Proletarians of all countries, unite /

INSTITUTE

MARXISM-LENINISM under the Central Committee of the CPSU

great patriotic

wars Soviet Union

1941-1945

in six volumes

Editorial committee:

POSPELOV P. N. (Chairman),

ANDREEV V. A., ANTONOV A. I., BAGRAMYAN I. Kh.,

BELOV P. A., BOLTIN E. A. (deputy chairman),

M. G. Bragin, F. I. Golikov, A. A. Grechko, I. D. Eliseev,

ZHELTOE A. S., ZHILIN P. A., ZHUKOV E. M., ZHURAVLEV N. A.

I. N. Zemskov, L. F. Ilyichev, D. M. Kukin, V. V. Kurasov,

A. P. KUCHKIN, I. I. MINTS, V. P. MOSKOVSKII (deputy chairman),

G. D. Obichkin, Z. S. Osipov, B. N. Polevoy, S. I. Rudenko,

A. L. SIDOROV, V. D. SOKOLOVSKY, B. S. TELPUHOVSKY,

A. A. Timofeevsky, V. M. Khvostov (N. I. Shatagin)

INSTITUTE OF MARXISM-LENINISM under the Central Committee of the CPSU DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

MOSCOW -1960

STORY

great patriotic

Soviet Union

1941-1945

volume one

THE PREPARATION AND UNLEASHING OF WAR BY THE IMPERIALIST

POWERS

MILITARY PUBLISHING HOUSE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR

MOSCOW -1960

Six-volume work "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945" developed by the team scientific staff Department of the History of the Great Patriotic War of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU (Head of the Department Boltin E. A., Deputy Head of the Department Telpukhovsky B. S.) on the basis of: documentary materials stored in the central party and state, departmental and local archives of the USSR; materials from the archives of the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Republic, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Romanian People's Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic; published documents of the USSR and other countries, as well as Soviet and foreign scientific and historical literature.

Deborin G. A. (head),

Zastavenko G. F., Lekomtsev F . 3.,

Semenov N. A. (literary editor),

Tamonov F.I., Shuktomov P.I.,

Ekshtein A. E.

A and p a n em yang M. E., B o g w w E. Yu., V o l t i n E. A., G p a x o v A. N., Komkov G. D., Krasnov I. I., M o n and n M. E., Nazar o v P. A., Niki t and n A. F., Nikitin E. F., Gerhard Nitsche (GDR], Os t about I-Ovsyany I. D., II p oector D.M., S e k u hundred in the VA, T p u khan o v skip V. G., Fomin V. T.. Shishkin S. N., Gein ts Schumann (GDR)

They will never defeat the people in which the workers and peasants for the most part recognized, felt and saw that they were defending their own, Soviet power- the power of the working people who defend the cause, the victory of which will provide them and their children with the opportunity to enjoy all the benefits of culture, all the creations of human labor.

V. I. LENIN

INTRODUCTION

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945, imposed on our people by predatory German imperialism, is the most difficult and at the same time the most heroic period in the history of our Motherland. Not a single nation has endured such severe trials that befell the Soviet people in these years. In a military storm, the might of the country of socialism was revealed with renewed vigor.

The Soviet people rose up in the Patriotic War in order to repulse the second attempt by international imperialism after foreign intervention and civil war to destroy the world's first socialist state by force of arms. This war ended with the complete victory of the USSR and the defeat of the most powerful army of the capitalist world at that time - the army Nazi Germany, based on the military-economic potential of almost all of bourgeois Europe.

In his report at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on January 14, 1960. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, head of the Soviet government N. S. Khrushchev said:

“The glory of the valiant sons and daughters of our people who shed blood and gave their lives in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the Motherland in the civil war and the Great Patriotic War will live forever. The Soviet people are deeply grateful to those who heroically repulsed the onslaught of the enemy and, sparing no effort, strengthened and strengthens the might of their homeland, standing guard over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

Having won the war against German fascism under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet people accomplished the greatest feat. He rightfully acquired for himself the glory of a heroic people, a victorious people, a heroic people, a liberator people.

1 N. S. Khrushchev. Disarmament is the way to consolidate peace and ensure friendship among peoples. M., Gospolitizdat, 1960, p. 49.

The victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany in its significance and consequences is an outstanding event. world history that determined the fate of generations. This victory saved the conquest of socialism in the USSR from the mortal danger, eliminated the fascist threat to the national and state existence of the Soviet people. Having crushed a strong, cruel and insidious enemy, the working people of the USSR fulfilled their internationalist duty to all mankind, eliminating the formidable danger of its enslavement by the hordes of German fascism. The Soviet people dispelled the crazy plans of the German imperialists who dreamed of world domination.

In the severe trials of the Great Patriotic War, the superiority of socialism over capitalism manifested itself with great force. It is the socialist public and political system gave the Soviet Union that irresistible power that enabled its people and army to defend their freedom and independence with honor under the most difficult conditions, stop the invasion of the Nazi hordes and defeat them, and render fraternal assistance to the peoples of Europe in liberation from the fascist yoke. The war demonstrated with all force and persuasiveness the historical invincibility of socialism, the decisive superiority of the new social order over moribund capitalism.

The Soviet people, rallied around the Communist Party and the Soviet government, showed during the war years their selfless devotion to the ideas of communism. On the fields of the gigantic battles of the Great Patriotic War, the question of the continued existence of socialist society, the independence and independence of our state, the life and death of the peoples of the Soviet Union was decided. The future of all peoples enslaved by fascism, the fate of modern civilization depended on the outcome of the grandiose single combat between the USSR and fascist Germany. Defending their socialist Fatherland, the Soviet people at the same time defended all mankind, all the achievements of world culture from fascist barbarism. This clearly expressed the leading role of socialism in historical development modern society. The national interests of the Soviet people in the war completely coincided with the international line, which stems from the very essence of the socialist system, from the noble principles of proletarian solidarity.

In the Great Patriotic War, the peoples of the USSR were not left alone. All the progressive forces of the world were on their side. The working people of foreign countries, in the name of their national and international interests, launched a liberation struggle against fascism, striving to render all possible assistance to the Soviet people. The mighty will of the peoples to defeat fascism and the desire of the ruling circles of those capitalist countries that entered the war with Nazi Germany to defend their positions led to the common interests of freedom-loving peoples in waging war, which led to the emergence of an anti-fascist coalition of peoples and governments. However, the burden of military trials and the hardships of the war fell on the coalition members far from evenly. The main efforts in the armed struggle against the fascist invaders fell to the share of the Soviet Union: the outcome of the war was decided and determined on the Soviet-German front.

The war imposed on the Soviet Union by German fascism was the largest armed action of the strike forces of world imperialism against the socialist world. This war decided the fate of the world's first socialist state, the future of world civilization, progress and democracy. It became the nationwide Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people for the freedom and independence of the socialist motherland, for socialism.

The entry of the Soviet Union into the battle with Nazi Germany fundamentally changed the political direction of the Second World War that began in 1939. Second World War was imperialist in nature. It was prepared and carried out in the conditions of the general crisis of capitalism. World War II began as a war between two groups of imperialist states. At the first stage, it had an imperialist, predatory character, but even then it showed the tendencies of a people's liberation, just war waged by the Polish people.

The entry into the war of the USSR as a result of the attack of fascist Germany was the main factor that determined the change in its character. The justified war aims of the USSR, the resistance movement in the occupied countries, and the pressure of the popular masses on the governments of the bourgeois-democratic states compelled these governments to form a united front with the Soviet Union. The war took on an anti-fascist character.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people was a just war of liberation against Germany and its allies. The Patriotic War was the decisive and most important part of the Second World War of 1939-1945.

German imperialism, starting a war against the USSR, set itself the goal of destroying the world's first socialist state, exterminating millions of people, enslaving the peoples of the Soviet Union, converting the vast territory of the country into a colony, and securing the path to world domination. Anti-communism is the main focus of fascism. Economic goals were defined by Adolf Hitler as the need to seize the resources of the USSR, regardless of the possibility of the death of millions of people and take from Russia everything that Nazi Germany needs.

Nazi Germany began preparing an attack on the Soviet Union shortly after the conclusion of the non-aggression pact. Already on March 30, 1940, at a meeting, Hitler set the task of destroying the state and the armed forces of Russia. On June 21, 1940, Field Marshal Brauchitsch received an order to prepare a plan for a war against the USSR; on December 18, 1940, the plan was approved "Barbarossa"- the plan of "blitzkrieg" war against the USSR. Its essence was to destroy the troops of the Red Army stationed in the western regions of the USSR within a few weeks with tank units, to prevent the retreat of combat-ready units to the east. The ultimate goal of the operation was “to create a defensive barrier against Asiatic Russia along the line of the Volga River - Arkhangelsk.
Thus, if necessary, the last Russian industrial area in the Ural Mountains can be destroyed by air forces. The Baltic Fleet would quickly lose its bases during these operations, thus becoming unable to continue the fight. The effective performance of the Russian air forces must be prevented by powerful strikes at the very beginning of the operation.

At the call of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the peoples of the USSR rose to the liberation, Patriotic War. The Soviet people in this war defended the independence of their homeland, the life and freedom of tens of millions of Soviet people, defended the existence of the world's first socialist state of workers and peasants. “The war that began on June 22, 1941, imposed on the Soviet Union by German fascism, was the largest military clash between socialism and striking forces imperialism. It became the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people for the freedom and independence of the socialist Motherland, for socialism ”(50 years of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Abstracts of the Central Committee of the CPSU. M., 1967, p. 18-19).

Together with Germany, Italy, Finland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria entered the war. On the Far Eastern border, the millionth Kwantung Army stood ready for hostilities - Japan was waiting for the capture of Moscow in order to enter the war. Turkey also took a hostile position.

The Great Patriotic War, which lasted almost four years, is divided into several periods associated with certain changes in the international, military and economic situation of the warring countries and their allies.

By June 1941, World War II, having drawn about 30 states into its orbit, came close to the borders of the Soviet Union. There was no force in the West that could stop the army of Nazi Germany, which by that time had already occupied 12 European states. The next military-political goal - the main one in its significance - was the defeat of the Soviet Union for Germany.

Deciding to start a war with the USSR and relying on "lightning speed", the German leadership intended to complete it by the winter of 1941. In accordance with the "Barbarossa" plan, a giant armada of selected, well-trained and armed troops was deployed near the borders of the USSR. The German General Staff placed its main bet on the crushing power of a surprise first strike, the swiftness of the rush of concentrated forces of aviation, tanks and infantry to the vital political and economic centers of the country.

Having completed the concentration of troops, Germany attacked our country early in the morning of June 22 without declaring war, bringing down a flurry of fire and metal. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against the Nazi invaders began.

For 1418 long days and nights, the peoples of the USSR marched towards victory. This path was incredibly difficult. Our Motherland fully knew both the bitterness of defeats and the joy of victories. The initial period was especially difficult.

German invasion of Soviet territory

While a new day, June 22, 1941, was breaking in the east, the shortest night of the year was still going on on the western border of the Soviet Union. And no one could even imagine that this day would be the beginning of the most bloody war that would last four long years. The headquarters of the German army groups, concentrated on the border with the USSR, received the prearranged signal "Dortmund", which meant - to start the invasion.

Soviet intelligence revealed the preparations the day before, about which the headquarters of the border military districts immediately reported to the General Staff of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA). So, the chief of staff of the Baltic Special Military District, General P.S. Klenov at 10 pm on June 21 reported that the Germans had completed the construction of bridges across the Neman, and the civilian population was ordered to evacuate at least 20 km from the border, “there is talk that the troops were ordered to take their starting position for the offensive.” Chief of Staff of the Western Special Military District, Major General V.E. Klimovskikh reported that the wire fences of the Germans, which still stood along the border during the day, were removed by evening, and in the forest, located not far from the border, the noise of motors was heard.

In the evening, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov invited the German ambassador Schulenburg and told him that Germany, without any reason, was deteriorating relations with the USSR every day. Despite repeated protests from the Soviet side, German planes continue to intrude into its airspace. There are persistent rumors about the upcoming war between our countries. The Soviet government has every reason to believe this, because the German leadership did not react in any way to the TASS report of June 14. Schulenburg promised to immediately report the complaints he had heard to his government. However, this was just a simple diplomatic excuse on his part, because the German ambassador was well aware that the Wehrmacht troops were on full alert and were just waiting for a signal to move east.

With the onset of dusk on June 21, the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov received a phone call from the Chief of Staff of the Kyiv Special Military District, General M.A. Purkaev and reported on a German defector, who said that at dawn the next day the German army would start a war against the USSR. G.K. Zhukov immediately reported this to I.V. Stalin and People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. Stalin summoned Timoshenko and Zhukov to the Kremlin and, after an exchange of opinions, ordered to report on the draft directive prepared by the General Staff on bringing the troops of the western border districts to combat readiness. Only late in the evening, after receiving a cipher from one of the residents of Soviet intelligence, who reported that there would be a decision that night, this decision was war, adding another point to the draft directive read to him that the troops should in no case succumb to possible provocations, Stalin allowed to send it to the districts.

The main meaning of this document boiled down to the fact that he warned the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kyiv and Odessa military districts about a possible attack by the aggressor during June 22-23 and demanded "to be in full combat readiness to meet a sudden attack by the Germans or their allies." On the night of June 22, the districts were ordered to covertly occupy fortified areas on the border, by dawn to disperse all aviation over field airfields and camouflage it, keep the troops dispersed, put the air defense on alert without additional lifting of assigned personnel, and prepare cities and objects for blackout . Directive No. 1 categorically forbade the holding of any other events without special permission.
The transmission of this document was completed only at half past one in the morning, and the entire long journey from the General Staff to the districts, and then to the armies, corps and divisions as a whole, took more than four hours of precious time.

Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 1 of June 22, 1941 TsAMO.F. 208.Op. 2513.D.71.L.69.

At dawn on June 22, at 3:15 am (Moscow time), thousands of guns and mortars of the German army opened fire on the border outposts and the location of the Soviet troops. German planes rushed to bombard important targets in the entire border strip - from the Barents Sea to the Black. Many cities were subjected to air raids. In order to achieve surprise, the bombers flew over the Soviet border in all sectors at the same time. The first strikes hit precisely the bases of the latest types of Soviet aircraft, command posts, ports, warehouses, and railway junctions. Massed enemy air strikes thwarted the organized exit of the first echelon of border districts to the state border. Aviation, concentrated on permanent airfields, suffered irreparable losses: on the first day of the war, 1,200 Soviet aircraft were destroyed, and most of them did not even have time to take to the air. However, despite this, in the first day the Soviet Air Force made about 6 thousand sorties and destroyed over 200 German aircraft in air battles.

The first reports of the invasion of German troops into Soviet territory came from the border guards. In Moscow, at the General Staff, information about the flight of enemy aircraft across the western border of the USSR was received at 03:07. At about 4 o'clock in the morning, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov called I.V. Stalin and reported the incident. At the same time, already in plain text, the General Staff informed the headquarters of the military districts, armies and formations about the German attack.

Upon learning of the attack, I.V. Stalin called for a meeting of the highest military, party and statesmen. At 5:45 a.m., S.K. arrived at his office. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, V.M. Molotov, L.P. Beria and L.Z. Mehlis. By 7:15 a.m., Directive No. 2 was drawn up, which, on behalf of the People's Commissar of Defense, demanded:

"one. Troops to attack the enemy forces with all their strength and means and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border. Do not cross the border until further notice.

2. Reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish the places of concentration of enemy aviation and the grouping of its ground forces. Destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb the main groupings of his ground forces with powerful strikes by bomber and ground attack aircraft. Air strikes should be carried out to the depth of German territory up to 100-150 km. Bomb Koenigsberg and Memel. Do not make raids on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions.

The prohibition to cross the border, besides the limitation of the depth of air strikes, indicates that Stalin still did not believe that it had begun " big war". Only by noon the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Beria - prepared the text of the statement of the Soviet government, which Molotov spoke on the radio at 12:15.

Speech on the radio by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
and People's commissioner for foreign affairs
Molotova V.M. dated June 22, 1941 TsAMO. F. 135, Op. 12798. D. 1. L.1.

At a meeting in the Kremlin, the most important decisions were made, which laid the foundation for turning the whole country into a single military camp. They were issued as decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: on the mobilization of those liable for military service in all military districts, with the exception of the Central Asian and Trans-Baikal, as well as the Far East, where the Far Eastern Front had existed since 1938; on the introduction of martial law in most of the European territory of the USSR - from the Arkhangelsk region to the Krasnodar Territory.

Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on martial law
and on the approval of the Regulations on Military Tribunals
dated June 22, 1941 TsAMO. F. 135, Op. 12798. D. 1. L.2.

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on mobilization by military districts.
Reports of the High Command of the Red Army for June 22-23, 1941
TsAMO. F. 135, Op. 12798. D. 1. L. 3.

On the morning of the same day, the First Deputy Chairman of the Council people's commissars(SNK) USSR N.A. Voznesensky, having gathered people's commissars responsible for the main industries, gave the orders provided for by the mobilization plans. Then no one even thought that the outbreak of war would soon break everything planned, that it would be necessary to urgently evacuate industrial enterprises to the east and create there, essentially anew, the military industry.

Most of the population learned about the beginning of the war from Molotov's speech on the radio. This unexpected news deeply shocked the people, aroused alarm for the fate of the Motherland. At once, the normal course of life was disrupted, not only plans for the future were upset, there was a real danger to the lives of relatives and friends. At the direction of the Soviet and party organs, rallies and meetings were held at enterprises, institutions, and collective farms. The speakers condemned the German attack on the USSR and expressed their readiness to defend the Fatherland. Many immediately applied for voluntary enlistment in the army and asked to be immediately sent to the front.

Germany's attack on the USSR was not only a new stage in the life of the Soviet people, to one degree or another it affected the peoples of other countries, primarily those who were soon to become its main allies or opponents.

The government and people of Great Britain immediately breathed a sigh of relief: a war in the east, at least for a while, would push back the German invasion of the British Isles. So, Germany has one more, besides quite a serious opponent; this would inevitably weaken it, and therefore, the British reasoned, the USSR should immediately be considered as its ally in the struggle against the aggressor. This is exactly what Prime Minister Churchill expressed, who on the evening of June 22 spoke on the radio about another German attack. “Any person or state that fights against Nazism,” he said, “will receive our help ... This is our policy, this is our statement. It follows from this that we will give Russia and the Russian people all the help we can ... Hitler wants to destroy the Russian state because, if successful, he hopes to withdraw the main forces of his army and aviation from the east and throw them on our island.

The US leadership made an official statement on June 23. Acting Secretary of State S. Welles read it on behalf of the government. The statement emphasized that any rallying of forces against Hitlerism, regardless of their origin, would hasten the fall of the German leaders, and that the Hitlerite army was now the main danger to the American continent. The next day, President Roosevelt told a press conference that the United States was pleased to welcome another opponent of Nazism and intended to provide assistance to the Soviet Union.

About the beginning new war The population of Germany learned from the Fuhrer's appeal to the people, which was read on the radio by the Minister of Propaganda J. Goebbels on June 22 at 5:30. He was followed by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop with a special memorandum listing accusations against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that Germany, as in her previous aggressive actions, placed all the blame for unleashing the war on the USSR. In his address to the people, Hitler did not forget to mention the “conspiracy of Jews and democrats, Bolsheviks and reactionaries” against the Reich, the concentration of 160 Soviet divisions on the borders, which allegedly threatened not only Germany, but also Finland and Romania for many weeks. All this, they say, forced the Fuhrer to undertake an "act of self-defense" in order to secure the country, "to save European civilization and culture."

The extreme complexity of the rapidly changing situation, the high mobility and maneuverability of military operations, the stunning power of the first strikes of the Wehrmacht showed that the Soviet military-political leadership did not have an effective system of command and control. As planned earlier, the leadership of the troops was carried out by the people's commissar for defense, Marshal Timoshenko. However, without Stalin, he could not solve almost a single issue.

On June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created, consisting of: People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Timoshenko (chairman), Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, Stalin, Molotov, Marshal Voroshilov, Marshal Budyonny and People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral Kuznetsov.

At the Stavka, an institute of permanent advisers to the Stavka was organized, consisting of Marshal Kulik, Marshal Shaposhnikov, Meretskov, Chief of the Air Force Zhigarev, Vatutin, Chief of Air Defense (Air Defense) Voronov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Beria, Voznesensky, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Mekhlis.

Such a composition allowed the Headquarters to quickly solve all the tasks of leading the armed struggle. However, it turned out two commanders-in-chief: Timoshenko - legal, who, without Stalin's sanction, did not have the right to give orders to the army in the field, and Stalin - the actual one. This not only complicated command and control, but also led to belated decisions in the rapidly changing situation at the front.

Events in the strip Western Front

From the first day of the war, the most alarming situation developed in Belarus, where the Wehrmacht dealt the main blow with the most powerful formation - the troops of Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Bock. But the Western Front that opposed it (commander General D.G. Pavlov, member of the Military Council, Corps Commissar A.F. Fominykh, chief of staff General V.E. Klimovskikh) had considerable forces (Table 1).

Table 1
The balance of forces in the Western Front at the beginning of the war

Forces and means	Western front *	Army Group "Center" (without 3 mgr) **	Ratio
Personnel, thousand people
Tanks, units
Combat aircraft, units

* Only serviceable equipment is taken into account.
** Until June 25, the 3rd tank group (tgr) operated in the zone Northwestern Front.

On the whole, the Western Front was slightly inferior to the enemy in terms of guns and combat aircraft, but significantly outnumbered him in terms of tanks. Unfortunately, in the first echelon of the covering armies it was planned to have only 13 rifle divisions, while the enemy in the first echelon concentrated 28 divisions, including 4 tank divisions.
Events on the Western Front unfolded in the most tragic way. Even in the course of artillery preparation, the Germans captured bridges across the Western Bug, including in the Brest region. Assault groups were the first to cross the border with the task of capturing border outposts literally within half an hour. However, the enemy miscalculated: there was not a single frontier post that would not offer him stubborn resistance. The border guards fought to the death. The Germans had to bring the main forces of the divisions into battle.

Fierce fighting broke out in the skies over the border regions. The pilots of the front waged a fierce struggle, trying to wrest the initiative from the enemy and prevent him from seizing air supremacy. However, this task turned out to be impossible. Indeed, on the very first day of the war, the Western Front lost 738 combat vehicles, which accounted for almost 40% of the aircraft fleet. In addition, on the side of the enemy pilots there was a clear advantage in both skill and quality of equipment.

A belated exit towards the advancing enemy forced Soviet troops engage in battle on the move, in parts. On the directions of the aggressor's strikes, they failed to reach the prepared lines, which means that they did not succeed in a continuous front of defense. Having met resistance, the enemy quickly bypassed the Soviet units, attacked them from the flanks and rear, sought to advance their tank divisions as far as possible in depth. The situation was aggravated by sabotage groups thrown out on parachutes, as well as submachine gunners on motorcycles rushing to the rear, who disabled communication lines, captured bridges, airfields, and other military installations. Small groups of motorcyclists fired indiscriminately from machine guns in order to give the defenders the appearance of being surrounded. With ignorance of the general situation and loss of control, their actions violated the stability of the defense of the Soviet troops, causing panic.

Many rifle divisions of the first echelon of the armies were dismembered from the very first hours, some were surrounded. Communication with them was interrupted. By 7 o'clock in the morning the headquarters of the Western Front had no wired connection even with the armies.

When the front headquarters received the directive of the People's Commissar No. 2, the rifle divisions were already drawn into the fighting. Although the mechanized corps began advancing to the border, but due to their great distance from the areas of the enemy’s breakthrough, communications disruption, the dominance of German aviation in the air, “fall on the enemy with all their might” and destroy his strike groups, as required by the order of the People's Commissar, Soviet troops, naturally they couldn't.

A serious threat arose on the northern face of the Bialystok ledge, where the 3rd Army of General V.I. Kuznetsova. Constantly bombarding the army headquarters located in Grodno, the enemy put out of action all communication centers by the middle of the day. Neither the headquarters of the front, nor the neighbors could not be contacted for a whole day. Meanwhile, the infantry divisions of the 9th German Army had already managed to push Kuznetsov's right-flank formations to the southeast.

On the southern face of the ledge, where the 4th Army, led by General A.A. Korobkov, the enemy had a three-four-fold superiority. Management was broken here as well. Not having time to take the planned lines of defense, the rifle formations of the army under the blows of the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian began to retreat.

Their retreat put the formations of the 10th Army, which was in the center of the Bialystok ledge, in a difficult position. From the very beginning of the invasion, the front headquarters had no connection with it. Pavlov had no choice but to send by plane to Bialystok, to the headquarters of the 10th Army, his deputy General I.V. Boldin with the task of establishing the position of the troops and organizing a counterattack in the Grodno direction, which was envisaged by the wartime plan. The command of the Western Front for the entire first day of the war did not receive a single report from the armies.

Yes, and Moscow throughout the day did not receive objective information about the situation on the fronts, although in the afternoon it sent its representatives there. To clarify the situation and help General Pavlov, Stalin sent the largest group to the Western Front. It included the deputies of the people's commissar of defense marshals B.M. Shaposhnikov and G.I. Kulik, as well as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General V.D. Sokolovsky and the head of the operational department, General G.K. Malandin. However, it was not possible to reveal the actual situation both on this front and on others, to understand the situation. This is evidenced by the operational report of the General Staff for 22 hours. “German regular troops,” it stated, “during June 22 fought with the border units of the USSR, having little success in certain areas. In the afternoon, with the approach of the advanced units of the field troops of the Red Army, the attacks of the German troops on the predominant stretch of our border were repulsed with losses for the enemy.

Based on the reports of the fronts, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff concluded that the battles were mainly fought near the border, and the largest enemy groupings are the Suwalki and Lublin, and the further course of the battles will depend on their actions. Due to the misleading reports of the headquarters of the Western Front, the Soviet High Command clearly underestimated the powerful German grouping that struck from the Brest region, however, it was not oriented in the general air situation either.

Believing that there were enough forces for a retaliatory strike, and guided by the pre-war plan in case of a war with Germany, the People's Commissar of Defense signed Directive No. 3 at 21:15. The troops of the Western Front were ordered to cooperate with the North-Western Front, holding back the enemy in the Warsaw direction with powerful counterattacks to the flank and rear, destroy his Suwalki grouping and, by the end of June 24, capture the Suwalki area. The next day, together with the troops of other fronts, it was necessary to go on the offensive and defeat the strike force of Army Group Center. Such a plan not only did not correspond to the true situation, but also prevented the troops of the Western Front from creating a defense. Pavlov and his staff, having received Directive No. 3 late at night, began preparations for its implementation, although it was simply unthinkable to do this in the hours remaining before dawn, and even in the absence of communication with the armies.

On the morning of June 23, the commander decided to launch a counterattack in the direction of Grodno, Suwalki with the forces of the 6th and 11th mechanized corps, as well as the 36th cavalry division, uniting them into a group under the command of his deputy General Boldin. Formations of the 3rd Army were also to take part in the planned counterattack. Note that this decision was absolutely unrealistic: the formations of the 3rd Army operating in the direction of the counterattack continued to withdraw, the 11th mechanized corps fought intense battles on a wide front, the 6th mechanized corps was too far from the area of ​​the counterattack - 60-70 km, even further from Grodno was the 36th cavalry division.

At the disposal of General Boldin was only part of the forces of the 6th mechanized corps of General M.G. Khatskilevich, and then only by noon on June 23. Considered by right the most complete in the Red Army, this corps had 1022 tanks, including 352 KB and T-34. However, during the advance, being under the incessant attacks of enemy aircraft, he suffered significant losses.

Fierce battles unfolded near Grodno. After the capture of Grodno by the enemy, the 11th mechanized corps of General D.K. Mostovenko. Before the war, he had only 243 tanks. In addition, in the first two days of fighting, the corps suffered significant losses. However, on June 24, the formations of the Boldin group, with the support of front-line aviation and the 3rd long-range bomber corps of Colonel N.S. Skripko managed to achieve some success.

Field Marshal Bock sent the main forces of the 2nd air fleet. German planes hovered continuously over the battlefield, depriving parts of the 3rd Army and Boldin's group of the possibility of any maneuver. Heavy fighting near Grodno continued the next day, but the forces of the tankers quickly dried up. The enemy pulled up anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, as well as an infantry division. Nevertheless, Boldin's group managed to chain significant enemy forces to the Grodno region for two days and inflict significant damage on him. The counterattack eased, albeit not for long, the position of the 3rd Army. But it was not possible to wrest the initiative from the enemy, and the mechanized corps suffered huge losses.

Panzer Group Hoth deeply embraced Kuznetsov's 3rd Army from the north, while General Strauss' 9th Army units attacked it from the front. Already on June 23, the 3rd Army had to withdraw beyond the Neman in order to avoid encirclement.

The 4th Army of General A.A. found itself in extremely difficult conditions. Korobkov. Guderian's tank group and the main forces of the 4th Army, advancing from Brest in the northeast direction, cut the troops of this army into two unequal parts. Fulfilling the directive of the front, Korobkov was also preparing a counterattack. However, he managed to collect only parts of the tank divisions of the 14th mechanized corps of General S.I. Oborina, and the remnants of the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions. And they were opposed by almost two tank and two infantry divisions of the enemy. The forces were too unequal. The 14th mechanized corps suffered heavy losses. Rifle divisions were also bled. The oncoming battle ended in favor of the enemy.

The gap with the troops of the North-Western Front on the right wing, where the Goth tank group rushed, and the difficult situation on the left wing, where the 4th Army was withdrawing, created a threat of deep coverage of the entire Bialystok grouping both from the north and from the south.

General Pavlov decided to reinforce the 4th Army with the 47th Rifle Corps. At the same time, the 17th mechanized corps (a total of 63 tanks, in divisions of 20-25 guns and 4 anti-aircraft guns) was transferred from the front reserve to the river. Sharu to create a defense there. However, they failed to create a solid defense along the river. The enemy tank divisions crossed it and on June 25 approached Baranovichi.

The position of the troops of the Western Front became more and more critical. Of particular concern was the northern wing, where an uncovered gap of 130 km was formed. Field Marshal Bock removed the Goth tank group, which rushed into this gap, from subordination to the commander of the 9th Army. Having received freedom of action, Goth sent one of his corps to Vilnius, and the other two to Minsk and bypassing the city from the north, in order to connect with the 2nd Panzer Group. The main forces of the 9th Army were turned to the south, and the 4th - to the north, in the direction of the confluence of the Shchara and Neman rivers, to cut the encircled grouping. The threat of complete catastrophe loomed over the troops of the Western Front.

General Pavlov saw a way out of the situation in delaying the advance of the 3rd Panzer Group Gotha with reserve formations united by the command of the 13th Army, three divisions, the 21st Rifle Corps, the 50th Rifle Division and the retreating troops were transferred to the army ; and at the same time, the forces of the Boldin group continue to deliver a counterattack on Gotu's flank.

The 13th army of General P.M. did not have time yet. Filatov to concentrate his forces, and most importantly, to put in order the troops retreating from the border, including the 5th Panzer Division of the North-Western Front, as enemy tanks broke into the location of the army headquarters. The Germans seized most of the vehicles, including those with encryption documents. The command of the army came to its own only on June 26th.

The position of the troops of the Western Front continued to deteriorate. Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov, who was at the headquarters of the front in Mogilev, turned to the General Headquarters with a request to immediately withdraw the troops. Moscow allowed the withdrawal. However, it is already too late.

For the withdrawal of the 3rd and 10th armies, deeply bypassed by the tank groups of Hoth and Guderian from the north and south, there was a corridor no more than 60 km wide. Moving off-road (all roads were occupied by German troops), under continuous attacks by enemy aircraft, with an almost complete absence of vehicles, in dire need of ammunition and fuel, the formations could not break away from the pressing enemy.

On June 25, the Stavka formed a group of armies of the reserve of the High Command, headed by Marshal S.M. Budyonny as part of the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies. Their formations, which began advancing as early as May 13, arrived from the North Caucasian, Orel, Kharkov, Volga, Ural and Moscow military districts and concentrated in the rear of the Western Front. Marshal Budyonny was given the task of starting to prepare a defensive line along the Nevel, Mogilev line and further along the Desna and Dnieper rivers to Kremenchug; at the same time "to be ready, on special instructions from the High Command, to launch a counteroffensive." However, on June 27, the Headquarters abandoned the idea of ​​​​a counteroffensive and ordered Budyonny to urgently occupy and firmly defend the line along the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, from Kraslava to Loev, preventing the enemy from breaking through to Moscow. At the same time, the troops of the 16th Army, which had arrived in Ukraine before the war, and from July 1, the 19th Army, were also rapidly transferred to the Smolensk region. All this meant that the Soviet command finally abandoned offensive plans and decided to switch to strategic defense, transferring the main efforts to the western direction.

On June 26, Hoth's tank divisions approached the Minsk fortified area. The next day, the advanced units of Guderian entered the approaches to the capital of Belarus. The formations of the 13th Army were defending here. Fierce fighting began. At the same time, the city was bombarded by German aircraft; fires broke out, water supply, sewerage, power lines, telephone communications failed, but most importantly, thousands of civilians died. Nevertheless, the defenders of Minsk continued to resist.

The defense of Minsk is one of the brightest pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. The forces were too unequal. The Soviet troops were in dire need of ammunition, and to bring them up, there was not enough transport or fuel, besides, part of the warehouses had to be blown up, the rest were captured by the enemy. The enemy stubbornly rushed to Minsk from the north and south. At 4 pm on June 28, units of the 20th Panzer Division of the Gota group, breaking the resistance of the 2nd Rifle Corps of General A.N. Ermakov, broke into Minsk from the north, and the next day the 18th Panzer Division from the Guderian group rushed towards them from the south. By evening, the German divisions connected and closed the encirclement. Only the main forces of the 13th Army managed to withdraw to the east. A day earlier, the infantry divisions of the 9th and 4th German armies connected east of Bialystok, cutting off the escape routes of the 3rd and 10th Soviet armies. The encircled grouping of troops on the Western Front was divided into several parts.

Almost three dozen divisions fell into the cauldron. Deprived of centralized control and supply, they, however, fought until July 8. On the inner front of the encirclement, Bock had to keep first 21 and then 25 divisions, which accounted for almost half of all the troops of Army Group Center. On the outer front, only eight of its divisions continued their offensive towards the Berezina, and even the 53rd Army Corps was operating against the 75th Soviet Rifle Division.

Exhausted by continuous battles, difficult transitions through forests and swamps, without food and rest, the encircled were losing their last strength. The reports of Army Group Center reported that as of July 2, 116 thousand people were taken prisoner in the area of ​​Bialystok and Volkovysk alone, 1505 guns, 1964 tanks and armored vehicles, 327 aircraft were destroyed or captured as trophies. The prisoners of war were kept in appalling conditions. They were housed in rooms not equipped for living, often right under the open sky. Hundreds of people died every day from exhaustion and epidemics. The weak were ruthlessly destroyed.

Until September, the soldiers of the Western Front left the encirclement. At the end of the month to the river. Sozh left the remnants of the 13th mechanized corps, led by their commander, General P.N. Akhlyustin. 1667 people, of which 103 were wounded, were brought out by the deputy commander of the front, General Boldin. Many who did not manage to get out of the encirclement began to fight the enemy in the ranks of partisans and underground fighters.

From the first days of the occupation, in areas where the enemy appeared, resistance from the masses began to arise. However, it developed slowly, especially in the western regions of the country, including in Western Belarus, whose population was merged into the USSR only a year before the start of the war. At first, mainly sabotage and reconnaissance groups sent from behind the front line, many military personnel who were surrounded, and partly local residents began to operate here.

On June 29, on the 8th day of the war, a directive was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions, which, along with other measures to turn the country into a single military camp to provide a nationwide rebuff to the enemy, contained instructions on the deployment of the underground and the partisan movement, the organizational forms, goals and objectives of the struggle were determined.

Of great importance for the organization of partisan struggle behind enemy lines was the appeal of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army of July 15, 1941 “To the military personnel fighting behind enemy lines”, issued in the form of a leaflet and scattered from aircraft over the occupied territory. In it, the activity of Soviet soldiers behind the front line was assessed as a continuation of their combat mission. The military personnel were asked to switch to the methods of guerrilla warfare. This leaflet-appeal helped many encircled people find their place in the common struggle against the invaders.

The fighting was already far from the border, and the garrison of the Brest Fortress was still fighting. After the withdrawal of the main forces, part of the units of the 42nd and 6th rifle divisions, the 33rd engineer regiment and the border outpost remained here. The advancing units of the 45th and 31st Infantry Divisions were supported by siege artillery. Barely recovering from the first stunning blow, the garrison took up the defense of the citadel with the intention of fighting to the end. The heroic defense of Brest began. Guderian recalled after the war: "The garrison of the important Brest fortress, which held out for several days, blocked the railway and highways leading through the Western Bug to Mukhavets, was especially fiercely defended." True, the general for some reason forgot that the garrison held out not for several days, but for about a month - until July 20.

By the end of June 1941, the enemy had advanced to a depth of 400 km. The troops of the Western Front suffered heavy losses in men, equipment and weapons. The air force of the front lost 1483 aircraft. The formations remaining outside the encirclement fought in a strip over 400 km wide. The front was in dire need of replenishment, but he could not even get what he was supposed to be fully staffed according to the pre-war plan in case of mobilization. It was disrupted as a result of the rapid advance of the enemy, an extremely limited number of vehicles, disruption railway transport and general organizational confusion.

By the end of June, the Soviet military-political leadership realized that in order to repel aggression, it was necessary to mobilize all the forces of the country. To this end, on June 30, an emergency body was created - State Committee Defense (GKO) led by Stalin. All power in the state was concentrated in the hands of the GKO. His decisions and orders, which had the force of wartime laws, were subject to unquestioning implementation by all citizens, party, Soviet, Komsomol and military bodies. Each member of the GKO was responsible for a specific area (ammunition, aircraft, tanks, food, transport, etc.).

In the country, the mobilization of those liable for military service continued in 1905-1918. birth in the army and navy. During the first eight days of the war, 5.3 million people were drafted into the armed forces. From the national economy, 234 thousand motor vehicles and 31.5 thousand tractors were sent to the front.

The headquarters continued to take emergency measures to restore the strategic front in Belarus. Army General D.G. Pavlov was removed from command of the Western Front and put on trial by a military tribunal. Marshal S.K. was appointed the new commander. Timoshenko. On July 1, the Stavka transferred the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies to the Western Front. In essence, a new front of defense was being formed. In the rear of the front, in the Smolensk region, the 16th Army was concentrated. The transformed Western Front now consisted of 48 divisions and 4 mechanized corps, but by July 1, the defense at the turn of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper was occupied by only 10 divisions.

The resistance of the Soviet troops, surrounded near Minsk, forced the command of Army Group Center to disperse their formations to a depth of 400 km, and the field armies fell far behind the tank groups. In order to more clearly coordinate the efforts of the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups to capture the Smolensk region and during the further attack on Moscow, Field Marshal Bock united both groups on July 3 into the 4th Panzer Army, led by Kluge's 4th Field Army. The infantry formations of the former 4th Army were united by the 2nd Army (it was in the reserve of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces Command - OKH), under the command of General Weichs, to eliminate the Soviet units surrounded west of Minsk.

In the meantime, fierce battles were going on in the interfluve of the Berezina, the Western Dvina and the Dnieper. By July 10, enemy troops crossed the Western Dvina, reached Vitebsk and the Dnieper south and north of Mogilev.

One of the first strategic defensive operations of the Red Army, later called the Belorussian one, ended. For 18 days, the troops of the Western Front suffered a crushing defeat. Of the 44 divisions that were originally part of the front, 24 were completely lost, the remaining 20 lost from 30 to 90% of their composition. Total losses - 417,790 people, including irretrievable - 341,073 people, 4,799 tanks, 9,427 guns and mortars and 1,777 combat aircraft. Leaving almost all of Belarus, the troops retreated to a depth of 600 km.

Defense of the Northwestern Front and Baltic Fleet

The Baltics also became the arena of dramatic events with the beginning of the war. The North-Western Front, which was defending here under the command of General F.I. Kuznetsova was much weaker than the fronts operating in Belarus and Ukraine, since he had only three armies and two mechanized corps. Meanwhile, the aggressor concentrated large forces in this direction (Table 2). Not only Army Group North under the command of Field Marshal W. Leeb took part in the first strike against the North-Western Front, but also the 3rd Panzer Group from the neighboring Army Group Center, i.e. Kuznetsov's troops were opposed by two of four German tank groups.

table 2
The balance of forces in the strip of the North-Western Front at the beginning of the war

Forces and means	Northwestern	army group	Ratio
		"North" and 3 tgr
Personnel, thousand people
Guns and mortars (without 50 mm), units
Tanks,** units
Combat aircraft**, units

* Without the forces of the Baltic Fleet
**Only serviceable

Already on the first day of the war, the defense of the North-Western Front was split. Tank wedges punched deep holes in it.

Due to the systematic disruption of communications, the commanders of the front and the armies were unable to organize command and control of the troops. The troops suffered heavy losses, but they could not stop the advance of the tank groups. In the zone of the 11th Army, the 3rd Panzer Group rushed to the bridges across the Neman. And although specially dedicated demolition teams were on duty here, along with the retreating units of the army, enemy tanks also slipped over the bridges. “For the 3rd tank group,” wrote its commander, General Goth, “it was a big surprise that all three bridges across the Neman, the capture of which was part of the group’s task, were captured intact.”

Having crossed the Neman, Hoth's tanks rushed to Vilnius, but ran into desperate resistance. By the end of the day, the formations of the 11th Army were dismembered into parts. Between the North-Western and Western fronts, a large gap was formed, which turned out to be nothing to close.

During the first day, German formations wedged to a depth of 60 km. While a deep penetration of the enemy required vigorous response measures, both the front command and the army command showed obvious passivity.

Order of the Military Council of the Baltic Special Military District No. 05 dated June 22, 1941
TsAMO. F. 221. Op. 1362. D. 5, volume 1. L. 2.

On the evening of June 22, General Kuznetsov received the People's Commissar's directive No. 3, in which the front was ordered: "Holding firmly the coast of the Baltic Sea, deliver a powerful counterattack from the Kaunas area to the flank and rear of the enemy's Suwalki grouping, destroy it in cooperation with the Western Front and by the end of 24.6, capture the area Suwalki.

However, even before receiving the directive, at 10 o'clock in the morning, General Kuznetsov ordered the armies and mechanized corps to launch a counterattack on the enemy's Tilsit grouping. Therefore, the troops carried out his order, and the commander decided not to change tasks, essentially not fulfilling the requirements of Directive No. 3.

Six divisions were to attack the Gepner Panzer Group and restore the position along the border. Against 123 thousand soldiers and officers, 1800 guns and mortars, more than 600 enemy tanks, Kuznetsov planned to put up about 56 thousand people, 980 guns and mortars, 950 tanks (mostly light).

However, a simultaneous strike did not work out: after a long march, the formations entered the battle on the move, most often in scattered groups. Artillery, with an acute shortage of ammunition, did not provide reliable support to the tanks. The task remained unfulfilled. The divisions, having lost a significant part of their tanks, withdrew from the battle on the night of June 24th.

At dawn on June 24, the fighting flared up with renewed vigor. More than 1,000 tanks, about 2,700 guns and mortars, and more than 175,000 soldiers and officers took part in them on both sides. Parts of the right flank of the 41st motorized corps of Reinhardt were forced to go on the defensive.

An attempt to resume the counterattack the next day was reduced to hasty, poorly coordinated actions, moreover, on a wide front, with a low organization of control. Instead of delivering concentrated strikes, the corps commanders were ordered to operate "in small columns in order to disperse enemy aircraft." Tank formations suffered huge losses: only 35 tanks remained in both divisions of the 12th mechanized corps.

If as a result of the counterattack it was possible for some time to delay the advance of the 41st motorized corps of Reinhardt in the Siauliai direction, then the 56th corps of Manstein, bypassing the counterattack formations from the south, was able to make a swift throw to Daugavpils.

The position of the 11th Army was tragic: it was squeezed in pincers between the 3rd and 4th tank groups. The main forces of the 8th Army were more fortunate: they stayed away from the armored fist of the enemy and retreated to the north in a relatively organized manner. The interaction between the armies was weak. Almost completely stopped the supply of ammunition and fuel. The situation required decisive measures to eliminate the enemy's breakthrough. However, having no reserves and having lost control, the front command could not prevent the retreat and restore the situation.

Field Marshal Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, ordered the 3rd Panzer Group Goth to be turned southeast, towards Minsk, as envisaged by the Barbarossa plan, so from June 25 it was already operating against the Western Front. Using the gap between the 8th and 11th armies, the 56th motorized corps of the 4th tank group rushed to the Western Dvina, cutting the rear communications of the 11th army.

The Military Council of the North-Western Front considered it expedient to withdraw the formations of the 8th and 11th armies to the line along the rivers Venta, Shushva, Viliya. However, on the night of June 25, he made a new decision: to launch a counterattack by the 16th Rifle Corps of General M.M. Ivanov to return Kaunas, although the logic of events required the withdrawal of units beyond the river. Viliya. Initially, the corps of General Ivanov had a partial success, but he could not complete the task, and the divisions retreated to their original position.

In general, the front troops did not fulfill the main task - to detain the aggressor in the border zone. Attempts to eliminate deep breakthroughs have also failed. German tanks on the the most important directions. The troops of the North-Western Front could not hold on to intermediate lines and rolled back further and further to the northeast.

Military operations in the northwestern direction unfolded not only on land, but also at sea, where the Baltic Fleet was subjected to enemy air strikes from the very first days of the war. By order of the commander of the fleet, Vice Admiral V.F. Tributs on the night of June 23, the installation of minefields at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland began, and the next day, the same barriers began to be created in the Irben Strait. The increased mining of fairways and approaches to bases, as well as the dominance of enemy aircraft and the threat to bases from land, fettered the forces of the Baltic Fleet. Dominance at sea for a long time passed to the enemy.

During the general withdrawal of the troops of the North-Western Front, the enemy met stubborn resistance at the walls of Liepaja. The German command planned to capture this city no later than the second day of the war. Against the small garrison, which consisted of parts of the 67th Infantry Division of General N.A. Dedayev and the naval base of Captain 1st Rank M.S. Klevensky, the 291st Infantry Division operated with the support of tanks, artillery and marines. Only on June 24, the Germans blocked the city from land and sea. The inhabitants of Liepaja, led by the defense headquarters, fought together with the troops. Only on the orders of the command of the North-Western Front on the night of June 27 and 28, the defenders left Liepaja and began to make their way to the east.

On June 25, the North-Western Front received the task of withdrawing troops and organizing defense along the Western Dvina, where the 21st mechanized corps of General D.D. was advanced from the Stavka reserve. Lelyushenko. During the withdrawal, the troops fell into plight: after an unsuccessful counterattack, the management of the 3rd mechanized corps, led by General A.V. Kurkin and the 2nd Panzer Division, left without fuel, were surrounded. According to the enemy, more than 200 tanks, more than 150 guns, as well as several hundred trucks and cars were captured and destroyed here. Of the 3rd mechanized corps, only one 84th motorized division remained, and the 12th mechanized corps lost 600 out of 750 tanks.

The 11th Army found itself in a difficult position. I'm leaving for the river. Viliya was hindered by enemy aircraft, which destroyed the crossings. A threat of encirclement was created, and the transfer of troops to the other side moved very slowly. Having received no help, General Morozov decided to withdraw to the northeast, but only on June 27 it turned out that the enemy, who had captured Daugavpils the day before, cut this path as well. Only the eastern direction remained free, through forests and swamps to Polotsk, where, on June 30, the remnants of the army entered the strip of the neighboring Western Front.

Field Marshal Leeb's troops were rapidly advancing deep into the territory of the Baltic states. Organized resistance was provided by the army of General P.P. Sobennikov. The line of defense of the 11th Army remained uncovered, which Manstein immediately took advantage of, sending his 56th motorized corps along the shortest path to the Western Dvina.

To stabilize the situation, the troops of the North-Western Front needed to gain a foothold on the line of the Western Dvina. Unfortunately, the 21st mechanized corps, which was to defend itself here, had not yet reached the river. Failed to timely take up the defense and formations of the 27th Army. And the main goal of Army Group "North" at that moment was precisely a breakthrough to the Western Dvina with the direction of the main attack on Daugavpils and to the north.

On the morning of June 26, the German 8th Panzer Division approached Daugavpils and captured the bridge across the Western Dvina. The division rushed to the city, creating a very important bridgehead for the development of the offensive on Leningrad.

South-east of Riga, on the night of June 29, the advance detachment of the 41st motorized corps of General Reinhardt crossed the Western Dvina near Jekabpils on the move. And the next day, the advanced units of the 1st and 26th army corps of the 18th German army broke into Riga and captured the bridges across the river. However, a decisive counterattack of the 10th Rifle Corps of General I.I. Fadeev, the enemy was driven out, which ensured the systematic withdrawal of the 8th Army through the city. On July 1, the Germans recaptured Riga.

As early as June 29, the Headquarters ordered the commander of the North-Western Front, simultaneously with the organization of defense along the Western Dvina, to prepare and occupy the line along the river. Great, while relying on the fortified areas there in Pskov and Ostrov. From the reserve of the Stavka and the Northern Front, the 41st Rifle and 1st Mechanized Corps, as well as the 234th Rifle Division, advanced there.

Instead of generals F.I. Kuznetsova and P.M. Klenov on July 4, generals P.P. Sobennikov and N.F. Vatutin.

On the morning of July 2, the enemy struck at the junction of the 8th and 27th armies and broke through in the direction of Ostrov and Pskov. The threat of an enemy breakthrough to Leningrad forced the command of the Northern Front to create the Luga task force in order to cover the southwestern approaches to the city on the Neva.

By the end of July 3, the enemy captured Gulbene in the rear of the 8th Army, depriving it of the opportunity to retreat to the river. Great. The army, commanded by General F.S. Ivanov, was forced to retreat north to Estonia. A gap formed between the 8th and 27th armies, where the formations of the 4th tank group of the enemy rushed. On the morning of the next day, the 1st Panzer Division reached the southern outskirts of the Island and immediately crossed the river. Great. Attempts to discard it were unsuccessful. On July 6, the Germans completely captured the Island and rushed north to Pskov. Three days later, the Germans broke into the city. There was a real threat of a German breakthrough to Leningrad.

In general, the first defensive operation of the North-Western Front ended in failure. For three weeks of hostilities, his troops retreated to a depth of 450 km, leaving almost the entire Baltic. The front lost over 90 thousand people, more than 1 thousand tanks, 4 thousand guns and mortars and more than 1 thousand aircraft. His command failed to create a defense capable of repelling the attack of the aggressor. The troops were not able to gain a foothold even on such barriers that were advantageous for defense, such as pp. Neman, Western Dvina, Velikaya.

A difficult situation developed at sea. With the loss of bases in Liepaja and Riga, the ships moved to Tallinn, where they were subjected to constant fierce bombing by German aircraft. And in early July, the fleet had to come to grips with organizing the defense of Leningrad from the sea.

Border battles in the area of ​​the Southwestern and Southern fronts. Actions of the Black Sea Fleet

The Southwestern Front, commanded by General M.P. Kirponos, was the most powerful grouping of Soviet troops concentrated near the borders of the USSR. The German Army Group "South" under the command of Field Marshal K. Rundstedt was tasked with destroying Soviet troops in the Right-Bank Ukraine, preventing them from retreating beyond the Dnieper.

The Southwestern Front had enough strength to give a worthy rebuff to the aggressor (Table 3). However, the very first day of the war showed that these possibilities could not be realized. From the first minute of formation, headquarters, airfields were subjected to powerful air strikes, and air Force and failed to provide adequate resistance.

General M.P. Kirponos decided to inflict two blows on the flanks of the main enemy grouping - from the north and south, each with the forces of three mechanized corps, in which there were a total of 3.7 thousand tanks. General Zhukov, who arrived at the front headquarters on the evening of June 22, approved his decision. The organization of a front-line counterattack took three days, and before that only part of the forces of the 15th and 22nd mechanized corps managed to advance and attack the enemy, and in the 15th mechanized corps there was only one forward detachment of the 10th Panzer Division. To the east of Vladimir-Volynsky a counter battle broke out. The enemy was detained, but soon he again rushed forward, forcing the counterattacks to retreat beyond the river. Styr, in the region of Lutsk.

The decisive role in defeating the enemy could be played by the 4th and 8th mechanized corps. They included over 1.7 thousand tanks. The 4th mechanized corps was considered especially strong: it only had 414 vehicles at its disposal for the new KB and T-34 tanks. However, the mechanized corps was fragmented into parts. His divisions operated in different directions. By the morning of June 26, the 8th mechanized corps of General D.I. Ryabysheva went out to Brody. Of the 858 tanks, barely half remained, the other half, due to all kinds of breakdowns, lagged behind almost on a 500-kilometer route.

At the same time, mechanized corps were being concentrated to deliver a counterattack from the north. The strongest in the 22nd mechanized corps, the 41st tank division, was attached in parts to rifle divisions and did not take part in the frontal counterattack. The 9th and 19th mechanized corps, which advanced from the east, had to overcome 200-250 km. Both of them totaled only 564 tanks, and even then of the old types.

Meanwhile, rifle formations fought stubborn battles, trying to delay the enemy. On June 24, in the zone of the 5th Army, the enemy managed to encircle two rifle divisions. A 70-kilometer gap was formed in the defense, using which the German tank divisions rushed to Lutsk and Berestechko. The surrounded Soviet troops defended stubbornly. For six days, units made their way to their own. Of the two infantry regiments of the division that were surrounded, only about 200 people remained. Exhausted in continuous battles, they retained their battle banners.

The soldiers of the 6th Army also staunchly defended themselves in the Rava-Russian direction. Field Marshal Rundstedt assumed that after the capture of Rava-Russkaya, the 14th motorized corps would be introduced into the battle. According to his calculations, this should have happened by the morning of June 23. But all Rundstedt's plans were thwarted by the 41st division. Despite the fierce fire of German artillery, massive bomber strikes, the regiments of the division, together with the battalions of the Rava-Russky fortified area and the 91st border detachment, held back the advance of the 4th Army Corps of the 17th Army for five days. The division left its positions only by order of the army commander. On the night of June 27, she withdrew to the line east of Rava-Russkaya.

On the left wing Southwestern Front defended the 12th army of General P.G. Monday. After the transfer of the 17th Rifle and 16th Mechanized Corps to the newly created Southern Front, the only rifle corps remained in it - the 13th. He covered the 300-kilometer section of the border with Hungary. For now, there was silence.

Intense battles unfolded not only on the ground, but also in the air. True, the fighter aircraft of the front could not reliably cover the airfields. In the first three days of the war alone, the enemy destroyed 234 aircraft on the ground. Bomber aircraft were also used inefficiently. In the presence of 587 bombers, front-line aviation during this time made only 463 sorties. The reason is unstable communications, the lack of proper interaction between combined arms and aviation headquarters, and the remoteness of airfields.

On the evening of June 25, the 6th Army of Field Marshal V. Reichenau crossed the river on the 70-kilometer stretch from Lutsk to Berestechko. Styr, and the 11th Panzer Division, almost 40 km away from the main forces, captured Dubno.

On June 26, the 8th mechanized corps entered the battle from the south, the 9th and 19th from the northeast. The corps of General Ryabyshev advanced from Brody to Berestechko by 10-12 km. However, other connections could not support his success. The main reason for the uncoordinated actions of the mechanized corps was the lack of a unified leadership of this powerful tank grouping from the front command.

More successful, despite the smaller forces, were the actions of the 9th and 19th mechanized corps. They were included in the 5th Army. There was also a task force headed by the first deputy front commander, General F.S. Ivanov, who coordinated the actions of the formations.

On the afternoon of June 26, the corps finally attacked the enemy. Overcoming enemy resistance, the corps commanded by General N.V. Feklenko, together with the infantry division, reached Dubno by the end of the day. Operating to the right of the 9th mechanized corps of General K.K. Rokossovsky turned around along the Rivne-Lutsk road and entered into battle with the 14th Panzer Division of the enemy. He stopped her, but he couldn't move a single step further.

Near Berestechko, Lutsk and Dubno, an oncoming tank battle unfolded - the largest since the beginning of World War II in terms of the number of forces participating in it. About 2 thousand tanks collided on both sides in a section up to 70 km wide. Hundreds of aircraft fought fiercely in the sky.

The counterattack of the Southwestern Front delayed for some time the advance of the Kleist group. In general, Kirponos himself believed that the border battle was lost. The deep penetration of German tanks in the Dubno area created the danger of a blow to the rear of the armies, which continued to fight in the Lvov salient. The military council of the front decided to withdraw the troops to a new defensive line, about which it reported to the Headquarters, and, without waiting for the consent of Moscow, gave the armies the appropriate orders. However, the Headquarters did not approve the decision of Kirponos and demanded that counterattacks be resumed. The commander had to cancel his own orders that had just been given, which had already begun to be carried out by the troops.

The 8th and 15th mechanized corps barely managed to get out of the battle, and then a new order: stop the withdrawal and strike in a northeast direction, in the rear of the divisions of the 1st tank group of the enemy. There was not enough time to organize the strike.

Despite all these difficulties, the battle flared up with renewed vigor. Troops in stubborn battles in the Dubno region, near Lutsk and Rivne, until June 30, fettered the 6th army and the enemy tank group. German troops were forced to maneuver in search of weak spots. The 11th Panzer Division, having covered itself with part of its forces from the attack of the 19th Mechanized Corps, turned to the southeast and captured Ostrog. But it was nevertheless stopped by a group of troops created on the initiative of the commander of the 16th Army, General M.F. Lukin. Basically, these were units of the army that did not have time to sink into trains to be sent to Smolensk, as well as the 213th motorized division of Colonel V.M. Osminsky from the 19th mechanized corps, whose infantry, having no transport, lagged behind the tanks.

The soldiers of the 8th mechanized corps tried with all their might to break out of the encirclement, first through Dubno, and then in a northerly direction. The lack of communication did not allow coordinating their own actions with neighboring connections. The mechanized corps suffered heavy losses: many soldiers died, including the commander of the 12th Panzer Division, General T.A. Mishanin.

The command of the Southwestern Front, fearing the encirclement of the armies defending in the Lvov ledge, decided on the night of June 27 to begin a systematic withdrawal. By the end of June 30, Soviet troops, leaving Lvov, occupied a new line of defense, which is 30-40 km east of the city. On the same day, the vanguard battalions of the mobile corps of Hungary went on the offensive, which on June 27 declared war on the USSR.

On June 30, Kirponos received the task: by July 9, using the fortified areas on the state border of 1939, "to organize a stubborn defense by field troops, with the allocation of anti-tank artillery weapons in the first place."

Korostensky, Novograd-Volynsky and Letichevsky fortified regions, built in the 1930s 50-100 km east of the old state border, were put on alert with the outbreak of war and, reinforced by rifle units, could become a serious obstacle to the enemy. True, there were gaps in the system of fortified areas, reaching 30-40 km.

The troops of the front had to retreat 200 km deep into the territory in eight days. Particular difficulties fell on the lot of the 26th and 12th armies, which had the longest path ahead, and with the constant threat of an enemy strike to the rear, from the north, by formations of the 17th army and the 1st tank group.

In order to impede the advance of the Kleist group and gain time to withdraw its troops, the 5th Army launched a counterattack on its flank from the north with the forces of two corps, which had exhausted their forces to the limit in previous battles: in the divisions of the 27th Rifle Corps, there were about 1.5 thousand people, and the 22nd mechanized corps had only 153 tanks. There was not enough ammunition. The counterattack was hastily prepared, the attack was carried out on a hundred-kilometer front and at different times. However, the fact that the blow fell in the rear of the tank group gave a significant advantage. Mackensen's corps was detained for two days, which made it easier for the Kirponos troops to get out of the battle.

The troops retreated with heavy losses. A significant part of the equipment had to be destroyed, since even a minor malfunction could not be eliminated due to the lack of repair facilities. In the 22nd mechanized corps alone, 58 out-of-service tanks were blown up.

On July 6 and 7, enemy tank divisions reached the Novograd-Volynsky fortified area, the defense of which was to be strengthened by the retreating formations of the 6th Army. Instead, some parts of the 5th Army were able to come out here. Here, the group of Colonel Blank, which got out of the encirclement, went on the defensive, created from the remnants of two divisions - a total of 2.5 thousand people. For two days, the subdivisions of the fortified area and this group held back the onslaught of the enemy. On July 7, Kleist's tank divisions captured Berdichev, and a day later, Novograd-Volynsk. Following the tank group on July 10, the infantry divisions of the 6th Army of Reichenau bypassed the fortified area from the north and south. It was not possible to stop the enemy even on the old state border.

A breakthrough in the Berdichevsky direction was of particular concern, because it created a threat to the rear of the main forces of the Southwestern Front. By joint efforts, formations of the 6th Army, the 16th and 15th mechanized corps held back the onslaught of the enemy until July 15.

To the north, the enemy's 13th Panzer Division captured Zhitomir on July 9. Although the 5th Army tried to delay the rapid advance of enemy tanks, the approaching infantry divisions repelled all of its attacks. In two days, German tank formations advanced 110 km and on July 11 approached the Kyiv fortified area. Only here, on the defensive line created by the troops of the garrison and the population of the capital of Ukraine, the enemy was finally stopped.

The militia played an important role in repulsing the enemy's attack. Already on July 8, 19 detachments with a total number of about 30 thousand people were formed in Kyiv, and in general, over 90 thousand people joined the ranks of the militia in the Kyiv region. An 85,000-strong corps of volunteers was created in Kharkov, a corps of five divisions with a total of 50,000 volunteers was created in Dnepropetrovsk.

Not as dramatic as in Ukraine, the war began in Moldova, where the border with Romania along the Prut and the Danube was covered by the 9th Army. It was opposed by the 11th German, 3rd and 4th Romanian armies, which had the task of pinning down the Soviet troops and, under favorable conditions, going on the offensive. In the meantime, the Romanian formations sought to capture bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Prut. In the first two days, fierce battles broke out here. It was not without difficulty that the bridgeheads, except for one in the Skulyan region, were liquidated by Soviet troops.

Hostilities also flared up in the Black Sea. At 03:15 on June 22, enemy aircraft raided Sevastopol and Izmail, and artillery fired on settlements and ships on the Danube. Already on the night of June 23, fleet aviation took retaliatory measures by raiding military installations in Constanta and Sulina. And on June 26, a special strike group of the Black Sea Fleet, consisting of the leaders "Kharkov" and "Moscow", struck at this port of Constanta. They were supported by the cruiser "Voroshilov" and destroyers"Smart" and "Smart". The ships fired 350 130mm shells. However, the 280-mm German battery covered the Moskva leader with return fire, which hit a mine while retreating and sank. At this time, enemy aircraft damaged the leader "Kharkov".

On June 25, the Southern Front was created from the troops operating on the border with Romania. In addition to the 9th, it included the 18th Army, formed from troops transferred from the Southwestern Front. The management of the new front was created on the basis of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, headed by its commander, General I.V. Tyulenev and the chief of staff, General G.D. Shishenin. The commander and his headquarters in the new location faced enormous difficulties, primarily due to the fact that they were completely unfamiliar with the theater of operations. In his first directive, Tyulenev set the front troops the task: “To defend the state border with Romania. In the event of an enemy crossing and flying into our territory, destroy him with active actions by ground troops and aviation and be ready for decisive offensive operations.

Taking into account the success of the offensive in Ukraine and the fact that the Soviet troops in Moldova held their positions, Field Marshal Rundstedt decided to surround and destroy the main forces of the Southern and South- Western fronts.

The offensive of the German-Romanian troops against the Southern Front began on July 2. In the morning, strike groups attacked the formations of the 9th Army in two narrow sections. The main blow from the Iasi region was delivered by four infantry divisions at the junction of rifle divisions. Another blow by the forces of two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade hit one rifle regiment. Having achieved decisive superiority, the enemy already on the first day broke through the poorly prepared defenses on the river. Prut to a depth of 8-10 km.

Without waiting for the decision of the Headquarters, Tyulenev ordered the troops to begin a retreat. However, the High Command not only canceled it, on July 7 Tyulenev received an order to throw the enemy behind the Prut with a counterattack. Only the 18th Army adjoining the Southwestern Front was allowed to withdraw.

The undertaken counterattack managed to delay the offensive of the 11th German and 4th Romanian armies operating in the Chisinau direction.

The situation on the Southern Front was temporarily stabilized. The delay of the enemy allowed the 18th Army to withdraw and occupy the Mogilev-Podolsky fortified area, and the 9th Army managed to gain a foothold west of the Dniester. On July 6, its left-flank formations that remained in the lower reaches of the Prut and Danube were united into the Primorsky Group of Forces under the control of General N.E. Chibisov. Together with the Danube military flotilla, they repelled all attempts by the Romanian troops to cross the border of the USSR.

The defensive operation in Western Ukraine (later it was called the Lvov-Chernivtsi strategic defensive operation) ended in the defeat of the Soviet troops. The depth of their retreat ranged from 60-80 to 300-350 km. Northern Bukovina and Western Ukraine were left, the enemy went to Kyiv. Although the defenses in the Ukraine and Moldova, in contrast to the Baltic states and Belarus, still retained some stability, the fronts of the Southwestern strategic direction were unable to use their numerical superiority to repel the attacks of the aggressor and, as a result, were defeated. By July 6, the casualties of the Southwestern Front and the 18th Army of the Southern Front amounted to 241,594 people, including 172,323 irretrievable people. They lost 4381 tanks, 1218 combat aircraft, 5806 guns and mortars. The balance of power changed in favor of the enemy. Possessing the initiative and retaining offensive capabilities, Army Group South was preparing a strike from the area west of Kyiv to the south in the rear of the Southwestern and Southern fronts.

tragic outcome initial period wars and transition to strategic defense

The initial period of the Great Patriotic War, which lasted from June 22 to mid-July, was associated with serious setbacks by the Soviet Armed Forces. The enemy has achieved major operational and strategic results. His troops advanced 300-600 km deep into Soviet territory. Under the onslaught of the enemy, the Red Army was forced to retreat almost everywhere. Latvia, Lithuania, almost all of Belarus, a significant part of Estonia, Ukraine and Moldova were under occupation. About 23 million Soviet people fell into fascist captivity. The country has lost many industrial enterprises and sown areas with ripening crops. A threat was created to Leningrad, Smolensk, Kyiv. Only in the Arctic, Karelia and Moldavia was the enemy advance insignificant.

During the first three weeks of the war, out of 170 Soviet divisions that took the first blow from the German military machine, 28 were completely defeated, and 70 lost more than half of their personnel and military equipment. Only three fronts - the North-Western, Western and South-Western - irretrievably lost about 600 thousand people, or almost a third of their strength. The Red Army lost about 4 thousand combat aircraft, over 11.7 thousand tanks, about 18.8 thousand guns and mortars. Even at sea, despite the limited nature of hostilities, the Soviet Navy lost its leader, 3 destroyers, 11 submarines, 5 minesweepers, 5 torpedo boats, and a number of other warships and transports. More than half of the reserves of the border military districts remained in the occupied territory. The losses suffered had a heavy impact on the combat readiness of the troops, who were in dire need of everything: ammunition, fuel, weapons, transport. It took the Soviet industry more than a year to replenish them. Back in early July, the German General Staff concluded that the campaign in Russia had already been won, although not yet completed. It seemed to Hitler that the Red Army was no longer able to create a continuous front of defense even in the most important areas. At a meeting on July 8, he only specified further tasks for the troops.

Despite losses, the Red Army troops, fighting from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, by mid-July had 212 divisions and 3 rifle brigades. And although only 90 of them were full-blooded formations, and the rest had only half, or even less than the regular staff, it was clearly premature to consider the Red Army defeated. The Northern, Southwestern and Southern Fronts retained their ability to resist, and the troops of the Western and Northwestern Fronts were hastily restoring their combat capability.

At the beginning of the campaign, the Wehrmacht also suffered losses that it did not know from the previous years of the Second World War. According to Halder, on July 13, over 92 thousand people were killed, wounded and missing in the ground forces alone, and the damage in tanks averaged 50%. Approximately the same data are already given in post-war studies by West German historians who believe that from the beginning of the war until July 10, 1941, the Wehrmacht lost eastern front 77,313 people. The Luftwaffe lost 950 aircraft. In the Baltic Sea, the German fleet lost 4 minelayers, 2 torpedo boats and 1 hunter. However, the losses of personnel did not exceed the number of field reserve battalions available in each division, due to which they were replenished, so the combat effectiveness of the formations was basically preserved. Since mid-July, the offensive capabilities of the aggressor remained large: 183 combat-ready divisions and 21 brigades.

One of the reasons for the tragic outcome of the initial period of the war is the gross miscalculation of the political and military leadership of the Soviet Union regarding the timing of aggression. As a result, the troops of the first operational echelon found themselves in an exceptionally difficult situation. The enemy smashed the Soviet troops in parts: first, the formations of the first echelon of the covering armies, located along the border and not put on alert, then with counter strikes, their second echelons, and then, developing the offensive, he preempted the Soviet troops in occupying advantageous lines in depth, on the move mastering them. As a result, the Soviet troops were dismembered and surrounded.

The attempts of the Soviet command to strike back with the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the aggressor, undertaken by him on the second day of the war, no longer corresponded to the capabilities of the troops and, in fact, were one of the reasons for the unsuccessful outcome of the border battles. The decision to switch over to strategic defense, adopted only on the eighth day of the war, turned out to be belated. In addition, this transition took place too hesitantly and at different times. He demanded the transfer of the main efforts from the southwestern direction to the western one, where the enemy delivered his main blow. As a result, a significant part of the Soviet troops did not fight as much as moved from one direction to another. This gave the enemy the opportunity to destroy formations in parts, as they approached the area of ​​concentration.

The war revealed significant shortcomings in command and control. The main reason is the weak vocational training command cadres of the Red Army. Among the reasons for the shortcomings in command and control was excessive attachment to wired communications. After the very first strikes by enemy aircraft and the actions of his sabotage groups, permanent wire communication lines were disabled, and the extremely limited number of radio stations, the lack of the necessary skills in their use, did not allow establishing stable communications. The commanders were afraid of radio direction finding by the enemy, and therefore avoided using the radio, preferring wire and other means. And the bodies of strategic leadership did not have pre-prepared command posts. The Headquarters, the General Staff, the commanders of the branches of the armed forces and the branches of the armed forces had to lead the troops from offices in peacetime that were absolutely unsuitable for this.

The forced withdrawal of Soviet troops made mobilization in the western border districts extremely difficult and to a large extent disrupted. Headquarters and rear divisions, armies, fronts were forced to fighting within peacetime.

The initial period of the Great Patriotic War ended with the defeat of the Soviet Armed Forces. The military-political leadership of Germany did not hide its glee at the expected close victory. As early as July 4, Hitler, intoxicated by the first successes at the front, declared: “I always try to put myself in the position of the enemy. In fact, he already lost the war. It's good that we defeated the Russian tank and air forces at the very beginning. The Russians won't be able to restore them anymore." And here is what the chief of the general staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces, General F. Halder, wrote in his diary: "... it would not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days."

However, they miscalculated badly. Already on July 30, during the battles for Smolensk, for the first time in two years of the Second World War, the Nazi troops were forced to go on the defensive. And the same German general F. Halder was forced to admit: “It has become quite obvious that the method of warfare and the fighting spirit of the enemy, as well as geographical conditions of this country, were quite different from those that the Germans had met in previous "lightning wars", which led to successes that astonished the whole world. During the bloody battle of Smolensk, the heroic Soviet soldiers thwarted the plans of the German command for " lightning war"in Russia, and the most powerful army grouping" Center "was forced to go on the defensive, postponing the non-stop attack on Moscow for more than two months.

But our country had to make up for the losses suffered, rebuild industry and Agriculture in a military way. This required time and a colossal exertion of the forces of all the peoples of the Soviet Union. To stop the enemy at all costs, not to let yourself be enslaved - for this, Soviet people lived, fought, and died. The result of this massive feat of the Soviet people was the Victory won over the hated enemy in May 1945.

The material was prepared by the Research Institute ( military history) Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

Photo from the archive of the Voeninform Agency of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Documents reflecting the activities of the leadership of the Red Army on the eve and in the first days of the Great Patriotic War, provided by the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

At dawn on June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the USSR without declaring war, and the Great Patriotic War began. The fascist German troops launched an offensive simultaneously along the entire western border of the USSR, 190 divisions (5.5 million people) took part in it. They were opposed by 170 divisions of the border districts (2.9 million people). The enemy was superior to the Soviet side in the effective use of the army's technical equipment, in tactical and strategic preparation for war, and in the experience of modern warfare. During the first three weeks of hostilities, German troops advanced 300-600 km inland. The Red Army suffered huge losses in combat strength (25.2% of all human losses at the front during the years of the war) and equipment.

June, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was created, on June 30 - the State Defense Committee, which concentrated all power in the country. I.V. was appointed Chairman of the State Defense Committee and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Stalin. The government set the task of turning the country into a single combat camp with the orientation of all economic and economic activities to the needs of the war and the strengthening of the Red Army, to the development of the partisan movement in the occupied territories.

In incredibly difficult, critical conditions, by the end of 1941, the decline in industrial production in the country was stopped, caused by losses from the occupation (territories with 40% of the country's population, 47% of the cultivated area, where one third of industrial output was produced) and the evacuation of 2593 factories to the east, reorientation of industry to the production of military products. From the middle of 1942, an increase in production began in metallurgy, the fuel and energy complex, and from 1943, a general rise in production. However, to achieve a balanced development of all constituent parts economy (industries of military production, fuel and energy complex, metallurgy, timber industry, transport system and others) succeeded only in 1944. In 1943, the rearmament of the army and navy with the latest models of military equipment accelerated.

Despite the huge reduction in arable land, the collective-farm system provided industry with raw materials, the army and the population (the latter - according to a strictly rationed rationing system) with food.

The advantages of an over-centralized dictatorial system of government and economy, the presence of colossal natural and human resources, the utmost exertion of all the forces of the people, mass labor heroism have yielded incredible results. With the remaining inequality of the industrial potentials of Germany (with those working for it European countries) and the Soviet Union, the USSR manufactured in June 1941 - May 1945. almost twice as much military equipment and weapons.

The Red Army offered fierce resistance to the German troops from the first border battles, but the troops, taken by surprise, insufficiently prepared for the war, could not stop the superior enemy forces. Leningrad was blocked (September 1941). the Germans approached Moscow, went to Rostov-on-Don. The Red Army lost in 1941 5 million people killed, wounded and captured, most of the equipment. But by the beginning of December 1941, the Nazi command was forced to give the order to go over to the defensive on the eastern front. The Red Army, during the battle of Moscow on December 5-6, went on the offensive, which continued along the entire front until April 1942. Having thrown the enemy 100-259 km from Moscow, the Soviet troops finally thwarted the Blitzkrieg plan. Turkey and Japan refrained from entering the war, and anti-fascist resistance began to rise in the West.

During the spring-summer campaign of 1942, due to a reassessment of its forces and major miscalculations, the Red Army was defeated in the Crimea and near Kharkov, and Sevastopol fell in July. The Germans occupied the Donbass, went to the North Caucasus and the Volga, starting the assault on Stalingrad. On November 19, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Stalingrad, culminating in the encirclement and complete liquidation of the 330,000th enemy grouping, while the total losses of the German army in Battle of Stalingrad amounted to 1.5 million people. In the course of an extended general offensive, the northern Caucasus was liberated, the blockade of Leningrad was broken, and the Germans were defeated in the central sector of the front. The victory at the Kursk Bulge (July 5 - August 23, 1943) allowed the Red Armenians to launch a strategic offensive along a 2,000-kilometer front.

The victory at Stalingrad and on the Kursk Bulge forced Germany to go on the defensive on all land fronts, a radical turning point in the Second World War as a whole. By the end of 1943, about half of the territories of the USSR occupied by the Germans were liberated. In 1944, Soviet troops successfully carried out the largest offensive operations, during which the blockade of Leningrad was liquidated, Ukraine, Crimea, Belarus, Moldova, Karelia, the Baltic states, and the Arctic were liberated. By the end of 1944 the campaign of the Soviet Army in Eastern Europe unfolds, which brought the liberation of Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia. On May 2, 1945, Soviet troops under the command of Marshal G.K. Zhukov and Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky completed the assault on Berlin. Who unconditional surrender was signed by representatives of the German command on the night of May 8-9, 1945.

Price: in 1945 - Stalin says 8 million dead, but in fact 37 million. Western historians say 46 million.

Reasons for the failure of the Red Army

• a) The transition of the economy to military production was not completed => insufficient technical equipment.
• b) Military-political miscalculations of Stalin and his entourage (in determining the beginning, x-ra and carrier of aggression). These miscalculations were strategic x-r.
• c) Miscalculations in the operational plan of the war: not the western, but the southwestern direction was considered the main one.
• d) The unpreparedness of the border districts to repel aggression.
• e) Lack of multi-layered defense.
• f) Surprise factor

Introduction

The plan and power of the aggressor. Causes of failure and heroism of the Red Army

Mobilization of the forces of the Soviet people to repulse the enemy. Operational actions of the military leadership and difficulties in organizing the country's defense

A radical change during the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. The expulsion of the Nazi invaders from the territory of the USSR

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union had a developed diversified economy capable of meeting all its needs, including in the field of defense. In connection with the aggravation of the international situation and the growing danger of aggression, especially after the seizure of power in Germany by fascism, the USSR prewar years took a number of significant measures to accelerate the development of the military industry. So, in the first years of the third five-year plan, calculated for 1938-1942, the annual increase in military production reached 39%, while the increase in the output of the entire Soviet industry amounted to 13%. Allocations for military needs grew rapidly. In 1939 they amounted to 25.6%, in 1940 - 32.6%, in the first half of 1941 - 43.3% of the country's state budget.

However, the Great Patriotic War began in extremely unfavorable conditions for the Soviet economy. Nazi Germany long before the attack on the USSR, it transferred its economy to a military footing. Having enslaved the countries of Europe, Germany significantly strengthened its already militarized economy with their human reserves, raw materials, industrial products, including military ones. In general, the base of the heavy industry of fascist Germany and the countries occupied by it exceeded the heavy industry of the USSR by about 2-2.5 times.

The aim of the work is to study the history of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.

· Consider the plans of the aggressor;

· Analyze the period of mobilization of Soviet troops;

· Analyze the fundamental turning point in the war in a historical aspect.

1. The plan and power of the aggressor. Causes of failure and heroism of the Red Army

On December 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21, known as the "Barbarossa Plan", a plan to launch a sudden powerful tank and air attack on the Soviet Union, encircle and destroy the main forces of Soviet troops in the border areas, then quickly advance and capture the most important administrative, political and industrial and raw materials centers: Donbass, Minsk, Kyiv, Leningrad, Moscow. Within 6-8 weeks of reaching the line Arkhangelsk - r. Volga-Astrakhan, in fact, the victorious end of the war. After the defeat of the USSR, it was planned to seize independent countries in the Mediterranean basin, British colonies in Africa, in the Near and Middle East, invade the British Isles, and launch military operations against America. As early as the autumn of 1941, the German generals expected to begin conquering Iran, Iraq, Egypt, the Suez Canal, and then India, where the Nazis were to link up with the Japanese troops.

Thus, Hitler's plans were worldwide, but for their successful implementation it was necessary to defeat the USSR, on whose territory four Reichskommissariats - German provinces - were to be formed. According to the plans of the fascist command, the population of the USSR was subject to Germanization; 30-40% were supposed to be evicted beyond the Urals, 10-15% to be Germanized, and the rest to be destroyed. “We are talking about a struggle for annihilation ... In the East, cruelty itself is a blessing for the future,” Hitler said at a meeting of the generals on March 30, 1941.

At dawn on June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany treacherously attacked the USSR. The war began under exceptionally favorable conditions for the Nazis, who were thoroughly preparing for war with the Soviet Union, using not only the patronage and assistance of overseas partners, but also the military-industrial potential of enslaved Europe. 28 million people worked for the war machine of Nazi Germany. On the eve of the war, German industry, together with satellites and occupied countries, extracted and produced (in million tons):

coal - 391.2 (in the USSR - 251.9)

cast iron - 25.3 (in the USSR - 14.0)

steel - 30.9 (in the USSR - 19.1)

The number of metal-cutting machine tools in Germany was 1.7 million units, in the USSR - 710 thousand. In addition, German industry had been working only for the war for more than a year.

The mobilized Nazi army had two years of experience in waging war in Europe.

Causes of failure and heroism of the Red Army

The "surprise" attack of fascist Germany, the massive bombing of aircraft and artillery led to the loss of stable command and control. On the very first day of the war, 1,200 Soviet aircraft were destroyed, over 800 burned down at airfields. A large number of equipment was destroyed, which did not enter the battle. By the end of June 22, the Nazi troops had penetrated up to 50 km into the borders of the Soviet state.

The troops of the western border districts, consisting of 170 divisions, which were not put on combat readiness and had not completed their strategic deployment, were dispersed over a broad front and in great depth. The balance of power was also not in favor of the Red Army. The enemy outnumbered our troops: in men - 1.8 times, in tanks - 1.5 times, in aircraft - 3.2 times, in guns and mortars - 1.25 times. In the direction of the main attacks, the enemy had a 4-6-fold superiority.

Repressions were "cut down" from five marshals - three, from five army commanders of the 1st rank - three, from ten commanders of the 2nd rank - all, from 57 commanders - 50, from 186 division commanders - 154, from 16 army commissars of the 1st and 2nd rank - all, out of 28 corps commissars - 25, out of 64 divisional commissars - 58, out of 456 colonels - 401. Of total number(733) senior commanders and political workers - from brigade commander to marshal - were repressed 579. From May 1937 to September 1938, about half of the regiment commanders, almost all division and brigade commanders, all corps commanders and district commanders, the majority political workers.

July 1941 Halder makes a clearly premature conclusion in his diary: “It will not be an exaggeration if I say that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days. Of course, it's not finished yet. The vast extent of the territory and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, using all means, will fetter our forces for many weeks to come.

However, this was hampered by the stubborn resistance of the Red Army. Fierce battles flared up along the entire Soviet-German front. On the second day of the war, Soviet troops counterattacked the enemy near Przemysl and defended the city for five days. Zastava A.V. Lopatina bravely fought in encirclement for 11 days, the Brest Fortress remained impregnable for more than a month. Soviet pilots fearlessly went to rams. At the cost of their own lives, fighters and commanders.

The Red Army defended every inch of their native Fatherland.

Despite the setbacks, temporary confusion, forced retreat, the Red Army did not lose its combat capability. The Soviet-German front became the main front of World War II.

2. Mobilization of the forces of the Soviet people to repulse the enemy. Operational actions of the military leadership and difficulties in organizing the country's defense

army military war domestic

At 12 o'clock. On the afternoon of June 22, a government message was broadcast on the radio about the perfidious attack of fascist Germany on the USSR. On behalf of the party and the government, on the first day of the war, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V.M. Molotov, called on the people to a holy war for their Fatherland. His words sounded with optimism: “Our cause is just! The enemy will be defeated! Victory will be ours”, which became the battle slogan of the front and rear of the Patriotic War. On the same day, Metropolitan Sergius addressed all believers.

On June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command was created to lead the armed struggle. The mobilization of those liable for military service in 1905-1918 was announced. birth. Queues of volunteers lined up at the recruiting stations. In Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv, they began to enroll in the people's militia, destroyer battalions for the purposes of local defense and the fight against saboteurs and paratroopers. On June 26, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was issued on the payment of cash benefits to the families of the mobilized.

On June 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR addressed the party and Soviet bodies of the front-line regions with a directive that outlined a program to organize the fight against the fascist aggressor. It was necessary to put the national economy on a military footing as soon as possible, to increase the production of weapons and ammunition, to ensure the fastest advance of military echelons, to ensure the protection of enterprises, power plants, means of communication, etc. With the forced withdrawal of Red Army units, everything of value had to be evacuated or destroyed - factories, machine tools, equipment, etc. - so that the enemy would not get anything. In areas temporarily occupied by the enemy were to be created partisan detachments, underground party and Komsomol organizations. All Soviet citizens called for a selfless struggle for the Motherland, a merciless struggle against the disorganizers of the rear, deserters, alarmists, cowards and spreaders of false rumors.

The war required a radical restructuring of the political, state and military leadership. On June 30, 1941, by decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created under the chairmanship of I.V. Stalin. It was an emergency wartime body that led the country through local Soviet and party bodies and through its representatives in the union and autonomous republics and regional centers. In the summer of 1941, city defense committees were created in the front-line areas.

For a clearer and more flexible control of the Red Army units, on July 10, the Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, headed by Stalin. To improve strategic leadership, the High Commands of three main directions were created: northwestern (Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov), western (Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Timoshenko), southwestern (Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Budyonny). On July 16, Stalin was appointed People's Commissar of Defense, and from August 8, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The headquarters became known as the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

Thus, all the political, economic and military leadership of the country was concentrated in the hands of one person, who in principle had usurped all power long ago - Stalin. During the war, the Council for the Evacuation, the Committee for the Accounting and Distribution of Labor, the Soviet Information Bureau were created. In total, in the summer and autumn of 1941, 10 million people and 1,523 industrial enterprises were taken to the rear areas.

To ensure an uninterrupted supply of food and industrial goods to the population, a rationed supply was introduced in July through the rationing system.

The patriotism of the Soviet people manifested itself in shock work under the motto “Everything for the front! Everything for victory!”, the creation of the National Defense Fund, the donation of warm clothes for front-line soldiers, etc.

Thus, from the first day of the war, the USSR promptly mobilizes all forces to defeat the enemy, the country turns into a single military camp.

Operational actions of the military leadership and difficulties in organizing the defense of the country.

In the summer and autumn of 1941, heavy defensive battles went on in three main directions: northwestern, western and southwestern (Leningrad-Moscow-Kyiv).

In the northwestern direction, the Nazis attached paramount importance to the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt. This would ensure the promptness of the supply of army groups "North" and "Center" by sea. After capturing the northwestern regions of the USSR, Army Group North intensified the Nazi offensive against Moscow together with Army Group Center. The fall of Leningrad represented not just the loss of the most important economic and strategic center, but also carried great political meaning - the beginning of the destruction of communism from its cradle.

In August-September 1941, critical days came for the defense of Leningrad. On September 8, the troops of the "North" group blocked the southern outskirts of the city. From the north it was blocked by Finnish troops. The city was systematically subjected to artillery shelling and aerial bombardment. In November-December 1941, the bread ration was 250 g for workers and 125 g for employees, dependents, children, "black, sticky, like putty, watery, mixed with cellulose and sawdust, and nothing else." Leningrad will courageously endure 900 days of a terrible blockade.

In the western direction, having captured Minsk in early July, the Nazis launched an offensive against Smolensk, an outpost of the Soviet capital. The battle of Smolensk unfolded on a front 900 km long and lasted almost 2 months. On July 14, in the area of ​​​​the city of Orsha, for the first time, rocket-propelled mortars were used, lovingly called by the Red Army "Katyusha". West of Smolensk in early August, 310,000 Soviet soldiers were captured, the Nazis captured over 3,000 tanks and the same number of guns.

Attempts by the command of the Red Army to rectify the situation at the front turned out to be unrealized. The connection didn't work well. The operational situation changed quickly and was not always taken into account by headquarters. The dominance of German aviation made it difficult for the troops to interact. Yes, and combat experience had to be acquired at the cost of blood.

Repulsing the fierce attacks of the enemy, the Red Army launched offensive operations in the region of Velikiye Luki, near Bobruisk, in the direction of Dukhovshchina and Yartsevo. The counterattack in the Yelnya area in early September was especially successful, as a result of which 8 fascist divisions were defeated and the city of Yelnya was liberated. In these battles, the Soviet Guard was born.

Smolensk fell, but the battle for it was a major strategic success. The Soviet command gained time to prepare strategic reserves and carry out defensive measures in the Moscow area. In addition, the enemy could not attack in the center, since the slow advance of Army Group North and South exposed the flanks of Army Group Center.

In the southwestern direction, having reached the Dnieper, Hitler decided to launch an offensive against Kyiv, Donbass, Rostov, hoping to deprive the USSR of the most important economic base - bread, coal, metal and oil. The capture of the Left-Bank Ukraine could open the way to Moscow through Bryansk and Orel.

At the end of August 1941, the German command transferred a strong tank grouping to the south. Back in July, the Chief of the General Staff and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR G.K. Zhukov proposed to leave Kyiv in connection with the threat of encirclement of a large group of Red Army troops by the enemy, for which he was actually removed from his posts by Stalin and sent to the front in the Yelnya region. Only on September 17, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief decided to leave Kyiv, but the encirclement closed around the Southwestern Front. Soviet troops lost 665 thousand Red Army soldiers, about 4 thousand guns, 884 tanks.

For more than 2 months, from August 8 to October 16, 1941, the defense of Odessa, blockaded from land, continued, the most important base of the Black Sea Fleet. For 69 days of fierce fighting, the enemy lost thousands of soldiers and officers. In connection with the threat of the capture of the Crimea by the Nazis, by order of the Headquarters, the Soviet troops left the city.

In the second half, October 1941, the Nazis broke into the Crimea. Their attempts to seize Sevastopol on the move were repulsed.

The heroic defense of the city began, lasting 250 days. Repeated assault, intense bombing of the city fettered large enemy forces, inflicting huge losses on him.

Thus, despite the great results achieved by the Nazi army during its summer offensive, the Wehrmacht did not achieve the defeat of the Red Army, which inflicted significant damage on it, gained combat experience, and gained time to mobilize forces in decisive battles.

3. A radical change during the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. The expulsion of the Nazi invaders from the territory of the USSR

In mid-July 1942, the Germans reached the bend of the Don, where it comes closest to the Volga in the region of Stalingrad. The city must not fall! was Stalin's order. And it reflected not just another whim of the leader, but the strategic calculation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. With the loss of the largest industrial center on the Volga, the already meager defense potential was reduced, the country was losing the most important strategic foothold. The prospects for a further offensive by the Nazis on the uncovered regions of the Center, the Urals, Central Asia and Transcaucasia were opened. Thus, favorable conditions were created for Turkey and Japan to enter the war. According to Lieutenant V. Nekrasov, a participant in the defense of Stalingrad, who became a writer after the war, the “bitter summer” of 1942 seemed more terrible than the summer of 1941: an oppressive feeling of “mortal danger” gripped the country even more than a year earlier.

July fell Rostov-on-Don - the gates of the Caucasus. In the big bend of the Don, several Soviet divisions were surrounded. In order to stabilize the critical situation, the People's Commissar of Defense of the Union of the USSR I.V. Stalin issued Order No. 277 on July 28, known as the order “Not a step back!”. Emphasizing the huge losses suffered by the country - Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Donbass and other regions (more than 70 million people, more than 800 million poods of grain per year and more than 10 million tons of metal per year), he stated: we now have no preponderance over the Germans either in manpower reserves or in grain supplies. Retreating further means ruining oneself and at the same time ruining our Motherland ... Not a step back!

Alarmists and cowards must be exterminated on the spot...”.

August 1942, at the cost of huge losses, the Germans managed to break through northwest of Stalingrad and reach the Volga. On September 14, fighting took place in the area of ​​the station, and a few days later the enemy reached the Volga in the area of ​​the central pier. Particularly fierce battles unfolded for Mamaev Kurgan, the territory of the Tractor Plant, the industrial settlements "Barrikada" and "Red October". In some places the Germans broke through to the banks of the Volga. The motto of the defenders of Stalingrad - the soldiers of the 62nd Army of General V. Luikov, the 64th Army of General M. Shumilov, the divisions of Generals A. Rodimtsev, L. Gurtiev and others - became the words of sniper Vasily Zaitsev: “There is no land for us beyond the Volga! »

The courageous defense of Stalingrad and the Caucasus allowed the Soviet command to concentrate strategic reserves to create a radical change in the course of the war.

The counteroffensive of the Red Army near Stalingrad began on November 19, 1942 with the forces of the South-Western (General N. Vatutin), Don (General K. Rokossovsky), and on November 20 - Stalingrad (General A. Eremenko) fronts. On January 8, 1943, an ultimatum to surrender was presented to the encircled enemy grouping (22 divisions with a total number of 330 thousand people). The commander of the grouping of troops, General Paulus, at the insistence of Hitler, rejected the ultimatum. On January 10, Soviet troops began to rout the enemy, and on February 2 it was all over. Over 147 thousand German soldiers and officers were killed, 91 thousand soldiers, more than 2.5 thousand officers, 24 generals, led by Field Marshal Paulus, were taken prisoner. A large amount of equipment and ammunition was captured. The Nazis lost a quarter of all the forces operating on the Soviet-German front. Hitler declared three days of mourning.

The victory on the Volga marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the entire war. The initiative to conduct military operations passed to the Red Army, whose combat operations were supported by shock labor throughout the country.

March 1943 The Supreme Soviet of the USSR assigns Stalin the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

The expulsion of the Nazi invaders from the territory of the USSR.

As a result of the major victories won by the Red Army in 1943, the nature of hostilities changed radically. “The war has entered that stage,” noted in the report of I.V. Stalin on November 6, 1943, “when it comes to the complete expulsion of the occupiers from Soviet soil and the elimination of the fascist “new order” in Europe.” A powerful offensive by the Soviet troops unfolded from the first days of 1944. The peculiarity of offensive operations was that powerful blows were delivered to the enemy in various directions of the huge Soviet-German front. This made it difficult for the Nazi troops to maneuver in creating an effective defense. From January 14 to March 1, the troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic fronts in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet, they carried out the Novgorod operation in Leningrad and defeated the enemy grouping "North". Leningrad was completely liberated from the blockade, which lasted 900 days. The Leningrad and Novgorod regions were cleared of invaders.

Simultaneously with the offensive near Leningrad and Novgorod, Soviet troops carried out major operations in the South-West. It was necessary to defeat the enemy on a broad front from Southern Polissya to the Black Sea, liberating the Right-Bank Ukraine, reach the State Border and transfer military operations beyond its borders. In January-February 1944, Soviet troops surrounded over 20 divisions in the area of ​​the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge on the Dnieper. On March 26, units of the Red Army reached the State Border of the USSR.

Having liberated the Right-Bank Ukraine, Soviet troops began to eliminate the enemy group in the Crimea. In the first half of April, Kerch and Simferopol were liberated. On May 9, Sevastopol was recaptured, and on May 12, Crimea again became Soviet.

In the summer of 1944, Operation Bagration began - the liberation of Belarus. On the front from the Western Dvina to Pripyat, on June 23, Soviet units went on the offensive, accounting for almost half of all forces and equipment operating on the Soviet-German front. Near Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Minsk, large fascist forces were surrounded. On July 3, Minsk was liberated.

July, Soviet troops liberated Vilnius, crossed the Neman and reached the border with East Prussia.

In June-July, the troops of the Leningrad and Karelian fronts with the support of the ships of the Baltic Fleet, the Ladoga and Onega flotillas, they defeated the enemy on the Karelian Isthmus and on August 9 reached the State Border.

Simultaneously with the liberation of Belarus, the liberation of Ukraine was completed. By the end of October, Soviet troops entered the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

August began the Iasi-Chisinau operation in Moldova. By the end of August, Moldova was liberated.

In October 1944, the Red Army drove the Nazis out of the Soviet Arctic.

As a result of offensive operations in 1944, the Nazis were expelled from Soviet territory. state border The USSR from the Barents to the Black Sea was restored.

Conclusion

It is impossible to understand the Soviet victories of late 1942 and the summer of 1943 without talking about the titanic efforts to rebuild the Soviet economy, completely reoriented by 1942 to the production of armaments by reducing the production of civilian products. In November 1941, industrial production, disorganized by the German occupation of the most important economic regions and the relocation of more than 1,500 factories to the east, fell to 52% of the level of November 1940. However, after the completion of the second stage of the evacuation of industrial potential (summer 1942), a clear rise in economic indicators. Activity played an important role in this.

Committee for Accounting and Distribution labor resources, which was entrusted with the task of providing relocated enterprises with a workforce. The severity of the problem was determined by the fact that 11 million people were in the ranks of the Red Army. Under these conditions, in February 1942, the government mobilized the urban population, and in November extended this measure to rural residents. During this year alone, 3 million people, including 830,000 young men and women who had just graduated from school, were compulsorily sent to industry and construction. In addition, in order to replace the skilled workers who went to the front, 1,800,000 adults and young men underwent an accelerated course of study in factory schools (FZU). These measures were accompanied by a broad campaign of "socialist competition" and "setting records", as in the best times of the Stakhanov movement, as well as toughening of working conditions and labor discipline (decrees of June 26, 1941 on an increase in the working day, of December 26, 1941 No. on limiting staff turnover, etc.).

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