The reasons for the war were in the contradictions between the European powers in the Middle East, in the struggle of European states for influence on the weakening and gripped by the national liberation movement of the Ottoman Empire. Nicholas I said that the inheritance of Turkey can and should be divided. In the upcoming conflict, the Russian emperor counted on the neutrality of Great Britain, which he promised after the defeat of Turkey new territorial acquisitions of Crete and Egypt, as well as on the support of Austria, as a gratitude for Russia's participation in the suppression of the Hungarian revolution. However, Nicholas's calculations turned out to be wrong: England herself pushed Turkey to war, thus seeking to weaken Russia's position. Austria also did not want to strengthen Russia in the Balkans.
The reason for the war was a dispute between the Catholic and Orthodox clergy in Palestine about who would be the guardian of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem and the temple in Bethlehem. At the same time, it was not about access to holy places, since all pilgrims used them on an equal footing. The dispute over the Holy Places cannot be called a far-fetched pretext for unleashing a war.
STAGES
During the Crimean War, two stages are distinguished:
I stage of the war: November 1853 - April 1854 Turkey was Russia's enemy, and hostilities took place on the Danube and Caucasian fronts. In 1853, Russian troops entered the territory of Moldavia and Wallachia, and hostilities on land were sluggish. In the Caucasus, the Turks were defeated near Kars.
II stage of the war: April 1854 - February 1856 Concerned that Russia would completely defeat Turkey, England and France, in the person of Austria, delivered an ultimatum to Russia. They demanded that Russia refuse to patronize the Orthodox population Ottoman Empire. Nicholas I could not accept such conditions. Turkey, France, England and Sardinia united against Russia.
RESULTS
The results of the war:
On February 13 (25), 1856, the Paris Congress began, and on March 18 (30) a peace treaty was signed.
Russia returned the city of Kars with a fortress to the Ottomans, receiving in exchange Sevastopol, Balaklava and other Crimean cities captured from it.
The Black Sea was declared neutral (that is, open to commercial and closed to military ships in peacetime), with the prohibition of Russia and the Ottoman Empire to have navies and arsenals there.
Navigation along the Danube was declared free, for which the Russian borders were moved away from the river and part of Russian Bessarabia with the mouth of the Danube was annexed to Moldavia.
Russia was deprived of the protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia, granted to it by the Kyuchuk-Kaynardzhysky peace of 1774, and the exclusive patronage of Russia over the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire.
Russia pledged not to build fortifications on the Aland Islands.
During the war, the members of the anti-Russian coalition failed to achieve all their goals, but managed to prevent the strengthening of Russia in the Balkans and deprive it of the Black Sea Fleet.
On June 20, 1855, Eduard Totleben, one of those people who were called the soul of the defense of Sevastopol during the Crimean War, was wounded. Although a lot of time has passed, those events are still judged at the level of clichés planted in the heads of many years of anti-Russian propaganda.
Here is the "technical backwardness" of tsarist Russia, and the "shameful defeat of tsarism", and the "humiliating peace treaty." The true scope and significance of the war remain little known. It seems to many that it was some kind of peripheral, almost colonial confrontation, far from the main centers of Russia.
The simplified scheme looks straightforward: the enemy landed troops in the Crimea, defeated the Russian army there and, having achieved their goals, solemnly evacuated. But is it? Let's figure it out.
Fragment of the panorama of Franz Roubaud "Defense of Sevastopol"
Firstly, who and how proved that the defeat of Russia was precisely shameful? The very fact of losing does not say anything about shame. In the end, Germany lost its capital in World War II, was completely occupied and signed unconditional surrender. But have you ever heard anyone call it a shameful defeat?
Let's look at the events of the Crimean War from this point of view. Three empires (British, French and Ottoman) and one kingdom (Piedmont-Sardinia) then came out against Russia. What is Britain of those times? This is a gigantic country, an industrial leader, the world's best navy. What is France? This is the third economy in the world, the second fleet, a large and well-trained land army. It is easy to see that the union of these two states has already had such a resonant effect that the combined forces of the coalition had absolutely incredible power.
But there was also the Ottoman Empire. Yes, to mid-nineteenth century, her golden period was left in the past, and she was even called the "sick man of Europe." But do not forget that this was said in comparison with the most developed countries in the world. The Turkish fleet had steamships, the army was numerous and partially armed with rifles, officers were sent to study in Western countries, and in addition, foreign instructors worked on the territory of the Ottoman Empire itself.
By the way, during the First World War, having already lost almost all of his European possessions, the “sick man of Europe” defeated Britain and France in the Gallipoli campaign. And if this was the Ottoman Empire at the end of its existence, then it must be assumed that in the Crimean War it was an even more dangerous adversary.
The role of the Sardinian kingdom is usually not taken into account at all, and yet this small country has put up twenty thousand well-armed troops against us.
Thus, Russia was opposed by a powerful coalition. Let's remember this moment.
Now let's see what goals the enemy pursued. According to his plans, the Aland Islands, Finland, the Baltic region, the Crimea and the Caucasus were to be torn away from Russia. In addition, the Kingdom of Poland was being restored, and in the Caucasus independent state Circassia, vassal to Turkey. That's not all. The Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were under the protectorate of Russia, but now it was supposed to transfer them to Austria. In other words, the Austrian troops would go to the southwestern borders of our country.
It is generally believed that this plan was lobbied by the influential member of the British cabinet, Palmerston, while the French emperor had a different point of view. However, let us give the floor to Napoleon III himself. Here is what he said to one of the Russian diplomats:
« I intend to... make every effort to prevent the spread of your influence and force you to return to Asia, from whence you came. Russia is not a European country, it should not be and will not be, if France does not forget about the role that she should play in European history… It is worth weakening your ties with Europe, and you yourself will begin to move to the East in order to turn back into an Asian country. It will not be difficult to deprive you of Finland, the Baltic lands, Poland and Crimea" (quoted from the book "Crimean War" by Trubetskoy).
This is the fate prepared for Russia by England and France. Isn't it familiar motives? Our generation was "fortunate" to live to see the implementation of this plan, and now imagine that the ideas of Palmerston and Napoleon III would have come true not in 1991, but in the middle of the 19th century. Imagine that Russia enters the First World War in a situation where the Baltic states are already in the hands of Germany, Austria-Hungary has a foothold in Moldavia and Wallachia, and Turkish garrisons are stationed in the Crimea. And the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, in this geopolitical situation, turns into a notorious catastrophe.
But "backward, powerless and rotten" Russia left no stone unturned from these projects. None of this has been implemented. The Paris Congress of 1856 drew a line under the Crimean War. According to the concluded agreement, Russia lost a tiny part of Bessarabia and agreed to free navigation along the Danube and the neutralization of the Black Sea. Yes, neutralization meant a ban for Russia and the Ottoman Empire to have naval arsenals on the Black Sea coast and keep the Black Sea military fleet, but compare the terms of the agreement with what goals the anti-Russian coalition initially pursued. Do you think this is a disgrace? Is this a humiliating defeat?
Now let's move on to the second important issue - to the "technical backwardness of serf Russia". When it comes to this, they always think of rifled weapons and the steam fleet. Like, in Britain and France, the army was armed with rifled guns, and Russian soldiers with obsolete smoothbore guns. While advanced England and advanced France long ago switched to steamboats, Russian ships sailed. It would seem that everything is obvious and backwardness is evident.
You will laugh, but in the Russian fleet there were steam ships, and in the army - rifled guns. Yes, the fleets of Britain and France were significantly ahead of the Russian one in terms of the number of steamships, but, excuse me, these are the two leading maritime powers! These are countries that have surpassed the whole world at sea for hundreds of years, and the Russian fleet has always been weaker.
It must be admitted that the enemy had much more rifled guns. This is true, but it is also true that the Russian army had rocket weapons, and the combat missiles of the Konstantinov system were significantly superior to their Western counterparts. In addition, the Baltic Sea was reliably covered by Boris Jacobi's domestic mines. This weapon was also among the best examples in the world.
However, let's analyze the degree of military "backwardness" of Russia as a whole. To do this, it makes no sense to go through all types of weapons, comparing each technical specification certain samples: just look at the ratio of losses in manpower. If Russia really seriously lagged behind the enemy in terms of armaments, then it is obvious that our losses in the war should have been fundamentally higher.
The numbers of total losses vary greatly in different sources, but the number of those killed is approximately the same, so let's turn to this parameter.
So, during the entire war, 10,240 people were killed in the army of France, 2,755 in England, 10,000 in Turkey, and 24,577 in Russia. About 5,000 people are added to Russia's losses. This figure shows the number of dead among the missing. In this way, total number the dead are considered to be 30,000.
As you can see, there is no catastrophic ratio of losses, especially considering that Russia fought for half a year longer than England and France.
Of course, in response, we can say that the main losses in the war fell on the defense of Sevastopol: here the enemy stormed the fortifications, and this led to relatively increased losses. That is, the "technical backwardness" of Russia was partially compensated by the advantageous position of the defense.
Well, let's consider then the very first battle outside Sevastopol - the battle of Alma. The coalition army of about 62,000 people (the absolute majority - the French and British) landed in the Crimea and moved on the city. In order to delay the enemy and buy time to prepare the defensive structures of Sevastopol, the Russian commander Alexander Menshikov decided to fight near the Alma River. At that time, he managed to collect only 37,000 people. He also had fewer guns than the coalition, which is not surprising: after all, three countries came out against Russia at once. In addition, the enemy was also supported from the sea by ship fire.
« According to one testimony, the Allies lost 4300 on the day of Alma, according to others - 4500 people. According to later estimates, our troops lost 145 officers and 5600 lower ranks in the battle of Alma”, – academician Tarle cites such data in his fundamental work"Crimean War". It is constantly emphasized that during the battle we had a shortage of rifled weapons, but note that the losses of the parties are quite comparable. Yes, our losses were greater, but the coalition had a significant superiority in manpower. What does the technical backwardness of the Russian army have to do with it?
An interesting thing: the size of our army turned out to be almost two times smaller, and there were fewer guns, and the enemy fleet was shelling our positions from the sea, in addition, Russia’s weapons were backward. It would seem that under such circumstances, the defeat of the Russians should have been inevitable. And what is the real result of the battle? After the battle, the Russian army retreated, maintaining order, the exhausted enemy did not dare to organize a pursuit, that is, his movement to Sevastopol slowed down, which gave the city's garrison time to prepare for defense.
The words of the commander of the British First Division, the Duke of Cambridge, perfectly characterize the state of the “winners”: “ One more such victory and England will have no army.” Such is the “defeat”, such is the “backwardness of serf Russia”!
I think that one non-trivial fact did not escape the attentive reader, namely the number of Russians in the battle on Alma. Why does the enemy have a significant superiority in manpower? Why does Menshikov have only 37,000 men? Where was the rest of the army at that time? The answer to the last question is very simple:
« At the end of 1854, the entire border strip of Russia was divided into sections, each subordinate to a special chief as commander-in-chief of an army or a separate corps. These areas were as follows:
a) The coast of the Baltic Sea (Finland, St. Petersburg and Ostsee provinces), the military forces in which consisted of 179 battalions, 144 squadrons and hundreds, with 384 guns;
b) the Kingdom of Poland and the Western provinces - 146 battalions, 100 squadrons and hundreds, with 308 guns;
c) The space along the Danube and the Black Sea to the Bug River - 182 battalions, 285 squadrons and hundreds, with 612 guns;
d) Crimea and the Black Sea coast from the Bug to Perekop - 27 battalions, 19 squadrons and hundreds, 48 guns;
e) coast Sea of Azov and the Black Sea - 31½ battalion, 140 hundreds and squadrons, 54 guns;
f) Caucasian and Transcaucasian Territory - 152 battalions, 281 hundred and squadron, 289 guns... ”, - reports the Encyclopedic Dictionary F.A. Brockhaus and I.A. Efron.
It is easy to see that the most powerful grouping of our troops was in the southwestern direction, and not at all in the Crimea. In second place is the army covering the Baltic, the third in strength - in the Caucasus, and the fourth - on the western borders.
What explains this, at first glance, the strange disposition of the Russians? To answer this question, let's temporarily leave the battlefields and move on to the diplomatic offices, where no less important battles unfolded and where, in the end, the fate of the entire Crimean War was decided.
British diplomacy set out to win over Prussia, Sweden and the Austrian Empire. In this case, Russia would have to fight almost with the whole world. The British acted successfully: Prussia and Austria began to lean towards an anti-Russian position. Tsar Nicholas I is a man of unbending will, he was not going to give up under any circumstances and began to prepare for the most catastrophic scenario. That is why the main forces of the Russian army had to be kept far from the Crimea along the border "arc" north - west - southwest.
Time passed, the war dragged on. The siege of Sevastopol continued for almost a year. In the end, at the cost of heavy losses, the enemy occupied part of the city. Yes, yes, no “fall of Sevastopol” ever happened: the Russian troops simply moved from the southern to the northern part of the city and prepared for further defense. Despite their best efforts, the coalition achieved almost nothing.
During the entire period of hostilities, the enemy captured a small part of the Crimea, Bomarzund on the Aland Islands and Kinburn on the Black Sea, but at the same time was defeated in the Caucasus. Meanwhile, at the beginning of 1856, Russia concentrated over 600,000 people on the western and southern borders, and this does not count the Caucasian and Black Sea lines. In addition, it was possible to create numerous reserves and collect militias.
And what did representatives of the so-called progressive public do at that time? As usual, they launched anti-Russian propaganda and distributed leaflets - proclamations.
« Written in glib language, with full diligence to make them accessible to the understanding of the common people and mainly the soldier, these proclamations were divided into two parts: one was signed by Herzen, Golovin, Sazonov and other persons who had left their fatherland; others - Poles Zenkovich, Zabitsky and Worzel”, - noted the pre-revolutionary historian, General Dubrovin.
Nevertheless, iron discipline reigned in the army, and few succumbed to the propaganda of the enemies of our state.. Russia climbed the Second patriotic war with all the ensuing consequences for the enemy. And here, from the diplomatic front, came disturbing news: Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Sardinia were openly joined by Austria. A few days later, Prussia also made threats to Petersburg. By that time, Nicholas I had died, and his son Alexander II was on the throne. After weighing all the pros and cons, the king decided to start negotiations with the coalition.
As mentioned above, the treaty that ended the war was by no means humiliating. The whole world knows about it. In Western historiography, the outcome of the Crimean War for our country is assessed much more objectively than in Russia itself.
« The results of the campaign had little effect on the alignment of international forces. It was decided to make the Danube an international water artery, and declare the Black Sea neutral. But Sevastopol had to be returned to the Russians. Russia, which previously occupied Central Europe dominant position, lost its former influence for the next few years, but not for long. The Turkish empire was saved, and also only temporarily. The union of England and France did not achieve its goals. The problem of the Holy Lands, which he was supposed to solve, was not even mentioned in the peace treaty. And the Russian Tsar canceled the agreement after fourteen years ”, - this is how Christopher Hibbert described the results of the Crimean War. This is a British historian. For Russia, he found much more correct words than many domestic figures.
The spirit in the troops is beyond description. At times ancient greece there was not so much heroism. I have not been able to be in business a single time, but I thank God that I have seen these people and live in this glorious time.
Lev Tolstoy
The wars of the Russian and Ottoman empires were a common occurrence in the international politics of the 18th-19th centuries. In 1853, the Russian Empire of Nicholas 1 entered another war, which went down in history as the Crimean War of 1853-1856, and ended with the defeat of Russia. In addition, this war showed the strong resistance of the leading countries of Western Europe (France and Great Britain) to the strengthening of the role of Russia in Eastern Europe especially in the Balkans. The lost war also showed Russia itself the problems in domestic politics which led to many problems. Despite victories at the initial stage of 1853-1854, as well as the capture of the key Turkish fortress of Kars in 1855, Russia lost the most important battles on the territory of the Crimean peninsula. This article describes the causes, course, main results and historical meaning in short story about Crimean war 1853-1856.
Causes of the aggravation of the Eastern question
Under the eastern question, historians understand a number of controversial issues in Russian-Turkish relations, which at any moment could lead to conflict. Main problems eastern question, which became the basis for the future war, are as follows:
- The loss of the Crimea and the northern Black Sea region by the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 18th century constantly stimulated Turkey to start a war in the hope of regaining the territories. Thus began the wars of 1806-1812 and 1828-1829. However, as a result of them, Turkey lost Bessarabia and part of the territory in the Caucasus, which further strengthened the desire for revenge.
- Belonging to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Russia demanded that these straits be opened for the Black Sea Fleet, while the Ottoman Empire (under pressure from the countries of Western Europe) ignored these demands of Russia.
- The presence in the Balkans, as part of the Ottoman Empire, Slavic Christian peoples who fought for their independence. Russia supported them, thereby causing a wave of indignation among the Turks about Russia's interference in the internal affairs of another state.
An additional factor that intensified the conflict was the desire of the countries of Western Europe (Britain, France, and Austria) not to let Russia into the Balkans, and also to close its access to the straits. For the sake of this, the countries were ready to support Turkey in a potential war with Russia.
The reason for the war and its beginning
These troubled moments brewed throughout the late 1840s and early 1850s. In 1853 Turkish sultan transferred the Bethlehem temple of Jerusalem (then the territory of the Ottoman Empire) to the control of the Catholic Church. This caused a wave of indignation of the highest Orthodox hierarchy. Nicholas 1 decided to take advantage of this, using the religious conflict as a pretext for attacking Turkey. Russia demanded to transfer the temple Orthodox Church, and at the same time also open the straits for the Black Sea Fleet. Turkey refused. In June 1853, Russian troops crossed the border of the Ottoman Empire and entered the territory of the Danubian principalities dependent on it.
Nicholas 1 hoped that France was too weak after the revolution of 1848, and that Britain could be appeased by transferring Cyprus and Egypt to it in the future. However, the plan didn't work. European countries called the Ottoman Empire to action, promising it financial and military assistance. In October 1853, Turkey declared war on Russia. Thus began, to put it briefly, the Crimean War of 1853-1856. In the history of Western Europe, this war is called Eastern.
The course of the war and the main stages
The Crimean War can be divided into 2 stages according to the number of participants in the events of those years. Here are the steps:
- October 1853 - April 1854. During these six months the war was between the Ottoman Empire and Russia (without the direct intervention of other states). There were three fronts: Crimean (Black Sea), Danube and Caucasian.
- April 1854 - February 1856. British and French troops enter the war, which expands the theater of operations, as well as a turning point in the course of the war. The allied troops were superior to the Russian ones from the technical side, which was the reason for the changes in the course of the war.
As for specific battles, the following key battles can be distinguished: for Sinop, for Odessa, for the Danube, for the Caucasus, for Sevastopol. There were other battles, but those listed above are the main ones. Let's consider them in more detail.
Battle of Sinop (November 1853)
The battle took place in the harbor of the city of Sinop in the Crimea. The Russian fleet under the command of Nakhimov completely defeated the Turkish fleet of Osman Pasha. This battle was perhaps the last major world battle on sailing ships. This victory significantly raised morale Russian army and gave hope for an early victory in the war.
Map of the Sinopo naval battle November 18, 1853
Bombing of Odessa (April 1854)
In early April 1854, the Ottoman Empire launched a squadron of the Franco-British fleet through its straits, which swiftly headed for Russian port and shipbuilding cities: Odessa, Ochakov and Nikolaev.
On April 10, 1854, the bombardment of Odessa, the main southern port of the Russian Empire, began. After a rapid and intense bombardment, it was planned to land troops in the northern Black Sea region, which would force the withdrawal of troops from the Danube principalities, as well as weaken the defense of the Crimea. However, the city withstood several days of shelling. Moreover, the defenders of Odessa were able to deliver accurate strikes against the Allied fleet. The plan of the Anglo-French troops failed. The allies were forced to retreat towards the Crimea and begin battles for the peninsula.
Fights on the Danube (1853-1856)
It was with the entry of Russian troops into this region that the Crimean War of 1853-1856 began. After the success in the Battle of Sinop, another success awaited Russia: the troops completely crossed to the right bank of the Danube, an attack was opened on Silistria and further on Bucharest. However, the entry into the war of England and France complicated the offensive of Russia. On June 9, 1854, the siege of Silistria was lifted and the Russian troops returned to the left bank of the Danube. By the way, on this front, Austria also entered the war against Russia, which was worried about the rapid advance of the Romanov Empire into Wallachia and Moldavia.
In July 1854, near the city of Varna (modern Bulgaria), a huge landing of the British and French armies landed (according to various sources, from 30 to 50 thousand). The troops were supposed to enter the territory of Bessarabia, ousting Russia from this region. However, a cholera epidemic broke out in the French army, and the British public demanded that the leadership of the army first strike at the Black Sea fleet in the Crimea.
Fights in the Caucasus (1853-1856)
An important battle took place in July 1854 near the village of Kyuruk-Dara (Western Armenia). The combined Turkish-British forces were defeated. At this stage, the Crimean War was still successful for Russia.
Another important battle in this region took place in June-November 1855. Russian troops decided to attack the eastern part of the Ottoman Empire, the fortress of Karsu, so that the allies would send part of the troops to this region, thereby slightly easing the siege of Sevastopol. Russia won the battle of Kars, but this happened after the news of the fall of Sevastopol, so this battle had little effect on the outcome of the war. Moreover, according to the results of the "peace" signed later, the fortress of Kars returned to the Ottoman Empire. However, as the peace talks showed, the capture of Kars still played a role. But more on that later.
Defense of Sevastopol (1854-1855)
The most heroic and tragic event of the Crimean War is, of course, the battle for Sevastopol. In September 1855, Franco-British troops captured the last point of the city's defense - Malakhov Kurgan. The city survived 11 months of siege, however, as a result, it was surrendered to the allied forces (among which the Sardinian kingdom appeared). This defeat became a key one and served as an impetus for the end of the war. From the end of 1855, intensified negotiations began, in which Russia had practically no strong arguments. It was clear that the war was lost.
Other battles in the Crimea (1854-1856)
In addition to the siege of Sevastopol on the territory of Crimea in 1854-1855, several more battles took place, which were aimed at "unblocking" Sevastopol:
- Battle of the Alma (September 1854).
- Battle of Balaklava (October 1854).
- Battle of Inkerman (November 1854).
- An attempt to liberate Evpatoria (February 1855).
- Battle on the Chernaya River (August 1855).
All these battles ended in unsuccessful attempts to lift the siege of Sevastopol.
"Distant" battles
The main fighting of the war took place near the Crimean peninsula, which gave the name to the war. There were also battles in the Caucasus, on the territory of modern Moldova, as well as in the Balkans. However, not many people know that battles between rivals also took place in remote regions of the Russian Empire. Here are some examples:
- Peter and Paul Defense. The battle that took place on the territory of the Kamchatka Peninsula between the combined Franco-British troops on the one hand and Russian on the other. The battle took place in August 1854. This battle was the result of the victory of Britain over China during the Opium Wars. As a result, Britain wanted to increase its influence in the east of Asia, ousting Russia from here. In total, the Allied troops made two assaults, both ended in failure for them. Russia withstood the Peter and Paul defense.
- Arctic Company. The operation of the British fleet to attempt to blockade or capture Arkhangelsk, carried out in 1854-1855. The main battles took place in the Barents Sea. The British also undertook the bombardment of the Solovetsky fortress, as well as the robbery of Russian merchant ships in the White and Barents Seas.
Results and historical significance of the war
In February 1855, Nicholas 1 died. The task of the new emperor, Alexander 2, was to end the war, and with minimal damage to Russia. In February 1856, the Paris Congress began its work. Russia was represented by Alexei Orlov and Philip Brunnov. Since neither side saw the point in continuing the war, already on March 6, 1856, the Paris Peace Treaty was signed, as a result of which the Crimean War was completed.
The main terms of the Treaty of Paris 6 were as follows:
- Russia returned the Karsu fortress to Turkey in exchange for Sevastopol and other captured cities of the Crimean peninsula.
- Russia was forbidden to have a Black Sea fleet. The Black Sea was declared neutral.
- The Bosporus and Dardanelles were declared closed to the Russian Empire.
- Part of Russian Bessarabia was transferred to the Moldavian principality, the Danube ceased to be border river, so navigation was declared free.
- On the Allada Islands (an archipelago in the Baltic Sea), Russia was forbidden to build military and (or) defensive fortifications.
As for losses, the number Russian subjects, who died in the war, is 47.5 thousand people. Britain lost 2.8 thousand, France - 10.2, the Ottoman Empire - more than 10 thousand. The Sardinian kingdom lost 12 thousand soldiers. Austrian casualties are unknown, possibly because Austria was not officially at war with Russia.
In general, the war showed the backwardness of Russia, compared with the states of Europe, especially in terms of the economy (completion of the industrial revolution, construction railways, the use of steamboats). After this defeat, the reforms of Alexander 2 began. In addition, a desire for revenge was brewing in Russia for a long time, which resulted in another war with Turkey in 1877-1878. But this is a completely different story, and the Crimean War of 1853-1856 was completed and Russia was defeated in it.
Preparations for a military campaign unprecedented at that time were considered in sufficient detail by us earlier (see "The Tortured Coalition", NVO No. 45 of 12/08/17), and in this material we will analyze the course of hostilities and consider what lesson she herself learned from these events Russia.
MAIN IMPACT
Having decided to invade Russia, London and Paris focused mainly on the "sore point" of the Russian Empire - the Crimea and its main and only naval base in the south - Sevastopol. At the same time, the main element of this campaign, not without fierce debate in the capitals of the two main participants in the anti-Russian coalition, was ultimately chosen as a landing operation, which, interestingly, refuted the beliefs that existed in those years about the impossibility of carrying out such an enterprise on such a scale. Most military experts of that time were sure that due to the small capacity of military ships, the difficulties encountered in transporting horses by sea, and the accidents inevitable in sea navigation, it is simply physically impossible to transport more than 30-40 thousand people with the necessary supplies by sea at a time. With the invention of steamships and screw ships, most of these problems were, however, removed, and the Crimean landing expedition served as a clear proof of this. In total, the transportation of the British-French expeditionary force to the Balkan-Crimea region required a huge number of watercraft - more than 600 transport ships.
In this regard, it should be emphasized that all this could not have happened if the Russian Emperor Nicholas I insisted on the implementation, under his own leadership, of the initial strike developed by the allies, which provided for a landing on the shores of the Bosphorus in the amount of 32-40 thousand people and possible occupation of Constantinople, but went on about his mentor with youthful years- the "father-commander" Field Marshal Ivan Fedorovich Paskevich, who strongly recommended limiting the zone of action of Russian troops to the Northern Balkans and the Caucasus, which supposedly, if successful, should have encouraged the allies to agree to reconciliation with St. Petersburg.
As a result, the Northern Balkans became the epicenter of the efforts of the Russian army, where, despite the successes at the very beginning (the practically bloodless occupation of the Danubian principalities), they were generally not lucky. At the same time, military historians emphasize the fact that, perhaps, the results of a number of failed subsequent actions of the Russian troops on the Danube became one of the reasons that formed the basis for the decision of the allies to land in the Crimea.
It must be admitted that the Russian troops in this theater, despite more a high degree trained and equipped than the Turks who opposed them, they acted inadequately and very passively, to which the future classic of Marxism, Friedrich Engels, who commented on the course of the war in those years in the media, paid special attention. The situation that was unfavorable for the Russian troops was aggravated by the often cool, and sometimes openly hostile attitude of the Danube population, who considered themselves descendants of the Roman colonists, who supposedly did not need Russian protection. In turn, the hopes that the Slavic population of the Balkans would rise up in arms to help the Russian troops were not justified due to "immaturity" and due to the poorly carried out work among them (which, however, was taken into account and crowned with success through just over two decades).
In many respects, the failures of the Russians were explained by the position of the commander of the army, Prince Mikhail Dmitrievich Gorchakov, a lack of initiative general, servilely, not in accordance with the rapidly changing situation, who carried out the instructions emanating from the distant northern capital. But even in the subsequent appointment of "father-commander" Paskevich as commander-in-chief of all Russian troops in the south, it did not lead to any noticeable success on the battlefield. The Turkish troops, on the contrary, were not only almost twice as large as the Russian grouping and were encouraged by the possible intervention on their side of the European allies at any moment, they were also led by the budding Sardarekrem (Marshal) Omer Pasha, who converted to Islam, a Slav - a Croat , a former Austrian subject. Thus, after a number of local successes of the Ottoman Empire in the Danube theater, the European allies began to take seriously the "increased skill" of the Turks.
At the same time, the affairs of the coalition in the Caucasus were far from in the best way. Here, just like with the Turks on the Danube, but already in favor of the Russian troops, a subjective factor played - the appointment at the beginning of the campaign at the head of the acting Russian corps of an extraordinary general, Prince Vasily Osipovich Bebutov. Under the leadership of this commander and his associates, the Turks suffered a series of serious defeats. Subsequently, the situation in favor of the allies in this theater could not be corrected by the actions of the "fifth column" - militant pro-Turkish highlanders actually in the rear Russian troops, nor the cruising of the ships of the joint British-French squadron along the Russian Black Sea coast with the shelling of ports and settlements and repeated landings, however, small landings, not even the secondment of the aforementioned Turkish commander Omer Pasha, who had proven himself well on the Danube. The major failures of the Turkish army in the Caucasus were largely due to the unwillingness of the "senior" allies to perceive this theater as if not the main, then at least "secondary" and, consequently, the alleged lack of the need to send any reinforcements here from the expeditionary forces of the Europeans. This, of course, caused discontent and sometimes open hostility on the part of the Turkish command towards "passive" European advisers, who flooded Turkish units and formations in large numbers.
And yet, the successes of the Russians in the Caucasus did not "reason" either the Turks, as they hoped in St. Petersburg, or even more so London and Paris, who set themselves the goal of finally breaking Russia at all costs.
FAR EASTERN "PILYULA"
It is noteworthy that even at the very beginning of the war, looking for the most optimal way to quickly crush the Russian Empire, the Allies analyzed the option of actions in the Baltic, implying not only the destruction of the key points of possible Russian resistance (Kronstadt, Sveaborg, etc.) from the sea, but also the landing of large landings on the coast. However, without the assistance of Sweden, both London and Paris understood that this was impossible to do. Stockholm, not buying into the promises to give him a number of Russian territories, in the end refused the allies to oppose Russia. Then it was decided to focus on the Crimea, but the Allies also intended to inflict a serious defeat on the Russians in the Baltic theater, which should have significantly increased their military and political authority in the eyes of all of Europe.
However, this did not happen. Large base-fortresses (such as Kronstadt) were too tough for them, and the shelling of the coast and the landing of small landings and the capture of merchant ships could not affect the course of the war as a whole. Even the seizure of the Aland Islands, which belonged to Russia, did not make any significant contribution to the balance of power. Moreover, the failures of the combined British-French squadron, often the result of a mismatch between the actions of the commands of both its parts, did not help eliminate the mutual hostility of the two main allies in the coalition. The only thing that the British and French achieved was diverting the qualitatively best Russian forces (guards) to defend the western border and the Baltic coast, instead of sending them to the Crimea.
In the north, an allied detachment of warships, having penetrated first into the Kola Bay and then into the White Sea, carrying out the decisions of London and Paris to blockade Russian commercial ports, was actually engaged in natural piracy at sea. And this despite the promise of London "not to violate the interests of private individuals." Having captured or destroyed dozens of civilian ships, warehouses and civilian dwellings on the coast, but not taking a single significant Russian military object, the British and French found themselves under the gun of fierce criticism even in the "lured" European media.
Approximately the same situation prevailed in Far East, where by the middle of the nineteenth century Russia had not yet created a permanent naval grouping. On the contrary, the British and French had bases and a certain amount of naval power on pacific ocean, which they decided to take advantage of by forming a combined squadron under the leadership of two rear admirals - the British David Price and the French Fevrier de Pointe. Despite the antipathy that has already become traditional for the relations of the allies and the endless disputes between the two commanders regarding the optimization of the actions of the squadron, in the end everything came down, as in the Baltic, to trivial piracy, which also did not add credibility to the fleets of either one or the other allied countries. An attempt to justify its mission in the region to capture at the end of August 1854 a relatively large Russian base Petropavlovsk ended in complete failure. The allies were not helped either by the essentially espionage activities of the American lumberjacks who worked under contracts in the Petropavlovsk region, and their information regarding the state of the Russian defense. Having lost about 450 people killed and wounded, the Allies were forced to retreat. In the world press, which happened quite rarely, sympathy this time turned out to be on the side of the Russians. One of the newspapers even noted: "The British received such a pill that will remain a shameful stain in the history of enlightened navigators and which the waves of all five oceans will never wash away."
LANDING
However, if on the flanks the situation was more or less favorable for Russia, then in the main theater - in the Crimea - the development of the situation did not cause optimism. Despite disruptions in the schedules for the arrival of the British-French-Turkish landing force, confusion and miscalculations in resolving issues of loading and unloading, in early September 1854, the Allied landing south of Yevpatoriya began. It is noteworthy that in this case, too, there were sharp disputes between the allies regarding where to carry out the landing, and the plan for subsequent actions. The French commander, Marshal Leroy de Saint Arnaud, tired, as he admitted, of endless bickering, was forced to leave the choice to his British counterpart, Lord Fitzroy Raglan. Moreover, experts noted that if it were not for the mistakes of the Russian military leadership regarding the timing of the landing and elementary countermeasures, this allied operation could have been prevented at the very beginning. Nevertheless, the unloading took place under almost ideal conditions.
The transportation of French troops directly to the Crimea with all the supplies and convoys that were with them required 172 sea vessels of various sizes, and the transportation of British troops required up to one and a half hundred steam and sailing transports. The Turkish division was planted on nine ships.
After the unloading was completed, the unpreparedness of the British and Turkish formations for this difficult expedition was revealed. The French, to put it mildly, were surprised by the carelessness of their colleagues and took urgent measures to eliminate the major miscalculations that had been revealed in supplying the troops of their allied colleagues with everything they needed and even took upon themselves the full provision of food for the Turkish formation. The sluggishness of the British quartermasters immediately made itself felt in the form of cholera and other epidemic diseases that spread among the allied troops.
Nevertheless, in the very first clash on the Alma River, which took place a week after the landing, while moving south of the peninsula, the Allies inflicted severe defeat Russian formations under the leadership of Prince Alexander Sergeevich Menshikov. In this battle and in subsequent battles, more high level technical equipment of Western European troops than Russians, in particular, rifled small arms, which allowed the British and French to inflict significant damage on their opponents without coming into direct contact with them and avoiding bayonet fighting, which Russian soldiers have been famous for since the time of Suvorov.
DISSERVICE
In principle, it was obvious: the allies needed to capture Sevastopol as soon as possible, which supposedly should have put an end to this war. Although the Russian leadership was aware of the key importance of this base city as a symbol of resistance to aggressors, it delayed the improvement of its defensive structures.
Local Crimean Tatars, anti-Russian, unwittingly rendered a disservice to their new allied patrons, disorienting them in relation to the supposedly strong northern fortifications of the city, which in reality had just begun to be built. The allies bypassed Sevastopol from the south, but they could not take it on the move. The heroic 349-day Sevastopol defense began.
In parallel with the massive shelling of the city (a total of six series of multi-day bombardments were carried out during the siege), there was a gradual increase in the grouping of allied troops and bringing it to 120 thousand people, mainly British and French. However, taking advantage of the absence of a closed line of siege of the city, the Russians also reinforced the garrison to about 40 thousand people, and the total grouping of troops in the Crimea - up to 90 thousand people.
The main role in the siege was played by French troops, better trained and learned than their British counterparts. It was the capture of the Malakhov Kurgan by the French, which the British were later forced to admit, in fact, sealed the fate of the city. The Turkish and Sardinian troops near Sevastopol were assigned a clearly secondary role. In the end, it was even decided to transfer Turkish formations from the Crimea to the Caucasus in order to reverse the unfavorable situation there.
STRATEGIC DEADLOCK
The protracted siege and related numerous victims caused concern both in London and Paris, since they clearly did not contribute to the popularity of the leadership of both countries. The seeming hopelessness of the impasse in the Crimea led to the growth of defeatism among the allies and even, at first, to their mass transition to the Russians. And only a number of cardinal measures taken in both Western European capitals with the aim of drastically changing the situation in their favor, including a partial change in the leadership of the grouping of allied forces, contributed to the intensification of the activities of the French and British troops, the transition to them of the initiative and, in the end, forcing the defenders of Sevastopol August 28 (September 9), 1855 to leave the almost completely destroyed city. But only two days later the allies decided to enter it.
The Sevastopol epic (among other battles) cost so many victims and expenses on both sides that the question arose: is it time to end the war altogether? At the end of 1855 hostilities ceased everywhere. By this time, the losses were really grandiose: Russia - over 522 thousand people, the Ottoman Empire - up to 400 thousand, France - 95 thousand, Great Britain - 22 thousand people. Russia spent about 800 million rubles on the war, the Allied Powers - 600 million.
Nevertheless, despite the surrender of Sevastopol and the defeat in the war as a whole, the situation for Russia was by no means as catastrophic as foreign and some domestic researchers prefer to emphasize. The fact is that the Russians never used their entire military potential, including the elite guards units and formations, which more than once in history decided the outcome of certain campaigns in favor of Russia. The main thing is that it was the allies who realized that it was absolutely pointless to continue the war with giant Russia. Yes, and in St. Petersburg, they decided to take advantage of the favorable situation in the foreign policy arena, expressed in the next aggravation of contradictions between the main allies in the coalition - Great Britain and France - in order, on the one hand, to negotiate for themselves the most acceptable conditions for concluding peace, and on the other, completely to concentrate on internal, including military, reforms to eliminate those root causes that led Russia in the end to a formal defeat.
Peace negotiations began in Vienna, culminating in the signing of the so-called Treaty of Paris in 1856. Naturally, the conditions that St. Petersburg had to accept could not be easy: after all, united Europe opposed Russia. Russia agreed to a ban on having a navy and bases in the Black Sea basin, to fortify the Aland Islands in the Baltic, and to make a number of minor, but nonetheless, territorial concessions to Turkey in Bessarabia and the Caucasus. At the same time - and this looked like a matter of principle - Russia was not supposed to pay any indemnities. Whereas, for example, France demanded exorbitant material compensation from its ally Great Britain if it continues to insist on the continuation of hostilities. This position of Paris further aggravated British-French relations.
WHEN ONE ENEMY IS BETTER THAN ANOTHER
It is noteworthy that even during the war, the rapprochement between St. Petersburg and Paris began. Not only did the Russian and French military leaders, officers and soldiers respect each other for their stamina and nobility in battle, both of them had a clear dislike for the arrogant, but "unimportant warriors" - the British, although the latter formally fought in the same ranks with the French. But the most significant was the fact that neither Russia nor the "seeing light" France did not want the strengthening of Great Britain either in Europe or in the adjacent regions.
Nevertheless, Anglophobic sentiments did not lead the French to the anti-British camp, while relations between Great Britain and Russia turned out to be completely spoiled. Moreover, there was no cardinal improvement in them, even despite the subsequent participation of both states in the same military coalitions during the years of two world wars. Yes, and "ungrateful" Austria finally moved into the camp of Russia's enemies. Relations with Turkey have not undergone any significant metamorphosis, remaining the relationship of two historically formed antagonists. As for the so-called Eastern question, because of which the war formally began, then, in fact, all the fundamental claims of Russia were satisfied.
Thus, the Crimean War, without resolving the serious contradictions of the main players, became only a prelude to subsequent major conflicts in Europe, and in the world as a whole, as a result of the so-called settlement of which the desired stability and tranquility in the regional and international arena have not yet been established. .
