonstrations for December 31st. However, on the eve, in accordance with the commander’s previously developed plan called “Gray Hawk”, 20 Soviet motorized rifle and tank battalions were introduced into all major cities “to control order” during the demonstration - anti-government demonstrations did not take place. The usual demonstration of equipment was enough, there was no need to use weapons.

The situation in the country began to gradually normalize only from the middle of 1969, when the reorganization of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the government of Czechoslovakia was completed (that is, when the main "troublemakers" were politically isolated).

Well, the events in Czechoslovakia were then considered for a long time in military academies as an example of a clear organization and conduct of a large-scale operation in the European theater of operations to provide "fraternal assistance to friends and allies."

However, in 1989, the last Soviet leader, M. S. Gorbachev, officially admitted that the introduction of troops was an unlawful act of interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country, which interrupted the democratic renewal of Czechoslovakia and had long-term negative consequences. In 1991, in the shortest possible time, the TsGV was liquidated, and the troops were withdrawn to their homeland.

A few years later, the “democratic” traditions, so touted by the first and last president of the USSR, M.S. Gorbachev, finally took over, and the country, which had collapsed into two sovereign states (the Czech Republic and Slovakia), entered the American program of “NATO expansion to the East.”

Notes:

15 developing countries are armed with ballistic missiles, another 10 are developing their own. Research in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons continues in 20 states.

Mayorov A. M. Invasion. Czechoslovakia. 1968. - M., 1998. S. 234–235.

Cit. Quoted from: Drogovoz I. G. Tank sword of the country of the Soviets. - M., 2002. S. 216.

USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay.

Cit. by: Russia (USSR) in local wars and military conflicts of the second half of the 20th century. - M., 2000. S. 154.

Mayorov A. M. Invasion. Czechoslovakia. 1968. - M., 1998. S. 314.

The entry of troops of the USSR, the GDR, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria in August 1968 into Czechoslovakia prevented not only a possible civil war in this country, as happened in, but also a new war in Europe. It is characteristic that the liberals, wringing their hands in condemnation of the “occupation” of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet troops, always “forget” to point out that the Hungarians, the Poles, the Germans, and the Bulgarians, together with the Russians, saved the Czechs from civil unrest and war. Almost half a century has passed since then, but it is very inconvenient to tell the truth. Therefore, the fact that, along with 18 divisions of Soviet troops, 8 divisions of our allies entered Czechoslovakia, and "independent" journalists, and liberal politicians, and politicians in the West are simply silent.

For those who want to deal with the situation, in addition to already, I offer new material.

"Occupier's Notes"

Czechoslovakia, 1968: behind the scenes

In early August, the Czech newspaper Parlamentnilisty published an article with a title uncharacteristic not only for the Czech Republic, but, without exaggeration, for the whole of Europe: “Inferiority of the Slavs from the point of view of Anglo-Saxon and Pan-German superiority” (Petr Lukeš: Méněcennost Slovanů z hlediska anglosaské a pangermánské nadřazenosti. 2.8 .2017). It looks like the Slavic brothers have recently started talking about their humiliation by the "old" members of the European Union, they remembered not only the national currency, but also national pride.

The publication looks especially non-European on the eve of the next anniversary of the entry of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries into Czechoslovakia, when in the West, according to an established tradition, a hubbub of full-time and non-staff propagandists and agitators rises, along with their “wards” - Russian liberals. Together and separately, they condemn, stigmatize, and shame the Soviet “occupation”, “annexation”, “aggression” and further along the whole range of anti-Soviet (Russophobic) definitions, developed over almost five decades.

Let me remind you that on the night of August 20-21, 1968, 18 Soviet divisions entered the territory of Czechoslovakia from three directions - from Poland, Germany, as well as Hungary and the USSR, and, I emphasize, two divisions each of the armies of the GDR, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria . In the West, participation in the "Soviet occupation" of eight formations from future NATO and EU member countries is stubbornly hushed up. Meanwhile, the introduction of allied troops into Czechoslovakia not only suspended the plans of the West, primarily the United States, to reformat Europe, but, in the most paradoxical way, became a consolidating factor in uniting all Russophobic and Russophobic forces against the “common enemy” — first the USSR, then Russia. Moreover, it contributed to the destruction of the commonwealth of socialist countries, including the military one.

The author of the mentioned publication, journalist Peter Lukes, quite justifiably uses as a starting point the thesis of the famous Czech historian Viktor Timur that: “For the West, the Slavs are still inferior and must serve it ...”. But "... the history that is taught in schools to our children is purposefully distorted and is a pan-German version of real history." “... The media blacken everything that is in the East. After all, there is a large Slavic empire of evil! Further, Lukesh says: “They are proud that they are Russians, and that they are Slavs! They have pride, that is, a quality that sharply contradicts the mentality of the slaves into which Western propaganda has turned us and continues to turn us.

Lukesh ends the article with words that, I think, should have been said 50 years ago, at least:

“A thousand times repeated propaganda lies about our inferiority have become true for many of our brothers! This truth is being imposed on us so that it would never occur to anyone to rise up and free themselves from subjugation to the West. That is why the Slavs specially quarrel. That is why they are being turned against Russia.”

The article evoked in me associations with specific events of 1968. In late August - early September, units of the 31st Panzer Division, the Vislenskaya Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov, occupied a military town left (by agreement) by the troops of the Czechoslovak People's Army in the city of Bruntal, which in Moravian-Silesian region. The editorial office of the divisional newspaper “Znamya Pobedy” was also located there, where I, then a young and green as a pod lieutenant, had just begun my service in a position called “correspondent-organizer”, due to which I was charged with organizing soldiers’ “letters to the editor ".

This little newspaper was surprisingly gluttonous. With a staff of only three journalistic officers, it had to appear three times a week on two A3 pages. They worked almost around the clock. However, like everything in that stressful period. But there was one insoluble problem: the cliché of photographs - they were made in zincography, which only large printing houses had. We, on the other hand, published a newspaper on wheels - in a camping printing house located in a ZIL van, where typesetters and printers - conscripts worked tirelessly. In short, only the local newspaper could help us, and, as we hoped, the committee of the Communist Party of the Bruntal region. And with a naive belief in the “friendship of the peoples of the countries of socialism”, the editor, Major Frolov Nikolai Nikolaevich, went to the editorial office of the regional newspaper.

He had a special attitude towards the Czechs: in 1945, he, a 19-year-old infantry soldier, liberated the town of Pisek, which is located in the South Bohemian region. He told me with what jubilation the victorious Red Army soldiers were greeted. The photo showed him and some Czech family. On the reverse side of the photograph was a half-erased inscription in pencil: names, surname, address and date - May 1945.

Story with photo received further development, but more on that later. And, going to visit his Czech colleagues on a “friendship visit”, Nikolai Nikolaevich took with him a bottle of Stolichnaya (the Soviet “currency” in Europe) and at the same time – me as moral support, apparently. Neither he nor I spoke Czech then.

The militia, which almost all took the side of those who supported the entry of the allied troops, let us through to the building of the district committee without hindrance. But the editor of the newspaper kept in the waiting room, probably for about an hour. Finally, the secretary, angry as a fury, let us into the office. We entered and said hello. In response - a gentleman's nod and a casual gesture towards the chairs. Sat down. They began to tell: so, they say, and so - we ask (in Czech, “please” means “please”) help ...

We knew that many in Czechoslovakia, primarily party cadres, speak Russian well, but in response we heard: I don’t understand Russian (as it is now in Ukraine!).

In fact, our languages ​​are so similar that you can always explain yourself if you wish. However, the district editor began calling the offices - maybe someone knows Russian there? No one!.. I also called the district committee - and there was not a single one who could speak Russian. In short, they made it clear to us that they didn’t want to talk to us, and here, breaking the chain of command, I intervened in the conversation and asked the Czech “comrade”, supplementing the words with gestures to make it clearer: in what language could we talk? To my surprise and delight (!), he replied in German that he would speak only in German.

It was not known to this Germanophile that the poručík (lieutenant) sitting in front of him had a diploma of a German language translator, and after my first phrase, uttered in a decent Berlin dialect (as taught at Kharkov University), he almost fell off his chair. But then the conversation went like this: my editor in Russian, Czech - in German. I translate. However, it was not possible to agree, and when we left the office, I looked at my “colleague” and, with all youthful categoricalness, spoke in Russian, as if addressing my editor: well, how stupid he is (or something like that ). Then he turned to his “colleague” and asked in German: “Translate?” And I heard in Russian: "No need." Soon he was removed from his post, he left for Germany, we did not see each other again, but, as they say, the sediment remained. Although later with the local edition, updated, good partnerships developed, even friendly.

By and large, there was nothing to be surprised or indignant at that time.

Back in the 19th century famous historiographer of the Czech kingdom and political figure Frantisek Palacky wrote that often in the center of Prague a person who asked a question in Czech could hear a contemptuous answer: “Please speak like a human being.”

Such was the attitude towards the Czechs in Austria-Hungary. Indicative in this sense, Yaroslav Gashek gives one of the main characters in his “Adventures of the Good Soldier Schweik”: “Lieutenant Lukash was a typical career officer of a very dilapidated Austrian monarchy. The Cadet Corps turned him into a chameleon: in society he spoke German, wrote in German, but read Czech books, and when he taught at a school for volunteers, consisting entirely of Czechs, he told them confidentially: “We will remain Czechs, but no one should know about it. I am also a Czech ... "He considered the Czech people a kind of secret organization, from which it is best to stay away."

Three centuries of total Germanization under the yoke of Austria-Hungary did not go unnoticed for the Czechs. Even Hitler recognized them as "partially Aryanized". By the way, during the occupation of the Sudetes, the Czech population was forced to leave Bruntal, and Hitler visited the city first of the rest of the places in Silesia. I was shown the balcony of one of the houses on the central square, preserved as a historical memorial (or maybe not only as a memorial ...), from where the “Führer” addressed the German nation.

Czechoslovakia has always been sacrificed for anti-Russian, anti-Soviet purposes, but certainly in the interests of Germany.

And in the first world war when the Czechs and Slovaks in the Austro-Hungarian army fought with Russian Empire. Czechoslovak legionnaires, by the way, who in 1917-1920. participated in civil war in Russia, in the Czech Republic they are considered heroes. Moreover, they "heroized" in terms of violence against the civilian population, but they stole gold in the amount of billions of modern dollars.

And in 1938 Anglo-Saxon capital brought Hitler to the borders of the USSR, providing him with the most powerful military-industrial and financial potential of Czechoslovakia (for the war with the USSR). In 1968, the West intended to create a "Czech corridor" that would allow access directly to the borders of the Soviet Union, while dividing the remaining Eastern European countries in the socialist community into two parts - northern and southern. Thus, ensuring the implementation of the revanchist aspirations of those forces in the FRG that transformed into a new elite from the Nazi elite and again became at the helm of the German state.

Naturally, because the West closely followed the processes that took place in Czechoslovakia in the spring and summer of 1968 and gave them completely objective assessments, which, of course, they carefully concealed from the "angry masses." In the USA, for example, according to information from the Czechoslovak embassy in Washington, they noted: “Development in Czechoslovakia is defined as a revolution deeper than the Hungarian events of 1956, since it covers all spheres of economic and political life in the country, takes place peacefully and in the state , which belongs to the most developed socialist and advanced, civilizationally mature countries. Actually, in Czechoslovakia, a “peaceful” scenario of a change of power in one of the socialist states of Europe was being worked out. It was planned that later the "Czechoslovak experience" could be extended to other countries.

The leaders of the socialist countries quite reasonably viewed the Czechoslovak events as a threat to the unity of the Commonwealth. It is today the change of power by the "angry" masses is widely known as the "color revolution". In the same Czechoslovakia, almost two decades later, it was under the banner of the “Prague Spring” that the “velvet” revolution unfolded. After her victory in 1989, the Czechoslovak federal Republic(ChSFR). In January 1993 the Czech and Slovak Republics are formed. A single country ceased to exist ...

If the USSR and its allies had not sent troops into Czechoslovakia, the same thing would have happened back in August 1968. But after the “Velvet Revolution”, the events of 1968 were painted exclusively in black. Czech President Vaclav Havel and his associates accused Russia of all mortal sins.

In general, everything is as usual: the West is “white and fluffy”, it, and first of all the United States, is allowed to carry “democratic values” on the wings of bombers to any point globe, Russia is only allowed to bow and repent.

Let us note that the same position is taken by the liberals of the “domestic spill”, who, obviously due to a misunderstanding, call themselves Russian. At best, they should "perform" under a neutral flag, as our most "patriotic" athletes do in international competitions.

And, returning to the events of 1968, it must be said that the population of Czechoslovakia was very persistently inspired with the idea that there was no danger of revanchism from the FRG, that one could think about the return of the Sudeten Germans to the country. The newspaper "Generalanzeiger" (FRG) directly wrote: "The Sudeten Germans will expect from Czechoslovakia, liberated from communism, a return to the Munich Agreement, according to which the Sudetenland was ceded to Germany in the fall of 1938." In the program of the National Democratic Party of Germany (FRG), one of the points read: "The Sudetenland must again become German, because they were acquired by Nazi Germany under the Munich Treaty, which is an effective international agreement." This program was actively supported by the "Fellowship of the Sudeten Germans" and the neo-fascist organization "Vitikobund", created by former active Nazis back in 1948.

The local cadres also sang along with the Germans. For example, the editor of the Czech trade union newspaper Prace, Irzicek, told German television: “About 150,000 Germans live in our country. One can hope that the remaining 100-200 thousand could return to their homeland a little later.” Well, I have already told about my meeting with an outspoken Germanophile.

Here it is necessary to clarify that before the Second World War, the Germans were the second largest people in Czechoslovakia. Most of them lived in the Sudetenland and in the regions bordering Austria, where they formed 90% population. The persecution of the Germans (real and imaginary) in Czechoslovakia (and in Poland, by the way) became a good reason for Hitler to start a war. By 1940 Germany included the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia and the Polish part of West Prussia with its center in Danzig (Gdansk).

The Czechs began to take revenge on the Germans immediately after the victory. They were forbidden to speak German in public places and walk on sidewalks! It was also forbidden to use public transport.

They had to wear an armband with the letter "N" (German). The Czechs introduced about a dozen such humiliating restrictions for the Germans. But the Germans were not simply infringed on their rights. A wave of pogroms and brutal massacres swept across the country

Known, for example, the so-called. Prsherov execution, when in On the night of June 18-19, 1945, in the city of Přerov, 265 German refugees were shot by a unit of the Czechoslovak counterintelligence. In the same row and Ustitsa massacre. On July 31, in the town of Usti-nad-Laboi, there was an explosion at one of the military depots. 27 people died. Immediately blamed the local Germans. They were hunted in the city. It was easy to find them by the bandage with the letter "N". The Germans were beaten, killed, thrown from the bridge into the river. Laba, finishing off in the water with shots. Czechs talk about 80-100 killed, the Germans insist on 220 . Of course, this is not the Volyn massacre, which Bandera staged for the Poles, massacring more than 150 thousand people. But the life of one person is an enduring value. But there was also Brunn death march.

May 29 Zemsky National Committee Brno(German Brunn) adopted a resolution on the eviction of Germans living in the city - women, children and men under the age of 16 and over 60 years. Able-bodied men had to stay to eliminate the consequences of hostilities. About 20 thousand deportees were driven towards the Austrian border. People died en masse along the way. The Germans determine the number of dead in 8 thousand The Czech side, without denying the fact of the "death march", names about 2 thousand victims.

There were many such cases. All Sudeten Germans total number approximately 2.5 million (exact figures are still unknown) were evicted to Germany and Austria, their property confiscated. But these sad pages of history do not like to remember in today's Czech Republic. And many do not know the whole truth. In Germany today, this topic is also preferred to be passed over in silence, but in 1968 the expelled Germans were spoken about widely and loudly. And it was the Bundeswehr that was assigned a vital role in a possible conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

So, in the course of preparations for the Black Lion exercise planned for the fall of 1968, the entire command staff The 2nd Corps, up to and including battalion commanders, visited Czechoslovakia as tourists and drove along the probable routes of movement of their units. With the beginning of the "exercises" it was planned to take the territories torn away by Germany in 1938 in a short throw, and to put the international community before the fact.

The calculation was based on the fact that if the USSR and the USA did not begin to fight because of the Arab territories captured by Israel in 1967, then they will not now either. But an armed clash did not occur solely for the reason that the allied forces of the Warsaw Pact countries preempted an attempt to re-annex the Sudetenland (as in 1938) by German (FRG) and American troops. It can be said that in 1968 the world was again on the brink of war, as in the recent (1962) Caribbean crisis.

As far as I know, the Germans have not forgotten anything from the joint German-Czech past. However, their list deported peoples – Crimean Tatars, the peoples of the Caucasus and the Baltic states, the Volga Germans. About their own exiled and humiliated compatriots - not a word.

In Europe, there is an unspoken taboo on this topic. But Russia is branded with terrible force. And - only her! This will continue until Russia gives an official assessment of the events of 1968.

So far, at the legislative level, the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia will not be recognized as a military military operation to defend the Motherland and the countries of socialism. And for starters, it would not hurt to figure out who even now benefits from the fact that the participants in that military operation are insultingly called occupiers, moreover, in Russia. With regard to those who were the first to be called internationalist warriors, the Russian state is obliged to restore justice, even if only in hindsight. The participants themselves may soon be gone, just as those who liberated Czechoslovakia in 1945 are almost gone.

... My first editor found the same Czech family with whom "For a long memory" was photographed in May 45th. Soon he was officially invited to Pisek by the city authorities. He returned from there with a commemorative medal on his chest, full of gifts and kisses, and with a letter testifying that he had been awarded the honorary title of citizen of the city of Pisek. Do they still remember this in that Czech city?

Yes, and in 1983 the city authorities of Bruntal met me like a warrior-liberator. He was then on a business trip in Prague and could not help but walk "through the places of military glory." We sat until morning. District editor Ivan Rzhegak, Vlasta Navratilova, chairman of the district council Maria Hartlova ... They sang "Katyusha". Yes, they drank a glass. And remember, remember...

And when in 1968 we, from the Soviet Union, saw rebellious Czechs, we would certainly ask: what do you lack? If they themselves knew what, after all, they lived in such abundance, which they did not even dare to dream of in the Union then. Today they do not have a single country. Broke up, as intended "Prague spring". More precisely, the Czechs and Slovaks destroyed it with their own hands. into two small states.

How much water has flowed under the bridge since then... But recently I saw the page "Bruntal, Czech Republic, Moravia and Silesia" on Vkontakte.

And below: “This group is for those who served, lived, studied or worked in the garrison of the glorious city of Bruntal (and not only for them) in the 60s-80s. in Czechoslovakia… And also for those who love this country and its culture.” (Invaders, huh?)

I will quote one post almost literally (with all the “grammar”), otherwise its bright mood will be lost: “Vasily Dvoretsky May 15 at 20:54 ATTENTION! BRUNTALS!!! Pay special attention to the post, the author of which is Jiri Ondrasek (Jiri Ondrasek)! He is a real hero, he is Czech, lives in Bruntal and works in the Municipality of Bruntal. He organized the celebration of Victory Day in Bruntal on May 7, 2017 on the day of the liberation of Bruntal from the Nazis and sent us a photo of this holiday.

Jiri wrote to me: “I was a co-organizer and I did it very gladly, because I feel gratitude to the Soviet liberators. A lot of people came, they played the anthem of Czechoslovakia and the USSR / RF and Arise, a huge country. The feelings of the participants were very good. We, like in other countries, have a lot of official Russophobia, and I decided to “fight” with it: I read Russian media, watch Russian video blogs, etc.” THANK YOU SO MUCH YIRJI!
YOU'RE DOING FINE! God bless you with health, strength, courage and support of the people, because the fight against Western Russophobia and the fight for peace is not an easy task!”

I am glad to welcome you, Bruntalians! Rád vás přivitat, bruntalci!"

| The participation of the USSR in the conflicts of the times cold war. Events in Czechoslovakia (1968)

Events in Czechoslovakia
(1968)

The entry of troops into Czechoslovakia (1968), also known as Operation Danube or the Invasion of Czechoslovakia - in waters of the Warsaw Pact troops (except Romania) to Czechoslovakia, started August 21, 1968 and ending reforms of the Prague Spring.

The largest contingent of troops was allocated from the USSR. The united group (up to 500 thousand people and 5 thousand tanks and armored personnel carriers) was commanded by General of the Army I. G. Pavlovsky.

The Soviet leadership feared that if the Czechoslovak communists pursued an internal policy independent of Moscow, the USSR would lose control over Czechoslovakia. Such a turn of events threatened to split the Eastern European socialist bloc both politically and military-strategically. The policy of limited state sovereignty in the countries of the socialist bloc, which allowed, among other things, the use of military force, if necessary, was called the "Brezhnev doctrine" in the West.

At the end of March 1968 The Central Committee of the CPSU sent classified information about the situation in Czechoslovakia to party activists. This document stated: “... recently, events have been developing in a negative direction. In Czechoslovakia, actions by irresponsible elements are on the rise, demanding the creation of an "official opposition" and "tolerance" for various anti-socialist views and theories. The past experience of socialist construction is incorrectly covered, proposals are made for a special Czechoslovak path to socialism, which is opposed to the experience of other socialist countries, attempts are made to cast a shadow on the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, and the need for an "independent" foreign policy is emphasized. There are calls for the creation of private enterprises, the abandonment of the planned system, and the expansion of ties with the West. Moreover, in a number of newspapers, on radio and television, calls are being propagated for “complete separation of the party from the state”, for the return of Czechoslovakia to the bourgeois republic of Masaryk and Benes, for the transformation of Czechoslovakia into an “open society” and others ... "

March 23 in Dresden, a meeting was held between the leaders of the parties and governments of six socialist countries - the USSR, Poland, the GDR, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, at which the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia A. Dubcek was sharply criticized.

After the meeting in Dresden, the Soviet leadership began to develop options for action against Czechoslovakia, including military measures. The leaders of the GDR (W. Ulbricht), Bulgaria (T. Zhivkov) and Poland (W. Gomulka) took a hard line and to a certain extent influenced the Soviet leader L. Brezhnev.

The Soviet side did not rule out the option of NATO troops entering the territory of Czechoslovakia, which carried out maneuvers code-named "Black Lion" near the borders of Czechoslovakia.

Given the current military and political situation, spring 1968 The joint command of the Warsaw Pact, together with the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, developed an operation code-named "Danube".

April 8, 1968 the commander of the airborne troops, General V.F. Margelov, received a directive, according to which he began planning the use of airborne assault forces on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The directive stated: "The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, loyal to international duty and the Warsaw Pact, must send their troops to assist the Czechoslovak People's Army in defending the Motherland from the danger looming over it." The document also emphasized: “... if the troops of the Czechoslovak People's Army treat the appearance of Soviet troops with understanding, in this case it is necessary to organize interaction with them and jointly carry out the assigned tasks. If the ChNA troops are hostile to the paratroopers and support the conservative forces, then it is necessary to take measures to localize them, and if this is not possible, to disarm them.

During April - May Soviet leaders tried to "reason" Alexander Dubcek, to draw his attention to the danger of the actions of anti-socialist forces. At the end of April, Marshal I. Yakubovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact, arrived in Prague to prepare exercises for the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

May 4th Brezhnev met with Dubcek in Moscow, but it was not possible to reach mutual understanding.

May 8 in Moscow A closed meeting of the leaders of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria and Hungary took place, during which a frank exchange of views took place on measures to be taken in connection with the situation in Czechoslovakia. Even then there were proposals for a military solution. However, at the same time, the leader of Hungary, J. Kadar, referring to, stated that the Czechoslovak crisis cannot be resolved by military means and a political solution must be sought.

At the end of May the government of Czechoslovakia agreed to conduct exercises of the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries called "Shumava", which took place June 20 - 30 involving only the headquarters of units, formations and signal troops. FROM 20 to 30 June for the first time in the history of the military bloc of the socialist countries, 16 thousand people were introduced into the territory of Czechoslovakia personnel. FROM July 23 to August 10, 1968 on the territory of the USSR, the GDR and Poland, the rear exercises "Neman" were held, during which troops were redeployed to invade Czechoslovakia. On August 11, 1968, a major exercise of the air defense forces "Heavenly Shield" was held. On the territory of Western Ukraine, Poland and the GDR, exercises of the signal troops were held.

July 29 - August 1 a meeting was held in Čierná nad Tisou, in which the entire Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, together with President L. Svoboda, took part. The Czechoslovak delegation at the talks basically acted as a united front, but V. Bilyak adhered to a special position. At the same time, a personal letter was received from a candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia A. Kapek with a request to provide his country with "fraternal assistance" from the socialist countries.

AT late July preparations for a military operation in Czechoslovakia were completed, but a final decision on its conduct had not yet been made. August 3, 1968 A meeting of leaders of six communist parties took place in Bratislava. The statement adopted in Bratislava contained a phrase about collective responsibility in the defense of socialism. In Bratislava, L. Brezhnev received a letter from five members of the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia - Indra, Kolder, Kapek, Shvestka and Bilyak with a request for "effective assistance and support" in order to wrest Czechoslovakia "from the imminent danger of counter-revolution."

In the middle of August L. Brezhnev called A. Dubcek twice and asked why the personnel changes promised in Bratislava were not taking place, to which Dubcek replied that personnel matters were resolved collectively, by a plenum of the Central Committee of the party.

August 16 In Moscow, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a discussion of the situation in Czechoslovakia was held and proposals for the introduction of troops were approved. At the same time, a letter was received from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. August 17 Soviet Ambassador S. Chervonenko met with the President of Czechoslovakia L. Svoboda and informed Moscow that at the decisive moment the president would be together with the CPSU and the Soviet Union. On the same day, the materials prepared in Moscow for the text of the Appeal to the Czechoslovak people were sent to the group of "healthy forces" in the HRC. It was planned that they would create a Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government. A draft appeal was also prepared by the governments of the USSR, the GDR, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary to the people of Czechoslovakia, as well as to the Czechoslovak army.

August 18 A meeting of the leaders of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary took place in Moscow. Appropriate measures were agreed, including the appearance of the "healthy forces" of the HRC with a request for military assistance. In a message to the President of Czechoslovakia Svoboda on behalf of the participants in the meeting in Moscow, one of the main arguments was the receipt of a request for assistance by the armed forces to the Czechoslovak people from the “majority” of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and many members of the government of Czechoslovakia.

Operation Danube

The political goal of the operation was to change the political leadership of the country and establish a regime loyal to the USSR in Czechoslovakia. The troops were to seize the most important objects in Prague, the KGB officers were to arrest the Czech reformers, and then the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the session of the National Assembly were planned, where the top leadership was to be replaced. At the same time, a large role was assigned to President Svoboda.

The political leadership of the operation in Prague was carried out by a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU K. Mazurov.

The military preparation of the operation was carried out by Marshal I.I. ground forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, General of the Army I. G. Pavlovsky.

At the first stage, the main role was played by airborne troops. air defense troops, Navy and rocket troops strategic purpose were put on high alert.

To August 20 a grouping of troops was prepared, the first echelon of which consisted of up to 250,000 people, and total- up to 500,000 people, about 5,000 tanks and armored personnel carriers. For the implementation of the operation, 26 divisions were involved, of which 18 were Soviet, not counting aviation. The troops of the Soviet 1st Guards Tank, 20th Guards Combined Arms, 16th Air Armies (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany), 11th Guards Army (Baltic Military District), 28th Combined Arms Army (Belarusian Military District) took part in the invasion. district), the 13th and 38th combined arms armies (Carpathian military district) and the 14th air army (Odessa military district).

The Carpathian and Central Fronts were formed:
☑ Carpathian Front was created on the basis of the administration and troops of the Carpathian military district and several Polish divisions. It included four armies: the 13th, 38th combined arms, 8th Guards Tank and 57th Air. At the same time, the 8th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 13th Army began to move to the southern regions of Poland, where Polish divisions were additionally included in their composition. Commander Colonel General Bisyarin Vasily Zinovievich.
☑ central front was formed on the basis of the administration of the Baltic Military District with the inclusion of the troops of the Baltic Military District, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Northern Group of Forces, as well as individual Polish and East German divisions. This front was deployed in the GDR and Poland. The Central Front included the 11th and 20th Guards Combined Arms and the 37th Air Armies.

Also for cover active group The Southern Front was deployed in Hungary. In addition to this front, the operational group Balaton (two Soviet divisions, as well as Bulgarian and Hungarian units) was deployed on the territory of Hungary to enter Czechoslovakia.

In general, the number of troops introduced into Czechoslovakia was:
☑ USSR- 18 motorized rifle, tank and air airborne divisions, 22 aviation and helicopter regiments, about 170,000 people;
☑ Poland- 5 infantry divisions, up to 40,000 people;
☑ GDR- motorized rifle and tank divisions, up to 15,000 people in total (according to publications in the press, it was decided at the last moment to refuse to send parts of the GDR to Czechoslovakia, they played the role of a reserve on the border;
☑ from Czechoslovakia there was an operational group of the NNA of the GDR of several dozen military personnel);
☑ Hungary- 8th motorized rifle division, separate units, a total of 12,500 people;
☑ Bulgaria- 12th and 22nd Bulgarian motorized rifle regiments, with a total number of 2164 people. and one Bulgarian tank battalion, armed with 26 T-34 vehicles.

The date for the entry of troops was set for the evening of August 20 when the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was held. On the morning of August 20, 1968, a secret order was read to the officers on the formation of the Danube High Command.

Commander-in-Chief was appointed General of the Army I. G. Pavlovsky, whose headquarters was deployed in the southern part of Poland. Both fronts (Central and Carpathian) and the Balaton task force, as well as two guards airborne divisions, were subordinate to him. On the first day of the operation, to ensure the landing of airborne divisions, five divisions of military transport aviation were allocated at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief "Danube".

Chronology of events

At 10:15 p.m. August 20 the troops received a signal "Vltava-666" about the beginning of the operation. AT 23:00 August 20 in the troops intended for the invasion, a combat alert was announced. Through closed communication channels, all fronts, armies, divisions, brigades, regiments and battalions were given a signal to advance. At this signal, all commanders were to open one of the five secret packages they kept (the operation was developed in five versions), and burn the four remaining in the presence of the chiefs of staff without opening. The opened packages contained an order to start Operation Danube and to continue hostilities in accordance with the Danube-Canal and Danube-Canal-Globus plans.

In advance, "Orders for interaction on the Danube operation" were developed. White stripes were applied to the military equipment participating in the invasion. All military equipment of Soviet and Union production without white stripes was subject to "neutralization", preferably without firing. In the event of resistance, stripless tanks and other military equipment were to be destroyed without warning and without commands from above. When meeting with NATO troops, it was ordered to stop immediately and not to shoot without a command.

Troops were sent in 18 places from the territory of the GDR, Poland, the USSR and Hungary. Parts of the 20th Guards Army from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (Lieutenant General Ivan Leontievich Velichko) entered Prague, which established control over the main objects of the capital of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, two Soviet airborne divisions were landed in Prague and Brno.

AT 2 am August 21 At the airfield "Ruzyne" in Prague, advanced units of the 7th Airborne Division landed. They blocked the main objects of the airfield, where Soviet An-12s with troops and military equipment began to land. The capture of the airfield was carried out using a deceptive maneuver: a Soviet passenger plane flying up to the airfield requested an emergency landing due to alleged damage on board. After permission and landing, paratroopers from the aircraft captured the airport control tower and ensured the landing of landing aircraft.

At the news of the invasion, the Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia immediately gathered in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Dubcek's office. The majority - 7 to 4 - voted in favor of the Presidium's statement condemning the invasion. Only members of the Presidium Kolder, Bilyak, Svestka and Rigaud spoke according to the original plan. Barbirek and Piller supported Dubcek and O. Chernik. The calculation of the Soviet leadership was on the preponderance of "healthy forces" at the decisive moment - 6 against 5. The statement also contained a call for an urgent convocation of a party congress. Dubcek himself, in his radio appeal to the inhabitants of the country, urged citizens to remain calm and prevent bloodshed and the actual repetition of the Hungarian events of 1956.

To 4:30 am August 21 the building of the Central Committee was surrounded by Soviet troops and armored vehicles, Soviet paratroopers broke into the building and arrested those present. Dubcek and other members of the Central Committee spent several hours under the control of paratroopers.

AT 5:10 am August 21 a reconnaissance company of the 350th Guards Airborne Regiment and a separate reconnaissance company of the 103rd Airborne Division landed. Within 10 minutes, they captured the airfields of Turzhany and Namesht, after which a hasty landing of the main forces began. According to eyewitnesses, transport planes landed at the airfields one after another. The landing party jumped off without waiting for a complete stop. By the end of the runway, the plane was already empty and immediately picked up speed for a new takeoff. With a minimum interval, other aircraft began to arrive here with troops and military equipment. Then the paratroopers on their military equipment and captured civilian vehicles went deep into the country.

To 9:00 am August 21 in Brno, paratroopers blocked all roads, bridges, exits from the city, radio and television buildings, telegraph, main post office, administrative buildings of the city and region, printing house, railway stations, as well as headquarters of military units and military industry enterprises. ChNA commanders were asked to remain calm and maintain order. Four hours after the landing of the first groups of paratroopers, the most important objects of Prague and Brno were under the control of the allied forces. The main efforts of the paratroopers were aimed at seizing the buildings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the government, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, as well as the buildings of the radio station and television. According to a predetermined plan, columns of troops were sent to the main administrative and industrial centers of Czechoslovakia. Formations and units of the allied forces were stationed in all major cities. Particular attention was paid to the protection of the western borders of Czechoslovakia.

At 10 a.m. Dubcek, Prime Minister Oldřich Czernik, Speaker of Parliament Josef Smrkowski (English) Russian, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Josef Spacek and Bohumil Szymon, and head of the National Front Frantisek Kriegel (English) Russian. KGB officers and employees of the StB who collaborated with them were taken out of the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and then they were taken to the airfield in Soviet armored personnel carriers and taken to Moscow.

By the end of the day on August 21 24 divisions of the Warsaw Pact countries occupied the main objects on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The troops of the USSR and its allies occupied all points without the use of weapons, since the Czechoslovak army was ordered not to resist.

Actions of the HRC and the population of the country

In Prague, protesting citizens tried to block the movement of troops and equipment; all signs and street signs were knocked down, all the maps of Prague were hidden in the shops, while the Soviet military only had outdated wartime maps. In this regard, control over radio, television and newspapers was belatedly established. "Healthy forces" took refuge in the Soviet embassy. But they could not be persuaded to form a new government and hold a Central Committee Plenum. The media has already managed to declare them traitors.

At the call of the President of the country and the Czech Radio, the citizens of Czechoslovakia did not provide an armed rebuff to the invading troops. However, everywhere the troops met the passive resistance of the local population. Czechs and Slovaks refused to provide Soviet troops with drink, food and fuel, changed road signs to hinder the advance of the troops, they took to the streets, tried to explain to the soldiers the essence of the events taking place in Czechoslovakia, and appealed to the Russian-Czechoslovak brotherhood. Citizens demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops and the return of party and government leaders who had been taken to the USSR.

At the initiative of the Prague City Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, clandestine meetings of the XIV Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia began ahead of schedule, on the territory of the plant in Vysochany (a district of Prague), however, without delegates from Slovakia who did not have time to arrive.

Representatives of the conservative-minded group of delegates at the congress were not elected to any of the leadership positions in the HRC.

Side losses

There was practically no fighting. There were isolated cases of attacks on the military, but the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of Czechoslovakia did not resist.

According to modern data, during the invasion, 108 citizens of Czechoslovakia were killed and more than 500 wounded, the vast majority of civilians. On the first day of the invasion alone, 58 people were killed or mortally wounded, including seven women and an eight-year-old child.

The largest number of civilian casualties was in Prague near the building of the Czech Radio. Perhaps some of the victims were undocumented. Thus, witnesses report that Soviet soldiers fired on a crowd of Prague residents on Wenceslas Square, as a result of which several people were killed and injured, although data on this incident were not included in the reports of the Czechoslovak security service. There are numerous testimonies of the death of civilians, including among minors and the elderly, in Prague, Liberec, Brno, Kosice, Poprad and other cities of Czechoslovakia as a result of the unmotivated use of weapons by Soviet soldiers.

Total from August 21 to September 20, 1968 the combat losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 12 dead and 25 wounded and injured. Non-combat losses for the same period - 84 dead and dead, 62 wounded and injured. Also, as a result of a helicopter crash near the city of Teplice, 2 Soviet correspondents were killed. It should be noted that the surviving helicopter pilot, fearing that he would have to bear responsibility for the accident, fired several bullets at the helicopter from a pistol, and then claimed that the helicopter had been shot down by the Czechoslovaks; this version was official for some time, and correspondents K. Nepomniachtchi and A. Zworykin appeared, including in internal KGB materials, as victims of "counter-revolutionaries".

August 26, 1968 near the city of Zvolen (Czechoslovakia), an An-12 crashed from the Tula 374 VTAP (c / c captain N. Nabok). According to the pilots, the plane with a load (9 tons of butter) during landing approach was fired from the ground from a machine gun at an altitude of 300 meters and, as a result of damage to the 4th engine, fell, not reaching the runway for several kilometers. 5 people died (burned alive in the resulting fire), the gunner-radio operator survived. However, according to Czech archivist historians, the plane crashed into a mountain.

Near the settlement of Zhandov near the city of Ceska Lipa, a group of citizens, blocking the road to the bridge, impeded the movement of the Soviet T-55 tank foreman Yu. I. Andreev, who was catching up with the column that had gone ahead at high speed. The foreman decided to turn off the road so as not to crush people and the tank collapsed from the bridge along with the crew. Three soldiers were killed.

The losses of the USSR in technology are not exactly known. In parts of the 38th Army alone, in the first three days, 7 tanks and armored personnel carriers were burned on the territory of Slovakia and North Moravia.

Known data on the losses of the armed forces of other countries participating in the operation. So, the Hungarian army lost 4 soldiers dead (all non-combat losses: accident, illness, suicide). The Bulgarian army lost 2 people - one sentry was killed at the post by unknown persons (while a machine gun was stolen), 1 soldier shot himself.

Further developments and international assessment of the invasion

AT early September troops were withdrawn from many cities and settlements Czechoslovakia to specially designated locations. Soviet tanks left Prague on September 11, 1968. On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary stay of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia "in order to ensure the security of the socialist community." October 17, 1968 a phased withdrawal of part of the troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.

AT 1969 in Prague, students Jan Palach and Jan Zajic set themselves on fire a month apart in protest against the Soviet occupation.

As a result of the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia, the process of political and economic reforms was interrupted. At the April (1969) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, G. Husak was elected first secretary. The reformers were removed from their posts, repressions began. Several tens of thousands of people left the country, including many representatives of the country's cultural elite.

On the territory of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet military presence remained until 1991.

August 21 representatives of a group of countries(USA, Great Britain, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay) spoke in the UN Security Council demanding that the "Czechoslovak question" be brought to the session of the UN General Assembly.

The representatives of Hungary and the USSR voted against. Then the representative of Czechoslovakia also demanded that this issue be removed from consideration by the UN. The military intervention of the five states was condemned by the governments of four socialist countries - Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania (which withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in September), the PRC, as well as a number of communist parties in Western countries.

Possible motivations for the deployment of troops and consequences

By the official version of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the countries of the Warsaw Pact(except Romania): The government of Czechoslovakia asked the allies in the military bloc to provide armed assistance in the fight against counter-revolutionary groups that, with the support of hostile imperialist countries, were preparing a coup d'état to overthrow socialism.

Geopolitical aspect: The USSR prevented the satellite countries from reviewing the unequal interstate relations that ensured its hegemony in Eastern Europe.

Military-strategic aspect: Czechoslovakia's voluntarism in foreign policy during the Cold War threatened the security of the border with NATO countries; before 1968 Czechoslovakia remained the only ATS country where there were no military bases of the USSR.

Ideological aspect: the ideas of socialism "with a human face" undermined the idea of ​​the truth of Marxism-Leninism, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leading role of the communist party, which, in turn, affected the power interests of the party elite.

Political aspect: the harsh crackdown on democratic voluntarism in Czechoslovakia gave the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU the opportunity, on the one hand, to crack down on internal opposition, on the other hand, to increase their authority, and thirdly, to prevent the disloyalty of the allies and demonstrate military power to potential opponents.

As a result of Operation Danube, Czechoslovakia remained a member of the Eastern European socialist bloc. The Soviet grouping of troops (up to 130 thousand people) remained in Czechoslovakia until 1991. The agreement on the conditions for the stay of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia became one of the main military-political results of the introduction of troops from five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Department of Internal Affairs. However, Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact as a result of the invasion.

The suppression of the Prague Spring increased the disillusionment of many on the Western Left with Marxist-Leninist theory and contributed to the growth of "Eurocommunism" ideas among the leadership and members of Western Communist parties - subsequently leading to a split in many of them. The communist parties of Western Europe lost mass support, as the impossibility of "socialism with a human face" was practically shown.

Milos Zeman was expelled from the Communist Party in 1970 for disagreeing with the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into the country.

The opinion is expressed that the operation "Danube" strengthened the position of the United States in Europe.

Paradoxically, a forceful action in Czechoslovakia in 1968 accelerated the arrival in relations between East and West of the period of the so-called. "detente" based on the recognition of the territorial status quo that existed in Europe and the holding by Germany under Chancellor Willy Brandt of the so-called. "New Ostpolitik".

Operation Danube hindered possible reforms in the USSR: “For the Soviet Union, the strangulation of the Prague Spring turned out to be associated with many grave consequences. The imperial “victory” in 1968 cut off the oxygen to reforms, strengthening the positions of dogmatic forces, strengthening the great-power traits in Soviet foreign policy, and contributing to the intensification of stagnation in all areas.”

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Operation Danube. This is what the documents called the strategic exercise of the troops of the five member countries of the Warsaw Pact, the purpose of which was "to protect the socialist gains in Czechoslovakia."

Under Gorbachev, the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968 was described as “the suppression of the construction of socialism with a human face”, and after the collapse of the USSR, these events are described only in a sharply condemning, and sometimes rude form, foreign policy The USSR is considered aggressive, Soviet soldiers are called "occupiers", etc.

Today's publicists do not want to reckon with the fact that all events in the world took place, and are taking place, in a specific international or domestic situation at a given period of time, and they judge the past by today's standards. Question: could the leadership of the countries of the socialist camp and, first of all, the Soviet Union at that time make a different decision?

International environment

1. At that time in Europe there were two worlds, opposite in ideologies - socialist and capitalist. Two economic organizations - the so-called Common Market in the West and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in the East.

There were two opposing military blocs - NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Now they only remember that in 1968 in the GDR there was a Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, in Poland - the Northern Group of Soviet Forces and in Hungary - the Southern Group of Forces. But for some reason they do not remember that the troops of the United States, Great Britain, and Belgium were stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and that the army corps of the Netherlands and France were ready to advance if necessary. Both military groups were in a state of full combat readiness.

2. Each of the parties defended its interests and, observing appearances, tried by any means to weaken the other.

Socio-political situation in Czechoslovakia

At the January 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the mistakes and shortcomings of the country's leadership were subjected to fair criticism, and a decision was made on the need for changes in the management of the state's economy. Alexander Dubcek was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who led the reforms, later called "the construction of socialism with a human face." The country's top leadership has changed (except for President L. Svoboda), and with it, domestic and foreign policy began to change.

4. Using the criticism of the leadership voiced at the Plenum, the opposition political forces, speculating on the demands of the “expansion” of democracy, began to discredit the Communist Party, power structures, state security agencies and socialism as a whole. Hidden shift preparations have begun political system.

5. In the media, on behalf of the people, they demanded: the abolition of the leadership of the party of economic and political life, the declaration of the HRC as a criminal organization, a ban on its activities, the dissolution of the state security agencies and the People's Militia. (People's militia - the name of the armed party workers' detachments that have been preserved since 1948, reporting directly to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.)

6. Various "clubs" ("Club 231", "Club of Active Non-Party People") and other organizations arose throughout the country, the main goal and task of which was to denigrate the country's history after 1945, rally the opposition, and conduct anti-constitutional propaganda. By mid-1968, the Ministry of Internal Affairs received about 70 applications for the registration of new organizations and associations. So, "Club 231" (On the basis of Article 231 of the Law on the Protection of the Constitution, anti-state and anti-constitutional activities were punished) was established in Prague on March 31, 1968, although it did not have permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The club united over 40 thousand people, among whom were former criminals and state criminals. As the newspaper Rude Pravo noted, among the members of the club were former Nazis, SS men, Henlein, ministers of the puppet "Slovak state", representatives of the reactionary clergy. At one of the meetings, the general secretary of the club Yaroslav Brodsky said: - "The best communist is a dead communist, and if he is still alive, then he should pull out his legs." At enterprises and in various organizations, branches of the club were created, which were called "Societies for the Protection of the Word and the Press."

7. One of the most striking anti-constitutional materials can be considered the appeal of the underground organization "Revolutionary Committee of the Democratic Party of Slovakia", distributed in June in organizations and enterprises in the city of Svit. Demands were put forward in it: to dissolve the collective farms and cooperatives, to distribute land to the peasants, to hold elections under the control of England, the USA, Italy and France, to stop criticism of Western states in the press, and to focus it on the USSR, to allow the legal activities of the political parties that existed in bourgeois Czechoslovakia, to annex already in 1968 "Transcarpathian Rus" to Czechoslovakia. The appeal ended with the call: "Death to the Communist Party!"

The French weekly Express on May 6 cited Antonin Lima, editor of the foreign department of the newspaper Literarni Listy: "Today in Czechoslovakia there is a question of taking power." Underground activities were revived by the Social Democratic Party and the Labor Party.

8. In order to create some sort of counterbalance to the Warsaw Pact, the idea of ​​creating the Little Entente was revived as a regional bloc of socialist and capitalist states and a buffer between the great powers. Publications on this topic were picked up by the Western press. Noteworthy was the remark of the analyst of the French newspaper "Figaro": "The geographical position of Czechoslovakia can turn it both into a bolt of the Warsaw Pact, the pact, and into a gap that opens the entire military system of the Eastern bloc." In May, a group of employees of the Prague Military-Political Academy published "Remarks on the development of the Program of Action of the Czechoslovak People's Army." The authors proposed "withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact or, possibly, collaboration Czechoslovakia with other socialist countries to eliminate the Warsaw Pact as a whole and replace it with a system of bilateral relations. As an option, there was a proposal to take a position of "consistent neutrality" in foreign policy.

Serious attacks from the position of "sound economic calculation" were also made against the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

9. On June 14, the Czechoslovak opposition invited the famous "Sovietologist" Zbigniew Brzezinski to speak in Prague with lectures in which he outlined his strategy of "liberalization", called for the destruction of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, as well as the elimination of the police and state security. According to him, he fully "supported the interesting Czechoslovak experiment."

A direct undermining of the national interests of Czechoslovakia were calls for "rapprochement" with the FRG, which were heard not only in the media, but also in the speeches of some of the country's leaders.

10. The matter was not limited to words.

The western borders of Czechoslovakia were opened, border barriers and fortifications began to be liquidated. At the direction of the Minister of State Security Pavel, spies of Western countries identified by counterintelligence were not detained, but were given the opportunity to leave. (In 1969, Pavel was put on trial and shot by the Czechoslovak authorities.)

Activities of foreign authorities, military and media

During this period, consultative meetings of representatives of NATO countries were held, at which possible measures were studied to bring Czechoslovakia out of the socialist camp. The United States expressed its readiness to influence Czechoslovakia on the issue of obtaining a loan from the capitalist countries, using the interest of Czechoslovakia in returning its gold reserves.

11. In 1968, the Vatican stepped up its activities in Czechoslovakia. Its leadership recommended directing the activities of the Catholic Church towards merging with the movement for "independence" and "liberalization", as well as taking on the role of "support and freedom in the countries of Eastern Europe", concentrating on Czechoslovakia, Poland and the GDR.

12. The population of Czechoslovakia was persistently instilled with the idea that there was no danger of revanchism on the part of the FRG, that one could think about the return of the Sudeten Germans to the country. The newspaper "General Anzeiger" (FRG) wrote: "The Sudeten Germans will expect from Czechoslovakia, liberated from communism, a return to the Munich Agreement, according to which the Sudetenland was ceded to Germany in the autumn of 1938." In the program of the National Democratic Party of Germany, one of the points read: "The Sudetenland must again become German, because they were acquired by Nazi Germany within the framework of the Munich Treaty, which is an effective international agreement." This program was actively supported by the "Fellowship of the Sudeten Germans" and the neo-fascist organization "Vitikobund".

And the editor of the Czech trade union newspaper Prace, Irzicek, told German television: “About 150,000 Germans live in our country. One can hope that the remaining 100-200 thousand could return to their homeland a little later.” Of course, no one anywhere remembered the persecution of the Czechs by the Sudeten Germans.

13. In the correspondence of the ADN agency, it was reported that Bundeswehr officers were repeatedly sent to Czechoslovakia for reconnaissance purposes. This applied, first of all, to the officers of the 2nd Army Corps, whose formations were stationed near the border of Czechoslovakia. Later it became known that in preparation for the Black Lion exercise planned for autumn, the entire command staff of the 2nd Corps, up to and including the battalion commander, visited Czechoslovakia as tourists and drove along the probable routes of movement of their units. With the start of the “exercises”, it was planned to take the territories torn away by Germany in 1938 in a short throw and put the international community before the fact. The calculation was based on the fact that if the USSR and the USA did not begin to fight because of the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967, they will not now either.

14. In order to create a situation in Czechoslovakia that would facilitate the withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact, the NATO Council developed the Zephyr program.

An article in the Finnish newspaper Päivän sanomat dated September 6, 1968 reported that in the region of Regensburg (Germany) “an agency has been operating and continues to function to monitor Czechoslovak events. In July, a special Observation and Control Center began to operate, which American officers call the "Strike Group Headquarters." It has more than 300 employees, including intelligence officers and political advisers. The center reported information about the situation in Czechoslovakia to NATO headquarters three times a day. The remark of the representative of the NATO headquarters is interesting: - “Although due to the entry of the Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia and the conclusion of the Moscow Agreement, the special center did not solve the tasks assigned to it, its activities still were and continue to be valuable experience for the future.”

Choice
Thus, by the spring of 1968, the countries of the socialist camp faced a choice:
- to allow opposition forces to push Czechoslovakia off the socialist path;
- to open the road to the East for a potential enemy, endangering not only the groupings of the Warsaw Pact forces, but also the results of the Second World War;

OR
- to protect the socialist system in Czechoslovakia with the help of the countries of the Commonwealth and to assist in the development of its economy;
- to put an end to the Munich policy once and for all, discarding all the claims of the revanchist heirs of Hitler;
- to put up a barrier in front of the new "Drang nah osten", showing the whole world that no one will be able to redraw the post-war borders established as a result of the struggle of many peoples against fascism.

15. Based on the prevailing situation, at the end of July 1968, the second was chosen. However, if the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had not shown such weakness and tolerance towards the enemies of the ruling party and the existing state system, nothing like this would have happened. The military-political leadership of the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact closely followed the events in Czechoslovakia and tried to bring their assessment to the authorities of Czechoslovakia. Meetings of the top leadership of the Warsaw Pact countries were held in Prague, Dresden, Warsaw, Cierna nad Tisou. During the meetings, the current situation was discussed, recommendations were made to the Czech leadership, but to no avail.

16. In the last days of July, at a meeting in Cierna nad Tisou, A. Dubcek was told that if the recommended measures were not taken, the troops of the socialist countries would enter Czechoslovakia. Dubcek not only did not take any measures, but also did not bring this warning to the members of the Central Committee and the government of the country. From a military point of view, there could be no other solution. The rejection of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, and even more so the entire country from the Warsaw Pact and its alliance with NATO, put the groupings of the Commonwealth troops in the GDR, Poland and Hungary under flank attack. The potential enemy received a direct exit to the border of the Soviet Union.

17. From the memoirs of the commander of the Alpha group of the KGB of the USSR, Hero of the Soviet Union, retired major general Zaitsev Gennady Nikolayevich (in 1968 - the head of the group of the 7th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR during Operation Danube):

“At that time, the situation in Czechoslovakia looked like this.

... Not even the "progressives" from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia began to come to the fore, but non-party forces - members of various "social" and "political" clubs, which were distinguished by their orientation towards the West and hatred of the Russians. June marked the beginning of a new phase of the aggravation of the situation in Czechoslovakia and the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and in mid-August the Dub-Chek team completely lost control over the situation in the country.

It is also noteworthy that some leaders of the Prague Spring believed that the sympathies of the West would certainly materialize in the form of a tough anti-Soviet position of the United States in the event of military action by the Soviet Union.

18. The task was set: a group led by G.N. Zaitsev to enter the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia and take control of it. Interior Minister I. Pavel managed to escape the day before. According to numerous testimonies, I. Pavel, as the Prague Spring developed, gradually liquidated the state security agencies, getting rid of the communist cadres and supporters of Moscow. He threatened his employees, who were trying to neutralize the so-called "progressives" (the Club of Non-Party Activists and the K-231 organization), with reprisals. Prior to the government's decision, they were ordered to immediately stop jamming foreign transmissions and begin dismantling equipment.

19. ... The documents contained information that the Minister of the Interior, I. Pavel, and the head of the department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, General Prkhlik, "prepared a project for the creation of a leading Center that should take all state power into its own hands during political tensions in the country." It also spoke about the implementation of "preventive security measures against the actions of conservative forces, including the creation of labor camps." In other words, a covert, but quite real preparation was carried out in the country for the creation of concentration camps, where all the forces opposed to the regime “with a human face” were to be hidden ... And if we add to this the titanic efforts of some foreign special services and agents of influence of the West, who intended to tear off at any cost Czechoslovakia from the Eastern Bloc, then overall picture events did not look as unambiguous as we are trying to assure.

20. ... How did you manage to capture by no means a small European country in the shortest possible time and with minimal losses? A significant role in this course of events was played by the neutral position of the Czechoslovak army (and this is about 200 thousand people armed at that time with modern military equipment). I want to emphasize that General Martin Dzur played a key role in that very difficult situation. But the main reason for the small number of victims was the behavior of Soviet soldiers, who showed amazing restraint in Czechoslovakia.

... According to Czech historians, about a hundred people died during the introduction of troops, about a thousand were wounded and injured.

21. ... I am convinced that at that time there was simply no other way out of the crisis. In my opinion, the results of the Prague Spring are very instructive. If not for the harsh actions of the USSR and its allies, then the Czech leadership, having instantly passed the stage of "socialism with a human face", would have found itself in the arms of the West. The Warsaw bloc would have lost a strategically important state in the center of Europe, NATO would have found itself at the borders of the USSR. Let's be completely honest: the operation in Czechoslovakia gave peace to two generations of Soviet children. Or not? After all, by "letting go" of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union would inevitably face the effect of a house of cards. Unrest would break out in Poland and Hungary. Then it would be the turn of the Baltic states, and after it the Transcaucasus.”

Start

22. On the night of August 21, the troops of the five countries of the Warsaw Pact entered the territory of Czechoslovakia, and troops landed at the Prague airfield. The troops were ordered not to open fire until they were under fire. The columns were moving at high speeds, stopped cars were pushed off the roadway so as not to interfere with traffic. By morning, all the advanced military units of the Commonwealth countries had reached the assigned areas. Czechoslovak troops were ordered not to leave the barracks. Their military camps were blocked, batteries were removed from armored vehicles, fuel was drained from tractors.

23. Interestingly, in early August, representatives of the People's Militia met with their commander A. Dubcek and presented an ultimatum: either he changes the policy of the leadership, or on August 22, the People's Militia will take control of all important objects, take power into their own hands, and remove him from the post of general secretary and demand the convening of a party congress. Dubcek listened to them, but did not give any concrete answer. Most importantly, he did not tell the commanders of the party's armed detachments subordinate to him personally about the ultimatum he received in Cierna nad Tisou from the leaders of the GDR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the USSR. Apparently, he was counting on something. And when the Warsaw Pact troops entered Czechoslovakia on August 21, the leadership of the detachments and ordinary communists considered this an insult. They believed that they could cope with the situation in the country themselves, without the introduction of foreign troops. Life has shown that then they overestimated their strength. Only after the defeat of the opposition in August 1969 did the opponents of the regime go underground for a long time.

The attitude of the local population

24. At first, the attitude of the local population towards the military personnel of the Commonwealth countries was bad. Intoxicated by hostile propaganda, duplicitous behavior of the first persons of the state, lack of information about the true reasons for the introduction of troops, and sometimes intimidated by local oppositionists, people not only looked askance at foreign soldiers. Stones were thrown at the cars, at night the places where the troops were located were fired from small arms. Signs and signs were demolished on the roads, and the walls of houses were painted with slogans such as "Occupiers, go home!", "Arrows of the occupier!" etc.

Sometimes local residents secretly came to military units and asked why the Soviet troops had come. And it would be fine, only Russians came, otherwise they brought “Caucasians” with “narrow-eyed” with them. In the center of Europe (!) people were surprised that the Soviet army was multinational.

The actions of the opposition forces

25. The entry of allied troops showed the forces of the Czech opposition and their foreign inspirers that the hopes of seizing power collapsed. However, they decided not to give up, but called for armed resistance. In addition to shelling cars, helicopters and locations of allied troops, terrorist acts began against Czech workers of party organs and intelligence officers. The evening edition of the English newspaper The Sunday Times of August 27 published an interview with one of the leaders of the underground. He said that by August "the underground numbered about 40,000 people armed with automatic weapons." A significant part of the weapons was secretly supplied from the West, primarily from the FRG. However, they were unable to use it.

27. In the very first days after the entry of the allied troops, in cooperation with the Czech security agencies, several thousand machine guns, hundreds of machine guns and grenade launchers were seized from many caches and cellars. Even mortars were found. So, even in the Prague House of Journalists, which was run by extremely opposition figures, 13 machine guns, 81 machine guns and 150 boxes of ammunition were found. At the beginning of 1969, a ready-made concentration camp was discovered in the Tatra Mountains. Who built it and for whom, at that time was unknown.

Information-psychological warfare

28. Another evidence of the existence of organized anti-constitutional forces in Czechoslovakia is the fact that by 8 o'clock on August 21, underground radio stations began to operate in all regions of the country, on some days up to 30-35 units. They used not only radio stations pre-installed on cars, trains and in secret shelters, but also equipment captured in the MPVO, in branches of the Union for Cooperation with the Army (such as DOSAAF in the USSR), in large agriculture. Underground radio transmitters were combined into a system that determined the time and duration of work. The capture groups found working radio stations deployed in apartments, hidden in the safes of the leaders of various organizations. There were also radio stations in special suitcases, along with tables of wave propagation in different time days. Install the antenna attached to the station and work. Radio stations, as well as four channels of underground television, disseminated false information, rumors, calls for the destruction of allied troops, sabotage, and sabotage. They also transmitted encrypted information and code signals to the underground forces.

29. The radio transmitters of the West German 701st psychological warfare battalion fit well into this "choir".

At first, Soviet radio intelligence officers were surprised that a number of anti-government stations were taking direction in the west, but on September 8 their guess was confirmed by the Stern magazine (Germany). The magazine reported that on August 23, the Literarni Listy newspaper, followed by the underground radio, reported that “Allied troops fired on the children's hospital on Charles Square. Broken windows, ceilings, expensive medical equipment…” A German television reporter rushed to the area, but the hospital building was unscathed. According to the Stern magazine, "this false information was transmitted not from Czech, but from West German territory." The magazine noted that the events of these days "provided an ideal opportunity for practical training 701st battalion.

30. If the first leaflets with a message about the introduction of allied troops were issued by official government or party bodies and printing houses, then there were no imprints on subsequent ones. In many cases, the texts and appeals in different parts of the country were the same.

A change of scenery

31. Slowly, but the situation changed.

The Central Group of Forces was formed, the Soviet military units began to settle in the Czech military towns liberated for them, where the chimneys were littered with bricks, the sewers were clogged, and the windows were broken. In April 1969, A. Dubcek was replaced by G. Husak, the leadership of the country changed. Emergency laws were adopted, according to which, in particular, a fist shown to a Russian “cost” up to three months in prison, and a provoked fight with Russians cost six. At the end of 1969, military personnel were allowed to bring their families to the garrisons where construction battalions built housing. Construction of housing for families continued until 1972.

32. So, what are these "occupiers" who sacrificed their lives so that civilians would not die, would not respond with a shot to the most brazen provocations, and would save people unknown to them from reprisal? Who lived in hangars and warehouses, and the beds, even in officers' and women's (for medical staff, typists, waitresses) dormitories, stood in two tiers? Who preferred to act not as soldiers, but as agitators, explaining to the population the situation and their tasks?

Conclusion

The entry of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries into Czechoslovakia was a forced measure aimed at maintaining the unity of the countries of the socialist camp, as well as preventing NATO troops from reaching the borders.

33. Soviet soldiers were not occupiers and did not behave like invaders. No matter how pathetic it sounds, but in August 1968 they defended their country on the front lines of the socialist camp. The tasks assigned to the army were completed with minimal losses.

34. No matter what modern political scientists say, but in that situation the government of the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp made a decision adequate to the current situation. Even the current generation of Czechs should be grateful to the Soviet army for the fact that the Sudetes remained part of Czechoslovakia and their state exists within modern borders.

"Notes in the Field"

35. But here is what is interesting and raises questions.

The soldiers who were the first (!) to be called "Warriors-Internationalists" are not even recognized as such in Russia, although by Order of the Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Grechko No. 242 of 10/17/1968 they were thanked for fulfilling their international duty. Order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR No. 220 dated July 5, 1990 “List of States, Cities, Territories and Periods of Combat Operations with the Participation of Citizens Russian Federation” was supplemented by the Republic of Cuba. For unknown reasons, Czechoslovakia (the only one!) was not included in the list, and, as a result, the relevant documents were not handed over to former servicemen who performed their international duty in this country.

36. The questions were repeatedly discussed at various levels whether or not to recognize the participants in the operation as internationalist soldiers and combat veterans.

A group of scientists, after analyzing the materials available for study and after meetings with direct participants in the Czechoslovak events, stated that “in 1968, a superbly planned and impeccably implemented military operation was carried out in Czechoslovakia, during which military operations were conducted. How in terms military science, and the real situation of the use of forces and means. And the soldiers and officers who fulfilled their duty during the operation "Danube" have every right to be called soldiers-internationalists and fall under the category of "combatant".

37. However, the Russian Ministry of Defense does not recognize them as such, and in response to questions and appeals regional organizations participants in the Danube operation replies that there were “only clashes”, and they were thanked for “fulfilling their international duty”, and not for participating in hostilities.

38. Meanwhile, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine included Czechoslovakia in the corresponding list, and the President of the country issued Decree No. 180/2004 of February 11, 2004 “On the day of honoring participants in hostilities on the territory of other states”. According to the Decree, former soldiers and officers who took part in the defense of social gains in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were given the status of "Combatant", "Veteran of War", and were granted benefits under the Law of Ukraine "On the status of war veterans, guarantees of their social protection" .

39. To date, the youngest participants in Operation Danube are already 64 years old, and every year their ranks are becoming smaller. The last, according to the author of the article, appeal only by the Rostov organization of the participants in the operation "Danube" was sent to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in January of this year. Let's wait for the new minister to respond.

On August 20, 1968, the Danube military operation began. International (mostly Soviet) troops "took" Prague in record time, capturing all strategically important facilities.

Brezhnev Doctrine

In the late 1960s, the “world system of socialism” was testing its strength. Relations with the fraternal peoples were not easy, but in relations with the West there was a stalemate "detente". I could take a deep breath and pay attention to Eastern Europe. The battle for the "correct" understanding of the Union of allied countries on the sidelines of NATO was called the "Brezhnev doctrine." The doctrine became the right to invade the guilty Czechoslovakia. Who else will defend socialism warped by independence and dispel the spring dissent in Prague?

Dubcek and reforms

In December 1967, Alexander Dubcek came to the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. He came, entered into a struggle with the "canned" neo-Stalinists, tried to draw a new socialism "with a human face." "Socialism with a human face" is the freedom of the press, speech and the repressed - echoes of the social democracy of the West. Ironically, one of the released, Gustav Husak, would later replace the innovator Dubcek as first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia under Moscow's patronage. But this is later, but for now Dubcek, together with the President of Czechoslovakia, proposed to the country a "Program of Action" - reforms. The innovations were supported by the people and the intelligentsia (signed by 70 under the article “Two thousand words”). The USSR, recalling Yugoslavia, did not support such innovations. Dubcek was sent a collective letter from the Warsaw Pact countries with a call to stop creative activity, but the first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia did not want to give in.

warning conference

On July 29, 1968, in the city of Chienra nad Tisou, Brezhnev, together with Dubcek, nevertheless agreed. The USSR undertook to withdraw allied troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia (there were such - they were introduced for training and joint maneuvers) and to stop attacks in the press. In turn, Dubcek promised not to flirt with the "human face" - to pursue domestic policy, not forgetting the USSR.

Warsaw Pact on the offensive

"The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, loyal to international duty and the Warsaw Pact, must send their troops to assist the Czechoslovak People's Army in defending the Motherland from the danger looming over it." Such a directive was received by the commander of the airborne troops, General Margelov. And this was back in April 1968, in other words, before the conclusion of the Bratislava Agreement on July 29, 1968. And on August 18, 1968, at a joint conference of the USSR, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria read a letter from the "true socialists" of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with a request for military assistance. The military operation "Danube" became not an idea, but a reality.
"Danube"

The specifics of the USSR military campaign against Czechoslovakia was the choice striking force. The main role was assigned to the airborne troops Soviet army. The air defense troops, the navy and the strategic missile forces were put on high alert. The actions of the international army were carried out on three fronts - the Carpathian, Central and southern fronts. Considering the role assigned to air force, on each of the fronts, the participation of air armies was provided. At 23:00 on August 20, a combat alarm sounded, one of the five sealed packages with the operation plan was opened. Here was the plan for Operation Danube.

On the night of 20 to 21 August

A passenger plane flying up to the Czech airport "Ruzyna" requested an emergency landing and received it. From that moment, from two in the morning, the airport was captured by the 7th Airborne Division. While in the building of the Central Committee, Dubcek addressed the people by radio with an appeal to prevent bloodshed. Less than two hours later, Dubcek and the Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia assembled by him in the amount of eleven people were arrested. The capture of the airport and the opposition was the main objective of Operation Danube, but Dubcek's reforms were contagious. At 5 am on August 21, a reconnaissance company of the 350th Guards Airborne Regiment and a reconnaissance company of the 103rd Airborne Division landed on the territory of Czechoslovakia. Within ten minutes, a continuous stream of soldiers disembarking from planes managed to capture two airports. Troops with equipment marked with white stripes moved inland. Four hours later, Prague was occupied - the Allied troops seized the telegraph, military headquarters, railway stations. All ideologically important objects - the buildings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the government, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff were seized. At 10 am, KGB officers took Alexander Dubcek and others like him out of the Central Committee building.

Results

Two days after the actual end of the campaign, negotiations between the interested parties took place in Moscow. Dubcek and his comrades signed the Moscow Protocol, which, as a result, allowed the USSR not to withdraw its troops. The protectorate of the USSR extended for an indefinite time, until the normal situation in Czechoslovakia was settled. This position was supported by the new First Secretary Husak and the President of Czechoslovakia, L. Svoboda. Theoretically, the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia was completed in mid-November 1968, in practice, the presence of the military forces of the Soviet army lasted until 1991. Operation Danube stirred up the public, dividing the socialist camp into those who agreed and disagreed. Dissatisfied marches took place in Moscow and Finland, but in general, Operation Danube showed the strength and seriousness of the USSR and, importantly, the full combat readiness of our army.