The history of Chechnya as an independent state began quite unexpectedly. In the summer of 1991, the whole world suddenly learned that some part of Checheno-Ingushetia decided to secede from the RSFSR and the USSR, and declared itself a new independent state called the Chechen Republic. A step towards this was the decision taken at the National Congress of the Chechen people, which also determined the governing body of the new state - the executive committee headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev.
The decision began to immediately turn into reality. In September 1991, Dudayev's armed guards seized the buildings of the Council of Ministers, the radio and television center. On September 6, the building of the Supreme Council of Chechnya was stormed. Thus, a coup d'état actually took place there, the Supreme Council was dissolved, and on October 27 elections were held for the first president of the Chechen Republic.
By 1993, while Dudayev's government was in power, the republic had become the most criminal zone in the territory of the former Soviet Union. The complete collapse of the police, the prosecutor's office and the courts contributed to the endless growth of crime. So, in 1992-1993, about 600 murders were committed annually on the territory of Chechnya, which was 7 times higher than in 1990. In 1993, there were 559 attacks on trains traveling through the territory of Chechnya, more than 4,000 wagons were looted. The losses from these crimes amounted to tens of billions of rubles.
Gradually, the center of crime began to grow. As of December 1, 1994, 1,900 people from Chechnya were put on the federal wanted list for committing crimes of varying severity. In addition, the scam with fake Chechen advice letters caused irreparable damage to the Russian economy. Its essence was that the criminals received cash on counterfeit payment orders from Chechen banks. Before the criminal network was uncovered, damage to the state was inflicted in the amount of 5 trillion rubles.
The production of counterfeit money also flourished here. The absence of militia and the rampant banditry that followed led to the violation of almost all human rights. There were no jobs and salaries, pensions and benefits were not paid. During the three years that Dudayev was in power, more than 200 thousand people fled the republic, which is 20 percent of the total population. At the same time, the number of Russians who left Chechnya at that time reached half.
At the same time, Dudayev actually kept the situation under control only in Grozny itself and its outskirts. The rest of the territory of the republic was ruled by clans who did whatever they wanted with regard to the Russian population. After the declaration of independence on October 15, massacres began. And after November 26 - real repressions, pogroms, mass deportations, robberies and murders. The situation began to threaten Russia, which remained after the collapse of the USSR. Taking advantage of the chaos that reigned in the country in connection with the collapse Soviet Union, Dudayev declared independence and began to carry out the secession of Chechnya from Russia.
The federal authorities tried to resolve the situation amicably. However, in general, the steps were indecisive, and the legislative acts adopted on this occasion were more persuasive than binding.
As a result, a military-police operation was announced to eliminate the Dudayev regime, disarm numerous armed formations and restore constitutional order in the region. However, it quickly escalated into a war. At the same time, it was a big surprise for the Russian leadership that Dudayev had a well-trained and armed army. So, according to the FSK, there were no more than 250 armed bandits in Chechnya at that time.
However, there was a big miscalculation. The Chechen armed forces, including the army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, state security detachments, the militia, self-defense detachments, had about 13 thousand people by the beginning of hostilities. There were also about 2,500 mercenaries and volunteers from various regions of Russia and the CIS countries. Due to the fault of military officials, a large number of serviceable weapons, small arms, and armored vehicles were left in the republic.
Another big surprise was that the inhabitants of Chechnya began to oppose the introduction of Russian troops into the republic. Most of them perceived this move as an invasion of hostile forces seeking to subdue the freedom-loving people. As a result of this, all those who fought against him all this time as part of the opposition also went over to the side of Dudayev.
All mine school years on television they showed reports about the war in Chechnya - at that time television was still quite objectively covering such things, showing this war through the eyes of both sides of the conflict. From the outside, everything looked like the Chechens were fighting for the right to live according to their customs and pursue a policy independent of Moscow, and Moscow wanted to deprive them of this right and force them to live by their own rules.
And here comes the first Chechen War and then the second one. "Wikipedia" in the column "results of the Second Chechen War" writes: "The result is the victory of Russia, the restoration by Russia of full control over the territory of Chechnya." One can agree with the "restoration of full control" (albeit with reservations), but I would argue about the "victory of Russia".
Let's look at the facts:
- De jure, Chechnya has federal legislation, but de facto there are many legislative nuances, this is noted by many Russian journalists and political scientists, for example, here is a quote from Yaroslav Trofimov: "Theoretically, Chechnya - although it is predominantly Muslim - is an integral part of the secular Russian Federation, and the same laws apply in it as in Moscow. However, in practice, this North Caucasian republic of 1.4 million people, destroyed and tormented by two wars in a row, lives by completely different rules.
These rules apply, for example, to weddings and other aspects of civic life - at the internal level, even those laws that may be contrary to federal law are in force.
- The leader of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, is pursuing an independent policy in many respects, this is noted by many researchers of the issue. Here is what Mikhail Khodorkovsky stated in one of his interviews published in The New York Times: "In many respects, Chechnya is practically an independent Islamic republic where Sharia is widely practiced. Some neighboring republics have only the appearance of belonging to a federal structure."
That is, in fact, the Chechens retained the right to live the way they want and solve problems in their own way.
- From the 2000s to the present, the Chechen Republic has been one of the most subsidized regions of Russia, huge funds are sent there. I have come across different figures, but in general, all charts put Chechnya in the top 5 among the subsidized regions of Russia, only Dagestan, Kamchatka and Crimea are higher than Chechnya (data for 2016). In my opinion, this state of affairs suits both the central Russian authorities and the Chechens themselves, this is what the deputy of the Chechen parliament, Magomet Khambiev, says ( former assistant Dudayev): “If Dudayev were alive now, then everything he would see, he would like. He would say: “Ramzan managed to do what I failed to do.”
In this regard, I have a question - so why were two Chechen wars needed and what is their real outcome?
Because now everything looks as if Chechnya did not lose in that confrontation for independence, but won - the Chechens live the way they want, and even receive colossal funds from Moscow.
Section: War |
During the armed conflict in the North Caucasus during the week of November 17-23, 2014, at least eight people were injured, six of them were killed and two were injured. Also this week it became known about the death of another person that happened earlier. Among the dead are six suspected of participating in the activities of the armed underground - two in Dagestan and four in Chechnya. It also became known about the death of a civilian in Chechnya a week earlier.
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Section: Opinions and assessments |Crimes in war
Section: News | Section: News | An NTV story about kidnappings and torture in Chechnya that was taken off the airSection: voinenet-inform | Presentation of the book "Diary of Zherebtsova Polina"
The presentation was held on October 21 at the museum and public center named after. Andrei Sakharov in Moscow. The book tells about the events of 1999-2002 in Grozny, during the second Russian-Chechen war. Polina Zherebtsova kept a diary as a wounded teenager: dreams, poems and drawings of explosions that looked like flowers helped her not to go crazy in this hell. The author participated in the presentation. Polina Zherebtsova spoke about herself, about the history of the publication of the book, read poems from the war years and fragments of her diary.
Watch our video report.
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Section: Opinions and assessments | North Caucasus: slavery of the word
Crimes in war
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Section: Opinions and assessments | About "Shali raid" Section: War |Opinions and ratings
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Section: Opinions and assessments | The son of Aslan Maskhadov published the book "My father is the Chechen president"Opinions and ratings
Section: Opinions and assessments |We are publishing Anzor Maskhadov's appeal in connection with his new project dedicated to the genocide of the Chechen people in the 20th-21st centuries.
Work is underway on a project dedicated to the genocide of the Chechen people. The purpose of the project is to collect, analyze and disseminate information about crimes against our people in the XX-XXI centuries. Unfortunately, the world knows nothing or almost nothing about the tragedy of our people. Our duty is to convey this information to the world for the sake of restoring historical justice, in the name of the memory of the dead and in the name of future generations. Only the widest possible publicity can guarantee that this will not happen again.
Here you can leave your signature under an appeal to the President of the Russian Federation with a request to hand over the body of Aslan Maskhadov to his relatives.
Chechen separatist leader, former President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov was killed on March 8, 2005 in the village of Tolstoy-Yurt.
The release of his body to relatives for burial was denied. He was secretly buried in an unknown location.
Was the First Chechen War necessary?
Quite a bit is left before the next memorable "black" date in our calendar. December 11 will mark 15 years since the introduction of federal troops into the territory of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. By that time, bandit lawlessness had been established on its territory. Murders, ethnic cleansing, genocide of the non-indigenous population under the slogan "Chechnya for the Vainakhs!", money on false vouchers, kidnappings and the slave trade, robberies of passenger and freight trains - this is not a complete list of the "exploits" of supporters of the criminal regime of Dzhokhar Dudayev. This war cost Russia great material losses, it was paid for with the lives of thousands dead soldiers and officers who became disabled, returned home with a broken psyche. Ultimately, the victory that came at a very high price from our army was stolen by the so-called Khasavyurt agreements signed in August 1996 by A. Maskhadov and A. Lebed. The criminal regime in Chechnya got a respite, managed to recover... As a result, this led to the 2nd Chechen war that began in 1999 and its new victims.
Second Chechen war. background
After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal Russian troops in 1996 there was no peace and tranquility in Chechnya and the regions adjacent to it.
Chechen criminal structures with impunity did business on mass kidnappings, hostage-taking (including official Russian representatives working in Chechnya), theft of oil from oil pipelines and oil wells, the production and smuggling of drugs, the production and distribution of counterfeit banknotes, terrorist attacks and attacks on neighboring Russian regions. On the territory of Chechnya, camps were set up for the training of militants - young people from the Muslim regions of Russia. Mine-blasting instructors and Islamic preachers were sent here from abroad. Numerous Arab mercenaries began to play a significant role in the life of Chechnya. Their main goal was to destabilize the situation in the Russian regions neighboring Chechnya and spread the ideas of separatism to the North Caucasian republics (primarily Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria).
In early March 1999, Gennady Shpigun, the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Interior Ministry in Chechnya, was abducted by terrorists at the Grozny airport. For the Russian leadership, this was evidence that CRI President Maskhadov was not in a position to fight terrorism on his own. The federal center took measures to intensify the fight against Chechen gangs: self-defense units were armed and police units were reinforced along the entire perimeter of Chechnya, the best operatives of units to combat ethnic organized crime were sent to the North Caucasus, several Tochka-U rocket launchers were deployed from the Stavropol Territory. ", designed for delivering pinpoint strikes. An economic blockade of Chechnya was introduced, which led to the fact that the cash flow from Russia began to dry up sharply. Due to the tightening of the regime at the border, it has become increasingly difficult to smuggle drugs into Russia and take hostages. Gasoline produced at clandestine factories has become impossible to take out of Chechnya. The fight against Chechen criminal groups that actively financed the militants in Chechnya was also intensified. In May-July 1999, the Chechen-Dagestan border turned into a militarized zone. As a result, the incomes of Chechen warlords were sharply reduced and they had problems with the purchase of weapons and payment of mercenaries. In April 1999 the commander-in-chief internal troops Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov was appointed, who successfully led a number of operations during the First Chechen War. In May 1999, Russian helicopters launched a missile attack on the positions of Khattab militants on the Terek River in response to an attempt by gangs to seize an outpost of internal troops on the Chechen-Dagestan border. After that, Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo announced the preparation of large-scale preventive strikes.
Meanwhile, Chechen gangs under the command of Shamil Basayev and Khattab were preparing for an armed invasion of Dagestan. From April to August 1999, conducting reconnaissance in combat, they made more than 30 sorties in Stavropol and Dagestan alone, as a result of which several dozen military personnel, law enforcement officers and civilians were killed and injured. Realizing that the strongest groupings of federal troops were concentrated in the Kizlyar and Khasavyurt directions, the militants decided to strike at the mountainous part of Dagestan. When choosing this direction, the bandit formations proceeded from the fact that there are no troops there, and it will not be possible to transfer forces to this hard-to-reach area in the shortest possible time. In addition, the militants counted on a possible blow to the rear of the federal forces from the Kadar zone of Dagestan, which since August 1998 has been controlled by local Wahhabis.
As the researchers note, the destabilization of the situation in the North Caucasus was beneficial to many. First of all, Islamic fundamentalists seeking to spread their influence throughout the world, as well as Arab oil sheikhs and financial oligarchs of the Persian Gulf countries, who are not interested in starting the exploitation of oil and gas fields in the Caspian.
August 7, 1999 from the territory of Chechnya, a massive invasion of militants into Dagestan was carried out under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The core of the militant group was made up of foreign mercenaries and fighters of the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade associated with al-Qaeda. The plan of the militants to transfer the population of Dagestan to their side failed, the Dagestanis put up desperate resistance to the invading bandits. The Russian authorities offered the Ichkerian leadership to conduct a joint operation with the federal forces against the Islamists in Dagestan. It was also proposed to "resolve the issue of liquidating the bases, places of storage and recreation of illegal armed groups, from which the Chechen leadership in every possible way disowns." Aslan Maskhadov verbally condemned the attacks on Dagestan and their organizers and inspirers, but did not take real measures to counter them.
For more than a month there were battles between the federal forces and the invading militants, which ended with the fact that the militants were forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya. On the same days - September 4-16 - in several Russian cities (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buynaksk) a series of terrorist acts were carried out - explosions of residential buildings.
Considering Maskhadov's inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants in Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops.
- On September 23, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Counter-Terrorist Operations in the North Caucasus Region of the Russian Federation." The decree provided for the creation of the United Group of Forces in the North Caucasus to conduct a counter-terrorist operation.
- On September 23, Russian troops began a massive bombardment of Grozny and its environs, on September 30 they entered the territory of Chechnya.
First Chechen War |
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Chechnya, also partially Ingushetia, Dagestan, Stavropol Territory |
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Khasavyurt agreements, the withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya. |
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Territorial changes: |
The actual independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. |
Opponents |
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Russian Armed Forces |
Chechen separatists |
Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia |
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Commanders |
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Boris Yeltsin |
Dzhokhar Dudayev † |
Side forces |
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95,000 troops (February 1995) |
3,000 (Republican Guard), 27,000 (regulars and militia) |
Military casualties |
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About 5,500 dead and missing (according to official figures) |
17,391 dead and captured (Russian data) |
First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - fighting between the Russian government forces (Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus in order to take control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991. Often referred to as the "first Chechen war", although officially the conflict was referred to as "measures to maintain constitutional order". The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of genocide of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.
Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the defeat and withdrawal of federal troops, massive destruction and casualties, the de facto independence of Chechnya until the second Chechen conflict and the wave of terror that swept across Russia.
Background to the conflict
With the beginning of "perestroika" in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements became more active. One such organization was the All-National Congress of the Chechen People, established in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed former general Soviet Air force Dzhokhar Dudayev.
"Chechen revolution" of 1991
On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power developed in the republic.
During the "August coup" in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of the republican state structures, accusing Russia of a "colonial" policy. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House.
More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Ruslan Khasbulatov then sent them a telegram: "I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic." After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final withdrawal of Chechnya from the Russian Federation.
On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the President of the Republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation.
On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree declaring a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. After these actions of the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic deteriorated sharply - supporters of the separatists surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of the state of emergency was thwarted and the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the republic began, which finally ended by the summer of 1992. The separatists began to seize and loot military depots. Dudayev's forces got a lot of weapons: 2 rocket launchers ground forces, 4 tanks, 3 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 armored personnel carrier, 14 lightly armored tractors, 6 aircraft, 60 thousand units of small arms automatic weapons and a lot of ammunition. In June 1992, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Pavel Grachev ordered that half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic be transferred to the Dudaevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to take out the rest due to the lack of soldiers and echelons.
The collapse of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR (1991-1992)
The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the disintegration of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. Malgobeksky, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former CHIASSR formed the Republic of Ingushetia as part of the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.
The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia has not been demarcated and has not been defined to date (2010). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992 in the Prigorodny district North Ossetia Russian troops were brought in. Relations between Russia and Chechnya deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time to solve the "Chechen problem" by force, but then the entry of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.
Period of de facto independence (1991-1994)
As a result, Chechnya became de facto independent, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia, a state. The republic had state symbols - a flag, emblem and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was supposed to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of their own state currency - nahara. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, CRI was characterized as an "independent secular state", its government refused to sign a federal treaty with the Russian Federation.
In fact, the CRI state system proved to be extremely inefficient and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994.
In 1992-1993, over 600 premeditated murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. For the period of 1993 at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasian railway 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand wagons and containers in the amount of 11.5 billion rubles. For 8 months in 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed in armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to take a decision to stop traffic on the territory of Chechnya from October 1994.
A special craft was the manufacture of false advice notes, on which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and the slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, since 1992, 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya.
Even after that, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer money from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Until 1994, Russian oil continued to flow to Chechnya, while it was not paid for and resold abroad.
The period of Dudayev's rule is characterized by ethnic cleansing against the entire non-Chechen population. In 1991-1994, the non-Chechen (primarily Russian) population of Chechnya was subjected to murders, attacks and threats from Chechens. Many were forced to leave Chechnya, being expelled from their homes, leaving or selling apartments to Chechens at a low price. Only in 1992, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 250 Russians were killed in Grozny, 300 were missing. The morgues were filled with unidentified corpses. Widespread anti-Russian propaganda was kindled by the relevant literature, direct insults and appeals from government stands, desecration of Russian cemeteries.
Political crisis of 1993
In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply escalated in the CRI. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of the Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, in which meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; thus, a coup d'état took place in CRI. The constitution, adopted last year, was amended, and Dudayev's regime of personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament.
Formation of the anti-Dudaev opposition (1993-1994)
After the coup d'état on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against Dudayev's regime. The first opposition organization was the National Salvation Committee (KNS), which held several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VSChR), which proclaimed itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).
Beginning of the civil war (1994)
Since the summer of 1994, hostilities have unfolded in Chechnya between government troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides, tanks, artillery and mortars were used.
The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and none of them could win the fight.
Only in Urus-Martan in October 1994, the Dudaevites lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the General Staff Armed Forces CRI A. Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan B. Gantamirov lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, a detachment of the opposition field commander R. Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, on September 12 and October 15, 1994, carried out offensive actions in Grozny, but every time they retreated without achieving decisive success, although they did not suffer heavy losses.
On November 26, the oppositionists unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian servicemen who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.
The course of the war
The entry of troops (December 1994)
Even before the announcement of any decision by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aircraft attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all the aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 "On Measures to Ensure Law, Law and Order and Public Security on the Territory of the Chechen Republic."
On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), which consisted of parts of the Ministry of Defense and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), the northwest (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya) and the east (from the territory of Dagestan).
The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The Western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, however, using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok grouping advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.
Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from the Chechen Grad rocket artillery installation and then entered the battle for this settlement.
The new offensive of the units of the OGV began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blockaded Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzha Range. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and the paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Division blocked the city from the side of the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.
Thus, on initial stage military operations, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.
Assault on Grozny (December 1994 - March 1995)
Despite the fact that Grozny was still not blocked from the south side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 units of armored vehicles, extremely vulnerable in street battles, entered the city. The Russian troops were poorly trained, there was no interaction and coordination between the various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops did not even have maps of the city and normal communications.
The western grouping of troops was stopped, the eastern one also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 131st separate Maikopskaya motorized rifle brigade and the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment, under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. There they were surrounded and defeated - the losses of the Maykop brigade amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin died, more than 100 servicemen were captured.
The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.
On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groups were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became the commander of the West group.
The Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting ensued in Grozny.
Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.
By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV had been increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.
Only on February 3, 1995, the South grouping was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the line federal highway"Rostov-Baku".
On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the United Forces, Anatoly Kulikov, and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the CRI, Aslan Maskhadov, on the conclusion of a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to take out the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.
In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen detachments, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.
Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants from the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last district of Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.
A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.
As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was actually destroyed and turned into ruins.
Establishing control over the flat regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)
After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the flat regions of the rebellious republic.
The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, persuading local residents expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied the dominant heights above the villages and cities. Thanks to this, on March 15-23, Argun was taken, on March 30 and 31, the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left the settlements.
Despite this, local battles were going on in the western regions of Chechnya. March 10 began fighting for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, the combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by detachments of SOBR and OMON, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoi-Martanovsky district of Chechnya) and entered into battle with militant forces. It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called "Abkhazian battalion" of Shamil Basayev). The losses of the militants amounted to more than 100 people, the Russians - 13-16 people dead, 50-52 wounded. During the battle for Samashki, many civilians died, and this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and increased anti-Russian sentiment in Chechnya.
On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, the Russian troops were forced to leave the village, since now the militants occupied the dominant heights above the village, using the old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed to conduct nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aviation. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the fighting was suspended after the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk and resumed in February 1996.
By April 1995, almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya was occupied by Russian troops, and the separatists focused on sabotage and partisan operations.
Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)
From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced the suspension of hostilities on its part.
The offensive resumed only on May 12. The blows of the Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedeno Gorge. Despite a significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in the enemy's defense - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.
Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the strike - instead of Shatoi to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in Argun Gorge and on June 3, Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12, the regional centers of Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.
Also, as in the plains, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the "truce", the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times.
Terrorist act in Budyonnovsk (14 - 19 June 1995)
On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen fighters numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, drove trucks into the territory Stavropol Territory(Russian Federation) and stopped in the city of Budyonnovsk.
The building of the GOVD became the first object of attack, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and drove the captured civilians into it. In total, about 2,000 hostages were in the hands of the terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiating with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of the hostages.
Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Because of the leak of information, the terrorists had time to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; as a result, the special forces recaptured all the corps (except the main one), releasing 95 hostages. Spetsnaz losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.
After the failure of military actions to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.
The total losses of the Russian side, according to official figures, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were employees of law enforcement agencies) and 415 wounded, the losses of terrorists - 19 killed and 20 wounded.
The situation in the republic in June - December 1995
After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to June 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.
From June 27 to June 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners "all for all", the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.
Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but not as members of illegal armed groups, but as "self-defense units." There were local battles throughout Chechnya. For some time, the emerging tensions could be resolved through negotiations. So, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at the talks in Grozny.
On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after a heavy shelling undertaken by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.
In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militants were in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their positions, because, according to them, these were "self-defense units" that had the right to stay in accordance with the agreements reached earlier.
On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made against the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he was in a coma. In turn, "retaliation strikes" were inflicted on Chechen villages.
On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was launched on the village of Roshni-Chu.
The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Dokka Zavgaev.
On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Geliskhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city, it took Russian troops about a week of “cleansing operations” to finally take Gudermes under their control.
On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but nevertheless recognized as valid. Supporters of the separatists announced in advance the boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, having received over 90% of the votes; at the same time, all military personnel of the UGV participated in the elections.
Terrorist act in Kizlyar (January 9-18, 1996)
On January 9, 1996, a detachment of 256 militants under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov raided the city of Kizlyar (Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation). Initially, the goal of the militants was a Russian helicopter base and an armory. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the soldiers guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to pull up to the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and the maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to increase anti-Russian sentiment in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved to the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would leave for Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped by warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations were held from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the Avrazia passenger ship with threats to shoot the Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.
The loss of the Russian side, according to official figures, amounted to 78 people dead and several hundred wounded.
Attack of militants on Grozny (March 6-8, 1996)
On March 6, 1996, several detachments of militants attacked Grozny, which was controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists, when withdrawing, took with them stocks of food, medicine and ammunition. The loss of the Russian side, according to official figures, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded.
Battle near the village of Yaryshmardy (April 16, 1996)
April 16, 1996 column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment The Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoi, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the head and trailing column of the car, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses.
Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev (April 21, 1996)
From the very beginning Chechen campaign Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the CRI, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on the satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.
On April 21, 1996, the Russian AWACS A-50 aircraft, on which equipment was installed for the bearing of a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev's motorcade left for the area of the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the aircraft reached the target, two missiles were fired at the cortege, one of which hit the target directly.
By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.
Negotiations with separatists (May-July 1996)
Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take on a protracted character. In the context of the emerging presidential elections The Russian leadership decided once again to negotiate with the separatists.
On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations took place in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the "rebellious Dudayev regime" and announced the abolition of military duty.
On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.
The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaykhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.
On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council Alexander Lebed announced the resumption of hostilities against the militants.
On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoisky, Vedensky and Nozhai-Yurtovsky regions.
Operation Jihad (August 6-22, 1996)
On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2,000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not set out to capture the city; they blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at roadblocks and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite a significant superiority in manpower and equipment, could not hold the city.
Simultaneously with the storming of Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (taken by them without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops held only the building of the commandant's office).
According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.
Khasavyurt agreements (August 31, 1996)
On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed ceasefire agreements in the city of Khasavyurt (Republic of Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.
Peacekeeping initiatives and activities of humanitarian organizations
On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of “Memorial” (later called the “Mission public organizations under the direction of S. A. Kovalev”). The Kovalev Mission did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations, the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial Human Rights Center.
On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the storming of Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen fighters and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement presidential palace, soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being at the headquarters of Dzhokhar Dudayev among the militants, “almost all the time was in the basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tankmen “a way out of the city without firing if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,
According to the Institute of Human Rights headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as Kovalev's entire human rights and anti-war position, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, government officials, as well as numerous supporters of the "state" approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, "because of his "one-sided position" aimed at justifying illegal armed groups."
In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, "for his statements against the war in Chechnya."
Representatives of various non-governmental organizations, deputies, and journalists traveled to the conflict zone as part of the Kovalev mission. The mission was engaged in collecting information about what was happening in the Chechen war, was engaged in the search for missing persons and prisoners, and facilitated the release of Russian servicemen who were captured by Chechen fighters. So, for example, the Kommersant newspaper reported that during the siege of the village of Bamut by Russian troops, Khaikharoev, who commanded militant detachments, promised to execute five prisoners after each shelling of the village by Russian troops, but under the influence of Sergei Kovalev, who participated in negotiations with field commanders , Khaykharoev abandoned these intentions.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has launched a massive relief program since the beginning of the conflict, providing more than 250,000 internally displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothes and plastic covers in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 inhabitants remaining in Grozny, 70,000 thousand were completely dependent on ICRC assistance.
In Grozny, the water and sewerage systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily set about organizing the supply of the city drinking water. In the summer of 1995, about 750,000 liters of chlorinated water per day, to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents, was delivered by tank trucks to 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters were produced drinking water for residents of the North Caucasus.
In Grozny and other cities of Chechnya, free canteens were opened for the most vulnerable segments of the population, in which 7,000 people were provided with hot food daily. More than 70,000 schoolchildren in Chechnya received books and stationery from the ICRC.
During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of programs to help victims of the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen fighters in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters on Red Cross letterhead, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contact with each other, so as all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the rehabilitation and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoi, provided regular assistance to nursing homes and orphanages shelters.
In the autumn of 1996, in the village of Novye Atagi, the ICRC equipped and opened a hospital for war victims. For three months of work, the hospital received more than 320 people, 1,700 people received outpatient care, almost six hundred surgical operations were performed. On December 17, 1996, an armed attack was made on the hospital in Novye Atagi, as a result of which six of its foreign employees were killed. After that, the ICRC was forced to recall foreign employees from Chechnya.
In April 1995, American humanitarian operations specialist Frederick Cuney, along with two Russian medical staff Russian Society of the Red Cross and an interpreter was involved in the organization of humanitarian aid in Chechnya. Kewney was trying to negotiate a truce when he went missing. There is reason to believe that Kewney and his Russian associates were captured by Chechen fighters and shot on the orders of Rezvan Elbiev, one of Dzhokhar Dudayev's counterintelligence chiefs, because they were mistaken for Russian agents. There is a version that this was the result of a provocation by the Russian special services, which in this way dealt with Kewni at the hands of the Chechens.
Various women's movements ("Soldier's Mothers", "White Shawl", "Women of the Don" and others) worked with servicemen - participants in military operations, released prisoners of war, wounded, and other categories of victims during hostilities.
Results
The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya has again become de facto independent, but de jure unrecognized by any country in the world (including Russia).
Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to the former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under the contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% from the amount of the contract. Due to ethnic cleansing and hostilities, almost the entire non-Chechen population left (or was killed) Chechnya. An interwar crisis began in the republic and the growth of Wahhabism, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War.
Losses
According to data released by the headquarters of the United Forces, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 people killed, 1,231 missing / deserted / captured, 19,794 wounded. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented cases of death according to the mothers of dead soldiers). However, it should be borne in mind that the data of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers include only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract servicemen, special unit soldiers, etc. The losses of militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen divisions (later President of the CRI) A. Maskhadov, the loss of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the HRC "Memorial", the losses of militants did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.
Commanders
Commanders of the Joint Grouping of Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic
- Mityukhin, Alexey Nikolaevich (December 1994)
- Kvashnin, Anatoly Vasilyevich (December 1994 - February 1995)
- Kulikov, Anatoly Sergeevich (February - July 1995)
- Romanov, Anatoly Alexandrovich (July - October 1995)
- Shkirko, Anatoly Afanasyevich (October - December 1995)
- Tikhomirov, Vyacheslav Valentinovich (January - October 1996)
- Pulikovsky, Konstantin Borisovich (acting July - August 1996)
In art
Movies
- "Cursed and Forgotten" (1997) - a feature film by Sergei Govorukhin.
- "60 hours Maikop brigade"(1995) - documentary Mikhail Polunin about the "New Year's" assault on Grozny.
- Checkpoint (1998) is a feature film by Alexander Rogozhkin.
- Purgatory (1997) is a naturalistic feature film by Alexander Nevzorov.
- "Prisoner of the Caucasus" (1996) - a feature film by Sergei Bodrov.
- DDT in Chechnya (1996): part 1, part 2
Music
- "Dead city. Christmas" - a song about the "New Year's" assault on Grozny by Yuri Shevchuk.
- The first Chechen war is dedicated to the song by Yuri Shevchuk Boys were dying.
- The songs “Lube” are dedicated to the first Chechen war: “Father Kombat” (1995), “Soon demobilization” (1996), “Step march” (1996), “Ment” (1997).
- Timur Mutsuraev - Almost all of his work is devoted to the First Chechen War.
- Songs about the First Chechen War occupy a significant part of the work of the Chechen bard Imam Alimsultanov.
- The first Chechen war is dedicated to the song of the group Dead Dolphins - Dead City.
- Blue berets - " New Year”, “Reflections of an officer at the hotline telephone”, “Two turntables on Mozdok”.
Books
- "Prisoner of the Caucasus" (1994) - story (story) by Vladimir Makanin
- "Chechen Blues" (1998) - a novel by Alexander Prokhanov.
- May Day (2000) - a story by Albert Zaripov. The story of the assault on the village of Pervomaiskoye in the Republic of Dagestan in January 1996.
- "Pathologies" (novel) (2004) - a novel by Zakhar Prilepin.
- I was in this war (2001) - a novel by Vyacheslav Mironov. The plot of the novel is built around the storming of Grozny by federal troops in the winter of 1994/95.
