The emergence of the concept of "Eastern question" dates back to the end of the 18th century, although this term itself was introduced into diplomatic practice in the 30s. 19th century Three main factors led to the emergence and further aggravation of the Eastern question:

1) the decline of the once mighty Ottoman Empire,
2) the growth of the national liberation movement against the Ottoman yoke,
3) aggravation of contradictions among European countries in the Middle East, caused by the struggle for the division of the world.

The decline of the feudal Ottoman Empire and the growth of the national liberation movement among the peoples subject to it prompted the great European powers to interfere in its internal affairs. After all, her possessions covered the most important economic and strategic regions in the Middle East: the Black Sea straits, the Isthmus of Suez, Egypt, Syria, the Balkan Peninsula, part of the Transcaucasus.

For Russia, the solution of the problem of the Black Sea and the Black Sea straits was associated with ensuring the security of the southern borders and with the economic development of the south of the country, with the intensive growth of Russia's foreign trade through the Black Sea. Here tsarism expressed the interests of the Russian landowners, the exporters of grain, and the emerging Russian bourgeoisie. Russia also feared that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire would make it the prey of the stronger European powers. She tried to strengthen her position in the Balkans. Russia in the European rivalry relied on the support of the Slavic peoples.

The patronage of the Orthodox population of the Balkan Peninsula served as a motive for Russia to constantly interfere in the affairs of the Middle East and counteract the expansionist machinations of England and Austria. In this case, tsarism was concerned not with the national self-determination of the peoples subject to the sultan, but with the use of their national liberation struggle in order to spread its political influence in the Balkans. It is necessary to distinguish between the subjective foreign policy goals of tsarism and the objective results of its foreign policy, which brought liberation to the Balkan peoples. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire also pursued an aggressive, predatory policy, sought revenge - to restore its dominance in the Crimea and the Caucasus, suppressed the national liberation movement of the peoples oppressed by it, tried to use the national liberation movement of the peoples of the Caucasus in their own interests against Russia .

The Eastern question acquired the greatest acuteness in the 1920s-1950s. During this period, three crises emerged in the Eastern question:

1) at the beginning of the 20s. in connection with the uprising in 1821 in Greece,
2) in the early 30s in connection with the war of Egypt against Turkey and the threat of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire,
3) in the early 50s. in connection with the dispute between Russia and France about the "Palestinian shrines", which served as a pretext for the Crimean War.

It is characteristic that these three phases of the aggravation of the Eastern question followed the revolutionary "shake-ups": in 1820-1821 - in Spain, Naples, Piedmont; in 1830-1831 - in France, Belgium and Poland; in 1848-- 1849 - in a number of European countries. During revolutionary crises, the "Eastern problem" seemed to fade into the background in the foreign policy of the European powers.

The uprising in Greece in 1821 was prepared with the active participation of Greek emigrants living in the southern cities of Russia. Through their intermediaries there was a lively trade between Russia and the countries of the Mediterranean. Since ancient times, the Greeks hoped for help from Russia in the struggle for liberation from the Ottoman yoke. In 1814, the leading center of the Greek struggle for independence, Geteria, arose in Odessa.

In February 1821, a prominent figure in Geteria, a general in the Russian service, Alexander Ypsilanti crossed over with a detachment of the Greeks Prut, published an appeal to his compatriots, urging them to rise to fight for freedom, and Alexander I sent a request for help to the rebels for independence. In response, the king dismissed Ypsilanti from the army, thus demonstrating his loyalty to the "legitimate" principles of the Holy Alliance. But the speech of Ypsilanti served as a signal for an uprising in Greece.

The Ottoman Empire sought to solve the "Greek question" by mass extermination of the rebellious Greeks. The atrocities of the punishers caused an outburst of indignation in all countries. The progressive public demanded immediate assistance to the Greeks.

At the same time, the Port, under the pretext of combating Greek smuggling, closed the Black Sea straits for Russian merchant ships, which hit the interests of the landowners hard. Alexander I hesitated. On the one hand, he, as the "first landowner of Russia", was obliged to ensure freedom of navigation through the straits and, at the same time, take advantage of the events in Greece to weaken Ottoman rule in the Balkans and strengthen Russia's influence in this region.

On the other hand, he, as an adherent of the principles of the Holy Alliance, considered the rebellious Greeks as "rebels" against the "legitimate" monarch.

Two groups arose at the court: the first was for help to the Greeks, for the prestige of Russia, for using the current situation to resolve the issue of the straits and strengthen Russia in the Balkans, the second was against any help to the Greeks because of the fear of exacerbating relations with other European powers, members of the Holy Alliance. Alexander I supported the position of the second group.

He was aware that his political line in the Greek question was contrary to the state interests of Russia, but he sacrificed them for the sake of strengthening the Holy Alliance and the principles of "legitimism". At the Verona Congress of the Holy Alliance, Alexander I agreed to sign a declaration condemning the Greek uprising as "purely revolutionary."

Meanwhile, the European powers sought to capitalize on the Sultan's conflict with his Greek subjects. England, seeking to gain a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean, recognized the Greeks as a belligerent. France, in order to spread its influence in Egypt, encouraged the Egyptian government of Muhammad Ali to assist the Sultan in suppressing the Greek liberation movement. Austria also supported the Ottoman Empire, hoping to get some territories in the Balkans in return. Nicholas I decided to negotiate with England. March 23 (April 4), 1826 Petersburg Protocol was signed, according to which Russia and England assumed the obligation to mediate between the Sultan and the rebellious Greeks. The demand was made to the Sultan that Greece should be granted autonomy, with its own government and laws, but under the vassalage of the Ottoman Empire. France joined the Petersburg Protocol, and all three powers entered into an agreement on the "collective defense" of the interests of Greece. The Sultan was given an ultimatum to grant autonomy to Greece. The ultimatum was rejected, and the three powers that signed the agreement sent their squadrons to the shores of Greece. October 8(20), 1827 in the bay of Navarino (in southern Greece) a naval battle took place, in which the Turkish-Egyptian fleet was almost completely defeated.

The battle of Navarino contributed to the victory of the Greek people in the struggle for independence.

The joint action of England, France and Russia by no means eliminated the sharp contradictions between them. England, seeking to tie Russia's hands in the Middle East, feverishly fomented revanchist sentiments in Iran and the Ottoman Empire. With British money and with the help of British military advisers, the Iranian army was armed and reorganized. Iran sought to return the territories lost under the Gulistan peace treaty of 1813 in Transcaucasia. The news of the uprising in St. Petersburg in December 1825 was perceived by the Shah's government as a good moment to unleash hostilities against Russia. On July 16 (28), 1826, the Iranian army invaded Transcaucasia without declaring war and began a rapid movement towards Tbilisi. But soon she was stopped and began to suffer defeat after defeat. At the end of August 1826, Russian troops under the command of A.P.

Yermolov completely cleared Transcaucasia from Iranian troops, and hostilities were transferred to the territory of Iran.

Nicholas I transferred command of the troops of the Caucasian Corps to I.F. Paskevich. In April 1827, the offensive of the Russian troops of Eastern Armenia began. The local Armenian population rose to help the Russian troops. In early July, Nakhchivan fell, and in October 1827, Eri Van, the largest fortresses and centers of the Nakhichevan and Erivan khanates. Soon all of Eastern Armenia was liberated by Russian troops. At the end of October 1827, Russian troops occupied Tabriz, the second capital of Iran, and quickly advanced towards Tehran.

Panic broke out among the Iranian troops. Under these conditions, the Shah's government was forced to agree to the terms of peace proposed by Russia. On February 10 (22), 1826, the Turkmenchay peace treaty between Russia and Iran was signed. On the Russian side, he negotiated and signed the contract with A.S. Griboyedov. According to the Turkmanchayek treaty, the Nakhichevan and Erivan khanates joined Russia, Iran paid Russia 20 million rubles. indemnity, provided on its territory advantages in trade for Russian merchants. The agreement provided for the free navigation of all Russian ships in the Caspian Sea, the prohibition for Iran to keep military ships in the Caspian, and the freedom of resettlement of the Armenian population in Russia. According to this clause of the agreement, 135,000 Armenians moved to Russia.

In 1828, the Armenian region was formed from the Erivan and Nakhichevan khanates annexed to Russia with Russian administrative control.

The liberation of Eastern Armenia and its entry into Russia had a beneficial effect on the development of the economy and culture of this religious oppression and the threat of extermination. The establishment of a preferential tariff by the Russian government contributed to the strengthening of Russian-Armenian trade and economic ties.

Favorable conditions were also created for cultural communication. However, the reunification of the Armenian people did not happen: Western Armenia continued to remain under the yoke of the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkmanchay Treaty was a major success for Russia. The British government did everything to frustrate it. Bribery of the Shah's officials and inciting religious and national fanaticism were also used. In February 1829, an attack was provoked on the Russian embassy in Tehran. The reason was the flight from one harem of two Armenian women and a eunuch, who had taken refuge in the embassy. A fanatical mob smashed the embassy and massacred almost the entire Russian mission of 38 people, only the secretary of the embassy escaped. Among the dead was the head of the mission, A. S. Griboyedov. But England failed to provoke a military conflict between Russia and Iran. Russia was satisfied with the Shah's personal apologies.

The Turkmanchay world untied Russia's hands before the imminent military conflict with the Ottoman Empire, which took an openly hostile position towards Russia, longed for revenge for previous failures and systematically violated the articles of peace treaties. The immediate cause of the war was a series of actions of the Ottoman government: the delay of merchant ships under the Russian flag, the seizure of cargo and the expulsion of Russian merchants from Ottoman possessions. On April 14 (26), 1828, the tsar issued a manifesto on the beginning of the war with the Ottoman Empire. The English and French cabinets, although they declared their neutrality, but secretly supported the Ottoman Empire. Austria helped her with weapons, and defiantly concentrated her troops on the border with Russia.

The war was extremely difficult for Russia. She revealed the inhibitory role of the feudal-absolutist order in the development of military affairs. The troops, accustomed to parade ground art, technically poorly equipped and led by incompetent generals, initially could not achieve any significant success. The soldiers were starving, diseases raged among them, from which more people died than from enemy bullets.

On August 8 (20) Adrianople fell. On September 2 (14), 1829, a peace treaty was concluded in Adrianople. Russia received the mouth of the Danube, the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus from Anapa to the approaches to Batumi. The Ottoman Empire paid 33 million rubles. contributions.

Russia's small territorial acquisitions under the Adrianople Treaty were of great strategic importance, as they strengthened Russia's position on the Black Sea. A limit was placed on Turkish expansion in the Caucasus.

The Peace of Adrianople was even more important for the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula: Greece received autonomy (in 1830 - independence), the autonomy of Serbia and the Danubian principalities - Moldavia and Wallachia expanded. But the pinnacle of Russia's diplomatic success in the Middle East was 1832-1833, when Russia intervened in the Turkish-Egyptian conflict.

Egypt, having achieved autonomy, began the final liberation. His troops defeated the army of the Turks. Nicholas decided to help the Ottoman Empire. On June 26 (July 8), 1833, an alliance agreement was signed with the Sultan for a period of 8 years (Unkar-Iskelesi). Under this treaty, both parties pledged to provide each other with military assistance in the event of an attack on one of them by any other power. The inviolability of the Treaty of Adrianople was confirmed.

But the most important thing was the secret article of the treaty, according to which Turkey was exempted from providing military assistance to Russia in the event of a war between Russia and any other power. In return, in case of war, she pledged to close the straits for the passage of military ships of all countries except Russia.

The Unkar-Iskelesi Treaty significantly strengthened Russia's position in the Middle East, but at the same time aggravated Russia's relations with the Western European powers. England and France sent notes of protest, demanding the annulment of the treaty. Austria joined them. A noisy anti-Russian campaign was launched in the English and French press. England sought to "drown" the Unkar-Iskelesi Treaty in some multilateral convention. Such a case presented itself.

In 1839, the Sultan removed Muhammad Ali from the post of ruler of Egypt. He again gathered a large army, moved it against the Sultan and defeated his troops in several battles. The Sultan again turned to the European powers for help. And first of all, to Russia, in pursuance of the treaty of 1833, England tried to use the current situation to conclude a multilateral treaty with respect to the Ottoman Empire even before the expiration of the Unkar-Iskelesi treaty. As a result, the bilateral Russian-Turkish alliance was replaced by the collective tutelage of the four European powers - Russia, England, Austria and Prussia.

a term denoting those that arose in the XVIII - early. XX centuries international contradictions associated with the beginning of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the growth of the national liberation movement of the peoples inhabiting it and the struggle of European countries for the division of the empire's possessions. Tsarism wanted to resolve this issue in its own interests: to dominate the Black Sea, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and the Balkan Peninsula.

Great Definition

Incomplete definition ↓

EASTERN QUESTION

conditional, accepted in diplomacy and East. liter-re, designation of international. controversy con. 18 - beg. 20 centuries, associated with the emerging collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Sultan Turkey) and the struggle of the great powers (Austria (since 1867 - Austria-Hungary), Great Britain, Prussia (since 1871 - Germany), Russia and France) for the division of its possessions, first turn - European. V. in. was generated, on the one hand, by the crisis of the Ottoman Empire, one of the manifestations of which was nat. the movement of the Balkan and other non-Turkish peoples of the empire, on the other hand, by strengthening in Bl. East colonial expansion of Europe. state-in in connection with the development of capitalism in them. The very term "V. in." was first used at the Verona Congress (1822) of the Holy Alliance during a discussion of the situation that arose in the Balkans as a result of the Greek national liberation uprising of 1821-29 against Turkey. The first period of V. century. covers a period of time from con. 18th century before the Crimean War of 1853-56. It is characterized by the the predominant role of Russia in Bl. East. Thanks to the victorious wars with Turkey 1768-74, 1787-91 (92), 1806-12, 1828-29, Russia secured the South. Ukraine, Crimea, Bessarabia and the Caucasus, and firmly established itself on the banks of the Black m. At the same time, Russia achieved bargaining. fleet of the right of passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles (see Kyuchuk-Kaynardzhysky world 1774), as well as for their military. ships (see Russo-Turkish Union Treaties of 1799 and 1805). The autonomy of Serbia (1829), the limitation of the Sultan's power over Moldavia and Wallachia (1829), the independence of Greece (1830), as well as the closing of the Dardanelles to the military. courts of foreign state-in (except Russia; see Unkyar-Iskelesi Treaty of 1833) in means. least were the results of the successes of the Rus. weapons. Despite the aggressive goals pursued by tsarism in relation to the Ottoman Empire and the territories departing from it, the formation of independent states on the Balkan Peninsula was a historically progressive consequence of the victories of the Russian army over Sultan's Turkey. The expansionist interests of Russia clashed at Bl. East with the expansion of other European. powers. At the turn of the 18-19 centuries. ch. role here tried to play post-revolutionary. France. In order to conquer the East. markets and the crushing of the colonial predominance of Great Britain Directory, and then Napoleon I sought terr. conquests at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and the acquisition of land approaches to India. The presence of this threat (and, in particular, the invasion of French troops into Egypt (see the Egyptian expedition of 1798-1801)) explains the conclusion of an alliance by Turkey with Russia in 1799 and 1805 and with Great Britain in 1799. Strengthening Russian-French. contradictions in Europe and, in particular, in V. century. led in 1807-08 to the failure of negotiations between Napoleon I and Alexander I on the partition of the Ottoman Empire. New aggravation of V. century. was caused by the uprising of the Greeks in 1821 against the tour. dominance and the growth of disagreements between Russia and Great Britain, as well as contradictions within the Holy Alliance. Tur.-Egypt. the conflicts of 1831-33, 1839-40, which threatened the preservation of the Sultan's power over the Ottoman Empire, were accompanied by the intervention of the great powers (Egypt was supported by France). The Unkar-Iskelesi Treaty of 1833 on an alliance between Russia and Turkey was the apogee of the political and diplomatic. successes of tsarism in V. century. However, pressure from Great Britain and Austria, seeking to eliminate the predominant influence of Russia in the Ottoman Empire, and especially the desire of Nicholas I for political. The isolation of France resulted in the rapprochement between Russia and Great Britain on the basis of the Great Britain. and the conclusion of the London Conventions of 1840 and 1841, which actually meant diplomatic. British victory. The royal government agreed to cancel the Unkar-Iskelesi Treaty of 1833 and, together with other powers, agreed to "monitor the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire," and also proclaimed the principle of closing the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to foreigners. military courts, including Russian ones. The second period of V. century. opens with the Crimean War of 1853-56 and ends in the end. 19th century At this time, the interest of Great Britain, France and Austria in the Ottoman Empire increased even more, as a source of colonial raw materials and a market for prom. goods. Expansionist policy of Western Europe. state-in, under convenient circumstances, tearing off its outlying territories from Turkey (the capture of Cyprus in 1878 by Great Britain and Egypt in 1882, the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1878 and Tunisia by France in 1881), was masked by the principles of maintaining the "status quo", " integrity" of the Ottoman Empire and the "balance of power" in Europe. This policy was aimed at achieving the English. and French capital of monopoly domination over Turkey, the elimination of Russian influence in the Balkan Peninsula and the closure of the Black Sea straits for Russian. military courts. At the same time, the ongoing West-Europe. by the powers, the course delayed the liquidation of the historically obsolete domination of the aurochs. feudal lords over the peoples subject to them. The Crimean War of 1853-56 and the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 helped to strengthen the position of the English. and French capital in the Ottoman Empire and its transformation to the con. 19th century to a semi-colonial country. At the same time, the revealed weakness of Russia in comparison with the capitalist. state-you Zap. Europe determined the decline of the influence of tsarism in the international. affairs, including in V. century. This was clearly manifested in the decisions of the Berlin Congress of 1878, when, after the war won with Turkey, the tsarist government was forced to revise the San Stefano Peace Treaty of 1878. Nevertheless, the creation of a single Romanian state (1859-61) and the proclamation of the independence of Romania ( 1877) were achieved thanks to the help of Russia, and the liberation of the Bolg. people from tour. oppression (1878) was the result of Russia's victory in the war with Turkey 1877-73. The desire of Austria-Hungary to economical. and political hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula, where the paths of expansion of the Habsburg monarchy and Tsarist Russia crossed, caused from the 70s. 19th century the growth of the Austro-Russian. antagonism in V. century. Advance in con. 19th century The era of imperialism opens the third period of the V. century. In connection with the completion of the division of the world, new vast markets appeared for the export of capital and goods, new sources of colonial raw materials, and new hotbeds of world conflicts arose - in the Far East, in Lat. America, in the Center. and Sev. Africa and in other regions of the globe, which led to a decrease in the proportion of V. century. in the system of contradictions in Europe. powers. Nevertheless, the inherent unevenness and spasmodic development of otd. capitalist countries and the struggle for the redistribution of the already divided world led to an intensification of rivalry between them in the semi-colonies, including in Turkey, which also manifested itself in the V. century. Especially rapid expansion was developed by Germany, which managed to oust Great Britain, Russia, France and Austria-Hungary in the Ottoman Empire. The construction of the Baghdad railway and the subordination of the ruling tour. the tops, headed by Sultan Abdul-Hamid II, and somewhat later, the Young Turks military-political. German influence. imperialists ensured Kaiser's Germany predominance in the Ottoman Empire. Germ. expansion contributed to the strengthening of Russian-German. and especially Anglo-German. antagonism. In addition, the activation of the aggressive policy of Austria-Hungary in the Balkan Peninsula (the desire to annex the territories inhabited by the South-Slavic peoples, and to gain access to the Aegean), based on the support of Germany (see the Bosnian crisis of 1908- 09), led to extreme tension in the Austro-Rus. relationships. However, the royal pr-in, postponing in the con. 19th century implementation of their captors. plans in V. century, adhered to a waiting and cautious course. This was explained by the diversion of Russia's forces and attention to the Far East, and then by the weakening of tsarism as a result of the defeat in the war with Japan, and especially thanks to the first Russian. revolutions of 1905-07. The growth of contradictions in V. century. in the era of imperialism and the expansion of its territories. the framework contributed to the further process of the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, accompanied, on the one hand, by the further development and expansion of the national liberation. movements of peoples subject to the sultan - Armenians, Macedonians, Albanians, the population of Crete, Arabs and, on the other hand, the intervention of Europe. powers in ext. affairs of Turkey. The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the progressive result of which was the liberation of Macedonia, Albania and Greek. islands of the Aegean m. from the tour. oppression, at the same time testified to the extreme exacerbation of V. century. Turkey's participation in the 1st World War on the side of the German-Austrian. block determined the onset of critical. phases of V. century. As a result of defeats on the fronts, the Ottoman Empire lost b. h. of its territory. At the same time, during the war, the German the imperialists turned the Ottoman Empire "... into their financial and military vassal" (V. I. Lenin, Soch., vol. 23, p. 172). Secret agreements concluded during the war between the members of the Entente (the Anglo-Russian-French agreement of 1915, the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916, etc.) provided for the transfer of Constantinople and the Black Sea straits to Russia and the division of Asia. parts of Turkey between the allies. The plans and calculations of the imperialists in the Great Britain. destroyed the victory in Russia Vel. Oct. socialist. revolution. Owls. pr-in resolutely broke with the policy of tsarism and canceled the secret treaties signed by the tsar and the Time. pr-you, including treaties and agreements relating to the Ottoman Empire. Oct. the revolution gave a powerful impetus to the national liberation. struggle of the peoples of the East and among them - the struggle of the tour. people. The victory of the national-liberate. movements in Turkey in 1919-22 and the collapse of the anti-Turks. imperialist Entente interventions were achieved with moral and political. and material support from the Soviets. Russia. On the ruins of the former multinational The Ottoman Empire formed a national bourgeoisie. tour. state-in. So, the new ist. era opened Oct. revolution, forever removed V. century. from the arena of world politics. Lit.ra about V. v. very large. There is not a single summary work on the history of diplomacy and international affairs. relations of modern times, and especially in the history of Turkey, Russia, and the Balkan states, in which V. v. would not have been affected to a greater or lesser extent. In addition, there is an extensive scientific and journalistic literature, dedicated to various aspects and periods of V. century. or covering certain events related to V. c. (preferably about the problem of the straits and about the Russian-Turkish wars of the 18-19th centuries). However, generalizing studies about V. in. extremely little, which to a certain extent is explained by the complexity and vastness of the issue itself, the interpretation of which requires the study of a large number of documents and extensive literature. Deep characteristic V. century. given by K. Marx and F. Engels in articles and letters, publ. on the eve and during the Crimean War and the Bosnian (Eastern) crisis of 1875-78 and dedicated to the state of the Ottoman Empire and the intensified struggle of Europe. powers on Bl. East (see Soch., 2nd ed., vols. 9, 10, 11; 1st ed., vols. 15, 24). Marx and Engels acted in them with consistently internationalist. positions dictated by the interests of development in Europe and, in particular, in Russia, revolutionary-democratic. and the proletarian movement. They angrily exposed the invaders. goals pursued in V. century. tsarism. Marx and Engels stigmatized politics in the century with particular force. English bourgeois-aristocratic. oligarchy headed by G. J. T. Palmerston, determined by aggressive aspirations in Bl. East. The best resolution of V. in. Marx and Engels considered the real and complete liberation of the Balkan peoples from the Turks. yoke. But, in their opinion, such a radical elimination of V. century. could be carried out only as a result of the victory of Europe. revolution (see Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 9, pp. 33, 35, 219). Marxist understanding of V. century. as applied to the period of imperialism, it was developed by V. I. Lenin. In various studies (for example, "Imperialism, as the highest stage of capitalism") and in numerous. articles ("Combustible material in world politics", "Events in the Balkans and Persia", "A new chapter in world history", "The social significance of Serbian-Bulgarian victories", "Balk. war and bourgeois chauvinism", "Awakening of Asia" , "Under a false flag", "On the right of nations to self-determination", etc.) Lenin characterized the process of turning the Ottoman Empire into an imperialist semi-colony. powers and their predatory policy in Bl. East. At the same time, Lenin claimed for all the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, including for the tour. people, the inalienable right to liberation from the imperialist. bondage and feud. dependencies and independence. Existence. In the owls ist. science V. c. widely interpreted in many studies of M. H. Pokrovsky about external. politics of Russia and international relations of the new time ("Imperialist War", Collection of Articles, 1931; "Diplomacy and Wars of Tsarist Russia in the 19th Century", Collection of Articles, 1923; article "Eastern Question", TSB, 1st ed., vol. 13) . Pokrovsky is credited with exposing and criticizing the aggressive designs and actions of tsarism in the Second Century. But attributing bargaining. capital a decisive role in external. and int. policy of Russia, Pokrovsky reduced the policy of tsarism in the V. century. to the desire of the Russian landowners and the bourgeoisie to achieve the possession of bargaining. through the Black Sea Straits. However, he exaggerated the value of V. century. in ext. Russian politics and diplomacy. In a number of his works, Pokrovsky characterizes the Russian-German. antagonism in V. century. as the main the cause of the 1st World War of 1914-18, and considers the tsarist government to be the main culprit in unleashing it. This implies the erroneous statement of Pokrovsky that in August-October. 1914 Russia allegedly sought to draw the Ottoman Empire into the world war on the side of the Central European. powers. Represent scientific. value based on unpubl. doc-tah of the work of E. A. Adamov "The Question of the Straits and Constantinople in International Politics in 1908-1917." (in the collection of documents: "Constantinople and the straits according to the secret docks of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs", (vol.) 1, 1925, p. 7 - 151); Ya. M. Zakhera ("On the history of Russian policy on the issue of the straits in the period between the Russian-Japanese and Tripolitan wars", in the book: From the distant and near past, collection in honor of N. I. Kareev, 1923 ; "Constantinople and the Straits", "KA", vol. 6, pp. 48-76, vol. 7, pp. 32-54; "Russian policy on the question of Constantinople and the straits during the Tripolitan War", "Izvestiya Leningrad State Pedagogical Institute named after A. I. Herzen", 1928, v. 1, pp. 41-53); M. A. Petrov "Preparation of Russia for a world war at sea" (1926) and V. M. Khvostov "Problems of capturing the Bosphorus in the 90s of the XIX century." ("Historian-Marxist", 1930, vol. 20, pp. 100-129), devoted to ch. arr. development in governments. circles of Russia of various projects for the occupation of the Bosphorus and the preparation of the Navy for the implementation of this operation, as well as the policy of Europe. powers in V. century. before and during World War I. A concise overview of the history of V. V., based on a document. sources, is contained in the articles of E. A. Adamov ("On the question of the historical prospects for the development of the Eastern Question", in the book: "Colonial East", edited by A. Sultan-Zade, 1924, pp. 15-37; " Section of Asian. Turkey", in collection of documents: "Section of Asian. Turkey. According to the secret documents of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs", edited by E. A. Adamov, 1924, p. 5-101 ). Deep analysis of the struggle of the imperialist. powers in V. century. in con. 19th century is contained in the article by V. M. Khvostov "The Middle East Crisis of 1895-1897." ("Historian-Marxist", 1929, v. 13), in the monographs of A. S. Yerusalimsky "Foreign policy and diplomacy of German imperialism in the late 19th century." (2nd ed., 1951) and G. L. Bondarevsky "The Baghdad road and the penetration of German imperialism into the Middle East. 1888-1903" (1955). Capitalist politics. state-in in V. century. in the 19th century and at the beginning 20th century studied in the works of A. D. Novichev ("Essays on the Turkish Economy before the World War", 1937; "The Turkish Economy during the World War", 1935). Based on the involvement of extensive materials, including archival documents, the predatory goals and methods of penetration into the Ottoman Empire by foreigners are revealed. capital, the conflicting interests of the monopoly. groups of various countries, characterized by the enslavement of Turkey German-Austrian. imperialists during World War I. European politics. powers in V. century. in the 20s 19th century The monograph "Russia and the Eastern Crisis of the 1920s" by A. V. Fadeev, based on archival materials, is devoted to this. (1958), articles by I. G. Gutkina "The Greek Question and Diplomatic Relations of the European Powers in 1821-1822." ("Uch. Zap. Leningrad State University", Ser. Historical Sciences, 1951, v. 18, No. 130): N. S. Kinyapina "Russian-Austrian contradictions on the eve and during the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-29. " ("Uch. zap. MGU", works of the Department of History of the USSR, 1952, v. 156); O. Shparo "Canning's Foreign Policy and the Greek Question 1822-1827" ("VI", 1947, No 12) and "The Role of Russia in the Greek Struggle for Independence" ("VI", 1949, No 8). In the aforementioned study by A. V. Fadeev and in another work by the same author (“Russia and the Caucasus in the first third of the 19th century,” 1960), an attempt was made to interpret the V. century broadly, as also including political. and economic problems cf. East and Caucasus. The policy of Russia and France in the V. century. in the beginning. 19th century and international the position of the Ottoman Empire during this period of time is covered in the monograph by A.F. Miller "Mustafa Pasha Bayraktar. The Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 19th century." (1947). Systematic diplomatic presentation. V.'s sides of century. can be found in the corresponding sections of the "History of Diplomacy", vol. 1, 2nd ed., 1959, vol. 2, 1945. Sharpness and political. the topicality of V. in internat. relations of the new time left a strong imprint on the studies of the bourgeoisie. scientists. In their works, the interests of the ruling classes of the country to which this or that historian belongs are clearly visible. Specialist. the study "The Eastern Question" was written by S. M. Solovyov (collected works, St. Petersburg, 1901, pp. 903-48). Considering the most important factor geographic development. environment, Solovyov formulates V. c. as a manifestation of the primordial struggle of Europe, to which he also refers Russia, with Asia, the sea coast and forests with the steppe. Hence his justification of the aggressive policy of tsarism in the V. century, which, in his opinion, is based on the process of colonization of the South Russian. districts, "fight against the Asians", "offensive movement in Asia". In the apologetic spirit illuminated the policy of tsarism in V. in. in the monograph by S. M. Goryainov "The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles" (1907), covering the period from the end. 18th century by 1878 and retaining its scientific. value due to the extensive use of archival documents. The unfinished publication of R. P. Martens "Collection of treatises and conventions concluded by Russia with foreign powers" (vols. 1-15, 1874-1909), although it does not contain treaties between Russia and Turkey, does include a number of international agreements. agreements directly related to V. century. Of scientific interest are also ist. introductions, preceded by most of the published documents. Some of these introductions, based on archival sources, contain valuable material on the history of V. century. in con. 18th century and in the 1st floor. 19th century Aggressive and anti-Russian. course in V. v. brit. English diplomacy. historians (J. Marriott, A. Toynbee, W. Miller) justify their bargaining by the needs of Great Britain. routes (especially communications linking it with India, and land approaches to this colony) and the importance from this point of view of the Black Sea straits, Istanbul, Egypt and Mesopotamia. So considers V. century. J. A. R. Marriot, "The Eastern question", 4 ed., 1940), trying to present the policy of Great Britain as invariably defensive. and pro-Turkish. For the French bourgeois historiography is characterized by the substantiation of the "civilizing" and "cultural" mission of France in Bl. East, to-roy she seeks to cover up the expansionist goals pursued in V. century. French capital. Attaching great importance to the right of religion acquired by France. protectorate over the Catholic Sultan's subjects, French historians (E. Drio. J. Ansel. G. Anoto, L. Lamouche) in every possible way extol the activities of Catholic missionaries in the Ottoman Empire, preim. in Syria and Palestine. This trend is visible in the repeatedly reprinted work of E. Driault (E. Driault, "La Question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusgu'a nos jours", 8 ?d., 1926) and in the book. J. Ancel (1923), "Manuel historique de la question d´Orient. 1792-1923". Austrian historians (G. Ibersberger, E. Wertheimer, T. Sosnosky, A. Pribram), exaggerating the significance of the aggressive policy of the tsarist government in the V. century. and portraying it as a creation of the pan-Slavists allegedly dominating Russia, at the same time they are trying to whitewash the annexationist actions and the invaders. plans on the Balkan Peninsula of the Habsburg monarchy. In this regard, the works of b. Rector of the University of Vienna G. Ubersberger. Wide involvement of Russian. literature and sources, including owls. publications of documents, is used by him for one-sided coverage of Russia's policy in V. in. and a frank justification of antislav. and antirus. policy of Austria (in the later period of Austria-Hungary) (N. Uebersberger, "Russlands Orientpolitik in den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten", 1913; his own, "Das Dardanellenproblem als russische Schicksalsfrage", 1930; his own, "?sterreich zwischen Russland und Serbien ", 1958). A similar point of view is shared by most Germans. bourgeois scientists (G. Franz, G. Herzfeld, H. Holborn, O. Brandenburg), who assert that it was precisely the policy of Russia in the V. century. caused World War I. So, G. Franz believes that Ch. the cause of this war was the desire of tsarism to possess the Black Sea straits. It ignores the value of germ support. imperialism of the Balkan policy of Austria-Hungary, denies that Kaiser Germany had independence. invader goals in V. century. (G. Frantz, "Die Meerengenfrage in der Vorkriegspolitik Russlands", "Deutsche Rundschau", 1927, Bd 210, Februar, S. 142-60). Typ. bourgeois historiography considers V. v. exclude. from the angle of vnesh.-political. provisions of Turkey 18-20 centuries. Guided by his extremely chauvinistic. the concept of historical process, tour. historians deny the existence of a nat in the Ottoman Empire. oppression. Fight netur. peoples for their independence, they explain the inspiration of Europe. powers. Falsifying history. facts, tour. historians (Yu. X. Bayur, I. X. Uzuncharshyly, E. Urash, A. B. Kuran, and others) argue that the conquest of the Balkan Peninsula by the Turks and its inclusion in the Ottoman Empire was progressive, because it allegedly contributed to the socio-economic. and cultural development of the Balkan peoples. Based on this falsification, tour. official historiography makes false, anti-historical. the conclusion that the wars waged by Sultan Turkey in the 18th-20th centuries were allegedly purely defensive. character for the Ottoman Empire and aggressive for Europe. Powers. Publ.: Yuzefovich T., Treaties of Russia with the East, St. Petersburg, 1869; Sat. treaties of Russia with other states (1856-1917), M., 1952; Constantinople and the Straits. According to secret documents b. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed. E. A. Adamova, vol. 1-2, M., 1925-26; Section of Asiatic Turkey. According to secret documents b. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed. Edited by E. A. Adamova. Moscow, 1924. Three meetings, foreword. M. Pokrovsky, "Herald of the NKID", 1919, No 1, p. 12-44; From an archivist's notebook. Note by A. I. Nelidov in 1882 on the occupation of the straits, foreword. V. Khvostova, "KA", 1931, v. 3 (46), p. 179-87; The project of capturing the Bosphorus in 1896, foreword. V. M. Khvostov, "KA", 1931, vol. 4-5 (47-48), p. 50-70; The project of capturing the Bosphorus in 1897, "KA", 1922, v. 1, p. 152-62; The tsarist government on the problem of the straits in 1898-1911, foreword. V. Khvostova, "KA", 1933, v. 6(61), p. 135-40; Noradounghian G., Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman, v. 1-3, P., 1897-1903; Strupp K., Ausgew?hlte diplomatische Aktenst?cke zur orientalischen Frage, (Gotha, 1916); A documentary record, 1535-1914, ed. by J. C. Hurewitz, N. Y. - L. - Toronto. 1956. Lit. (except for the one indicated in the article): Girs A.A., Russia and Bl. Vostok, St. Petersburg, 1906; Dranov B. A., Black Sea Straits, M., 1948; Miller A. P., A Brief History of Turkey, M., 1948; Druzhinina E.I., Kyuchuk-Kainarji world of 1774 (its preparation and conclusion), M., 1955; Ulyanitsky V.A., Dardanelles, Bosphorus and Black Sea in the 18th century. Essays on diplomacy. East history. question, M., 1883; Cahuet A., La question d´Orient dans l´histoire contemporaine (1821-1905), P., 1905; Choublier M., La question d´Orient depuis le Trait? de Berlin, P., 1897; Djuvara T. G., Cent projets de partage de la Turquie (1281-1913), P., 1914; Martens F., Etude historique sur la politique russe dans la question d´Orient. Gand-B.-P., 1877; Sorel A., La Question d´Orient au XVIII si?cle (Les origines de la triple alliance), P., 1878; Roepell R., Die orientalische Frage in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung 1774-1830, Breslau, 1854; Wurm C. F., Diplomatische Ceschichte der Orientalischen Frage, Lpz., 1858; Bayur Y. H., T?rk inkil?bi tarihi, cilt 1-3, Ist., 1940-55. (See also literature at the station of the Black Sea Straits). A. S. Silin. Leningrad.

EASTERN QUESTION

The very term "V. in." was first used at the Verona Congress (1822) of the Holy Alliance during a discussion of the situation that arose in the Balkans as a result of the Greek national liberation uprising of 1821-29 against Turkey.

The first period of V. century. covers a period of time from con. 18th century before the Crimean War of 1853-56. It is characterized by the the predominant role of Russia in Bl. East. Thanks to the victorious wars with Turkey 1768-74, 1787-91 (92), 1806-12, 1828-29, Russia secured the South. Ukraine, Crimea, Bessarabia and the Caucasus, and firmly established itself on the banks of the Black m. At the same time, Russia achieved bargaining. fleet of the right of passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles (see Kyuchuk-Kaynardzhysky world 1774), as well as for their military. ships (see Russo-Turkish Union Treaties of 1799 and 1805). The autonomy of Serbia (1829), the limitation of the Sultan's power over Moldavia and Wallachia (1829), the independence of Greece (1830), as well as the closing of the Dardanelles to the military. courts of foreign state-in (except Russia; see Unkyar-Iskelesi Treaty of 1833) in means. least were the results of the successes of the Rus. weapons. Despite the aggressive goals pursued by tsarism in relation to the Ottoman Empire and the territories departing from it, the formation of independent states on the Balkan Peninsula was a historically progressive consequence of the victories of the Russian army over Sultan's Turkey.

The expansionist interests of Russia clashed at Bl. East with the expansion of other European. powers. At the turn of the 18-19 centuries. ch. role here tried to play post-revolutionary. France. In order to conquer the East. markets and the crushing of the colonial predominance of Great Britain Directory, and then Napoleon I sought terr. conquests at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and the acquisition of land approaches to India. The presence of this threat (and, in particular, the invasion of French troops into Egypt (see Egyptian expedition 1798-1801)) explains the conclusion of an alliance with Turkey in 1799 and 1805 and with Great Britain in 1799. Strengthening the Russian-French. contradictions in Europe and, in particular, in V. century. led in 1807-08 to the failure of negotiations between Napoleon I and Alexander I on the partition of the Ottoman Empire. New aggravation of V. century. was caused by the uprising of the Greeks in 1821 against the tour. dominance and the growth of disagreements between Russia and Great Britain, as well as contradictions within the Holy Alliance. Tur.-Egypt. the conflicts of 1831-33, 1839-40, which threatened the preservation of the Sultan's power over the Ottoman Empire, were accompanied by the intervention of the great powers (Egypt was supported by France). The Unkar-Iskelesi Treaty of 1833 on an alliance between Russia and Turkey was the apogee of the political and diplomatic. successes of tsarism in V. century. However, pressure from Great Britain and Austria, seeking to eliminate the predominant influence of Russia in the Ottoman Empire, and especially the desire of Nicholas I for political. The isolation of France resulted in the rapprochement between Russia and Great Britain on the basis of the Great Britain. and the conclusion of the London Conventions of 1840 and 1841, which actually meant diplomatic. British victory. The royal government agreed to cancel the Unkar-Iskelesi Treaty of 1833 and, together with other powers, agreed to "monitor the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire," and also proclaimed the principle of closing the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to foreigners. military courts, including Russian ones.

The second period of V. century. opens with the Crimean War of 1853-56 and ends in the end. 19th century At this time, the interest of Great Britain, France and Austria in the Ottoman Empire increased even more, as a source of colonial raw materials and a market for prom. goods. Expansionist policy of Western Europe. state-in, under convenient circumstances, tearing off its outlying territories from Turkey (the capture of Cyprus in 1878 by Great Britain and Egypt in 1882, the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1878 and Tunisia by France in 1881), was masked by the principles of maintaining the "status quo", " integrity" of the Ottoman Empire and the "balance of power" in Europe. This policy was aimed at achieving the English. and French capital of monopoly domination over Turkey, the elimination of Russian influence in the Balkan Peninsula and the closure of the Black Sea straits for Russian. military courts. At the same time, the ongoing West-Europe. by the powers, the course delayed the liquidation of the historically obsolete domination of the aurochs. feudal lords over the peoples subject to them. The Crimean War of 1853-56 and the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 helped to strengthen the position of the English. and French capital in the Ottoman Empire and its transformation to the con. 19th century to a semi-colonial country. At the same time, the revealed weakness of Russia in comparison with the capitalist. state-you Zap. Europe determined the decline of the influence of tsarism in the international. affairs, including in V. century. This was clearly manifested in the decisions of the Berlin Congress of 1878, when, after the war won with Turkey, the tsarist government was forced to revise the San Stefano Peace Treaty of 1878. Nevertheless, the creation of a single Romanian state (1859-61) and the proclamation of the independence of Romania ( 1877) were achieved thanks to the help of Russia, and the liberation of the Bolg. people from tour. oppression (1878) was the result of Russia's victory in the war with Turkey 1877-73. The desire of Austria-Hungary to economical. and political hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula, where the paths of expansion of the Habsburg monarchy and Tsarist Russia crossed, caused from the 70s. 19th century the growth of the Austro-Russian. antagonism in V. century.

Advance in con. 19th century The era of imperialism opens the third period of the V. century. In connection with the completion of the division of the world, new vast markets appeared for the export of capital and goods, new sources of colonial raw materials, and new hotbeds of world conflicts arose - in the Far East, in Lat. America, in the Center. and Sev. Africa and in other regions of the globe, which led to a decrease in the proportion of V. century. in the system of contradictions in Europe. powers. Nevertheless, the inherent unevenness and spasmodic development of otd. capitalist countries and the struggle for the redistribution of the already divided world led to an intensification of rivalry between them in the semi-colonies, including in Turkey, which also manifested itself in the V. century. Especially rapid expansion was developed by Germany, which managed to oust Great Britain, Russia, France and Austria-Hungary in the Ottoman Empire. The construction of the Baghdad railway and the subordination of the ruling tour. the tops, headed by Sultan Abdul-Hamid II, and somewhat later, the Young Turks military-political. German influence. imperialists ensured Kaiser's Germany predominance in the Ottoman Empire. Germ. expansion contributed to the strengthening of Russian-German. and especially Anglo-German. antagonism. In addition, the activation of the aggressive policy of Austria-Hungary in the Balkan Peninsula (the desire to annex the territories inhabited by the South-Slavic peoples, and to gain access to the Aegean), based on the support of Germany (see the Bosnian crisis of 1908- 09), led to extreme tension in the Austro-Rus. relationships. However, the royal pr-in, postponing in the con. 19th century implementation of their captors. plans in V. century, adhered to a waiting and cautious course. This was explained by the diversion of Russia's forces and attention to the Far East, and then by the weakening of tsarism as a result of the defeat in the war with Japan, and especially thanks to the first Russian. revolutions of 1905-07. The growth of contradictions in V. century. in the era of imperialism and the expansion of its territories. the framework contributed to the further process of the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, accompanied, on the one hand, by the further development and expansion of the national liberation. movements of peoples subject to the sultan - Armenians, Macedonians, Albanians, the population of Crete, Arabs and, on the other hand, the intervention of Europe. powers in ext. affairs of Turkey. The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the progressive result of which was the liberation of Macedonia, Albania and Greek. islands of the Aegean m. from the tour. oppression, at the same time testified to the extreme exacerbation of V. century.

Turkey's participation in the 1st World War on the side of the German-Austrian. block determined the onset of critical. phases of V. century. As a result of defeats on the fronts, the Ottoman Empire lost b. h. of its territory. At the same time, during the war, the German the imperialists turned the Ottoman Empire "... into their financial and military vassal" (V. I. Lenin, Soch., vol. 23, p. 172). Secret agreements concluded during the war between the members of the Entente (the Anglo-Russian-French agreement of 1915, the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916, etc.) provided for the transfer of Constantinople and the Black Sea straits to Russia and the division of Asia. parts of Turkey between the allies.

The plans and calculations of the imperialists in the Great Britain. destroyed the victory in Russia Vel. Oct. socialist. revolution. Owls. pr-in resolutely broke with the policy of tsarism and canceled the secret treaties signed by the tsar and the Time. pr-you, including treaties and agreements relating to the Ottoman Empire. Oct. the revolution gave a powerful impetus to the national liberation. struggle of the peoples of the East and among them - the struggle of the tour. people. The victory of the national-liberate. movements in Turkey in 1919-22 and the collapse of the anti-Turks. imperialist Entente interventions were achieved with moral and political. and material support from the Soviets. Russia. On the ruins of the former multinational The Ottoman Empire formed a national bourgeoisie. tour. state-in. So, the new ist. era opened Oct. revolution, forever removed V. century. from the arena of world politics.

Lit.ra about V. v. very large. There is not a single summary work on the history of diplomacy and international affairs. relations of modern times, and especially in the history of Turkey, Russia, and the Balkan states, in which V. v. would not have been affected to a greater or lesser extent. In addition, there is an extensive scientific and journalistic literature, dedicated to various aspects and periods of V. century. or covering certain events related to V. c. (preferably about the problem of the straits and about the Russian-Turkish wars of the 18-19th centuries). Nevertheless generalizing researches about V. of century. extremely little, which to a certain extent is explained by the complexity and vastness of the issue itself, the interpretation of which requires the study of a large number of documents and extensive literature.

Deep characteristic V. century. given by K. Marx and F. Engels in articles and letters, publ. on the eve and during the Crimean War and the Bosnian (Eastern) crisis of 1875-78 and dedicated to the state of the Ottoman Empire and the intensified struggle of Europe. powers on Bl. East (see Soch., 2nd ed., vols. 9, 10, 11; 1st ed., vols. 15, 24). Marx and Engels acted in them with consistently internationalist. positions dictated by the interests of development in Europe and, in particular, in Russia, revolutionary-democratic. and the proletarian movement. They angrily exposed the invaders. goals pursued in V. century. tsarism. Marx and Engels stigmatized politics in the century with particular force. English bourgeois-aristocratic. oligarchy headed by G. J. T. Palmerston, determined by aggressive aspirations in Bl. East. The best resolution of V. in. Marx and Engels considered the real and complete liberation of the Balkan peoples from the Turks. yoke. But, in their opinion, such a radical elimination of V. century. could be carried out only as a result of the victory of Europe. revolution (see Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 9, pp. 33, 35, 219).

Marxist understanding of V. century. as applied to the period of imperialism, it was developed by V. I. Lenin. In various studies (for example, "Imperialism, as the highest stage of capitalism") and in numerous. articles ("Combustible material in world politics", "Events in the Balkans and Persia", "A new chapter in world history", "The social significance of Serbian-Bulgarian victories", "Balk. war and bourgeois chauvinism", "Awakening of Asia" , "Under a false flag", "On the right of nations to self-determination", etc.) Lenin characterized the process of turning the Ottoman Empire into an imperialist semi-colony. powers and their predatory policy in Bl. East. At the same time, Lenin claimed for all the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, including for the tour. people, the inalienable right to liberation from the imperialist. bondage and feud. dependencies and independence. Existence.

In the owls ist. science V. c. widely interpreted in many studies of M. H. Pokrovsky about external. politics of Russia and international relations of the new time ("Imperialist War", Collection of Articles, 1931; "Diplomacy and Wars of Tsarist Russia in the 19th Century", Collection of Articles, 1923; article "Eastern Question", TSB, 1st ed., vol. 13) . Pokrovsky is credited with exposing and criticizing the aggressive designs and actions of tsarism in the Second Century. But attributing bargaining. capital a decisive role in external. and int. policy of Russia, Pokrovsky reduced the policy of tsarism in the V. century. to the desire of the Russian landowners and the bourgeoisie to achieve the possession of bargaining. through the Black Sea Straits. However, he exaggerated the value of V. century. in ext. Russian politics and diplomacy. In a number of his works, Pokrovsky characterizes the Russian-German. antagonism in V. century. as the main the cause of the 1st World War of 1914-18, and considers the tsarist government to be the main culprit in unleashing it. This implies the erroneous statement of Pokrovsky that in August-October. 1914 Russia allegedly sought to draw the Ottoman Empire into the world war on the side of the Central European. powers.

Represent scientific. value based on unpubl. doc-tah of the work of E. A. Adamov "The Question of the Straits and Constantinople in International Politics in 1908-1917." (in the collection of documents: "Constantinople and the straits according to the secret docks of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs", (vol.) 1, 1925, p. 7 - 151); Ya. M. Zakhera ("On the history of Russian policy on the issue of the straits in the period between the Russian-Japanese and Tripolitan wars", in the book: From the distant and near past, collection in honor of N. I. Kareev, 1923 ; "Constantinople and the Straits", "KA", vol. 6, pp. 48-76, vol. 7, pp. 32-54; "Russian policy on the question of Constantinople and the straits during the Tripolitan War", "Izvestiya Leningrad State Pedagogical Institute named after A. I. Herzen", 1928, v. 1, pp. 41-53); M. A. Petrov "Preparation of Russia for a world war at sea" (1926) and V. M. Khvostov "Problems of capturing the Bosphorus in the 90s of the XIX century." ("Historian-Marxist", 1930, vol. 20, pp. 100-129), devoted to ch. arr. development in governments. circles of Russia of various projects for the occupation of the Bosphorus and the preparation of the Navy for the implementation of this operation, as well as the policy of Europe. powers in V. century. before and during World War I. A concise overview of the history of V. V., based on a document. sources, is contained in the articles of E. A. Adamov ("On the question of the historical prospects for the development of the Eastern Question", in the book: "Colonial East", edited by A. Sultan-Zade, 1924, pp. 15-37; " Section of Asian. Turkey", in collection of documents: "Section of Asian. Turkey. According to the secret documents of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs", edited by E. A. Adamov, 1924, p. 5-101 ). Deep analysis of the struggle of the imperialist. powers in V. century. in con. 19th century is contained in the article by V. M. Khvostov "The Middle East Crisis of 1895-1897." ("Historian-Marxist", 1929, v. 13), in the monographs of A. S. Yerusalimsky "Foreign policy and diplomacy of German imperialism in the late 19th century." (2nd ed., 1951) and G. L. Bondarevsky "The Baghdad road and the penetration of German imperialism into the Middle East. 1888-1903" (1955). Capitalist politics. state-in in V. century. in the 19th century and at the beginning 20th century studied in the works of A. D. Novichev ("Essays on the Turkish Economy before the World War", 1937; "The Turkish Economy during the World War", 1935). Based on the involvement of extensive materials, including archival documents, the predatory goals and methods of penetration into the Ottoman Empire by foreigners are revealed. capital, the conflicting interests of the monopoly. groups of various countries, characterized by the enslavement of Turkey German-Austrian. imperialists during World War I. European politics. powers in V. century. in the 20s 19th century dedicated to the monograph based on archival materials by A. V. Fadeeva "Russia and the Eastern Crisis of the 20s of the XIX century." (1958), articles by I. G. Gutkina "The Greek Question and Diplomatic Relations of the European Powers in 1821-1822." ("Uch. Zap. Leningrad State University", Ser. Historical Sciences, 1951, v. 18, No. 130): N. S. Kinyapina "Russian-Austrian contradictions on the eve and during the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-29. " ("Uch. zap. MGU", works of the Department of History of the USSR, 1952, v. 156); O. Shparo "Canning's Foreign Policy and the Greek Question 1822-1827" ("VI", 1947, No 12) and "The Role of Russia in the Greek Struggle for Independence" ("VI", 1949, No 8). In the aforementioned study by A. V. Fadeev and in another work by the same author (“Russia and the Caucasus in the first third of the 19th century,” 1960), an attempt was made to interpret the V. century broadly, as also including political. and economic problems cf. East and Caucasus.

The policy of Russia and France in the V. century. in the beginning. 19th century and international the position of the Ottoman Empire during this period of time is covered in the monograph by A.F. Miller "Mustafa Pasha Bayraktar. The Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 19th century." (1947). Systematic diplomatic presentation. V.'s sides of century. can be found in the corresponding sections of the History of Diplomacy, vol. 1, 2nd ed., 1959, vol. 2, 1945.

Sharpness and politics the topicality of V. in internat. relations of the new time left a strong imprint on the studies of the bourgeoisie. scientists. In their works, the interests of the ruling classes of the country to which this or that historian belongs are clearly visible. Specialist. the study "The Eastern Question" was written by S. M. Solovyov (collected works, St. Petersburg, 1901, pp. 903-48). Considering the most important factor geographic development. environment, Solovyov formulates V. c. as a manifestation of the primordial struggle of Europe, to which he also refers Russia, with Asia, the sea coast and forests with the steppe. Hence his justification of the aggressive policy of tsarism in the V. century, which, in his opinion, is based on the process of colonization of the South Russian. districts, "fight against the Asians", "offensive movement in Asia". In the apologetic spirit illuminates the policy of tsarism in the V. century. in the monograph by S. M. Goryainov "The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles" (1907), covering the period from the end. 18th century by 1878 and retaining its scientific. value due to the extensive use of archival documents.

The unfinished publication of R. P. Martens "Collection of treatises and conventions concluded by Russia with foreign powers" (vols. 1-15, 1874-1909), although it does not contain treaties between Russia and Turkey, does include a number of international agreements. agreements directly related to V. century. Of scientific interest are also ist. introductions, preceded by most of the published documents. Some of these introductions, based on archival sources, contain valuable material on the history of V. century. in con. 18th century and in the 1st floor. 19th century

Aggressive and anti-Russian. course in V. v. brit. English diplomacy. historians (J. Marriott, A. Toynbee, W. Miller) justify their bargaining by the needs of Great Britain. routes (especially communications linking it with India, and land approaches to this colony) and the importance from this point of view of the Black Sea straits, Istanbul, Egypt and Mesopotamia. So considers V. century. J. A. R. Marriot, "The Eastern question", 4 ed., 1940), trying to present the policy of Great Britain as invariably defensive. and pro-Turkish.

For the French bourgeois historiography is characterized by the substantiation of the "civilizing" and "cultural" mission of France in Bl. East, to-roy she seeks to cover up the expansionist goals pursued in V. century. French capital. Attaching great importance to the right of religion acquired by France. protectorate over the Catholic Sultan's subjects, French historians (E. Drio. J. Ansel. G. Anoto, L. Lamouche) in every possible way extol the activities of Catholic missionaries in the Ottoman Empire, preim. in Syria and Palestine. This trend is visible in the repeatedly reprinted work of E. Driault (E. Driault, "La Question d" Orient depuis ses origines jusgu "a nos jours", 8 ed., 1926) and in the book. J. Ancel (J. Ancel, "Manuel historique de la question d" Orient. 1792-1923 ", 1923).

Austrian historians (G. Ibersberger, E. Wertheimer, T. Sosnosky, A. Pribram), exaggerating the significance of the aggressive policy of the tsarist government in the V. century. and portraying it as a creation of the pan-Slavists allegedly dominating Russia, at the same time they are trying to whitewash the annexationist actions and the invaders. plans on the Balkan Peninsula of the Habsburg monarchy. In this regard, the works of b. Rector of the University of Vienna G. Ubersberger. Wide involvement of Russian. literature and sources, including owls. publications of documents, is used by him for one-sided coverage of Russia's policy in V. century. and a frank justification of antislav. and antirus. politics of Austria (in the later period of Austria-Hungary) (N. Uebersberger, "Russlands Orientpolitik in den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten", 1913; his own, "Das Dardanellenproblem als russische Schicksalsfrage", 1930; his own, "Österreich zwischen Russland und Serbien" , 1958).

A similar point of view is shared by most Germans. bourgeois scientists (G. Franz, G. Herzfeld, H. Holborn, O. Brandenburg), who assert that it was precisely the policy of Russia in the V. century. caused World War I. So, G. Franz believes that Ch. the cause of this war was the desire of tsarism to possess the Black Sea straits. It ignores the value of germ support. imperialism of the Balkan policy of Austria-Hungary, denies that Kaiser Germany had independence. invader goals in V. century. (G. Frantz, "Die Meerengenfrage in der Vorkriegspolitik Russlands", "Deutsche Rundschau", 1927, Bd 210, Februar, S. 142-60).

Typ. bourgeois historiography considers V. v. exclude. from the angle of vnesh.-political. provisions of Turkey 18-20 centuries. Guided by his extremely chauvinistic. the concept of historical process, tour. historians deny the existence of a nat in the Ottoman Empire. oppression. Fight netur. peoples for their independence, they explain the inspiration of Europe. powers. Falsifying history. facts, tour. historians (Yu. X. Bayur, I. X. Uzuncharshyly, E. Urash, A. B. Kuran, and others) argue that the conquest of the Balkan Peninsula by the Turks and its inclusion in the Ottoman Empire was progressive, because it allegedly contributed to the socio-economic. and cultural development of the Balkan peoples. Based on this falsification, tour. official historiography makes false, anti-historical. the conclusion that the wars waged by Sultan Turkey in the 18th-20th centuries were allegedly purely defensive. character for the Ottoman Empire and aggressive for Europe. Powers.

Publ.: Yuzefovich T., Treaties of Russia with the East, St. Petersburg, 1869; Sat. treaties of Russia with other states (1856-1917), M., 1952; Constantinople and the Straits. According to secret documents b. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed. E. A. Adamova, vol. 1-2, M., 1925-26; Section of Asiatic Turkey. According to secret documents b. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed. Edited by E. A. Adamova. Moscow, 1924. Three meetings, foreword. M. Pokrovsky, "Herald of the NKID", 1919, No 1, p. 12-44; From an archivist's notebook. Note by A. I. Nelidov in 1882 on the occupation of the straits, foreword. V. Khvostova, "KA", 1931, v. 3 (46), p. 179-87; The project of capturing the Bosphorus in 1896, foreword. V. M. Khvostova, "KA", 1931, vol. 4-5 (47-48), p. 50-70; The project of capturing the Bosphorus in 1897, "KA", 1922, v. 1, p. 152-62; The tsarist government on the problem of the straits in 1898-1911, foreword. V. Khvostova, "KA", 1933, v. 6(61), p. 135-40; Noradounghian G., Recueil d "actes internationaux de l" Empire Ottoman, v. 1-3, P., 1897-1903; Strupp K., Ausgewählte diplomatische Aktenstücke zur orientalischen Frage, (Gotha, 1916); A documentary record, 1535-1914, ed. by J. C. Hurewitz, N. Y. - L. - Toronto. 1956.

Lit. (except for the one indicated in the article): Girs A.A., Russia and Bl. Vostok, St. Petersburg, 1906; Dranov B. A., Black Sea Straits, M., 1948; Miller A. P., A Brief History of Turkey, M., 1948; Druzhinina E.I., Kyuchuk-Kainarji world of 1774 (its preparation and conclusion), M., 1955; Ulyanitsky V.A., Dardanelles, Bosphorus and Black Sea in the 18th century. Essays on diplomacy. East history. question, M., 1883; Cahuet A., La question d "Orient dans l" histoire contemporaine (1821-1905), P., 1905; Choublier M., La question d "Orient depuis le Traité de Berlin, P., 1897; Djuvara T. G., Cent projets de partage de la Turquie (1281-1913), P., 1914; Martens F., Etude historique sur la politique russe dans la question d "Orient. Gand-B.-P., 1877; Sorel A., La Question d "Orient au XVIII siècle (Les origines de la triple alliance), P., 1878; Roepell R., Die orientalische Frage in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung 1774-1830, Breslau, 1854; Wurm C. F., Diplomatische Ceschichte der Orientalischen Frage, Lpz., 1858; Bayur Y. H., Türk inkilâbi tarihi, cilt 1-3, Ist., 1940-55 (See also literature at the Black Sea Straits station).

A. S. Silin. Leningrad.

Soviet historical encyclopedia. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. Ed. E. M. Zhukova. 1973-1982 .

Department of Russian History

COURSE WORK

The "Eastern Question" in International Relations in the First Half of the 19th Century

Introduction...……………………………………………………………………..….3

1 "Eastern question" in international relations of the first half of the XIX century. before the start of the Crimean War

1.1 The importance of the Middle East in the system of international relations in the early 19th century

1.1.1 The policy of Russia and Western European powers in the Middle East ..11

1.1.2 Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829 ……………………………………19

1.3 Russian-English relations in the 40s XIX century …………….....33

2 Diplomacy during the Crimean War

2.1 The international situation on the eve of the Crimean War...………………...37

2.2 The position of the Western European powers in the Russian-Turkish conflict......43

2.3 Diplomatic activities of the great powers during the Crimean War and the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 …………………………………....51

Conclusion ...……………………………………………………………………….56

List of references...……………………………………...……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Introduction

The emergence of the concept of "Eastern Question" dates back to the end of the 18th century, although the term itself was first used in international legal terms at the Verona Congress of the Holy Alliance in 1822. In the 30s of the XIX century. firmly entered the political lexicon, diplomatic documents, historical literature and journalism.

The main components of the "Eastern Question" were: Russia's relations with Turkey and with the great powers over Turkish possessions in the Balkans and control over the straits; the policy of Russia and other great powers in relation to the "contact zones" - territories where the possessions of Turkey were in contact with the possessions of the great powers; national liberation struggle of the Balkan peoples.

The relevance of the topic of the work lies in the fact that the "Eastern question" during the second half of the XVIII - early XX century. played an important and often decisive role in the international life of Europe, Western Asia, North Africa and affected most of the European countries. The problems associated with the territories of the Ottoman Empire attracted close attention of European states for many years. Russia and the European powers sought to expand their influence in the East. The conquest of foreign territories and the establishment of their jurisdiction in them was one of the means to achieve the strategic goal - strengthening the political and economic position in the international arena.

The periodization of the history of the "Eastern Question" is controversial among historians. The main difficulty lies in determining the periodization criteria: what should be taken into account when isolating the stages, what should be placed in the center of the periodization scheme. These may be the processes of internal crisis and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the success of the national liberation struggle of the peoples inhabiting it, foreign policy factors. Depending on the use of one or another criterion as a defining criterion, periodization schemes can vary significantly. The lower frames correspond to the middle of the 18th century, when the Ottoman Empire entered the crisis phase of its history. The upper limit is determined by the 20-30s. XX century, during which there was a complete collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

The chronological framework of the work covers the period from the beginning of the XIX century. - until the end of the Crimean War and the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1856.

Russian historians addressed the issue on this issue as early as the 19th century. The “Eastern question” at that time worried many Russian philosophers, publicists and historians, which is quite understandable. In the works of S.S. Tatishchev, F. Martens and many other pre-revolutionary authors, the policy of tsarism in Eastern affairs was portrayed as peaceful, defensive and just. CM. Solovyov overgeneralized the concept of the “Eastern Question”, introducing into it motives and facts of a world-historical nature, which will not change and remain in full force even after the resolution of those historical and cultural gaps that occurred as a result of the Turkish conquest of the peoples of South-Eastern Europe. The work “Russia and Europe” by N.Ya. Danilevsky, historian and sociologist, who saw the essence of the "Eastern question" in the struggle between two historically established types - Romano-Germanic and Greek-Slavic, each of which had its own development path. Danilevsky saw the solution to the problem in the creation of a unified Slavic federation under the scepter of the Russian Tsar.

In pre-revolutionary Russian historiography, there were several attempts to give the "Eastern Question" certain boundaries and to reveal its exact content. In 1883, a book by Professor V.A. Ulyanitsky "The Dardanelles, the Bosporus and the Black Sea in the 18th century". He set himself the task of finding out what the historical traditions and tasks of Russian policy in the East were. His conclusions are that the national and religious issues were only in their infancy and so far served only as one of the means of Russia in its quest to ensure its immediate interests: the security of the Russian-Turkish border and the economic development of the southern Russian outskirts of that time. Thus, Ulyanitsky sought to prove that Russia, in relation to Turkey, pursued the goal of achieving freedom of passage for Russian ships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and, in general, freedom of navigation on the Black Sea. Consequently, the essence of the Eastern Question was reduced exclusively to economic problems. This point of view has become widespread in Russian historiography, including the Soviet and post-Soviet period.

Another position is presented in the great work of S.A. Zhigarev. The author of the essay admits that in Russian journalism and scientific research there is no consensus on the "Eastern question", caused by the contradiction of both judgments and facts relating to this topic. S.A. Zhigarev criticizes S.M. Solovyov and N.Ya. Danilevsky for a too broad and non-specific view of the problem and tries to give his own definition of the "Eastern question". According to S.A. Zhigarev, the starting point for the history of the "Eastern Question" should be considered the foundation on the ruins of the Byzantine Empire of the state of the Ottoman Turks. Thus, the main motive must be assumed to be the new order of things that was created in South-Eastern Europe by the Muslim conquest, and in those obligations that nature itself assigned and partially accepted by Russia, as an Orthodox state, in relation to the Christian peoples of the Balkans subject to the Turks. peninsulas.
Further S.A. Zhigarev, trying to reveal the content of the Eastern question, introduces into his argument the question of the straits and Russia's economic interests in the East. At the same time, the author contradicts his own point of view, since he points out below that relations between Russia and Turkey could not be limited to the material interests of the Russian people in the East. As a result, the author of the book introduced two tasks into the definition of the "Eastern Question": the desire for freedom of navigation and the protection of the Slavs enslaved by the Turks. Moreover, S. Zhigarev believed that in solving the “Eastern question” for itself, the Russian Empire always cared about the balance of Europe, tried not to violate the legitimate interests and rights of the other independent powers of Europe and the Turkish Christians themselves.

The most clear definition of the problem in all of Russian pre-revolutionary historiography was given by the Byzantine scholar F.I. Uspensky. He believes that the "Eastern Question" is the question of the political changes that have taken place in the Middle East and the Balkan Peninsula as a result of the Turkish conquest of Christian nations. The history of the Eastern question consists in attempts to restore the violated state and territorial rights of the Christian peoples and to liberate them from Muslim power. Thus, for F.I. Uspensky, the history of the "Eastern Question" begins in the 15th century. The scientist believes that for Russia the southern direction also became relevant after the fall of Constantinople. The essence of the problem is seen by F.I. Uspensky in two aspects: the national liberation struggle of the Balkan peoples against the Turkish yoke and in the relations of European states (including Russia) with the Ottoman Empire.

In Soviet historiography, E.V. Tarle, A.L. Narochnitsky, V.A. Georgiev, N.S. Kinyapina, S.B. Okun, M.T. Panchenkova, O.B. Shparo, A.V. Fadeev, V.Ya. Grosul, I.G. Grosul, I.G. Gutkina, V.G. Karasev, N.I. Khitrova, I.F. Iovva, S.S. Landa, O.V. Orlik, B.E. Syroechkovsky and others. Among Soviet historians, the emergence of the "Eastern Question" is usually dated to the last third or last quarter of the 18th century. So, I.S. Dostyan and V.I. Freidzon believe that in the last third of the 18th century, in connection with the emergence of the "Eastern Question", the Balkans became part of the pan-European international system. Thus, the definition and historical framework of the "Eastern Question" is closely linked to the active policy of Russia in the Balkans and a series of Russian-Turkish wars, during which access to the Black Sea was gained, and Russia's influence among the Balkan peoples increased.

Soviet historians criticized Western scholars for the lack of unity in defining the problems and chronological framework of the "Eastern question". In Western historical science, there are many concepts and approaches to the history of the "Eastern question". However, its content mainly boils down to relations between the Ottoman Empire and European states. Scholars from England, France, Germany, and Austria present Eastern politics in a favorable light for their country. A considerable number of authors proceed from the thesis about the inevitability and irremovability of the confrontation between the West and the East, explaining the causes and essence of the "Eastern question" either by religious strife or by the cultural incompatibility of the two civilizations. The French historian C. Sorel most clearly expressed the content of the Eastern Question in the following words: "Since the Turks appeared in Europe, the Eastern Question has also been born."

The French historian of the middle of the 20th century, J. Tonga, believes that the history of the "Eastern Question" originates in the 6th century. We are talking about the confrontation between East and West in the era of the Byzantine emperor Justinian. The Arab conquests, and then the expansion of the Ottoman Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean led to a civilizational confrontation between Christian Europe and the Muslim East. According to a French researcher, the crusades of the 11th-13th centuries and plans for military campaigns against the Ottoman Empire, developed in Europe in the late 16th - early 17th centuries, speak about the severity of the "Eastern Question" in the Middle Ages and in the early Modern Age.
The Austrian historian G. Goering establishes the chronological framework of the "Eastern Question" from the time of the Turkish invasion (beginning of the 15th century) to the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Its essence, according to G. Goering, lies in the nature of the relationship between European states and the Ottoman Empire. In the period from the second half of the 16th to the end of the 17th century - when there was a delicate balance between the two centers of power: Europe was looking for a way to exist with the Turks. Therefore, these one and a half centuries in the history of international relations are characterized by intensive diplomatic and trade contacts in the Mediterranean.
The judgments of K. Marx and F. Engels on the "Eastern question" are interesting in their own way. They believed that the Turkish yoke was a serious obstacle to the development of the peoples subject to the Porte. However, they connected the prospect of national and social liberation with the future European revolution, and not with the successes of the policy of tsarism. According to K. Marx, after capturing Constantinople and the straits, Russia will subjugate the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, and then move deep into Europe, annex Hungary, Prussia, Galicia, create a grandiose "Slavic empire" and secure world domination.

This concept of the historical role of Russia in Eastern affairs did not find support in Soviet historiography. At the same time, Marx and Engels accurately noted the fact that tsarism was rapidly losing its influence in the young Balkan states created with its support and paid for with the lives of hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers. “No matter how Russian and Turkish Slavs are connected by their kinship and community of religion; nevertheless, their interests will begin to diverge decisively from the day when the latter gain freedom. Trade needs arising from the geographical position of both countries make this understandable,” wrote F Engels, referring to Serbia, which, not from Russia, but from Western Europe, had to borrow its political institutions, schools, science and its industrial organization.

In Turkish historiography, attention to the "Eastern Question" arose as Turkey became involved in international relations in the 19th-20th centuries. Initially, some Turkish historians saw in the politics of Western countries a manifestation of the eternal struggle between Islam and the "godless" Western civilization. However, this point of view is preserved by some modern Turkish historians of a fundamentalist orientation. Historians and publicists associated with the "new Ottomans" and "Young Turks" focused on the policy of a particular European country towards Turkey, mainly idealizing the reformers and the position of England, later Germany, took the anti-Russian side, saw in Russia the main external reason for the weakening and collapse of the empire. This point of view was also reflected in the works of historians of the 1920s and 1930s (D. Avcioglu, early works of E. Karala, etc.).

Modern Turkish historians are increasingly inclined towards a comprehensive analysis of the causes of the crisis and collapse of the Ottoman Empire, considering the influence of the "Eastern Question" among the diverse internal and external factors. I.Jem, E.Karal note the inconsistency of the influence of the Western powers and Russia on the Ottoman Porte.

On the basis of several of the above monographs, a term paper was built, consisting of an introduction, two chapters and a conclusion.

The main purpose of the study is to consider the international relations of the first half of the 19th century in the prism of the "Eastern question". The tasks include: to reveal the significance of the Middle East in the system of international relations of the early 19th century, to analyze the Unkiyar-Iskelessi Treaty and to trace the development of diplomatic relations during the Crimean War.

1 The "Eastern Question" in the international relations of the first halfXIXin. before the start of the Crimean War

The importance of the Middle East in the system of international relations of the beginningXIXcentury

1.1.1 The policy of Russia and Western European powers in the Middle East

The internal collapse of the Ottoman Empire and its military defeats put at the end of the XVIII century. the problem of the division of Turkish possessions in Europe between the great European powers (England, Russia, France, Austria). Each of the major European powers put forward their own claims to the Ottoman inheritance. Neither was willing to allow the other to political or economic dominance in the Ottoman Empire.

In 1800, in a note submitted by Count F.V. Rastopchin to Emperor Paul, it was said: "Porta, upset in all parts, takes away with indecision the last strength of her reign. All the measures she is now taking are nothing more than a medicine given to a hopeless patient, to whom the doctors do not want to announce his danger." As a result of such a sentence, F.V. Rastopchin proposed the division of Turkey.

In 1802, Count V.P. Kochubey gave Emperor Alexander I a completely different opinion. Regarding the rumors about Bonaparte's attempts on Turkey, V.P. Kochubey asked: "What should Russia do in this case?" - and answered: “Her behavior cannot be otherwise than either to start dividing Turkey with France and Austria, or to try to avert such a harmful state of affairs. There is no doubt that the latter would not be preferable, for regardless that Russia does not have there is already a need for expansion, there are no neighbors more peaceful than the Turks, and the preservation of these natural enemies of ours should indeed henceforth be the fundamental rule of our policy. Kochubey advised to communicate with England on this matter and warn Turkey.

The weakness of Turkey imposed a heavy duty to resist other states that would want to strengthen themselves at its expense or increase their influence in it with the exclusion of Russian influence - a struggle necessary in a weak state open to all influences. Russian ambassador in Paris, Count I.I. Morkov, reported to his court that Bonaparte constantly leads the conversation to the imminent collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and on December 24, 1802, Chancellor A.R. Vorontsov sent I.I. A letter to Morkov, in which he authorized him to answer clearly every time that the emperor had no intention of taking part in any project hostile to Turkey.

In 1821, a Greek uprising broke out and the Turks, according to the historian S.M. Solovyov, free from any political permutations of popular feelings and relations, continuing to consider themselves the natural enemies of Russia, and the Russians - the natural enemies of Turkey, they certainly want to see the cause of Russia in the Greek uprising, they turn all their anger against her, insult her. The war with the neighbors must begin again. But in Europe they don’t want to calmly look at this war, here the protection of Turkey is also declared as the main rule of policy, preventing a strong Russia from crushing Turkey or strengthening its influence over it, relying on a population of the same faith and of the same tribe. Since then, for a quarter of a century, Europe has been preparing an anti-crusade to the East, a campaign against Christian Russia and its co-religionists in defense of Mohammedan Turkey.

The tranquility of Europe, according to Emperor Alexander I, was based on the Holy Alliance, on the resolution of important European affairs, on calming unrest together, at congresses, congresses of sovereigns and their ministers, and Russia was ready to serve Europe, its tranquility with all its means, as it served to liberation from Napoleon.

The allied courts, firstly, did not want to allow Turkey to feel the influence of Russia, to force her to obey the demands of the latter, to let Russia do something for the Turkish Christians and thereby strengthen the bond between them and Russia. Secondly, the importance of Russia in this general management of European affairs was unbearably hard for them. They used the means of Russia to overthrow the material oppression of Napoleon; but now it seemed hard to them the importance of Russia, the moral influence of the Russian emperor.

At the congresses, after the Russian emperor, the most prominent person was the Austrian Chancellor Klemens Metternich. He insisted that the Greek uprising was a phenomenon identical to the revolutionary movement in Italy and Spain, and was carried out according to a general revolutionary plan in order to damage the Holy Alliance and its protective aspirations. Emperor Alexander I did not argue against this; but the Turks, embittered by the Greek uprising, rage against the Christians and insult Russia. The Russian sovereign proposes the following system of action: if the Turks are allowed to suppress the uprising, then it is known how they will take advantage of their triumph, and this will disgrace the union, disgrace the governments before the peoples; the following is necessary: to settle the matter by the intervention of the European powers by their common agreement; The Porte will not agree to allow this interference; it is necessary to force it to do so by force - and the Russian army will be ready to carry out the verdict of the congress on eastern affairs, and the Russian emperor undertakes not to think about his private benefits.

But this proposal did not suit the European powers. To let the Russian army into Turkish possessions, to give it the opportunity to occupy Constantinople - this thought terrified their political leadership.

In Vienna, it was decided to act carefully, not to irritate the Russian emperor, to restrain the Sultan, to prevent a war between Russia and Turkey, to play for time, and in the meantime the Turks would be able to suppress the Greek uprising. But the representatives of Austria and England at the Port had one goal in mind - to complete the Greek uprising as soon as possible, without Russian intervention.

But England soon realized that this principle was becoming harmful to her immediate interests; when the allies decided at the congress to stop the revolutionary movement in Spain and entrusted the execution of this matter to France. England was terribly annoyed by this French interference in Spanish affairs; in addition, it was not in the interests of England to stop the unrest in Spain, she needed to continue the Spanish revolution, continue the weakness of the Spanish government in order to enable the Spanish colonies in America to secede from the mother country, as this was required by the commercial interests of England. Hence the change in English policy; from conservative to liberal.

It is clear that the change in English policy was to be strongly reflected in the course of Eastern affairs - in London it was decided to take the most active part in the liberation of the Greeks. And since Russia could not be excluded from this participation, then, at least, not to give her the first place here, obscuring her with her influence, to show the Greeks and all of Europe that the liberation of Greece is the business of England, and not Russia.

At the beginning of 1826, Nicholas I, the new Russian emperor, strongly rejected any interference by an outside power in the conflict between Russia and Turkey, in what he considered a purely Russian issue. The Russian ultimatum consisted of three points: 1) the complete restoration of the situation in which the Danubian principalities were before 1821; 2) the immediate release of the Serbian delegates and the exact implementation of the Bucharest treaty regarding the benefits received by Serbia, and 3) the expulsion of the delegates to the border to end the interrupted negotiations on Russian affairs proper. The ultimatum ended with the fact that if in six weeks the required articles were not fulfilled, then the Russian embassy would leave Constantinople.

Turkey was taken by surprise. Occupied exclusively with the Greek question, irritated by the change in English policy, the Porte lost sight of Russia, all the more so the news of the circumstances that accompanied the accession to the throne of Emperor Nicholas I gave her hope for internal unrest in Russia, which would not give her emperor the opportunity to think about a foreign war.

4 April 1826 Duke Arthur of Wellington - with the English and Earls C.W. Nesselrode and L.A. Lieven - on the Russian side, the Petersburg Protocol was signed, which was an agreement between England and Russia on the Greek question. Greece, according to this "diplomatic instrument", forms a separate state; the sultan is considered his supreme overlord; however, Greece must have its own government, its own laws, etc. Russia and England undertake to "support" each other in carrying out this plan, in case there are obstacles from Turkey. George Canning, having received this Petersburg protocol, saw that Nicholas I bypassed A. Wellington. Thus, it was not England who dragged Russia into the war, but Russia dragged England into it; if there is a war - and there will certainly be, because Mahmud II, the Ottoman sultan, will never agree to lose such territory without a war - then England, according to the protocol, will have to take an active part in this war.

On May 26, 1826, K. Metternich learned about the protocol with great irritation and anxiety. Not only did the Greek question suddenly become more formidable than ever; something else happened: the hated D. Canning won the most decisive victory over the Holy Alliance - Russia, on whose initiative the Holy Alliance was concluded, tramples on it itself, goes hand in hand with the patron of the "rebels", D. Canning. To this were added two other circumstances that were very disturbing for Austria: firstly, the Turks, frightened by rumors of an agreement between Russia and England, hastened to accept the tsar's ultimatum regarding the Danubian principalities and Serbia, hoping by this concession to somehow get rid of the need to give independence to Greece; secondly, just in the summer of 1826, Mahmud II began the most severe suppression of the Janissary rebellion and the extermination of this rebellious army. This weakened the Turkish forces and further reduced the chances of successfully resisting the harassment of Russia and England. George Canning knew that, according to the Petersburg Protocol, neither Russia nor England should make any territorial acquisitions in their favor in the event of a war with Turkey. Therefore, he was not very opposed when the French side complained that France was not involved in the resolution of the Greek question. D. Canning told the French ambassador in London, Jules Polignac, that he himself would be glad from the bottom of his heart, but Nicholas I did not want a third participant. Then La Ferrone, the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, turned to Nicholas I. The tsar replied that he would personally welcome the participation of France, but D. Canning was preventing it. Nicholas I wanted the participation of the French even less than D. Canning; but when D. Canning yielded, the tsar immediately yielded. A mighty coalition of three powers was formed against Turkey: Russia, England and France. K. Metternich had to finally admit his defeat.

It was not only the Austrian chancellor who resented the heavy blow inflicted on the Holy Alliance. The extreme reactionaries in all the monarchies of Europe were not very happy either. Duke A. Wellington, for example, was also dissatisfied, who himself became an instrument of someone else's policy - first D. Canning, then Nicholas I. He was already unsympathetic in advance to the war against the Turks, hand in hand with the ambitious and dangerous young autocrat, who so deftly bypassed him, - said one thing about the Greeks, but did another, and harbors some other dubious projects. A. Wellington was angry not only with Nicholas I, but also with D. Canning. When George Canning was appointed First Minister in the spring of 1827, he offered Arthur Wellington any portfolio. The duke flatly refused and did not fail to openly explain why: he does not want to assist Russia in the destruction of Turkey, nor anywhere to support the revolutionaries against their legitimate governments. D. Canning did without A. Wellington; he made up an office in which he was actually the owner.

George Canning brought his historic undertaking almost to completion. The Holy Alliance is the scattered limbs of the torso, the British Prime Minister said triumphantly. Russia, together with England, stood for the liberation of Greece.

And suddenly, on August 8, 1827, D. Canning died, to a complete surprise for England and Europe. His death caused the jubilation of Clemens Metternich and Mahmud II. The minions of Mahmud II loudly said that, therefore, Allah did not forget his faithful, if he destroyed their most terrible enemy.

However, the joy of the faithful was premature: the cause of George Canning did not die with him. Three powers - Russia, France and England - opposed Turkey and sent their squadrons into Turkish waters. On October 20, 1827, the Turkish-Egyptian fleet was destroyed in the Bay of Navarino. The cause of Greek liberation and the Eastern question as a whole entered a new phase of their development.

1.1.2 Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829

The problems associated with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire took an important place in the foreign policy of Nicholas I. Russian policy was aimed at creating friendly, independent Orthodox states in South-Eastern Europe, the territory of which could not be absorbed and used by other powers (in particular, Austria). In connection with the division of spheres of influence in Turkey, the question of who would really control the Black Sea straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles) - a sea route in the Mediterranean that is vital for Russia, also arose. In 1827, Russia enters into a coalition with England and France to support the Greeks who rebelled against Turkish rule. The coalition sent an allied squadron to the coast of Greece, which destroyed the Ottoman fleet in the Bay of Navarino. After that, the Turkish Sultan Mahmud II called for a "holy war" against Russia. Turkey closed the straits for Russian ships and terminated the Akkerman Convention (1826), which regulated Russian-Turkish relations. In response, Emperor Nicholas I on April 14, 1828 signed the Manifesto on the beginning of the war with Turkey. Eleven days later, on May 7, 1828, a long and difficult war began for Russia.

Starting the war with Turkey, the Russian government counted on a quick victory. During the eastern crisis, Black Sea trade declined, which dealt a blow to the Russian economy. By the beginning of the war, the Russian army did not have food, uniforms, weapons sufficient to conduct a long campaign. Things were going well only in Asia Minor, but in Europe the situation was such that it sometimes seemed as if the Russians would leave with nothing, and the whole enterprise of Nicholas I would end in failure. The jubilation of K. Metternich knew no bounds, and he did not stop writing to the capitals of all the great powers about the supposedly hopeless situation of the Russians on the Balkan Peninsula. However, in contradiction to this statement of his, he did not cease to prove in London, and in Paris, and in Berlin that Prussia, England and France needed to enter into an agreement with Austria and demand an immediate end to the war. But neither Prussia, nor France, nor England considered it necessary to interfere in Russian-Turkish relations. By the way, in all three countries, the liberal part of bourgeois society definitely wanted in 1828-1829. destruction of Turkey. Nicholas I had not yet been figured out, and Mahmud II was well known as a representative of bloody despotism, the culprit of unheard-of atrocities against the Greeks.

Nothing came of the efforts of the Austrian Chancellor to create a quadruple anti-Russian alliance (and these efforts lasted from November 1828 to June 1829). The first of the Russian diplomats who closely followed the activities of K. Metternich and his agents was the Russian ambassador in Paris, K.O. Pozzo di Borgo. He immediately let Petersburg know about everything, and he himself tried to denigrate K. Metternich in front of the French king Charles X. He did this by telling the king one truth and adding one lie to it: the truth was that Clemens Metternich wanted to blackmail the king, secretly communicating with the Bonapartists and holding in reserve the candidacy for the French throne of Napoleon's son, the Duke of Reichstadt. It was a lie that Metternich even offered Russia to assist in the accession of the Duke of Reichstadt. It is not known whether Charles X believed the cunning Corsican's reports. One way or another, relations between France and Russia became in 1829 even closer than they had been before. Messages from K.O. The Pozzos di Borgo made a great impression on the king, especially since they were confirmed from all sides: after all, all three governments to which Metternich secretly addressed with a proposal for a quadruple alliance, having already decided to abandon this alliance, were in a hurry to extradite K Metternich to Nicholas I. The king was extremely irritated. He told the Austrian ambassador Charles-Louis Ficquelmont that he considered K. Metternich's policy pathetic, and announced that he knew about all the dirty tricks and traps that K. Metternich puts Russia at every turn.

Clemens Metternich was scared. He rushed to write letters to Paris, Berlin, London, arguing that he was misunderstood, that he was not planning anything hostile to Russia at all. And then, finally, the Russian victories arrived. Russian General I.I. Dibich entered Adrianople. The Russian army stood a stone's throw from Constantinople. Mahmud II decided to ask I.I. Dibich truce and peace. Negotiations began. The Russian commander-in-chief had to make incredible efforts to hide that he already had about 4,000 soldiers lying in hospitals, from where few returned, and that he sent more than half of his army from Adrianople for militant demonstrative walks.

On September 14, 1829, in Adrianople, the Turks agreed to the conditions presented to them. Turkey has lost the Black Sea coast from the mouths of the Kuban to the bay of St. Nicholas and almost the entire Akhaltsikhe pashalyk. On the Danube, the islands in the Danube Delta retreated to Russia, the southern arm of the mouth of the river became the Russian border. The Russians received the right of passage of their merchant ships through the Dardanelles and through the Bosphorus. The Danubian principalities and Silistria remained in Russian hands until the fulfillment of all the conditions of the Adrianople Treaty. The Turks lost the right to settle south of the Danube. As for Greece, it was declared an independent power, connected with the Sultan only by a payment of 1 million piastres per year (and these payments begin only in the fifth year after the acceptance of the condition by Turkey), and the people of Greece were allowed to elect as sovereign any prince from the reigning Christians in Europe. dynasties, but not an Englishman, not a Russian or a Frenchman.

Thus, the historical significance of the Peace of Adrianople was not in the temporary strengthening of Russia's influence in the Balkans, but in the formation of an independent Greek state, in the strengthening of the autonomy of the Danubian principalities and in Serbia, in the international recognition of their autonomous status.

The European powers reacted zealously to the results of the Peace of Adrianople. Their stubborn diplomatic struggle against Russia during the Eastern crisis of the 20s. 19th century actually lost. After the end of the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829. Russia sought to maintain good neighborly relations with Turkey. England, Austria, and France, who competed with Russia in the Near and Middle East, wanted to prevent this. England remained the main opponent of Russia in resolving the Eastern question.

1.2 Unkiyar-Iskelessi treaty between Russia and Turkey and the contradictions of the great powers in the "Eastern Question"

In the early 30s of the XIX century. The "Eastern Question" has again risen to the center of European diplomacy because of the Turkish-Egyptian conflict. The powerful vassal of Turkey, the Pasha of Egypt, Mehmed Ali, rebelled against the Sultan and went to war with him. Having occupied Syria, the Egyptian army, better trained and armed than the army of the Sultan, moved north, and on December 21, 1832, in the battle of Konya, the son of Mehmed Ali, Ibrahim, completely defeated the Turkish army. Sultan Mahmud II found himself in a desperate situation: he had neither the money nor the time to even hastily raise a new army.

Mahmud II turned to the powers for help. But French diplomacy, which had long chosen Egypt and Syria as its future sphere of influence, refused to help him. Henry Palmerston, the English cabinet minister, suggested that the sultan wait until Austria helped: he hoped not to bring the sultan to the need to turn to Nicholas I. G. Palmerston hoped that the work needed by England would thus be carried out by Austrian hands.

But it turned out quite differently. Firstly, the Austrian army was not at all ready to resist the victorious Egyptian army in the distant deserts of Asia Minor; secondly, K. Metternich, reluctantly, had to put up with the Russian danger in the East in order to preserve a powerful ally in the fight against the revolutionary danger in Europe itself. Therefore, he least of all wanted to openly quarrel with Nicholas I. And Nicholas I immediately, even before the battle of Konya, offered the Sultan armed assistance against Ibrahim; even earlier, the Russian general N. N. Muravyov suddenly landed on the shores of the Bosphorus. The Sultan was well aware of the danger from Russian help. Subsequently, to the indignant question of the English ambassador, how could the sultan even agree to accept “help” from Nicholas I, one of the members of the Divan repeated the words spoken by Mahmud: “When a person drowns and sees a snake in front of him, he will even grab hold of it, if only not drown." N.N. Ants, setting up his camp on the Bosporus, came to the Sultan as a special envoy from the king with the following proposal: if the Sultan wishes, Nicholas I will demand from the rebellious Egyptian pasha Mehmed Ali that he immediately remove his troops and order Ibrahim to return to Egypt. In case of refusal, the king declares war on Mehmed-Ali.

But Mehmed-Ali did not submit, and the Sultan hesitated to give Nicholas I his consent. Moreover, Ibrahim moved a little further north. In complete panic, the Sultan decided on everything, and on February 3, 1833, the Russian representative in Constantinople, A.P. Butenev, finally received the long-awaited diplomatic document: Mahmud II formally asked the king to help him against the rebellious vassal. The Russian fleet, which had long stood ready in Sevastopol, weighed anchor and sailed for Constantinople. On February 20, 1833, this fleet appeared in the Bosphorus. Then the French ambassador, Admiral Roussin, rushed to the Sultan, strongly urging him to ask the Russian fleet to leave. The English ambassador supported Roussin. They both declared that they would leave Constantinople immediately if the Russians occupied the city. This meant that, in the event of the Sultan's refusal, England and France would support Mehmed Ali. The Sultan demanded from Roussain a commitment to support him against Mehmed Ali, and Roussain signed this commitment with the Turkish Foreign Minister.

Mehmed Ali was an excellent diplomat; he clearly saw that the French wanted only to send back the Russian fleet, and now, having achieved this, they would not make any effort to block Ibrahim's path. Sultan Mahmud became convinced that Roussin and the British had deceived him. Meanwhile, new terrible news came: Ibrahim's agents, having made their way to Smyrna, raised an uprising against the Sultan there. The Sultan directly announced that he again turned to A.P. Butenev, and the Turkish ministers informed the latter of the consent of the Sultan so that the Russian fleet would not leave the Bosphorus. A.P. Butenev could only kindly answer this that the Russian fleet did not even think to move, since he, A.P. Butenev, there was only an oral, not a written proposal to withdraw the fleet. On April 2, 1833, a new Russian squadron appeared on the Black Sea coast, near the Bosphorus, and a third one a few days later. A little less than 14 thousand Russian soldiers were landed on the shore.

French diplomacy and G. Palmerston were in great alarm. It was clear that words alone could not get rid of it. It was necessary either to save Sultan Mahmud II from the Egyptian Pasha by decisive measures, or to give Constantinople to Russian troops, and even with the permission of the Sultan himself. In the end, Roussin and the English ambassador John Ponsonby called their squadrons to Egypt and achieved peace between the Sultan and Mehmed Ali. The peace was very beneficial for the Egyptian pasha and significantly expanded his possessions. But Constantinople was saved. However, both for the Sultan and for Europe, it was clear that Ibrahim and his army were afraid not of the English and French ships maneuvering somewhere, but of the Russian army, which was already standing on the Asia Minor shore of the Bosphorus. Sultan Mahmud II was delighted with the help rendered to him and even more from Count A.F., transferred to him through the royal adjutant general. Orlov's statement that the saviors of the Turkish Empire on July 11, 1833 intend to set sail from the friendly Turkish shores and return to Sevastopol.

Count A.F. It was not without reason that Orlov spent almost two months in Constantinople before this. Then they said in the diplomatic circles of Paris and London that by the beginning of July only one unbribed A.F. remained in all of Constantinople. To Orlov, a man, namely the ruler of the faithful, Mahmud II - and even then only because it seemed to Count Alexei Fedorovich Orlov already an unnecessary expense. But this detail alone cannot, of course, explain the brilliant diplomatic success that fell to the lot of Alexei Orlov exactly three days before the departure of the Russian fleet from the Bosporus. On July 8, 1833, in the town of Unkiyar-Iskelessi, an agreement famous in the annals of diplomatic history was concluded between Russian and Turkish representatives. In Unkiyar Iskelessi, Nicholas I won a new diplomatic victory, more remarkable than the Peace of Adrianople, this victory was achieved without war, by deft maneuvering.

From now on, Russia and Turkey pledged to help each other in the event of a war with a third power, both in the fleet and in the armies. They also pledged to help each other in case of internal unrest in one of the two countries. Turkey pledged in the event of a war between Russia and any power not to allow warships to the Dardanelles. The Bosphorus, under all conditions, remained open for the entry of Russian ships.

The agreement in Unkiyar-Iskelessi became one of the reasons for the aggravation of the Anglo-Russian contradictions, which infuriated G. Palmerston. In the British ruling elite, as well as in broad circles of the big bourgeoisie, two currents have emerged on the question of Turkey and Russia. One was Richard Cobden, a well-known publicist, founder of the Anti-Corn Law League, a free-trade advocate, and John Bright MP; the representative of the other was Lord Henry Palmerston, who was followed by an overwhelming majority in and out of Parliament. R. Cobden repeatedly expressed his views in speeches, articles and in a special pamphlet "Russia" ("Rossia"), issued in 1836. These views boiled down to the fact that Russian-Turkish relations should not be interfered with either diplomatically or in particular armed hand.

Even if we assume that Russia establishes itself in Constantinople, neither English industry, nor trade, nor shipping will lose anything from this. The Russians cannot compete economically with the British, and England will continue to dominate all the countries of the Levant. And that there will be Russian police in Constantinople, this is rather a favorable circumstance. There will be more order and security than with the Turkish police. Without conducting a diplomatic struggle with Russia, it is possible to conclude the most profitable trade agreements with it. And nothing else is required for England.

Henry Palmerston and his press never ceased to sharply attack the views of R. Cobden and his friends. For G. Palmerston and the majority of not only conservatives, but also the Whigs (in whose ranks he himself was listed) to let Russia into Constantinople meant a few years later to see her in India. The protection by all diplomatic and military means of both Turkey and Persia from being absorbed by Russia was recognized as a direct duty and the main task of British policy. For England to lose India would be like Holland or Belgium. Struggling against the tsarist intrigues and aggressive aspirations in Turkey, G. Palmerston and his like-minded people fought, in their opinion, for the existence of England as a great power. The British minister had an idea: to "expand" the Unkiyar-Iskeless Treaty by "inclusion" in it of all the great European powers. In other words, putting aside the deliberately confusing diplomatic style, Lord Palmerston wished to destroy the Unkiyar-Iskelesi Treaty and guarantee the inviolability of the Turkish possessions with the signatures of not only Russia, but also England, France and Prussia. Mr. Palmerston even started a conference in London for this purpose.

Nicholas I managed to disrupt the conference, but G. Palmerston's maneuver put the tsar in a difficult position. However, the king was lucky again: French diplomacy began to openly and even defiantly support the Egyptian pasha. Since the entry of Louis Adolphe Thiers into the cabinet, it has become clear that French diplomacy seeks to some extent to lay hands on Syria, and if things go well, then on Egypt. Henry Palmerston was unhappy with this. First, he did not want to consolidate French influence in Egypt and Syria; secondly, the new speech of Mehmed-Ali gave Nicholas I the right, on the exact basis of the Unkiyar-Iskelessi Treaty, to intervene in the Turkish-Egyptian conflict and even take Constantinople. Mr. Palmerston took immediate action. Through the Austrian diplomat in London, Baron F. Neumann, he informed K. Metternich that he had decided to fight against the intention of the French, who had already conquered Algeria, to take Egypt and "expel England" from the Mediterranean. Austrian diplomacy immediately began to work, which made it known to St. Petersburg about the statement of Lord Palmerston. Nicholas I saw an opportunity to get in touch with the British on the Turkish-Egyptian question, to isolate the hated "revolutionary" July monarchy with the "king of the barricades" Louis Philippe and to break the agreement between England and France on all major diplomatic issues, which Charles had so skillfully established Maurice Talleyrand during his four-year stay in London (1830-1834) as ambassador. Behind A. Thiers, secret negotiations began between the "eastern monarchies" - as it was then customary to designate Russia, Austria and Prussia - and G. Palmerston. Knowing nothing about this, A. Thiers tried in June 1840, through the French ambassador in Constantinople, Pontois, to insist on the removal of the Grand Vizier Khozrev Pasha, who was considered a protege of Nicholas I and an ardent enemy of Mehmed Ali.

In response to this, on July 15, 1840, an agreement was signed in London between the four powers - England, Austria, Prussia and Russia. This agreement was rightly regarded by Karl Marx as an attempt to renew the Holy Alliance against France.

The leading ministers of Louis Philippe, A. Thiers and F. Guizot, were outraged not only by the content of this agreement, which was entirely directed against the Egyptian Pasha and in favor of the Sultan, but also by the fact that it was concluded in secret from the French. “I have always been a supporter of the union of France with England - why did you break this union?” Adolphe Thiers said to the English ambassador E. Bulwer-Lytton, having learned about the agreement on July 15, 1840.

Nicholas I rejoiced. Russian Ambassador in London F.I. Brunnov, an intelligent and observant diplomat, had, however, the most harmful, purely courtier manner of conveying to Petersburg not what actually happened, but what it was desirable and pleasant for the tsar to read in his reports. Thus, in his reports, he immensely exaggerated the significance of the diplomatic victory won by Russia over France on July 15, 1840. And Nicholas I, confused by Philip Brunnov, from then on began to imagine that relations between France and England were hopelessly damaged and that now one can think and about having a one-on-one deal with England at an opportune moment. Nicholas I tried to implement this idea. He told Henry Palmerston to be told that if France declared war on England, he would side with England. The furious campaign of the French press against England, which suddenly developed at the obvious instigation of A. Thiers, seemed to fully confirm the assurances of F.I. Brunnov, that from now on we can expect the resumption of good relations with England and count on them. G. Palmerston, it seemed, directed all his fighting temperament against A. Thiers and against F. Guizot, who replaced Adolphe Thiers as Minister of Foreign Affairs (in the same 1840). But at the same time, he deftly used the king's delusion to prevent the renewal in 1841 of the Unkiar-Iskelessi treaty, the eight-year term of which had just come to an end.

On July 13, 1841, with the consent of the king, an agreement was concluded between Turkey, on the one hand, and Russia, England, Austria, Prussia and France, on the other, on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles: it was decided that the straits would be closed to military ships of all powers as long as Turkey is not at war; in time of war, Turkey has the right to pass through the straits the ships of that power with which it will be advantageous to come to an agreement. Nicholas I did not protest against France's participation in the treaty; and this time it was impossible to do without it, even from the point of view of Henry Palmerston himself. France stopped supporting Mehmed Ali, seeing that the four powers were against her, and the Egyptian pasha was content with serious territorial acquisitions and reconciled with the new sultan Abdulmejid, who succeeded Mahmud II, who died in 1839.

But the main achievement in the eyes of Nicholas I remained in force: France was discounted in the Eastern question; the way to a frank explanation with England was open. And then September 1841 brought the resignation of Henry Palmerston. The Whigist cabinet of Lord William Melbourne fell, and with it the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, G. Palmerston, also left. The new conservative premier, Robert Peel, was known as a Russophile; to an even greater extent, a friend of Russia, and most importantly, an enemy of Turkey, was considered the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs appointed by Robert Peel, Lord George Aberdeen. J. Aberdeen believed that on the overwhelming majority of issues, England could well come to an agreement with Russia. And Nicholas I imagined that among these questions was the question of Turkey.

For the second quarter of the XIX century. characterized by a new sound and even greater acuteness of the Eastern question. One of the most acute for European diplomacy was the question of the regime of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, which were of the greatest importance for the Black Sea powers. Another problem was the struggle of the developed bourgeois states for economic dominance in the Ottoman Empire. The strengthening of colonial contradictions in Turkey went in parallel with the development of capitalism in Europe. In the second quarter of the XIX century. a new aspect in the history of the Eastern question is revealed. The struggle of the Arab peoples and, first of all, Egypt, for secession from the Ottoman Empire, which led to the aggravation of the Eastern question in general and led to increased interference of European powers in the internal affairs of Turkey, was on the agenda. Aspects of the Eastern problem became leading in the history of international relations in the 2nd quarter of the 19th century.

The fierce rivalry between Egypt and Turkey gave rise to an acute pan-European crisis, which clearly showed two main directions in the contradictions in the Middle East in those years: the Anglo-French colonial differences over Egypt and Syria and the contradictions between Russia and the Western European powers on the issue of Black Sea straits.

The first Turkish-Egyptian conflict led to the signing of the Unkiyar-Iskelessi peace treaty between Russia and Turkey, the second to the signing of the London Conventions of 1840 and 1841, which radically changed the legal regime of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits (in essence, Russia's successes achieved in 1833, and were her diplomatic defeat). The European crisis put an end to a long period in the history of tsarist diplomacy (1801-1841), during which it based its policy on maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and tried to regulate relations with Turkey on the basis of bilateral agreements.

1.3 Russian-English relations in the 40sXIXcentury

In the 40s of the XIX century. there was a certain lull in eastern affairs. Each of the great powers jealously followed the others. Western countries avoided abrupt actions that could destroy the precarious balance in the Balkans and in the straits. The diplomacy of Nicholas I behaved differently. It increasingly raised the topic of the inevitability of the imminent collapse of the Ottoman Empire and came up with various projects for the division of its possessions.

At the beginning of 1844, Nicholas I made it clear that he would like to pay a visit to Queen Victoria. The corresponding invitation was immediately received. On May 31, 1844, the tsar and his retinue landed at Vulwich. Nicholas was received by the court and the aristocracy with all the signs of that special reverence, even almost servility, with which monarchical Europe then received him everywhere, seeing in him the most powerful sovereign in the world, a politician successful in all his enterprises, a reliable bulwark against the revolution. In this atmosphere, Nicholas I, of course, could feel a special disposition to those "frank" conversations about Turkey, for which he undertook his trip. Almost immediately after his move, at the invitation of Victoria, from London to Windsor, Nicholas I saw and spoke with J. Aberdeen. Here is the earliest record of the most significant words of the king, made by Baron Stockmar, according to Eberdeen himself, immediately after a conversation with Nicholas I: “Turkey is a dying person. We can strive to keep her alive, but we will not succeed. She must die and she will die. This will be the critical moment. I foresee that I will have to make my armies march. Then Austria will have to do the same. At the same time, I am not afraid of anyone, except France. What will she want? I'm afraid that there are many in Africa, in the Mediterranean Sea and in the East itself. Frightening George Aberdeen with the possibility of French claims in Egypt, Syria and the Mediterranean, that is, precisely where the British would not allow French rule for anything, the king continued: “Shouldn’t England be on the scene with all on your own? So, the Russian army, the Austrian army, the large English fleet in those countries! So many barrels of gunpowder near the fire! Who will save it so that the sparks do not ignite it?

The conclusion was clear, and the tsar made it very clearly in conversations with George Aberdeen and with the head of the ministry, Robert Peel: in order to successfully overcome French desires, in order to prevent Austria from using the “sick man’s” inheritance, Russia and England must agree in advance on the division of booty. The royal words about the "dying man" were very well heard at Windsor and by J. Aberdeen and R. Peel. “Turkey must fall,” the tsar told Robert Peel. “I don’t want an inch of Turkey, but I won’t allow another to get at least an inch of it.” Robert Peel very well understood what the king wanted, and not only did not show virtuous indignation, but immediately told the king that it would be pleasant for England to receive Egypt in the future division of the Turkish Empire. Robert Peel expressed this thought in such careful, truly diplomatic words: “England is in the same position with respect to the East. In one point alone, English policy has somewhat changed with regard to Egypt. The existence of a powerful government there, such a government that could close trade routes to England, deny passage to English transports, England could not allow. Robert Peel knew very well that the king did not lay claim to Egypt, but to Constantinople and the straits, as well as to Moldavia and Wallachia; Egypt is claimed by the French, against whom the tsar proposes to England to blockade with Russia. Nicholas I, of course, could take the words of R. Piel for agreement on the division of the Turkish inheritance. Therefore, the king continued: “Now it is impossible to decide what should be done with Turkey when she dies. Such decisions will hasten her death. Therefore, I will use everything to maintain the status quo. But we need to honestly and reasonably discuss all possible cases, we need to come to reasonable considerations, a correct, honest agreement.

The king left England, extremely pleased that this time his interlocutors were not deaf. He rashly even ordered K.V. Nesselrode to send a memoir to England outlining all his thoughts about the need for an advance agreement in case of the collapse of Turkey; he really wanted to have something like R. Peel or J. Aberdeen signed confirmation of their agreement with the thoughts set forth by the king. But he did not expect this. The British ministers seem to have come to their senses: they did not wish to be bound by a document.

In June 1846 Robert Peel's cabinet resigned. The Whigs, led by Lord John Rossel and Henry Palmerston as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, seized power again. Nicholas I knew for a long time that G. Palmerston was anxiously following the growth of Russia's influence in Europe, but Lord Palmerston never concealed this. “Europe has slept too long, it is now awakening to put an end to the system of attacks that the tsar wants to prepare at different ends of his vast state,” Henry Palmerston said back in 1837 directly to the face of the Russian ambassador K.O. Pozzo di Borgo. Trying to resume now, in 1846, with H. Palmerston those conversations that were so easy and convenient to carry on with R. Peel and J. Aberdeen, seemed to the tsar completely impossible. In Vienna, on the way, in December 1846, the tsar spoke again with Clemens Metternich about Turkey and considered it necessary to declare that if Turkey disintegrated, he would not give Constantinople to anyone. If someone tries to send an army there, then he, the king, will appear in Constantinople earlier. And if he already enters there, then he will remain there. These were more threats than a proposal for division. Yes, and the king considered Austria too weak at that moment.

It is curious to note that Nicholas I, with his boundless self-confidence and absolute misunderstanding of the aspirations of broad sections of the population in Europe at that time and, in particular, in the German countries and in the possessions of the Habsburgs, who closed his eyes to obvious facts with irritation and stubbornness, nevertheless sensed in these years of revolution. He already foresaw that his "allies" might not withstand the expected terrible shock. He attributed the weakness and confusion of the Austrian and Prussian governments. “Before there were three of us, but now there are only one and a half left, because I don’t count Prussia at all, but I count Austria as half,” said Nikolai in 1846 to a Danish diplomat.

Late 40s-early 50s. 19th century the balance of power in the "Eastern question" was in favor of the Western powers. They seized the political initiative and reinforced it with intensive financial and commercial penetration into the Ottoman Empire. Anglo-French contradictions were settled by the beginning of the 50s. The Austrian Empire, having recovered from the upheavals of 1848-1849, intensified its Balkan policy.

2 Diplomacy during the Crimean War

2.1 International situation on the eve of the Crimean War

The state of affairs in the East and the situation in Europe, according to Nikalai I, were conducive to taking effective steps to resolve the "Eastern Question" in accordance with the interests and goals of Russia. On January 9, 1853, at the evening at the Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna's in the Mikhailovsky Palace, which was attended by the diplomatic corps, the tsar approached the British envoy, Sir Hamilton Seymour, and started a conversation with him about the "Eastern question." The emperor's words, with their "unexpected frankness ... and meaningful content," plunged the British diplomat into amazement, since the discussion turned to a partial division of the Sultan's possessions. According to the king, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire could happen in the near future. It had to happen naturally. Turkey is a “sick person”, she is dying. And therefore, Russia and England should have taken care of the fate of the “sick man” inheritance in advance. “Now I want to speak to you like another gentleman,” Nikolai said. “If we manage to come to an agreement - me and England - the rest is of no importance to me, it is indifferent to me what others do or will do. And so, speaking frankly, I declare to you directly that if England thinks of settling in Constantinople in the near future, then I will not allow it. I do not attribute these intentions to you, but in such cases it is preferable to speak clearly. For my part, I am equally disposed to accept the obligation not to settle there, of course, as a proprietor; as a temporary guard is another matter. It may happen that circumstances will force me to occupy Constantinople, if nothing is foreseen, if everything has to be left to chance. Neither the Russians, nor the British, nor the French will take possession of Constantinople. Similarly, Greece will not receive it either. I will never let that happen." The tsar continued: “Let Moldavia, Wallachia, Serbia, Bulgaria come under the protectorate of Russia. As for Egypt, I fully understand the importance of this territory for England. Here I can only say that if, in the distribution of the Ottoman inheritance after the fall of the empire, you take possession of Egypt, then I will have no objection to this. I will say the same about Candia (Crete). This island may be suitable for you, and I do not see why it should not become an English possession. At parting with Hamilton Seymour, Nikolai said: “Good. So urge your government to write again on this subject, to write more fully, and let it do so without hesitation. I trust the English government. What I ask of him is not a commitment, not an agreement: it is a free exchange of opinions, and, if necessary, the word of a gentleman. It's enough for us."

Hamilton Seymour was invited to Nicholas within five days. The second conversation took place on January 14, the third on February 20, the fourth and last on February 21, 1853. The meaning of these conversations was clear: the tsar offered England to share the Turkish Empire together with Russia, and did not prejudge the fate of Arabia, Mesopotamia, Asia Minor.

Starting these conversations in January-February 1853, the tsar made three major mistakes: firstly, he very easily discounted France, convincing himself that this power was still too weak after the experiences experienced in 1848-1851. unrest and coups, and that the new emperor of France, Napoleon III, would not risk getting involved in a distant war that he did not need; secondly, Nicholas I, in response to G. Seymour's question about Austria, replied that Austria is the same as he, Nicholas I, that is, that there will not be the slightest opposition from Austria; thirdly, he completely misunderstood how his proposal would be received by the British government. Nicholas I was confused by Victoria's always friendly attitude towards him; to the end of his days he did not know and did not understand English constitutional theory and practice. He was reassured that at the head of the cabinet in England at that moment, in 1853, was the same Lord J. Aberdeen, who listened to him so kindly at Windsor back in 1844. All this seemed to allow Nicholas I to hope that his the proposal will be well received. On February 9, a reply came from London, given on behalf of the Cabinet by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord John Rossel. The answer was sharply negative. Lord Rossel was no less suspicious of Russian policy in the East than G. Palmerston himself. Lord Rossel declared that he did not see at all why it was possible to think that Turkey was close to falling. In general, he does not find it possible to conclude any agreements regarding Turkey. Further, even the temporary transfer of Constantinople into the hands of the king, he considers unacceptable. Finally, Rossel stressed that both France and Austria would be suspicious of such an Anglo-Russian agreement.

After receiving this refusal, K.V. Nesselrode, in a conversation with G. Seymour, tried to soften the meaning of the initial statements of the tsar, assuring that the tsar did not want to threaten Turkey, but only wished, together with England, to guarantee her from possible attempts by France. After this refusal, two paths opened up for Nikolai: either simply postpone the undertaking, or go ahead. If the tsar thought that Austria and France would side with John Rossel, then he would have to choose the first path. If, however, it was admitted that Austria and France would not join England, then it was possible to go ahead, since the tsar well understood that England would not dare to fight him without allies.

Nicholas chose the second path. “As for Austria, I am sure of it, since our treaties determine our relations,” the tsar made such a note with his own hand on the margins of the copy of Lord Rossel’s letter to Hamilton Seymour presented to him. Thus, he discounted Austria.

Just as easily, Nicholas I discounted France. This was his third and most important mistake. She was inevitable. The tsar did not understand either the position of France after the coup of December 2, 1851, or the aspirations of its new ruler. The Russian ambassadors, N.D., were also to blame for this complete misunderstanding. Kiselev in Paris, F.I. Brunnov in London, P.K. Meyendorff in Vienna, A.F. Budberg in Berlin, and most of all Chancellor K.V. Nesselrode, they all distorted the state of affairs before the tsar in their reports. They almost always wrote not about what they saw, but about what the king would like to know from them. When one day Andrey Rozen convinced Prince I.A. Lieven, so that he finally opened the eyes of the king, then I.A. Lieven answered literally: “What should I say to the emperor?! But I'm not stupid! If I wanted to tell him the truth, he would have thrown me out the door, and nothing else would have come of it.

The beginning of enlightenment followed in connection with the diplomatic feud between Louis Napoleon III and Nicholas I, which arose over the so-called "holy places". It began as early as 1850, continued and intensified in 1851, weakened in the beginning and middle of 1852, and again became unusually aggravated just at the very end of 1852 and the beginning of 1853. Louis Napoleon III, while still president, declared to the Turkish government that he wanted to preserve and renew all the rights and advantages of the Catholic Church confirmed by Turkey back in 1740 in the so-called holy places, that is, in the temples of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The Sultan agreed; but on the part of Russian diplomacy in Constantinople, a sharp protest followed, pointing out the advantages of the Orthodox Church over the Catholic Church on the basis of the conditions of the Kyuchuk-Kainarji peace. In essence, these wranglings, of course, did not in the least interest either Louis Napoleon III or Nicholas I; for both, it was about a much more serious matter. Subsequently, the foreign minister of Napoleon III, Drouin de Luis, stated quite frankly: “The question of holy places and everything related to it has no real significance for France. This whole "Eastern question", which is causing so much noise, served the imperial [French] government only as a means to upset the continental alliance, which for almost half a century paralyzed France. Finally, the opportunity presented itself to sow discord in a powerful coalition, and Emperor Napoleon III seized it with both hands. For Napoleon III, complications in the East, if only under the pretext of some quarrel over holy places, were needed to split England and Austria from Russia: it was in the East that their interests diverged from those of the king; for Nicholas I, the question of holy places was also a very convenient and popular pretext for a quarrel, but not with France, but with Turkey. Imperceptibly, the matter of the holy places intertwined with the claim put forward by Nicholas I not only to protect the rights of the Orthodox Church in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, but also to become the defender of all Orthodox subjects of the Sultan recognized by Turkey itself, that is, to receive the right of constant diplomatic intervention in internal Turkish affairs.

At the beginning of 1853, the dispute became very aggravated. Abdulmejid and his ministers, under the direct pressure of French diplomacy, became especially persistent in negotiations with Russia and at the same time satisfied most of the French demands regarding holy places. “He is taking revenge,” said the tsar, now clearly understanding that Napoleon III had not forgotten the history of the title.

And yet, Nicholas I continued to hold on to his illusion: Napoleon III would not go to war because of Turkey for nothing, Austria would not dare either, England would not move without Austria and France. Having been refused by England, the tsar decided to go ahead and make, first of all, not a military, but for the time being only a diplomatic attack on Turkey. On February 11, 1853, the Minister of Marine A.S. was sent as an ambassador to Porto. Menshikov with a demand to recognize the rights of the Greek Church to holy places in Palestine and to provide Russia with protection over 12 million Christians in the Ottoman Empire, which accounted for about a third of the entire Ottoman population. All this had to be formalized in the form of a contract. In case of incomplete satisfaction of A.S. Menshikov was allowed to present an ultimatum.

The international situation that developed on the eve of the Crimean War was caused by the desire of European countries to get rid of the Russian predominance that burdened Europe. At the same time, the war was provoked by the inept diplomacy of Nicholas I, who overestimated the depth of the crisis in Turkey and the imminence of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

2.2 The position of the Western European powers in the Russo-Turkish conflict

Already in March 1853, having heard about the first steps of A.S. Menshikov in Constantinople, Napoleon III ordered his navy, stationed in Toulon, to immediately sail to the Aegean Sea, to Salamis, and be ready. Napoleon irrevocably decided to fight with Russia. The protection of Turkey from a possible Russian conquest seemed to the emperor of the French absolutely necessary, in connection with French financial investments in the Turkish Empire and French economic interests in the East in general. The comparative restraint of Lord J. Aberdeen caused French diplomacy to suspect that England did not want to fool the French and eventually come to an agreement with Russia together on the division of Turkish possessions, as the Tsar had proposed to Hamilton Seymour in early 1853. Already after the departure of the French fleet to the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea followed the order and the British squadron to go there too. The situation escalated. The hatred for Nicholas I was so strong that in France and England there could not have been a more popular war at that moment than the war against the tsarist government. And this pushed Napoleon III, who saw in the war against Nicholas I an opportunity not only to cover his throne with glory, but also to somewhat appease the opposition, driven underground, into emigration and into exile.

In the autumn of 1853 European diplomacy was in great agitation. Buol-von-Schauenstein, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Austrian Empire, conducted lively negotiations on two fronts: on the one hand, he tried to convince the king of the need to quickly come to an agreement with Turkey and clear the Danubian principalities, and on the other, he intrigued in Paris and London , wanting to know what can be obtained from the Western powers for a policy hostile to Russia.

Buol was able to spy around the Russian embassy in Vienna with great success. Franz Joseph Emperor of Austria already in 1853 began to take an anti-Russian position. On the other hand, he was also afraid of Napoleon III, who made rather transparent hints about the possibility of expelling Austria from Lombardy and Venice without much difficulty. The French emperor did not hide from Baron Huebner, the Austrian ambassador in Paris, that he was not very disposed to allow Austria to remain in the position of a neutral country. Consequently, Franz Joseph had to either act in concert with Napoleon III and England and seek the removal of Russian troops from Moldavia and Wallachia, or act jointly with Nicholas I and, in the event of his victory over Turkey, lose the position of an independent monarch of a first-class power and lose Lombardy and Venice .

But Austria was also a member of the German Confederation, where Prussia was the main state after Austria.

In Prussia the situation was different. The possible collapse of Turkey did not affect any of the vital interests of Prussia, and the hostile position towards Russia was associated with the risk of forming a Franco-Russian alliance, in which Prussia could be destroyed. In addition, at that moment the line that Otto von Bismarck then so energetically led was already beginning to emerge: the line of expanding and deepening the antagonism between Prussia and Austria. Bismarck had not yet played a leading role in Prussian politics during the Crimean War; he was only the representative of Prussia in the Diet of the German Confederation. But his point of view, precisely because of its certainty, eventually prevailed: in the name of what should Prussia take an anti-Russian position in the conflict flaring up in the East? The more Austria is weakened, the more profitable it will be for Prussia. At the Prussian court and in the Prussian government, two parties were formed - "English" and "Russian". At the head of the "English" was the Prussian ambassador in London, Robert Wilhelm Bunsen; almost the entire liberal bourgeoisie sympathized with her; from 1854, the most conservative brother and heir of the king, Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, began to draw closer to this party. The "Russian Party" was led by a friend of the king, General Leopold von Gerlach; it was followed by the entire aristocracy, the majority of the nobility. Very many in this "Russian" party were not guided by such complex diplomatic calculations and calculations as Bismarck, but simply saw in Nicholas I the most solid and reliable support of absolutism and noble reaction against the rising bourgeoisie. Thus, the tsar was opposed not to Austria, as Otto von Bismarck did, but to liberal England.

King Frederick William IV himself did not know what to decide. He was afraid of Napoleon III, afraid of Nicholas I and rushed from side to side. Bismarck, who followed these zigzags with irritation from Frankfurt, said that the Prussian royal policy resembled a poodle that has lost its master and, in confusion, runs up to one passerby, then to another.

It turned out that Prussia would not join England and France, and Austria without Prussia would not dare to do so. Buol drew up a draft note, which he handed over to the ambassadors of England and France invited to the meeting in Vienna. This note stated that Turkey assumes the obligation to comply with all the conditions of the Adrianople and Kyuchuk-Kaynarji peace treaties; the provision on the special rights and privileges of the Orthodox Church was again emphasized. It was decided to send this note on July 31, 1853 to the tsar, and, if the tsar agreed, to the sultan. Nicholas I agreed.

Having heard that some kind of compromise was planned in Vienna, Lord Stratford de Radcliffe began to lay a diplomatic mine to disrupt the undertaking. He forced Sultan Abdulmejid to reject the Vienna note, and even before that he hastened to draw up another note, allegedly on behalf of Turkey, with some reservations against the Vienna note. The king, in turn, rejected her. In essence, the Vienna Note coincided with the Turks' own project, but in order to justify the refusal of the Turks to accept this note, Stratford de Radcliffe did his best to fan the "indignation" of the Turks on interpretation Vienna, given by Chancellor K.V. Nesselrode. The king at that time received from N.D. Kiselyov from Paris, the most comforting news about the impossibility of a joint military action by England and France.

October has come. Prompted by the assurances of Stratford and the French ambassador Chalmel-Lacour, the Sultan declared war on Russia on October 4, 1853. Meanwhile, English and French diplomacy received an exact confirmation of the news that had already swept through Europe: on November 18, 1853, Admiral Nakhimov attacked the Turkish fleet in the Sinop Bay, exterminated it and destroyed the coastal fortifications.

The Sinop battle was the impetus that discharged the long-accumulated electricity. In mid-December, Napoleon III announced to the British ambassador in Paris, Lord Cowley, that he intended to order his fleet to enter the Black Sea. This predetermined the actions of the British Cabinet. Back in February 1853, as soon as G. Seymour's first reports arrived from St. Petersburg about the tsar's confidential conversations with him, Secretary of State George Clarendon and the French ambassador in London, Count A.F. Walevsky signed an agreement under which England and France pledged not to do anything in the field of the "Eastern Question" without prior agreement. Now is the time to fulfill this obligation. J. Aberdeen agreed to give the English fleet the appropriate orders. The fluctuations of English diplomacy did not last long. After Sinope, excitement against Russia increased to an incredible degree in British public circles. The press loudly accused even Queen Victoria and her husband of suspicious, almost treasonous designs. When Henry Palmerston suddenly resigned on December 15, 1853, a real storm of indignation fell on the cabinet, from where “an honest patriot survived,” etc. A week later, J. Aberdeen begged G. Palmerston to return to the ministry. This return placed Aberdeen's cabinet entirely in Palmerston's hands. The war against Russia was a foregone conclusion.

On January 4, 1854, the combined Anglo-French fleet entered the Black Sea, and the two admirals who commanded the fleet informed the Russian authorities that they had the task of protecting Turkish ships and ports from attacks from the Russian side.

K.V. Nesselrode turned to the Russian ambassador in Paris, N.D. Kiselev and London - F.I. Brunnov, inviting them to ask both governments to which these ambassadors are accredited, how to understand the message of the admirals. Does the actual prohibition to navigate the Black Sea apply only to Russian ships or also to Turkish ones. In the event that it turns out that the ban applies only to Russian ships, F.I. Brunnov and N.D. Kiselev was ordered to immediately break off diplomatic relations and leave London and Paris.

The British press called out for the need to fight for the independence of Turkey. In Turkey itself, the actual masters of the situation were Stratford de Radcliffe and the French ambassador Barage d'Ilye. The only consolation for the Sultan was that Stratford and Barage d'Ilye quarreled furiously and continuously among themselves. On January 29, 1854, a letter from the French Emperor Napoleon III to the All-Russian Emperor Nikolai Pavlovich appeared in the official organ of the French Empire "Moniter". Napoleon III wrote that the thunder of the Sinop cannons offended French and English national honour; he offers the king the last way out: to withdraw troops from Moldavia and Wallachia; then France and England will order their fleets to leave the Black Sea. And then let Russia and Turkey appoint representatives for peace talks. This unusual method in diplomatic practice - the public appeal of one reigning monarch to another - was correctly understood by all of Europe, as an attempt, just before the outbreak of war, to shift all responsibility on the enemy, flaunting his peacefulness. Nicholas I replied on February 9, 1854. Simultaneously with sending the original to Paris, he also ordered a copy of his letter to be printed in the Journal de Saint-Petersburg, the official organ of the Russian Foreign Ministry. The tsar replied that Russian honor was as dear to him as French honor was to Napoleon III; The Sinop battle was a completely legitimate action; one cannot equate the occupation of the Danubian principalities with the actual mastery of the Black Sea by sending French and English fleets there. Both emperors signed the formula they both remember: “Your Majesty good friend".

And already on the third day after the letter of Napoleon III was sent to St. Petersburg, N.D. Kiselev also received an official note from Drouin de Luis in Paris. The note had a deliberately defiant character; she explained that the ban on navigation on the Black Sea applies only to the Russian fleet, and not to the Turkish one. Immediately, by virtue of instructions already received, N.D. Kiselev announced the break in diplomatic relations between Russia and France.

France's action against Russia in this case was so poorly motivated that both Nicholas I in St. Petersburg and N.D. Kiselyov in Paris tried to emphasize that they look at the break with France differently than at the simultaneous break with England. Nicholas I ordered that passports be sent immediately to Hamilton Seymour's house to leave the embassy. And General Castelbajac, the French ambassador, was allowed to declare his desire to leave and obtain passports when he pleased; at a very gracious farewell to the general, Nicholas I gave the ambassador one of the highest orders - the star of Alexander Nevsky. This extraordinary gesture, as it were, emphasized that the tsar considers the break with France a diplomatic misunderstanding, which can be settled as soon as it suddenly arose. This was emphasized even more when N.D. Kiseleva from Paris. Nikolai Kiselev, having already notified Minister Drouin de Luis on February 4, 1854, of his departure from Paris with an embassy, immediately after that declared that he would like to personally bow to Emperor Napoleon III. This is how Nikolai Dmitrievich Kiselev explained his act in a letter to Karl Vasilyevich Nesselrode, which, by the way, did not arouse the slightest objection either from the Chancellor or from Nikolai. “If, contrary to custom, I wished to say goodbye to Louis-Napoleon in a private rendezvous before demanding my passport, it is because I knew how sensitive he was to such manifestations and displays of personal respect, and how much the recollection of such an act could, with case, to help re-establish relations. Napoleon III accepted N.D. Kiseleva in the morning audience, alone, and they talked for a long time. The emperor claimed that his behavior in this whole conflict was the most conciliatory. Slightly, with a hint, Napoleon III also touched on the unfortunate story with his title, and it became clear to Nikolai Kiselev that his interlocutor had not forgotten or forgiven her. Kiselev even said: “Sir, let me tell you that you are mistaken... France is throwing herself into a war that she does not need, in which she can win nothing, and she will fight only to serve the goals and interests of England. It is no secret to anyone here that England would see with equal pleasure the destruction of any fleet, yours or ours, and France is at present assisting in the destruction of the [Russian] fleet, which, in case of need, would be your best assistant against that fleet which, when someday he will turn his guns against yours." The French emperor listened to these meaningful statements in silence, and - which is extremely significant - not a single word from N. D. Kiselyov did not object to them. It is curious that both interlocutors somehow completely forgot about Turkey. Napoleon III did not even realize that for decency it was necessary to at least mention the “independence” of the country, allegedly for the “protection” of which he draws his sword and starts a bloody war.

The Sinop incident served as a formal basis for the entry of England and France into the war against Russia. Nikolai Pavlovich, addressing the Berlin and Vienna courts, suggested that, in case of war, they observe neutrality, supported by weapons. Austria and Prussia declined this proposal, as well as the alliance proposed to them by England and France, but concluded a separate treaty between them.

2.3 Diplomatic activities of the great powers during the Crimean War and the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856

Nicholas I found himself in the face of a powerful coalition, against a bloc not only of European governments, but also of European society. March 27, 1854 Great Britain and France declared war on Russia.

From now on, the war was, in fact, lost. With the landing of allied forces in the Crimea, it changed from offensive to purely defensive. Even before the landing was actually completed, Napoleon III ordered the formulation of "four points", to communicate them to Austria, Prussia, England and then, on behalf of the four powers, present them to Nicholas I. The points were accepted by England and Austria. But the Prussian king for a long time did not want to take part in this hostile action of all the great powers against the tsar. When he learned that Austria began to gradually occupy with its troops those parts of Moldavia and Wallachia that were cleared by the outgoing Russian army, Frederick William IV suddenly felt remorse and went over to the side of the king, announcing that he was breaking the agreement signed with Austria on April 20. Then he was pressed again from Paris and London, and the king, although he did not sign the "four points", agreed not to protest against what they said about Prussia. The note was sent to Petersburg.

Here are the points, finally formulated on July 18, 1854: 1) the Danubian principalities come under the general protectorate of France, England, Austria, Russia and Prussia, and are temporarily occupied by Austrian troops; 2) all these five powers are declared collectively as patronesses of all Christian subjects of the sultan; 3) the same five powers receive collectively supreme supervision and control over the mouths of the Danube; 4) the agreement of the powers with Turkey on the passage of ships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, concluded in 1841, must be radically revised.

The king received "four points", but did not give an answer. He was not given a deadline. Napoleon III and England decided to transfer the army from Varna to the Crimea and weakened their overwhelming influence on Austria. In Vienna, they complained that, by taking their forces to the Crimea, the Allies were leaving Austria face to face with a formidable Russian neighbor. In Austria, they continued to be afraid of Russia, no matter what. It was believed that Russia could be defeated, but it could not be weakened for a long time: woe to those neighbors who would be tempted by her temporary weakness.

The autumn of 1854 came with bloody battles near Alma, Balaklava, Inkerman, with the first bombardments of Sevastopol. Diplomacy didn't work. The Allies watched with concern the unexpectedly protracted siege of Sevastopol, the surrender of which was expected a few days after the landing.

Winter came with the November storm, with diseases, colossal mortality in the Allied camp. In Vienna, the Russian ambassador was no longer F.E. Meyendorff, and Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov - and Buol, as the disasters that the French and British had to experience near Sevastopol grew, became more and more friendly and cordial to A.M. Gorchakov. The sudden news of the death of Nicholas I (in February 1855) briefly revived hopes for peace. Franz Joseph and Buolle received strange and unpleasant news from Paris, which greatly embarrassed them. It turned out that as soon as Napoleon III received the news of the death of Nicholas I, he immediately invited the Saxon envoy von Seebach, who was married to the daughter of the Russian Chancellor K.V. Nesselrode, and expressed (for transmission to the new Tsar Alexander II) his condolences. From the letters, the French emperor, to his joy, learned how hopelessly commander-in-chief Mikhail Gorchakov looked at the prospects for the defense of Sevastopol, how little the new tsar hoped to defend the fortress, how deadly the situation was with the supply of Russian troops with ammunition, etc. In view of all this, all attempts to conclude peace before the fall of Sevastopol were terminated: it was decided with a vengeance to seek the surrender of Sevastopol.

On August 27, 1855, Sevastopol fell, and the big diplomatic game resumed again. Russia did not conclude peace - negotiations in Vienna were conducted at a conference of ambassadors, in which Alexander Gorchakov, the Russian ambassador to Austria, also took part. But things didn't move forward. Henry Palmerston, who at the beginning of February 1855 was already the first minister of England, was not at all interested in the end of the war immediately after the capture of Sevastopol. Mr. Palmerston believed that only after the fall of Sevastopol should a big war be launched. This meant for Lord Palmerston, first, that new allies had to be brought in; secondly, that the French emperor should be encouraged to strengthen his army by more and more recruits. Only then will it be possible to "bring Russia to its knees" and obtain for England the fruits of these new French victories. For the first time after the fall of Sevastopol, it seemed to Henry Palmerston that everything was going great. And Napoleon III also did not think about peace and negotiated with the Swedish king Oscar I about Sweden's entry into the war against Russia. These negotiations were fruitless.

After the fall of Sevastopol, Napoleon III was indifferent to G. Palmerston's projects regarding Poland, the Baltic countries, the Crimea, and the Caucasus. Moreover, already in October, rumors spread that the French emperor did not want to fight anymore, and that if Alexander II agreed to start peace negotiations on the basis of the "four points", then a peace congress could open even now.

In mid-October 1855, Alexander II first received the news that Napoleon III would like to start "direct" relations with him. In other words, the emperor of the French, on the one hand, made it clear that he was not in the least constrained by an alliance with England, and on the other hand, that he, too (like the Russian emperor) was not very pleased with the Vienna conferences.

The Congress of Paris began on February 25 and ended with the signing of a peace treaty on March 30, 1856. It fixed Russia's defeat in the war. The unsuccessful course of the war for Russia led to the infringement of its rights and interests; territorial losses in the end turned out to be for her, however, minimal (initially, England demanded, among other things, the cession of Bessarabia and the destruction of Nikolaev): Russia refused to strengthen the Aland Islands; agreed to freedom of navigation on the Danube; renounced the protectorate over Wallachia, Moldavia and Serbia and part of southern Bessarabia; ceded to Moldavia its possessions in the mouths of the Danube and part of Southern Bessarabia, returned Kars occupied from Turkey (in exchange for Sevastopol and other Crimean cities). Of fundamental importance for Russia was the point on the neutralization of the Black Sea. Neutralization meant a ban on all Black Sea powers to have navies, arsenals and fortresses on the Black Sea. Thus, the Russian Empire was placed in an unequal position with the Ottoman Empire, which retained its entire naval forces in the Marmara and Mediterranean Seas. The treatise was accompanied by a convention on the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, confirming their closure to foreign warships in peacetime.

The Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 completely changed the international situation in Europe, destroying the European system based on the Vienna Treaty of 1815. “The supremacy in Europe passed from St. Petersburg to Paris,” K. Marx wrote about this time. The Treaty of Paris became the core of European diplomacy until the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871.

Conclusion

The region of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean has served for many centuries as a place of contact between cultures and civilizations and at the same time as a battlefield for the great powers. From the 16th century it was unified under the rule of the Muslim Ottoman Empire. Its weakening by the end of the 18th century raised the question of the future fate of vast territories located on three continents. In the 19th century The "Eastern Question" turned into one of the most difficult diplomatic problems, in which all the great powers of the "concert of Europe" were interested in one way or another. Depending on the circumstances, each of the powers could either maintain the unity of the Ottoman Empire or contribute to its collapse, but in both cases, the empire was considered not as a full-fledged subject of international relations, but rather as an object of political influence from outside. The most acute rivalry of the powers unfolded around its future, which was closely intertwined with the internal processes in the country - the growth of the liberation movement of non-Turkish peoples and the attempts of the authorities to modernize the country and centralize its administration.

In this paper, we examined 3 stages associated with the aggravation of the "Eastern Question" in the first half of the 19th century. The first period was due to the uprising in Greece for independence against Turkey and the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829. The second stage is characterized by the refusal on the part of England and France to support Turkey in suppressing the uprising in Egypt. Russia, on the contrary, helped the Ottoman Empire and in 1833 a secret Russian-Turkish treaty was signed on the exclusive right of Russia to use the Black Sea straits. The final stage is the diplomatic activity of the great powers during the Crimean War.

But the Eastern Question did not lose its relevance after the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty in 1856. “The Eastern question, despite the rivers of blood that it has cost Europe, is more unresolved today than ever before,” wrote Prince A.M., the new Russian Foreign Minister, in early 1857. Gorchakov. The next decades will witness new crises, political tensions and new wars, the source of which will be the same "eternal Eastern question". The Crimean War and the Congress of Paris became the boundary of an entire era of international relations.

The “Viennese system” finally ceased to exist. It was replaced by other systems of unions and associations of European states, primarily the "Crimean system" (England, Austria, France), which was destined to have a short life. Major changes were also taking place in the foreign policy of the Russian Empire. Instead of the former solidarity of the three northern courts, a Russian-French rapprochement began to take shape during the Paris Congress. Even more important was the change in the very direction of Russian policy.

In April 1856, K.V. was dismissed. Nesselrode, who headed the ministry for four decades. Several months will pass, and Europe will hear the significant phrase of A.M. Gorchakova: “Russia is concentrating”, that is, it begins to pay main attention to internal problems, and acts cautiously in the foreign policy arena, heals wounds and gathers strength. This will be a new course of Russian politics, corresponding to the tasks of the new era.

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The Eastern question is the so-called oral designation of a number of international contradictions that arose in the late 18th and early 20th centuries. It was directly...

Eastern question: background, essence, results

By Masterweb

03.04.2018 16:01

The Eastern question is the so-called oral designation of a number of international contradictions that arose in the late 18th and early 20th centuries. It was directly connected with the attempts of the Balkan peoples to free themselves from the Ottoman yoke. The situation was aggravated in connection with the impending collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Many great powers, including Russia, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, sought to fight for the division of Turkish possessions.

background

The Eastern question initially arose due to the fact that the Ottoman Turks, who settled in Europe, formed a fairly powerful European state. As a result, the situation on the Balkan Peninsula has changed dramatically, between Christians and Muslims there has been a confrontation.

As a result, it was the Ottoman state that became one of the key factors in international European political life. On the one hand, they were afraid of her, on the other hand, they were looking for an ally in her person.

France was one of the first to establish diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire.

In 1528, the first alliance between France and the Ottoman Empire was concluded, which was based on mutual hostility to the Austrian Empire, which at that time was personified by Charles V.

Over time, religious components were added to the political ones. King Francis I of France wanted one of the churches in Jerusalem to be returned to Christians. The Sultan was against it, but promised to support all Christian churches that would be founded in Turkey.

Since 1535, the French and all other foreigners have been allowed to freely visit the Holy Places under the auspices of France. Thus, for a long time, France remained the only Western European country in the Turkish world.

Decline of the Ottoman Empire

The decline in the Ottoman Empire began in the 17th century. The Turkish army was defeated by the Poles and Austrians near Vienna in 1683. Thus, the advance of the Turks into Europe was stopped.

The leaders of the national liberation movement in the Balkans took advantage of the weakened empire. These were Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins, Vlachs, mostly Orthodox.

At the same time, in the 17th century, the economic and political positions of Great Britain and France were increasingly strengthening in the Ottoman Empire, which dreamed of maintaining their own influence, while trying to interfere with the territorial claims of other powers. First of all, Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The main enemy of the Ottoman Empire

In the middle of the 18th century, the main enemy of the Ottoman Empire changed. Russia replaces Austria-Hungary. The situation in the Black Sea region changed radically after the victory in the war of 1768-1774.

Based on its results, the Kuchuk-Kaynardzhi Treaty was concluded, which formalized the first Russian intervention in the affairs of Turkey.

At that time, Catherine II had a plan for the final expulsion of all Turks from Europe and the restoration of the Greek Empire, on the throne of which she predicted her grandson Konstantin Pavlovich. At the same time, the Ottoman government expected to take revenge for the defeat in the Russian-Turkish war. Great Britain and France continued to play an important role in the Eastern Question, and the Turks counted on their support.

As a result, in 1787 Turkey launched another war against Russia. In 1788, the British and French, through diplomatic tricks, forced Sweden to enter the war on their side, which attacked Russia. But within the coalition, everything ended in failure. First, Sweden withdrew from the war, and then Turkey agreed to another peace treaty, which pushed its border to the Dniester. The government of the Ottoman Empire renounced its claims to Georgia.

Aggravation of the situation

As a result, it was decided that the existence of the Turkish Empire would ultimately prove more beneficial to Russia. At the same time, Russia's sole protectorate over Turkish Christians was not supported by other European states. For example, in 1815, at a congress in Vienna, Emperor Alexander I believed that the Eastern Question deserved the attention of all world powers. Shortly thereafter, a Greek uprising broke out, followed by the terrible barbarism of the Turks, all this forced Russia, along with other powers, to intervene in this war.

After that, relations between Russia and Turkey remained tense. Noting what are the reasons for the aggravation of the Eastern Question, it is necessary to emphasize that the Russian rulers regularly examined the possibility of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. So, in 1829, Nicholas I ordered to study the position of Turkey in the event of collapse.

In particular, it was proposed to justify five minor states instead of Turkey. The Kingdom of Macedonia, Serbia, Epirus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Principality of Dacia. Now it should be clear to you what are the reasons for the aggravation of the Eastern Question.

Expulsion of the Turks from Europe

The plan for the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, conceived by Catherine II, was also tried by Nicholas I. But as a result, he abandoned this idea, deciding, on the contrary, to support and protect its existence.

For example, after the successful uprising of the Egyptian pasha Megmet Ali, after which Turkey was almost completely crushed, Russia in 1833 entered into a defensive alliance, sending its fleet to the aid of the Sultan.

Enmity in the East

The enmity continued not only with the Ottoman Empire, but also between the Christians themselves. In the east, the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches competed. They competed for various privileges, advantages for visiting Holy places.

By 1740, France had succeeded in securing certain privileges for the Latin Church at the expense of the Orthodox. The followers of the Greek religion obtained from the Sultan the restoration of ancient rights.

Understanding the causes of the Eastern Question, one must turn to 1850, when French envoys sought the return of individual Holy places located in Jerusalem to the French government. Russia was categorically against it. As a result, a whole coalition of European states came out against Russia in the Eastern Question.

Crimean War

Turkey was in no hurry to accept a favorable decree for Russia. As a result, in 1853 relations worsened again, the solution of the Eastern Question was again postponed. Soon after, relations with European states went wrong, all this led to the Crimean War, which ended only in 1856.

The essence of the Eastern Question was the struggle for influence in the Middle East and the Balkan Peninsula. For several decades, he remained one of the key in Russia's foreign policy, she confirmed this over and over again. Russia's policy in the Eastern Question was the need to establish its influence in this region, which was opposed by many European powers. All this resulted in the Crimean War, in which each of the participants pursued their own selfish interests. Now you have figured out what the Eastern question was.

Massacre in Syria

In 1860, the European powers again had to intervene in the situation in the Ottoman Empire, after a terrible massacre against Christians in Syria. The French army went east.

Regular uprisings soon began. First in Herzegovina in 1875, and then in Serbia in 1876. Russia in Herzegovina immediately declared the need to alleviate the suffering of Christians and finally put an end to the bloodshed.

In 1877, a new war broke out, Russian troops reached Constantinople, Romania, Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria gained independence. At the same time, the Turkish government insisted on observing the principles of religious freedom. At the same time, the Russian military-political leadership continued to develop plans for a landing on the Bosphorus at the end of the 19th century.

The situation at the beginning of the 20th century

By the beginning of the 20th century, the expansion of Turkey continued to progress. In many ways, this was facilitated by the rule of the reactionary Abdul-Hamid. Italy, Austria and the Balkan states took advantage of the crisis in Turkey to wrest their territories from her.

As a result, in 1908 Bosnia and Herzegovina was ceded to Austria, the Tripoli region was annexed to Italy, in 1912 four minor Balkan countries started a war with Turkey.

The situation was aggravated due to the genocide of the Greek and Armenian people in 1915-1917. At the same time, the Entente allies made it clear to Russia that in the event of a triumph, the Black Sea straits and Constantinople could go to Russia. In 1918, Turkey capitulated in the First World War. But the situation in the region has changed dramatically once again, which was facilitated by the fall of the monarchy in Russia, the national-bourgeois revolution in Turkey.

In the war of 1919-1922, the Kemalists led by Ataturk won, and the new borders of Turkey, as well as the countries of the former Entente, were approved at the Lausanne Conference. Ataturk himself became the first president of the Turkish Republic, the founder of the modern Turkish state in the form we know.

The results of the Eastern Question was the establishment of borders in Europe close to modern ones. It was also possible to resolve many issues related, for example, to the exchange of population. Ultimately, this led to the final legal elimination of the very concept of the Eastern Question in modern international relations.

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EASTERN QUESTION

Department of Russian History

COURSE WORK

The "Eastern Question" in International Relations in the First Half of the 19th Century

Eastern question: background, essence, results

By Masterweb

background

Decline of the Ottoman Empire

The main enemy of the Ottoman Empire

Aggravation of the situation

Expulsion of the Turks from Europe

Enmity in the East

Crimean War

Massacre in Syria

The situation at the beginning of the 20th century

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