Battles at Legnica and on the river Chaio. Mongols in Eastern Europe. Why the Mongols did not capture Europe When the Mongols decided to attack the cities of Europe

While some are trying to prove that there was no conquest of Genghis Khan, and Batu is Alexander Nevsky in disguise, others are writing studies about this based on historical sources.

Here, for example, is a text describing Batu's campaign in Hungary.
The invasion of Batu's armies into Hungary began in March 1241. The Tatars easily overcame the so-called Russian Gates - the Veretsky Pass in the Carpathians, which separated Hungary and Russia. “They had forty thousand warriors armed with axes, who went ahead of the troops, felling the forest, laying roads and removing all obstacles from the path,” says Archdeacon Thomas of Split. - Therefore, they overcame the blockages, built by order of the king, with such ease, as if they were erected not from a pile of powerful fir trees and oaks, but composed of thin straws; in a short time they were scattered and burned, so that it was not difficult to pass them. When they met with the first inhabitants of the country, at first they did not show all their ferocious cruelty and, driving around the villages and taking booty, did not arrange big beatings.

But that was only the beginning. Tatar troops advanced on Hungary from several directions. Ogedei's son Kadan (who made a special appearance during this campaign) and the grandson of Chagadai Buri moved from Galicia, south of Batu's main forces. After passing through the forests “between Russia and Cumania” for three days, they captured the royal residence of Rodna, inhabited mainly by German miners who mined silver here, and 600 Germans, led by Count Aristald, “more skilled than other warriors”, joined their army (subsequently they will be resettled by Buri in the city of Talas [See the amendment in the comments on the name of the city], now Dzhambul, in Kazakhstan). Moving further through gorges and rapids, the Tatars unexpectedly approached the large episcopal city of Varada (now Oradea, in Romania). The deacon here was the Italian Rogerius, later Bishop of Split and Thessaloniki, the author of the “Lamentation Song” about the devastation of the Hungarian land - one of our main sources on the history of the Hungarian war. “Tatars ... quickly taking possession of the city and burning most of it, in the end they left nothing outside the walls of the fortress and, having captured the booty, killed young and old men and women in the squares, in houses and in the fields,” wrote Rogerius (he himself then hid from the Tatars in the forest, but later still captured by them). - ... Having done all this, the Tatars suddenly retreated, taking with them all the booty. Another Mongol commander, Bahatu, crossed the Seret River further south, in Moldavia; "having defeated the people who had gathered for battle, the Tatars began to completely occupy this land." As for Batu himself, he, as already mentioned, acted in the central direction. “The chief master of Batu, after he crossed the gate (Veretsky pass. - A.K.), began to burn villages, and his sword did not spare either sex or age.”

As always, detachments from previously conquered lands acted as part of the Tatar armies. Contemporaries, describing what was happening with horror, named first of all Cumans - Polovtsians, as well as other neighboring peoples. The Tatars, "united with the bloodthirsty people of the Komans, ravaged the country with terrible cruelty," the author of the Cologne Chronicle reported; “Most of this vile people, with an army consisting of all those who joined them, devastate Hungary with unheard-of cruelty,” Count Heinrich of Thuringia wrote to his father-in-law, the Duke of Brabant. The detachments of the Mordovians who acted (as in Poland) in the vanguard of the Mongol troops were especially ferocious. “Ahead of them are certain tribes called Mordans, and they destroy all people indiscriminately,” a certain Hungarian bishop reported to the Parisian bishop Wilhelm (Guillaume) III. “Not one of them dares to put on shoes on his feet until he kills a man… Without hesitation, they devastated all the lands and destroyed everything that came across…” from Cologne, - ... peaceful people who are defeated and subjugated as allies, namely a great many pagans, heretics and false Christians, [they] turn into their warriors. By "heretics" and "false Christians" the Latin authors-monks could also have in mind Christians of the Greek rite, that is, Orthodox Christians, first of all, probably, Alans and Russians. However, we can speak quite definitely about the participation of Russian detachments in the war in Hungary. Actually, the Galicia-Volyn Chronicle unequivocally makes it clear that the campaign in this country did not take place without the participation of Russian governors (recall the Kyiv thousand Dmitr). The “Rutenov” (Russians) are also mentioned as part of the Mongol army by the Croatian chronicler Foma Splitsky, a contemporary and eyewitness of the Tatar invasion: one of these “rutens” defected to the Hungarians on the eve of the decisive battle.

Already in early April, the Mongols' forces were ready to unite. Their forward detachments, as happened in all campaigns, acted against the main enemy forces concentrated at that time near the city of Pest (part of today's Budapest, the capital of Hungary). The Tatars “sent forward a cavalry detachment, which, approaching the Hungarian camp and teasing them with frequent sorties, incited them to fight, wanting to test whether the Hungarians had the courage to fight them,” wrote Foma Splitsky. King Bela, believing that his troops outnumbered the enemy, gave the order to move forward. As expected, the Tatars immediately retreated; the Hungarians began the pursuit and soon reached the Shaio (or Solo; Russian chroniclers called it the Solona River), the right tributary of the Tisza, where they met with the main forces of the Tatars. They were located on the opposite bank of the river, but in such a way that "they were not completely visible to the Hungarians, but only in part." The Hungarians were still very afraid of them. “Seeing that the enemy detachments had gone across the river,” Thomas continues, “[they] camped in front of the river ... The king ordered to set up tents not far from each other, but as close as possible. Having thus arranged the wagons and shields in a circle like camp fortifications, they all settled down as if in a very tight corral, as if covering themselves from all sides with wagons and shields. And the tents turned out to be heaped up, and their ropes were so intertwined and twisted that they completely entangled them all the way, so that it became impossible to move around the camp, and they all seemed to be tied. The Hungarians believed that they were in a fortified place, but it was the main reason for their defeat.

Here, on the banks of the Chaillot, near the town of Mohi, a battle took place that decided the fate of Hungary. It took place on April 11, 1241 - just two days after the equally fateful battle of Legnica, in which the forces of the Polish prince Henry were defeated. The coordination of actions of individual Mongolian detachments is amazing! In just three days, they defeated the armies of the strongest rulers of Central Europe and conquered two powerful and previously prosperous states!

The battle of Shio was extremely fierce, and success did not immediately come to the side of the Mongols. All the main leaders of the Mongol army, who were then in Hungary, took part in the battle - Batu himself, his first commanders Subedei and Buraldai, princes Kadan, Shiban and others. For us, the battle of Chaillot is of particular interest, since it was then that it was the only time during the entire Western campaign! - The sources reflected both the personal participation of Batu in hostilities, and his role in achieving victory. Researchers restoring the course of the battle were generally lucky. A detailed story about him has been preserved in various and completely unrelated sources - both Western, Latin, and Eastern - Persian and Chinese. These stories complement each other well, allowing you to see the key moments of the battle through the eyes of both the Hungarians themselves and their Tatar opponents. (This is also the only case of its kind in the history of the Western campaign.) Moreover, in describing many details, the sources are unanimous: they all agree that initially the preponderance of forces was on the side of King Bela; what key point the battle became a battle for a bridge across the river; that, finally, personal intervention in the events of Batu significantly influenced their course. However overall picture what happened is restored with difficulty - and only thanks to a scrupulous comparison of sources, their "imposition" on each other. The actions of Batu are especially difficult to interpret. Let's talk about them in more detail, especially since the opportunity to look at it directly in a combat situation is given to us for the first and last time.

According to the testimony of Archdeacon Thomas of Split, on the eve of the battle, Batu, "the senior leader of the Tatar army", "climbing the hill, carefully examined the location of the Hungarian army." This reconnaissance predetermined the outcome of the battle. Returning to the army, Batu made an inspired speech, and in it he touched on the numerical superiority of the Hungarians, which obviously embarrassed his soldiers.

My friends, - this is how Batu's speech is conveyed by the Split chronicler, - we should not lose courage: even though there are a great many of these people, they will not be able to escape from our hands, because they are ruled carelessly and stupidly. After all, I saw that they, like a flock without a shepherd, were locked up as if in a tight pen.

Having said this, Batu "ordered all his detachments, built in their usual order, that same night to attack the bridge that connected the banks of the river and was not far from the camp of the Hungarians."

How reliable is this evidence? Answering this question, one must take into account that the theme of “carelessness” and “stupidity” of the rulers of the Hungarian land is the key one in the work of Archdeacon Thomas, who does not get tired of denouncing the inactivity and disunity of the Hungarian barons and King Bela himself. And therefore, the speech put into the mouth of the leader of the Tatar army, obviously, belongs to the Split chronicler himself; in any case, its content is fully consistent with his view of what is happening. However, Batu's speech before the battle (or even during the battle) is also reported by another contemporary of the events - the Franciscan monk Giovanni del Plano Carpini. The latter believed that if the Hungarians had not faltered at the decisive moment and "courageously resisted" the Tatars, they "would have gone beyond their limits, since the Tatars had such fear that everyone tried to escape." They were stopped by Batu, who, "drawing his sword before their face, resisted them." Batu's speech Plano Carpini conveys in such very lofty and not entirely clear terms:

Do not run, because if you run, then no one will escape, and if we must die, then it is better that we all die, since what Genghis Khan predicted will come true, that we should be killed; and if now the time has come for it, let us better endure it.

"And thus they were inspired, remained, and ruined Hungary."

Plano Carpini does not provide other details of the battle. But his companion, a member of the same embassy, ​​Benedict Polyak, on the contrary, reports a lot of interesting things about the battle of Chaillot, and one that finds a match in the sources coming from the camp of the Tatars themselves. Referring to their stories, Benedict also writes that Batu, after the Tatars fled from the Hungarians, "drawn his sword and forced them to return to battle." True, there is not a word about any speech by Batu.

Plano Carpini's version is even more bewildering than Thomas of Split's story. The words attributed by him to Batu seem completely unthinkable. In fact, the Europeans could talk about the inevitable death of the Mongols (and strongly hope for it!) But not the leader of the Mongol army. The mentioned imaginary prediction of Genghis Khan, the essence of which Plano Carpini reveals a little higher (“... they (the Mongols. - A.K.) must subjugate the whole earth ... until the time comes for their slaughter: namely, they fought for forty-two years and must first reign eighteen years After that, they are said to be defeated by another people, which, however, they do not know how they were foretold"), based on calculations of the supposed time of the reign of the Antichrist and those apocalyptic peoples whose invasion should herald his appearance; these calculations were extracted by Christian writers from the works of the Fathers of the Church - both authentic and apocryphal, written on their behalf later. It is clear that the mythical predictions of the death of the Mongol kingdom based on such calculations could not have arisen among the Mongols themselves. And in general, this whole scene, written out in the traditions of the knightly saga, with fiery speeches (the domestic reader probably remembered the famous: “The dead have no shame ...” of the Russian prince Svyatoslav), does not at all fit with the customs of the Mongols, for whom retreat is a military technique, deserving of praise, and by no means of censure. A complete misunderstanding of the enemy, the logic of his actions forced European chroniclers to often describe what did not actually exist. So it is here: Batu's actions received an interpretation that did not correspond to reality at all. But something still stood behind his "speeches" addressed to the soldiers? And in fact, at some point, the outcome of the battle might seem unclear and the Mongols had the idea of ​​​​retreating or even fleeing?

The picture is partly clarified by Persian authors who were in the service of the Mongols, in particular Juvaini and Rashid ad-Din. They report the following. Intending to exterminate the "Kelars and Bashgirds", that is, the Christian Hungarians, Batu gathered a significant army. But the enemy army was also extremely large (Juvaini, and after him other authors give absolutely fantastic figures of 400 or even 450 thousand horsemen). At the forefront of his army, “for reconnaissance and patrol,” Batu sent his younger brother Shiban (according to Juvaini, with a 10,000-strong detachment). A week later, Shiban returned and informed his brother that there were twice as many enemies as the Mongols, "and all the people are brave and warlike." It was then, probably, that the scene occurred, described, but not understood by European chroniclers. After “the troops came close to each other,” continues Juvaini, Batu “climbed the hill and for a whole day did not speak a word to anyone, but prayed fervently and cried loudly. To Muslims (let me remind you that this is written by a Muslim author. - A.K.), he also ordered everyone to gather and pray. The next day they prepared for battle. Between them was big river... "Rashid ad-Din, who repeated the story of Juvaini, adds that Batu did so "according to the custom of Genghis Khan." A younger contemporary, Rashid al-Din Wassaf, somewhat colors the picture, but he does not report anything new in essence; moreover, in his presentation, the pagan Batu looks almost like an orthodox Muslim: “having ascended to the top of the hill”, he “humbly and weakly prayed to the Almighty, the only giver of blessings, stayed awake all night with a heart that burned like a lamp, and with a soul that blew like the coolness of the morning, he passed the night until the day came.

So, it was not a matter of developing a plan for the upcoming battle, and not even of banal cheering on their warriors on the eve or during the fight. Batu's actions had a distinctly ritual character. But the Muslim authors did not quite correctly interpret them. Evidently, while performing rites on the top of the hill, Batu sought to achieve the favor of the heavenly powers - that very "Eternal Sky", by whose power and blessing the Mongols explained all their victories. At the same time, it should be taken into account that Batu offered up his prayers in one of the special dark nights, almost on the new moon (that month it fell on the next night, April 12), - and this time was especially noted by the Mongols. Important things “they begin at the beginning of the moon or at the full moon,” wrote Plano Carpini, and therefore they “call [the moon] the great emperor, kneel before her and pray.”

As you know, Genghis Khan and his descendants in the male line descended directly from Heaven itself (for one of the ancestors of Genghis Khan, Bodonchar, was born to a mother, Alan-Goa, when she was unmarried, - in her own words, from some heavenly light, penetrated into her bosom; this story was canonized by the Mongols and included in their sacred chronicle - "The Secret Tale") (2). Like the rulers of other nomadic communities, the Genghisids perceived themselves as intermediaries between the divine Heaven and their own subjects, believed in their ability to provide heavenly protection and prosperity to the people (modern researchers translate the medieval Mongolian term "suu jali", which denoted such a supernatural ability, with the word "charisma" ). Batu obviously demonstrated these qualities on the night before the battle, inspiring the soldiers to win. At the same time, he followed the custom of his grandfather Genghis Khan, who often did the same on the eve of important battles - the testimony of Rashid ad-Din on this score seems to be key to understanding the essence of what is happening. It is pertinent to note that the Chaillot episode seems to be the only description of such a ritual in the history of the Mongol conquests. And the fact that he is connected specifically with Batu is probably not accidental. The leader of the Western campaign managed to prove himself not just as a commander, but as a bearer of sacred properties, the very charisma of power that was able to ensure victory for his army. And this quality, in the eyes of the Mongols themselves, was much more significant than the simple ability to correctly lead the troops, especially since Batu did not lack talented and energetic commanders. Modern researchers even believe that the possession of such sacred qualities, such charisma initially contributed to the promotion of Batu from among other princes, and in particular to his superiority among the Jochids.

It is curious that another contemporary, the Western European writer of the mid-13th century, the Dominican monk Vincent of Bove, the author of the Historical Mirror, also reported on some prayer actions of Batu during his invasion of Hungary, but naturally interpreted them in a completely different way. , eschatological key. Batu, according to him, “sacrificed to the demons, asking them if he had the courage to walk on this earth. And the demon living inside the idol gave the following answer: “Go carelessly, for I am sending three spirits ahead of your deeds, thanks to the actions of which your opponents will not be able to resist you,” which happened. These spirits are: the spirit of discord, the spirit of distrust and the spirit of fear - these are the three unclean spirits, like frogs, about which it is said in the Apocalypse. (Compare in the description of the “end times” in the Revelation of John the Theologian: “And I saw three unclean spirits, like frogs, coming out of the mouth of the dragon and out of the mouth of the beast and out of the mouth of the false prophet: these are demonic spirits that work signs; they go out to the kings of the earth the whole world, to gather them for battle on that great day of God Almighty”; Rev. 16:13-14.)

But this is only one side of the matter. The role of Batu cannot be reduced only to ritual actions on the eve of the battle. Judging by the evidence of sources, he directly led (or at least tried to lead) his troops - and this, I repeat once again, is the only case of this kind in his entire biography, as it is presented in the written sources that have come down to us. But the actions of Batu as a commander received a far from unambiguous assessment in the sources. As it turns out, it is in them that the reasons for those failures that almost led to the defeat of the Mongols in the battle of Shio lie.

According to Foma Splitsky, a certain defector from the Russians warned the Hungarians about the plans of the Tatars. Upon learning of the impending attack, the brother of King Bela Koloman and Bishop Hugrin of Kaloch with their detachments approached the bridge over the Shio. It turned out that part of the Tatars had already begun crossing the river; a fight ensued. The Hungarians overturned the enemy with a swift blow, "put down a lot of them, and others, breaking through back to the bridge, were thrown into the river." An important detail is reported by the Franciscan monk Benedict Pole: Koloman "in the very first fight, he personally threw the main leader of the Tartars from the bridge over this river, along with a horse and weapons, into the abyss of death." This fact is confirmed by eastern sources, from which we learn the name of the deceased Mongol leader - he was the governor Batu Bahatu, who led one of the columns of the Mongol army during the invasion of Hungary (more on the circumstances of his death will be discussed later). Coloman "withstood their second and third onslaught," continues Benedict, "and fought until the Tartars fled."

Success at the first stage of the battle remained with the Hungarians - this is confirmed by all sources. But what happened next? Foma Splitsky gives such a version of events. After the detachment of Koloman and Hugrin moved away from the bridge, the Tatars pulled up seven siege weapons here and, throwing huge stones and shooting arrows, drove away the guards left by the Hungarians. So they managed to cross the river without hindrance, after which they rushed to the camp of the Hungarians, who did not expect an attack and for the most part behaved very carelessly (this, I recall, is a favorite topic of the Split chronicler). The Pole Benedict states the matter differently: according to his information, the outcome of the battle was decided by a roundabout maneuver that Batu undertook. The leader of the Mongols “sent an army across the river in its upper reaches at a distance of one or two days of travel, so that they unexpectedly attacked the opponents fighting on the bridge from the rear ... As a result, the outcome of the case took an unexpected turn. And after the Hungarians ignored the warning of King Koloman, the Tartars crossed the bridge. Sources of eastern origin also report on the roundabout maneuver of the Mongol troops; however, it is not entirely clear whether it took place downstream or upstream of the river.

In the future, the battle unfolded at the very camp of the Hungarians. This had fatal consequences for them. “A large Tatar horde, as if in a round dance, surrounded the entire camp of the Hungarians,” says Foma Splitsky. - Some, pulling their bows, began to shoot arrows from all sides, others hurried to set fire to the camp in a circle. And the Hungarians, seeing that they were surrounded by enemy detachments from everywhere, lost their mind and prudence and no longer understood at all how to deploy their orders, or how to raise everyone to battle, but, stunned by such a great misfortune, rushed around in a circle like sheep in a pen, seeking salvation from wolf teeth." Terrified, they rushed to escape - but then they came across “another evil, arranged by them and well known to them. Since the approaches to the camp, due to tangled ropes and piled up tents, turned out to be very risky blocked, then during a hasty flight, some pressed on others, and the losses from the stampede, arranged by their own hands, seemed to be no less than those that were committed by the enemies with their arrows " . In this situation, the Tatars resorted to another trick that they often used: they “as if they opened a certain passage for them and allowed them to leave. But they did not attack them, but followed them from both sides, not allowing them to turn either there or there. And when the Tatars saw that the Hungarians retreating in disarray “are already exhausted by the difficult road, their hands cannot hold weapons, and their weakened legs are not able to run further, then they began to hit them with spears from all sides, cut them with swords, sparing no one, but brutally destroying everyone ... ”The miserable remnants of the Hungarian army were pressed against some kind of swamp, and those who escaped the sword of the Tatars drowned in the quagmire. Bishops Khugrin Kalochsky, Matvey Esztergomsky, Gregory Dyorsky, many other magnates and without the number of ordinary soldiers perished in this terrible battle. The brave brother of the king Koloman, seriously wounded at the beginning of the battle, fled to Pest, and then went across the Drava River to Croatia (after a short time he died from his wounds). As for King Bela IV, he, having barely escaped death or captivity, found refuge in the possessions of the Austrian Duke Frederick II Babenberg, but he simply robbed him, luring the amount of 10 thousand marks, and then, as a pledge of this amount, taking from his area in the west of Hungary. From the Austrian possessions, the king moved to Zagreb, where he remained throughout the summer and autumn, and by winter, fearing the Tatars, he fled with his family to the coast of Dalmatia and took refuge on one of the islands of the Adriatic Sea.

A look at what is happening from the other side is presented by Juvaini and Rashid ad-Din. According to their version, the decisive role in the victory of the Mongols was played, firstly, by the perseverance and determination of the detachments of Shiban and Buraldai operating in the vanguard, and secondly, by the same roundabout maneuver of Batu, which we have already spoken about.

That same night, Batu “sent one part of the army around,” says Juvaini, “and the army of Batu himself crossed the river from this side. Shibakan, Batu's brother, personally moved into the middle of the battle and made several attacks in a row. The enemy troops, being strong, did not budge, but that army (sent around) went around them from behind. Then Shibakan with all his army hit them at once, rushed to the fences of the royal tents, and they cut the ropes of the tents with swords (a detail known to us from the story of Thomas of Split. - A.K.) (3). When they overturned the fences of the royal tents, the army of the Kelars (Hungarians. - A.K.) was confused and fled; no one escaped from this army ... It was one of the many great deeds and terrible battles. Rashid ad-Din adds that Batu, together with Emir Buraldai (whose name Juvaini does not mention), crossed the river himself at night; Buraldai, on the other hand, undertook an "attack with all the troops at once." The Mongols “rushed to the tent of the Kelar (king. - A.K.), who was their king, and cut the ropes with swords. As a result of the fall of the tent, their army (Hungarians. - A.K.) lost heart and turned to flight. Like a brave lion that rushes at its prey, the Mongols chased them, attacked and killed them, so that they destroyed most of that army. (Subsequently, the richly decorated tent of the Hungarian king served Batu himself.) Another detail, though hardly reliable, is contained in the “Book of Victories” by the 15th-century Persian writer Sheref ad-Din Ali Yazdi. The latter reports that Batu "personally entered the battle itself and made several attacks in a row." However, it is unlikely that Yazdi had any unique sources on the history of the Hungarian war, from where he could extract this information. He used the writings of authors known to us (primarily the "Collection of Chronicles" by Rashid al-Din), and the news of Batu's personal participation in the battle was most likely contrived by him.

Well, the picture is impressive and, at first glance, quite objective. We could limit ourselves to it - if we did not have at our disposal another source that sheds light on the circumstances of the defeat of the Hungarians hidden from prying eyes. It turns out that there was some dispute between the main commanders of the Mongols, even a conflict, and Batu's actions almost led to disaster. Fortunately for the Mongols and unfortunately for their opponents, along with Batu, a commander who had an exceptional understanding of the situation and a genuine military genius participated in the battle.

What remained outside the knowledge of Latin chroniclers and Persian historians is described in the "Biography of Subedei", which is read in the Chinese chronicle "Yuan-shih". According to this source, Subedey was at the forefront of the army that fought in Hungary, “together with the Chuvans (here: members of the Golden Family. - A.K.) Batu, Hulagu (whose name is not mentioned in other sources in connection with the Western campaign - A. K.), Shiban and Kadan. All these commanders advanced "on separate five roads." The clash with the main forces of King Bela really caused confusion among the leaders of the Mongols. "The army of the king is full of strength, we will not be able to move easily," they said. Then Subedei “put forward an excellent plan”, the essence of which was to lure the Hungarian army to the river (its name is given in a Chinese source as Ho-nin, but in terms of meaning, we are undoubtedly talking about the Shaio River). It was Subedei, and not Batu, who owned the idea of ​​a detour; he commanded the troops that were moved behind enemy lines. “The troops of all the princes were in the upper reaches, where shallow water and horses could wade, in addition, there was a bridge in the middle,” the author of his biography in Yuan-shi explains Subedei's intention. - In the lower reaches, the water is deep. Subedei wanted to tie rafts for a secretive, underwater (? - A.K.) crossing, leading to the enemy's grasp from behind. An indispensable condition for success, as always with the Mongols, was to be the synchronism of the actions of individual Mongolian detachments - both the one that attacked the Hungarian units defending the bridge in the forehead, and the one that came in from behind and had to cross the river downstream, where it least expected by the Hungarians. However, this time there was no concerted action. Batu hurried - maybe overestimating own forces, or maybe not wanting to share the laurels of the winner with his elderly, but still undefeated mentor. The Chinese source directly blames the “zhuvan” Batu for hasty and ill-considered actions that led to excessive losses among the attackers, and not only among the “subjugated peoples”, but also among the Mongols themselves: “Without waiting for the crossing, the zhuvan was the first to ford the river for battle. Batu's army began to fight for the bridge, but instead of using it, every thirtieth of the soldiers drowned; along with them, his subordinate commander Bahatu died. Immediately after the crossing, the Zhuwang, in view of the increasing army of the enemy, wanted to demand the return of Subedei, belatedly counting on him. Subedei said this: “Van wants to return - let him return. Until I reach the city of Pest on the Danube (both names are given in transcription corresponding to the Hungarian original. - A.K.) - I will not return!” and ran towards the city. (Here, the Chinese source is somewhat ahead of the events: the city of Pest was taken by the Mongols after the defeat of the Hungarian forces at Shaio. - A.K.) All the princes also went to the city, as a result of which they attacked together, captured it and returned back. When the victory was finally won and the detachments united, Batu made claims to Subedei:

During the battle near the Ho-nin River, Subedei was late to help, my Bahatu was killed.

But Subedey dismissed the accusations against him, essentially convicting Batu of not understanding the elementary truths of the military tactics of the Mongols:

Although Zhuwang knew that the upper reaches were shallow, he still took possession of the bridge to cross and fight, not knowing that I had not yet completed tying the rafts in the lower reaches. And today, you know, he says to himself - I was late, and he thinks that this is the reason.

We must pay tribute to Batu: he managed to admit his own wrong. (“Then Batu also figured out how it was,” the source says.) Later, at the traditional gathering of princes and emirs, when everyone “drank mare’s milk and grape wine,” Batu confirmed this: “Speaking about the events during the campaign against the king , Batu said this: “Everything that was captured at that time is the merit of Subedei!”

It is worth noting that subsequently Batu always paid tribute to both Subedei himself and his son Uryankhatai, and, in turn, could count on their support, including in delicate matters that were very important for him and related to his relationship with relatives. If he was distinguished by vindictiveness, then to the same extent he possessed the ability to appreciate people for true merits. This character trait is inherent only in a truly prominent politicians- invariably brought him dividends.

Notes

1. The article is an abridged fragment from the book: Karpov A. Yu. Baty. M., 2011 (ZhZL series). References and references can also be found there.

2. This story, from the words of the Tatars themselves, was known in other countries; see the stories of Rashid ad-Din and the Armenian historian, contemporary of the events of Kirakos Gandzaketsi.

3. In all likelihood, it was this battle that was preserved in the Khiva legends, recorded in the 17th century by the Khiva khan and historian Abu-l-Gazi, a descendant of Shiban. These legends also told about how brother Batu chopped iron chains and wooden carts that surrounded the enemy camp; True, the capital of Russia, Moscow, is named as the place of the battle (an obvious anachronism). Persian author early XIV Vassaf, following mainly Juvaini, names instead of Shiban - obviously by mistake - the son of Batu Sartak: the latter “with one fog rushed towards the enemy; this party went down the side of the mountain just like a mountain stream. Like a predetermined disaster falling on people, which no one is able to repel, they rushed to the enemy’s camp and cut the ropes of the tent fences with swords ... ".

Having conquered by the beginning of the 1240s a vast expanse from the Sea of ​​Japan to the Danube, the Mongols came close to central Europe. They were ready to go further, but their progress suddenly stopped.

First to the North

The first western campaign of the Mongols was carried out during the lifetime of Genghis Khan. It is crowned with a victory over the united Russian-Polovtsian army in the Battle of Kalka in 1223. But the subsequent defeat of the weakened Mongol army from the Volga Bulgaria for some time postpones the expansion of the empire to the West.

In 1227 the Great Khan dies, but his cause continues to live. In the Persian historian Rashid-ad-Din, we find the following words: "in pursuance of the decree given by Genghis Khan in the name of Jochi (eldest son), he entrusted the conquest of the Northern countries to members of his house."

Since 1234, the third son of Genghis Khan, Ogedei, carefully plans a new campaign, and in 1236, a huge army, according to some estimates, reaches 150 thousand people, advances to the West.

It is headed by Batu (Batu), but the real command is entrusted to one of the best Mongol commanders - Subedei.
As soon as the rivers are ice-bound, the Mongol cavalry begins its movement towards the Russian cities. Ryazan, Suzdal, Rostov, Moscow, Yaroslavl capitulate one after another. Kozelsk holds out longer than others, but it is also destined to fall under the onslaught of countless Asian hordes.

To Europe via Kyiv

Genghis Khan planned to take one of the richest and most beautiful cities of Russia back in 1223. What the Great Khan did not succeed in, his sons did. Kyiv was besieged in September 1240, but only in December the defenders of the city faltered. After the conquest Kyiv principality nothing was holding back the Mongol army from invading Europe.

The formal goal of the campaign in Europe was Hungary, and the task was the destruction of the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan, who was hiding there with his horde. According to the chronicler, Batu "for the thirtieth time" offered the Hungarian king Bela IV to expel the Polovtsians defeated by the Mongols from their lands, but every time the desperate monarch ignored this proposal.

According to some modern historians, the pursuit of the Polovtsian Khan prompted Batu and Subedei to decide to conquer Europe, or at least some of its part.

However, the medieval chronicler Yvon of Narbonne attributed much more extensive plans to the Mongols:

“They invent that they are leaving their homeland in order to transfer to themselves the kings-sorcerers, whose relics Cologne is famous for; then, to put an end to the greed and pride of the Romans, who in ancient times oppressed them; then, to conquer only the barbarian and Hyperborean peoples; sometimes out of fear of the Teutons, in order to humble them; then, to learn military science from the Gauls; something to seize fertile lands that can feed their multitude; sometimes because of the pilgrimage to St. James, whose final destination is Galicia.

"Devils from Hell"

The main blows of the Horde troops in Europe fell on Poland and Hungary. On the days of Palm Week in 1241, the “devils from the underworld” (as the Europeans called the Mongols) almost simultaneously find themselves at the walls of Krakow and Budapest.
It is interesting that the tactics successfully tried in the battle of Kalka helped the Mongols to defeat the strong European armies.

The retreating Mongol troops gradually lured the attacking side deep into the rear, stretching it and dividing it into parts. As soon as the right moment came, the main Mongol forces destroyed scattered detachments. An important role in the victories of the Horde was played by the "despicable bow", so underestimated by European armies.

Thus, the 100,000-strong Hungarian-Croatian army was almost completely destroyed, and the color of the Polish-German chivalry was partially exterminated. Now it seemed that nothing would save Europe from the Mongol conquest.

fading strength

The Kyiv thousand-man Dmitra, who was captured by Batu, warned the khan about crossing the Galicia-Volyn lands: “Do not linger in this land for a long time, it’s time for you to go to the Ugrians. But if you delay, O strong land, they will gather against you and will not let you into their land.”

Batu's troops managed to pass the Carpathians almost painlessly, but the captive governor was right in another way. The Mongols, gradually losing their strength, had to act extremely quickly in such distant and alien lands.

According to the Russian historian S. Smirnov, Russia during the western campaign of Batu could put up to 600 thousand militias and professional soldiers. But each of the principalities opposing the invasion, which decided to fight alone, fell.

The same applied to the European armies, which, many times outnumbering the troops of Batu, were unable to consolidate at the right time.

But by the summer of 1241, Europe began to wake up. King Frederick II of Germany and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, in his encyclical, appealed to "open the eyes of spiritual and bodily" and "become a bulwark of Christianity against a ferocious enemy."

However, the Germans themselves were in no hurry to resist the Mongols, since at that time Frederick II, who was in conflict with the papacy, led his army to Rome.

Nevertheless, the appeal of the German king was heard. By autumn, the Mongols repeatedly tried to overcome the bridgehead on the southern bank of the Danube and transfer military operations to the territory of the Holy Roman Empire, but all failed. 8 miles from Vienna, having met with the combined Czech-Austrian army, they were forced to retreat back.

harsh lands

According to most Russian historians, the Mongol army fundamentally weakened its resources during the seizure of Russian lands: its ranks thinned by about a third, and therefore it was not ready to conquer Western Europe. But there were other factors as well.

As early as the beginning of 1238, when trying to capture Veliky Novgorod, Batu's troops were stopped on the outskirts of the city by no means by a strong enemy, but by a spring thaw - the Mongol cavalry thoroughly got stuck in the swampy area. But nature saved not only the merchant capital of Russia, but also many cities of Eastern Europe.

Impenetrable forests, wide rivers and mountain ranges often put the Mongols in a difficult position, forcing them to make tedious many-kilometer detours. Where did the unprecedented speed of movement on the steppe impassability go! People and horses were seriously tired, and moreover, they were starving, not getting enough food for a long time.

death after death

In spite of serious problems, with the onset of December frosts, the Mongolian army was seriously going to move deep into Europe. But the unforeseen happened: on December 11, 1241, Khan Ogedei died, which opened a direct path to the Horde throne of Guyuk, the implacable enemy of Batu. The commander turned the main forces home.

A struggle for power begins between Batu and Guyuk, ending in the death (or death) of the latter in 1248. Batu ruled for a short time, having died in 1255, Sartak and Ulagchi also quickly passed away (probably poisoned). New Khan Berke in the coming Time of Troubles more concerned about the stability of power and tranquility within the empire.

On the eve of Europe, the "black death" swept over - a plague that reached the Golden Horde along the caravan routes. The Mongols will not be up to Europe for a long time. Their later western campaigns will no longer have the scope that they acquired under Batu.

Why did the Tatar-Mongols, having conquered the vast expanses of Eurasia (from China to Russia), suddenly stop their campaign “to the last sea” and spare Western Europe? One of the most important mysteries of world history has not yet been unequivocally explained. Recently, scientists, relying on chronicle sources and the "archives" of nature itself (tree rings), recreated the microclimate of Eastern Europe and pointed to the decisive role natural factors Mongolian strategy. The cold and rainy spring of 1242, the swamping of the Middle Danube Plain, coupled with the plunder of the region, made it difficult to supply the army, and as a result, the Mongols chose not to risk returning to the southern Russian steppes. Historians reflected on the relationship between climate, politics and military affairs in the 13th century on the pages of Scientific Reports.

Gog and Magog attack

The task of conquering the Polovtsy and reaching Kyiv was set by Genghis Khan (in 1221), but the Mongols began to implement these plans only under his son Ugedei, after the kurultai (congress of khans) in 1235. An army under the command of Batu (Batu), the grandson of Genghis Khan and an experienced commander Subedei, moved to the west - numbering about 70 thousand people. The details of the campaign against northeastern and southern Russia are well known to everyone from school. After the burning of Kyiv, Batu captured the cities of southern and western Russia, up to Galich and Przemysl, where he settled down for the winter of 1240/1241.

The next target of the Mongols is obvious - Hungary, located on the Middle Danube Plain, the extreme western part of the great belt of the Eurasian steppes. In addition, it was there, to King Bela IV, that the defeated Cumans, old enemies of the Tatar-Mongols, migrated. But the army was divided: the 30,000th army victoriously passed the Polish lands, defeating the Polish-German army in the battle of Legnica (April 9). However, the Mongols did not move against Germany, turned south and ended up in Hungary through Moravia - where the main forces of the nomads had invaded even earlier.

Image: Nature

Batu's corps moved through the Veretsky Pass in the Carpathians, Kadan's corps - through Moldavia and Transylvania, Buchek's detachment - through the southern route, through Wallachia. Such a formation was planned by Subedei - in order to force the Hungarians to split their forces and break them in parts. The main forces of Subedei moved more slowly, acting as a reserve. After the capture of many cities and complex maneuvers, on April 11, the Mongols utterly defeated the Hungarian-Croatian army on the Shaio River and began the administrative restructuring of the conquered part of Hungary.

After resting for several months, in the winter of 1242, Batu's army crossed the frozen Danube and began to lay siege to cities, while Kadan's corps set off to ravage Croatia, where the Hungarian king had hidden. However, the Dalmatian fortress of Klis did not submit to the Mongols. In the spring of 1242, for a reason still unknown, Batu and Subedey turned back and returned to the southern Russian steppes through Bosnia, Serbia and Bulgaria.

Retreat Mystery

What made the Mongols stop their victorious invasion deep into Europe and even leave conquered Hungary, where they had already appointed Baskaks (tribute collectors) and minted coins? Most often, Batu's retreat is explained by the sudden death of Khan Ogedei in December 1241 - Genghisid wanted to arrive at the kurultai in Mongolia as soon as possible in order to participate in the election of the great khan. However, this hypothesis is opposed by the fact that Batu never reached the kurultai, but remained on the territory of his ulus (the future Golden Horde).

There is an opinion that the Tatar-Mongols were not going to conquer Europe, but only wanted to punish their Polovtsian enemies, already defeated at the Kalka River. The Kypchaks were sheltered by the Hungarian king, who ignored the demands of the Mongols to extradite them. This version is supported by Batu's purposeful hunt for Bela IV, for the pursuit of which in the winter of 1242 a whole corps was allocated. However, this version does not explain why the Mongols began to include Hungary in their state and why they then abandoned this project.

The explanations of a military nature are more substantiated: the difficulty of taking fortresses in the transdanubian part of Hungary, large losses in manpower and the poverty of the Pannonian plain, which is not able to feed the troops, forced the Mongols to turn back. However, all this did not stop the Avars and the Hungarians three or four centuries ago.

Dirt, slush and crop failure

The authors of the new study rightly point to too much general character all these explanations. To understand the logic of Batu and Subedei, one must at least clearly understand the geography, climate and weather of 1240-1242 in the theater of operations. The Mongol military leaders followed the natural conditions very closely (this is known from the letter of Khan Hulagu to the French king) - and scientists admit that rapid climatic shifts influenced both the successful conquest of Hungary and the decision to leave it a year later.

Image: Szechenyi National Library, Budapest

So, in the spring and autumn of 1241, the Mongols quickly moved across the Hungarian lands, capturing one fortress after another. No one offered organized resistance to the invaders, and they freely robbed, killed and captured the local population. The summer was early (the chronicler mentions the heat during the Battle of the Chaillot River - April 11) and warm. The chronicle says that the Mongols did not burn cereals in the fields, took care of fruit trees and did not kill peasants who were harvesting. That is, they did not turn agricultural land into pastures because their horses did not lack food.

But the cold and snowy winter of 1242 came early. First, she helped the Mongols: the Danube froze, the nomads crossed the river and began to besiege the fortresses of Bela IV (usually the Mongols did not start campaigns in winter). But luck turned away from them: because of the early thaw, they could not take Szekesfehervar. “The snow and ice melted, and the swampy area around the city became impregnable,” writes the Hungarian chronicler. Due to the same impassable mud, the Kadan corps sent to Dalmatia was forced to retreat from the city of Trogir.

Soil scientists know that the lowlands of Hungary are very easily flooded. If the winter is snowy and the spring is rainy, then the vast plains quickly turn into a swamp. By the way, the Hungarian steppes “dried up” only in the 19th century, thanks to the drainage projects of the Habsburgs - before that, the spring floods of numerous rivers formed many kilometers of swamps. Swamp and mud nullified the effectiveness of siege weapons and reduced the mobility of the cavalry.

Image: Nature

The cold rainy spring, the late appearance of grass and the swamping of the plains sharply reduced the area of ​​pastures - the Mongolian horses, already weakened by the hard winter, did not have enough food. The Mongols realized that there was no need to wait for a big harvest in 1242. And so it happened: in the autumn a terrible famine broke out in Hungary.

So the decision of the Mongols to retreat looks quite reasonable. Weather influenced the choice of route for returning to the southern Russian steppes - through Serbia and Bulgaria. Batu's army preferred the drier and higher mountain areas along the foothills of the Carpathians to the swampy plains.

Is history driven by climatic anomalies?

“In my opinion, it is rather reckless to explain the stoppage of the Mongol advance to Europe by a two-year weather anomaly. The Mongols waged wars of conquest for decades under extremely unfavorable conditions. climatic conditions, their troops operated in areas poorly suited or completely unsuitable for cavalry operations (Southern China, Afghanistan, Burma, Kashmir), and even organized sea expeditions (the failed invasion of Java).

Historian Alexei Kupriyanov specifically for Lenta.ru: It is worth noting that the Mongols won victories in these campaigns with the help of local allies and auxiliary detachments recruited from local natives, using the conquered territories as a base for further expeditions. During the invasion of Europe, the Mongols had no one to rely on: behind them lay the devastated southern Russian steppes and burned cities (one of the few exceptions was the Bolokhov land, whose princes entered into an alliance with the Mongols in exchange for fodder supplies), the army was exhausted by a long campaign, while while in front of them was densely saturated with fortified cities and castles Western Europe with a warlike population. At the same time, a struggle for power began in the Mongol Empire, and under these conditions, Batu Khan, naturally, preferred to return to the banks of the Volga and begin the arrangement of his ulus. Therefore, from my point of view, it is too early to abandon the traditional theory in favor of the “climate” hypothesis.”

When recreating the "weather history" of the western campaign, the authors of the article did not limit themselves to random facts from medieval chronicles. Tree-ring data from northern Scandinavia, the Central Eastern Alps, the Romanian Carpathians, and the Russian Altai have helped determine European summer temperatures for 1230-1250. Judging by the mountains closest to Hungary, in 1238-1241 the summer was long and hot - this, in particular, could attract the Mongols there. However, the years 1242-1244 are characterized by colder summers. Moreover, in 1242 on the territory of the Czech Republic, southern Poland, western Slovakia, northwestern Hungary and eastern Austria - and only there, in the conflict area - have received anomalous rainfall.

Scientists emphasize that the influence of climate on history is not total and static, but random and dynamic. Thus, a fleeting anomaly in 1242 (a cold spring plus a lot of precipitation) played a serious enough role that the Mongols - who were always distinguished by the flexibility of their goals and objectives - decided not to go ahead, but to retreat, saving people and horses. Similarly, the typhoons (kamikaze, divine wind) that swept the Mongol fleet off the coast of Japan twice saved this country from conquest at the end of the 13th century.

One way or another, the Tatar-Mongols limited themselves to the South Russian steppes in the West. Scientists carefully note: it is not yet possible to finally establish whether the nomads retreated due to political factors (the death of Ogedei) or decided that the Hungarian lands, too vulnerable to weather fluctuations, are not suitable for them as a bridgehead (and rear base). It is worth studying the environment of the 13th century more carefully: for example, excavate the fortresses besieged by the Mongols (and the mud near their walls), deal with the state of the rivers and swamps of the Pannonian Plain - and other regions of Eurasia that the Mongols (including Russia) walked through.

Ever since Sultan Saladin took Jerusalem from the crusaders at the end of the 12th century, the best knights of Europe have been trying to return the lost shrine. However, all their efforts were fruitless. On the way to the Holy City, the German king Friedrich Barbarossa died. Did not achieve victory and the English king Richard Lion Heart. It seemed that the crusader cause had failed completely. Everything favored the Mohammedans. Suddenly, a rumor spread that Mongolian regiments were coming from the unknown distance of the East to help the Europeans. It was said that they were Christians in a hurry to defeat the hated Mohammedans.

But in Europe they rejoiced in vain. "The devils who escaped from the underworld" were moving towards her. Since that time, Europeans have nicknamed the uninvited guests "sons of hell." The formidable commander Genghis Khan was the first to lead the "Tartar" army to the west. If the history of the conquest of Kievan Rus is known to us, then other European campaigns of the Mongols, for example, the defeat of Hungary and Poland, remained in the shadow of the fires of Ryazan and Kyiv.

On the day of Palm Sunday in 1241, the Devil appeared at the walls of the Polish city of Krakow. The townspeople were already preparing to celebrate Easter, when suddenly the trumpet began to whine. The meaning of her call was clear to anyone. Disaster was approaching the city. Mongols! The signal broke off at once - an arrow stuck out of the trumpeter's throat ... The Mongols, like a tornado, burst into the city on that holiday, left a terrible memory. And then they did not leave Krakow alone. Three more times, in 1242, 1259 and 1287, they burned it.

I was struck not only by their sudden appearance, but also by their appearance, their strange language. Their fame outstripped the pace of their cavalry. They were considered invincible. Any resistance to them was pointless. They looked like demons that had come out of the underworld. Their very name - and they were often called "Tatars" after the name of the Mongol tribe that inhabited Central Siberia - suggested their origin. Medieval chroniclers changed their name to "Tartars". So it seemed to them rather, because the ancient Greeks called the kingdom of the dead - Tartarus. That's where this invincible army came from!

However, not only superstition and fear prevented the Europeans from resisting the Mongols. At that time, the Mongol army was perhaps the most combat-ready in the world. In the 13th century, European armies were made up of mounted knights dressed in heavy armor, as well as infantrymen on foot - ordinary townspeople and peasants. The knights were noble people; they considered the bow as a weapon of commoners and fought with swords. Therefore, in Europe, any battle broke up into many fights. The knights of both armies, divided into pairs, fought with each other.

In the battle with the Mongols - "wall to wall" - it was ridiculous to talk about tactics, about the art of war. Although this principle of warfare was reasonable in Europe, when meeting with the Mongol army, it turned out to be meaningless. Not a disparate army of Asians was hurrying towards the knights - no, a car was rolling towards them, all parts of which were well fitted to each other. The Mongol horde swept away the figurines of knights, like the lava of a volcano - individual trees. They fought against the colossus that rolled over them - and fell dead. Often they did not even have time to fight one on one with one of the Mongols - they died under a hail of arrows or tried to escape, being overtaken by arrows.

This "despicable bow", rejected by the knights, played a crucial role in the tactics of the Mongols. Most of their cavalry did not even wear armor, except for a helmet. These warriors did not think about martial arts. Without approaching the enemy, they shot him with bows, and the accuracy of their shooting at full gallop was amazing. They used arrows in battle different type. For the knights, they prepared arrows with flexible steel tips that pierced any armor. Some of the arrows were drilled, so in flight they emitted such a loud whistle that they often could not stand the nerves not only of the enemy horses, but also of the enemy. A spear, a lasso, a sword supplemented the weapons of the Mongols, but they were used only when the advantage over the enemy was clearly tangible and victory was inevitable.

Usually the Mongols at full speed rushed at the enemy, showering him with a hail of arrows. When the enemy was too close, they suddenly imitated a retreat, and, turning halfway, they shot just as accurately, preventing the enemies from moving. Then, giving the horses a rest, they again rushed to the attack. Again the arrows were fired. In practice, it was an "artillery preparation", after which even the most staunch enemy could falter. As soon as the latter turned to flight, the heavy cavalry went into battle on command. Horsemen in leather armor finished off with their peaks the confused soldiers of the enemy, who were already rushing at random.

Before the sophisticated tactics of the Mongols, any crowd of knights that did not tolerate strict control was powerless. In addition, the Mongols were not only brilliant fighters, but also excellently waged psychological warfare. Their cruelty became the talk of the town, but it was not an end in itself. Having slaughtered the population of one city that decided to give battle, the Mongols could hope that in the future dozens of cities would submit to them without a fight. From such cities, according to L.N. Gumilyov, the Mongols "levied a moderate indemnity with horses for the repair of cavalry and food supplies for warriors." The Mongols did not leave their garrisons anywhere, so the "submission" was purely symbolic; after the departure of the Mongol army, the inhabitants returned home and everything went on as before.

Having conquered China, Khorezm and the Black Sea region, by 1227 the Mongol ruler Genghis Khan became a true “ruler of the world”: never before in history has there been such an extended empire as his. Nevertheless, Genghis Khan firmly held power in his hands. If only he held the reins as tenaciously! He fell off his horse and fell to his death. His ambitious plans were put to an end.

To avoid confusion in the country, which could break out after his death, Genghis Khan took care of the future structure of his state in advance. He divided it into four khanates, which were to be ruled by heirs. The most important, from a strategic point of view, was the western khanate, spread over the Polovtsian lands. They began to be ruled by the grandson of Genghis Khan - Batu Khan (Batu). Subsequently, it received the name "Golden Horde".

It was from here, from the Volga steppes, that the Mongols began to threaten Europe. At first, few people paid attention to their appearance, they were not considered a worthy opponent. Meanwhile, the Mongol scouts carefully found out everything about Europe and Russia. They were interested in the policy of individual principalities and states, their economy, living conditions in these countries. Preparing for the war, the leaders of the Mongols thoroughly found out everything about their opponents, who were not waiting for them ...

From 1234, a campaign to the west was planned for two years. New great khan Ogedei sent an army of 150,000 there (according to other sources, the Mongol army numbered 30-40 thousand people, at most 50 thousand). It was headed by Batu, but in fact it was commanded by one of the best military leaders of the Mongol state, Subedei. More recently, in 1232-1234, he won victory after victory in China. Now he was just as carefully preparing to defeat a series of weak, unfriendly principalities - fragments of the mighty Kievan Rus.

The first victim of the Mongols was the Volga Bulgaria, located at the crossroads of trade routes that connected Central Asia, Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. From here, from the banks of the Volga, the Mongols were preparing to conquer the Russian cities, hoping to find rich booty there.

It was the thirty-seventh year of the thirteenth century. Fourteen years earlier, the Mongols had already fought on the steppe river Kalka with Russian and Polovtsian troops and defeated them utterly. Then the Mongols returned to their homeland. Russia got a break. But now they were not going to leave.

On the eve of the new war, about five million people lived in Russia. According to the Russian historian S. Smirnov, the country could field about a hundred thousand professional soldiers and about half a million militias, which was several times larger than the Mongolian army. However, constant strife prevented the gathering of a single army. And so it happened that each of the principalities fought and died alone.

The defeat at Kalka did not unite the Russian princes and did not even alert them. Accustomed to beating up nomads - both Pechenegs and Polovtsy - they were not interested in the unknown Mongols, did not try to find out their plans, to understand their way of thinking. Only this can explain, for example, the death of the Ryazan principality.

Batu knew that the Ryazan princes did not fight on the Kalka, and was not going to fight them. Approaching Ryazan, he informed the princes that he intended to get food and horses for a further campaign. Subsequently, it was so: the cities Northeast Russia avoided the assault, supplying the Mongols with provisions. However, the Ryazan princes, as L. Gumilyov noted, "not bothering to find out who they were dealing with," proudly replied: "Kill us - everything will be yours."

What did the Russian princes count on in anticipation of the war? On the powerful walls of cities that nomads cannot overcome? Or to the Volga - this huge natural ditch filled with water, which nomads cannot overcome. If only they knew that the Mongols, armed with Chinese assault guns, took any fortress! They fired at the enemy city with ballistas and catapults, showered it with burning arrows, causing numerous fires, built siege towers and punched holes in the walls. The garrisons of recalcitrant fortresses and their civilian population were always completely exterminated. The stubbornness of the recalcitrant townspeople was hopeless and doomed everyone to death.

And the Volga… in December 1237, it froze over. And the hooves of the cavalry pounded on the ice. It was the sound of death itself. On December 21, Ryazan fell, although many Mongol warriors were killed near its walls. Then, during the winter, Suzdal, Rostov, Yaroslavl, Moscow fell. The Mongols spent an average of three days to a week on the siege of Russian cities. The winter campaign of 1237-1238 ended on March 4 with a battle on the Sit River, where the army of the Grand Duke of Vladimir Yuri Vsevolodovich was defeated, and he himself died.

The Mongols hurried to the north. Torzhok, standing in their way, held out for two weeks and was taken only on March 23. Further, beyond the forests and swamps, "Mr. Veliky Novgorod" was waiting for them - one of the richest cities in Russia and one of the European centers of trade of that time. Novgorod was a member Hanseatic League, uniting port cities on the coast of the Baltic and North Seas.

But here the maps of the Mongols were confused by the weather, or rather, bad weather. They did not have time to approach Novgorod before spring, and soon the thaw began. Only she saved the merchant capital. In the forest, swampy Russia, the Mongols could move only in winter - along frozen rivers. Now their horses were drowning in the melted swamps. There was no road. From there, Batu moved on, but, before reaching Novgorod, he turned south and went to Kozelsk. It is customary to explain the turn from Novgorod with spring floods, but there is another explanation - probably, the trip did not fit into the planned time frame.

Turning the troops back, Batu was detained for seven weeks near Kozelsk, whose inhabitants offered strong resistance to the invaders. After the capture, Kozelsk was nicknamed the "evil" city by the Tatars, and its defense became a symbol of resistance to the Mongol-Tatar invasion.

By the summer of 1238, the Mongols returned to the Lower Volga. Here, on the steppe expanses, their army rested from the hardships of the winter campaign.

In the next two years, the Mongols ravaged South Russia, destroyed and burned Kyiv, took Chernigov, conquered Galician Russia. The war was fought again in winter, so the great Ukrainian rivers did not interfere with the rapid transfer of troops.

All these years, while an unknown incoming army was systematically cracking down on the largest European state, in another part of Europe - in the west - amazing complacency reigned. There, too, they counted on the powerful walls of cities, believed in an easy victory over non-Christians. In the meantime, the Pope was at enmity with the German emperor, none of the kings entered into a military alliance, did not prepare for war with the Mongols.

When they killed in Poland Mongolian ambassadors, the Mongolian army burst into the country with lightning speed. Almost instantly, the Polish troops were swept away. Unprecedented panic arose throughout Poland. Waves of refugees rolled west in terror. City after city was captured, ruined, burned. Ahead of the Mongol columns, rumors flew, repeating about "hundreds of thousands of enemies" marching on Europe. Truly, fear has large eyes. But it was really scary to fight the Mongols. Knights were waiting for failure.

An army of German and Polish knights, up to forty thousand in number, gathered to meet the enemy. She was waiting for the Mongols near the city of Legnica. Another army was moving there from Bohemia. It was led by King Wenceslaus and had 50,000 soldiers with him. They had only two days left to travel. But then, having overtaken them, the advanced Mongol detachment - and there were about 20,000 people in it - went to Legnica.

On April 9, 1241, the battle began. Advancing, the Mongols shouted at Polish: "Save yourself! Save yourself!" This familiar command confused "international forces rapid response» XIII century. The Europeans were confused and were utterly defeated. The survivors fled west. The Mongols did not pursue them. They had other plans.

Them main goal were the Hungarian steppes. Most of the Mongol forces - three separate armies - were advancing on Hungary. They went from different directions: through Transylvania, the Danube valley, the Central Carpathians. Under the walls of the Hungarian capital, Buda, they were to meet. The detachment, fierce in Poland, was only supposed to "secure the rear" and protect the future possessions of the Mongols in Hungary from an unexpected attack from the north.

In anticipation of the Mongols, the Hungarian king Bela IV gathered almost a hundred thousandth army. When the advanced detachments of the enemy appeared, the Hungarians went on the offensive. And at first the Mongols, apparently, faltered. After several days of careful pursuit, Bela IV overtook them at the Chaillot River. So far, he has been lucky. He easily recaptured the bridge over the river from the Mongols and even began to transport troops to its other side, preparing to continue the campaign. For the night, he set up a fortified camp on the other side of the river, fearing random sorties of the timid Mongols.

But that night passed quietly. But when the first rays of the sun were to shine and illuminate the day of complete victory over the enemies, there was a thunder, more terrible than which no one heard, and the whole sky was filled with fire, and stones began to fall on people from above. Many perished without understanding anything; others fled in terror. So the cunning Mongols used ballistas, catapults and Chinese crackers to stun the enemy.

Under this roar, the main parts of the Mongols crossed the Shaio River and surrounded the camp, where the main Hungarian forces remained. Their extermination began. Stones, arrows and burning oil rained down on the Hungarians from all sides. They desperately tried to get out of the encirclement, and when a gap suddenly formed in the ranks of the Mongols, they rushed into it. Hurrying to escape from the battlefield, they threw armor and weapons. Perhaps they thought that the worst was over.

But then the Mongol cavalry appeared from all sides and began to cut down the fugitives. Within a few hours, about 70,000 Hungarians died. The kingdom was left without an army.

Continuing to ravage Hungary, the Mongols reached the Adriatic Sea. They were already preparing to settle for a long time in the Hungarian steppes; have already minted their coin; already dreamed of conquering neighboring countries - Italy, Austria, how intervened in the matter - some historians like to say - Divine Providence. An event that happened ten thousand kilometers from Hungary changed the course of world history.

The great Khan Ogedei died. His son Guyuk, an old enemy of Batu, could become his heir. A few years ago, he almost pulled Baty by the hair after a quarrel. Now there was nothing to hold back the mutual hatred of the two brothers.

Surprisingly, the military campaign was over. From the walls of Venice and Vienna, the Mongol army moved back to the east. She stopped the conquest and began to prepare for civil war. Only at the cost of long negotiations was it possible to maintain peace in the state.

For four years in the Mongolian capital, Karakorum, the kurultai lasted - a popular assembly at which a new great khan was chosen. All this time, the Mongols did not wage wars with their neighbors. In the end, Guyuk was elected great khan in January 1246, and Batu received land in Eastern Europe, which he had conquered.

The latter proved to be skillful statesman. After the election of Guyuk as the great khan, the fate of Batu seemed to be sealed. Realizing the hopelessness of his situation, he tried to enlist support ... in Russia devastated by him. His politics recent years made it easy for him to choose. He had long since abandoned new attacks on Russian cities; he did not leave Mongol garrisons in the cities, but only kept his servants at the courts of the princes - the Baskaks, who collected tribute. The Russian princes retained power over their lands and were only obliged to come to the capital of Batu to swear allegiance to him. Contrary to popular misconceptions, Russia in 1241-1380 was not at all a colony of the Mongol khans in the full sense of the word. She paid certain sums of money to the Mongol Khan.

Batu entered into an alliance with Alexander Nevsky, the best commander of Russia and the Grand Duke in Novgorod. Batu's son, Sartak, converted to Christianity. The diplomatic efforts of Batu, his cunning and determination, helped him eventually win a hopeless battle with his relative.

Two years later, when the armies of Batu and Guyuk were already preparing for war with each other, the great Khan Guyuk died. Probably, Batu's supporters poisoned him. And now he could calmly reign in his possessions.

In those days, on the banks of the Volga, not far from modern Astrakhan, there was the city of Sarai-Batu, the capital of the state of Batu - the Golden Horde. His power united the Volga Bulgaria, the Polovtsian steppes, the Crimea and Western Siberia. The power of Batu extended over the entire territory from the lower Danube to the lower Ob, from the Irtysh to the Neva, from the Black and Caspian Seas to the White Sea.

After the death of Batu in 1255, his brother, Berke, came to power. He confirmed all the rights of Alexander Nevsky, foreseeing that soon the other heirs of Genghis Khan would quarrel among themselves and he would really need Russian help. In addition, Berke moved the capital to the north, to modern Volgograd, to the city of Sarai-Berke. And soon it became the center of caravan trade. Shed-Berke quickly grew, turning into The largest city Europe, with a population of more than half a million people. In the Middle Ages, only Constantinople could compare with it. Even in the famous Florence in the era of Dante and Petrarch, a little more than a hundred thousand people lived.

Now calm reigned on all the borders of the Golden Horde. Pax Mongolica, the "Mongolian world" came, spreading to the entire East European Plain, Western Siberia, and soon to China. After centuries of civil strife on the territory along the Great Silk Road, a single power arose - you can call it "Asia without borders" - from the Carpathians to Korea.

This event decisively influenced the development of Europe. Now its merchants could safely trade with the most remote regions of the Eurasian continent. Up to Beijing, the path was open for them. The Venetians were especially successful in this trade. The revival of trade led to a rapid economic recovery in the countries of Europe. From the Asian states, goods and new information constantly flowed to them.

At first, information about how people live in the countries of the East seemed to Europeans "empty stories", "fairy tales". The most striking example of this is the story of the merchant Marco Polo, who was not believed at first after his return from China.

After several decades of the “Mongolian world”, Europe is experiencing a real economic and cultural renaissance. Italy especially benefits from Pax Mongolica - a country of large port cities, vying with each other in a hurry to trade with the East. Colonies of Italian merchants appeared on the Crimean coast - transshipment points for international trade of that time. Between Genoa and Venice, as well as Constantinople, recovering from its defeat by the crusaders, a real trade war even flares up.

But it was this boundless peaceful distance that destroyed the Golden Horde. Along the same roads where the caravans of merchants had recently moved, the “black death” was now in a hurry. An invisible guest with a scythe secretly nailed first to one group of merchants, then to another. Spent the night in inns. I looked around at the crowded bazaars. And everywhere she sowed the seeds of infection, and in the following days she harvested her harvest - she mowed down human lives one after another.

On all the roads of the Golden Horde in the direction of Europe, a plague blew. The idyllic world of "Asia Without Borders" was destroyed not by war, but by a never-before-seen pestilence. It is known that in Europe in just five years, from 1347 to 1352, about a third of the population died out, including most of the inhabitants of southern Italy and three-quarters of the population of Germany.

The population of the Golden Horde also decreased significantly, although we do not know the exact numbers. But it is known that after the "Great Plague" in the Golden Horde, a troubled time came. It practically broke up into separate areas. From 1357 to 1380, more than 25 khans were on the throne of the Horde. Khorezm, Dnieper, Astrakhan separated from it. In Asia Minor and the Balkan Peninsula, the Ottoman Turks began to rule, blocking the way through the Black Sea straits and significantly complicating world trade.

Another usurper, Mamai, who did not even belong to the Genghisides family, was defeated in the Battle of Kulikovo.

The subsequent disappearance of the Golden Horde was swift. In 1395, the ruler of Samarkand Timur (Tamerlane) defeated the Mongol Khan Tokhtamysh, invaded the Volga region and destroyed the Horde cities, including the capital Sarai-Berke. By this time, the Mongols had already been expelled from China, where the national Ming dynasty came to power.

This is how the Mongolian superpower disappeared from the earth. The Golden Horde broke up into many small khanates, most of which were conquered in turn by the grand dukes and tsars of Moscow in the 15th-16th centuries. With the fall of the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates under Ivan the Terrible European part the history of the Mongols actually ceased. Since that time, the fate of Mongolia has been the fate of a small country lying in the steppe and desert regions south of Lake Baikal, never again playing any significant role in world history.

Kurushin M.Yu.