The sea eagle soared behind the clouds... The underwater pantheon is boundless.

You can't erect a gravestone here And you can't plant a tree over it...

Rasul Gamzatov (1923-2003), Avar Soviet poet and public figure

It happened on October 29, 1955 at half past one in the night. All Crimean seismic stations with cold indifference recorded ground vibrations in the Sevastopol region. It was the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, the battleship Novorossiysk, that exploded. After 2 hours 45 minutes, he capsized and went to the bottom. More than 600 people died. "The death of the battleship was and will remain biggest disaster warship in peacetime from the beginning of the century to the present day, ”wrote B.A. Karzhavin in the book“ The Mystery of the Death of the Battleship Novorossiysk ”(P.6).

For almost half a century, participants in the events, writers, journalists, historians, and private researchers have been arguing, each defending his own version of the tragedy. They come down mainly to the directions: undermining the ship by underwater saboteurs, a mine during the second defense of Sevastopol, mining by the Italians before handing over the battleship to the Soviet side, and a number of others that are not worth remembering (for example, torpedoing an unknown submarine) ... Each of the versions there are arguments. One looks absurd. In the latter case (the author is Oleg Sergeev), we are talking about the fact that we did it ourselves (?!).

One involuntarily recalls a phrase dropped by Johann Goethe: “They say the truth lies between two opposing opinions. Wrong! There is a problem between them."

Let's touch her.

In December 2010, something happened that made me think.

One of the former commanders of the anti-PDSS detachment, in the past assistant commander of the KChF for anti-submarine sabotage work, a veteran of naval special forces, smiled at my question about the possible causes of the death of the battleship. “There is another version,” he said slowly, wrinkling his forehead, “it has not been discussed sufficiently by the public. There were three of them, they came from the shore. Two of them arrived in the city, and the third from Sevastopol. But it's too early to talk about it. Documents closed. In the report of the Government Commission (10/17/1955), which investigated the causes of the death of the ship, among other things, it was said: "... it cannot be completely ruled out that sabotage is the cause of the battleship's undermining."

Documents closed. How often do researchers hear this ominous phrase, and hands down. And the Italians intend to declassify some of the materials of the special services of the period of interest to us only in the 30s of the current century.

We dare to go back more than half a century ago. Let's try to take a different look at one of the major tragedies of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol, the entire Soviet Navy. We will do this without claiming exclusivity and without belittling the opinions of other researchers and specialists.

So, sabotage.

By what forces it was done, we know, but we don’t know how it happened in practice, and whether they were Italians. In order to get closer to understanding the process of the operation, let's turn to the history of the 10th MAS flotilla, commanded by the "black prince" Vitolio Borghese. His men trained in mining the battleship when it was still under the Italian flag and was called "Giulio Cesare" ("Great Caesar"). A photograph has been preserved in which the pilots of human-controlled torpedoes are near the side of the ship. It is known that Borghese allegedly said (interpretation) that the battleship would not live under the Soviet flag. But words are not always deeds, and we will return to this remark below. Let us turn to the history of the elite division of Italian underwater saboteurs during the Second World War (1939-1945).

The Italians are at the forefront of the professional use of underwater saboteurs in naval affairs. It happened back in the course of the First World (Great, Second Patriotic) War (1914-1918). However, during last war Russia with Turkey (1877-1878) a Russian officer tried to swim to the enemy ship and blow it up with a mine.

During the conflict, a powerful Turkish flotilla operated on the Danube, which included: 8 armored artillery monitors, 5 gunboats, 11 armed steamers and a number of ships of other classes. The Russians had only 14 steam boats and 20 rowboats at their disposal. The forces are not equal, all the more so, given the threat from the sea of ​​the armored squadron of Gobart Pasha. In this situation, Lieutenant Mikhail Fedorovich Nikonov put forward the idea of ​​​​using the floating projectile invented by the Englishman Boyton for reconnaissance and undermining enemy ships using a hand mine. Soon, for this purpose, he gathered about 15 like-minded people. In the navy, they were called "swimmer-hunters."

Their main task is reconnaissance. But M. F. Nikonov decided to blow up the Turkish ship with a mine. Using a "swimming projectile" and attaching a hand mine to it, he went in search of the enemy. Nikonov managed to swim close to the shore occupied by the Turks and set a target near the city of Tulchi. It was an armored monitor. Having prepared the mine, Nikonov swam to the ship, but made a miscalculation in determining the distance of the probable drift by the current. The last one was strong. Two tens of meters was not enough for the officer to reach the goal. It was swept away by the current for several kilometers downstream. There he made his way to the island, where he spent the rest of the night and the next day.

With the onset of darkness, Nikonov returned to the location of the unit.

In 1918, engineer-captain 3rd rank Rafaele Rossetti and lieutenant of the medical service Rafaele Paolucci designed a human-controlled torpedo. It was controlled by one person. For the manufacture of the product, a German 510-mm case was used. torpedoes (length - 8.2 m, displacement - 1.5 tons). The carrier could only move in a semi-submerged state. Its speed was no more than 2 knots, which was provided by a 40 hp engine. with., driven by compressed air. The explosive charge consisted of two shells of 170 kg each and was equipped with a clockwork with a time delay of up to 5 hours. The torpedo was equipped with powerful magnets for attaching ammunition to the ship's hull. Based on this feature of the torpedo, the authors named it "Minyatta" ("Leech").

On October 31, 1918, R. Rosseti and R. Paolucci first used the carrier. With his help, they penetrated the Austrian naval base of Paul. In the morning, one charge was placed under the bottom of the battleship Viribus Unitis. The clockwork was set to operate for 1 hour. “The second charge with a time delay of the clockwork was left on the torpedo, which R. Paolucci put adrift downstream. "Minyatta" drifted towards the parking lot auxiliary cruiser"Vin" (7400 tons), which, after the explosion of the second ammunition, was seriously damaged ... ".

6 hours 45 minutes in the morning. A powerful explosion under the hull of the battleship Viribus Unitis signed his death warrant. Thus began the submarine war...

Before the start of the second world conflict, the carrier was finalized. By the mid-30s of the 20th century, engineers Sub-Lieutenant Teseo Tesei and Sub-Lieutenant Elio Toschi produced a modernized version of the Mignatta. He received the name SLC (slow-speed torpedo) or "Mayale" ("Pig").

With a maximum speed of about 5.5 km / h, the carrier allowed the transfer of two saboteur swimmers (pilots) to a distance of up to 19 km. The product could work submerged up to 30 meters. Its autonomy (according to the reserve of the respiratory mixture in the apparatus of the closed type of pilots) was approximately 6 hours. The weight of explosives during the modernization was increased from 250 to 300 kg. The clock mechanism had a delay of up to 5 hours.

Thus, Italy is the only country from the participants in the world conflict that entered it, having a new type of sabotage weapon with a proven tactic of use. The Italians will have time to prepare personnel. Since 1936, under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Gonzago di Cirello, pilot training for the new Mayale human-controlled torpedo began. They were brave, selfless, young and desperate people. They knew that the probability of surviving the vortex of future underwater death was unlikely to exceed 30%. But they were ready for it in the name of their beloved Italy.

For the delivery of carriers and saboteur pilots to the place of operation, submarines were converted: "Iride", "Ambra" - type "Perla", "Gondar", "Wider" - type "Adua", "Grongo", "Murena" - type " Flutto. After the start of the war, the coordination of actions and the provision of underwater saboteurs were assigned to a special assault flotilla - the 10th MAS flotilla (created in 1938). It was armed with ultra-small submarines, human-controlled torpedoes, exploding boats. The first commander of the flotilla was Captain 2nd Rank V. Mokkagatta.

“A very capable and knowledgeable officer, persistent in pursuing his goals,” wrote V. Borghese in the book “10th MAS Flotilla” (p. 21). “Before that, he served mainly on large ships, and he lacked special technical knowledge in the field of new weapons. However, thanks to his inexhaustible energy, exceptional capacity for work, he quickly got up to speed. An excellent organizer, he developed an organizational structure that was supposed to turn the assault detachment into a highly effective naval unit engaged in research, development and use of weapons capable of "hitting the enemy wherever he is."

After the death of V. Moccagatta, the unit was headed by Prince V. Borghese. He later stated: “Having a guided torpedo and an exploding boat, italian navy, and only he alone, possesses the means that, with their sudden and massive use at the same time in various ports, could bring Italy a very tangible victory at the very beginning of hostilities. This victory would equalize the potential capabilities of the opposing fleets ... ".

However, the next clashes will bring tangible losses to the Italian side. The British captured a sample of an Italian man-controlled torpedo. In 1941, representatives of foggy Albion formed a unit to combat enemy underwater saboteurs. It was led by Lieutenants Bailey and Crabbe. But since 1941, the most successful were the actions of a flotilla of Italian exploding MTM boats.

On July 25, 1941, a catastrophe happened. The second creator of the human-controlled torpedo, Major T. Tezei, and almost the entire command of the 10th IAS flotilla died. After that, the Italians focused on the use of human-controlled torpedoes and exploding MTM boats. They went into battle, suffering losses, but. They die or are “heavily” damaged in a short time: the Norwegian tanker Pericles (8324 tons displacement), the armed motor ship Durham (10,900 tons), the squadron tanker Denbidale, the tanker Fiona Shell (2444 tons), the destroyer "Jervis".

A landmark victory for the Italians was the destruction of English battleships. The end of 1941 will be a triumph for the men of the 10th MAC flotilla (December 19). “Almost simultaneously, around 6.20 am, two explosions sounded. Valiant will lose 167 sq. m. of the bow of the lower boules and will receive other serious damage (only in July 1942 will the repair of the ship be completed). The condition of another battleship, the Queen Elizabeth, will be even worse. An explosion of enormous force ripped out 502 sq. m. double bottom, and the ship will sink heavily to the bottom (repair will be completed in July 1943). Against the backdrop of this "disaster", as the English Admiral Cunningham would call the tragedy that occurred, the death of the tanker "Sagon" (7554 tons), mined and blown up on the same day by the crew of the third "Mayale" (captain V. Martelotta, non-commissioned officer M. Marino), as well as incidental damage by the explosion of the destroyer Jervis, were no longer perceived so sharply ... Of the three battleships blown up by underwater saboteurs during the military conflict, two were on account of the Italians.

And they improvise. In the Spanish port of Algeciras (opposite Gibraltar), on the Italian ship "0lterra", the Italians created a secret base of human-controlled torpedoes and underwater saboteurs "Gamma Group". "Under the guise of a major overhaul, part of the hold compartments of the ship was converted for a hidden exit and entry of carriers in a submerged position." At the same time, 12 underwater saboteurs of the Gamma group acted independently, but in accordance with the general direction of operations.

Let's make a useful digression.

The special subdivision of underwater saboteurs "Gamma" was created by V. Borghese at the end of 1941. It was intended for joint operations with the crews of the Mayale human-controlled torpedoes. The saboteurs were armed with light diving equipment, which allowed them to operate under water for about an hour. For the unit, small charges weighing 2-3 kg were developed, fixed on the fighter's belt in the amount of 4-5 pieces. They got the name "Bugs". The installation of ammunition was carried out to the hull of the vessel using vacuum suction cups. A wearable charge "Rakushka" weighing about 4.5 kg has been developed. He had a more reliable magnetic device for attaching to the bottom of a ship or vessel.

1942 brought a number of serious troubles for the flotilla. But on December 10, 1942, the Italians attacked the Allied ships at the anchorage in the Algiers roadstead. Four ships with a total displacement of 22,300 tons were destroyed. From September 1942 to August 1943, the underwater saboteurs of the Gamma group and the crews of the Mayale human-controlled torpedoes managed to sink or damage 11 Allied transport ships and ships with a total displacement of 54,200 tons!

But all this took place outside the Black Sea theater of operations in World War II.

Since the summer of 1942, a separate grouping of the 10th flotilla MAS operated on the Crimean peninsula against the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. They settled down in the area of ​​Cape Foros (not far from the modern government dacha "Zarya"). The unit's deployment area made it possible to optimally use assault boats on the communications of the Black Sea Fleet. Note that the Gamma sabotage group did not operate in the Crimea, recalling the once popular feature film “They were only known by sight”.

For delivering strikes on the ships of the Black Sea, it was chosen mainly at night. It was assumed that at a given time of day, up to 3 boats would go to sea. They will be able to sink several ships on the Sevastopol communications.

With the help of the Germans, a temporary base was equipped with devices for launching and raising boats, and anti-aircraft guns were installed in its vicinity. On May 19, 1943, an Italian special unit arrived from La Spezia to Simferopol. By car we got to the place of deployment. The unit was organizationally part of the "Mokkagatta column", and the operational management of the Italian naval forces in the Black Sea was carried out by Captain 2nd Rank Mimbelli.

The operations of the Italian midget submarines (SMPL) in the Black Sea (6 SMPLs of the SV type (side number 6-i) will be successful.

On January 14, 1942, the Italian Admiral Riccardi signed an agreement with Berlin, according to which, from the spring of 1942, the country's "light national naval forces" will be involved in assisting the German Navy in combat operations against the Soviet fleet on Ladoga and in the Black Sea. It was supposed to send 4 MAS torpedo boats under the command of Captain 3rd Rank Bianchini to Ladoga. It was planned to place 10 MAS boats, 5 MTVM torpedo boats and 5 MTM attack (exploding) boats of the mosquito fleet on the Black Sea. The Germans responded enthusiastically about the actions of the latter. On the Sevastopol communications MTM: “... did not limit their tasks to attacks of enemy ships”, but also “widely cooperated with the coastal flank of the German army. These ships were fired upon with machine guns Soviet troops and their fortifications on the coast, landed subversive teams, and many times fought with Soviet boats. Their actions received the highest praise from the Germans” (see MILITARY Crimea, No. 2.2005).

Italian SMPLs on railway platforms during 25.04. - 05/02/1942 were transported from La Spezia to Constanta (Romania). Within a month they were put into combat. Under their own power, the boats were transferred to the Crimea, based in the port of Yalta. The first group of Italian SMPLs of the SV type arrived in the city from Constanta on 06/05/1942 (SV-1 - lieutenant commander Lezen d Asten, SV-2 - lieutenant Russo, SV-3 - lieutenant Sorrentino). On June 11, the second group of boats arrived in Yalta (SV-4 - Lieutenant Commander Suriano, SV-5 - Lieutenant Commander Faroroli, SV-6 - Lieutenant Galliano).

The boats took an active part in the hostilities against the Soviet Black Sea Fleet on the outskirts of Sevastopol and, according to Italian data, sank the S-32 and Shch-203 submarines (V-bis, built in 1935, commander captain 3rd rank V. I. Nemchinov) . The Italians themselves lost only one submarine, and then not in the course of hostilities (C-5). She was sunk in the port of Yalta by Kochiev's torpedo boats. By the way, SMPL was qualified by boatmen as a low-tonnage barge.

On 10/09/1942, the Italian 4th flotilla, which included all SMPLs and boats on the Black Sea under the command of Captain 1st Rank Mimbelli, received an order to relocate to the Caspian Sea. 09/01/1942, the Italians left the base at Cape Foros and moved to Yalta. On September 22, they left the city and arrived in Mariupol on their own. Makhachkala was chosen as the main base for the Italian unit. But the defeat of the German troops near Stalingrad will make the execution of this order meaningless. On January 2, 1943, by order of Admiral Bartholdi, all Italian ships were withdrawn from the Black Sea theater of operations. In March 1943, having overcome considerable difficulties, the “Moccagatta column”, commanded by Romano, arrived in La Spezia.

We deliberately dwelled on the actions of the Italian special forces MAS in relatively detail, so that the reader could form their own opinion about its capabilities.

The capitulation of Italy (09/03/1943) stopped the practical operations of the flotilla. However, the experience of its combat use, the mechanisms for developing operations, developments in the field technical support have already been introduced into the training of special forces of the fleets of Germany, England, and the USA. According to the laws of war, this was done quickly, without regard to the inevitable huge costs. The Italians were in Sevastopol.

In July 1942, they took part in a “very difficult” battle for the 35th battery and wrote that they would not soon forget him.

The boats were given the task of blocking the exits from the battery casemates towards the sea. For this, four units were included in the case (they stayed at sea for 14 hours and 10 minutes).

In addition, the Italians were supposed to land on the shore and enter the underground casemates of the battery.

The commander of the 10th MAS flotilla, Prince Vitolio Borghese, wrote: “the fort ... after the fall of Sevastopol remained the last center of Russian resistance. Built on a high steep bank, it consisted of a system of trenches and galleries cut into the rocks, some of them had access to the sea. Our patrol and torpedo boats were ordered to take part in the assault, that is, to block the exits from the fort. 4 of our boats went out to sea, the crews of which were armed with machine guns and hand grenades. A small group ... of sailors entered the galleries from the sea. The noise they made, the firing from machine guns and the explosions of grenades misled the defenders, taken by surprise, as to the number of attackers, which helped the Germans to break the stubborn defense of the enemy.

As a result of the assault, about 80 prisoners of war were captured. These were the last defenders of the 35th battery. Exhausted, hungry, all wounded, poisoned by poisonous gases, they could no longer offer serious resistance to the enemy.

On July 6, 1942, the Italians visited Sevastopol. He made a huge impression on them. “The city was completely destroyed,” one of the sailors recalled, “A sunken cruiser and a destroyer were visible in the port: workshops, shipyards - everything was destroyed. The bodies floated in the water. In the courtyards of the houses, the wounded townspeople left by everyone lay on the ground and silently awaited death. Not a single cry, not a single groan; the living lay among the dead, whom no one removed. Everywhere only dust, heat, flies, corpses, corpses and more corpses. On the streets, passers-by stepped over the dead ... ".

A photograph has been preserved where several SMPLs of the SV type are moored near the Sevastopol pier.

War is over. The difficult 50s came, the cold war was gaining momentum more and more.

The development of torpedo-type submarine carriers continued. The Italians were once again among the first to propose new solutions in the development of a proven type of underwater weapon. Their specialists created the Sea Horst transporter (Ippokampo) or Seahorse. In September 1955, a new carrier was tested in the area Los Angeles(USA). Recall: in October 1955, the Novorossiysk was killed.

Externally, the carrier had a torpedo-shaped hull 2 ​​meters long, which housed two swimmer-pilots. The total weight of the product was 1145 kg. A design feature was that a gasoline engine was used as a power plant, operating according to the RDP scheme (i.e., with air supplied from the surface of the water through a flexible hose). During the tests, the Sea Horst traveled 21 miles under water at a speed of 6 knots, plunging to a depth of 3 to 45 meters. According to the Sun newspaper (09/30/1955), the autonomy of the carrier in terms of range was 37 miles. It was a serious application regarding promising areas for the development of underwater vehicles for underwater saboteurs. But we recall that it was tested only in September 1955. In such a short time, to entrust an operation that can cause an international scandal to an unfinished technical means. dangerous, but not out of the question... Could the first CX models have been used in the attack on Novorossiysk? Knowing the state of the project - no.

Now another circumstance.

Let's remember "Olterra" and the desire of Italian saboteurs, when leaving the naval base of the future potential enemy, to leave "bookmarks". Could this have happened in 1944?

It is known that in 1947 Italy was deprived of the right to have assault weapons in the Navy. The 10th MAS flotilla was disbanded. But the Italians participated in the training of German, English and Israeli submarine saboteurs. Soon, in Italy itself, despite the terms of the Peace Treaty of 1947, a specialized unit was recreated. It was located in the city of Varignano, commanded by Captain 1st Rank Birindelli, who had rich combat experience. In the process of reorganization, the special unit had different names (modern "Comcubin").

The death of Novorossiysk is often associated with the iconic phrase of Valerio Borghese that the battleship will not fly under the Soviet flag. In 1955, underwater saboteurs remained in Italy who could complete this task. But if they came from the shore, then it would not have been real without the help of the agents mothballed in Sevastopol, left by the Germans. After the liberation of the city in May 1944, Smersh actively identified it.

B. A. Karzhavin in the book “The Mystery of the Death of the Battleship Novorossiysk” made a reservation that in the autumn of 1955 there was a suspicious influx of Italian tourists to Yalta. Why not before, why not after? These actions are a convenient cover for the penetration of illegal agents into the country. There were two of them, two smiling Italians who stepped down the ladder of a cruise ship in the port of Yalta. But they were not interested in sights of Crimea. It was necessary to get into Sevastopol in a short time and meet with someone who would help them solve the problem of destroying the battleship. Note that MAB was part of the 10th flotilla. Russian nobleman, one of the most experienced underwater saboteurs - Eugenio Volk. After the capitulation of Italy, he will train the British. And the wife of the commander of the 10th MAS flotilla, V. Borghese, was a Russian noblewoman, Countess Daria Vasilievna Olsufieva. This indicates a high probability of their connection with the Russian diaspora, who dreamed of overthrowing the Soviets at any cost.

Let us turn again to Boris Aleksandrovich Korzhavin. He wrote: “It was in Algiers at the end of 1964. We fulfilled our duty to train officers and midshipmen of the Algerian Navy on torpedo boats of the "183rd" project. When talking with an Algerian officer, I don’t remember his last name, he said that in Algeria several officers from Italy were training Algerians, submariners, saboteurs, and one of them participated in blowing up the battleship Novorossiysk (p. 237).

According to the source, indeed, two Italian officers were awarded high awards shortly after the death of the battleship. Who are these people?

The fate of the traitor is also unknown.

Now the main thing.

They could use the "bookmark" left before the Germans left Sevastopol. Therefore, the Italians or someone else arrived in the USSR "clean". It is useful to remember that during the occupation of Sevastopol, the Germans with a "ruler" climbed the docks in the Admiralty (Aleksandrovsky and Alekseevsky), the largest in the theater. They carefully studied the 35th and 30th batteries, made their detailed diagrams. It is hard to believe that the same was not done with the coastline of the city. It is especially important for sabotage work. Curiously, after the death of the battleship, an order was received from Moscow to inspect all the grottoes and niches in the vicinity of the naval base. This was done by the combat swimmers of the fight against the PDSS of the Black Sea Fleet, and then the KChF. Such an operation was performed more than once (in Soviet time). The author has no information that “bookmarks” of special equipment or their traces were found. According to official information, they were not found.

And if we are talking about external sabotage, then ammunition of such power was delivered to the battleship using a carrier. It's impossible to do it by hand.

For more than half a century after the tragedy in the Sevastopol Bay, other versions of the death of the battleship were put forward. For example, "... in the area of ​​​​the explosion, as we remember," "a torn part of a barge with a winch 8-9 meters long, 4 meters wide, protruding from the ground by 2.5-4 meters", i.e. to the bottom of the battleship . It was quite possible to place V.V. charges on the barge, with a total mass of 2-2.5 tons or more ”(see http://flot.com).

No, not that. At the bottom of the Sevastopol Bay, what just does not lie after two defenses and the Civil War. Eyewitnesses testify that "some boats" were seen at the side of the battleship on that fateful night. But this is normal. The fleet lives around the clock with abstract concept"weekend". Barges and boats are constantly moving around the bay, carrying personnel, cargo.

And there is no answer here.

It is hardly possible to agree with the tempting version of sea captain Mikhail Lander from Odessa. He said that he allegedly met in Italy with a participant in sabotage. “Then he showed me a photograph of eight divers, where in the center he and the leader of the group, a well-known Italian submarine specialist. He told me everything in such detail and drew that it is impossible to doubt his veracity. When I asked why he was telling me, he replied that he was the only one still alive from this company and was bound by a vow of silence. And since he already has one foot "there", I can write about it.

He said: the carriers were delivered to the territorial waters of the USSR by a mother ship. After leaving it, the Italians settled in the Kruglaya (Omega) Bay, creating a "base" there. From it, the saboteurs made two exits on carriers to the battleship, delivering a deadly cargo. Then they went to sea, waited for a ship for a day and were evacuated. Verbatim.

“The performers are eight combat swimmers, each of them has a combat sabotage school on the Black Sea. On October 21, 1955, at night, an ordinary cargo ship left one Italian port and headed for the Black Sea to one of the Dnieper ports for loading wheat (there was no such ship, it was confirmed documents - A. Ch.). The course and speed were calculated so as to pass the traverse of the Khersones lighthouse at midnight on October 26 at 15 miles. Coming in given point, the steamer released a mini-submarine from a special cutout in the bottom and left on its own course. "Picollo" (? - A. Ch.) went to the Omega Bay area, where they set up an underwater base (according to that level - how is it? - A. Ch.) - they unloaded breathing cylinders (saboteurs used apparatus with a closed breathing cycle. - A . Ch.), explosives, hydro-tugs, etc. With darkness they went back to the sea, waiting for a signal. Finally received a signal, returned to Omega Bay in exactly the right place. Changed into spacesuits (?, wetsuits or diving suits. - A.Ch.) and, having captured everything you needed, with the help of hydrotugs (?. - A.Ch.) swam to the object. Visibility is terrible, they worked almost by touch. Returned twice to Omega for explosives in magnetic cylinders. At sunset, everyone finished, sailed to Omega and quickly slipped into the Piccollo. In a hurry, they forgot the bag with tools and the spare propeller of the hydrotug. With darkness they went out to sea, waited for their ship for two days, dived under the uterus, slammed the bottom, pumped out the water. Three long-awaited strikes on the cabin informed that the hatch could be opened.

Everything. Operation completed. Ambition satisfied. So it was according to an eyewitness” (The World Odessa Club, Odessa, Ukraine, 10.10).

I was forced to study the state of the coastline of the bay at that time and the depth data. According to contemporaries (survey), it turned out that there was a beach on the shore of this very shallow Sevastopol harbor. Sevastopol residents came to him in buses, on boats. To the west of the bay was the guarded Dacha of the fleet commander. There was a rest house nearby. On the shore there was a berth for boats that cruised from the Sevastopol Bay with vacationers. Nearby was a guarded air defense facility (at one time it was armed with anti-aircraft artillery systems). Since the beginning of the 20th century, a hydro-aviation aviation unit (currently an aircraft repair plant) has been based on the eastern coast. Finally, the border zone.

Could a group of saboteurs with carriers have been in this place (base) unnoticed for 2 days? In the bay, where, in accordance with sea ​​chart the depth of 15 meters is only at the entrance. In the bay, where the overwhelming water area has its values ​​\u200b\u200bof 2-5, and a small part - 8 meters, and even with SMPL, the name of which could not be found anywhere (judging by the source). Hardly.

And in general, there are a number of details in the text (see in the course of presentation), which indicate that the person who wrote it is not familiar with the terminology of diving. But the source of "information" to which the author appeals could not but know this.

And the last of the "Italian version". Here are the words of the former saboteurs of the 10th MAS flotilla. A. N. Norchenko published these interviews in the book “The Cursed Secret”.

Article from the almanac "Marine Archive", No. 3 (4), 2012
Chairman of the Editorial Board Markov A.G.
Editor-in-chief Maslov N.K.

L. Ferrari. He served as an underwater saboteur in the Gamma Detachment. Member of military operations, holder of the Big Gold Medal "for military valor".

E. Legnani. He began his service in the Navy in the command of the battleship Giulio Cesare, so he knew him well. In the 10th MAS flotilla - on assault boats. During the war he was in the Crimea and Sevastopol. Since 1949 - commander of a detachment of ships.

E. Marcolini. Underwater saboteur of the 10th flotilla MAS. He was awarded the Grand Gold Medal "for military prowess" as a result of the operation against the British aircraft carrier Aquila.

At the time of the explosion, the commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Kukhta, was on vacation. His duties were performed by senior assistant captain 2nd rank Khurshudov. According to staffing, on the battleship were 68 officers, 243 foremen, 1231 sailors. After the "Novorossiysk" moored, part of the crew went on leave. More than one and a half thousand people remained on board: part of the crew and a new replenishment (200 people), cadets maritime schools and the soldiers who had arrived on the battleship the day before.

On October 29, at 01:31 Moscow time, a powerful explosion was heard under the ship's hull from the starboard side in the bow. According to experts, its force was equivalent to an explosion of 1000-1200 kilograms of trinitrotoluene. From the starboard side in the underwater part of the hull, a hole was formed with an area of ​​​​more than 150 square meters, and on the port side and along the keel - a dent with a deflection arrow from 2 to 3 meters. The total area of ​​damage to the underwater part of the hull was about 340 square meters in a section 22 meters long. Outboard water poured into the resulting hole, and after 3 minutes there was a trim of 3-4 degrees and a roll of 1-2 degrees to starboard.

At 01:40, the incident was reported to the fleet commander. By 02:00, when the list to starboard reached 1.5 degrees, the head of the operational department of the fleet, captain 1st rank Ovcharov, ordered "to tow the ship to a shallow place", and the approaching tugboats turned it stern to the shore.

By this time, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral V.A. Parkhomenko, the chief of staff of the fleet, Vice Admiral S.E. Chursin, a member of the Military Council, Vice Admiral N.M. Kulakov, the acting squadron commander, Rear Admiral N .I. Nikolsky, Chief of Staff of the Squadron Rear Admiral A.I. Zubkov, Commander of the Cruiser Division Rear Admiral S.M. Lobov, Head of the Political Directorate of the Fleet Rear Admiral B.T. Kalachev and 28 other senior staff officers.

At 02:32 a list to port was discovered. By 03:30, about 800 unemployed sailors lined up on the deck, rescue ships stood at the side of the battleship. Nikolsky offered to transfer sailors to them, but received a categorical refusal from Parkhomenko. At 03:50, the list to port reached 10-12 degrees, while the tugs continued to pull the battleship to the left. After 10 minutes, the list increased to 17 degrees, while 20 were critical. Nikolsky again asked Parkhomenko and Kulakov for permission to evacuate the sailors who were not engaged in the fight for damage and was again refused.

"Novorossiysk" began to capsize upside down. Several dozen people managed to get into boats and onto neighboring ships, but hundreds of sailors fell from the deck into the water. Many remained inside the dying battleship. As Admiral Parkhomenko later explained, he "did not consider it possible to order the personnel to leave the ship in advance, since until the last minutes he hoped that the ship would be saved, and there was no thought that it would die." This hope cost the lives of hundreds of people who, having fallen into the water, were covered by the hull of the battleship.

By 04:14, the Novorossiysk, which had taken in more than 7,000 tons of water, listed to a fatal 20 degrees, swung to the right, just as suddenly fell to the left and lay on board. In this position, he remained for several hours, resting on solid ground with masts. At 22:00 on October 29, the hull completely disappeared under water.

August 22nd, 2013

On October 29, 1955, the flagship of the Black Sea squadron of the Soviet Navy, the battleship Novorossiysk, sank in the Northern Bay of Sevastopol. More than 600 sailors were killed. According to the official version, an old German bottom mine exploded under the bottom of the ship. But there are other versions, unofficial, but very popular - supposedly Italian, English and even Soviet saboteurs are responsible for the death of Novorossiysk.

At the time of the death of the battleship "Novorossiysk" was 44 years old - a respectable period for the ship. For most of her life, the battleship bore a different name - "Giulio Cesare" ("Julius Caesar"), sailing under the flag of the Italian Navy. She was laid down at Genoa in the summer of 1910 and launched in 1915. The battleship did not take part in the First World War, in the 1920s it was used as a training ship for the training of naval gunners.

In the mid-1930s, Giulio Cesare underwent a major overhaul. The displacement of the ship reached 24,000 tons, it could reach a fairly high speed of 22 knots. The battleship was well armed: two three-barreled and three turret guns, three torpedo tubes, anti-aircraft guns and heavy machine guns. During the Second World War, the battleship was mainly engaged in escorting convoys, but in 1942 the Navy command recognized it as obsolete and transferred it to the category of training ships.

In 1943, Italy capitulated. Until 1948, the Giulio Cesare lay in the parking lot, not being mothballed, with a minimum number of crew and without proper maintenance.

According to a special agreement, the Italian fleet was to be divided among the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. The USSR accounted for a battleship, a light cruiser, 9 destroyers and 4 submarines, not counting small ships. On January 10, 1947, an agreement was reached in the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Allied Powers on the distribution of the transferred Italian ships between the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and other countries affected by the Italian aggression. For example, four cruisers, four destroyers and two submarines were allocated to France, and one cruiser to Greece. The battleships became part of groups "A", "B" and "C", intended for the three main powers.

The Soviet side claimed one of the two new battleships, which in their power surpassed even the German ships of the Bismarck type. But since by this time the Cold War had already begun between the recent allies, neither the United States nor England sought to strengthen the Soviet Navy with powerful ships. I had to throw lots, and the USSR received group "C". The new battleships went to the United States and England (later, these battleships were returned to Italy as part of the NATO partnership). By decision of the Tripartite Commission in 1948, the USSR received the battleship Giulio Cesare, the light cruiser Emmanuele Filiberto Duca D'Aosta, the destroyers Artilleri, Fuchiliere, destroyers Animoso, Ardimentoso, Fortunale and submarines. Marea" and "Nicelio".

On December 9, 1948, the Giulio Cesare left the port of Taranto and on December 15 arrived in the Albanian port of Vlora. On February 3, 1949, the transfer of the battleship took place in this port. Soviet commission, led by Rear Admiral Levchenko. On February 6, the naval flag of the USSR was hoisted over the ship, and two weeks later it sailed for Sevastopol, arriving at its new base on February 26. By order of the Black Sea Fleet dated March 5, 1949, the battleship was given the name Novorossiysk.

"Novorossiysk"

As almost all researchers note, the ship was handed over by the Italians to Soviet sailors in a state of disrepair. In a relatively satisfactory form was the main part of the weapons, the main power plant and the main hull structures - plating, framing, main transverse bulkheads below the armored deck. But general ship systems: pipelines, fittings, service mechanisms, required serious repair or replacement. There were no radar equipment on the ship at all, the fleet of radio communications equipment was scarce, and small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery was completely absent. It should be noted that immediately before the transfer to the USSR, the battleship underwent a small repair, which concerned mainly the electromechanical part.

When the Novorossiysk settled in Sevastopol, the command of the Black Sea Fleet gave the order to turn the ship into a full-fledged combat unit as soon as possible. The matter was complicated by the fact that part of the documentation was missing, and there were practically no naval specialists who spoke Italian in the USSR.

In August 1949, Novorossiysk took part in squadron maneuvers as a flagship. However, his participation was rather nominal, since in the three months allotted they did not manage to put the battleship in order (and they could not have time). However political situation demanded to demonstrate the successes of Soviet sailors in the development of Italian ships. As a result, the squadron went to sea, and NATO intelligence made sure that the Novorossiysk was floating.

From 1949 to 1955, the battleship was factory repaired eight times. It was equipped with 24 twin installations of Soviet 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, new radar stations, radio communications and intra-ship communications. They also replaced Italian turbines with new ones manufactured at the Kharkov plant. In May 1955, Novorossiysk entered service with the Black Sea Fleet and went to sea several times until the end of October, practicing combat training tasks.

On October 28, 1955, the battleship returned from the last campaign and took up a place in the Northern Bay on a "battleship barrel" in the area of ​​​​the Marine Hospital, about 110 meters from the coast. The water depth there was 17 meters of water and about 30 meters of viscous silt.

Explosion

At the time of the explosion, the commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Kukhta, was on vacation. His duties were performed by senior assistant captain 2nd rank Khurshudov. According to the staffing table, there were 68 officers, 243 foremen, 1231 sailors on the battleship. After the "Novorossiysk" moored, part of the crew moved out on dismissal. More than one and a half thousand people remained on board: part of the crew and a new replenishment (200 people), cadets of naval schools and soldiers who had arrived on the battleship the day before.

On October 29, at 01:31 Moscow time, a powerful explosion was heard under the ship's hull from the starboard side in the bow. According to experts, its force was equivalent to an explosion of 1000-1200 kilograms of trinitrotoluene. On the starboard side in the underwater part of the hull, a hole was formed with an area of ​​​​more than 150 square meters, and on the port side and along the keel - a dent with a deflection arrow from 2 to 3 meters. The total area of ​​damage to the underwater part of the hull was about 340 square meters in a section 22 meters long. Outboard water poured into the resulting hole, and after 3 minutes there was a trim of 3-4 degrees and a roll of 1-2 degrees to starboard.

At 01:40, the incident was reported to the fleet commander. By 02:00, when the list to starboard reached 1.5 degrees, the head of the operational department of the fleet, captain 1st rank Ovcharov, ordered "to tow the ship to a shallow place", and the approaching tugboats turned it stern to the shore.

By this time, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral V.A. Parkhomenko, the chief of staff of the fleet, Vice Admiral S.E. Chursin, a member of the Military Council, Vice Admiral N.M. Kulakov, the acting squadron commander, Rear Admiral N .I. Nikolsky, Chief of Staff of the Squadron Rear Admiral A.I. Zubkov, Commander of the Cruiser Division Rear Admiral S.M. Lobov, Head of the Political Directorate of the Fleet Rear Admiral B.T. Kalachev and 28 other senior staff officers.

At 02:32 a list to port was detected. By 03:30, about 800 unemployed sailors lined up on the deck, rescue ships stood at the side of the battleship. Nikolsky offered to transfer sailors to them, but received a categorical refusal from Parkhomenko. At 03:50, the list to port reached 10-12 degrees, while the tugs continued to pull the battleship to the left. After 10 minutes, the list increased to 17 degrees, while 20 were critical. Nikolsky again asked Parkhomenko and Kulakov for permission to evacuate the sailors who were not engaged in the fight for damage and was again refused.

"Novorossiysk" began to capsize upside down. Several dozen people managed to get into boats and onto neighboring ships, but hundreds of sailors fell from the deck into the water. Many remained inside the dying battleship. As Admiral Parkhomenko later explained, he "did not find it possible to order the personnel to leave the ship in advance, because until the last minutes he hoped that the ship would be saved, and there was no thought that he would die." This hope cost the lives of hundreds of people who, having fallen into the water, were covered by the hull of the battleship.

By 04:14, the Novorossiysk, which had taken in more than 7,000 tons of water, listed to a fatal 20 degrees, swung to the right, just as suddenly fell to the left and lay on board. In this position, he remained for several hours, resting on solid ground with masts. At 22:00 on October 29, the hull completely disappeared under water.

In total, 609 people died during the disaster, including emergency parties from other ships of the squadron. Between 50 and 100 people died directly as a result of the explosion and flooding of the bow compartments. The rest died during the capsizing of the battleship and after it. Timely evacuation of personnel was not organized. Most of the sailors remained inside the hull. Some of them were kept in the air cushions of the compartments for a long time, but only nine people managed to be saved: seven came out through a neck cut in the aft part of the bottom five hours after capsizing, and two more were taken out after 50 hours by divers. According to the recollections of divers, the sailors immured and doomed to death sang "Varyag". Only by November 1 did the divers stop hearing the knocks.

In the summer of 1956, the special purpose expedition "EON-35" began lifting the battleship by blowing. Preparations for the ascent were fully completed by the end of April 1957. The general blowdown began on the morning of May 4 and completed the ascent on the same day. The ship surfaced with a keel on May 4, 1957, and on May 14 it was taken to the Cossack Bay, where it was turned over. When the ship was raised, the third turret of the main caliber fell out, which had to be raised separately. The ship was dismantled for metal and transferred to the Zaporizhstal plant.

Commission conclusions

To find out the causes of the explosion, a government commission was set up headed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry, Colonel General of the Engineering Service Vyacheslav Malyshev. According to the recollections of all who knew him, Malyshev was an engineer of the highest erudition. He perfectly knew his business and read theoretical drawings of any complexity, being well versed in issues of unsinkability and stability of ships. Back in 1946, after reading the drawings of "Giulio Cesare", Malyshev recommended that this acquisition be abandoned. But he failed to convince Stalin.

The commission gave its conclusion two and a half weeks after the disaster. Tough deadlines were set in Moscow. On November 17, the conclusion of the commission was submitted to the Central Committee of the CPSU, which accepted and approved the conclusions.

The cause of the disaster was called "an external underwater explosion (non-contact, bottom) of a charge with a TNT equivalent of 1000-1200 kg." The most probable was the explosion of a German magnetic mine left on the ground after the Great Patriotic War.

As for responsibility, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice-Admiral Parkhomenko, acting. squadron commander Rear Admiral Nikolsky and acting. battleship commander captain 2nd rank Khurshudov. The Commission noted that Vice Admiral Kulakov, a member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet, also bears direct responsibility for the disaster with the Novorossiysk battleship, and especially for the death of people.

But despite the harsh conclusions, the case was limited to the fact that the commander of the battleship Kukhta was demoted in rank and sent to the reserve. Also removed from office and demoted in rank: Rear Admiral Galitsky, commander of the division for the protection of the water area, acting. squadron commander Nikolsky and a member of the Military Council of the Fists. A year and a half later, they were reinstated in ranks. The commander of the fleet, Vice Admiral Viktor Parkhomenko, was severely reprimanded, and on December 8, 1955, he was removed from his post. No legal action has been taken against him. In 1956, the commander of the Soviet Navy, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, was removed from his post.

The commission also noted that “sailors, foremen and officers, as well as officers who led the direct struggle to save the ship, - acting. comrade Matusevich, the commander of the survivability division, comrade Gorodetsky, and the head of the technical department of the fleet, comrade Ivanov, who helped them, skillfully and selflessly fought the water that entered the ship, everyone knew his job well, showed initiative, showed examples of courage and true heroism . But all the efforts of the personnel were devalued and nullified by the criminally frivolous, unskilled and indecisive command ... "

The documents of the commission spoke in detail about those who should have, but failed to organize the rescue of the crew and the ship. However, none of these documents gave a direct answer to the main question: what caused the disaster?

Version number 1 - mine

The initial versions - the explosion of a gas depot or artillery cellars - were swept aside almost immediately. The tanks of the fuel depot on the battleship were empty long before the disaster. As for the cellars, if they rushed, there would be little left of the battleship at all, and five cruisers standing nearby would also fly into the air. In addition, this version was immediately overturned by the testimony of the sailors, whose place of military service was the 2nd tower of the main artillery caliber, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bwhich the battleship received a hole. It was precisely established that the 320-millimeter shells remained safe and sound.

There are still a few versions left: mine explosion, submarine torpedo attack and sabotage. After studying the circumstances, the mine version won the most votes. Which was quite understandable - mines in the Sevastopol bays were not uncommon since the time of the Civil War. The bays and the raid were periodically cleared of mines with the help of minesweepers and diving teams. In 1941, during the offensive German armies to Sevastopol, the German Air Force and Navy mined the water area both from the sea and from the air - mines different types and appointments were put up by them several hundred. Some worked during the fighting, others were removed and neutralized after the liberation of Sevastopol in 1944. Later, the Sevastopol bays and the roadstead were regularly trawled and inspected by diving teams. The last such comprehensive survey was conducted in 1951-1953. In 1956-1958, after the explosion of the battleship, 19 more German bottom mines were found in the Sevastopol Bay, including three at a distance of less than 50 meters from the place of the death of the battleship.

The testimonies of divers also spoke in favor of the mine version. As the squad leader Kravtsov testified: “The ends of the skin of the hole are bent inward. By the nature of the hole, the burrs from the skin, the explosion was from the outside of the ship.

Version number 2 - torpedo attack

The next version was that the battleship was torpedoed by an unknown submarine. However, when studying the nature of the damage received by the battleship, the commission did not find characteristic signs corresponding to a torpedo strike. But she discovered something else. At the time of the explosion, the ships of the division for the protection of the water area, whose duty it was to guard the entrance to the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, were in a completely different place. On the night of the catastrophe, the outer raid was not guarded by anyone; the network gates were wide open, and the direction finders were inactive. Thus, Sevastopol was defenseless. And, theoretically, a foreign submarine could well enter the bay, choose a position and deliver a torpedo strike.

In practice, for a full-fledged attack, the boat would hardly have had enough depth. However, the military was aware that some Western navies already had small or midget submarines in service. So, theoretically, a dwarf submarine could penetrate the inner roadstead of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. This assumption, in turn, gave rise to another - were saboteurs involved in the explosion?

Version number 3 - Italian combat swimmers

This version was supported by the fact that before falling under the red flag, Novorossiysk was an Italian ship. And the most formidable underwater special forces during World War II, the 10th Assault Flotilla, were with the Italians, and they were commanded by Prince Junio ​​Valerio Borghese, a staunch anti-communist who allegedly publicly swore after the transfer of the battleship to the USSR to avenge such a humiliation of Italy.

Graduate Royal naval school Valerio Borghese expected brilliant career a submarine officer, which was facilitated by a noble origin and excellent academic performance. The first submarine under the command of Borghese was part of Italian Legion, which, as part of Franco's assistance, acted against the Republican fleet of Spain. After that, the prince received a new submarine under his command. Later, Valerio Borghese completed a special training course in Germany on the Baltic Sea.

Upon his return to Italy, Borghese was given command of the most modern submarine, the Shire. Thanks to the skillful actions of the commander, the submarine returned back to its base unharmed from each military campaign. The operations of the Italian submariners aroused genuine interest in King Victor Emmanuel, who honored the prince-submariner with a personal audience.

After that, Borghese was asked to create the world's first flotilla of naval saboteurs-submarines. Ultra-small submarines, special guided torpedoes, manned exploding boats were created for her. On December 18, 1941, Italians in midget submarines secretly entered the harbor of Alexandria and attached magnetic explosive devices to the bottoms of the British battleships Valiant and Queen Elizabeth. The death of these ships allowed the Italian fleet to seize the initiative in combat operations in the Mediterranean for a long time. Also, the "10th Assault Flotilla" took part in the siege of Sevastopol, based in the ports of Crimea.

Theoretically, a foreign submarine cruiser could deliver combat swimmers as close as possible to Sevastopol so that they carried out sabotage. Given the combat potential of first-class Italian scuba divers, pilots of small submarines and guided torpedoes, and also taking into account the sloppiness in matters of protecting the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, the version of underwater saboteurs looks convincing.

Version 4 - English saboteurs

The second unit in the world capable of such sabotage was the 12th Flotilla. Naval Forces Great Britain. It was commanded at that time by Captain 2nd Rank Lionel Crabbe, also a legendary man. During the Second World War, he led the defense of the British naval base of Gibraltar from Italian combat swimmers and was rightfully considered one of the best underwater saboteurs of the British fleet. Crabbe personally knew many of the Italians from the 10th Flotilla. In addition, after the war, captured Italian combat swimmers advised specialists from the 12th flotilla.

In favor of this version, the following argument is put forward - as if the Soviet command wanted to equip Novorossiysk with nuclear weapons. atomic bomb The USSR had been in possession since 1949, but there were no naval means of using nuclear weapons at that time. The solution could only be large-caliber naval guns firing heavy projectiles over a long distance. The Italian battleship was ideally suited for this purpose. Great Britain, which is an island, in this case turned out to be the most vulnerable target for the Soviet Navy. In the case of the use of atomic explosive devices near the west coast of England, taking into account the wind rose, which in those parts all year round blow to the east, the whole country would be exposed to radiation contamination.

And one more fact - at the end of October 1955, the British Mediterranean squadron conducted maneuvers in the Aegean and Marmara seas.

Version 5 - the work of the KGB

Already in our time, the candidate of technical sciences Oleg Sergeev put forward another version. The battleship "Novorossiysk" was blown up by two charges with a total TNT equivalent within 1800 kg, installed on the ground in the area of ​​​​the bow artillery cellars, at a small distance from the diametrical plane of the ship and from each other. The explosions occurred with a short time interval, which led to the creation of a cumulative effect and infliction of damage, as a result of which the ship sank. The undermining was prepared and carried out by domestic special services with the knowledge of the country's leadership exclusively for domestic political purposes. In 1993, the performers of this action became known: a senior lieutenant of special forces and two midshipmen - a support group.

Who was this provocation directed against? According to Sergeyev, first of all, against the leadership of the Navy. Two years after the death of Novorossiysk, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on October 29, 1957, Nikita Khrushchev answered this question: “We were offered to invest more than 100 billion rubles in the fleet and build old boats and destroyers armed with classical artillery. We had a big fight, removed Kuznetsov ... he was incapable of thinking, taking care of the fleet, of defense. Everything needs to be re-evaluated. It is necessary to build a fleet, but above all to build submarine fleet armed with missiles.

The ten-year shipbuilding plan, which does not reflect in the future the priority of developing the most capital-intensive and beneficial for the military-industrial complex, naval strategic nuclear forces, objectively could not be supported by the military-political leadership of the country, which sealed the fate of the commander-in-chief of the Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov.

The death of Novorossiysk was the beginning of a large-scale reduction Navy USSR. The obsolete battleships "Sevastopol" and " October Revolution”, the captured cruisers Kerch and Admiral Makarov, many captured submarines, destroyers and ships of other classes of pre-war construction.

Version criticism

Critics of the mine version claim that by 1955 the power supplies of all bottom mines would inevitably have been discharged, and the fuses would have become completely unusable. Until now, there were no batteries capable of not being discharged for ten or more years. It is also noted that the explosion occurred after 8 hours of mooring the battleship, and all German mines had hourly intervals that were multiples of only 6 hours. Before the tragedy, Novorossiysk (10 times) and the battleship Sevastopol (134 times) moored on barrel No. different time years - and nothing exploded. In addition, it turned out that in fact there were two explosions, and such a force that two large deep craters appeared at the bottom, which the explosion of one mine cannot leave.

As for the version about the work of saboteurs from Italy or England, in this case a number of questions arise. Firstly, an action of this magnitude is possible only with the participation of the state. And it would be very difficult to hide preparations for it, given the activity of Soviet intelligence on the Apennine Peninsula and the influence of the Italian Communist Party.

It would be impossible for private individuals to organize such an action - too large resources would be needed to provide it, starting with several tons of explosives and ending with means of transportation (again, let's not forget about secrecy). This is acceptable in feature films like " The dogs of war", but in real life becomes known to the relevant services at the planning stage, as was the case, for example, with the unsuccessful coup in Equatorial Guinea. In addition, as the former Italian combat swimmers themselves admitted, their life after the war was tightly controlled by the state, and any attempt at amateur performance would have been stopped.

In addition, preparations for such an operation should have been kept secret from the allies, primarily from the United States. If the Americans had known about the impending sabotage of the Italian or British navies, they would certainly have prevented this - in case of failure, the United States would not have been able to wash off the accusations of inciting war for a long time. To make such a sortie against a nuclear-weapon country in the midst of cold war it would be crazy.

Finally, in order to mine a ship of this class in a protected harbor, it was necessary to collect complete information about the security regime, mooring places, ship exits to the sea, and so on. It is impossible to do this without a resident with a radio station in Sevastopol itself or somewhere nearby. All operations of Italian saboteurs during the war were carried out only after careful reconnaissance and never "blindly". But even after half a century, there is not a single evidence that in one of the most protected cities of the USSR, filtered through by the KGB and counterintelligence, there was an English or Italian resident who regularly supplied information not only to Rome or London, but personally to Prince Borghese.

Supporters of the Italian version argue that some time after the death of Novorossiysk, a message flashed in the Italian press about the awarding of orders to a group of officers of the Italian Navy "for performing a special task." However, so far no one has published a single photocopy of this message. Links to the Italian naval officers, who once declared to someone about their participation in the sinking of Novorossiysk, were unproven for a long time.

Yes, information about the explosion of "Novorossiysk" in the Western press appeared very quickly. But Italian newspaper comments (with vague allusions) are a common journalistic device, when after the fact there is "most reliable" evidence. It should also be taken into account that the Italians allowed their "younger" battleships, received back from NATO allies, to be melted down. And if there hadn’t been a catastrophe with Novorossiysk, only historians of the Navy would have remembered the battleship Giulio Cesare in Italy.

Belated Rewards

Based on the report of the government commission, in November 1955, the Black Sea Fleet command sent the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, submissions on awarding orders and medals to all the sailors who died along with the battleship. The awards were also presented to 117 people from among those who survived the explosion, sailors from other ships who came to the aid of Novorossiysk, as well as divers and doctors who distinguished themselves during rescue operations. In Sevastopol, at the headquarters of the fleet, they delivered required amount awards. But the award never took place. Only forty years later it turned out that at the presentation by the head of the personnel department of the Navy of that time, a note was made: "Admiral Comrade Gorshkov does not consider it possible to come up with such a proposal."

Only in 1996, after repeated appeals from the ship's veterans, the Russian government gave appropriate instructions to the Ministry of Defense, the FSB, the Prosecutor General's Office, the Russian State Maritime Historical and Cultural Center and other departments. The main military prosecutor's office began to check the materials of the investigation conducted in 1955. All this time, secret award lists for Novorossiysk soldiers were kept in the Central Naval Archive. It turned out that 6 sailors were posthumously presented to the highest award of the USSR - the Order of Lenin, 64 (53 of them posthumously) - to the Order of the Red Banner, 10 (9 posthumously) - to the Orders of the Patriotic War of the 1st and 2nd degrees, 191 ( 143 posthumously) - to the Order of the Red Star, 448 sailors (391 posthumously) - to the medals "For Courage", "For military merit”, Ushakov and Nakhimov.

Since by that time there was no longer a state under whose naval flag the Novorossiysk died, nor Soviet orders, all the Novorossiysk citizens were awarded the Orders of Courage.

a memorial at the Fraternal Cemetery in the form of a 12-meter figure of the Grieving Sailor, cast from the bronze propellers of the battleship, installed in 1963

The real reason for the death of the battleship.

Most recently, news agencies reported that Hugo D'Esposito, a veteran of the Italian frogmen unit Gamma, admitted that the Italian military was involved in the sinking of the Soviet battleship Novorossiysk. 4Arts writes about it.

According to Hugo D'Esposito, the Italians did not want the ship to go to the "Russians", so they made sure to flood it.

Previously, the version that the Novorossiysk sank as a result of sabotage organized by the Italians was not officially confirmed.

After the death of Novorossiysk, various explanations for a possible sabotage were put forward (according to one of them, the explosives were allegedly hidden in the ship's hull already at the time of its transfer to the Soviet Union).

In the mid-2000s, the Itogi magazine, having published material on this topic, placed in it the story of a certain submarine officer Nikolo, allegedly involved in sabotage. According to him, the operation was organized by the former commander of underwater saboteurs Valerio Borghese, who, after the transfer of the ship, swore "to take revenge on the Russians and blow it up at all costs." The sabotage group, according to the source, arrived in a mini-submarine, which, in turn, was secretly delivered by a cargo ship that arrived from Italy. The Italians, as the newspaper wrote, equipped a secret base in the area of ​​Sevastopol's Omega Bay, mined the battleship, and then took the submarine to the open sea and waited for "their" steamer to pick them up.

Now I wonder if the relatives of the victims will sue Italy? Here is the site dedicated to the battleship and sailors.

The death of the battleship "Novorossiysk"

THE MYSTERY OF THE DEATH OF THE BATTLESHIP "NOVOROSSIYSK".

After the victory in World War II, the Allies divided the Italian fleet by decision of the Tripartite Commission in 1948. As a result, the Soviet Union got a light cruiser, 9 destroyers, 4 submarines and the battleship "Julius Caesar", built before the First World War. On February 6, 1949, the flag of the USSR Navy was hoisted over the ship, and a little later, in March, the battleship was renamed Novorossiysk.
The condition of the Julius Caesar during the transfer was unimportant: for five years, almost scrapped, the ship was rusting with a small, obviously insufficient for such a vessel, crew on board without proper maintenance. Did not save the situation and a small repair, carried out immediately before the transfer of the battleship to the Union.

Nevertheless, already in July 49, Novorossiysk took part in maneuvers as the flagship of the squadron. Subsequently, the battleship spent quite a lot of time at the repair docks, it was repaired as many as eight times and achieved some success: the combat and technical equipment was replaced, the turbines were modernized, and even the inconvenient layout was sorted out. They planned to completely rearm the ship, but decided to take their time and leave the Italian guns. In the future, it was supposed to equip the battleship with shells with tactical nuclear charges - and then, despite its venerable age of 35, it would begin to pose a real threat to the enemy.

October 28, 1955 "Novorossiysk" returned from the next campaign, moored in the area of ​​the Marine Hospital. on board, in addition to full-time sailors, there were soldiers transferred from the army to the fleet and completely unprepared for what happened a little later: at half past two in the night, a powerful explosion was heard under the ship's hull (~ 1100-1800 kg of trinitrotoluene). Seeing that it was impossible to stop the flow of water, the acting commander, captain of the second rank G. Khorshudov, turned to the fleet commander, Vice Admiral Parkhomenko, with a proposal to evacuate part of the team, which, due to the flooding of the bow, began to gather on the poop and numbered several hundred people, but received refusal. At 4.15 the ship capsized after a roll, dragging hundreds of people under water who were on deck and in the compartments. At ten o'clock in the evening the battleship sank completely.

Despite the fact that there was enough time from the moment of the explosion to the moment of capsizing (not to mention the time of complete flooding, which occurred 20 hours after the accident), only 9 people were saved from the compartments: two were pulled out by divers, seven were pulled out through the cut bottom of the ship by rescuers from Karabakh.

As a result of the disaster, more than 600 people died: not only the crew of the battleship, but also those who came to the rescue got it. No one at that time knew about the fact of the tragedy, it was destined to become a state secret. In connection with this situation, Admiral Kuznetsov was removed from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy: he was removed from his post, stripped of his rank and dismissed. First of all, such a decision was influenced by the fact that a lot of people died, and not suddenly, but after a poorly organized procedure for saving the ship, because only a little less than a day passed from the moment of the explosion to the time of flooding! It is also striking that the frankly outdated battleship continued to work on a par with younger ships and was even the flagship. Despite the long time spent by him in repairs, "Novorossiysk" could not compete with modern combat ships and did not meet some technical requirements. And, nevertheless, he went on sea trips, and did not stand as a museum in the port. Perhaps due to the fact that the USSR did not yet have its own large ships, and the need for powerful ocean-going vessels was felt.

Causes of the disaster "Novorossiysk" different people at different times, the negligence of the fleet command, and the sabotage carried out either by the Italians or the British, and an exploded mine or even a couple of mines from the Second World War were considered. Below we will consider in more detail two versions of what happened: Candidate of Technical Sciences Oleg Leonidovich Sergeev and Captain Second Rank Sergey Vasilyevich Elagin will share their opinions. The first researcher says that the sabotage could well have been carried out not by foreign special teams, but by Soviet professionals in order to discredit the high command of the fleet in the person of Admiral Kuznetsov and his entourage. The second author does not exclude the intervention of English combat swimmers, citing some examples from history. However, first things first...

Maxim Volchenkov

Evidence from the past - The death of Novorossiysk.

... Unexpected conclusions can be drawn from a comparison of the materials of the work of the government commission of the USSR (1955) on the fact of the tragic death of the battleship "Novorossiysk" and more than 600 sailors of its crew at the naval base of Sevastopol with the results and results of the work of the commission of officials of the British government (1956 d.), when only one sailor from the 12th Flotilla died in Portsmouth Royal Navy UK Lionel Crabbe.
... It can be said with confidence that the attack on Novorossiysk was carried out by real professionals, experts in their field. There were so few of them at that time that it was not difficult to name each of them! It could only be combat swimmers from the Italian MAC flotilla, the British 12th flotilla or the German "K" formation. There were simply no other specialists with practical combat experience in Europe and NATO. Why did the government commission of the USSR in 1955 only timidly pull and immediately break the thin thread of the version that was reaching out to saboteurs from the 12th flotilla of the British naval forces in Portsmouth? There is a version, but there seems to be no indisputable facts to confirm at the time of the work of the USSR government commission. Or were the commissions simply not allowed to complete what they had begun for political reasons in the light of the "Soviet-British friendship that grew stronger every day for eternity"?

On April 18, 1956, a detachment of Soviet ships arrived in England on an official visit. On board one of them was the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. The ships moored at the pier of the British naval base Portsmouth, which was guarded especially carefully. On ships, the steam turbine main power plants were taken out of action, the readiness of which to start moving (the beginning of the rotation of ship propellers) was more than 1 hour from a cold state.

The visit proceeded day by day in strict accordance with the official program. Suddenly, a whole series of interconnected "random" events occurs, in the center of which is the Soviet flagship cruiser "Ordzhonikidze". "Accidentally" under the bottom of this particular ship was a diver, "accidentally" the steam turbine plant of the cruiser turned out to be warmed up and capable of immediate launch, "accidentally" the cruiser's mechanics received an order: "Turn the propellers!", "accidentally" the diver was pulled under the spinning propellers cruisers. It is very likely that the cruiser's crew knew in advance about the plan and time of the visit without the invitation of a "saboteur" diver, whom she exponentially destroyed without using any weapons!

The Soviet side made an official protest to the British government. The British government apologized, saying that it knew nothing about this provocation, organized by unknown third parties with the aim of breaking good neighborly relations between the former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition.

The journalists reliably established that this "saboteur" diver, who died tragically and unknown to anyone, was one of the veterans of the super-secret 12th flotilla of the British Navy, had the rank of captain of the 2nd rank and his name was Lionel Crabbe. During the Second World War, he successfully led the defense of the British naval base of Gibraltar from Italian combat swimmers and was rightfully considered one of the best divers in the British fleet. Lionel Crabbe personally knew many Italians from the 10th IAS flotilla. Captured Italian combat swimmers not only advised specialists from the 12th flotilla, but also carried out joint combat operations.

The newest Soviet cruisers of the 68-bis project repeatedly shocked the British Admiralty. In the first ten days of October 1955, the Sverdlov cruiser, as part of a detachment of Soviet ships, began to move to the British naval base of Portsmouth on a friendly visit. Following the Belt, escorted by 2 destroyers, in dense fog, he did the impossible (by British standards). The ship briefly went out of order, deviated from the deep-water fairway and at full speed crossed a sandbank with a depth of only about 4 m! Having performed such an amazing (for NATO radar observation posts) maneuver, the ship returned to the deep-water fairway and exactly took its place in the ranks of Soviet ships. A gross mistake in the actions of the calculation of the Sverdlov's navigation bridge during the turn was taken by NATO specialists for "secret tests" of the lead cruiser of the 68-bis project, as close as possible to the conditions for a combat breakthrough of Soviet cruiser-raiders into the Atlantic from the Baltic Sea and decided to inspect at the first opportunity the bottom of the cruiser by a light diver (combat swimmer).

October 12, 1955 during a friendly visit of the cruisers "Sverdlov" and "Alexander Nevsky" (both projects 68-bis) moored at the wall of the naval base Portsmouth. But no one even tries to make a diving inspection of their bottoms - at the base of the 12th flotilla in Portsmouth at that time there are no combat swimmers who can be entrusted with such a responsible task.

On April 18, 1956, the serial cruiser "Ordzhonikidze" moored in Portsmouth during an official visit. And it is at this moment that the veteran of the 12th flotilla, Captain 2nd Rank Crabb, dies while performing a secret mission!

If in October 1955 the best combat swimmers are absent in Portsmouth, then we must look for "traces" of them professional activity far enough beyond. One such "trace" exists - a sabotage explosion on October 29, 1955 of the Soviet battleship Novorossiysk in the bay of Sevastopol! Over the past years, numerous authors of versions of the reasons for the death of the battleship Novorossiysk attributed the blame for this sabotage exclusively to the professionals of the Second World War from the unit of combat swimmers of Italy - the 10th MAC flotilla! But who can seriously believe that in 1955 the command of the Italian Navy could independently plan and carry out special operations of such a scale and such a level of possible military-political consequences without the sanction of the NATO command? It can be assumed that a single team of British and Italian combat swimmers was operating in the Sevastopol Bay, serving jointly in the 12th Flotilla of the Royal Navy.

The question remains about the motives for blowing up Novorossiysk. The answer can be found in the history of the Suez Canal! In February 1955, Britain initiates the formation of a military alliance - the Baghdad Pact, which initially includes Turkey and Iraq. Britain enters the Baghdad Pact on April 4, 1955, which allows it to establish dual military control (through NATO and the Baghdad Pact) over the Black Sea straits - the only way for the USSR Black Sea Fleet to enter the Mediterranean Sea. On May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Pact Organization was created, which includes Albania, which creates the possibility of a naval presence of the USSR in the Mediterranean, based on the Albanian port and naval base of Durres in close proximity to the strategic communications of the British Empire through the Suez Canal !

In September 1955, Egypt, in response to a real military threat from Great Britain, concludes "trade" agreements with the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland on the supply of modern weapons. On October 29, 1955, the battleship Novorossiysk was mysteriously blown up in Sevastopol, which could actually destroy the entire combat core of the Black Sea Fleet and disable its main naval base for a long period. On June 11, 1956, the last British soldier leaves the Suez Canal zone. In July 1956, the Egyptian government nationalizes the Suez Canal. October 29, 1956 Great Britain, France and Israel take aggressive action against Egypt in the Suez Canal zone. If you ask yourself what unites the dates October 29, 1955, October 29, 1956, then the answer lies in the plane of geopolitics - the Suez Canal!

Source: http://macbion.narod.ru, Sergey Elagin

Hidden Facts

The information layer raised over the past years by historians and writers highlighted the refusal of the government commission in the report of November 17, 1955 "On the death of the battleship Novorossiysk" and part of its crew "to give an objective answer to three main questions: what exploded, why it was not possible to save battleship after the explosion and who could carry out sabotage.

From the available materials, it follows that the commission sought to prevent an explanation of the facts of a double explosion and to connect the catastrophe with a self-explosion of substandard artillery ammunition, and then, when this version was not confirmed, with an accidental detonation on an unexploded mine, for which speculative models were built, far from the real situation.

The key factor in organizing the struggle for damage was not considered - the absence at the time of the disaster of 80% of combat officers, including the commander of the ship and the commander of the BCH-5, which should be considered the main cause of the death of the battleship after the explosion.

Speaking about the serious design flaws of the battleship, the commission belittles the courage and heroism of the sailors who managed to fight for the survivability of the ship that received disastrous damage for 165 minutes. On the contrary, the "Empress Maria" stayed afloat for only 54 minutes, when the crew, in the conditions of an ongoing series of explosions, could not withstand the onslaught of the elements and began to escape.

The fact of the unscheduled exit of the battleship to the sea on October 28, 1955, which was not provided by the command and headquarters of the squadron, remained a mystery. The true reasons for the unsatisfactory organization of the rescue operations were not disclosed (the entire command of the fleet was simultaneously disabled when the battleship capsized), the possibility of preparing sabotage from the coast.

At that time, there was more than enough evidence and facts of sabotage, it was only necessary to dispose of them properly, accumulating information in accordance with the holistic concept - weapons, including means of destruction and delivery to the target, instruments and control and guidance devices. This approach required the involvement of specialists and scientists in explosive processes, who without much difficulty established the key cause of the death of the ship as a result of the simultaneous detonation of two bottom thousand-kilogram charges.

Failure to comply with these obvious requirements allowed the commission to disregard the significant differences between the seismograms of real and experimental explosions, where a twofold excess of the amplitude of soil displacement during a real explosion compared to an experimental explosion is clearly visible, as well as the difference in the duration of oscillatory processes and the features of the damage caused to the ship.

About the damage to the bow of the Novorossiysk LK, Salamatin, the commander of the emergency party of the cruiser Kerch, said the following: “I noticed that where there was an explosion, it was as if a hole had been made with a bore. Apparently, there was a directional explosion. Very strong. The sides near the nose completely whole."

It is obvious that it is impossible to cause through damage to the ship with one ammunition, as indicated in the commission's act.

A double explosion is confirmed by documentary evidence of participants in the events (also not taken into account during the investigation), who distinguished two shocks with a short time interval, as well as the discovery of two explosion craters in the anchorage area, an analysis of the configuration and relative position of which could provide important information about the nature of explosive processes, possible methods of delivery and setting charges.

Consequently, in addition to the total power and the number of charges, there are additional conditions necessary for the concentration of the energy of underwater explosions. Informative was the guess of the head of the mine and torpedo department of the Black Sea Fleet Markovsky about the connection between the destruction of the ship and the formation of a "gas chamber" during the explosion of two German mines of the RMH type, but the discussion of this topic was suppressed by the commission.

The scientific data of those years in the field of the theory of explosion and cavitation made it possible to explain what happened as follows. The first explosion of the charge occurred under the ship without causing fatal damage, however, the gas bubble created in the water column concentrated the energy of the explosion of the second charge, giving it a cumulative effect.

Accordingly, the conclusions on these facts could be as follows.

The battleship "Novorossiysk" was blown up by two charges with a total TNT equivalent of 1800 kg, installed on the ground in the area of ​​the bow artillery cellars, at a small distance from the center plane of the ship and from each other. In terms of explosive power, the charges are close to German LBM mines or domestic AMD-1000.

The explosions occurred with a short time interval, which led to the creation of a cumulative effect and infliction of damage, as a result of which the ship sank.

The very formulation of the problem refuted the conclusion of the commission about blowing up Novorossiysk on a German mine left over from the time of the war, installed without reference to a specific target, despite the fact that by 1955 German mines were out of order due to aging power sources, and being in a combat-ready state of two min takes this event out of reality.

In addition, the time interval between explosions, distinguishable by a person, is too long for the case of initiating a second charge due to detonation or triggering a proximity fuse, which indicates a targeted orientation and detonation of charges at a given time.

A slight discrepancy in the time of explosions, amounting to tenths of a second, indicates the use of high-precision and shock-resistant clockwork, since due to an error, domestic and German urgency devices used in mine weapons of those years were not suitable for this purpose.

Not only the choice of the time of day, but also the half-hour multiplicity of the installation of temporary fuse mechanisms can speak of the advance study of the plan of sabotage.

Turning to historical analogies, the commission could establish that, in terms of accuracy, the clock mechanisms of fuses are significantly inferior to those used by the British during the explosion of the German battleship Tirpitz in 1943 and are more consistent with domestic frequency response devices.

Another analogy is a coincidence - as on the "Empress Maria", the explosions began with a bypass of the artillery cellars. According to the testimonies of the sailors, the explosion occurred exactly at the moment the hatch of the forward artillery cell was opened. Not otherwise, when preparing the sabotage, the facts were taken into account national history and maintenance regulations.

Based on this information, the commission would have to conclude that there was a single plan and plan for the preparation and conduct of sabotage, and the explosion was carried out by the simultaneous operation of the temporary (hourly) fuse mechanisms of each of the charges set for 1 hour 30 minutes. October 29, 1955.

The foregoing completely excludes the widespread versions of the use of weapons systems of Italian or English origin - combat swimmers, human-controlled torpedoes and mini-submarines of the "Midget" type, the actions of which are limited by their operational and structural and technical elements.

Thus, the reaction time of the sabotage system ranged from several weeks to months, therefore effective tool counteraction was a frequent change in the deployment of ships. The order to stand on the anchor barrel No. 3 came when the Novorossiysk, returning to the base, had already landed on the Inkerman targets, which ruled out the possibility of retargeting, and even more so, the deployment of foreign sabotage forces and means.

And the delivery and installation of hundreds of underwater saboteurs to the battleship's parking lot of two tons of explosives is absolutely fantastic.

Along with this, it should be said about the very dubious military and political expediency of carrying out such an operation by any state during the period of nuclear confrontation, the development and implementation of which requires the involvement of many state structures with the inevitable leakage of information, which sooner or later becomes the property of foreign intelligence.

There is no need to say that the self-activity and recklessness of the "patriots" were severely suppressed by the special services of the state, to which the former Italian submarine saboteurs themselves drew the attention of Russian historians.

Preparing for the explosion

An analysis of the combat capabilities of foreign sabotage weapons should have led the commission to the idea of ​​​​delivering charges equivalent to AMD-1000 mines by surface small-sized watercraft flooded at the battleship's parking lot. This is evidenced by the mysterious disappearance of the boat and longboat, which were under the right shot at the explosion site, while the watercraft near the symmetrical shot of the left side were preserved and did not suffer.

At the same time, the divers noted that the depth and smoothness of the craters were insignificant for the power of the charges, which is typical for the case when explosions do not occur on the ground, but on a platform one and a half meters from the ground, which corresponds to the height of the side of the missing water craft.

It should be noted that the objects found by the divers at the site of the explosions were not examined by the commission for belonging to the indicated floating craft.

Taking into account the presence of up to 900 kg of gasoline in the tanks of the boat, the commission had to come to the following conclusions: the complete destruction of the wooden hulls of the boat and longboat occurred during underwater contact explosions of ammunition; under the created conditions, a volumetric explosion of the gasoline-air mixture naturally occurs.

Signs of a volumetric explosion recorded by observers include a bright flash and a black cap of smoke on the forecastle of the battleship, the presence of an air wave, a sharp pressure drop, the smell of gasoline, which caused the initial report of the explosion of a gasoline tank that was never on the ship, as well as burning fuel, raised to the surface.

The question arises, how and in what terms could the covert delivery of ammunition and the flooding of watercraft be carried out? From the port side in the last hours before the explosion, sailors discharged ashore were received.

The arrival of the last longboats was reported by 00.30. At that time, on the forecastle of the battleship, from where the deck was clearly visible to the first tower of the main caliber and both shots, along with the duty service, there was a group of sailors who had arrived from the dismissal.

Consequently, the "charged" boat and longboat were already at that time under the right shot of the battleship.

The final preparation for the explosion, therefore, was carried out upon the arrival of the battleship in the harbor and included the loading and delivery of ammunition for the starboard shot.

The saboteurs needed to flood the boat of the senior assistant commander of the ship, Khurshudov, who had gone ashore after a more than strange announcement to the crew about the upcoming early exit to the sea, and a longboat with special cargo prepared for the explosion.

The direct executors of these operations solved the usual task for the naval special forces of checking the vigilance of the watch service and did not know about the "stuffing" of the boat and longboat.

In 1993, the performers of this action were named: a senior lieutenant of special forces and two midshipmen - a support group.

Based on the totality of the data, the commission should have made, but never voiced a conclusion that would be fatal for itself:

To aim at the artillery cellar of floating craft with charges, the right shot of the battleship Novorossiysk moored on the anchor barrel No. 3 was used. The undermining was prepared and carried out by domestic special services with the knowledge of the country's leadership exclusively for domestic political purposes.

Provocation against the naval commander

Who needed and against whom was this grandiose provocation directed? Khrushchev answered this question exactly two years after the death of Novorossiysk on October 29, 1957 at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU: “We were offered to invest more than 100 billion rubles in the fleet and build old boats and destroyers armed with classical artillery. Kuznetsov ... to think, to take care of the fleet, of defense, he turned out to be incapable. We need to evaluate everything in a new way. We need to build a fleet, but above all, build a submarine fleet armed with missiles. "

In the continental state - Russia, the fleet plays an extremely important, but not decisive role in the country's defense capability and the choice of priorities for military development. The naval commander, who during the war years proved himself a master of organizing interaction between the army and navy, could not help but know this.

As a person with a scientific mindset, he could not help but understand that in the conditions of economic restrictions, the high capital intensity of military shipbuilding prevented the nuclear and space-rocket industries from deploying land-based strategic missile systems.

As you know, in August 1945, by a decree of the State Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars, in order to speed up work on the creation of an atomic bomb, the 1st Main Directorate was formed, which required multibillion-dollar expenses.

Less than a year later, by resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of May 13, 1946 No. 1017-419ss "Issues of jet weapons", the leading defense ministries were tasked with the development and production of jet weapons.

In many ways, the fate of the ten-year program for the construction of the Navy, presented in September 1945 to the government and which included the production of aircraft carriers - large and small, cruisers, new submarines and destroyers, as well as Kuznetsov personally, who was relieved of his post in 1947, was decided by Stalin's words: " Sailors have always been distinguished by ignorance and unwillingness to reckon with the possibilities of industry."

This was the first warning of the military-industrial complex.

After being reinstated in 1951 as the Minister of the Navy of the USSR, Kuznetsov prepared a report on the obsolete fleet, on the construction of ships according to old designs, and on rocket weapons. He opposed the cancellation of the warranty period for newly built ships and weapons. These proposals did not evoke applause in the USSR Minsudprom.

Being an adherent of a balanced fleet, in 1954-1955 Kuznetsov raises the issue of a ten-year plan for shipbuilding, achieves the installation of the first prototypes of sea-based and coastal-based jet weapons, approves the project of a nuclear submarine, takes measures to develop inertial systems and computing devices for submarines, equipped with long range rocket weapons.

In the same period, after the successful testing of a thermonuclear device (hydrogen bomb) in August 1953, the government of the USSR decided to develop a ballistic missile with an intercontinental range capable of hitting strategic targets in any area. the globe and launch an artificial Earth satellite into outer space.

The priority of strategic nuclear forces for this period has been finally adopted, which requires the transfer of most of the country's economic and intellectual resources to these purposes.

The ten-year shipbuilding plan, which does not reflect in the future the priority of developing the most capital-intensive and beneficial for the military-industrial complex, naval strategic nuclear forces, objectively could not be supported by the military-political leadership of the country, which sealed the fate of Kuznetsov for the second time.

Of the entire arsenal of the Middle Ages, by the time of the events described, the main weapon remained the discrediting of those who disagreed with a single course by showing the inferiority of the ideas defended, for which it was not considered shameful to sacrifice the lives of innocent people.

After Kuznetsov filed a report on May 26, 1955 with a request to be relieved of his post for health reasons, the field of action for discrediting narrowed, and the raised sword threatened to strike at an empty place, nullifying the entire effect of Khrushchev's "big fight". The fact that the country's leadership was looking for a way out of this situation is confirmed in the memoirs of Kuznetsov. About the events of those days, he writes: “In October of the same 1955, such conversations (about leaving office) acquired a real embodiment in the form of an official statement addressed to me that, of course, I should be released, but not because of illness, but for other reasons. ".

In a letter to his wife Vera Nikolaevna from Yalta dated October 20, 1955, Nikolai Gerasimovich wrote: "... As far as I was able to understand, the minister wants to have his own new Commander-in-Chief, but he wants to explain this with something serious and therefore hides from me."

The basis for the removal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy from his post could be a large-scale emergency, since it was impossible to postpone further the satisfaction of Kuznetsov's request.

The dismissal of Kuznetsov on December 8, 1955, and the appointment of Gorshkov as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, which followed the death of the Novorossiysk, opened the way for reducing the naval personnel and aviation of the Navy, cutting up unfinished ships for scrap.

In the future, the country's leadership, in order to achieve immediate political goals due to decisive superiority in the nuclear missile field, went to a sharp reduction in the armed forces, the destruction of the Air Force aircraft fleet and the curtailment of high-tech industries.

The mobilization potential of the military-industrial complex of the USSR was supported by fierce competition between industry and intra-industry groupings for obtaining state orders for the creation of weapons and military equipment.

Sometimes this struggle was waged not for life, but for death.

The Novorossiysk LK and other captured ships turned out to be a bargaining chip, which became a burden on the industry, then the turn came to the cruisers and aviation complexes under construction, including promising strategic ones, not to mention the thousands of dismissed specialists, the training of which took many years and resources.

The tragedy of "Novorossiysk" has its own optimistic component in the historical expediency of the priority development of productive forces, where the defense complex, for all its shortcomings, plays the role of a locomotive and master generator.

The Navy plays an exceptional role in the implementation of nuclear and missile projects, the deployment of the Strategic Missile Forces and the Military Space Forces of the country.

Russia still maintains the status of an advanced power in the field of space and nuclear technologies.

Janes is always right

From a short message from the Janes Fighting Ships reference book on warships of the world for 1957-1958. it follows that the battleship "Novorossiysk" was sunk by a "drifting" mine, the number of victims was hundreds of people. With reference to another report, it is claimed that the ship was used during "some experiments" in the Black Sea. The awareness of the publishers of the most authoritative reference book published since 1897 has never been questioned. It is hardly possible to ignore the presented version, which hides between the lines information obtained not only from the act of the government commission, but also from other, more objective sources of information.

The publication of "Janes Fighting Ships" about the Novorossiysk tragedy, two years late, its brevity and Aesopian language describing the situation (positioning and detonation of mines for certain purposes), can be explained by the desire not to "light up" sources of information not only in the Main Command of the Navy, the KGB , but also in the party leadership and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It is difficult to get rid of the feeling that the conclusions drawn by the government commission in record time were programmed, aimed not at establishing the cause of the disaster, but at accusations, sometimes drawn, of the Navy command and attempts to relieve industry of responsibility for the unfulfilled set of measures to ensure the survivability and unsinkability of the ship and equip the fleet with modern hydroacoustic means to search for submarines.

In the tradition of eternal memory of the 30s. a man was appointed chairman of the commission who in 1952 accused Nikolai Kuznetsov of an anti-state case - "slandering the most modern ships". Among the members of the commission were Sergey Gorshkov - the acting Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the former commander of the Black Sea Fleet, who is directly responsible for the state of affairs in this fleet, as well as representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB of the USSR.

Symptomatically adopted already at the beginning of 1956, the decision to destroy evidence materials and not initiate a criminal case against the direct perpetrators of the disaster in order to prevent an investigation that would inevitably lead to the disclosure of the true causes of the Novorossiysk disaster and the identification of its customers and perpetrators.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the established facts speak of a real opportunity to complete the investigation into the causes of the Novorossiysk disaster, involve the prosecutor's office in it, which should initiate a criminal case on the fact of the death of a warship, pay tribute to the heroism of the Black Sea sailors, who to the end fulfilled their military duty, but did not receive well-deserved awards.

Source: http://nvo.ng.ru, Oleg Sergeev

The death of the battleship "Novorossiysk": five versions

On October 29, 1955, the flagship of the Black Sea squadron of the Soviet Navy, the battleship Novorossiysk, sank in the Northern Bay of Sevastopol. More than 600 sailors were killed. According to the official version, an old German bottom mine exploded under the bottom of the ship. But there are other versions, unofficial, but very popular - allegedly Italian, British and even Soviet saboteurs are responsible for the death of Novorossiysk.

Giulio Cesare

At the time of the death of the battleship "Novorossiysk" was 44 years old - a respectable term for a ship. For most of her life, the battleship bore a different name - "Giulio Cesare" ("Julius Caesar"), sailing under the flag of the Italian Navy. She was laid down at Genoa in the summer of 1910 and launched in 1915. The battleship did not take part in the First World War, in the 1920s it was used as a training ship for the training of naval gunners.

In the mid-1930s, "Giulio Cesare" was overhauled. The displacement of the ship reached 24,000 tons, it could reach a fairly high speed of 22 knots. The battleship was well armed: two three-barreled and three turret guns, three torpedo tubes, anti-aircraft guns and heavy machine guns. During the Second World War, the battleship was mainly engaged in escorting convoys, but in 1942 the Navy command recognized it as obsolete and transferred it to the category of training ships.

In 1943, Italy capitulated. Until 1948, "Giulio Cesare" was in the parking lot, not being mothballed, with a minimum number of crew and without proper maintenance.

According to a special agreement, the Italian fleet was to be divided among the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. The USSR accounted for a battleship, a light cruiser, 9 destroyers and 4 submarines, not counting small ships. On January 10, 1947, an agreement was reached in the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Allied Powers on the distribution of the transferred Italian ships between the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and other countries affected by the Italian aggression. So, for example, France was allocated four cruisers, four destroyers and two submarines, and Greece - one cruiser. The battleships became part of groups "A", "B" and "C", intended for the three main powers.

The Soviet side claimed one of the two new battleships, which in their power surpassed even the German ships of the Bismarck type. But since by this time the Cold War had already begun between the recent allies, neither the United States nor England sought to strengthen the Soviet Navy with powerful ships. I had to throw lots, and the USSR received group "C". The new battleships went to the United States and England (later, these battleships were returned to Italy as part of the NATO partnership). By decision of the Tripartite Commission in 1948, the USSR received the battleship Giulio Cesare, the light cruiser Emmanuele Filiberto Duca D'Aosta, the destroyers Artilleri, Fuciliere, destroyers Animoso, Ardimentoso, Fortunale and submarines. Marea" and "Nicelio".

December 9, 1948 "Giulio Cesare" left the port of Taranto and December 15 arrived in the Albanian port of Vlora. On February 3, 1949, the transfer of the battleship to the Soviet commission, headed by Rear Admiral Levchenko, took place in this port. On February 6, the naval flag of the USSR was hoisted over the ship, and two weeks later it sailed for Sevastopol, arriving at its new base on February 26. By order of the Black Sea Fleet dated March 5, 1949, the battleship was given the name "Novorossiysk".

As almost all researchers note, the ship was handed over by the Italians to Soviet sailors in a state of disrepair. The main part of the armament, the main power plant and the main hull structures - plating, framing, main transverse bulkheads below the armored deck were in relatively satisfactory condition. But general ship systems: pipelines, fittings, service mechanisms - required serious repair or replacement. There were no radar equipment on the ship at all, the fleet of radio communications equipment was scarce, and small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery was completely absent. It should be noted that immediately before the transfer to the USSR, the battleship underwent a small repair, which concerned mainly the electromechanical part.

When "Novorossiysk" settled in Sevastopol, the command of the Black Sea Fleet gave the order - to turn the ship into a full-fledged combat unit as soon as possible. The matter was complicated by the fact that part of the documentation was missing, and there were practically no naval specialists who spoke Italian in the USSR.

In August 1949, Novorossiysk took part in squadron maneuvers as a flagship. However, his participation was rather nominal, since in the three months allotted they did not manage to put the battleship in order (and they could not have time). However, the political situation demanded to demonstrate the success of Soviet sailors in the development of Italian ships. As a result, the squadron went to sea, and NATO intelligence was convinced that the Novorossiysk was floating.

From 1949 to 1955, the battleship was factory repaired eight times. It was equipped with 24 twin installations of Soviet 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, new radar stations, radio communications and intra-ship communications. They also replaced Italian turbines with new ones manufactured at the Kharkov plant. In May 1955, the Novorossiysk entered service with the Black Sea Fleet and went to sea several times until the end of October, practicing combat training tasks.

On October 28, 1955, the battleship returned from the last campaign and took up a place in the North Bay on a "battleship barrel" in the area of ​​​​the Marine Hospital, about 110 meters from the coast. The water depth there was 17 meters of water and about 30 meters of viscous silt.

Explosion

At the time of the explosion, the commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Kukhta, was on vacation. His duties were performed by senior assistant captain 2nd rank Khurshudov. According to the staffing table, there were 68 officers, 243 foremen, 1231 sailors on the battleship. After the "Novorossiysk" moored, part of the crew went on leave. More than one and a half thousand people remained on board: part of the crew and a new replenishment (200 people), cadets of naval schools and soldiers who had arrived on the battleship the day before.

On October 29, at 01:31 Moscow time, a powerful explosion was heard under the ship's hull from the starboard side in the bow. According to experts, its force was equivalent to an explosion of 1000-1200 kilograms of trinitrotoluene. On the starboard side in the underwater part of the hull, a hole was formed with an area of ​​​​more than 150 square meters, and on the port side and along the keel - a dent with a deflection arrow from 2 to 3 meters. The total area of ​​damage to the underwater part of the hull was about 340 square meters in a section 22 meters long. Outboard water poured into the resulting hole, and after 3 minutes there was a trim of 3-4 degrees and a roll of 1-2 degrees to starboard.

At 01:40, the incident was reported to the fleet commander. By 02:00, when the list to starboard reached 1.5 degrees, the head of the operational department of the fleet, captain 1st rank Ovcharov, ordered "to tow the ship to a shallow place", and the approaching tugboats turned it stern to the shore.

By this time, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral V.A. Parkhomenko, the chief of staff of the fleet, Vice Admiral S.E. Chursin, a member of the Military Council, Vice Admiral N.M. Kulakov, the acting squadron commander, Rear Admiral N .I. Nikolsky, Chief of Staff of the Squadron Rear Admiral A.I. Zubkov, Commander of the Cruiser Division Rear Admiral S.M. Lobov, Head of the Political Directorate of the Fleet Rear Admiral B.T. Kalachev and 28 other senior staff officers.

At 02:32 a list to port was discovered. By 03:30, about 800 unemployed sailors lined up on the deck, rescue ships stood at the side of the battleship. Nikolsky offered to transfer sailors to them, but received a categorical refusal from Parkhomenko. At 03:50, the list to port reached 10-12 degrees, while the tugs continued to pull the battleship to the left. After 10 minutes, the roll increased to 17 degrees, while the critical ones were 20. Nikolsky again asked Parkhomenko and Kulakov for permission to evacuate the sailors who were not engaged in the fight for damage and was again refused.

"Novorossiysk" began to capsize upside down. Several dozen people managed to get into boats and onto neighboring ships, but hundreds of sailors fell from the deck into the water. Many remained inside the dying battleship. As Admiral Parkhomenko later explained, he "did not consider it possible to order the personnel to leave the ship in advance, since until the last minutes he hoped that the ship would be saved, and there was no thought that it would die." This hope cost the lives of hundreds of people who, having fallen into the water, were covered by the hull of the battleship.

By 04:14, the Novorossiysk, which had taken in more than 7,000 tons of water, listed to a fatal 20 degrees, swung to the right, just as suddenly fell to the left and lay on board. In this position, he remained for several hours, resting on solid ground with masts. At 22:00 on October 29, the hull completely disappeared under water.

In total, 609 people died during the disaster, including emergency parties from other ships of the squadron. Between 50 and 100 people died directly as a result of the explosion and flooding of the bow compartments. The rest died during the capsizing of the battleship and after it. Timely evacuation of personnel was not organized. Most of the sailors remained inside the hull. Some of them were kept in the air cushions of the compartments for a long time, but only nine people managed to be saved: seven came out through a neck cut in the aft part of the bottom five hours after capsizing, and two more were taken out after 50 hours by divers. According to the recollections of divers, the sailors who were immured and doomed to death sang "Varyag". Only by November 1 did the divers stop hearing the knocks.

In the summer of 1956, the special purpose expedition "EON-35" began lifting the battleship by blowing. Preparations for the ascent were fully completed by the end of April 1957. The general blowdown began on the morning of May 4 and completed the ascent on the same day. The ship surfaced with a keel on May 4, 1957, and on May 14 it was taken to the Cossack Bay, where it was turned over. When the ship was raised, the third turret of the main caliber fell out, which had to be raised separately. The ship was dismantled for metal and transferred to the Zaporizhstal plant.

Commission conclusions

To find out the causes of the explosion, a government commission was set up headed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry, Colonel General of the Engineering Service Vyacheslav Malyshev. According to the recollections of all who knew him, Malyshev was an engineer of the highest erudition. He perfectly knew his business and read theoretical drawings of any complexity, being well versed in issues of unsinkability and stability of ships. Back in 1946, having read the drawings of "Giulio Cesare", Malyshev recommended that this acquisition be abandoned. But he failed to convince Stalin.

The commission gave its conclusion two and a half weeks after the disaster. Tough deadlines were set in Moscow. On November 17, the conclusion of the commission was submitted to the Central Committee of the CPSU, which accepted and approved the conclusions.

The cause of the disaster was called "an external underwater explosion (non-contact, bottom) of a charge with a TNT equivalent of 1000-1200 kg." The explosion of a German magnetic mine, which remained on the ground after the Great Patriotic War, was recognized as the most probable.

As for responsibility, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice-Admiral Parkhomenko, acting. squadron commander Rear Admiral Nikolsky and acting. battleship commander captain 2nd rank Khurshudov. The Commission noted that Vice Admiral Kulakov, a member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet, also bears direct responsibility for the catastrophe with the Novorossiysk battleship and especially for the death of people.

But despite the harsh conclusions, the case was limited to the fact that the commander of the battleship Kukhta was demoted in rank and sent to the reserve. Also removed from office and demoted in rank: Rear Admiral Galitsky, commander of the division for the protection of the water area, acting. squadron commander Nikolsky and a member of the Military Council of the Fists. A year and a half later, they were reinstated in ranks. The commander of the fleet, Vice Admiral Viktor Parkhomenko, was severely reprimanded, and on December 8, 1955, he was removed from his post. No legal action has been taken against him. In 1956, the commander of the Soviet Navy, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, was removed from his post.

The commission also noted that "the sailors, foremen and officers, as well as the officers who led the direct struggle to save the ship, - the acting commander of the warhead-5 t. Matusevich, the commander of the survivability division, t. Ivanov skillfully and selflessly fought against the water entering the ship, everyone knew their business well, showed initiative, showed examples of courage and true heroism. ."

The documents of the commission spoke in detail about those who should have, but failed to organize the rescue of the crew and the ship. However, none of these documents gave a direct answer to the main question: what caused the disaster?

Version number 1 - mine

The initial versions - the explosion of a gas depot or artillery cellars - were swept aside almost immediately. The tanks of the fuel depot on the battleship were empty long before the disaster. As for the cellars, if they rushed, there would be little left of the battleship at all, and five cruisers standing nearby would also fly into the air. In addition, this version was immediately overturned by the testimony of the sailors, whose place of military service was the 2nd tower of the main artillery caliber, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bwhich the battleship received a hole. It was precisely established that the 320-millimeter shells remained safe and sound.

There are still a few versions left: mine explosion, submarine torpedo attack and sabotage. After studying the circumstances, the mine version won the most votes. Which was quite understandable - mines in the Sevastopol bays were not uncommon since the time of the Civil War. The bays and the raid were periodically cleared of mines with the help of minesweepers and diving teams. In 1941, during the offensive of the German armies on Sevastopol, the German Air Force and Navy mined the water area both from the sea and from the air - they laid several hundred mines of various types and purposes. Some worked during the fighting, others were removed and neutralized after the liberation of Sevastopol in 1944. Later, the Sevastopol bays and the roadstead were regularly trawled and inspected by diving teams. The last such comprehensive survey was conducted in 1951-1953. In 1956-1958, after the explosion of the battleship, 19 more German bottom mines were found in the Sevastopol Bay, including three at a distance of less than 50 meters from the place of the death of the battleship.

The testimonies of divers also spoke in favor of the mine version. As the squad leader Kravtsov testified: "The ends of the skin of the hole are bent inward. By the nature of the hole, burrs from the skin, the explosion was from the outside of the ship."

Version number 2 - torpedo attack

The next version was that the battleship was torpedoed by an unknown submarine. However, when studying the nature of the damage received by the battleship, the commission did not find characteristic signs corresponding to a torpedo strike. But she discovered something else. At the time of the explosion, the ships of the division for the protection of the water area, whose duty it was to guard the entrance to the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, were in a completely different place. On the night of the catastrophe, the outer raid was not guarded by anyone; the network gates were wide open, and the direction finders were inactive. Thus, Sevastopol was defenseless. And, theoretically, a foreign submarine could well enter the bay, choose a position and deliver a torpedo strike.

In practice, for a full-fledged attack, the boat would hardly have had enough depth. However, the military was aware that some Western navies already had small or midget submarines in service. So, theoretically, a dwarf submarine could penetrate the inner roadstead of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. This assumption, in turn, gave rise to another - were saboteurs involved in the explosion?

Version number 3 - Italian combat swimmers

This version was supported by the fact that before falling under the red flag, Novorossiysk was an Italian ship. And the most formidable underwater special forces during the Second World War, the "10th Assault Flotilla", were with the Italians, and they were commanded by Prince Junio ​​Valerio Borghese, a staunch anti-communist who allegedly publicly swore after the transfer of the battleship to the USSR to avenge such a humiliation of Italy.

A graduate of the Royal Naval Academy, Valerio Borghese, was expected to have a brilliant career as a submarine officer, which was facilitated by a noble origin and excellent academic performance. The first submarine under the command of Borghese was part of the Italian legion, which, as part of Franco's assistance, acted against the Republican fleet of Spain. After that, the prince received a new submarine under his command. Later, Valerio Borghese completed a special training course in Germany on the Baltic Sea.

Upon his return to Italy, Borghese was given command of the most modern submarine, the Shire. Thanks to the skillful actions of the commander, the submarine returned back to its base unharmed from each military campaign. The operations of the Italian submariners aroused genuine interest in King Victor Emmanuel, who honored the prince-submariner with a personal audience.

After that, Borghese was asked to create the world's first flotilla of naval saboteurs-submarines. Ultra-small submarines, special guided torpedoes, manned exploding boats were created for her. On December 18, 1941, Italians in miniature submarines secretly entered the harbor of Alexandria and attached magnetic explosive devices to the bottoms of the British battleships Valiant and Queen Elizabeth. The death of these ships allowed the Italian fleet to seize the initiative in combat operations in the Mediterranean for a long time. Also, the "10th Assault Flotilla" took part in the siege of Sevastopol, based in the ports of Crimea.

Theoretically, a foreign submarine cruiser could deliver combat swimmers as close as possible to Sevastopol so that they carried out sabotage. Given the combat potential of first-class Italian scuba divers, pilots of small submarines and guided torpedoes, and also taking into account the sloppiness in matters of protecting the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, the version of underwater saboteurs looks convincing.

Version 4 - English saboteurs

The second unit in the world capable of such sabotage was the 12th Flotilla of the British Navy. It was commanded at that time by Captain 2nd Rank Lionel Crabbe, also a legendary man. During the Second World War, he led the defense of the British naval base of Gibraltar from Italian combat swimmers and was rightfully considered one of the best underwater saboteurs of the British fleet. Crabbe personally knew many of the Italians from the 10th Flotilla. In addition, after the war, captured Italian combat swimmers advised specialists from the 12th flotilla.

In favor of this version, the following argument is put forward - as if the Soviet command wanted to equip Novorossiysk with nuclear weapons. The USSR possessed the atomic bomb since 1949, but there were no naval means of using nuclear weapons at that time. The solution could only be large-caliber naval guns firing heavy projectiles over a long distance. The Italian battleship was ideally suited for this purpose. Great Britain, which is an island, in this case turned out to be the most vulnerable target for the Soviet Navy. In the case of the use of atomic explosive devices near the west coast of England, taking into account the wind rose, which in those parts blow east all year round, the entire country would be exposed to radiation contamination.

And one more fact - at the end of October 1955, the British Mediterranean squadron conducted maneuvers in the Aegean and Marmara seas.

Version 5 - the work of the KGB

Already in our time, the candidate of technical sciences Oleg Sergeev put forward another version. The battleship "Novorossiysk" was blown up by two charges with a total TNT equivalent of 1800 kg, installed on the ground in the area of ​​the bow artillery cellars, at a small distance from the center plane of the ship and from each other. The explosions occurred with a short time interval, which led to the creation of a cumulative effect and infliction of damage, as a result of which the ship sank. The undermining was prepared and carried out by domestic special services with the knowledge of the country's leadership exclusively for domestic political purposes. In 1993, the performers of this action became known: a senior lieutenant of special forces and two midshipmen - a support group.

Who was this provocation directed against? According to Sergeyev, first of all, against the leadership of the Navy. Nikita Khrushchev answered this question two years after the death of Novorossiysk, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on October 29, 1957: “We were offered to invest more than 100 billion rubles in the fleet and build old boats and destroyers armed with classical artillery. We had a big fight , Kuznetsov was removed ... he was unable to think, take care of the fleet, about defense. We need to evaluate everything in a new way. We need to build a fleet, but above all, build a submarine fleet armed with missiles. "

The ten-year shipbuilding plan, which does not reflect in the future the priority of developing the most capital-intensive and beneficial for the military-industrial complex, naval strategic nuclear forces, objectively could not be supported by the military-political leadership of the country, which sealed the fate of the commander-in-chief of the Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov.

The death of "Novorossiysk" was the beginning of a large-scale reduction in the Navy of the USSR. The obsolete battleships "Sevastopol" and "October Revolution", the captured cruisers "Kerch" and "Admiral Makarov", many captured submarines, destroyers and ships of other classes of pre-war construction went to scrap.

Version criticism

Critics of the mine version claim that by 1955 the power supplies of all bottom mines would inevitably have been discharged, and the fuses would have become completely unusable. Until now, there were no batteries capable of not being discharged for ten or more years. It is also noted that the explosion occurred after 8 hours of mooring the battleship, and all German mines had hourly intervals that were multiples of only 6 hours. Before the tragedy, Novorossiysk (10 times) and the battleship Sevastopol (134 times) were moored on barrel No. 3 at different times of the year - and nothing exploded. In addition, it turned out that in fact there were two explosions, and such a force that two large deep craters appeared at the bottom, which the explosion of one mine cannot leave.

As for the version about the work of saboteurs from Italy or England, in this case a number of questions arise. Firstly, an action of this magnitude is possible only with the participation of the state. And it would be very difficult to hide preparations for it, given the activity of Soviet intelligence on the Apennine Peninsula and the influence of the Italian Communist Party.

It would be impossible for private individuals to organize such an action - too large resources would be needed to ensure it, starting with several tons of explosives and ending with means of transportation (again, let's not forget about secrecy). This is acceptable in feature films like "Dogs of War", but in real life it becomes known to the relevant services at the planning stage, as was the case, for example, with the unsuccessful coup in Equatorial Guinea. In addition, as the former Italian combat swimmers themselves admitted, their life after the war was tightly controlled by the state, and any attempt at amateur performance would have been stopped.

In addition, preparations for such an operation should have been kept secret from the allies, primarily from the United States. If the Americans had learned about the impending sabotage of the Italian or British navies, they would certainly have prevented this - in case of failure, the United States would not have been able to wash off the accusations of inciting war for a long time. It would have been insane to launch such a sally against a nuclear-weapon country in the midst of the Cold War.

Finally, in order to mine a ship of this class in a protected harbor, it was necessary to collect complete information about the security regime, mooring places, ship exits to the sea, and so on. It is impossible to do this without a resident with a radio station in Sevastopol itself or somewhere nearby. All operations of Italian saboteurs during the war were carried out only after careful reconnaissance and never "blindly". But even after half a century, there is not a single evidence that in one of the most protected cities of the USSR, filtered through by the KGB and counterintelligence, there was an English or Italian resident who regularly supplied information not only to Rome or London, but personally to Prince Borghese.

Supporters of the Italian version argue that some time after the sinking of Novorossiysk, a message flashed in the Italian press about awarding orders to a group of officers of the Italian Navy "for performing a special task." However, so far no one has published a single photocopy of this message. References to the Italian naval officers themselves, who once declared to someone about their participation in the sinking of the Novorossiysk, are unsubstantiated. There are many "absolutely reliable" interviews on the Internet with people who allegedly personally led midget submarines to Sevastopol. One problem - it immediately turns out that these people have either already died, or there is still no way to talk to them. And the descriptions of the sabotage attack are very different ...

Yes, information about the explosion of "Novorossiysk" in the Western press appeared very quickly. But Italian newspaper comments (with vague allusions) are a common journalistic device when "most reliable" evidence arises after the fact. One should also take into account the fact that the Italians allowed their "younger" battleships, received back from NATO allies, to be remelted. And if there hadn't been a catastrophe with Novorossiysk, only historians of the Navy would have remembered the battleship Giulio Cesare in Italy.

Belated Rewards

Based on the report of the government commission, in November 1955, the Black Sea Fleet command sent the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, submissions on awarding orders and medals to all the sailors who died along with the battleship. The awards were also presented to 117 people from among those who survived the explosion, sailors from other ships who came to the aid of Novorossiysk, as well as divers and doctors who distinguished themselves during rescue operations. In Sevastopol, at the headquarters of the fleet, the required number of awards was delivered. But the award never took place. Only forty years later it turned out that at the presentation by the head of the personnel department of the Navy of that time, a note was made: "Admiral Comrade Gorshkov does not consider it possible to come up with such a proposal."

Only in 1996, after repeated appeals from the ship's veterans, the Russian government gave appropriate instructions to the Ministry of Defense, the FSB, the Prosecutor General's Office, the Russian State Maritime Historical and Cultural Center and other departments. The main military prosecutor's office began to check the materials of the investigation conducted in 1955. All this time, the classified award lists for the "Novorossiysk" were kept in the Central Naval Archive. It turned out that 6 sailors were posthumously presented to the highest award of the USSR - the Order of Lenin, 64 (53 of them posthumously) - to the Order of the Red Banner, 10 (9 posthumously) - to the Orders of the Patriotic War of the 1st and 2nd degrees, 191 ( 143 posthumously) - to the Order of the Red Star, 448 sailors (391 posthumously) - to the medals "For Courage", "For Military Merit", Ushakov and Nakhimov.

Since by that time there was no longer a state under whose naval flag the Novorossiysk died, nor Soviet orders, all the Novorossiysk citizens were awarded the Orders of Courage.

Afterword

Will there ever be a definitive answer to the question of what exactly ruined Novorossiysk? Most likely not anymore. If the raised battleship, along with the specialists who determined the degree of its further suitability, were properly examined by specialists from the competent authorities and departments, they could find certain "traces" of the hitherto unknown "charge" in the ship's bottoms. But the ship was quickly cut into metal, and the case was closed.

When writing the article, the following materials were used:
site battleships.spb.ru.
S.V. Suliga. Battleship "Giulio Cesare" ("Novorossiysk").
N.I. Nikolsky, V.N. Nikolsky. "Why did the battleship Novorossiysk die?"
Sergeev O.L. The disaster of the battleship "Novorossiysk". Evidence. Judgments. Data.
Publication of the journal of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation "Security Service" No. 3-4, 1996 of the materials of the investigation file on the death of the battleship "Novorossiysk" from the archives of the FSB.

Material from the site: http://flot.com/history/events/novorosdeath.htm

To the begining

A veteran of the special unit of combat swimmers of the 10th flotilla of the Italian Navy said that the battleship of the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR Navy Novorossiysk, which died under mysterious circumstances on October 29, 1955, was blown up by Italian combat swimmers. Hugo de Esposito made this confession in an interview with the Italian publication 4Arts.

Hugo de Esposito is a former member of the Italian Military Intelligence Service, and an expert on secure (encrypted) communications. According to him, the Italians did not want the battleship, the former Italian dreadnought "Giulio Cesare", to go to the "Russians", so they made sure to destroy it. This is the first direct admission by the Italian military that they were involved in the explosion and death of the battleship. Prior to this, Admiral Gino Birindelli and other veterans of the Italian special forces denied the involvement of the Italians in the death of the ship.

In 2005, Itogi magazine published a similar article on the death of the battleship Novorossiysk. The magazine published the story of a former Soviet naval officer who emigrated to the United States, who met with the last surviving executor of the sabotage "Nikolo". The Italian said that when the transfer of Italian ships to the USSR took place, the former commander of the 10th flotilla, Junio ​​Valerio Scipione Borghese (1906 - 1974), nicknamed the "Black Prince", swore an oath to avenge the dishonor of Italy and blow up the battleship at all costs. The aristocrat Borghese did not waste words.

In the post-war period, the vigilance of Soviet sailors was blunted. The Italians knew the water area well - during the Great Patriotic War, the "10th MAS flotilla" (from Italian Mezzi d "Assalto - assault weapons, or Italian Motoscafo Armato Silurante - armed torpedo boats) operated on the Black Sea. Preparations were underway during the year On October 21, 1955, a cargo ship left Italy, which went to one of the Dnieper ports to load grain.At midnight on October 26, 15 miles traverse of the Chersonese lighthouse, a cargo ship released a mini-submarine from a special hatch in the bottom. "Picollo "passed to the area of ​​the Sevastopol Bay Omega, where a temporary base was set up. With the help of hydrotugs, the sabotage group reached Novorossiysk, work began on laying charges. Twice, Italian divers returned to Omega for explosives, which were in magnetic cylinders. They were successfully able to dock with a cargo ship and leave.

strategic trophy

The battleship "Giulio Cesare" is one of the five ships of the type "Conte di Cavour". The project was developed by Rear Admiral Edoardo Masdea. He proposed a ship with five main gun turrets: at the bow and stern, the lower turrets were three-gun, the upper ones were two-gun. Another three-gun tower was placed amidships - between the pipes. The caliber of the guns was 305 mm. Julius Caesar was laid down in 1910 and commissioned in 1914. In the 1920s, the ship underwent the first upgrades, received a catapult for launching a seaplane and a crane for lifting the aircraft from the water and onto the catapult, and the artillery fire control system was replaced. The battleship became a training artillery ship. In 1933-1937. "Julius Caesar" was overhauled by engineer-general Francesco Rotundi. The power of the main caliber guns was increased to 320 mm (their number was reduced to 10), the firing range was increased, armor and anti-torpedo protection were strengthened, boilers and other mechanisms were replaced. The guns could fire up to 32 km with more than half a ton of shells. The displacement of the ship has grown to 24 thousand tons.

During World War II, the ship took part in a number of combat operations. In 1941, due to a lack of fuel, the combat activity of the old ships was reduced. In 1942, the Julius Caesar was withdrawn from the active fleet. In addition to the lack of fuel, there was a high risk of the battleship being killed by a torpedo strike under the dominance of enemy aircraft in the air. The ship until the end of the war was turned into a floating barracks. After the armistice, the allied command initially wanted to keep the Italian battleships under their control, but then three old ships, including Caesar, were allowed to be transferred to the Italian Navy for training purposes.

According to a special agreement, the victorious powers divided the Italian fleet on account of reparations. Moscow claimed a new Littorio-class battleship, but only the obsolete Caesar was handed over to the USSR, as well as the light cruiser Emanuele Filiberto Duca d'Aosta (Kerch), 9 destroyers, 4 submarines and several auxiliary ships. The final agreement on the division of the transferred Italian ships between the USSR, the USA, England and other states that suffered from Italian aggression was concluded on January 10, 1947 at the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Allied Powers. In particular, 4 cruisers were transferred to France. 4 destroyers and 2 submarines, Greece - one cruiser. The new battleships went to the United States and Great Britain, later they were returned to Italy as part of the NATO partnership.

Until 1949, the Caesar was mothballed and used for training. He was in a bad state of disrepair. The battleship was included in the Black Sea Fleet. On March 5, 1949, the battleship was given the name Novorossiysk. In the next six years, a significant amount of work was carried out at Novorossiysk to repair and modernize the battleship. It installed short-range anti-aircraft artillery, new radars, radio communications and intra-ship communications, modernized the main caliber fire control devices, replaced emergency diesel generators, changed Italian turbines to Soviet ones (increasing the speed of the ship to 28 knots). By the time of the death of "Novorossiysk" was the most powerful ship in the Soviet fleet. It was armed with ten 320 mm guns, 12 x 120 mm and 8 x 100 mm guns, 30 x 37 mm anti-aircraft guns. The displacement of the ship reached 29 thousand tons, with a length of 186 meters and a width of 28 meters.

Despite her advanced age, the battleship was an ideal ship for the "atomic experiment". Its 320mm guns hit targets at ranges up to 32km with 525kg projectiles suitable for carrying tactical nuclear warheads. Back in 1949, when Soviet Union received the status of a nuclear power, the battleship was visited by the Minister of War, Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky, and in 1953 by the new Minister of Defense, Nikolai Bulganin. In 1955, the next Minister of Defense of the USSR, Georgy Zhukov, extended the service life of Novorossiysk by 10 years. Nuclear Modernization Program battleship involved two stages. At the first stage, they planned to develop and manufacture a batch of special projectiles with atomic charges. The second is to replace the aft turrets with cruise missile mounts that can be equipped with nuclear warheads. At the Soviet military factories, as a matter of priority, they worked on the manufacture of a batch of special shells. The gunners of the ship, under the command of the most experienced commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Alexander Pavlovich Kukhta, solved the problem of controlling the fire of the main caliber guns. All 10 guns of the main caliber could now shoot at the same target.

The tragic death of Novorossiysk

October 28, 1955 "Novorossiysk" was in the Northern Bay of Sevastopol. A.P. Kukhta was on vacation. It is believed that if he had been on the ship, the events that followed the explosion could have unfolded differently, in a less tragic direction. The acting commander of the ship, Captain 2nd Rank G. A. Khurshudov, left for the shore. The senior officer on the battleship was the assistant commander of the ship Z. G. Serbulov. On October 29, at 1:31 a.m., a powerful explosion was heard under the nose of the ship, equivalent to 1-1.2 tons of trinitrotoluene. The explosion, which seemed to some to be double, pierced through the multi-storey armored hull of a huge warship from the bottom to the upper deck. A huge hole up to 170 square meters was formed in the bottom from the starboard side. Water rushed into it, breaking the duralumin bulkheads of the interior and flooding the ship.

The howl came from the most densely populated part of the ship, where hundreds of sailors were sleeping in the bow quarters. At the very beginning, up to 150-175 people died, and about the same number were injured. From the hole, the cries of the wounded were heard, the noise of incoming water, the remains of the dead floated. Some confusion arose, it was even considered that a war had begun, the ship was hit from the air, an emergency and then a combat alarm was announced on the battleship. The crew took their places according to the combat schedule, shells were fired at the anti-aircraft guns. The sailors used all available power and drainage facilities. Emergency teams tried to localize the consequences of the disaster. Serbulov organized the rescue of people from the flooded premises and began to prepare the wounded to be sent ashore. The battleship was planned to be towed to the nearest shoal. Emergency parties and medical teams began to arrive from nearby cruisers. Rescue boats also began to arrive.

At this time, a tragic mistake was made, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral V. A. Parkhomenko, who arrived on the battleship, gave the order to suspend the towing of Novorossiysk to the shallows. When they tried to resume it, it was already too late. The bow of the battleship has already landed on the ground. Khurshudov, seeing that the list to the port side was increasing, and it was not possible to stop the flow of water, suggested that part of the team be evacuated. He was also supported by Rear Admiral N.I. Nikolsky. People began to gather at the stern. Komflota made a new mistake, under the pretext of maintaining calm ("Let's not create a panic!"), He suspended the evacuation. When the decision to evacuate was made, the ship began to rapidly capsize upside down. Many people remained inside the ship, others were unable to swim out after capsizing. At 4 hours 14 minutes the battleship Novorossiysk lay down on the port side, and in a moment turned over with a keel. In this state, the ship lasted up to 22 hours.

There were many people inside the ship, fighting to the end for its survival. Some of them were still alive, remaining in "air bags". They knocked on the news. The sailors, without waiting for instructions "from above", opened the bottom lining in the stern of the battleship and saved 7 people. Success inspired, they began to cut in other places, but to no avail. Air was coming out of the ship. They tried to close the gaps, but it was already useless. The battleship finally sank. In the last minutes, according to a prototype of direct conversational underwater communication, which was brought to the scene of the accident, it was heard how Soviet sailors sang "Varyag". Soon everything was quiet. A day later, in one of the feed quarters, they found alive. Divers were able to pull out two sailors. On November 1, the divers stopped hearing any knocks from the compartments of the battleship. October 31 buried the first batch of dead sailors. They were escorted by all the surviving "Novorossiysk", dressed in full dress, they marched through the whole city.

In 1956, work began on lifting the battleship by blowing. It was carried out by the special purpose expedition EON-35. Preliminary work was completed in April 1957. On May 4, the ship floated up with a keel - first the bow, and then the stern. On May 14 (according to other sources, May 28), the battleship was towed to the Cossack Bay. Then it was dismantled and transferred to the Zaporizhstal plant.

Opinion of the government commission

A government commission headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, the Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry, Colonel-General of Engineering and Technical Service Vyacheslav Malyshev, made a conclusion two weeks and a half after the tragedy. On November 17, the report was presented to the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Central Committee of the Communist Party accepted and approved the conclusions drawn. The cause of the death of Novorossiysk was considered an underwater explosion, apparently, of a German magnetic mine, which had remained at the bottom since the Second World War.

Versions of the explosion of a fuel depot or artillery cellars were swept aside almost immediately. The fuel storage tanks on the ship were empty long before the tragedy. If the artillery cellars had exploded, the battleship had been blown to pieces, and neighboring ships would have been seriously damaged. This version was refuted by the testimony of the sailors. The shells remained safe and sound.

The commanders of the fleet Parkhomenko, Rear Admiral Nikolsky, Vice Admiral Kulakov, a member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet, and Captain 2nd Rank Khurshudov, were responsible for the death of people and the ship. They were demoted in rank and position. Rear Admiral Galitsky, the commander of the division for the protection of the water area, also suffered punishment. The commander of the battleship A.P. Kukhta also hit the distribution, he was demoted to captain 2nd rank and sent to the reserve. The commission noted that the personnel of the ship fought to the end for its survival, showed examples of real courage and heroism. However, all the efforts of the crew to save the ship were nullified by the "criminally frivolous, unskilled" command.

In addition, this tragedy was the reason to remove Nikolai Kuznetsov, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, from his post. Khrushchev did not like him, since this largest naval commander opposed the plans to "optimize" the fleet (Stalin's programs to turn the USSR Navy into an ocean-going fleet went under the knife).

Versions

1) The mine version got the most votes. This ammunition was not uncommon in the Sevastopol Bay, starting from the time of the Civil War. Already during the Great Patriotic War, the German Air Force and Navy mined the water area both from the sea and from the air. The bay was regularly cleaned by diving teams and trawled, mines were found. In 1956-1958. after the death of Novorossiysk, another 19 German bottom mines were discovered, including at the site of the death of the Soviet ship. However, this version has weaknesses. It is believed that by 1955, the power supplies of all bottom mines should have already been discharged. Yes, and the fuses would have become unusable by this time. Before the tragedy on barrel No. 3, Novorossiysk moored 10 times, and the battleship Sevastopol 134 times. Nobody exploded. In addition, it turned out that there were two explosions.

2) Torpedo attack. It was suggested that the battleship was attacked by an unknown submarine. But when clarifying the circumstances of the tragedy, the characteristic signs of the torpedo attack remaining from the attack were not found. On the other hand, they found out that the ships of the water area protection division, which were supposed to guard the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, were in a different place at the time of the explosion. On the night of the death of the battleship, the outer raid was not guarded by Soviet ships; the network gates were open, the direction finders were not working. Thus, the Sevastopol naval base was defenseless. Theoretically, the enemy could penetrate it. An enemy mini-submarine or a sabotage detachment could penetrate the internal raid of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet.

3) Subversive group. "Novorossiysk" could be destroyed by Italian combat swimmers. The Italian flotilla of naval saboteurs-submarines already had experience of penetrating small submarines into a foreign harbor. On December 18, 1941, Italian saboteurs under the command of Lieutenant Commander Borghese secretly entered the harbor of Alexandria and heavily damaged the British battleships Valiant, Queen Elizabeth, the destroyer HMS Jarvis with magnetic explosive devices and destroyed the tanker. In addition, the Italians knew the water area - the 10th flotilla was based in the ports of Crimea. Given the sloppiness in the field of port security, this version looks quite convincing. In addition, there is an opinion that specialists from the 12th flotilla of the British Navy participated in the operation (or it was completely organized and carried out). Her commander then was another legendary man - Captain 2nd Rank Lionel Crabbe. He was one of the best submarine saboteurs of the British fleet. In addition, after the war, captured Italian specialists from the 10th flotilla advised the British. London had a good reason for the destruction of Novorossiysk - its future nuclear weapons. England was the most vulnerable target for a tactical nuclear weapon. It is also noted that at the end of October 1955, the Mediterranean squadron of the British fleet conducted exercises in the Aegean and Marmara seas. However, if this is true, the question arises, what did the KGB and counterintelligence do? Their work during this period was considered very effective. Did you overlook the operation of the enemy right under your nose? In addition, there is no iron evidence for this version. All publications in the press are unreliable.

4) KGB operation. "Novorossiysk" was drowned by order of the top political leadership of the USSR. This sabotage was directed against the top leadership of the Soviet fleet. Khrushchev was engaged in the "optimization" of the armed forces, relying on rocket troops, and in the navy - to a submarine fleet armed with missiles. The death of Novorossiysk made it possible to strike at the leadership of the Navy, which was against the reduction of "obsolete" ships and the curtailment of the program to build up the forces of the surface fleet, increasing its power. From a technical point of view, this version is quite logical. The battleship was blown up by two charges with a total TNT equivalent of 1.8 tons. They were installed on the ground in the area of ​​​​the bow artillery cellars, at a short distance from the diametrical plane of the ship and from each other. The explosions occurred with a short time interval, which led to the appearance of a cumulative effect and infliction of damage, as a result of which the Novorossiysk sank. Given the treacherous policy of Khrushchev, who destroyed the basic systems of the state and tried to arrange "perestroika" back in the 1950s and 1960s, this version has the right to exist. Suspicion is also caused by the hasty liquidation of the ship after it was raised. "Novorossiysk" was quickly cut into scrap metal, and the case was closed.

Will we ever know the truth about the tragic death of hundreds of Soviet sailors? Probably not. Unless reliable data from the archives of Western intelligence services or the KGB appears.

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