The reform of 1861 was the starting point for Russia. After all, what is any reform at all, if not a reactionary attempt to prolong the agony of an obsolete system through structural adjustment in the name of maintaining the power of the existing elite, which is a brake on community development? This is done against the interests of the majority of the people, at the cost of their impoverishment and death.
The reforms initiated by Alexander II were no exception.
Post-reform Russia was an ashes on which a new class of rich people triumphed like a predatory crow - "grimy", as the Narodniks called the wealthy plebeians. The reform of 1861, contrary to popular belief, ruined the majority of the peasants, let native Russia go around the world. It was during this period that the beginning of the depopulation of the central provinces - the backbone of the Russian nation.
A genocidal national policy was superimposed on the horrific picture of the people's ruin. Like all past and present Russian reformers, Alexander II hated the Russian people to the marrow of his bones, but he felt reverence for other, more "efficient" nationalities. Here is what the poet F.I. wrote to his daughter in 1870. Tyutchev: "In Russia, absolutism dominates, which includes the most distinctive feature of all - a contemptuous and stupid hatred of everything Russian, an instinctive, so to speak, rejection of everything national." Thanks to this policy Russian wealth began to quickly flow into foreign hands.
There were conditions under which there was an unprecedented economic recession.
This rotten system supported its existence by constant lawlessness, violation of its own laws, arbitrariness, which Petrashevsky noted: “The vital principle (of government) is the principle of arbitrariness, which, due to the complicity of all state officials in it, makes a commercial company out of the state apparatus, having purpose of exploiting the country.
It was at the heart of this system that the blow was dealt. The tsar - the main official, the main culprit of the people's suffering, the organizer and head of this "commercial company" - was struck down by the hands of the people's avengers.

Who opposed him and hundreds of thousands of his satraps? A handful of national intelligentsia, the best Russian youth. Belonging for the most part to the inhabitants of the cities, to the middle class, these young people were little aware of the real life of the people. According to the memories left by them, we can judge the effect that their acquaintance with the actual folk life had on them: “The veil fell from our eyes. what she gave to the people, and indignation seized us, "- this is the general feeling that united these youth. From this feeling a desire was born to help the people, to teach them elementary rules for protecting their own interests, methods of resisting the arbitrariness of an official and the extortion of an exploiter.
In this paper, we will try to analyze the justification of such an approach to the consideration of the peasant reform of 1861.

1. Background of the reform of 1861

There are two points of view on this issue:
1. a Serfdom is a brake on economic development countries.
b. Forced labor is inefficient.
c. The economy is deteriorating.
d. The country was heading towards revolution, but the peasantry was not a revolutionary force, and therefore the revolution did not take place.
2. a Serfdom has by no means exhausted its resources. Serfdom could have existed for more than a dozen, maybe even a hundred years.
b. Russia could slowly but surely move to the capitalist way of doing business.
c. Serfdom looked immoral. AII, guided by world opinion, understood this. Therefore, for the world recognition of Russia's development, the abolition of the KP was required.
d. The Crimean War showed that militarily Russia could not compete with the developed industrial powers.
e. Unlike Western countries, in Russia everything happens from above, and the reforms carried out in other countries from below, during bourgeois revolutions, are carried out in Russia from above, by the state.
As mentioned above, the peasant reform of 1861 is one of such key, turning points in the history of our country. First, we have serfdom canceled about 50 years after the last European country. The last country was Germany, where the liberation took place during Napoleonic Wars, Napoleon, along with the banners of his regiments, carried the Napoleonic Code and the liberation of other countries from feudal fetters. If you delve into history, you can see that on the border between the feudal and agrarian economy and the economy of the industrial, free, capitalist, market economy, a moment arises when the countries passing through this period make a big breakthrough, as if a clot of energy splashes out, and countries rise to a completely new level of quality development. So it was in England. In fact, they got rid of serfdom in England - it was the first country in Europe - by the 15th-16th centuries there had already been fences, the peasants were freed from the land, and "the sheep ate the people," as they said then. And it all ended with the English Revolution, when Charles I was beheaded. But after that, England became a country completely free from feudal remnants. And this freedom, this emergence of the rule of law had a decisive influence on the fact that the country, which lies on the outskirts of Europe and has always been very insignificant in terms of population compared to continental countries, eventually became the "workshop of the world", the "mistress of seas", etc.
In fact, the same thing happened during the Great Agrarian Revolution, when the peasants get freedom, they get the opportunity to freely improve their lives, and this gives a huge impetus that is created not by the decrees of the Communist Party, but simply by freedom. And our country had the same potential. And just his release began with the Great Peasant Reform, as they said, after the tsar's manifesto on February 18, 1861. But, unlike the English or French version, we had a very limited one. The reform was carried out "from above", by the main reformers. The main people who insisted on reform were people from the highest aristocracy: these Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, his wife Elena Pavlovna, a number of prominent aristocrats who convinced the tsar, and the tsar also became a supporter of the reform, although in the depths of his soul there was, of course, always resistance. And it was necessary to reach a compromise between the peasants, between their interests and the interests of the feudal lords, the main landowners who owned the land, and the peasants themselves. The question was that simply giving freedom to the peasants is not enough, they should be able to live on something, which means they should have been given land. And then she found a scythe on a stone, they were looking for a compromise. There was a liberal party and a party of revolutionary democrats. They were close, but, of course, very different. These are people like, say, the liberals Kaverin and Chicherin, Samarin. From the side of revolutionary democracy, these are Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov. But at a certain point they came out together because they were pushing for radical reforms and clearing the way for the development of a free peasantry. Although, it must be said that none of them affected the community, since both the Slavophiles and the revolutionary democrats were convinced that the peasant community is such a feature Russian society which will save Russia from the plague of capitalism. And at that time capitalism was in Europe. In England, our then leaders, society saw a huge difference between the rich and the poor, etc. - what we see now - and tried to largely avoid this, so somehow no one touched the community. But for freedom there was such a struggle that the peasants would receive land on the most favorable terms for themselves. And it ended with the fact that the conditions were very difficult. To a large extent, conditions acceptable to the nobles were accepted, which means that the peasants received land for redemption, the ransom was quite significant, that they still had to have certain duties to work for the landowner, a community was preserved in which they were bound by mutual responsibility for debts by buyouts.
The reasons for the reform of 1861 include:
. industrial revolution;
. change social structure Russian society (capitalists appear, the institution of hired workers is formed);
. the Crimean War (Russia was shown to be a second-class country);
. public opinion (condemnation of serfdom);
. death of Nicholas I.
It is impossible to deny the fact that the peculiarities of serfdom in Russia were also the basis for the implementation of the reform.
The features of serfdom in Russia were:
. There were no documents about serfdom. And if in the countries of Europe it disappeared naturally, then in Russia its elimination becomes a state task.
. In all European countries, serf relations were diverse, i.e. relations of serfdom were observed in different estates and, in accordance with this, serfs had different rights. In Russia, the state itself forms a single estate.
The emperor is trying to present his actions as a response to the proposals of the Baltic nobility. The solution was to create a secret committee, but the burden of work was transferred to the provincial committees, i.e. fieldwork is in progress. Committees were created in 45 provinces. In 1858, the main committee for peasant affairs was created, it was headed by Russian tradition, emperor. The leading role in organizing the work belonged to the Ministry of the Interior, under which a special Zemsky Sobor was created. 2 editorial commissions worked in the main committee, which prepared all the documents.

2. The content of the reform.

Having become emperor, Alexander II immediately began to restructure the entire socio-political and administrative system in Russia. most
his main reform was the peasant reform. Back in 1856 on one
from meetings in Moscow, Alexander II said his famous phrase: "Better
abolish serfdom from above rather than wait until the time when it
itself will begin to be canceled from below ... ", meaning by these words the possibility
peasant uprising. The news of the beginning of the peasant reform caused
enthusiasm in wide circles of Russian society.
The Manifesto for the Emancipation of the Peasants was signed on February 19, 1861. Per
his peasant reform, Alexander II was called the "Tsar Liberator".
Unlike other countries, peasants received land upon liberation. Per
the land they received from the landlords was paid by the state; state
the cost of the land had to be paid by the peasants themselves for 49 years.
85% of the peasants bought the land in 20 years. In 1905 the government
canceled the remaining peasant debt.
Peasants received land not in personal ownership, but in ownership
"communities" (villages or villages). The community was a small democratic
cell. All local issues in it were decided by a majority vote.
The most important task in the community was the fair distribution of "common" land
between individual farms. Large families received correspondingly more
land, small - less. But, as the composition of families changed, it was necessary
quite often redistribute the land. Thus, the peasant
farms did not have permanent land.
The general affairs of agricultural regions began to be decided by elective
representatives of communities and landlords. This organization was named
"zemstvo". Zemstvos carried out great and useful work in the villages. They are
built schools and churches, opened hospitals, organized agronomic
help.
The city administration, the system of popular
education and the military conscription system.
The basis of the pyramid of noble self-government was the county noble assemblies, at which candidates for peace mediators were outlined - persons who were to exercise direct and constant supervision over peasant communities. Mediators were elected only from the nobility, the lower limit of their land qualification was 150 - 500 acres of land (depending on the province). Then the lists of mediators were submitted to the governor and finally approved by the Senate.
The post of conciliator was not among the sinecures. There were many problems to be solved. The country was torn apart by conflicts of an unusual kind, the landowners were embittered and frightened, the peasants were confused and depressed. Most often, when choosing a peace mediator, the nobles appointed a wolf to oversee a herd of sheep. Indeed, among the local landowners there were very few who sympathized with the peasants and wished to alleviate their plight.
And the rights of the conciliator were considerable. He approved everything - from the elders and volost foremen elected at rural gatherings to the dates and times of the gatherings themselves. In addition, and not least, not a single transaction, not a single agreement between the landowner and the peasant society was considered valid without confirmation by the conciliator.
Problems that faced a number of peace mediators, or private problems of one mediator or another, were resolved at district congresses. The county world congress, according to the idea of ​​the reformers, was supposed to limit the possible arbitrariness of world mediators, perpetrated in the interests of neighboring landowners, and also monitor relations within the peasantry of the volost. That is, the subjects of the department of the county world congresses include: firstly, disputes, misunderstandings and complaints arising from compulsory land relations between landlords and peasants, as well as complaints from peasants and societies against volost meetings and volost officials.
Peasant reform of the 60s. served as the main reason for the creation in Russia of an all-encompassing system of official signs. Previously, the country had almost no positions that would not have appropriate uniforms. The peasant reform brought to life many elected posts, the holders of which had to constantly clash with people, judge them, encourage or punish them. And in Russia, in order to perform such work, it was necessary to have a formal sign of the right to a position. And when this problem arose, in the very first documents that appeared on this occasion, one can see the concern with the psychological aspect of the problem.
So, the reform was carried out on the basis of the "Regulations" on February 19, 1861 (published on March 5). Peasants received personal freedom and the right to dispose of their property. The landowners retained ownership of their lands; The peasants were obliged to redeem the allotments received from the landlords, which in a number of places met with the resistance of the peasantry. Before the ransom, the peasants were called temporarily liable and carried duties in favor of the landowner. On the ground, the reform was carried out by peace mediators who controlled the drafting of statutory letters for each estate.
The reform on the emancipation of the serfs was carried out in the interests of the landlords. The serfs did not receive land free of charge. According to the law, they had to pay the landowner a lump sum for their allotment about a fifth of the stipulated amount. The rest of the landowners were paid by the state. However, the peasants had to return this amount (with interest!) to the tsarist government in annual payments for 49 years. As a result, having paid the landlords 550 million rubles, the tsarist government collected about two billion gold rubles from all the peasants!
It should be emphasized that after the reform, the peasants throughout the country had one fifth of the land less than it was before 1861.
To the greatest regret, the peasant reform turned out to be not at all what Herzen, Chernyshevsky and other revolutionary democrats dreamed of. And yet one cannot deny the enormous moral significance of the reform that put an end to centuries of slavery.
After the reform, the stratification of the peasantry intensified. Some peasants grew rich, bought land from landowners, hired workers. Of these, subsequently formed a layer of the kulaks - the rural bourgeoisie.
Many poor peasants went bankrupt and gave away their allotments to the kulaks for debts, and they themselves were hired as farm laborers or went to the city, where they became the prey of greedy factory owners and manufacturers.
Social contradictions between landless peasants and wealthy landowners (landowners and kulaks) were one of the reasons for the coming Russian revolution. After the reform, the issue of land became a burning problem in Russian reality. After all, freedom is not yet bread! Throughout Russia, 30,000 landowners owned the same amount of land as 10.5 million peasant households. In this situation, the Russian revolution was inevitable!
The peasant reform of 1861 had its own characteristics in various areas Russian Empire. So, together with the "General Regulations on the peasants who emerged from serfdom" were signed "Additional rules" on the peasants in the Land of the Don Army, in the Stavropol province, in Siberia and in the Bessarabian region. During the implementation of the reform, it also became necessary to adjust the general provisions in relation to some areas.
On February 19, 1864, four decrees were signed defining the organization of peasants in the Kingdom of Poland: "On the organization of peasants", "On the organization of rural communes", "On the liquidation commission" and "On the procedure for introducing new peasant resolutions". The main reason for the rather serious concessions made by the government was the Polish uprising of 1863. If in the indigenous regions of the empire the autocracy did everything to ensure the interests of the nobility, then in the Kingdom of Poland, on the contrary, an attempt was made to rely on the peasantry (represented mainly by Belarusians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians ) in the fight against the Polish national liberation movement, in which Polish nobles widely participated.
The famous professor of literature, associate of Pogodin, Shevyrev wrote enthusiastic letters from Florence on April 13, praising the wisdom of the Russian people, and explained it by faith and love, without it, faith is dead, and his son, who was sitting in the village, simultaneously wrote from there that the peasants did not understand the Regulations, do not agree to any agreements, and everyone hopes to get it for nothing. The historian S. M. Solovyov, a man of a sober mind and the broadest outlook, summarized his impressions of how the people adopted the Reform in the following expressive words: “The peasants accepted the matter calmly, coolly, stupidly, as any measure that comes from above and concerning immediate interests - God and bread. Those only peasants rejoiced at the will, whose family and property were in danger - but these were not all peasants and not the majority.
This opinion of a contemporary historian characterizes the immediate, momentary attitude of the peasantry to the Reform - the attitude to the Manifesto itself, by no means the attitude of the peasants to the Provision in essence. It is impossible not to admit that the question of grain was essentially anew solved by these Provisions, isn't it? Earth! How does the new “will” deal with it? And here we have not bewilderment, indifference, stupidity in relation to new government acts, but a direct rejection of them - rejection of the “will” itself, since this will, in the view of the peasants, is paid for by the loss of land. Where the peasants are faced with the prospect of cutting off land, voices are sometimes heard: “No, it’s better as before! Who needs a will - you have a will. They would have asked us first ... We would have said: take it whoever wants it, but we don’t need it.
Sometimes this unwillingness to accept the will in the form in which it was offered to him took on a massive and incredibly stubborn character. The most significant in this respect was the so-called Bezdnensky affair - the pacification of the peasants of the village of Bezdny, Kazan province, by the sovereign's messenger Count Apraksin.
But it would be a mistake to think that the peasantry, having abandoned active resistance, which had the character of open disobedience to the authorities, at the same time refused other forms of manifestation of its negative attitude towards the Reform.
Let not everywhere the peasant disobedience acquired such a tragic character as in the Kazan or Penza provinces: the general attitude of the peasants to the Regulations was the same everywhere. This was revealed from the very first reports of the aide-de-camp and retinue generals to the Sovereign. According to the instructions given to them, they had to directly inform the Tsar about the results of their activities, so that "His Majesty could always see the present state of the transformation being undertaken and the success of the measures indicated by the government." These reports, which for the first time became the subject of examination in the hands of A. Popelnitsky, testify to the fact that the peasantry did not take their will anywhere. A few days after the announcement of the Manifesto, the Sovereign received a deputation of peasants, who, in touching terms, declared to the Tsar that the peasantry "would not offend" Him with their behavior. "Everything will be in order - so that You never repent that You gave us by will." Reality has shown otherwise. The peasantry, however, continued to be monarchically loyal - but in relation to some fantastic Tsar, who controlled their imagination, the same real “will” that the real Tsar offered him, they resolutely and unanimously rejected, considering it false.
The officialdom of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Northern Post" in the "Administrative and Legislative Review" for 1861, placed in the first issues of the newspaper for 1862, characterizes this sad phenomenon in the following, quite distinct terms.
“After the first impression of joy, another time came, the most difficult in peasant business: the acquaintance of 100 thousand landlords and 20 million peasants with the new Regulations, the introduction of new principles into the entire sphere of personal and economic relations that have developed over the centuries, but not yet assimilated, but already requiring immediate practical applications." The peasants from the Manifesto learned that a change for the better awaited them. But in what? It didn't show up right there and then. Naturally, the peasants were perplexed: what is the will? They began to turn to the landlords, priests, officials, seeking clarification. Nobody could satisfy them. The peasantry suspected deceit: there is a will, but it is hidden. It itself began to look for it in the Regulations. Literates appeared who, confusing the peasants, became instigators. "There were, although few, also examples of undeniable malice or self-interest." The peasantry also rushed along a different path. According to the apt expression of one provincial Presence, “it began, so to speak, to straighten its tired limbs, to stretch in all directions and try: to what extent it is now possible not to go to corvée with impunity, not to fulfill the assigned lessons, not to obey the patrimonial authorities.” Passive resistance began. Where the landlords realized that they had to give the people a chance to come to their senses and moderated their demands, misunderstandings were settled more easily. Where they saw the disobedience of the peasants as a manifestation of anarchy and, with the help of the authorities, resorted to strict measures, or where, indeed, there were difficult economic conditions, more serious clashes arose. The unrest sometimes grew to such an extent that it made necessary the use of vigorous measures. "These measures pacified the people, but they did not convince them." The peasants continued to believe that there would be both “pure freedom” and “land for free”, only they would receive it in two years ...
As you can see, the government did not hush up the tragedy that was revealed during the implementation of the Reform. It had the courage to openly declare that the measures of severity applied by it pacified the people, but did not convince them. Indeed, let the unrest abate sharply, let the riots begin to stop: the peasantry, having abandoned the offensive, only went on the defensive! It did not accept the position. This was expressed in the fact that the peasantry not only resolutely evaded signing the Statutory Charters, which were supposed to confirm their new relations with the landowners on a mutual agreement and secure the lands allotted to them, but - which was a complete surprise and seemed incomprehensible and inexplicable! - just as resolutely refused to replace corvée with dues. If we take into account the hatred that the peasants felt for corvée as a symbol of serfdom, especially if we take into account that - according to the general opinion - the main bewilderment of the peasants in their understanding of their declared will was the fact that corvee was preserved as something incompatible with will, it is really impossible not to admit that this stubbornness with which the peasants refused to liquidate it, acquired the character of a peculiar mystery. And, meanwhile, both of these phenomena, i.e., the refusal to switch to quitrent, and the refusal to sign the Statutory Charter, have become widespread and widespread.
As a result, the reforms prepared 19 legislative acts, which either related to individual territories or regulated individual issues (for example, the provision on redemption). Two main reform ideas:
. immediate implementation of laws after their publication;
. the decision on land plots was postponed, the peasants were transferred to a temporarily obligated state, relations with landlords (now only land) were regulated by charter letters, which fixed the rights and obligations of the parties, the conditions, size and terms of redemption.
The documents disappointed the population because:
. the land was not received by the one who did not have it. The landowners were allowed to take one tithe per capita from the peasants in return for ransom. The size of the allotment had a different price: the first tithes were more expensive, the larger ones were cheaper. This was done because the peasants would have more land left, since it was more profitable to buy more land.
. private ownership of the land was not established. Peasants had a special restriction of land rights.
But in general, the state consistently carried out measures to form a civil society, the entire population acquires almost uniform rights in society, although stratification was observed even among the peasantry.
The community in Russia had very deep roots. The most pressing questions for the study were: what is a community, land relations of the community, the role of the community as a social regulator, police and fiscal functions of the community, relations with the landowner and with the patrimonial administration. The community was divided into a rural community (public) and a volost community. The first was understood as the totality of peasants settled on the lands of one landowner and gravitating towards one church parish. The community performed police and fiscal functions, had self-government. She regulated important issues for the peasants:
. cases of land redistribution;
. layout and collection of taxes, the landowner himself did not collect taxes, he was paid by the head of the community;
. made lists of recruitment duty;
. a number of other less important points, for example, the settlement of relations between communities.
The community during the reform was not only preserved, but also strengthened. For the first time, laws were applied that regulated peasant self-government. In rural gatherings, the village headman dominated and was elected, in volost gatherings (volost 300 - 2000 revision souls) - the volost board, headed by the volost headman and the volost court. The mechanism of encouragement for the position of hair elder is interesting. A volost headman who has served for 3 years is exempted from recruitment duty for the term of service, after 6 years he was absolutely exempt from recruitment duty, and after 9 years of service he could release from duty, at his choice, a relative
The organs directing the peasant reform took shape spontaneously. This system has been redesigned. In 1889 there was a peak of reforms: peace mediators, county congresses of mediators were liquidated and at this time the communities received autonomy. Zemsky district chief was always appointed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Nobles were appointed to this position from the age of 25 and the presence higher education. But often the second requirement was not met, because there were not enough qualified personnel. The functions of the district zemstvo chief are in many respects similar, but much wider in comparison with the county intermediaries:
. fully resolved the issues of peasant land management;
. exercised control over peasant self-government up to the possibility of suspending permanent rural gatherings;
. had police functions: they must stop riots and unrest.
Now the courts of first instance resolved petty criminal cases and civil suits up to 500 rubles.

3. Significance of the reform.

Our historical "science" is dominated by the view that of the totality of reforms, only the peasant reform of 1861 was of any significant importance, while the rest were concessions of tsarism to traitor liberals that were not of serious importance for the country, thirty pieces of silver of Judas the liberal. Objectively, this was the establishment of a "fifth wheel" in the rattletrap of the old autocracy. This point of view does not stand up to scrutiny. If we consider that for Russia in the 60s of the 19th century capitalism was progress, and, moreover, the only possible one, then political transformations turn out to be decisive for that time, and not the struggle for the amount of land for the peasant. The lack of land created by the reform of 1861, with the freedom to sell land, to leave at any time and anywhere, with civil liberty and equality in the country (at least to some extent), with even the most miserable parliament, constitution, legality, no case, it would not have become such a terrible scourge of the country as in the absence of all these political freedoms. Freedom and the possibility of resettlement in the eastern lands, an incomparably faster growth of industry (no one denies that the political remnants of feudalism and, in the first place, the monopoly leadership of the country by the bureaucracy were a terrible obstacle to capitalism), a much more intensive influx of capital from abroad (for there were guarantees for the West that nothing would happen to these capitals) - this alone would create additional demand for millions of workers. And the departure of these millions from the countryside would, in turn, be a colossal stimulus to the development of capitalism, for it would cause a new concentration of land in the countryside, an increase in the market for agricultural products in the city, etc. Finally, with political freedoms, emigration across the ocean would at a faster rate, which would be exceptionally beneficial for accelerating capitalist progress within (raising the price of labor, reducing the colossal agrarian overpopulation of Russia, which was perhaps the most terrible and dangerous enemy capitalism). The shortage of land was so terrible, firstly, because it was very difficult to leave the village, and secondly, because there was nowhere in particular to leave. Both of these were tied to politics.
Meanwhile, the people, the working people in the 60s were absolutely indifferent to political transformations, just like extreme revolutionaries like Chernyshevsky. And these reforms changed the face of Russia no less than the peasant reform. The result of political reforms was a complete change in the conditions of political life. Or rather, the emergence of this political life, parties with their ideologies, organizations, press and other propaganda tools, their struggle and the direct influence of this struggle on government policy. There was nothing like this before the reforms; it is impossible to consider the appearance of the works of Pushkin, Gogol, Belinsky, which did not directly, directly, not a single political issue, as political life. But besides these works and individual secret circles, there was nothing before the reforms. The political reforms gave opportunities, although very limited, for the political and cultural education of the nation, for the struggle for progress, against feudalism in Russia. After all, suffice it to say that since 1855, the Kolokol was read in Russia, the works of Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov, Pisarev, Nekrasov, Shchedrin and magazines edited by these representatives of extreme, sharply radical, revolutionary trends were legally published; published the works of Marx and Engels.
As in Germany, in Russia in the 60s there was a real "revolution from above", it led to a turning point no less steep and sharp than in Germany, but since the starting positions were completely different levels between the two countries, the results were very different.
This internal coup radically changed Russia's foreign policy as well. The foreign policy of Nicholas I is the Congress of Vienna, an alliance with Prussia and Austria with the friendly support of the British conservatives in order to isolate "restless" France and stifle the revolution, in the expectation that these grateful allies will give up Turkey for the role of a European gendarme. Instead, the diplomacy of Alexander II already in 1859, during the Austro-French War, proclaimed neutrality friendly to France and Piedmont. During the wars for the reunification of Germany, Russia supports Bismarck (both in 1866 and 1870), thereby contributing to the reunification of Germany, Italy, the collapse and reform after this collapse of Austria. Finally, Russia's position brought the end of Bonapartism closer, when it outlived itself in the late sixties. During the American Civil War, Russia quite openly supported Lincoln against the southerners supported by England and France. In general, the foreign policy of Alexander II for the first time (and the last until 1917) in the 19th century, and indeed a significant part of the 18th century, not only did not have a reactionary character, which seemed to be the constant essence of Russian foreign policy, but played a directly progressive role. Even Russia's desire for the straits, this eternal strong point of reaction in Russia of all ages and formations in foreign policy, now led to the liberation of Bulgaria and radical bourgeois-democratic transformations in it.
In peasant Russia, since the second half of the last century, agrarian reforms - reforms and revolutions - have become the main means of modernizing and accelerating socio-economic development. From the beginning of the 1860s, they occupied - and still retain - a very special place in the historical process, they determined the nature of not only agrarian evolution, but also the general course of Russian history.
The historical destinies of the country of the second or even the third "echelon" of market modernization, associated with its socio-economic backwardness, pushed Russia onto the path of catching up development, strengthening the role of the already hypertrophied state power.
The suppression of society by the state power, limited opportunity spontaneous changes explain a lot in the course and outcome of Russian reforms. What is striking is the strong influence of extraneous interests of the state, ruling classes, etc.) - extraneous to the tasks that the reforms were called upon to solve. Characteristically, they are compelled by various kinds of political factors: military defeats, social conflicts, lagging behind in the "competition" of countries, ideological aspirations - autocratic-patriarchal, socialist or liberal.
These features were fully manifested in the reform of 1861, which marked the beginning of the elimination of the serf dependence of the peasants on the landowners. If we turn to historical realities, then we have a picture of a protracted process, indefinite in stages and forms, painful for the peasants. Of the many infringements of the peasants in favor of their former owners, "cut-offs" and "temporarily obligated state" were of decisive importance, which created a system of semi-serfdom with a strong admixture of bondage of exploitation of the peasants. The selfishness of the nobility, the inability to renounce the feudal "right to do nothing", economic mediocrity led to the freezing of the system of relations, which was conceived as transitional to the new, but turned out to be a continuation of the old. Crop failures, hunger strikes did not allow the peasants for the most part to start redemption payments. The "temporarily liable state" dragged on for a long time, until on December 28, 1881, a law was issued on mandatory redemption from January 1, 1883. The payment of "redemption" was calculated for 49 years and would continue until the beginning of the 30s.
With the termination of the "temporarily obligated state" the question arose of further ways and forms of development of rural life. It was then that the Minister of Finance, N.Kh. The implementation of this great reformist idea would be greatly facilitated by the measures already implemented by Bunge in 1882 - the abolition of the poll tax and, in particular, the establishment of a peasant bank, designed to promote "the spread of private land ownership among the peasants" by buying land from landowners and the state.
There are enough reasons to believe that the implementation of N.Kh. Bunge's proposals could be successful. Ahead was the time needed to lay the foundations for new socio-economic structures in the countryside, to embark on the path of spontaneous capitalist modernization Agriculture. However, this would have doomed the nobility to fairly rapid displacement from the economic life of the countryside. During the 20 years of the "temporarily obligated state" of the peasants, it understood nothing and learned nothing. N.H. Bunge's proposals were rejected. A period of counter-reforms began.
It is not customary to talk about the implemented and proposed measures by N.H. Bunge as a reform. Meanwhile, we have a major agrarian reform practically begun, aimed at creating conditions for the organic development of the processes of modernization of the peasant economy - the main form of agricultural production in Russia. It is characteristic that the counter-reforms were directed precisely against the new tendencies in the agrarian question. Counter-reforms for the village meant strengthening the power of the community over its members through the tightening of mutual responsibility and limiting the exit of peasants from the community. They were the actual attachment of the peasant to the land, which, according to the tsarist bureaucracy, was supposed to prevent the formation of the "ulcer of the proletariat" and the revolutionary threat associated with it. In 1893, even a very limited permit for the exit of peasants from the community, granted in 1861, was canceled. This fully corresponded to the economic interests of the landlords.
Of course, there is no need to go to extremes and argue that the country was indebted for reforms only to the government of Alexander II and the liberal nobility. They would have been carried out by a much more moderate government, but they would not have been quite the same reforms. It is enough to add to the reforms of Alexander II the "amendments" of his son in order to imagine another, very different version of the transformations. And these "amendments" could have appeared 20 years earlier, along with the reforms themselves. This did not happen only because the government interfered. And without twenty years of freedom, liberalism, the rapid growth of revolutionary organizations, the development of culture (it was the greatest twenty-five years in the history of Russian culture), 1905, not to mention 1917, would have been impossible.
The period from the Crimean War to March 1, 1881 began with Herzen's Kolokol and ended with Plekhanov's Socialism and the Political Struggle. This is the period to which Turgenev, Nekrasov, Shchedrin belong. Without the experience of this period, there would be no Leo Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, Repin, Tchaikovsky. This is the period of the Sovremennik, the Russian Word, the Mighty Handful, the Wanderers. In short, in politics and economics, this quarter of a century cannot be compared with anything, and in cultural terms - only with all the previous one and a half centuries of development. In the field of revolutionary struggle, there is nothing to compare this time with. There has never been anything like it in terms of development.
In Western Europe, as a result of bourgeois revolutions, feudalism was replaced by capitalism. Peasants who worked on the lands of feudal lords - dukes, counts, barons, as well as church episcopates - after these revolutions became land owners - farmers. The fate of the Russian peasants was different. As a result of the purposeful actions of the princes and boyars, and then the tsars and nobles, feudalism turned into slavery, and the once free Russian peasants became slaves.
There are two concepts of slavery in historiography: exogenous and endogenous. Under exogenous slavery, slaves and slave owners belong to different peoples. With endogenous - two antagonistic classes make up one people. Russian slavery was endogenous - the most cruel and inhuman. In the history of human civilization, this is the only case of turning one's own people into slaves!
After the abolition of slavery (that is, the abolition of serfdom), a radical democratic movement intensified in tsarist Russia. The first underground revolutionary organization, Land and Liberty, arose.
On April 4, 1866, a student at Moscow University, Dmitry Karakozov, fired at Alexander II in the Summer Garden. However, the bullet flew past: a man who happened to be next to Karakozov pushed him by the arm. The shooter was captured and subsequently hanged.
In 1876, a new organization with the old name "Land and Freedom" arose, with the goal of preparing a people's socialist revolution. On April 2, 1879, Alexander Solovyov, a member of this organization, having tracked down the tsar during his walk along Palace Square, shot Alexander II five times, but missed ... He shared the fate of Dmitry Karakozov.
In August 1879, the Black Redistribution organization was created, headed by Georgy Plekhanov. A radical wing headed by Andrey Zhelyabov was formed in the organization "Land and Freedom", which became the core of the new organization - "Narodnaya Volya".
On August 26, 1879, at a secret congress in Lipetsk, the executive committee " People's Will handed down a death sentence to Alexander II.
February 27, 1881 Andrey Zhelyabov was arrested. The organization was headed by Sofya Perovskaya, the 28-year-old daughter of the former governor of St. Petersburg. On March 1, 1881, an attempt was made on the life of Alexander II, when his carriage was passing along the Catherine Canal. Narodnaya Volya member Nikolai Rysakov threw a bomb under the wheels of the carriage, but the emperor again remained unharmed. Only after getting out of the carriage, he was mortally wounded by another terrorist - Ignaty Grinevetsky, who died himself ...
On April 3, 1881, five Narodnaya Volya members were publicly hanged - Zhelyabov, Perovskaya, Rysakov, Mikhailov and Kibalchich.
The historical significance of the reform of 1861 can be expressed in the following theses:
1. it opened the way for the development of capitalism
a) in agriculture; agriculture began to develop along the Prussian path in the Black Earth region (in Prussia, landlord latifundia remained and the peasants rented land from the landlords) and along the American path in the Non-Black Earth Region and, mainly, on the outskirts (that is, farms developed there). The landlords of the suburbs are also satisfied - the redemption operation stretched out for 20 years.
b) in industry: the emergence of new free workers.
2. The monarchy has strengthened the material base, having received millions of taxpayers. The redemption operation strengthened the finances of the state
3. the moral significance of the reform is great. Slavery is over. The beginning of the era of reforms, self-government, courts, etc.
But as noted above, the reform was undemocratic, pro-nobility in nature. The main vestiges are autocracy in the political sphere and landlordism in the economic sphere. The reform ruined the peasants. Segments from their lands reached 20%.

Conclusion.

In history, as well as in macroeconomics, two main alternative ways of modernization are usually distinguished: 1) modernization from above; 2) modernization from below. Although the official policy of President Putin seems to be oriented towards the second option, the final choice has not yet been made. The first option, albeit in a smoothed form, has many supporters and, in addition, Putin's economic policy has not yet been subjected to serious tests, which usually provoke a turn to power methods. Let us recall Stalin's turn from the NEP to the command system. Therefore, explaining the differences, features and consequences of the implementation of each of the options requires constant repetition.
The first path, modernization from above, is the path of increased influence of state power on achieving the goals of modernization. This means the redistribution of the gross product in favor of the state, the concentration in its hands of the resources necessary for massive state investments in the reconstruction of the national economy, as well as the large-scale use of power, administrative or even repressive resources to force people to act for modernization, for the "public good" in the interpretation of the authorities. This is a return to the mobilization economy that dominated Russia for more than 70 years and led it to collapse. This was the second large-scale attempt at modernization from above in Russian history. The first, carried out by Peter the Great, is considered canonically successful, indeed bringing the country into the ranks of modern powers, although it cost it a third of its population.
The temptation of modernization from above always exists when a serious gap arises in the economy and in society between the scale of tasks dictated by vital necessity and real development, which does not provide a solution to these tasks. At least that's how it seems to contemporaries.
This is precisely the situation in Russia today, which has arisen on the verge between stages I and II of the post-communist transformation. Therefore, the danger of the mobilization scenario remains.
However, it is in the conditions modern Russia he is doomed to failure, which would be a real tragedy for her. It's about the conditions. Historical experience shows that modernization from above can be successful after a long period of quiet evolution without state interference, and visible success is sometimes achieved in relatively short periods of time, which enhances its attractiveness. And the upheavals caused by it usually turn out to be so distant that no one connects them with the modernization from above, long past and exalted by historians. So, it is recognized that October Revolution was largely due to the half-heartedness of the peasant reform, but at the same time it is rarely remembered that Peter's reforms strengthened the feudal order in Russia, while in Europe they were already abandoned, and thereby consolidated and aggravated the socio-economic backwardness of the country for a long time. What under Peter was a source of strength, under Nicholas I became a source of weakness, and under Nicholas II - the basis of revolutionary upheavals.
But conditions were favorable for Peter's modernization from above: the country was ready for them, and apart from the will of the monarch there was no other social force. long positive consequence was ensured by the relative susceptibility of the ruling classes to innovations, especially since their financial situation not only did it not worsen, but, on the contrary, the possibilities of enrichment increased.
Stalin's modernization from above was qualitatively different: it relied on the potential of unfinished agrarian reforms and the expectations of the creative forces of the revolution, as well as on the rejection of former institutions, including morality and legality. But it took place in a country that was on the rise even without Marxist schemes. The destruction of the creative forces developing from below - the market, capitalism, led to a short life of the modernizing impulse and led to the exhaustion of the economic and social forces of society. Society turned out to be sick and certainly not ready for new experiments of new dictators.
It must be clearly understood that modernization from above, in order to achieve results that could at least at first be interpreted as positive, must ensure a colossal concentration of resources, will and power, primarily power, such as that of Peter and Stalin, and the authorities must be ready to suppress those who do not agree to sacrifice their own interests. And the suppression of one's own interests is the suppression of the energy and initiative of people who, under a different scenario, could themselves become the main force of modernization.
The second way is modernization from below, relying on the private initiative and energy of everyone. prosperity developed in economic terms countries everywhere, in the West or in the East, is based today on a free open economy. All of them have experienced modernization from below.
The state did not stand aside. But it did not itself decide for everyone what to do, what to build; it created conditions and institutions that promoted initiative and self-activity, which turned them into an uplifting force.
And in Russian history there is an experience of modernization from below. This is the peasant reform of 1861, these are the judicial, zemstvo, military reforms that followed it, which together gave a strong impetus to the development of the economy and society, made Russia one of the most dynamic countries that overcame the backlog from the countries that had gone ahead, while the country lived in complacency from an imaginary superiority of their social organization. This organization made it possible to implement Peter's reforms and defeat Napoleon, but has long been hopelessly outdated. Alexander II laid the foundation for its replacement, this was his modernization, through the liberation of the peasants and the formation of the beginnings of civil society. The baton of Alexander II was picked up by S.Yu. Witte and P.A. Stolypin. They did not win, they could not prevent a destructive revolution. But the work carried out by them showed the merits of the path of modernization from below, and its effectiveness in Russia as well.

Literature.

1) Kiryushin V. I. Key issues of agrarian reform. M., 2001
2) Danilov V.P. Agrarian reforms and peasantry in Russia. M., 1999
3) Gavrilenkov E. G. The economic strategy of Russia. M., 2000
4) Voropaev N. G. The abolition of serfdom in Russia. M., 1989
5) Krasnopevtsev L. V. The main moments of the development of the Russian revolutionary movement in 1861-1905. M., 1957
6) Archimandrite Konstantin (Zaitsev) Miracle of Russian History, M., 2002

D. Zhukovskaya

The great past of the Soviet people Pankratova Anna Mikhailovna

1. The growth of capitalism in Russia after the reform of 1861

Tsarist Russia later than other countries Western Europe entered the path of capitalist development. While large-scale machine industry was growing rapidly in England, France, and Germany, and the proletariat was growing along with it, unproductive serf labor still dominated in Russia. After the reform of 1861, capitalism began to develop faster. From 1861 to 1881, over 19 thousand kilometers were built railways. In 1871, the first blast furnace in Ukraine was blown out - in Yuzovka (now Stalino). Southern factories began to manufacture rails and equipment for railways, which used to be imported from abroad. In the south of Russia, a new industrial region has grown - the Donetsk coal basin (Donbass). In the Caucasus, the Baku oil region was rapidly developing, in which valuable liquid fuel, oil, was extracted.

For 20 years after the abolition of serfdom, the production of fabrics has tripled. Weaving mills replaced handicraft weaving.

Capitalism also penetrated the countryside. The landed estates gradually turned into capitalist ones. Among the peasants, a prosperous elite, the kulaks, grew rapidly.

The lack of land among the peasants forced them to rent land or be hired as farm laborers to the kulaks and landowners. For rented land the peasants had to cultivate the land of the landowner with their inventory. It was the old feudal corvée in a new form of labour. Another form of corvée was sharecropping, when peasants gave half of their crops for rented land. All this ruined the peasants, and many of them went to work as farm laborers or to work in the city.

The remnants of the feudal order hindered the development of capitalism, and this entailed Russia's lagging behind other capitalist countries. Nevertheless, capitalism in Russia developed rapidly. “The Russia of the plow and the flail, the water mill and the hand loom,” Lenin wrote at the end of the 19th century, “began to quickly turn into the Russia of the plow and thresher, the steam mill and the steam loom.”

The development of capitalism in Russia caused the growth of the working class and the beginning of a mass labor movement.

Joint work at large enterprises helped to unite the working class, and the common struggle against the exploiters developed in it the fighting revolutionary qualities. The new social class - the proletariat - was fundamentally different from the serf workers and small artisans.

The working conditions of the workers were extremely difficult. The working day often reached 15-16 hours. The wages were meager. Women were paid especially low wages. For the same work as a man, they received lower wages. The work of teenagers and children was paid even worse. For a sixteen-hour working day, they received 4 rubles a month, but they were given only 8 kopecks each. The owner of the factory took 6 rubles 50 kopecks a month for the maintenance of teenagers. Thus, after a month of work, the teenager remained "owing" the manufacturer 2 rubles 58 kopecks. He had to work off this debt when he became an independent worker.

The factory owners fined the workers mercilessly. The fines were imposed quite arbitrarily. Often, when issuing wages, the manufacturers cheated the workers, gave them, instead of money, poor-quality products from the factory shop and calculated for them two or three times more than these products cost on the market. Living conditions were extremely poor. Several working-class families huddled in the small closets of the barracks.

The unbearable situation of the workers is evidenced in its report by the Zemstvo Sanitary Commission, which in the early 80s examined the reasons for the unrest of the workers of the Khludovskaya manufactory, located at the Yartsevo station of the Moscow-Brest railway:

“Serving as a nest of any infection, the millionth factory (Khludov) is at the same time a model of the merciless exploitation of people's labor by capital. Work in the factory is extremely adverse conditions: workers have to inhale cotton dust, be under the influence of suffocating heat - up to 28.2 ° R - and endure a suffocating smell spreading from poorly arranged retreats. The factory administration explained that it did not take measures to improve these retreats because otherwise, with the elimination of the miasma, these places would turn into places of rest for the workers, and they would have to be expelled from there by force. What must be the conveniences of life and work at Khludov's factory, if even retreats can become places of rest.

Work goes on day and night; everyone has to work two shifts a day, taking a break every 6 hours, so that in the end the worker can never get enough sleep. At the factory, the workers are housed in a huge damp building, on the third floor, divided like a gigantic menagerie into cages or closets, dirty, stinking, saturated with the stench of latrines. The tenants are packed in these closets like herring in a barrel.

Workers at Khludov's factory were hired for a year. Their paybooks stated that the workers were not allowed to leave the factory before the end of the year. But at the same time, the factory administration could drive the worker out at any time. The workers received their salaries not in money, but in food and clothing from the owner's shop.

Children and adolescents, who accounted for almost half of all workers, were subjected to especially cruel exploitation at this factory. According to the testimony of a zemstvo doctor, children and adolescents were so tired that even during an operation, after some kind of injury, they fell asleep without any anesthesia.

The situation of the workers at Khludov's factory was no exception.

The terrible exploitation of workers in the factories and plants of tsarist Russia was common and widespread. It gave factory owners and factory owners enormous profits, exhausted the workers, turned them into invalids, and led to premature death. In Russia, as elsewhere, capitalism grew on the bones and blood of the workers.

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Peasant reform of 1861 in Russia

Introduction

Socio-economic situation in Russia after the abolition of serfdom

Consequences of the abolition of serfdom

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

The peasant reform of 1861 became a turning point in the history of Russia. The formation of private ownership of land, the ability to independently manage the economy and the lack of influence of the landowners changed the outlook of the peasants. The desire to obtain lands with which the future was associated determined the specific behavior of the peasantry during the revolutionary events of the 20th century.

The relevance of this study is also determined by the fact that for many decades the establishment of objective truth about historical events by researchers was often hampered by subjective factors: first of all, the political situation. In particular, the authors of the pre-revolutionary era positively assessed the results of the abolition of serfdom in Russia in February 1861, but practically did not dare to criticize the policy of the authorities in the agrarian sector after the peasant reform. The works of Soviet historians are focused on substantiating the indisputability of Lenin's conclusions about plight peasantry, its poverty due to the robbery by the tsarist administration and landowners and the expected development of the class struggle in the countryside. Having the relevant documents and materials at our disposal, one can objectively develop the theme of the significance of the abolition of serfdom for the socio-economic development of Russia.

The purpose of the study is to analyze the implementation of the peasant reform of 1861 by Russian tsarism and its significance for the socio-economic development of Russia on the basis of a critical understanding of scientific works.

This goal is specified by the following tasks:

To reveal the historical prerequisites for the abolition of serfdom in Russia.

Investigate the socio-economic situation in Russia after the abolition of serfdom.

To analyze the positive and negative results of the abolition of serfdom in Russia.

Chronological framework of this work cover the period from 1861 to 1906. The initial date is associated with the abolition of serfdom, and the final boundary is due to the beginning of the reforms in agriculture introduced by P. Stolypin.

The peasant question in the 19th century became a central topic of discussion in all sectors of society. Many understood the need to free the peasants from the almost unlimited power of the landowner, since, due to the existence of this system, all spheres of society suffered. So, the main reasons for the abolition of serfdom:

The inefficiency of landlordism

Serfdom not only began to bring much less economic benefit to the state, but, considering the general trend, it can be noted that it even brought losses: the estates brought less and less income to the owners, some were unprofitable. Therefore, the state had to financially support the ruined nobles, who, however, provided the state with people for service.

Serfdom hindered the industrial modernization of Russia

Serfdom prevented the formation of a free labor market, and, due to the low purchasing power of the population, hindered the development of domestic trade. As a result, there was no need for enterprises to upgrade equipment, and the country lagged behind not only in quantity, but also in the level of equipment of factories and manufactories.

Defeat in Crimean War

The defeat in the Crimean War also proved the failure of the serf system. The country was unable to give a worthy rebuff to the enemy, mainly because of the internal situation: financial difficulties, the country's backwardness in all sectors. After the defeat in the Crimean War, Russia was in danger of losing its influence on the world stage.

Increased unrest of the peasants

The peasants were dissatisfied with the arbitrariness of the landowners (an increase in corvée, dues) and additional recruitment among the serfs. Their discontent manifested itself in the form of active and passive resistance. The first should mean open uprisings (arson of estates, murders of landowners), which, thanks to the developed local police system, were stopped quite quickly. Passive resistance was expressed in the deterioration of the quality of work, sometimes - non-payment of dues. It was impossible to cope with this problem under the prevailing conditions, so this phenomenon covered a huge number of peasants.

So, the abolition of serfdom was historically inevitable. In 1858, the Main Committee for Peasant Affairs was created, the program of which, however, provided for the mitigation of serfdom, but not its elimination. December 4, 1858 was adopted new program peasant reform: providing peasants with the opportunity to buy land allotment and the creation of peasant public administration. To develop a peasant reform in March 1859, Editorial Commissions were created under the Main Committee. The work of the commissions ended in October 1860. Further, the project of "reform in the peasant case" was discussed State Council(since January 1861). Finally, on February 19 (March 3), 1861 in St. Petersburg, Alexander II signed the Manifesto "On the most merciful granting to serfs of the rights of the state of free rural inhabitants" and the Regulations on peasants emerging from serfdom, which consisted of 17 legislative acts. The manifesto was promulgated in Moscow on March 5 (OS), 1861, on Forgiveness Sunday in churches after mass, in St. Petersburg, Moscow and other cities. In the Mikhailovsky Manege, the decree was read out to the people by the tsar personally. In some remote places - during March of the same year.

Considering the issue of the abolition of serfdom in Russia today, we continue to meet with the methodological assessments of the nature, causes and consequences of the reform of 1861 approved by Soviet historiography, we see the desire of scientists to adhere to the concept of reform outlined by the leader of Russian Marxists Ulyanov (Lenin) at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries.

It was presented in concentrated form in a series of articles written on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the abolition of serfdom in 1911.

Basically, the concept of the reform of 1861 proposed by Lenin boiled down to the following provisions:

The reform, as a "by-product of the revolutionary struggle", was the result of the crisis of feudal-serf relations, as well as the revolutionary situation that arose in 1859-1861.

The immediate reason that forced tsarism to abolish serfdom and embark on the path of democratic reforms was the Crimean War lost by Russia and peasant revolts, which "grew with every decade before liberation."

The reform was carried out "from above" by the tsarist government and the feudal lords themselves, and therefore turned out to be incomplete, massively dispossessing the land of the villagers and economically tying them to the landowners' farms.

The reform was carried out in the interests of the landowners, who, however, having received huge funds for the redemption of peasant allotments, squandered them, without rebuilding the economy on a capitalist basis and continuing to exploit the peasants economically dependent on them by semi-serf methods.

The reform opened a "valve" for the development of capitalism in Russia, primarily in trade and industry, which, having made a grand leap in a few decades, reached at the beginning of the 20th century. level corresponding to the advanced countries of Europe.

The reform was not completed. The mass dispossession of the peasantry, the preservation of the remnants of serfdom in the countryside led to the impoverishment of the bulk of the peasantry, its class differentiation, the emergence of the rural bourgeoisie (kurkulstvo) and the rural proletariat (the future ally of the working class in the socialist revolution), as well as the middle peasantry (also an ally of the proletariat, but in bourgeois-democratic revolution).

Assessing historical events century and a half ago from various methodological positions, it can be seen that a number of the “Leninist” provisions mentioned above require clarification from a scientific point of view.

Thus, the current level of knowledge allows us to evaluate differently the process of maturation of objective conditions for the abolition of serfdom, which dragged on for more than a hundred years. As is known, the problem dates back to the 18th century, and in the first quarter of the 19th century. feudal relations turned into a serious brake on the development of industry, trade and rural entrepreneurship, which even then fell under the influence of commodity-money relations. Previously, the crisis gripped those landowners' estates where corvée economy predominated and in which about 70% of all the serfs of the empire's peasants worked. A striking manifestation of the crisis was the emergence of new forms of corvée - "lesson" and "lunar", providing for a significant increase in feudal exploitation. Not in the best position were those estates in which the villagers were on dues. Starting from the 20s of the 19th century, arrears in the payment of contributions have been growing everywhere. The debts of the landowners, both to credit institutions and to private individuals, to whom they began to mortgage and re-mortgage their own "serf souls" are also growing. The sum of the debt of the landowners, whose estates were mortgaged in credit institutions alone, amounted to 425 thousand rubles on the eve of the reform of 1861, which was twice the annual income of the state budget. However, even under such conditions, feudal-serfdom relations continued to dominate in the central regions of European Russia.

A completely logical question arises: at the expense of what resources did tsarism manage to maintain serfdom and quite successfully maintain trade and economic relations with the leading countries of Europe until 1861?

We find the answer to it from the Russian historian A. Presnyakov (1870-1929), who, characterizing the era of Nicholas I, used the term "Nikolaev imperialism".

Its essence was that, while still having enough strength at that time, tsarism compensated for the narrowness of the internal market in the central regions of the empire by expanding it on the outskirts through militaristic expansion into the Caucasus and Central Asia. Within the Ukrainian lands, the objects of such expansion, first military and then economic, have long been the territories of the south-steppe Ukraine, the Northern Black Sea region and the Crimea. However, the policy of artificial preservation of feudal relations, which was based on the strength of the army and military expansion, objectively could not ensure sustainable success.

The economic gulf between feudal Russia and the advanced countries of Europe with their highly efficient economies was supposed to lead to the collapse of "Nikolaev imperialism." This was confirmed by the defeat in the Crimean War. It not only demonstrated the economic backwardness of the empire, but, more importantly, it clearly marked the loss of its positions in the international arena. The army lost its power and in the future was no longer the mainstay of tsarism in solving the problems of foreign and domestic policy. As a result, the state power of the Russian Empire, its international authority and, finally, the system itself were under threat. government controlled. To overcome these crisis phenomena, it was necessary to reorganize the army, re-equip it and build modern means of communication (railroads) to move it. In this regard, it was necessary to create a new modern industry, which, in turn, needed civilian workers. But this was hindered by the legal dependence of the peasantry on the landowners. This dependence had to be eliminated as soon as possible. Ultimately, this set of facts decided the fate of serfdom in Russia. The government was no longer able to listen to the demands of the landowners to preserve serfdom and took the path of its abolition.

Another problem that requires serious revision is the presence of a revolutionary situation in 1859-1861, which, according to Lenin, seriously influenced the government's decision to abolish serfdom.

In The Collapse of the Second International, he outlined his vision of the revolutionary situation, the quintessence of which he considered an extremely upsurge in the revolutionary activity of the masses. In this case, we are talking, first of all, about the masses of the serfs, who showed more interest in the abolition of serfdom. That is why Lenin, recognizing the power of economic development, drew Russia into commodity-money relations, at the same time noted: “Peasant“ riots ”, growing every decade before liberation, forced the first landowner Alexander II to admit that it was better to free“ from above ”, rather than wait until they are overthrown "from below". At one time, this expression served as one of the real confirmations of how much tsarism was afraid of the people's wrath. Moreover, the terms “from below” and “from above” were read as political. Today, another reading of them is possible. The part of the speech of Alexander II to the Moscow nobility, transmitted by the Russian researcher R. Zakharova, reads as follows: “There are rumors that I want to announce the liberation of serfdom. This is not true. [...] I will not say that I was completely against it: we live in a time when sooner or later this must happen. [...] I think it's better for all this to happen from above than from below.”

Upon careful reading of this quote, one can notice that here we are not talking about revolutionary events, but about the objective course of historical development, when the sprouts of new relations, developing in the bowels of the old society (that is, “from below”), objectively have already prepared the ground for the abolition of serfdom . And the government should only legitimize and lead this spontaneous process (“from above”). At the same time, going for reforms, Alexander II sought to preserve the existing form of state administration by adjusting it to new development trends and thereby strengthening both the internal power and the international authority of the empire, which had been shaken after the defeat in the Crimean War. What was the influence of the masses on public policy in the field of the abolition of serfdom? Consider the dynamics of the peasant movement on the eve of the reforms of 1861.

The generalizing statistics of the mass peasant movement on the eve of the reform records that within the empire in 1857 there were 192 performances, in 1858 - 528, in 1859 - 938 and in 1860 - 354 performances.

The given data testify to the tendency to reduce the peasant movement on the eve of the abolition of serfdom. And its record figures within the Russian Empire, recorded in 1859 (938 speeches), achieved through the people's struggle against wine farming and high taxes on wine (636 out of 938 speeches). The same 1370 speeches that took place in the first half of 1861 took place after the proclamation of the manifesto on February 19 and the promulgation of the legislative acts of the reform and cannot be considered to have influenced the government's decisions to abolish serfdom.

The Manifesto of February 19, written on behalf of Alexander II, by the Moscow Metropolitan Filaret (Drozdov), gave the serfs legal freedom. “Having called on God to help,” it said, “we decided to put this matter in motion. Through the provisions indicated above, the serfs will in due time receive the full rights of free rural inhabitants. It also explained the obligatory endowment of the peasants with both the estate and the field land, which they had to redeem from the landowners. The norms of the manifesto were specified in a number of other legislative acts. The most important of them were: “General provisions on peasants who have emerged from serfdom”, “Local provisions” for individual regions, “Regulations on the arrangement of courtyards”, “Regulations” on the redemption of land plots allocated to them by peasants and a number of other additional rules. A separate provision regulated the formation of bodies for managing peasant affairs and peasant self-government.

When reading the documents on the reform, it becomes clear that the process of emancipating the peasants had to take place gradually, stretching over years.

So, in the manifesto of February 19, in particular, it was stated that until the peasants were completely transferred for redemption, the landowner retained ownership of all land owned by the peasants, including peasant allotments. “Using this land ideal,” the manifesto noted, “for this, the peasants must perform in favor of the landowners the obligations stipulated in the provisions. In that state, which is transitional, the peasants are called temporarily obliged”, i.e., the peasants remained temporarily liable until the conclusion of the redemption transaction. In fact, this meant for the peasants the preservation of dependence on the former feudal lords and the continuation of the execution of corvee in favor of the latter. And although the government demanded that the landowners complete the complete transition of the peasants to redemption over the next three years after the abolition of serfdom, i.e. until 1864, but in reality this period reached 9-25 years.

So, the abolition of serfdom became an urgent need of the time, an important government measure to restore the state power of the Russian Empire. As I. Gurvich noted, “the liberation of the peasants became a means for attracting domestic and foreign capital in Russian industry.”

However, it was impossible to do this without affecting the interests of the nobility. In the current circumstances, Alexander II and his government, taking care of the interests of the state and maintaining the existing form of state government, decided to inflict a sensitive blow on the nobility: by abolishing serfdom, that is, freeing up labor for the future modernized industry, the government equally sacrificed the nobility in the interests of state, how much it sacrificed the peasants in the interests of the nobles.

serf war peasant reform

2. Socio-economic situation in Russia after the abolition of serfdom

Historiography for a long time was dominated by the opinion of the negligence of the landowners, who quickly lost the funds received for peasant allotments, without rebuilding their farms on new principles and continued to use semi-serf methods of exploiting the peasants. In fact, everything happened much more complicated. First, the funds were paid to the landowners in stages over more than a quarter of a century. In addition, of the amounts assigned to him, almost a third was withheld for previous debts. The change in the exchange rate of the ruble led to the fact that, at the time the redemption operation was completed, the landlords within the empire received only about half of the funds intended for this. In addition, the legal emancipation of the peasants and the intensified industrialization of the country led to a massive outflow of workers from the landowners' estates. As a result, the cost of hired labor noticeably rose, especially in the southern regions of Ukraine, where the commodity character of agriculture prevailed.

In the end, all this became a significant reason for the deep crisis that engulfed most of the landowners' farms in the 70s. 19th century

In a memorandum government commission, which in 1872 checked the state of the empire's agriculture, it was noted on this occasion that “the farms of private landowners were subjected to a strong shock as a result of the reform of February 19. They withstood and are withstanding an extremely difficult crisis. Private landowners were not ready for the reform, it took them by surprise [...], a significant number of owners did not have savings, [...] the implementation of ransom letters was difficult.

The facts cited above testify that the landed estates suffered heavy losses in the course of the reform of 1861. These losses were expected and even programmed by the government, which, however, tried to do everything possible to protect the landowners from the expected difficulties. However, having lost the opportunity to exploit free peasant labor, the majority of landlords could not fit into the new economic conditions.

AT historical literature the reform of 1861 is often referred to as "serf reform", because, although it was carried out by the government clearly not in the interests of the peasantry, it was aimed at cardinal changes precisely in its environment. Therefore, in evaluating its consequences, it is expedient to determine what they turned out to be precisely for the many millions of peasant masses. The government and the landlords, Lenin noted, conducted things in such a way that the peasants went "free", "ragged like beggars", left the slavery of the landowners into bondage to the same landowners. These conclusions formed the basis of most of the works of Soviet historians, which reflected the robbery of the peasantry during the implementation of the reform of 1861.

Without denying the correctness of this assessment, one should pay attention to a number of publications on this issue that appeared in the early 1990s. 20th century

An article by I. Kovalchenko and L. Borodkin devoted to a non-standard analysis of the paths of agrarian evolution in Russia after the abolition of serfdom was published in the materials of the Soviet-American symposiums on agrarian history. In it, the authors came to the following conclusion: “Objectively, the economic situation was such that the broader basis for the bourgeois agrarian evolution was the peasant economy, which occupied a dominant position in agricultural production. The landlord economy did not have the proper weight and production, technical and economic advantages over the peasant economy. Actually, Lenin also wrote about this: “Insofar as the peasant really, and not only nominally, was freed from serf relations, insofar as he entered into an atmosphere of bourgeois public relations. The more land the peasants would have received upon liberation, the faster, wider, freer the development of capitalism in Russia would have gone.

As we can see, Lenin made the possibility of active participation of peasant farms in the capitalist agrarian evolution directly dependent on the proper provision of peasants with land. However, “in reality,” he wrote, “the “allotments” of 1861 meant in most cases the creation not of a free independent farmer, but of a master attached to the land.”

However, as more recent research shows, this approach to business is erroneous. I noticed this in the early 1990s. 20th century B. Litvak. “It is hardly legitimate,” he wrote, “to accept the percentage of segments known in the literature, obtained as the difference between the figure of the pre-reform allotment indicated in the materials of the Editorial Commissions, and the post-reform one according to “land property statistics,” because the size of the precisely established post-reform allotment, which subject to redemption, far from coincides with the data of the land census of 1877-1878.

It is clear that the landlessness of the peasants in the course of the reform took place and it hit a certain part of them painfully. However, in this case (and B. Litvak's calculations convince us of this), a number of points should be taken into account. Firstly, the dispossession of the peasants was the result not only of "segments" of their land in the course of the reform, but was also the result of a purely bureaucratic oversight on the part of officials. After all, allotments should have been received only by men recorded in the last, X revision. But it took place as early as 1858, and peasants began to allocate land from 1861. In the time that has passed since the last revision, the number of those who should receive the allotment has grown in the empire as a whole by no less than 450,000 souls. Unaccounted for by the 10th revision, they were left without allotment and were included in the total number of the dispossessed, as a result of the reform of the peasants.

Speaking about the landlessness of the peasants in the course of their receiving meager allotments of 1-1.5 acres. (the so-called "gift"), certain features should be taken into account. A significant part of the peasants expected to make up for the lack of land by renting it, which at that time was cheap and accessible to almost everyone. Calculations for the Chernihiv province show that the pre-reform land use of the peasants there was about 884.4 thousand acres, while their land ownership after the reform was more than 759.2 thousand acres. Consequently, the difference between the figures before and after the reform was approximately 125.1 thousand acres.

In Soviet historiography, another figure was given - more than 207.8 thousand acres. But at the same time, the peasants additionally rented another 204 thousand acres after the reform. Therefore, their post-reform land use amounted to 759.2 thousand acres + 204 thousand acres = 963.2 thousand acres, or 79 thousand acres more than before the reform.

The above data allows us to speak about enough high level providing peasants with land after the reform of 1861, at least a significant part of them.

During the 60s. 19th century direct struggle for land accounted for only 9.2% of total speeches. This is indirect evidence that the problem of providing land immediately after the reform did not bother the peasants very much. Taking this into account, one can better understand the conclusion of I. Kovalchenko and L. Borodkin that it was the peasant economy that, in economic terms, became a more favorable basis for bourgeois agrarian evolution than the landowner economy. Even earlier, members of the government commission came to the same conclusion, who in the early 70s. 19th century studied the problems of agricultural production within the Russian Empire. Assessing the detrimental effect of the reform of 1861 on the landowners' farms, they noted that "the peasant economy is much better equipped during the transition period than the landlords" .

Such a description of the peasant economy, provided by scientists both in the 19th century and at the end of the 20th century, would have been impossible without the proper provision of land for the peasants. Consequently, it is not necessary to speak of a significant dispossession of the peasants as a result of the reform. However, we must not forget that many peasants were not ready for "freedom" in moral and psychological terms, which made it impossible for the full development of peasant farms. An additional inhibitory factor in the development of peasant farms was the restraining dictate of the community, large redemption payments.

The situation began to change dramatically around the 1980s. 19th century It was then that progressive commodity-money relations were finally established in agriculture. As a result, the landowners are beginning to join the market more and more actively. This immediately negatively affected the nature of lease relations, which at that time were the main factor for improving the land situation of the peasants. In the materials of the investigation on the mass peasant movement of 1902, it was noted on this occasion: “The phenomenon of a sharp and progressive rise in the price of land in recent times caused the desire of the landowners by all means to increase the profitability of the estates, for the purpose of which [...] they themselves began to cultivate as much land as possible and give the peasants for rent only […] the worst land, moreover, on very unfavorable conditions for them.

The activity of kulaks as intermediaries in lease relations between peasants and landowners also contributed to the deterioration of the conditions for leasing land by peasants. In 1884, Chernigov Governor S. Shakhovsky reported to St. Petersburg that such activities of the kulaks had become a real disaster for the province. Renting the landlords' land in bulk, the kulaks leased it out in small plots to the peasants, taking from them twice, thrice or more for the lease of the land. Taking into account the sharp reduction in peasant allotments due to natural population growth, the deterioration of lease conditions and the increase in market prices for land, the shortage of peasant land began to grow sharply. But it was generated not so much by the landlessness of the peasants in the course of the reform, but by the objective process of socio-economic development in the post-reform period.

3. Consequences of the abolition of serfdom

By legally liberating the peasants, the government of Alexander II thus violated their age-old settlement and attachment to the land, to the landowner himself.

Thus, conditions were created for the mass migration of the peasantry, during which the market for civilian labor force, which was necessary for the subsequent industrialization of the country, was intensively formed.

A significant factor in solving this problem was railway construction, the development of which was under the close attention of the government and the emperor. It was in this industry that foreign investments were primarily attracted, and the owners of capital were guaranteed a five percent profit. Wages in the construction of railways were noticeably higher than in other industries. This contributed to the involvement in railway construction of the broad masses of the peasantry, who left their native places and replenished the detachments of the proletariat.

As a result, in the second half of the XIX century. the railway network of the empire grew 25 times. The needs of railway construction contributed to the rapid growth of other industries, in particular, metallurgical, mining, machine-building, woodworking, etc.

The development of these industries was also facilitated by appropriate government measures, among which we note preferential domestic financing, attraction of foreign capital, release of domestic market for domestic products by imposing ultra-high duties on competing foreign goods (metal, coal, iron ore, sugar, etc.).

In the course of intensive industrialization, a new powerful industrial region was created in the south and east of Ukraine, which quickly took a leading place in the empire. At the beginning of the 20th century, it accounted for 52.9% of the all-Russian production of iron ore, about 50% of coal and iron smelting. The intensive development of strategic branches of heavy industry made it possible to quickly strengthen the military and economic potential of the empire, significantly strengthening its position in Europe. Already at the end of 1879, the government of Alexander II unilaterally canceled the terms of the Paris Agreement of 1856, which were humiliating for Russia, and during 1877-1878. demonstrated the increased potential of the reformed Russian army in the first, after the Crimean War, victorious campaign in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

Significant changes took place in agriculture. Having preserved the ground for the remnants of serfdom in the countryside, the reform of 1861 at the same time objectively contributed to the spread of market, commodity-money relations here. This process was most noticeable in its leading industry - agriculture. In the post-reform period in agriculture, there is a steady trend towards changes in the structure of sown areas in favor of crops that had a large market demand or served as raw materials for food and light industry.

As a result of such changes during the 60-90s. XIX century, the total area of ​​sugar beet cultivation in Russia increased from 75 thousand to 350 thousand dess. During the last decade of the nineteenth century crops increased: spring wheat - by 42%, oats - by 20.7%, barley - by 20.5%, potatoes - more than three times. Important changes took place in the nature of land ownership. With the beginning of the transformation of land into a commodity, land ownership begins to quickly lose its estate character and pass from the hands of the nobility or the state into the ownership of peasants, bourgeois, Cossacks, merchants, etc. As a result, during 1863-1910. within the empire, or rather its European part, a total of more than 145,600,000 acres of privately owned lands entered the market. There was a submission to the laws of the market economy and other branches of agriculture. Consequently, elements of the bourgeois way of life gradually penetrated into agriculture.

Significant for the Russian Empire were the consequences of the reform in the socio-political sphere.

The change in the legal status of a huge mass of former serfs, the emergence of new social groups of the population, and, first of all, the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the change in the status of former state and appanage peasants - all this led to the fact that one of the following, after the abolition of serfdom , the key moments of the democratic transformations of the 60-70s. XIX century was the judicial reform of 1864. Its preparation was carried out in parallel with preparations for the abolition of serfdom. It made it possible to subordinate the strata of the population freed from serfdom to the legal influence of the state. A step was taken towards overcoming class inequality, towards civil society. Zemstvo, city, military and other democratic reforms are subordinated to the same goal. Their implementation markedly strengthened the position of the young bourgeoisie, primarily in the localities. Solving global state problems, the government of Alexander II at the same time consciously went to the full support of the bourgeoisie, sacrificing the interests of the nobility. The latter, having suffered a tangible economic blow during the reform, began to quickly lose its influence in society.

This situation undermined the foundations of the existence of the monarchical system. Today it is difficult to say in what direction the evolution of the state government of Russia would have gone if Alexander II had not been killed by the Narodnaya Volya in March 1881.

his successor Alexander III resolutely took a course towards strengthening the role and influence of the nobility in the then society. A number of his reforms markedly strengthened the positions of the nobles, turning them into a significant alternative to the power ambitions of the bourgeoisie. Thus, the autocratic government, having subdued to its influence the bourgeoisie generated by it, and resuscitating the virtually exhausted nobility, began to correct relations between them in its own interests.

Thus, conditions were created both for the economic growth of the Russian Empire and for the preservation of the existing form of government.

Russia has become a bourgeois monarchy. From this point of view, the reform of 1861, as a key moment in the transformations of the second half of the 19th century, carried out in the interests of the state, achieved its goal, enabling the monarchy, in a slightly modified form, not only to refrain from falling during the years of the first revolution of 1905 - 1907 but also to hold out in power until 1917.

Conclusion

As you can see, the analysis of the causes, nature and consequences of the abolition of serfdom within the Russian Empire indicates the need for a significant correction of the Soviet historical theory regarding the reform of 1861, which is the basis for studying the problem in Soviet historiography.

At the same time, we note that the event, which became a milestone 154 years ago, significantly influenced the fate of the peoples living within the Russian Empire. Having liberated the peasantry legally, the reform of 1861 cleared the way for intensive industrial development based on new market principles, opened the way for proper democratic transformations in the social life of society. All this made it possible for Russia to quickly restore its authority in Europe, lost after the Crimean War. A number of the following reforms of the 60-70s. XIX century contributed to the transformation of the empire into a bourgeois monarchy, and the reforms of the 80-90s. XIX century contributed to the preservation of the existing form of government.

On the other hand, the reform left great opportunities for preserving the remnants of serf relations, the basis for which was the existing landownership and the economic dependence of a significant part of peasant farms on landlord farms. In Soviet historiography, this factor became decisive for characterizing the reform of 1861 as half-hearted, unfinished, such that it did not fulfill its historical task.

In fact, the reform was formerly an undertaking by the government aimed at maintaining its own positions in the new concrete historical conditions. Objectively reflecting the needs of the time, it was the result of revolutionary pressure on the authorities. The immediate reason for it was the defeat of Russia, primarily economic, in the Crimean War.

The latter clearly demonstrated the backwardness of Russia from the advanced European states, due to the preservation of serfdom, the lack of modern means of communication, a proper economic base based on market principles. It was possible to restore the lost positions only by eliminating the causes of this lag.

So, the reform of 1861 was carried out by the government not in the interests of the peasantry, not in the interests of the nobility or any other stratum of the population. It was carried out, first of all, in the interests of the state and from this point of view, to a large extent justified itself. By the beginning of the 20th century, Russia had returned to the ranks of the most powerful European states, with a re-equipped economy, a modernized army, and advanced communications. At the same time, as a result of the reforms of the 60s-90s. In the 19th century, the Russian monarchy, although it turned into a bourgeois one, nevertheless noticeably strengthened its internal position. This allowed the government and the emperor, skillfully using the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, not only to stay in power during the years of the first great upheaval of 1905-1907, but also to remain in power until February 1917.

The laws of the development of society imply periodic repetition of the path traveled at a higher level. Given this, very similar problems that were solved by Russian government in the 60-90s. XIX century, were the strategic tasks of the Soviet leadership during the period of "perestroika". However, previous experience in solving similar problems was not taken into account. Was this not one of the reasons for the demise of the once mighty USSR?

Bibliography

1. Gurvich V.I. The economic situation of the Russian village. - M, 1896.

Report of the Highest Established Commission to Study the Current Situation of Agriculture and Rural Productivity in Russia. - St. Petersburg, 1873. S.5-6.

Zakharova R.G. Autocracy and the abolition of serfdom in Russia: 1856-1861. - Moscow, 1984. - S.41-42.

Kovalchenko I.D., Borodkin L.I. Two paths of bourgeois agrarian evolution in European Russia. (Experience of multidimensional typological analysis) // Agrarian evolution of Russia and the USA in the 19th - early 20th century. - M., 1991. P.19.

Peasant movement in Russia in 1857 - May 1861: Sat. doc. - Moscow, 1963. - S.736.

Lenin V.I. Full composition of writings. - T.20. - P.132-135.

Litvak B.G. The coup of 1861 in Russia: why the reformist alternative was not realized. - M., 1991. P. 166.

Presnyakov A.E. Russian autocrats. - M., 1990. S.291.

Russian legislation of the X-XX centuries. - T.7: Documents of the peasant reform. - M., 1989.

indicating the topic right now to find out about the possibility of obtaining a consultation.

Peasant economy after the reform of 1861. The stratification of the peasantry

The defining feature of the peasant economy was the process of social stratification of the peasantry, its "de-peasantization". Already by the beginning of the 80s, horseless and one-horse households accounted for about 70% in the non-agricultural zone, up to 55% in the agricultural zone, and from 59 to 63% of the total number of households in the Urals. Wealthy peasants, kulaks, hired the rural poor to work for them. According to V.I. Lenin, by the 1990s, out of 3.5 million agricultural hired workers, approximately 1.5 million were employed in kulak farms. The kulaks used hired force to carry out 48 to 78% of household work.

All this shows that capital, penetrating into the countryside, restructured the very mode of production. Wealthy farms became capitalist, with hired labor, the poorest went bankrupt. New categories of the rural population were formed - the rural bourgeoisie and the agricultural proletariat, which constituted the reserve of the industrial proletariat. In a word, the peasant economy after 1861, in the process of developing commodity-money relations, passed from the old, feudal methods of management directly to the new, capitalist ones. peasantry capitalism agriculture

Otherwise, the landlord economy developed. Here, before the reform, the corvée system dominated. The reform of 1861 undermined all its foundations: natural economy, attaching peasants to the land, non-economic, i.e. legal, their dependence on the landowner. Peasant farming ceased to be integral part landlord. Now the landowner was losing direct power over the peasants and was forced to rebuild his economy on a capitalist basis. But the transition from the corvée system to the capitalist one could not be quick. On the one hand, there was a lack of conditions necessary for capitalist production (a class of people accustomed to working for hire, replacing peasant implements with landlords, a rational, commercial and industrial organization of agriculture); on the other hand, the corvée system, although it was undermined, still retained its viability: the landowners took over 1/5 of the peasant lands in the form of "segments" and could use such rudiments of non-economic coercion as the condition of the peasants temporarily liable, corporal and other punishments, preservation community and mutual responsibility. All this allowed the landowners to introduce a transitional, so-called labor-work system of management, which combined the features of corvée and capitalist systems.

The labor-working system consisted in the fact that the peasants cultivated the landowner's land with their inventory and livestock, either for cash rent, or to pay off a debt (bread and money), or to pay a fine for damage, logging, etc., but most often for land rented at the landowner. This system differed from corvée primarily in that the landowner forced the peasants who were legally dependent on him to serve the corvée, and the peasants resorted to working off voluntarily, because of the economic need to survive, not to die of hunger. In essence, working off was a relic of the corvée, with its extremely low labor productivity and primitive methods of management. They were paid much lower than with free employment. However, after 1861, even working off began to acquire capitalist features, namely, the employee's interest in labor productivity (especially with the main type of working off - sharecropping, when the worker pays rent to the owner for the land in shares of the crop).

In the capitalist system of economy, the landowner kept his own livestock and agricultural implements, hired workers and paid them for cultivating his land with his own implements and livestock. At the same time, the landowner, who was interested in increasing his income, took care of the quality side of production: he purchased agricultural machines and introduced agronomic innovations. Being, beyond comparison, more progressive, the capitalist system of agriculture in the country as a whole prevailed over the labor system: according to the data of the 80s, out of 43 provinces of European Russia, it was the most common in 19, while the labor system was the most common in 17 (another 7 provinces mixed system prevailed). But in the black earth provinces, the capitalist system was inferior to the labour-service system (9 provinces against 12). Here corvee, i.e. feudal, methods of agricultural production proved to be very tenacious. Only at the turn of the century, with the advent of capitalism, did the role of labor compensation in the landowners' economy decline sharply.

Analyzing the agrarian evolution in Russia after 1861, V.I. Lenin rightly concluded that two paths of development of capitalism in agriculture coexist and oppose: the Prussian (Junker, landowner) and the American (farm, peasant). The first path met the interests of the landlords: on this path, landownership was preserved and gradually grew from feudal to capitalist, with the ruin of the bulk of the peasantry. The second way was in the interests of the peasants, because it assumed the absence (as, for example, in Siberia or Novorossiya) or the destruction of landownership and the free development of peasant farms according to the type of farms. Since the peasant reform in Russia was carried out by the landowners, who retained powerful land ownership in their hands, they seemed to orient the capitalist evolution of agriculture along the Prussian path, thereby determining its priority. However, the needs of economic development pushed Russia onto the American path, which gave the problem of "two ways" a national significance. This economic problem acquired both social and political urgency. It was fraught with revolutionary upheavals, and the most explosive in it was the agrarian question.

The essence of the agrarian question in Russia late XIX in. reveal the following figures illustrating the two poles of Russian land ownership: 10.5 million poor peasant farms (about 50 million people) had 75 million acres of land and almost the same amount (70 million acres) accounted for 30 thousand large landlord latifundia ( about 150 thousand people). In other words, the peasant household had an average of 7 acres (whereas for normal management it required at least 15 acres), and the landlord latifundia - 2333 acres. This distribution of land was a direct consequence of the reform of 1861, a concentrated expression and economic basis of the remnants of serfdom that survived after the reform.

Remnants of serfdom (above all, landlordism and the labor system) hampered the development of capitalism in agriculture, on the one hand, ruining the peasant poor, and on the other hand, limiting and restricting peasant entrepreneurship. As a result, agriculture in post-reform Russia progressed sluggishly, with a glaring (8-fold) lag behind industry. Academician N.M. Druzhinin calculated that grain yields on peasant allotment lands in 30 provinces of European Russia in 1861-1870 amounted to. self-3.3, in 1871-1880. - self-3.5, and potato yields respectively - self-3.8 and self-4.7. The number of horses and cattle for 1870-1880. increased from 9,013 thousand to 9,207 thousand (horses) and from 10,828 thousand to 11,458 thousand (cattle), but on average per household even decreased somewhat due to the outstripping population growth.

By the end of the century, it became more and more obvious to sensible Russians that the remnants of serfdom were a monstrous brake on the path of agriculture (mainly) and the entire domestic economy to progress. The entire course of the country's economic development inexorably presented tsarism with a choice: either go for the elimination of feudal remnants through a radical reform, or become a victim of a grandiose and destructive revolution.

The defining feature of the peasant economy was the process of social stratification of the peasantry, its "de-peasantization". Already by the beginning of the 80s, horseless and one-horse households accounted for about 70% in the non-agricultural zone, up to 55% in the agricultural zone, and from 59 to 63% of the total number of households in the Urals. Wealthy peasants, kulaks, hired the rural poor to work for them. According to V.I. Lenin, by the 1990s, out of 3.5 million agricultural hired workers, approximately 1.5 million were employed in kulak farms. The kulaks used hired force to carry out 48 to 78% of household work.

All this shows that capital, penetrating into the countryside, restructured the very mode of production. Wealthy farms became capitalist, with hired labor, the poorest went bankrupt. New categories of the rural population were formed - the rural bourgeoisie and the agricultural proletariat, which constituted the reserve of the industrial proletariat. In a word, the peasant economy after 1861, in the process of developing commodity-money relations, passed from the old, feudal methods of management directly to the new, capitalist ones.

Otherwise, the landlord economy developed. Here, before the reform, the corvée system dominated. The reform of 1861 undermined all its foundations: natural economy, attaching peasants to the land, non-economic, i.e. legal, their dependence on the landowner. Peasant farming ceased to be an integral part of the landlord. Now the landowner was losing direct power over the peasants and was forced to rebuild his economy on a capitalist basis. But the transition from the corvée system to the capitalist one could not be quick. On the one hand, there was a lack of conditions necessary for capitalist production (a class of people accustomed to working for hire, replacing peasant implements with landlords, a rational, commercial and industrial organization of agriculture); on the other hand, the corvée system, although it was undermined, still retained its viability: the landowners took over 1/5 of the peasant lands in the form of "segments" and could use such rudiments of non-economic coercion as the condition of the peasants temporarily liable, corporal and other punishments, preservation community and mutual responsibility. All this allowed the landowners to introduce a transitional, so-called labor-work system of management, which combined the features of corvée and capitalist systems.

The labor-working system consisted in the fact that the peasants cultivated the landowner's land with their inventory and livestock, either for cash rent, or to pay off a debt (bread and money), or to pay a fine for damage, logging, etc., but most often for land rented at the landowner. This system differed from corvée primarily in that the landowner forced the peasants who were legally dependent on him to serve the corvée, and the peasants resorted to working off voluntarily, because of the economic need to survive, not to die of hunger. In essence, working off was a relic of the corvée, with its extremely low labor productivity and primitive methods of management. They were paid much lower than with free employment. However, after 1861, even working off began to acquire capitalist features, namely, the employee's interest in labor productivity (especially with the main type of working off - sharecropping, when the worker pays rent to the owner for the land in shares of the crop).

In the capitalist system of economy, the landowner kept his own livestock and agricultural implements, hired workers and paid them for cultivating his land with his own implements and livestock. At the same time, the landowner, who was interested in increasing his income, took care of the quality side of production: he purchased agricultural machines and introduced agronomic innovations. Being, beyond comparison, more progressive, the capitalist system of agriculture in the country as a whole prevailed over the labor system: according to the data of the 80s, out of 43 provinces of European Russia, it was the most common in 19, while the labor system was the most common in 17 (another 7 provinces mixed system prevailed). But in the black earth provinces, the capitalist system was inferior to the labour-service system (9 provinces against 12). Here corvee, i.e. feudal, methods of agricultural production proved to be very tenacious. Only at the turn of the century, with the advent of capitalism, did the role of labor compensation in the landowners' economy decline sharply.

Analyzing the agrarian evolution in Russia after 1861, V.I. Lenin rightly concluded that two paths of development of capitalism in agriculture coexist and oppose: the Prussian (Junker, landowner) and the American (farm, peasant). The first path met the interests of the landlords: on this path, landownership was preserved and gradually grew from feudal to capitalist, with the ruin of the bulk of the peasantry. The second way was in the interests of the peasants, because it assumed the absence (as, for example, in Siberia or Novorossiya) or the destruction of landownership and the free development of peasant farms according to the type of farms. Since the peasant reform in Russia was carried out by the landowners, who retained powerful land ownership in their hands, they seemed to orient the capitalist evolution of agriculture along the Prussian path, thereby determining its priority. However, the needs of economic development pushed Russia onto the American path, which gave the problem of "two ways" a national significance. This economic problem acquired both social and political urgency. It was fraught with revolutionary upheavals, and the most explosive in it was the agrarian question.

The essence of the agrarian question in Russia by the end of the 19th century. reveal the following figures illustrating the two poles of Russian land ownership: 10.5 million poor peasant farms (about 50 million people) had 75 million acres of land and almost the same amount (70 million acres) accounted for 30 thousand large landlord latifundia ( about 150 thousand people). In other words, the peasant household had an average of 7 acres (whereas for normal management it required at least 15 acres), and the landlord latifundia - 2333 acres. This distribution of land was a direct consequence of the reform of 1861, a concentrated expression and economic basis of the remnants of serfdom that survived after the reform.

Remnants of serfdom (above all, landlordism and the labor system) hampered the development of capitalism in agriculture, on the one hand, ruining the peasant poor, and on the other hand, limiting and restricting peasant entrepreneurship. As a result, agriculture in post-reform Russia progressed sluggishly, with a glaring (8-fold) lag behind industry. Academician N.M. Druzhinin calculated that grain yields on peasant allotment lands in 30 provinces of European Russia in 1861-1870 amounted to. self-3.3, in 1871-1880. - self-3.5, and potato yields respectively - self-3.8 and self-4.7. The number of horses and cattle for 1870-1880. increased from 9,013 thousand to 9,207 thousand (horses) and from 10,828 thousand to 11,458 thousand (cattle), but on average per household even decreased somewhat due to the outstripping population growth.

By the end of the century, it became more and more obvious to sensible Russians that the remnants of serfdom were a monstrous brake on the path of agriculture (mainly) and the entire domestic economy to progress. The entire course of the country's economic development inexorably presented tsarism with a choice: either go for the elimination of feudal remnants through a radical reform, or become a victim of a grandiose and destructive revolution.