What year was the 1st Afghan war. War in Afghanistan. Background

Source: photochronograph.ru


  • skinning our soldiers on occasion, Basmachi’s lawless bastards .. but in fact, almost the entire population was ready to take up arms, and when most of the country is ready to take up arms, it’s not easy to fight, this is the difficulty of thinking this wars

  • The photos are colorful, lively .. thanks ... the complexity of the war in Afghanistan from 79 -89 years was still
    and the fact that the majority fought with the USSR, that is, if they were some kind of separate gang formations of radical fanatics like the Taliban (by the way, the Taliban is also different, and very different), then this would be half the trouble, but since any invasion of third-party states Under any pretext, even under the most trustworthy one, is perceived by the Islamic world as a seizure, occupation, uninvited invasion, intervention, etc., etc. .., peacefully grazed some sheep, for example, if you watch doc films .. already 20 years later, what do they think about the war locals, then in Afghanistan it turns out that almost every 4th shot at ours, and everyone calmly talks about it ... now they are all these storytellers, civilians, bake cakes, trade behind the counter, work as taxi drivers, etc., etc. ... and you never think that they were evil mujahideen 20 years ago ... for example, for me, the word mujahideen basmach or dushman always associated with some kind of bastards teraryugs
    skinning our soldiers on occasion, such lawless Basmachi .. but in fact, almost the entire population was ready to take up arms, and when most of the country
    ready to take up arms, it is not easy to fight, this is the complexity of the thought of this war

    Click to reveal...

    Everything is correct. From the point of view of the Afghans - We, or the United States, are the invaders. Today there is a lot of talk about whether or not it was necessary to send troops to Afghanistan. I think it was necessary then. Unfortunately. And Everlasting memory To all Soldiers. They fought for their country.

  • By the way ... there is such a dock film, very famous in the world and sensational, and there is a reason for this .. it was filmed by Paul Refsdal, a Norwegian journalist .. it is called "Taliban without a mask" where you can see the classic type of enemy ... these are the so-called moderate groups which main topic-drive the interventionist from their land (that is, patriotic comrades) and there are those whose main theme is everything else .. that is, those who only hide behind the idea of ​​patriotism - they are usually called radicals .. both of them prefer not to argue with each other once again friend
    but it doesn’t always work out, and then wars begin between the clans. During the Afghan war, both of them united against the common enemy of the USSR, .. as ours left, a showdown between clans began ... in general, the situation is predictable ... then the Americans came .. and again a common enemy,
    True, there is no longer such unity as during the Afghan war, no national heroes like Masud .. and. the situation is slightly different, .. soon Refsdal was kidnapped by radicals ... he was filmed ... though it cost money later ... people in a white hillock of Helmand ... or something like that .. almost after this shelling, the most important of his family was covered by US drones, razed to the ground in a day
    after which he probably had all the reasons to hate the Americans)

  • The topic is correct and necessary. quivering.
    My call fell just on the withdrawal of OKSVA from the DRA. Komroty, foreman and platoon commander were from there. All are sensitive, undermined, ... Between officers and ensigns, from across the river, and those who have not been there, there was an unspoken, silent and not always visible to the eye, but clearly felt difference. We young people immediately sensed this and trusted them more than those who did not fight .... Without witnesses, a war ensign could land a major, such incidents sometimes happened with staff officers ... To the credit of the warring officers and ensigns, I will say that for two years I have been among them condoms never met, and among the headquarters and support sometimes came across rare specimens ....... The first category was forgiven a lot, the second was paid with soldier's hatred and, under especially favorable circumstances, with soldier's fists. By this time, the country was already rushing at full speed to the cliff and much hidden for the time being and not the best in people was asked to come out ....

    89-91. St. s-t, Brest.

    I'll throw in a bug. Found on the web.

  • 1 December 1 - Day of Remembrance of the intelligence officers of 783 ORB who died on this day in 1984 in the battle near the village of Ishanan (Kunduz province)

    - Captain Karataev A.A. - commander of the 2nd RR
    - Junior Sergeant Aseev S.I. - squad leader 2 rr
    - Private Tsyganov A.V., gunner-operator 2 RR
    - Private Tukhtaev T.M., scout 2 RR

    Aseev Sergei Ivanovich, junior sergeant, commander of the reconnaissance squad. Born on May 9, 1965 in the village of Kalinka, Skopinsky District, Ryazan Region. Father - Aseev Ivan Vasilyevich, mother - Aseeva Evdokia Kirillovna. Graduated in 1983 Moscow School metrostroy, worked as an installer in Metrostroy. On May 3, 1984, he was drafted into the army by the Pervomaisky district military registration and enlistment office in Moscow. In the Republic of Afghanistan - since November 1984. During the combat operation on December 11, 1984, his reconnaissance company entered into battle with the enemy. During the battle, the fighters of the squad, led by Aseev, attacked the enemy and broke into his positions. Sergey died in the battle. For courage and courage shown in the performance of a combat mission, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star (posthumously). He was buried in the village of Kalinka, Skopinsky district.

    TSYGANOV Alexey Vladimirovich , private, gunner-operator of the BMP, b. 01/25/1965 in the village. Shekshem, Sharyinsky district, Kostroma, region Russian. He studied at the Kolpinsky ship repair school.
    In Armed. The forces of the USSR were called up on 11/3/83 by the Zhdanovsky RVC, Leningrad.
    In the Rep. Afghanistan from Apr. 1984.
    Participated in 9 combat operas.
    He showed himself to be a brave and courageous warrior.
    12/11/1984 reconnaissance, the company in which he served, fought with the pr-com. C. fought fearlessly and skillfully.
    With machine gun fire, he disabled several rebels.
    Died on the battlefield.

    Buried in his native village.

    TUKHTAEV Tuymurod Mukhsinovich , private, shooter, genus. 02/18/1966 on the territory. collective farm "Aini" Gijduvan district of Bukhara, region Uzbek SSR. Uzbek. He studied at the Samarkand Cooperative Institute.
    In Armed. The forces of the USSR were called up on 12.4.84 by the Bagishamal RVK in the city of Samarkand.
    In the Rep. Afghanistan since Sept. 1984.
    12/11/1984 during combat operas in the district of us. point Ishan acted in the battle formation of a reconnaissance company.
    Having blocked the village, the company began combing it, but was met with strong fire from the rebels.
    As part of a group of three people, T. came close to the duval, because of which the fire was fired, and destroyed the fire with grenades. point.
    During the battle, he was the first to break into the house where the rebels were, and opened fire on them.
    He died in this battle.
    load ord. Red Star (posthumously).
    Buried at home.

  • Dead:

    Deputy Commander of the ORB for the technical part, Major Anatoly Petrovich Yashchenko;
    - Deputy commander of the RDR for the VDP, Lieutenant Kelekhsaev Sergey Aleksandrovich;
    - squad leader Sergeant Petrov Vasily Nikolaevich;
    - squad leader Sergeant Shilov Dmitry Yuryevich;
    - senior scout junior sergeant Kapriyanidi Georgis Ivanovich;
    - senior intelligence officer junior sergeant Dancha Ivan Ivanovich;
    - Radiotelegraph operator Private Sorokin Nikolai Anatolyevich.



  • And almost everything in the highlands


    Kandahar Province, Kandahar, 173 SESN, 1987. original photo
    Scouts 173 separate detachment special purpose at a combat exit somewhere east of Kandahar. Pashtun tents are visible in the background, and some suitcases and other things that cannot be identified lie in the shadows in front of the scouts. The scouts were wearing unloading vests (it looks like they are Chinese “chi-com”), which contained 6 equipped magazines for a machine gun, 4 grenades, three additionally had a belt cartridge belt for ten VOG-25 grenades from the PG-25 underbarrel grenade launcher.

    From left to right: Captain Andrey Vasilyevich Kravchenko, deputy commander of the 3rd company, senior lieutenant Khamzin Anvar Gumerovich ( awarded the order Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star), senior sergeant of the 3rd company Sergey Zatemov, commander of the 3rd company captain Prokopchuk Konstantin Viktorovich (died on 04/21/1987, awarded two orders of the Red Banner and the Order of the Red Star).


    original photo
    In the photo: Deputy commander of the security company, Senior Lieutenant Polyakov Leonid Igorevich at the outpost of the second drilling station, producing drinking water for the Kabul garrison, organized not far from the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan, surrounded by the "service" dogs of the outpost - on the left is a shepherd dog brought from the USSR by one of the employees of the drilling rig, and on the right is a local mongrel who has nailed to the outpost.

    Dogs were brought from the USSR by military personnel and employees of the Soviet Army, many local homeless stray dogs were nailed to our units, becoming there for allowance. Basically, they were companions and were used to carry out guard duty, which was carried much better by conscripts, notifying the approach of uninvited guests with their bark. Soviet outposts were built in an open field and were often fenced only with reinforced concrete poles with barbed wire stretched over them, which was not a serious obstacle for the enemy if the guard service was poorly organized. Dogs perfectly filled these gaps in the organization of guarding outposts. After the withdrawal of troops, a huge number of dogs remained in Afghanistan

    Kabul Province, Kabul, 1351 OBO, 1985. original photo
    In the photo: at the outpost of the second drilling station, which produces drinking water for the Kabul garrison, organized near the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan, on the left is the deputy commander of the security company, Senior Lieutenant Polyakov Leonid Igorevich, on the right, the commander of the security platoon, Senior Lieutenant Felikov Viktor.

  • The photos are colorful, lively .. thanks ... the complexity of the war in Afghanistan from 79-89 years was also in the fact that the majority fought with the USSR, that is, if these were some kind of separate gang formations of radical fanatics like the Taliban (by the way, the Taliban also different, and very different) then it would be half the trouble, but since any invasion of third-party states Under any pretext, even under the most trustworthy one, is perceived by the Islamic world as a seizure, occupation, uninvited invasion, intervention, etc., etc. .. .then, accordingly, those who were not in any way in any groupings take up arms, and there .., peacefully grazing some kind of sheep, for example, if you watch the dock films .. already 20 years later, what do the locals think about the war, then in Afghanistan it turns out almost every 4th shot at ours, and everyone calmly talks about it ... now they are all these storytellers, civilians, bake cakes, trade behind the counter, work as taxi drivers, etc., etc. ... and you will never think that they were evil mujahideen 20 years ago ... for example, for me, the word mujahideen basmach or dushman always associated with some kind of bastards teraryugs
    skinning our soldiers on occasion, Basmachi’s lawless bastards .. but in fact, almost the entire population was ready to take up arms, and when most of the country is ready to take up arms, it’s not easy to fight, this is the difficulty of thinking this wars

    Click to reveal...

    If only the Americans hadn’t poured money, weapons, instructors into this war ..., the complexity would have been much less ...
    And if Russia now applied 10% of the efforts spent by the United States, the Americans from Avgan would be purring ....

  • Nangarhar Province, Jalalabad, 66 SMBR, 1985.
    The command of the 9th company is at the location of the company.
    From left to right - platoon commander l-t Loskutov (?), commander of the 9th company senior l-t Aliskerov A., platoon commander l-t Voronkin S.V., platoon commander Lieutenant Nazarov (?).

    In the camp of the Afghan opposition, on Pakistani bases, with the participation of American and Pakistani advisers, they developed a plan: to take the border town of Khost, to create an alternative government to Kabul, with all the ensuing consequences.

    Our command conceived the operation "Magistral" in order to unblock the Gardez-Khost highway and restore the food supply to the population of the city.

    A gang of dushmans is moving out of Pakistan into Afghan territory.

    Afghan dushmans strongly resembled the Central Asian Basmachi of the 20s and 30s.
    During the operation, which was carried out from November 23, 1987 to January 10, 1988, the road was unblocked. On December 30, the first convoy with food arrived in Khost. Checkpoints were set up at critical heights along the highway.

    However, the dushman thugs and their American and Pakistani patrons did not reconcile themselves to this situation, and threw the best forces to eliminate checkpoints, and the dushman special squad "Black Stork ".

    According to legend, this detachment consisted of criminals who were supposed to atone for their guilt before Allah with the blood of the infidels. In fact, they were Pakistani special forces dressed in dushman rags, who, due to their ethnicity, speak Pashto. That day they were in black uniforms with rectangular black-yellow-red stripes on the sleeves.

    At half past four on January 7, 1988, dushmans began shelling height 3234. Corporal Fkdotov died during the shelling. The rocket fired from the branch it was under. Under the cover of fire from recoilless rifles, mortars and rocket launchers, the bandits approached our positions at a distance of 220 meters. With the onset of dusk, under the cover of massive fire, the dushmans attacked from two directions.

    After 50 minutes, the attack was repulsed. Dushmans could not approach the main positions closer than 60 meters. 10-15 dushmans were killed, about 30 were wounded. During the attack, junior sergeant Vyacheslav Aleksandrov was killed.

    The fire of the dushmans was concentrated on the position of Aleksandrov, who fired from the Utyos heavy machine gun.

    Vyacheslav ordered his fighters Obedkov and Kopyrin to take cover behind the position, while he himself continued to fire and repulsed three enemy attacks.

    Slava Alexandrov shortly before the battle.

    The second assault began at 17.35. dushmans concentrated their efforts where the Utyos machine gun they had just destroyed stood. But this assault was also repulsed.

    During this assault, the main blow was taken by the machine gunner Andrey Melnikov. With aimed fire with frequent changes of positions, Andrey Melnikov managed to repel numerous enemy attacks for a long time. When Andrei ran out of ammunition, the wounded paratrooper managed to throw a grenade into the midst of the militants, but he himself died from the explosion of an enemy mine. The fragment, breaking through the Komsomol ticket, a photograph of his wife and daughter, went straight into the heart.

    From the memoirs of S. Yu. Borisov, sergeant of the 2nd platoon of the 9th company, made by him immediately after the battle at height 3234 (according to the book by Yury Mikhailovich Lapshin - deputy commander of the 345th RAP in 1987-89 "Afghan Diary").
    "All the attacks of the dushmans were well organized. Other platoons of the company came to our aid, replenished our supply of ammunition. There was a lull, or rather the shooting calmed down. But he got up strong wind it got very cold. I went down under the rock, where the comrades who had just arrived were.
    At this time, the most terrible and most terrible attack began. It was light from the breaks of the "boundaries" (grenades from RPG-7). Dushmans fired heavily from three directions. They figured out our positions, and fired concentrated grenade launchers at the place where Melnikov was with a machine gun. The spirits fired five or six grenades into it. He ran downstairs already dead. Dropped dead without a word. From the very beginning of the battle, he fired from a machine gun, both from our direction and from the one where he received a mortal wound.

    ml. I ordered Sergeant Peredelsky V.V. to carry all the grenades upstairs, to the stone where all our comrades were. Then he took a grenade and rushed there. Having encouraged the guys to hold on, he himself began to fire.
    Spirits have already approached 20-25 meters. We fired at them almost point-blank. But we did not even suspect that they would crawl even closer to a distance of 5-6 meters and from there they would begin to throw grenades at us. We simply could not shoot through this pothole, near which there were two thick trees. At that moment, we no longer had grenades. I stood next to A. Tsvetkov and the grenade that exploded under us was fatal for him. I was wounded in the arm and leg.
    There were many wounded, they were lying, and we could do nothing to help them. There were four of us left: me, Vladimir Shchigolev, Viktor Peredelsky and Pavel Trutnev, then Zurab Menteshashvili ran to the rescue. We already had two magazines for each, and not a single grenade. Even there was no one to equip stores. At this most terrible moment, our reconnaissance platoon came to our aid, and we began to pull out the wounded. Private Igor Tikhonenko covered our right flank all 10 hours, conducted aimed fire from a machine gun. Perhaps, thanks to him and Andrei Melnikov, the "spirits" could not get around us on the right side. At four o'clock the spirits realized that they could not take this hill. Taking their wounded and dead, they began to retreat.
    On the battlefield, we later found a grenade launcher, shots for it in different places, and three hand grenades without rings. Apparently, when they tore the rings, the checks remained in the heat of the moment. Maybe the rebels literally did not have enough of these three grenades to crush our resistance.
    There was a lot of blood everywhere, apparently, they had heavy losses. All the trees and stones were riddled, no living place was visible. Shanks from the "boundaries" stuck out in the trees.
    I have not yet written about the "Cliff", which the "spirits" literally turned into a piece of scrap metal with bullets and shrapnel. We fired from it until the very last minute. How many was the enemy, one can only guess. According to our estimates, no less than two or three hundred.

    In total, from eight in the evening to three in the morning, dushmans went to attack heights nine times.

    Significant assistance to the defenders was provided by our artillery, the fire of which under the dushman bullets was directed by artillery spotter Senior Lieutenant Ivan Babenko, who was in the positions of the 9th company.

    At a critical moment, a reconnaissance platoon of senior lieutenant Alexei Smirnov approached, delivering ammunition, which made it possible to go on a counterattack and finally decided the outcome of the battle.

    Alexei Smirnov, a graduate of the RVVDKU, led a group of scouts that came to the aid of Viktor Gagarin's platoon.

    The Mujahideen realized that they would not be able to take this mountain. Taking away the wounded and dead, they began to retreat. Pakistani helicopters were waiting for them in a nearby gorge. However, as soon as they were about to take off, the Tornadoes hit them, and most of the squad was destroyed.

    In the 9th company, six paratroopers were killed, twenty-eight were injured, nine of them severe. Junior Sergeant Alexandrov and Private Melnikov were posthumously awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union.

    The photo shows the awarding of the soldiers of the 9th company.

    The film "9th company"
    Many of the facts in it were distorted. So, the events in the film unfold in 1989, and not in 1988, as it was in reality. Also, losses Soviet army in this battle, according to the film, they make up almost 100%, while in fact 6 out of 39 people died. The most serious distortion of the facts (ALmost CRIMINAL) is that in the film the paratroopers were "forgotten" at a height and took the fight alone, without any command and support.
    Another distortion - the battle took place in the highlands, in the snow, and not in the sands, as in the film. Nikolai Starodymov, editor-in-chief of the Battle Brotherhood magazine, a veteran of the War in Afghanistan, criticized Bondarchuk's film, saying that "the film showed the situation not just what was not there - what, in principle, could not be."

    After the battle, two fighters received the title of "Heroes of the Soviet Union" posthumously.
    This is Junior Sergeant Vyacheslav Alexandrov and Private Andrei Melnikov (on the first photo).
    Eternal glory to the dead...

    • · Year 1985 · Year 1986 · Year 1987 · Year 1988 · Year 1989 · Results · Subsequent events · Losses of the parties · Foreign aid to the Afghan Mujahideen · War crimes · Media coverage · "Afghan Syndrome" · Memory · In works of culture and art · Related articles · Literature · Notes · Official site ·

    Afghanistan casualties

    On June 7, 1988, in his speech at a meeting of the UN General Assembly, Afghan President M. Najibullah said that "from the beginning of hostilities in 1978 to the present" (that is, until 06/07/1988), 243.9 thousand people have died in the country. military personnel of government troops, security agencies, civil servants and civilians, including 208.2 thousand men, 35.7 thousand women and 20.7 thousand children under the age of 10; another 77 thousand people were injured, including 17.1 thousand women and 900 children under the age of 10 years.

    The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; available estimates range from 670,000 civilians to 2 million in total. According to the researcher of the Afghan war from the United States, Professor M. Kramer: “During the nine years of the war, more than 2.7 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, several million more were in the ranks of refugees, many of whom left the country” . Apparently, there is no exact division of victims into government army soldiers, Mujahideen and civilians.

    Ahmad Shah Massoud, in his letter to the Soviet Ambassador in Afghanistan Y. Vorontsov dated September 2, 1989, wrote that the support of the PDPA by the Soviet Union led to the death of more than 1.5 million Afghans, and 5 million people became refugees.

    According to UN statistics on the demographic situation in Afghanistan, between 1980 and 1990, the total mortality of the population of Afghanistan was 614,000 people. At the same time, during this period, there was a decrease in the mortality of the population of Afghanistan in comparison with previous and subsequent periods.

    Period Mortality
    1950-1955 313 000
    1955-1960 322 000
    1960-1965 333 000
    1965-1970 343 000
    1970-1975 356 000
    1975-1980 354 000
    1980-1985 323 000
    1985-1990 291 000
    1990-1995 352 000
    1995-2000 429 000
    2000-2005 463 000
    2005-2010 496 000

    The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was the flow of Afghan refugees to Iran and Pakistan. Photo of Sharbat Gula, placed on the cover of the magazine national geographic in 1985, under the name "Afghan Girl", became a symbol of the Afghan conflict and the problem of refugees around the world.

    The army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in 1979-1989 suffered losses in military equipment, in particular, 362 tanks, 804 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 120 aircraft, 169 helicopters were lost.

    USSR losses

    Total - 13 835 people. These data first appeared in the Pravda newspaper on August 17, 1989. Subsequently, the total figure increased slightly. As of January 1, 1999, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and in accidents, missing) were estimated as follows:

    • Soviet Army - 14,427
    • KGB - 576 (including 514 border troops)
    • Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28

    Total - 15,031 people. Sanitary losses - almost 54 thousand wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 416 thousand cases.

    According to professor Military Medical Academy Petersburg, Vladimir Sidelnikov, the final figures do not include servicemen who died from wounds and diseases in hospitals on the territory of the USSR.

    In a study conducted by officers of the General Staff under the direction of prof. Valentina Runova, gives an estimate of 26,000 dead, including those killed in action, those who died of wounds and disease, and those who died in accidents. The breakdown by year is as follows:

    According to official statistics, during the fighting in Afghanistan, 417 military personnel were captured and went missing (of which 130 were released in the period before the withdrawal Soviet troops from Afghanistan). In the Geneva Accords of 1988, the conditions for the release of Soviet prisoners were not fixed. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, negotiations on the release of Soviet prisoners continued through the mediation of the government of the DRA and Pakistan:

    • So, on November 28, 1989, in the territory of Pakistan, in the city of Peshawar, two Soviet soldiers were handed over to representatives of the USSR - Andrey Lopukh and Valery Prokopchuk, in exchange for the release of which the DRA government released 8 previously arrested militants (5 Afghans, 2 citizens Saudi Arabia and 1 Palestinian) and 25 Pakistani citizens detained in Afghanistan

    The fate of those who were taken prisoner developed in different ways, but an indispensable condition for saving lives was their acceptance of Islam. At one time, the uprising in the Pakistani camp of Badaber, near Peshevar, received a wide response, where on April 26, 1985, a group of Soviet and Afghan captured soldiers tried to free themselves by force, but died in an unequal battle. In 1983, the Committee for the Rescue of Soviet Prisoners in Afghanistan was created in the United States through the efforts of Russian emigrants. Representatives of the Committee managed to meet with the leaders of the Afghan opposition and persuade them to release some Soviet prisoners of war, mainly those who expressed a desire to stay in the West (about 30 people, according to the USSR Foreign Ministry). Of these, three people returned to the Soviet Union after the USSR Prosecutor General's statement that the former prisoners would not be prosecuted. Cases are known when soviet soldiers voluntarily went over to the side of the Mujahideen and then participated in hostilities against the Soviet Army.

    In March 1992, the Russian-American Joint Commission on the Affairs of Prisoners of War and Missing Persons was established, during which the United States provided Russia with information about the fate of 163 Russian citizens missing in Afghanistan.

    Death toll Soviet generals according to publications in the press, as a rule, there are four dead, in some cases the figure is 5 dead and dead in Afghanistan.

    Name Troops Title, position Place the date Circumstances
    Vadim Nikolaevich Khakhalov air force Major General, Deputy Commander of the Air Force of the Turkestan Military District gorge Lurkoh September 5, 1981 He died in a helicopter shot down by Mujahideen
    Petr Ivanovich Shkidchenko SW Lieutenant General, Head of the Combat Control Group under the Minister of Defense of Afghanistan province of Paktia January 19, 1982 He died in a helicopter shot down by ground fire. Posthumously awarded the title of Hero Russian Federation (4.07.2000)
    Anatoly Andreevich Dragun SW lieutenant general, head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces DRA, Kabul? January 10, 1984 Died suddenly while on a business trip to Afghanistan
    Nikolay Vasilievich Vlasov air force Major General, Advisor to the Commander of the Afghan Air Force DRA, Shindand Province November 12, 1985 Shot down by a MANPADS hit while flying a MiG-21
    Leonid Kirillovich Tsukanov SW Major General, Advisor to the Commander of the Artillery of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan DRA, Kabul June 2, 1988 Died of illness

    Losses in equipment, according to widely disseminated official data, amounted to 147 tanks, 1314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel trucks, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters (helicopters lost only 40- th Army, excluding helicopters of the border troops and the Central Asian Military District). At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, information was not published on the number of combat and non-combat losses of aviation, on the losses of aircraft and helicopters by type, etc. It should be noted that the former deputy commander of the 40 Army for armaments, General Lieutenant V. S. Korolev gives other, higher figures for losses in equipment. In particular, according to him, in 1980-1989, the Soviet troops irretrievably lost 385 tanks and 2530 units of armored personnel carriers, BRDM, BMP, BMD (rounded figures).

    Read more: List of Soviet Air Force aircraft losses in the Afghan war

    Read more: List of losses of Soviet helicopters in the Afghan war

    Expenses and expenses of the USSR

    About 800 million US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget to support the Kabul government.

    Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. Ryzhkov formed a group of economists who, together with specialists from various ministries and departments, were to calculate the cost of this war for the Soviet Union. The results of this commission's work are unknown. According to General Boris Gromov, “Probably, even incomplete statistics turned out to be so stunning that they did not dare to make it public. Obviously, today no one is able to give an exact figure that could characterize the expenses of the Soviet Union for the maintenance of the Afghan revolution.

    Losses of other states

    Pakistan Air Force lost 1 combat aircraft in dogfight. Also, according to the Pakistani authorities, in the first four months of 1987, more than 300 civilians were killed as a result of Afghan air raids on Pakistani territory.

    Iranian Air Force lost 2 combat helicopters in air battles.

    "The 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans only did what they could."

    The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was an objective necessity. About it on round table“Afghanistan is a school of courage”, which was held in the Tyumen Regional Duma, said the chairman of the council of the regional public organization Union of paratroopers Grigory Grigoriev.

    “Afghanistan is not only the name of a country. This word includes the whole gamut of feelings and memories: pain and delight, courage and cowardice, military comradeship and betrayal, fear and risk, cruelty and compassion that the fighters in this country had to experience. It serves as a kind of password for those who fought in the Afghan war,” said Grigory Grigoriev.

    The head of the Union analyzed in detail the reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. This was the provision of international assistance to the allied government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. There was a danger that the Islamic opposition would come to power and, as a result, the danger of transferring the armed struggle to the territory of the Central Asian republics of the USSR. This is a threat that Islamic fundamentalism will hit all of Central Asia.

    It was necessary to prevent the strengthening of the US and NATO on their southern borders, which were arming the Islamic opposition and wishing to transfer military operations to Central Asia. According to one of the Kuwaiti newspapers, the number of military instructors who advised Islamists is as follows: Chinese - 844, French - 619, Americans - 289, Pakistanis - 272, Germans - 56, British - 22, Egyptians - 33, as well as Belgians, Australians, Turks, Spaniards, Italians and others. In fact, 55 states fought against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

    Another reason for bringing in the army is drug trafficking. Afghanistan was the second largest opium producer in the world. It spread through the Central Asian republics to Russia and Europe. In addition, it was impossible to allow strengthening of the PRC on its southern borders. China has done a lot for the Islamic opposition. Since the late 1960s, relations between the USSR and the PRC were very tense, it came to the use of armed forces. The USSR had a large border with China, which was the line of confrontation, and often the front line. The leadership of the USSR did not want to lengthen this line.

    The entry of troops into Afghanistan was a response to the deployment of US missiles in Europe. It was necessary to strengthen our own positions in the region against Iran and Pakistan. The latter was in a state of permanent conflict with India, and Afghanistan was a good springboard for the Union to provide assistance to India. One of the economic reasons is the protection and continuation of the construction of national economy facilities. More than 200 of them were built by Soviet specialists - a dam, a hydroelectric power station, a gas pipeline, a car repair plant, international airfields, a house-building plant, an asphalt concrete plant, the Salang highway, and more. A whole Soviet microdistrict was built in Kabul.

    “Entering Afghanistan was necessary for our country. This is not a personal whim of the Soviet leadership and not an adventure. It is impossible to consider the causes of this war in isolation from each other. They must be considered comprehensively, without prejudice, on the basis of documents and testimonies of the participants. With these reasons in mind, we ask ourselves, should the USSR sit back and let the Islamic opposition overthrow the pro-Soviet regime? And this despite the fact that the population of the three republics bordering Afghanistan professed Islam. The overthrow of the Soviet regime in favor of Islam would be a dangerous example,” said Grigory Grigoriev.

    According to him, behind the Islamic opposition were the interests of the United States, which, having lost their influence in Iran, tried to urgently strengthen their positions in the region. Especially Grigory Grigoriev emphasized that the Americans had a medal "For the implementation of national interests." The national interests of the USSR in the Central Asian region are all the more obvious.

    In confirmation, the head of the regional Union of paratroopers read out a letter from a soldier of the 9th company of the 345th separate guards parachute Andrei Tsvetkov’s regiment, written on May 17, 1987: “Father, you write that we are losing health, and sometimes life for Asians. This is far from true. Of course, we are fulfilling our international duty. But besides this, we are also fulfilling a patriotic duty, we are defending the southern borders of our homeland, and therefore you. This is the main reason for our being here. Father, imagine what a threat would hang over the USSR if the Americans were here, and their missiles were on the border.

    Thus, the interest of the superpower of the USSR consisted, firstly, in protecting its own borders, and secondly, in counteracting the attempts of another superpower and other countries to gain a foothold in this region. Another reason is the danger of transferring the actions of the Islamic opposition to the territory of the Central Asian republics. After strengthening it Soviet-Afghan the border became one of the most restless: detachments of dushmans constantly attacked Soviet territory. This can be seen as a kind of reconnaissance in combat. The Islamic opposition has never recognized the entry of the Central Asian republics into the USSR.

    The Islamists did not use such terms as "Soviet Union" or "Soviet troops". Firstly, the word "council" in translation coincides with the Arabic "shura" - an elected Islamic council. It was considered a purely Muslim term. In addition, the opposition did not recognize the influence of the USSR in Central Asia. In their printed publications, they preferred to say "Russia" and "Russians" with the addition of offensive epithets "wild", "barbarians", "bloodthirsty".

    Grigory Grigoriev cited the words of a lieutenant colonel of the border troops of the KGB of the USSR, a participant in the Afghan war, holder of the Order of the Red Banner of Makarov: “Now it is customary to talk about this war, that, they say, it is not needed, no one threatened anyone from Afghanistan. But in fact, there was a constant attack by bandits and terrorists on our outposts, border detachments, on collective farms with the aim of robbery, cattle theft, taking our people into captivity, and killing party workers. They tried to distribute leaflets in which they called on Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens to fight against the Russian invaders. Constantly had to be on the alert. Not a border, but a front line. And when our border motorized landings and assault groups went there, then the ground caught fire under the feet of the bandits. They were not up to Soviet territory. One task was how to get away from our soldiers, which they did not always succeed in.”

    Soviet troops entered the territory of Afghanistan at a distance of 100 km, and the border guards closed the border. 62,000 border guards took part in hostilities and set up outposts. The officers who served before the war in the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts and who knew the situation firsthand, in the majority believe that fighting were inevitable, and it is better to wage war on foreign territory. Hafizullah Amin began to seek rapprochement with other states. The Kremlin's fear was caused by the increased activity of Western intelligence services. In particular, the frequent meetings of employees of the American Foreign Ministry with the leaders of the Afghan armed opposition.

    On December 12, 1979, a group of the most influential members of the USSR Politburo decided to send troops to Afghanistan in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people and to prevent anti-Afghan actions from neighboring states. The entire period of the Soviet army's stay in Afghanistan can be conditionally divided into four stages: the introduction and deployment of troops, the introduction of active hostilities, the transition from active operations to supporting Afghan troops, and the participation of Soviet troops in the policy of national reconciliation.

    The officers call the operation to bring in troops a classic one. On December 25, at 15.00 Moscow time, several Soviet formations entered deep into Afghanistan from two directions. In addition, military units landed at airfields in Kabul and Bagram. In a few days, the fighters occupied the territory inhabited by 22 million people. On December 27, Amin's palace was taken by storm. Colonel General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army, wrote in his book “Limited Contingent”: “I am deeply convinced that there are no grounds for asserting that the 40th Army was defeated, clearly as well as that we won military victory in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country without hindrance, carried out their tasks, unlike the Americans in Vietnam, and returned to their homeland in an organized manner. If we consider armed opposition detachments as the main enemy of a limited contingent, then the difference between us was that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans only what they could.

    The losses of Soviet troops in the bloody Afghan war amounted to 15 thousand 51 people.

    Many times I had to stumble upon such questions on the Internet. Some people are sure that war in Afghanistan was meaningless. Some whim of the bloodthirsty Soviet regime, which suddenly took it and out of boredom decided to arrange a massacre, in the manner of Vietnam.

    “Degenerates tend to hate normal people. Millions and millions of normal people perish for the amusement and sadistic pleasure of the leaders of a degenerate sect."
    G.P. Klimov

    Other people sincerely do not understand - why was this war needed? The official reason is "support for a loyal USSR government in Afghanistan" does not give an answer (primarily a moral one), but why did the Russian soldiers themselves have to die in order to solve the political issues of another country? No visible benefit supposedly have not received.

    So Why was the war in Afghanistan started?

    The main stumbling block in this matter is that the causes of the Afghan war lie not in what we got (seized territory or achieved some other tangible good), but in what was avoided, what negative events NOT happened.

    It is this formulation of the question that gives rise to the position - was there a threat at all? After all, if it did not exist, then it is absolutely fair to consider such a war senseless.

    Here I want to emphasize and draw your attention to a very important detail. This position was still justified in 1989. But today it is completely untenable for a very simple reason. If earlier the calculation of all threats was available only to the special services and was an exclusively theoretical calculation, today it is available to everyone who has access to the Internet, because all the predicted threats have actually come true.

    A bit of theory

    The USSR adhered to the ideology of internationalism and friendship of peoples. There is an opinion that this friendship was imposed on people almost by force. There is some truth in this. Most of the population did not really have a strong love for other peoples, but they were not hostile either, i.e. easily got along with the same adequate representatives of any other nationalities.

    However, in addition to sane people, on the territory of almost all republics there were local "Svidomo" - a special caste, turned on radical nationalism or religious fanaticism . Pay attention to this bundle, I will mention it below.

    Under strong Soviet rule, they could not afford to be in any way active, but they were a social time bomb that would work at the first opportunity, i.e. as soon as the control of the authorities weakens (a vivid example of such a triggering is Chechnya).

    The leadership of the USSR believed that if radical Islamists came to power in Afghanistan, and let me remind you that Afghanistan directly bordered on the USSR, they would inevitably begin to inflame the existing hotbeds of tension within the country.

    Thus, the actions of the USSR are the actions of a person who saw that a neighbor's house caught fire. Of course, this is not our house yet, and you can drink tea imposingly, but entire settlements burn down. Common sense tells us that we need to start fussing when our house is not on fire yet.

    Was this assumption correct?

    Our generation has a unique opportunity not to guess, but to look at how history developed after the events in Afghanistan.

    War in Chechnya

    They lived quietly for themselves as part of the USSR, and suddenly here you are - war.

    The reasons for the war were found as many as 2, and mutually exclusive:

    • the war of the Chechen people for independence;
    • jihad.

    If this is war Chechen people, it is not clear what Khattab, Una-UNSO (Muzychko) and mercenaries from the Baltic republics were doing there.

    If this jihad - what about the Chechen people? After all, nationalism is a sin for a Muslim, because. Allah created people differently and made no distinction between them.

    Having two mutually exclusive reasons indicates that in reality it was not so much the idea itself or the reason (any one, specific) that was important as the war itself and preferably on the largest possible scale, for which the maximum number of reasons was used to immediately draw into it and nationalists and religious fanatics.

    Let us turn to the primary sources and listen to what the main instigator of the war, Dudayev, says about the causes of the war. If you wish, you can watch the video in its entirety, but we only care about its beginning, namely the phrase from 0:19-0:30.

    Is it worth these huge sacrifices and destruction of the desire of Chechens to live in a free and independent state?

    Freedom and independence is for us life or death.

    It sounds very poetic and beautiful. But a legitimate question arises. And why was the topic of independence not raised before, if it is such a fundamental issue of life and death?

    Yes, it’s trite because in the days of the USSR, Dudayev’s posing the question in this way “freedom or death” would have ended with his death within 48 hours. And for some reason I think he knew about it.

    Simply because the leadership of the USSR, with all its shortcomings, had the political will and was able to make difficult decisions, such as the Storming of Amin's Palace.

    Dudayev, being a military officer, felt very well that Yeltsin was not in a position to make such a decision. And so it happened. As a result of the inaction of Boris Nikolaevich, Dzhakhar Dudayev was able to seriously strengthen his position in the military, political and ideological sense.

    As a result, ancient military wisdom worked: Whoever cannot strike first, gets it first. Athenagoras of Syracuse

    I will also draw your attention to the fact that shortly before the war in Chechnya, 15 (!!!) republics seceded from the USSR. Their separation took place without a single shot being fired. And let's ask ourselves a simple question - was there a peaceful way to resolve the issue of life and death (to use Dudayev's poetic terminology)"? If 15 republics managed to do this, it is logical to assume that such a method existed. Draw your own conclusions.

    Other conflicts

    The example of Chechnya is very vivid, but it may not be convincing enough, because this is just 1 example. And let me remind you that it was given to substantiate the thesis that in the USSR there really were social time bombs, the activation of which by some external catalyst could provoke serious social problems and military conflicts.

    Chechnya is by no means the only example of the explosion of these "mines". Here is a list of similar events that took place on the territory of the republics former USSR after its collapse:

    • the Karabakh conflict - the war of Armenians and Azerbaijanis for Nagorno-Karabakh;
    • the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict - the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia;
    • the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict - the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia;
    • Ossetian-Ingush conflict - clashes between Ossetians and Ingush in the Prigorodny district;
    • Civil war in Tajikistan - inter-clan Civil War in Tajikistan;
    • conflict in Transnistria - the struggle of the Moldovan authorities with the separatists in Transnistria.

    Unfortunately, it is not possible to consider all these conflicts within the framework of the article, but you can easily find materials on them yourself.

    Islamic terrorism

    Look at the events in the world - Syria, Libya, Iraq, the Islamic State.

    Wherever Islamic extremism takes root, there is war. Long, protracted, with a large number of civilian casualties, with terrible social consequences. It is noteworthy that Islamic extremists kill even fellow believers who do not share radical views.

    The Soviet Union was an atheistic state in which any religion was subjected to repression. There is also communist China, but China has never conquered Muslim territories, unlike the USSR.

    And I remind you that the oppression of Muslims on their territory is a pretext for the start of Jihad. Moreover, an occasion that is recognized by all currents of Islam.

    As a result, the Soviet Union risked become enemy No. 1 for the entire Muslim world.

    US threat

    It's no secret that the US supported Islamic radicals in Afghanistan. In the distant 1980s, the United States, as part of Operation Cyclone, financed the training of Mujahideen detachments in Pakistan, which were then armed and deployed to Afghanistan to participate in the civil war. that is why the government of Afghanistan could not stand alone against them. For the United States, the Soviet Union was the main, and in fact, the only enemy. Accordingly, if we had not entered Afghanistan, the United States would have done it, because by that time they had already begun to spend a lot of money on training and supplying the Mujahideen. Moreover, they could enter Afghanistan in different senses:

    • establish a controlled regime in Afghanistan, which would become their springboard for subversive activities against the USSR in an ideological war;
    • send troops into Afghanistan and have the prospect of deploying their own ballistic missiles on our border.

    Were these fears justified? Today we know that the Americans actually entered Afghanistan. This fear is entirely justified.

    conclusions

    The start of the war in Afghanistan was vital.

    Soviet soldiers were heroes who died for a reason, but defended the country from a HUGE number of threats. Below I will list them and next to each I will write the state of affairs today, so that it would be clearly visible whether these were fictional threats or real ones:

    • the spread of radical Islam in southern republics where he was on favorable ground. Today, radical Islamists pose a threat to the whole world. Moreover, a threat in various senses of the word, ranging from direct military operations and terrorist acts, as in Syria, to simply social unrest and tension, as for example in France or Germany;
    • creation from the USSR of the main enemy of the Islamic world. The Wahhabis in Chechnya openly called on the entire Islamic world for Jihad. At the same time, another part of the Islamic world turned its attention to the US;
    • the location of NATO troops on the borders with the Soviet Union. US troops are in Afghanistan today. Let me remind you that Afghanistan is located at a distance of 10,000 km from the United States and was located on the border of the USSR. Draw your own conclusions;
    • an increase in drug trafficking to the Soviet Union, across a 2,500 km border. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the production of drugs on the territory of this country increased many times over.

    Afghan war - civil war in Afghanistan 1979-2001, in which in 1979-1989. Soviet troops were involved.

    Crisis of the pro-Soviet regime

    The crisis of the semi-feudal state in Afghanistan led to an increase in political upheaval in the 1970s. The pro-communist coup of 1978 and radical anti-feudal reforms destabilized the situation in the country. Repressions against all those dissatisfied with the regime of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) met with armed resistance from the population of the country. A resistance movement began to grow under the banner of Islam. Repression and the outbreak of war caused a flow of refugees to neighboring Pakistan. Already by the mid-1980s, their number reached more than 3 million people. Tens of thousands of them returned to Afghanistan with weapons supplied by NATO countries seeking to overthrow the PDPA regime.

    The resistance to the communists was led by supporters of the Islamic state. Partisans were called fighters for the faith - Mujahideen.

    Amin became the President of Afghanistan. In Moscow, Amin was considered an unpredictable leader who could reorient himself towards the United States or China in order to bring about an end to the war. Then a hostile state would have arisen at the borders of the USSR. To prevent this threat, the leaders of the Soviet Union decided to overthrow Amin, replace him with a more moderate leader Babarak Karmal, and at the same time a decision was made to introduce a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

    After the entry of Soviet troops

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