At first, the Chekists and the NKVD searched unsuccessfully for him. Then the KGB, Federal
The Security Service and other, more or less secret, services of Russia. Per
for ninety years no one has been able to snatch the secrets from the Siberian land. During
latest scientific expedition Russian explorers to Baikal,
bathyscaphes found at the bottom of the lake a wagon of times civil wars s. Straightaway
rumors spread that it could be a trace of missing gold

The treasure was part of the gold and silver reserves
tsarist Russia, estimated from 1200 to 1600 tons. During the First
world war, on the eve of the Bolshevik revolution, this is a huge wealth
Tsar Nicholas II ordered to be taken to Kazan on the Volga. collected in the city
more than 600 tons of gold bars and gold rubles and almost 500 tons
silver, including jewelry. Soon in Russia began
civil war, and the royal treasure fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

autumn
1918 Kazan was captured by the supporters of the Whites soldiers of the Czechoslovak
corps - formed during the First World War on the territory
Russia from prisoners and deserters from the Austro-Hungarian army. under supervision
Czechs, royal gold was transported to Omsk, where
headquarters of Admiral Kolchak.

Alexander Kolchak

leaning
with money from the gold reserves of the kings, Admiral Alexander Kolchak captured
dictatorial power throughout Siberia, up to the Urals. Piece of gold
immediately sent to the banks of France, Great Britain and Japan as
payments for weapons, supplies and provisions and in the form of deposits,
transferred, probably to private accounts. When in May 1919,
finally, Kolchak ordered an inventory of the treasure, it turned out
that there were about 500 tons.

How many of these funds
spent, still no one knows. It is assumed that he could
use about 180 tons, but there are no documents that would confirm
such a quantity.

In the autumn of 1919, when the Red Army
began to oust the White troops from the next provinces, and Kolchak himself
pushed everything further beyond the Urals, the admiral decided to send the treasure to
Vladivostok. Gold was to be transported east along the Trans-Siberian
railroad. The valuable deposit was loaded into 29 wagons, and the golden train
went from Omsk to the east. The train also included wagons with platinum and
silver. But the boxes with Kolchak's treasure never made it to
Vladivostok.

Mystery Train

Route
the golden composition was controlled by the soldiers of the Czechoslovak Corps. Exactly
they were also obliged to guard the dispatch of Kolchak. It's hard to say why, but
the train with the treasure dragged mercilessly slowly. Only travel to
Irkutsk, which in those circumstances could be overcome within
ten days, lasted more than two months. At that time in Siberia
the anti-Kolchak uprising spread, the admiral's army was
pushed further east, the Bolsheviks were strengthening, and the admiral himself was losing
support for the Entente. Finally, the representatives of the coalition forced Kolchak
give power to General Denikin and transfer the train with gold under control
Czechs. It happened on December 27 at Nizhneudinsk station.

When
the train reached Irkutsk, the Czech soldiers nevertheless handed over to the Bolsheviks
both the admiral and the transported gold. In return they received
a guarantee of a safe route to Vladivostok and 30 coal wagons for
locomotive.

The Bolsheviks shot Kolchak, and the gold again
moved to Kazan. However, what part of the treasure did they receive from the Czechs
in fact, it is difficult to establish. Various sources give conflicting,
or just an approximation. It is about 409
million rubles in gold, or about 18 wagons that Czech soldiers
allegedly handed over to representatives of the Revolutionary Committee. When gold
returned to Kazan, Soviet bankers estimated its number as
approximately 318 tons, and 190 tons were considered missing. Recognized
also that 5 tons "evaporated" from the Bolsheviks themselves.

Accurate
the value of the treasure that fell into Kolchak's hands was never
installed. Gold from the royal fund was counted into all sorts of units
measurements: from rubles, through boxes and pounds, to tons, or even wagons.
Such calculations were far from accurate, so it is not surprising that before
today it is difficult to determine how much gold he really sent
Kolchak to Vladivostok, and how many were missing from the golden train. It could
be about a ton, or three. Or much more. According to one version, this
it was the Czechs who themselves took 18 wagons out of Irkutsk.

Preserved
also the testimony of eyewitnesses who claimed that on the way to Omsk,
boxes of gold disappeared from the train and were buried in the taiga.

Hidden gold

It is known
that that part of the treasure that Kolchak managed to deposit in
Western banks, was sent in batches from Siberia by train to
Vladivostok. In general, the admiral carried out 7 such transportations. One of
parties, the last one was captured by ataman Semyonov in Transbaikalia.

There were about 30 tons of gold there.

There is
also a third track, called simply Siberian. According to this version,
part of Kolchak's gold was hidden in the region of Tomsk, Tobolsk and Tyumen.

Among
some seekers of the Kolchak treasure it is believed that prudent
the admiral kept hiding the gold piece by piece in various places.

Treasure
usually buried in the ground. Skeptics point out that in 1919
winter started early and was very frosty, which practically made
impossible burial of gold. But the admiral was not a simple military man. He
He was also a polar explorer, explorer and sapper. He knew how to deal with
difficult polar conditions. Possibly when building caches
used explosives.

One theory says that some
Admiral's people tried to smuggle Kolchak's gold in a train through
Baikal, laying rails on the frozen ice of the lake. However, the ice is
endured, and the treasure went to the bottom. When last year one of
underwater vehicles The world found at the bottom of Lake Baikal an old wagon from the times
civil war, Kolchak's gold was again remembered. Promotion support
search expressed even the deputies of the State Duma.

However,
in the wreckage of the car, instead of the treasure, only a box with
cartridges. It is more likely that the weakened remnants of Kolchak's army,
escaping from the Red Army, they crossed Baikal on sledges, on
who were carrying part of the treasure saved from the new "owners". frost,
reaching 60 degrees, and the wind took its toll. Nightmare trip
few survived. Part of the gold, along with the sleigh, went to the bottom during
spring melting ice, some were hidden in the cellars of the surrounding churches.

Hidden
Russian services were looking for Kolchak's gold for several
decades. Only in the area of ​​​​Tobolsk, Tomsk and Tyumen, the Chekists dug
land for a whole decade, from 1922 to 1933. They managed to find a part
royal jewels.

In 1941, the NKVD, on the basis of
eyewitness testimony began searching for 26 chests of gold buried
near the village of Taiga. However, a witness, a former regimental
clerk in Kolchak's army, could not accurately determine the location
treasure cache, claiming that after so many years he was unable to
recognize the place. He was executed by firing squad on charges of
delusion and deceit of power. In the 50s, they tried to find this gold
Russian MIA. In 1970, the KGB was looking for gold in the Khanty-Mansiysk region.
There is also information about a treasure hidden in the caves of Altai, and
a few years ago, the Kazakh trace appeared.

Maybe,
to find Kolchak's gold, one must ... think in Polish. One of
advisers to the admiral at the time when this golden epic was taking place,
was a Pole. Writer, traveler, scientist, geographer, chemist and geologist,
Professor Ferdinand Anthony Ossendowski. Anti-communist, talented
scout and connoisseur of Siberia, who in 1922 returned to free
Poland. He reached the country through Manchuria and Mongolia, and, as
some legends about Kolchak's gold claim, it is there that part of
hidden treasures.

Royal gold, captured by Admiral Kolchak,
already overgrown with myths to such an extent that today it is difficult to separate
fiction from facts. There is no doubt only that about the lost
people will tell the treasure for a long time and look for it just as long. At
Russians also have their own version of the legend of the Amber Room.

The book contains information about 17815.147 kg of gold. These tons disappeared from the vault of the Kazan branch of the People's Bank of Russia in August 1918. The value has not yet been discovered. In the Ministry of Internal Affairs there is an operational-search case "Golden Fleece"; some information on this topic is kept under the heading "top secret". At present, treasure hunters have also joined the search for royal gold. The author for the first time cites data from two declassified funds of the National Archives of Tatarstan. Historical context events that unfolded simultaneously with the evacuation of the gold reserves, is reproduced on the basis of memoirs and works of historians.

17,815.147 KG GOLD (From the author)

This book contains information about 17,815.147 kg of gold that disappeared from the vault of the Kazan branch of the People's (State) Bank of Russia in August 1918. These tons amount to 572,770 troy ounces and are constantly rising in price. On January 1, 2011, they were valued on the London Stock Exchange at $ 813,619,785. At the time of reading these lines, you yourself can find a quote for a troy ounce of gold on the Internet and simply multiply by the number of ounces. You will see how the cost of this loss today is inexorably approaching one billion US dollars.

Perhaps you know treasures of this magnitude, but the author has not found any mention of treasures of such value in the entire history of the world. For comparison: the world-famous burial of Tutankhamun kept the golden tomb of the pharaoh weighing 110.4 kg. Naturally, the artifacts of the pharaoh of the XVIII dynasty of rulers ancient egypt much more valuable in the cultural and historical sense. But in the applied sense, the value of gold treasures near Kazan has nothing to compare with ...

How real these mysterious tons of yellow metal are, the author leaves the reader to judge by the declassified documents of the State Bank of the USSR. In fact, it is not so easy to clarify the issue. In the bowels of the Ministry of Internal Affairs there is an operational-search case "Golden Fleece", which stores most of the information on this topic under the heading "top secret".

In the summer of 1918, in the "gold pantry" of the Kazan branch of the People's Bank, 444 tons of 509 kilograms 799 grams and 65 milligrams of gold in the amount of 574,127,751.46 royal gold rubles gleamed with yellow sides of coins and ingots. At that time, the National Bank of Russia was called the National Bank. Four steel safes and a chest of the "gold pantry" of the Kazan branch, as well as seven shelving of the vault were designed to store gold, two shelving - for silver. The entrance to the pantry was securely locked with steel lattice doors from Artur Koppel JSC, welded according to the system of the Berlin company Ponzer.

A spiral staircase led up from the second underground floor, where the "golden pantry" was located. In the upper vault - the "money pantry", as well as in the premises of the change office, there were seven more safes and chests, in the office of the loan office - one more. The "upper" vault contained precious jewelry, bundles of paper banknotes, securities, and bags of copper coins. And also that part of the gold that was brought in the summer of 1918 and which simply no longer fit in a specialized pantry.

In total, by August 1918, over 73 percent of Russia's gold reserves were concentrated in Kazan under the control of the Bolsheviks. The strategic reserve was restlessly burning through the pockets of the representatives of the new government and beckoning their opponents to it. At that time, the Bolsheviks were negotiating in Berlin on the conditions for the export of part of Russia's gold to Germany as an indemnity under the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace on March 3, 1918.

The enemies of Germany - the Russian officers who fought with her - could not forgive the Leninists for capitulating to the Kaiser's troops. But besides emotions, the opponents of the Bolsheviks had other reasons for discontent.

On January 22, 1918, Lenin by his decree announced the financial insolvency of Russia - default. At that time, it turned out that by the beginning of World War I, Russia's gold reserves were the largest in the world and amounted to 1.695 billion royal gold rubles. In the metric system, this figure corresponds to 1312328325 grams of the precious metal, in troy ounces - 42192 335.39190706. Multiply this figure by the current exchange rate of the troy ounce, as there is information on the Internet. On January 1, 2011, the royal gold reserves of 1914 would be estimated at $59,934,212,424.2.

But by the time the banks were seized by the Bolsheviks, the gold reserves had decreased by more than 1.5 times. While the total public debt of Russia exceeded the entire remaining gold reserves of the country. Referring to bankruptcy and revolution, the Bolsheviks for the first time in world history completely refused to pay debts - to foreigners (although there was plenty of gold to pay for external obligations) and subjects of Russia.

It turned out that, in fact, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty credits given by England, France and the USA for the war with Germany, Russia transferred the same Germany to continue the war with Russia's creditors, and the Bolsheviks themselves showed the Entente a revolutionary figure. Many people could not come to terms with this. Russian and foreign hands reached out to the Kazan storehouse of gold reserves. Both camps of the Civil and World War spoke about patriotism, the salvation of the Motherland, the honor of the borrower. But they were understood in the opposite way: to export gold to Berlin (Vienna) or London (Paris, Washington). And at the same time leave some within Russia ...

Ordinary residents turned out to be hostages of circumstances and reminded the patient of two dentists who took turns pulling the same golden tooth.

For a contemporary, that wound has not healed to this day. Because part of the gold in the turmoil of battles simply disappeared and sits like a restless thorn in the body of the country in an area known to the Russian special services for more than 80 years.

Even for the author of the book, her information remains an unsolved code. Because the documents authoritatively testify that the treasures are real. But why, then, have they not been found so far by highly qualified representatives of the banking community and special services? Apparently, the devil is in the details. You should read again and again all the vicissitudes of this golden drama, which the author, as an investigative journalist, cite with the greatest possible thoroughness and detail. And only after that to understand: what did the gold hunters not think of during all the past searches? What detail was overlooked? Where did the soles of their feet not turn? In answering these questions and actually looking for real traces of gold, the reader can outdo his predecessors. What the author sincerely wishes for him.

Two more circumstances of the appearance of the book are noteworthy. At 12:38 on November 25, 2009, her manuscript was sent by e-mail to the editors of Novaya Gazeta. With the proposal of the author of the investigation to select those fragments that she considers necessary for publication on her pages. On January 15, 2010 at 3:37 pm, the editor of the newspaper, Dmitry Muratov, wrote to the author in an email: “I have read it. I'm interested". Later, however, even this publication began to hesitate to publish fragments of the investigation.

The digest from the book was published in a small edition on the pages of the Vechernyaya Kazan newspaper in September - November 2010 in twelve articles. Articles lost sharply in circulation, but won in terms of criticism. They were silently “enlightened” and not challenged in court by the press service of the National Bank of the Republic of Tatarstan (the successor of the Kazan branch of the State Bank), Tatarstan employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Security Service, as well as treasure hunters. All of them are interested in not making a fuss about these values ​​until the discovery of the treasure.

The only comment on the general historical context of events, which the author took into account, was made by local historians. And also during the publication of newspaper articles, the grateful son of one of the main figures in the history of 1918, bank secretary Viktor Kalinin, responded. His son's name is German Viktorovich, he enriched the contents of the book with new details and photographs of his father. He was also grateful that I told the readers about the parent.

The author was in no hurry to publish the entire contents of the book until, in the fall of 2010, frank distortions of information about the lost gold appeared in the federal media. This was done by treasure hunters. In order to lead the reader away from the place of searching for tons of gold.

For your information, Article 51 of the Mass Media Law, in particular, states: “It is not allowed to use the rights of a journalist established by this law for the purpose of concealing or falsifying publicly significant information, spreading rumors under the guise of reliable reports ...”

Did people who did not even read this article have a desire to comply with other legal norms and, according to the law, share with the state and society unrecorded millions in gold? Doubts about this issue forced the author to speed up the publication of the book.

1 part. About Russian gold during the First World War

In the history of Russian gold during the First World War, many dramatic events in the domestic and international life of the Russian Empire were reflected as in a drop of water.

The gold reserves of the Russian Empire on the eve of the war.

By the beginning of the First World War, Russia had a fairly large supply of gold - 1233 tons in the vaults of the State Bank of the Russian Empire. This is not counting about 300 tons of "yellow" metal, which was in circulation in the form of coins. On the eve of the First World War, Russia was in second place in the world in terms of centralized gold reserves, second only to the United States. In 1915 (data at the beginning of the year), she continued to maintain her gold reserves, although she lost second place to France.

Official gold reserves of the leading countries of the world in the period 1845-1915. (t)

	Total around the world	Great Britain		Germany

Notes:

Source : Timothy Green. Central Bank Gold Reserves. An historical perspective since 1845. World Gold Council. November 1999.

Russia has been accumulating its gold for several decades, the rate of accumulation has been high. In 1865, when Russia had just embarked on the path of capitalist development, the stock was only 57 tons. In 1895, as a result of targeted efforts by the government, it grew to almost 700 tons. Gold was necessary for the monetary reform of 1897, as a result of the reform, the golden ruble was born. Over the next two decades, Russia's gold reserves grew another 1.8 times. After all, the coverage of paper money circulation according to the laws of the Russian Empire was the highest among the countries that established the gold standard (almost 100%). True, Russia's gold ruble was expensive. Why did the stock of gold grow?

Firstly, due to the extraction of the yellow metal within the country. This is perhaps the main source of reserve formation. According to our estimates, for the period 1891-1914. about 1 thousand tons of yellow metal were mined in Russia.

Secondly, due to the export of the main export product of Russia - wheat and some other grains. During the period of the country's preparation for the monetary reform (transition to the gold standard), the proportion of the distribution of crops between domestic consumption and exports changed very much in favor of the latter. The implementation of the slogan “we’d ​​better not eat it, but we’ll take it out” undermined the social basis of the village, and, therefore, the whole country (its population was predominantly rural).

Thirdly, by attracting gold from abroad in the form of loans. This sharply increased Russia's external debt - primarily to France and Great Britain, and brought it into the category of the main debtor before the First World War. Before the First World War, Russia had the largest external debt in the world.

Government measures to preserve the gold reserves after the start of the war.

First World War extremely complicated the possibility of providing paper-money emission with a centralized reserve of gold. During these years, it was no longer necessary to talk about 100% coverage of the issue of credit notes with gold; several times during the war, the norms for covering the issue of money with gold reserves were revised

For 1915-1916 the issuing right of the State Bank was expanded four times. As a result of this liberalization of the issuance policy, the volume of paper money issued during the war years increased almost 4 times, and the purchasing power of the ruble at the beginning of 1917 was less than 1/3 of the level at the beginning of 1914. The backing of paper money with gold by the time of the February Revolution of 1917 was at best 13%.

All this contributed to the transformation of the State Bank into a kind of "issue factory", completely curtailing operations in the commercial loan market.

Unlike other central banks European countries in Russia, the State Bank was under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Finance, which made it easier to transform it into a body for financing military spending.

Despite the course taken to increase the issue, the monetary authorities did not abandon measures to preserve and centralize the gold reserves in the State Bank. The most important of these were the following.

1. Termination of the exchange of paper money (credit notes) for gold.

On June 27, 1914, Emperor Nicholas II approved the Law "On the Suspension of the Exchange of Credit Notes for Gold." The cessation of the exchange of paper money for gold at this time was carried out in all the leading countries of the gold standard with the exception of the United States.

2. Measures against the leakage of gold abroad through private and commercial channels. Among them is the tightening of the norms for issuing foreign currency when individuals go abroad, the introduction of control over foreign trade contracts, the payment of which required foreign currency, etc.

3. Refusal to maintain the exchange rate of the ruble with the help of gold and foreign exchange interventions.

4. Appeal to the population to make contributions in gold in monetary and non-monetary forms for the needs of the war. “Under the influence of an appeal to the population, patriotic contributions in gold coins and gold products began both as a gift for the needs of the war and in exchange for credit notes, which ensured an increase in receipts on the State Bank’s gold account in coins, ingots and banknotes.” However, this measure had limited effectiveness, because. most of the gold coins that were in circulation before the war for a short time ended up in the hands of the population and were theosaurated.

5. Purchases of gold from mining companies and the public. “Along with gold mining, gold bars were purchased for foreign currency at parity with an 8% commission withheld, and a little later a 30% premium was set for gold coming to the treasury from gold-alloy laboratories and the Mint.”

6. Attracting foreign credits and domestic loans to finance military spending, as well as partly to build up the “gold abroad” position

Measures to stabilize monetary circulation in wartime conditions.

During the First World War, Russia's foreign debt continued to increase. New loans received from abroad were used not only to finance military spending. Part of foreign loans (primarily received from the UK) were "frozen" and represented funds that were deposited in foreign bank accounts and remained there without movement. In fact, these were fictitious credit transactions that gave the impression of an increase in that part of the state gold reserve, which belonged to the category "gold abroad". This fictitious build-up of Russia's gold reserves ultimately pursued the goal of increasing the issuance of paper money by the State Bank of Russia against the supposedly increased gold reserves, which was necessary to finance military spending at home.

Thus, the following operations were carried out sequentially:

1) transfer of physical gold from Russia to the UK as collateral;

2) the provision by the UK of Russia secured by the received gold of "targeted" loans to increase the volume of "gold abroad";

3) the issue by the State Bank of the Russian Empire of an additional amount of paper money supply, taking into account the allegedly increased gold reserves of the country.

These operations were of a rather secret nature, which made it possible to maintain the illusion, both in Russia and especially abroad, of a reliable supply of the Russian currency with gold. This kind of scheme was imposed on Russia by Great Britain and had such unpleasant consequences as an increase in the country's external debt, a decrease in the state stock of physical gold, and the depreciation of the Russian ruble in the domestic money market.

The external depreciation of the ruble proceeded much more slowly: the illusion of a significant increase in Russia's gold reserves contributed to maintaining its relatively high exchange rate on international markets.

As a result of the export of physical gold and loans received from the “allies”, the item “gold abroad” in the balance sheet of the State Bank increased and amounted to (million rubles):

On 07/01/1914 - 143.8

On 01/01/1915 - 172.5

On 01/01/1916 - 646.1

On 01/01/1917 - 2146.7.

According to official data, the amount of the gold reserve of the State Bank for 1914-1916. increased from 1695 to 3617 million rubles, but if at the beginning of this period "gold abroad" accounted for a few percent, then at the end of the period - about 2/3.

Russia's gold begins to float to the British Isles.

During the years of the First World War (until the beginning of 1917), the gold reserve of the Russian Empire (excluding the position “gold abroad”) decreased by about 462 tons. This decrease was almost exclusively due to the transfer of part of the gold reserve of Russia to the Bank of England to form a special guarantee gold reserve , as mentioned above. It is known that at the beginning of the war Russia transferred 498 tons of gold to the Bank of England; 58 tons were soon sold, and the remaining 440 tons lay in the vaults of the Bank of England as collateral. In addition, the country's monetary authorities actually lost most of the gold that was in circulation before the war: in the first month of the war, the gold coin disappeared from circulation and was never returned to the treasury. By January 1, 1917, in the hands of citizens, according to the estimates of the State Bank, there were gold coins worth 436 million rubles. , which in terms of pure gold is equivalent to 337 tons of metal.

Russia was constantly put under pressure by Great Britain and its other "allies", demanding additional deliveries of Russian gold as a condition for granting military loans at the interstate level. Russia in the first two years of the war managed to restrain these aspirations of the West. Where possible, it resorted to funds to finance military purchases that did not require the transfer of the precious metal abroad (commercial loans, government loans from the United States and Japan). However, in the future, gold began to leave the treasury outside the country, primarily to Great Britain.

During the war, Russia transferred 498 tons of gold to the Bank of England; 58 tons were soon sold, and the remaining 440 tons lay in the vaults of the Bank of England as security.

According to the Soviet historian A.L. Sidorov, gold was supplied to England in December 1915, June 1916 and February 1917. As S.M. 5 years in the return of gold after the war. These obligations were credited to the balance sheet of the State Bank as “Gold Abroad”, which made it possible to use them as formal security for the ongoing issue of credit notes. It is interesting to note that the last shipment abroad in February 1917 of about 147 tons of gold was not reflected in the official statistics of the State Bank: on October 23, 1917, the article "Gold in Russia" showed the presence of 1000 tons of metal. Obviously, the sent gold continued to be listed under the “On the way” section, which took into account the metal that had already left the country, but had not yet arrived at the place”

Here is how the authors of the book The Economics of Sovereign Democracy describe the "disappearance" of the last batch of "royal" gold sent to the Bank of England: The agreed route ran through all of Russia to Vladivostok and further (on Japanese warships) to Ottawa (Canada) (there was one of the Bank of England's foreign vaults - VK). The Bank of England rechecked the receipt of gold and gave confirmation to Russia. Only after that, the State Bank transferred the corresponding amount from the “gold in Russia” column to the “gold abroad” column. The gold sent from Vladivostok in November 1916 reached Ottawa in August 1917, but as early as October 8, 1917, gold worth 189.5 million rubles was listed on the balance sheet of the State Bank. It was never credited by the Bank of England ... And this is just an episode of the usual thieving practice of international bankers ”

According to some reports, in early 1917, 5.5 tons of personal gold of Nicholas II was also sent to Great Britain (to the bank of the Bering brothers).

The first shipment of gold to the UK was sent from Arkhangelsk to Liverpool on the Mantua transport. In the future, due to the risk of sinking transports by German submarines, gold for Great Britain began to be sent through the Far East (especially since Great Britain determined not the British Isles, but Canada, where it had its own storage facilities, as the final destination of gold). It should be noted that some of the gold destined for the UK was Far East“Intercepted” (more precisely, captured) by Japan and never reached its destination.

Sending gold from Russia to the UK

Dispatch time	Lot volume (weight and cost indicators)	Notes
October 1914	58.8 t / 8 million lbs. Art./75 million 120 thousand gold rub.	Gold in accordance with the secret British-Russian agreement (October 1914) was delivered on the British transport "Mantua" along the route Arkhangelsk - Liverpool to the Bank of England
End of December 1915	73.5 t / 10 million lbs. Art./ 93 million 897.5 thousand gold. rub.
Mid June 1916	73.5 t / 10 million lbs. Art. / 93 million 897.5 thousand gold rub.	Gold sent through the Far East in accordance with the secret Antanto-Russian financial agreement (December 1915) to the Bank of England *
Early November 1916	147 tons / 20 million lbs. Art. / 187 million 795 thousand tons of gold rub.	Gold sent through the Far East in accordance with the secret Antanto-Russian financial agreement (December 1915) to the Bank of England *
February 1917	147 tons / 20 million lbs. Art./ 187 million 795 thousand gold. rub.	The gold was sent through the Far East in accordance with the secret Entente-Russian financial agreement (February 1917) to the Bank of England*. The destination did not reach, because was intercepted by Japan and delivered to the port of Maizuri (Japan)
February 1917	5.5 t / 8.0 million gold rub.	Personal gold of Nicholas II. Sent via the Far East to English bank brothers Baring (London).* Did not reach the destination, because. was intercepted by Japan and delivered to the port of Maizuri (Japan).
	505.3 tons / about 646 million gold rub.	352.8 tons reached their destinations; Japan intercepted 152.5 tons

* The route of gold - vaults of the State Bank (European part of Russia), then by rail through Siberia to Vladivostok, then across the Pacific Ocean on chartered military ships of Japan to Vancouver (Canada) or San Francisco (USA), then to Ottawa (one from overseas vaults of the Bank of England) or through North America to the east coast, further to Liverpool or London (the vaults of the Bank of England).

Sources :

V.Novitzky. The Russian Gold Reserve before and during the World and Civil Wars (1883-1921). In: "Russian Gold: a collection of articles and statistical data reporting the Russian Gold Reserve and shipments of Soviet Gold". New York, Amtorg Trading Corporation, Information Department, 1928, p.12-15;

A.L. Sidorov. The financial situation of Russia during the First World War. M., 1960;

V.A. Sirotkin. Foreign gold of Russia. M.: "Olma-Press", 2000.

To get a more complete picture of the movement of the imperial gold reserves in the period from August 1914 to October 1917, we present a table that was presented by the Russian emigrant S.G. Petrov in his material prepared in the 90s of the last century and in which all indicators are expressed in cost units - gold rubles and pounds sterling (Table 3). As can be seen from this table, the total value of gold exported abroad for the specified period amounted to 643.36 million gold rubles, which, based on the official gold parity of the Russian currency, is equivalent to 498 tons of pure gold.

In this way, overall ratings The export of gold given in Table 2 is slightly higher than the estimates in Table 3, but there are no fundamental differences in these estimates.

Indicator / operation	Million angry rub.
(A) Balance at the start of World War I
(B) Sent abroad during the First World War 1) sold to Great Britain and sent in October 1914 in order to provide a loan to pay for military supplies of 8 million pounds sterling 2) Sent to the UK via Vladivostok and Canada on Japanese warships on credit December 1915 - 10 million pounds sterling June 1916 - £10 million November 1916 - £20 million Total - 40 million pounds sterling 3) Sent to the UK via Vladivostok and Canada on Japanese warships under an agreement to provide an additional loan of 20 million pounds sterling 4) Sent to Sweden in October 1917 for the purchase of military supplies Total exported abroad	643,36
(C) Balance before adjustment: C= A - B	1.051,64
(D) Amendment: Added to World War I gold reserves from gold mines
(E) November 1917 balance sheet: D = C + D	1.101,69

Source:

Petroff S. Where did the Russian gold go? Report on the Russian gold reserves (1914-1929) // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11/30/1999.

Other foreign routes of Russian gold.

"Royal" gold as a pledge, according to some sources, was also sent from Russia to USA . According to prof. V. Sirotkin, from the end of 1915. Until the end of 1916, the tsarist government sent several consignments of gold to the United States as collateral for the purchase of weapons and smokeless powder, which were never delivered to Russia (moreover, DuPont Chemical planned to build a plant in Connecticut for the supply of gunpowder). The main shipment of gold for the United States, according to Sirotkin, was estimated at 40 million pounds. Art., which in terms of weight was more than 500 tons of metal.

We have doubts about the fact of sending gold (especially such a large shipment) to the United States. For example, A.L. Sidorov in his fundamental research about the financial position of Russia during the First World War does not mention at all the fact that the yellow metal was sent to the USA. According to him, to finance the purchase of gunpowder and weapons in the United States, collateral gold, located in the UK, was used. According to most sources, the US was not the final recipient of the gold, but transit territory, through which gold from Russia was sent to the UK (Bank of England). It is possible that some of the gold destined for Great Britain actually ended up in the accounts of American banks and companies (secondary redistribution of Russian gold). Thus, the information of Prof. V. Sirotkina requires additional verification and clarification.

Once again, we note that, starting from 1915, almost all gold was exported abroad through the Far East, where the Japanese controlled sea lanes. According to a number of sources, gold destined for the US and Great Britain was intercepted in March 1917. Japan .

“The last “golden train” to the USA and England ... was completely captured by Japan and taken to the port of Maizuri (Japan) on the cruisers Kashima and Katori as a “war trophy” (Russia and Japan did not fight in March 1917 ". It should be borne in mind that some part of the "royal" gold that was sent abroad through the Far East, apparently, was not sent outside Russia before the 1917 revolution and settled in the vaults of the State Bank of the Russian Empire in its branch in Vladivostok, however, in the end, this gold went abroad.This happened already during the years of the civil war and intervention.

In addition, it must be borne in mind that even before the start of the war, Russia had France a significant amount of foreign exchange in gold francs and other "gold" currencies ("gold abroad"). Moreover, literally a month before the start of the First World War, Russia managed to transfer its “foreign” gold from German banks to French ones (from Russia’s point of view, the transfer of “foreign” gold to France was a reasonable action, since Paris was considered our main ally in the expected war). After the start of the war, "allied" France introduced a so-called "moratorium" on the use of these currency values, fearing that Russia would not fulfill its obligations to repay and service French loans. In fact, this is how it all happened: the “foreign” gold of Russia in French banks was used mainly not to purchase weapons and equipment, so necessary for the Russian army, but to pay interest to French rentiers.

After the February Revolution, the Provisional Government also managed to contribute to the export of gold abroad: literally on the eve of the October Revolution, it sent a batch of gold to Sweden for the purchase of weapons (in the amount of 4.85 million gold rubles, i.e. about 3.8 tons of metal).

Russia's gold reserves on the eve of the October Revolution of 1917.

Table 1 gives a general idea of ​​the place that gold exported abroad occupied in the total gold reserves of Russia. 4. As can be seen from the table, the share of gold abroad in the total gold reserves of Russia during the war years, right up to the October Revolution of 1917, steadily increased and reached more than 2/3.

Gold of Russia within the country and abroad during the First World War (million rubles) *

					8.10.1917
Gold within the country
Gold abroad
Total supply of gold
Share of gold abroad in total gold reserves, %

* As of January 1 of the respective year (except for the last column). The composition of gold reserves includes not only metallic gold, but also the currencies of the countries of the gold standard. Such a sharp increase in the volume of "gold abroad" in the period under review is probably due to the fact that it includes the amounts of loans received by Russia from the Entente countries in the form of currencies. The share of metallic gold in the total volume of "gold abroad" at the end of the period under review was, apparently, very insignificant.

At the beginning of the First World War, the Russian army was forced to retreat and leave some of the western provinces. The Germans approached Petrograd. The question arose about the safety of the state gold reserves, located in Petrograd in the pantries of a number of provincial offices of the State Bank. It was decided to evacuate the gold to the rear cities far from the front.

In 1915, the evacuation of state valuables from Petrograd to Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod began. After the revolution, gold was transported to Kazan from Voronezh, Tambov and Samara, Kursk, Mogilev, Penza, etc.

For a more comprehensive understanding of subsequent changes in the fate of Russia's gold reserves, it is necessary to recall in general terms some of the main military and political events of the country in 1918-1920. Let's consider just three of them:

1. After the revolution of 1917, a constituent assembly was elected to decide the main issues of state life. The Social Revolutionaries (Democratic Party of Social Revolutionaries) received the majority of the votes. The communists were in the minority. The Constituent Assembly refused to approve the decrees of Soviet power.

After the first meeting in January 1918, the Communists closed the meeting. The deputies of the constituent assembly left for Samara and formed a bourgeois-democratic government - the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly (KOMUCH), which led the fight against Soviet power.

• 2. In March 1918, the Soviet government concluded an enslaving peace treaty with Germany and its allies in Brest, according to which a significant part of the European part of the country departed from Russia, and Russia was obliged to pay Germany an indemnity of 246 tons of gold. The Social Revolutionaries were categorically against such a peace treaty.
• 3. In the First World War, units of the Czechoslovak corps, numbering 45 thousand soldiers, fought on the side of Russia. They fought for the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the Austro-Hungarian occupation and did not agree with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The command of the corps agreed with the Soviet government that the corps would be transferred to France through Vladivostok and, together with other troops of the Entente, would continue to participate in the war with Germany and its ally Austria-Hungary for the freedom of their homeland. By the summer of 1918, the military echelons of the Czechoslovaks were stretched along the entire line railway between Syzran, Penza, Novosibirsk, Omsk and Irkutsk.

At the head of the corps was a democratically minded body - the Russian branch of the Czechoslovak National Council.

He was destined to play an important role in subsequent events related to Russian gold.

The Czechoslovak leaders, together with the future president T. Masaryk, at the insistence of the Entente countries, agreed to oppose Soviet Russia. On May 25, 1918, the commander of the Czechoslovak corps rebelled, as the Entente countries promised to support the creation of an independent Czechoslovak Republic.

The corps joined the troops of KOMUCH and captured a number of cities along the Trans-Siberian Railway.

On July 6, the Socialist-Revolutionaries killed the German ambassador and revolted in many cities of the country. The commander of the eastern front, the Socialist-Revolutionary M.A. Ants refused to admit Brest Peace with Germany. M.A. Muravyov tried to create an independent Volga Republic and continue the war with Germany to the bitter end, but was soon shot. There was a threat of the capture of Kazan by the troops of KOMUCH.

The Bolshevik government decided to evacuate the gold reserves from Kazan. Representatives of the Soviet government sent here managed to take out 4.6 tons of gold (100 boxes).

With a sudden attack on August 6, 1918, the troops of KOMUCH and the Czechoslovak corps under the command of Colonel V. A. Kappel captured the city and the gold reserves located here. Already on August 16, gold in the amount of 500 tons on two ships under special protection, which included officers of the Academy of the General Staff, was sent to Samara for transfer to KOMUC.

Soon the Red Army launched a successful offensive against the forces of Komuch and the Czechoslovaks, liberated a number of cities and approached Samara.

In connection with the threat of death that arose for them, all the counter-revolutionary forces united and created a new government. It is known in history as the Ufa directory. Admiral A. V. Kolchak was appointed Minister of War.

In Siberia, the White Guard government also functioned, which sought to take power from the Ufa directory.

At the end of September, KOMUCH began a hasty evacuation of gold from Samara to Ufa and then to Omsk. The headquarters and government of Admiral A.V. were already here. Kolchak, whom all anti-communist groups and movements recognized as the supreme ruler of Russia and the leader of the white movement in Russia.

KOMUCH did not agree with this. He feared that the transfer of valuables to the leader of the white movement could lead to the squandering of Russian gold. Members of KOMUCH on their last November 28, 1918. meeting, they turned to the Czechoslovak National Council to accept, on behalf of the Czech people, the gold reserve for safekeeping, and then transfer it to the newly convened Constituent Assembly or a nationwide recognized government.

However, under the influence of the British mission, the command of the Czechoslovak corps decided to go over to the side of A.V. Kolchak and not. prevent the transfer of gold reserves to his disposal. It should be noted that, as a statesman, the admiral treated the safety of the gold reserves with care, although he was unable to prevent some losses and even major theft.

The gold reserve was accompanied by officials from the State Bank who sought to keep accurate records of the movement of gold. Researchers of this problem note that there was no looting of gold, because there was a strict accountability. In the archives of the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank of Russia, relevant documents have been preserved about this.

In November 1918, trains arrived in Omsk, and the gold reserve was placed in the Omsk branch of the State Bank of Russia. The protection of the gold reserve was carried by a special detachment subordinate to the Ministry of Finance of the white government. After the arrival of echelons with Kazan gold, gold arrived in Omsk from branches of state and private banks in Siberia and the Urals.

In May 1919, a group of bank employees began to recalculate the gold that was placed at the disposal of the government of A.V. Kolchak. Seals were checked on all undamaged boxes. About 400 damaged boxes and bags of gold coins were counted in special goals. According to the credentials, each box contained two sacks, each containing gold coins worth 30,000 rubles.

After the recount, it was found that in total there were 505 tons of gold in Omsk in the form of Russian and foreign coins, mugs, polo and ingots. In addition, gold that was not included in the state reserve was stored here. For example, the gold parts of instruments belonging to the Main Chamber of Weights and Measures, as well as gold nuggets and depositories of the Mining Institute.

As noted earlier, the tsarist government had 440 tons of gold in London, on account of which loans were opened to the tsarist government for the purchase of weapons and uniforms for the army in the field. It subsequently made it possible to well arm and provide everything necessary for the white army, which deployed successful fighting, relying on the help of the legionnaires of the Czechoslovak corps. With the help of this corps, the Whites captured the main cities of the Middle Volga, the Urals and Siberia.

In the winter of 1919, the Red Army defeated the White armies. They lost a lot of military equipment and weapons. The Entente countries prepared the troops of A.V. Kolchak to counteroffensive.

They began to intensively equip them with weapons and everything necessary for conducting active hostilities. white army received and:) Great Britain uniforms and equipment for 240 thousand soldiers, hundreds of thousands of rifles, machine guns and millions of cartridges for them. France delivered 400 artillery pieces, 1,700 machine guns with ammunition and 30 airplanes for the White Army. The United States alone supplied the armies of A. V. Kolchak with about 400 thousand rifles, 1 thousand machine guns, 2 million pairs of shoes and other items. A lot of weapons came from Japan.

All this had to be paid for. Representatives of the admiral tried to renew loans against the unused balance of royal gold previously deposited in London. Under the security of this gold, the above-mentioned loans to the tsarist government were opened. After October revolution 1917 they were closed.

It was not possible to renew the previous loans, as insoluble international legal problems arose, because the government of A.V. Kolchak was never recognized by the Entente, Japan and the USA, All Russian, i.e. successor of the tsarist and provisional government A.F. Kerensky.

In this situation, Kolchak decided to sell part of the gold reserves to finance military supplies. From numerous sources published on the basis of archival data, it can be seen that gold was withdrawn from the storerooms of the Omsk branch of the State Bank six times in large quantities and sent to Vladivostok for subsequent shipment to Japan, France, Great Britain and the USA. The gold reserves also paid for the supply of weapons to the volunteer white army, which, under the command of General A.I. Denikin fought against Soviet power in the European part of Russia.

In October 1919, a consignment of gold worth 43.6 million rubles, i.e. 33.7 tons, was sent from Omsk to Vladivostok.

At that time, General G.M. Semenov, with the assistance of Japan, created the Trans-Baikal Republic and took gold for the needs of his army, which was taken for loading onto Japanese and American ships.

During August, using weapons received from overseas, the government of the white movement carried out several mobilizations and formed 15 new regiments, preparing them for military operations against the Red Army. In total, there were up to 400 thousand people in the white army. The command of this army also relied on the help of interventionist troops. In the summer of 1919, there were 120 thousand soldiers and officers from Japan, France, Great Britain and the USA in Siberia and the Far East. They provided the rear of the white armies preparing for the offensive.

In early September, Kolchak's armies and Czechoslovak units, having a significant superiority in numbers and equipment, went on the offensive and achieved success. Eastern front The Red Army was broken through, and it began to retreat. Its stubborn resistance was supported by an expanding partisan movement in the rear of the White armies.

On October 14, 1919, the Red Army launched a counteroffensive. The White Guards were forced to retreat. In a number of sectors of the front, the retreat turned into a stampede. The commanders of the Czech units hurriedly withdrew their troops to the railway stations, seized the echelons and train after train went to the east. On November 4, the Red Army captured the city of Ishim on the territory of the present Tyumen region. It was at that time the most important railway junction on the way to Omsk.

In October 1919, in connection with the continuing offensive of the Red Army, the wide scope partisan movement and the beginning of the collapse of the army, the government of A.V. Kolchak decided to move the capital to Irkutsk. The redeployment of the Ministry of Finance began on October 28, 1919.

On October 31, by order of the admiral, the gold reserve was taken out of the Omsk branch of the bank and loaded into wagons, which are under heavy guard. officers have been prepared for shipment. The echelon with gold and the government moved towards Irkutsk on November 12, i.e. two days before Soviet power was established in Omsk.

Gold and guards were placed in 40 wagons. At the same time, there were guards and accompanying personnel in 12 cars. The echelon with gold under the number "Liter D" was supposed to follow from Omsk to Vladivostok. The government was firmly convinced that the gold could be exported abroad. As early as November 4, the Ministry of Railways of the white government issued an order along the lines of the Omsk, Tomsk, Transbaikal and Chinese Eastern Railways on the unhindered passage of the Liter D train to Vladivostok. The employees of the State Bank accompanying the gold reserves were issued travel documents to Vladivostok.

Staff train A.V. Kolchak and the train with the gold reserves moved extremely slowly. Railway stations and half-stations were filled with trains with Czechoslovak troops and wagons with the wounded. The armored train sent ahead cleared the way for the Czechoslovaks, who kept the railroad under control, letting their trains pass first of all.

On December 27, the headquarters train and the train with gold arrived at the Nizhneudansk station. It took a month and a half for the trains to advance a distance that, under normal conditions, a train travels in less than one day. At this time, an uprising of workers broke out in Irkutsk, as a result, power passed to the local government - the Political Center, which unites representatives of different political parties.

The staff train and the echelon with gold remained in Nizhneudansk until the situation cleared up. The commander of the Czechoslovak battalion received instructions from the allies, from which it followed that:

• * the admiral's train and the echelon with gold are taken under the protection of the allied powers, i.е. Entente;
• * as soon as possible, these trains under the flags of Great Britain, the USA, France, Japan and Czechoslovakia will be withdrawn from Nizhneudansk to the east;
• * Nizhneudansk station is declared a neutral zone. The Czechs must guard the trains and prevent local authorities and their armed detachments from entering the station;
• * in the event of an armed clash between the admiral's escort and armed local detachments, disarm both sides and give the admiral complete freedom of action. This could be understood in such a way that the Allies no longer considered the admiral as supreme ruler Russia.

The Czechs occupied and strengthened the defense of the station from a possible partisan attack. The guards of the echelons were carried out by the soldiers of the admiral's convoy, which consisted of 500 privates and 60 officers.

At the same time, under the pressure of the advancing Red Army and the Siberian partisans, Kolchak's representatives lost power in settlements and cities located along the Trans-Siberian Railway from Irkutsk to Chita.

January 5, 1920 A.V. Kolchak signed an order to transfer the train with the gold reserve under the protection of the Czechoslovak armed forces. On the same day, he signed an act of renunciation of the supreme government in Russia in favor of General A.I. Denikin, who in April 1919 united the White Volunteer Army, Don and Kuban Cossack units under his command. Relying on the help of the Entente, having a 150,000-strong army, he intended to overthrow Soviet power.

General A.I. Denikin demanded that the gold reserves be placed at his disposal. He considered it necessary to take the gold abroad and deposit it in approximately equal parts against the security of loans in the UK, the USA and Japan.

Government of A.V. Kolchak, even before that he was convinced that to take out the gold reserves on your own failed, decided to turn to the US government with a proposal to accept gold for safekeeping. The American government responded that it was ready to accept the gold, but that the Czechs would have to ensure its delivery to Vladivostok. But this was unrealistic, since the workers of Irkutsk and the surrounding areas, relying on partisan detachments, presented an ultimatum to the Czechoslovaks: either they remove their guards from the echelon with gold, or the workers block the further advance of trains with Czechs towards Vladivostok. As a compromise, it was decided to allow small groups of partisans to guard the echelon with gold.

The allies offered the admiral, under the protection of the Czechs, to take him out in one carriage. They considered the export of all his guards and gold impossible. The admiral's associates suggested that he change into a soldier's dress and, together with his adjutant, hide in one of the passing Czech echelons. The Czechs freely accepted and took out in their echelons white officers who were fleeing the Bolsheviks.

At first, A.V. Kolchak refused these proposals, but then was forced to agree with the first. In essence, the admiral and the gold reserve became hostages of the Czechs and, as shown further developments, were used by the Czechoslovaks in their own interests.

Given that the admiral was not a real force in the fight against Soviet power, the Czechoslovaks, in accordance with the instructions of the command of the Entente troops, took over the protection of trains with a guarantee on their own behalf and on behalf of the allied powers of the immunity of both the admiral himself and Russian gold. In this regard, the flags of the allied powers were strengthened on the carriage of A.V. Kolchak: American, English, Japanese, Czech, etc. The admiral, confident in complete safety, disbanded his guard detachment and completely relied on foreign patrons.

A paradoxical situation has arisen. The Czechoslovaks became the main force that determined the position of the white government. Kolchak's units fought with units of the Red Army and retreated in panic along the highway to the east. The Czechs and Slovaks, not participating in the battles, moved in trains under the protection of the retreating Kolchak soldiers and dictated conditions for the passage of echelons.

On January 15, 1920, a train carrying the admiral and his entourage arrived in Irkutsk, followed by a trainload of gold.

With the consent of the rest of the allies, the Czechoslovaks used A.V. Kolchak and the echelon with gold in the political game with the Irkutsk Political Center.

They announced that they would extradite the admiral and his associates on the condition that they and other allied troops were provided with steam locomotives and wagons to Vladivostok, where ships were already waiting for them to move on to Europe. They guaranteed to transfer the echelon with gold immediately as soon as the last Czech echelon left Irkutsk.

On the day of arrival in Irkutsk, the admiral was issued local authorities and placed in jail. On January 21, 1920, the Political Center of Irkutsk transferred power to the Military Revolutionary Committee (VRK) of the Irkutsk province. The committee was headed by the Bolsheviks. At this time, a large group of White Guard troops under the command of General V.A. advanced towards Irkutsk. Kappel, the one who at one time commanded a united detachment of Russian-Czechoslovak and Serbian troops, who suddenly seized Kazan and Russia's gold reserves. The task of this group was to capture Irkutsk and free A.V. Kolchak.

On February 6, the order of the Irkutsk Military Revolutionary Committee was transmitted along the railway line. It noted: “To all revolutionary committees, executive committees, all revolutionary organizations, troops, partisans, the entire population along the line of the Trans-Baikal Railway. In no case should traffic be allowed along the line of the Trans-Baikal railway. to the east from Irkutsk trains with the gold reserves of Russia, whoever accompanied him. To spoil the way, to blow up bridges, tunnels, to destroy vehicles, to wrest these valuables from the hands of a gang of robbers, whoever they may be, in open battle.

The Red Army units and partisans managed to repulse the Kappel attack, however, in the current situation, the Military Revolutionary Committee sentenced Admiral A.V. Kolchak to be shot. On February 7, the sentence was carried out, and the remains of the admiral were lowered under the ice of the Angara River.

History repeated itself. Two years before, in connection with the approach of Kolchak and Czechoslovak troops to Yekaterinburg, he was shot without trial by the verdict of the Military Revolutionary Committee Russian tsar Nicholas II and his family.

• On February 7, an armistice agreement was signed between the commanders of the fifth Soviet army and the Czechoslovak corps. The Soviet command undertook to assist in the evacuation of the Czechoslovak troops, and the Czechoslovak command - to transfer the train with gold to the Irkutsk Revolutionary Committee when the last Czechoslovak echelon left Irkutsk.
• On March 22, 1920, the train with gold was sent west, back to Kazan. On May 7, 1920, his cargo was again stowed in the storerooms of the Kazan office of the People's Bank of the RSFSR.

From the certificate compiled in June 1921 by the People's Commissariat for Finance of the RSFSR, it can be seen that during the reign of Admiral A.V. Kolchak, Russia's gold reserves decreased by 235.6 million rubles, or 182 tons, including gold delivered to Vladivostok, as follows from other publications, by 191 million rubles.

Let us now consider the fate of gold, which, as noted earlier, Ataman G.M. Semyonov seized in Chita from the train en route from Omsk to Vladivostok. Of the seized amount of gold, at least 5.8 tons ended up in the hands of the Japanese.

In January 1920, having made the most difficult march to Chita, he arrived from near Irkutsk, after an unsuccessful attempt to take the city and free A.V. Kolchak, detachment of General V.A. Kappel. The general himself died during the campaign. This detachment, numbering 15 thousand fighters hardened in the war, mostly officers, united with the Cossack units of Ataman G.M. Semenov, as a result, the Far Eastern Army (TWO) was formed. For the maintenance of this army, G.M. Semyonov allocated 39 boxes of gold coins and bullion.

In September 1920, the Red Army approached Chita. On the eve of leaving Chita, G.M. Semyonov sent a shipment of gold to the Russian military attache in Tokyo, General Podtyagin, allegedly for the purchase of weapons, although it was already clear that DVA weapons would not be needed, because she had left Russian territory. This gold was deposited in the Japanese bank Yokohama Hurry Bank.

TWO, ​​under the pressure of the Red Army, moved to China. The command, after crossing the Russian-Chinese border, decided to divide the received from G.M. Semenov 39 boxes of gold.

This decision was made on November 19, 1920 at the Manchuria station of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The military council was attended by the head of the rear of the TWO, General P.P. Petrov. His son in our time in the 80s. handed over to Professor of the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs V.G. Sirotkin documents from the family archive. As can be seen from these documents, the military council of the TVA decided to divide 39 boxes into two parts: 17 of them, which contained gold coins worth 1050 thousand rubles. transfer to the commanders of four corps for unforeseen expenses related to the maintenance of the evacuated troops; 22 boxes containing gold coins and bullion total amount 1270 thousand rubles, in view of the real threat of their capture by the Red Army or Chinese robbers, it was decided to transfer against receipt to the head of the Japanese military mission at the Manchuria station. This operation was assigned to General P.P. Petrov. On November 22, the head of the mission, colonel of the Japanese army R. Izome, issued a receipt:

"REGISTER.

This receipt is given by the Japanese military mission at st. Manchuria to the Chief of Supply of the Far Eastern Army of the General Staff, Major General Pavel Petrovich Petrov, that the Japanese Military Mission at st. Manchuria accepted for cutting twenty (20) boxes of gold coins and two boxes of gold bullion. (Numbers of boxes are listed below.) All boxes are sealed with a wax seal and have a seal. The above boxes with gold coins and gold bars are the property of the Far Eastern Army and are not subject to any alienation on anyone's behalf. I undertake, at the first request of the General Staff, Major General P.P. Petrov or by his power of attorney to issue everything accepted for storage. That we testify with signatures and the application of the seal.

November "22" day 1920.

Station Manchuria. Colonel Izome's signature."

The first attempts to return this gold were made immediately in December due to the need to pay for military supplies. Not only were the valuables not returned, but R. Izome left Manchuria without informing the Russian partners about the fate of the gold transferred to him for safekeeping.

In February 1920, when the Ussuri Cossack army left Khabarovsk, Colonel Savitsky and military foreman Klok seized 38 pounds from the local branch of the bank, i.e. more than 600 kg of gold and handed it over against receipt to the commander of the Japanese infantry regiment Colonel Sugi. The latter issued a receipt for the acceptance of gold.

Before the evacuation of the Japanese from Khabarovsk, the gold was administered by General Yamadi, who then transferred it to the Japanese Chosen Bank for safekeeping. In October 1922, when the Japanese were evacuated from Russia, the gold was transported to the Japanese city of Shimonoseki.

Generals Semenov, Petrov and Podtyagin in the 20-30s. tried to return through the court the gold transferred to the Japanese. The decision to sue for the return of the gold did not come about without the help of liberal elements in Japan's leadership circles. There were certain influential groups here who supported the white generals behind the scenes. Liberal MPs accused former War Minister and then Prime Minister Ugaki of using Russian gold to finance his conservative party. In these circles a complex political game was played against the generals of the Kwantung Army.

Possible trial could become a platform for accusing the generals of this army of violating the laws and customs of Japan during the intervention in Russia in 1920-1922. Subsequently, one of the Japanese researchers found in the parliamentary library in Tokyo a court case on the issues of Semyonov's gold, which, as was clear from this case, was 1200 pages long. The Japanese court recognized the presence of Russian gold assets in the country's banks, but refused to satisfy the generals' claim, citing the fact that they no longer have official authority to dispose of state gold. Thus, back in those years, Japan recognized the presence of Russian gold in the country and even demonstrated its readiness to return it to the "official" authorities. There is evidence that Russian gold was used in interbank transactions involving the Japanese government. This is evidenced by the fact that Yokohama Hurry Bank transferred a large amount of interest in connection with operations with Russian gold to the income of the Japanese state budget.

In 1945, the American military administration liquidated the Yokohama Hurry Bank and Chosen Bank as accomplices of Japanese militarism, but their successor was the Bank of Tokyo, created by the American occupation administration, which, merged with the Mitsuba Bank, entered the top ten largest banks in the world.

Documents collected joint stock company closed type “Russian Gold”, indicate that it was the predecessors of this bank who used Russian gold, and the bank should be responsible for the return of the precious metal to the Russian Federation.

As early as 1922, at the World Genoa Conference, when the Bolsheviks sought diplomatic recognition from the West, they used the available data on gold appropriated by the Entente states from reserves that had previously been stored in Kazan. The conference raised the issue of recognizing Soviet Russia's pre-war tsarist debts. This issue, at the insistence of Russia, should have been considered together with the return and offset against the debt of the royal gold that ended up abroad. According to the Russian delegation, this gold was estimated at 215 million gold coins, not counting 60 million, which the government of Admiral A.V. Kolchak was transferred to the Syndicate company and other private banks as gold to obtain a loan for the purchase of weapons. As a result of the counterclaims presented, it was decided to postpone the discussion of the issue of mutual obligations that arose during the First World War and the Civil War for a future time.

The fate of Russian gold and other valuables that ended up abroad after the defeat of the white movement and the departure of the interventionists was of interest to many former statesmen and academic historians. One of the attempts to determine their value was made by the former Finance Manager of the Far Eastern Republic A.I. Pogrebetsky. This democratic republic was formed in April 1920 in Eastern Siberia in the Far East after the defeat of the white movement. In November 1922, the republic became part of the RSFSR.

Based on the data of A.I. Pogrebetsky and his own research, the former Minister of Finance of the white government V.I. Moravsky prepared a certificate on the presence of Russian gold abroad. This reference was found in the archives of the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace in California. Using these documents and the results of his own research, the Russian scientist N.K. Ablazhey and the American scientist N.V. Moravsky (the son of a former minister) compiled and published information in 1996, from which it is clear that the government of A.V. Kolchak in October 1919 deposited 81.5 million rubles. gold, most of which was used to pay for armaments. The remainder of the unused amount fluctuated, according to the emigrant press, in the range of 12-14 million rubles. gold.

In the Chinese city of Qingqikar, the governor-general detained 350,000 rubles in 1920. gold, and the customs of the Chinese city of Harbin detained on March 6, 1920 316 thousand gold rubles.

Until now, we have been talking about that part of the gold reserves of Russia, which was stored in Kazan. The other part of the reserve was stored in Nizhny Novgorod, and its fate is connected with the peace treaty, which in March 1918 Russia concluded with Germany. This agreement went down in history under the name "Brest Peace". A secret agreement was drawn up for it, according to which Russia, which had lost Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltic states and part of Poland under the agreement, had to pay an indemnity in the amount of 245 tons 564 kg of gold.

In September 1918, 93 tons 536 kg were handed over to the German Reichsbank. Sending the rest of the gold from Nizhny Novgorod to Berlin was suspended due to the revolution in Germany. Soon the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the agreement to it were denounced by Russia.

After the defeat of Germany in the First World War, Russian gold was at the disposal of the French army. The command of the occupying forces decided that this was a trophy of France, but the other victorious countries of Germany did not agree with this. As a result of negotiations, it was decided to deposit 93.5 tons of gold in a French bank under the control of Great Britain, France and the United States. Subsequently, the United Kingdom and the United States ceased to show interest in this gold. At the conclusion in June 1919 of an agreement between the victorious countries in the First World War and Germany, Article 259 was included in its text, which noted that gold in the amount of 93.5 tons belongs Russian state and placed in safe custody in France. The cost of this gold at modern prices would be more than $1 billion.

In 1963, the status of this gold was legally and actually confirmed by an agreement at the level of the governments of the USSR and France. Of this gold, the Russian side agreed to give 45 tons, and the French side agreed to accept it to pay off old Russian debts in favor of France. This agreement once again confirmed that the remaining 48.5 tons belong to Russia.

Newly Created expert advice, which, together with the joint-stock company Russian Gold, is conducting a study of documents related to royal gold located abroad and the possibility of returning its value to Russia.

The press has already reported that the temporary bourgeois Russian government, who led the country in February-October 1917, sent 3.7 tons of gold to Sweden for the purchase of military equipment, which at modern prices costs about 45 million dollars. jar. Russia did not receive a single rifle, a single cartridge from Sweden on account of this gold.

Given that at the moment Russia has begun to recognize royal debts, it has the right to claim the return of the royal gold that ended up abroad. Part of the gold reserves of tsarist Russia was spent on financing foreign communist and workers' parties to intensify their activities to speed up the world revolution. This money was transferred through the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs RSFSR. In total, this Commissariat spent abroad during 1920-1921. 12 million gold rubles, i.e. 9.2 tons of gold.

Of course, there was also money for the maintenance of diplomatic missions, but this amount could be many times less. An additional argument for such a conclusion is the official statement of the issuance of gold coins, found in the archives of the State Bank of the USSR. It notes that in the period from October 1, 1920 to May 15, 1921, 2984 thousand rubles were issued for the needs of the communist International. gold.

Sending gold abroad continued in subsequent years. Therefore, the spending of gold returned from Siberia to Kazan, and gold stored in Nizhny Novgorod and Moscow, is directly related to the desire of the Bolshevik leadership to establish a Soviet form of government in other countries of the world.