"The first united campaign of the Entente against the Soviet Republic began in the first days of March 1919 with the offensive of the Kolchak troops on the Eastern Front.
The serious danger that arose for the Soviet Republic in connection with this offensive was aggravated by the fact that the country, despite the successes of the Red Army in early 1919, continued to be in a close circle of fronts.
The struggle went on in the North, in the Baltic states, in Belarus, in the Ukraine, on Dopa, on the outskirts of the Urals.
In the winter of 1918-1919, when the main force was the Southern Front, the main forces of the Red Army were sent south in order to put an end to the counter-revolution in the Don and the North Caucasus as quickly as possible and to repulse the invaders who had landed in Ukraine and the Crimea. More Soviet troops were concentrated on the Southern Front than on any other.
Meanwhile, the Eastern Front, which had stretched from the Caspian Sea to the North Ural tundra by the spring of 1919, had extremely limited forces. Over a 1,800-kilometer area, by the beginning of March, Soviet troops numbered a little over 1,000 bayonets and cavalry troops with 1,882 machine guns and 374 guns.
These forces were located as follows. On the right wing of the front - in the Ural and Orenburg directions - were the 4th Army and a detachment of Turkestan troops, which made its way in January 1919 to Orenburg. In early March, this detachment was reorganized into the Turkestan Army under the command of G.V. Zinoviev, which, together with the 4th Army, formed the Southern Group Eastern Front. This group was headed by an outstanding figure of the Communist Party, a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, M.V. Frunze, who had previously commanded the 4th Army. Troops of the 4th and Turkestan armies occupied the sector of the front from
Alexandrova Gaia, south of Uralsk, to Aktobe.
To the left of the Turkestan Army, to the east of Orenburg, the 1st Army under the command of Guy (GK Bezhishkyants) advanced to the line Aktyubinsk - Orsk - Avzyan-Petrovsk Plants.
In the center of the front - in the Ufa direction - from the Arkhangelsky factory to the village of Buraevo (50 kilometers north of Birsk), the 5th Army was located, commanded by J.K. Blumberg, and from April 5 - M.N. Tukhachevsky.
Two armies operated on the left wing of the front: 2-
I - the river Belaya and the city of Osa, covering the direction to Sarapul and Votkinsk, and 3-
I - in the Vyatka-Perm direction, grouping on the line Okhansk - Nytvensky plant - Grigorievskaya station and further north. The 2nd army was commanded by B.I. Shorin, the 3rd - by S.A. Mezheninov.
In February, as a result of the onslaught of the counterpike on its right flank, the 2nd Army was forced to withdraw its units to the Kama. A gap of 50 kilometers formed between the 2nd and 5th armies, only part of which was covered by the small Petrograd cavalry regiment.
The Eastern Front had the strongest grouping on its moral wing. As for the center, the 5th Army, located here for 200 kilometers, was at that time the smallest of all the armies of the Eastern Front; it numbered only about 11 thousand bayonets and sabers.
On February 21, 1919, the Eastern Front was ordered to develop an offensive against Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk), as well as towards Turkestan.
It was planned to strike the main blow in the Chelyabinsk - Yekaterinburg zone with the immediate goal - to capture these cities. At the same time, the troops of the right wing of the front (4th and Turkestan armies) were to liberate the Ural region and Orenburg province and vigorously move towards Soviet Turkestan in order to ensure communication with it.
The 1st Army received the task of liberating the South Urals and assisting the 5th Army with an offensive on Troitsk.
The 5th Army was to advance from Ufa to Zlatoust and Chelyabinsk. The efforts of the 2nd and 3rd armies were directed against the Permian group of whites: the 2nd army had the task of enveloping the left flank of this group, and the 3rd army was to pin down the enemy from the front. Thus, the plan of the commander-in-chief and command of the Eastern Front provided for a decisive offensive simultaneously in two directions: towards the Urals and towards Turkestan.
Such a task, as shown further developments, did not correspond to the real balance of forces and the prevailing situation.
Kolchak had been preparing his troops for a decisive offensive since the winter of 1918-1919. At the beginning of 1919, the Kolchak government mobilized several contingents of the population into its army. The mobilization was facilitated by the fluctuations of the Siberian peasantry, who at first did not understand the essence of the Kolchak regime. The Kolchak command had the opportunity to significantly replenish and reorganize the front-line units, to begin creating reserves.
In early March, the White Guards opposed the Soviet armies of the Eastern Front with forces reaching 130-145 thousand bayonets and sabers with 1300 machine guns and 211 guns. These troops were full command staff from the officers of the old army. The Soviet troops had some superiority in artillery and machine guns, but due to the lack of ammunition, this was of little practical importance. At the same time, the enemy, as mentioned above, received sufficient ammunition from the invaders. His great advantage was also a double superiority in cavalry. The Soviet troops on the Eastern Front always felt the lack of cavalry units, especially where they had to deal with the White Cossack cavalry.
The Ural White Cossacks and the Orenburg White Cossack Army of Ataman Dutov acted against the 4th, Turkestan and 1st armies - with a total number of about 19_ thousand Khabol .. and bayonets, the 1st Army opposed "and the so-called Southern Army Group of General Belov - about 14 500 bayonets and sabers.This group was created by the White Guard command in early March 1919 to restore the situation on the left wing of the Kolchak front, where, in connection with the transition of the Bashkir units to the side Soviet power a gap formed between the Orenburg and Western armies of Kolchak. Belov's group was instructed to deal ruthlessly with the population of the region it occupied, who refused to support the Kolchak regime.
The most strong army White Guards - Western, under the command of General Khanzhin. Opa numbered about 50 thousand bayonets and sabers. Belov's Southern Army Group was also operationally subordinate to her.
The 2nd and 3rd armies were opposed by the Siberian army under the command of General Gaida. The Siberian army had more than 48 thousand bayonets and sabers.
The reserve of the White Guard command was formed in the area of Chelyabinsk - Kurgan, the corps of General Kanpel. In addition, three divisions were formed in Omsk and Tomsk and the so-called shock corps in Yekaterinburg.
The peculiarity of the grouping of the forces of the parties was that if on the right wing of the front the Whites were inferior to the Red Army in numbers, and on the left the forces were equal, then in the center, against the 5th Army, the enemy concentrated almost five times more troops than this one had. army. The White Guards here also had a double superiority in artillery and hung over the open left flank of the 5th Army. This situation was fraught with great danger for the Soviet armies of the Eastern Front, since they were all stretched out in one line and the front command did not have any significant reserves at its disposal. The presence of several huge fronts and the lack of material resources of the Soviet Republic made it very difficult to create the necessary reserves. This circumstance, as well as the need to concentrate the main forces in the south, did not allow sufficient reinforcements to be allocated to the Eastern Front in time.
The idea of Kolchak's offensive was based on the idea of a "combined campaign" against the Soviet Republic. But when developing a plan for the upcoming operations, two different views emerged among the military representatives of the Entente and Kolchak's high command, reflecting the existence of a contradiction within the counter-revolutionary camp. The dispute was about where to deliver the main blow: by the forces of the Siberian army through Vyatka (Kirov) and Vologda - to connect with the troops of the interventionists and whites in the north and from there through Yaroslavl to Moscow, or by the forces of the Western army - to the Middle Volga, in order to connect with the troops Denikin for a joint attack on Moscow from the east and south.
The representative of England, General Knox, insisted on a northerly direction. This was explained by the fact that the British interventionists in the Soviet North could not achieve any significant success in the fight against the Red Army. Establishing direct contact with the Kolchak front would significantly strengthen their position. At the same time, this would increase the influence of England on the Kolchak government, since the supply of Kolchak troops would be carried out through Arkhangelsk, which was in the hands of the British interventionists. In Arkhangelsk, large stocks of weapons were already being prepared in order to subsequently deliver them to Kotlas. But among the representatives of the Entente and the Kolchak command there were also supporters of the southern direction, who believed that an offensive towards Samara to connect with Denikin would give much more benefits than an offensive in a northern direction. The French imperialists, whose interests were represented by General Janin, were primarily interested in the southern version.
Kolchak, who depended mainly on the Anglo-American interventionists, had to reckon with their opinion in the first place. In addition, he was tempted by the prospect of taking over Moscow without the participation of Denikin and becoming the sovereign dictator of Russia.
In February 1919, in Chelyabinsk, at a meeting of the Kolchak command, the issue of the upcoming offensive was discussed. As Gaida wrote later, at this meeting there was a plan for headquarters - to strike the main blow in a northerly direction along the Perm - Vyatka - Vologda line in order to capture the industrial region and Moscow. Gaida claimed that allegedly he and ataman Dutov were against this plan and proposed to develop the offensive by the left wing of the front in order to connect with Denikin. But the chief of the Kolchak headquarters, General Lebedev, opposed the proposal, saying that such a connection would cause friction over primacy and could lead to disastrous consequences. According to Gaida, speaking at the end of the meeting, Kolchak frankly stated:
“Whoever enters Moscow first will be master of the situation.” Baron Budberg, head of Kolchak's military ministry, also wrote about the plans of the headquarters to strike the main blow in the northern direction. In his diary on May 11, 1919, he wrote:
“Kasatkin (the chief head of military communications at Kolchak. - Ed.) gave me a report from the headquarters, drawn up in accordance with the decision of the meeting of the highest ranks of the headquarters, at which everyone spoke in favor of the advantages of the northern direction. It turned out that the headquarters (as they say, according to Lebedev) do not believe in the strength and stability of Denikin's army and consider it unreliable ... "2
Denikin, having learned about Kolchak's intention to move his troops in a northerly direction, wrote to him with displeasure on February 14:
“It is a pity that the main forces of the Siberian troops, apparently, are directed to the north. A joint operation against Saratov would have given enormous advantages: the liberation of the Ural and Orenburg regions, the isolation of Astrakhan and Turkestan.
And most importantly, the possibility of a direct, immediate connection between the East and the South ... "3 The advance of the Red Army in early 1919 into the regions of the Southern Urals and the threat of an offensive by the Soviet 5th Army from the Ufa region forced the White Guard command to pay closer attention to the southwestern direction . Additional forces were deployed there. However, Kolchak's rate did not go to a radical change in the original plan. It was decided only to conduct a private operation in the center of the Eastern Front in order to defeat the Soviet troops that had advanced east of Ufa and take a more advantageous operational position for a decisive offensive towards the centers of the Soviet Republic.
On February 15, Kolchak set the task for his armies - by the beginning of April, to take an advantageous starting position for the development of decisive operations in the spring. To do this, the Siberian army had to advance in the Vyatka direction, defeat the 2nd army and capture the Sarapul-Votkiisk-Izhevsk region.
The Western Army was ordered to crush the 5th Army, capture the area of Birsk - Belebey - Sterlitamak - Ufa and reach the Ik River. At the same time, the Western Army was supposed to strike at the rear of the Soviet 1st Army to help the Orenburg Army of Dutov-. The last one was PTTGGLOTGGSTTY-z-yaDYacha to take possession of Orenburg and connect with the Ural squirrel zachYҐ~a rmiei.
Kolchak's directive did not say which army would deliver the main blow. Confused by the vagueness of the directive, the commander of the Western Army, Khanzhin, turned to headquarters for instructions on this issue and with a request to confirm the task of the Siberian Army - to ensure the right flank of the Western Army with an attack on Krasnoufimsk-Sarapul. On March 3, on the eve of the offensive, Kolchak instructed:
"... in the upcoming operations, the main blow is assigned to the Western Army in order to capture the Ufa region" 4.
As you can see, the Kolchak headquarters, adhering to the northern as the main strategic direction, at the same time, during a private operation, which had the goal of reaching troops to more advantageous starting lines, placed the main blow on the Western army. In accordance with this, it was ordered to strengthen the Western Army with reinforcements from the area of the Siberian Army. However, this did not have any noticeable effect on the grouping of troops. Gaida, who believed that the main role belonged to his army, and dreamed of being the first to enter Moscow, opposed this in every possible way. The Siberian army remained almost the same in number as the Western one.
Later, when the success of the Western Army exceeded expectations and the center of the Eastern Front of the Soviet troops was broken through, the White Guard command, intoxicated by this success, decided to continue the offensive with the existing grouping of forces, without any pause. Thus, the operation, undertaken at the beginning with a limited purpose, suddenly developed into a general offensive of strategic importance.
The Siberian army was now to reach the Vyatka-Kazan-Volga line (the mouth of the Kama), and the Western Army was to reach the Volga in the Simbirsk (Ulyanovsk)-Samara section, followed by forcing the river between Samara and Saratov. At the same time, the southern direction, where the Western Army operated, acquired, thanks to the success achieved here, more important than the northern one. However, as soon as the Western army, having failed to fulfill its task, began to suffer defeat, the northern direction again came to the fore.
In this regard, the efforts of the White Guard command bifurcated. It turned out that two on their own active groups- Siberian and Western armies - had to strike in two separate directions, without interaction with each other. ]
This was one of the miscalculations of Kolchak's strategy.
The offensive plans of the White armies were drawn up without taking into account the strength of the resistance of the Red Army, the strength of its rear, and with a clear overestimation of their own forces. They reflected the desire to move forward at all costs. Kolchak's leaders understood that only successes on the 1st front could strengthen the "supreme ruler" regime. However, the declining morale of the White Guard troops, largely replenished by forcibly mobilized peasants of Siberia and the Urals, the growth of discontent in the rear and flared up partisan movement, vicious strategy - all this, at the first serious failure, threatened to lead the planned enterprise to collapse.
The general offensive of the Kolchak troops was launched on March 4 by the Siberian army. The main blow was dealt by the most numerous 1st Siberian Corps of General A. Pepellev at the junction of the 2nd and 3rd armies between Okhansk and Osa. At the same time, part of the forces of the Steppe Corps of General Verzhbitsky conducted demonstrative attacks south of Osa.
Having crossed the ice across the Kama, the strike group of the Siberian Corps launched an offensive in three directions: to the northwest - to Okhansk, to the west - to Sosnovskoye and to the south - to Osa. In addition, the White Guards launched an offensive in secondary directions - north of Okhansk and north of railway Perm - Glazov. The 30th rifle division 3rd army. Under pressure from superior enemy forces, she was forced to retreat.
On March 7, having occupied several settlements on the right bank of the Kama, parts of the Siberian Corps broke into Okhansk. The next day, the troops of the Steppe Corps took Osa. The capture of these cities opened up the opportunity for the Whites to develop the offensive.
Parts of the right column of the strike group of the Siberian Corps began to advance through the Ochersky Zavod to reach the Perm-Glazov railroad near the Kuzma station and cut off the withdrawal route of the 29th Rifle Division of the 3rd Army. The middle column of the enemy moved to the Kez station for a deeper bypass of the units of the 29th division. The left-flank column rushed to the rear of the Soviet troops in the Osa area. The steppe corps of Verzhbitsky launched an offensive against Votkinsk.
In order to avoid a detour and level the front, the 3rd Army was forced to retreat to a new line, covering the railway to Glazov and the tract roads to Votkinsk and Debessy. In itself, the withdrawal of the 3rd Army was not catastrophic, but it exposed the left flank of the 2nd Army, as a result of which the 5th Ural Division of this army, which was located here, also began to retreat, opening the Votkinsk direction. After the capture of Okhansk and Osa, the Kolchak command demanded that the Siberian army develop an offensive in the Sarapul direction,
"to give freedom of movement forward to the right flank of the Western Army" 5.
But the Soviet 2nd and 3rd armies, despite the unfavorable situation, continued to hold back the enemy's pressure, leaving only a small territory. By mid-March, the 2nd Army held the front on the line that ran from the Bikbarda plant north to the Kama near the village of Kryukov and further up the Kama to the village of Chastye, and from here to the west to the village of Ploskaya, where there was a junction with the 3rd Army. The section of the front north of the Ploskaya to the right tributary of the Kama - the Inva was occupied by the troops of the 3rd Army, who covered the Perm - Glazov railway in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Borodulino station.
Until the end of March, the attempts of the Siberian army to break through the front were unsuccessful. Particularly stubborn resistance was provided by the 2nd Army, preventing the Steppe Corps from advancing in the Votkinsk and Sarapul directions.
On March 24, the White Guard command was forced to again give the order for the offensive of the Siberian army with the task of reaching the Glazov-Izhevsk-Sarapul line no later than April 5.
On March 26, units of two White Guard corps - Wall and Consolidated - launched an offensive along the railway to Sarapul. But here they met stubborn resistance from the 28th Infantry Division, commanded by V. M. Asia, who became famous for his courage in battles with the White Guards. Parts of the Consolidated Corps on the very first day suffered heavy losses and could not move forward. Soviet soldiers stubbornly defended every inch of land, repeatedly turning into counterattacks. However, the Whites managed to break through the right flank of the 2nd Army, taking advantage of the gap between it and the 5th Army. On March 30, the Whites captured the village of Rabak near the railway to Sarapul in the rear of the Soviet units. The position of the 28th division became threatening. There was nothing to support it, since the reserves of the 2nd Army were transferred to defend the Menzelinsky direction. Nevertheless, the 28th division continued to heroically defend the railway, ensuring the evacuation of valuable cargo. Only under the pressure of many times superior enemy forces did the Soviet units slowly, with fierce battles, begin to retreat to the west.
On April 7, in Votkinsk, which was in close proximity to the front, a counter-revolutionary rebellion organized by the Socialist-Revolutionaries broke out, which made it easier for the Kolchakists to capture the city. With the fall of Votkinsk, the Soviet Republic lost a large arms factory. Three days later, on April 10, the enemy managed to capture Sarapul.
By this time, the 2nd and 3rd armies occupied the front along the line from Pyany Bor to the north, west of Votkinsk and the Kez station, further northwest to the Zalazninsky plant.
For a month and a half of defensive battles, the 2nd Army lost about 10 thousand killed, wounded and captured. Significant losses were also in the 3rd Army. But still, both armies retained combat capability.
The Siberian army of whites during this time was able to advance with heavy losses only 80-130 kilometers, without reaching its goal.
The offensive of the Western White Army began after the Siberian Army. The main blow in the central sector of the front was delivered by Kolchak's troops on the open left flank of the 5th Army. This offensive came as a surprise to the command of the Eastern Front, which at that time was conducting an offensive against Zlatoust, Chelyabinsk. On March 5, the troops of the right flank of the 5th Army - the 26th Infantry Division, supported by the 1st Brigade of the 27th Infantry Division - despite severe frost and deep snow, successfully advanced to occupy the Asha-Balashevskis passes in the Ural Mountains. But already on March 6 it became clear that the White Guards had attacked the units of the 27th division, located on the left flank of the army, and forced them to withdraw. Tired and small regiments could not resist the onslaught of superior enemy forces. On March 9, the command of the Eastern Front reported to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic about the difficult situation in the 5th Army area.
On March 10, the 2nd Ufa White Corps managed to capture Birsk. The capture of Birsk inspired the White Guard command. Khanzhin on the same day informed his corps commanders that “the resistance of the 5th Red Army has been broken. Its left flank is crumpled and retreating, the right one is still holding on” 6.
Khanzhin ordered the 2nd Ufa Corps to occupy the Chpshma railway junction no later than March 13. The 6th Ural Corps of the Whites, moving in a southwestern direction, was to intercept the Sterlitamak tract, and on March 11 the 3rd Ural Corps was tasked with advancing on Ufa.
Fierce fighting broke out on the approaches to Ufa. Units of the 26th and 27th divisions and a detachment of Ufa railway workers fought heroically. On the night of March 11, they drove the White Guards out of the village of Sharypova, located 35 kilometers away, with a swift counterattack. northwest Ufa, they captured prisoners and machine guns, but they could not hold this point. Under the threat of a bypass, they had to retreat.
On March 14, the White Guards broke into Ufa and captured the city. The bridge over the Belaya River was not blown up. This allowed the enemy to immediately take advantage of the railroad running from Ufa to the west. On the same day (March 14), by the evening, the Chishma station was also captured by the Whites,
Fighters of the 29th Rifle DIVISION of the 3rd Army at the howitzer platform. Eastern front. 1919 (Photo.)
through which the railway lines from Ufa to Simbirsk and Samara passed. In Ufa, large stocks of grain, fodder, a significant part of the ships of the river flotilla and many other property fell into the hands of the Whites. But almost all the workers left Ufa together with the Red Army units.
With the fall of Ufa and the Chishma station, the center of the Eastern Front was broken through. The 5th Army, which lost almost half of its strength in the battles on the outskirts of Ufa, was forced to retreat in two divergent directions: along the Volga-I Bugulma railway to Bugulma and along the Samara-Zlatoust railway I to Belebey, which further expanded the breakthrough . Due to the loss of control, the 26th Rifle Division of the 5th Army was temporarily subordinated to the 1st Army and retreated from Ufa to the south.
The breakthrough of the Whites endangered the left flank and rear of the 1st Army. The position of the Soviet troops was further complicated by the fact that kulak revolts prepared by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks began in their immediate rear. On March 8, counter-revolutionary riots broke out in Samara, Syzrap, Sengiles, Stavropol and Melekes districts. Two days later, on the night of March, the 175th Regiment rebelled in Samara under the influence of the Mennevist-SR propaganda. pursued the goal of capturing Samara in order to facilitate the advance of the White Guard troops to the Volga.All these rebellions were quickly suppressed, but they diverted part of the Soviet troops and created additional difficulties for the Eastern Front.
The White Guard command tried to use the favorable situation for it and spurred its troops in every possible way. But even the first battles after the fall of Ufa showed that the Whites' hopes for a quick and easy march to the Volga would not materialize. Despite the losses suffered, the troops of the 5th Army put up stubborn resistance. The best-preserved 26th Rifle Division fought especially staunchly. Holding back the enemy’s offensive on Belebey, on March 18, together with the 1st and 2nd brigades of the 27th division, they managed to gain a foothold south of Ufa in the area northeast of the Davlekanovo station and take up defense in a huge section from the Belaya to the Samara-Zlatoust railway roads. On March 22, fierce battles began here. The stubborn resistance of the Soviet regiments forced the Kolchak command to temporarily change the direction of the main attack of its Western Army to the south. The Kolchakites also moved the 2nd Ufa Corps from the Menzelinsky and Bugulma directions to Belebey.
The change in direction led to some i-j shensho of the White Guard units, which slowed down the pace of their offensive. The troops of the 5th Army were able to cover the most important directions, passing through Buguruslan to Samara and through Bugulma to Simbirsk and to strengthen in the position taken for defense.
The heroic resistance of the regiments of the 26th and 27th divisions and the units of the 1st Army that came to their aid lasted twelve days. Soviet troops with continuous counterattacks pushed back the superior forces of the Whites. At dawn on March 28, having struck at the junction of two White Guard corps, the 26th division launched a vigorous offensive in the direction of Ufa along the Sterlitamak tract. The White Guards were driven out of several villages south of Ufa. The Soviet units captured about 700 prisoners and 5 guns. Particularly distinguished in these battles were the 227th IS l and Dimirsky and the 228th Karelian regiments. Red-I army men of these regiments led by communists | engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy, bayonets and grenades turned him into a stampede. Kolchak, in order to stop this offensive and eliminate the breakthrough, transferred an entire division here. But all their attempts to break the 26th division invariably ran into the iron steadfastness of its fighters and commanders.
Simultaneously with the counterattacks of the 26th division, the 2nd brigade of the 27th division, acting jointly with the Ufa workers' regiment, broke through the White front on the Chermasan River and occupied the Vuzdyak station on the Volga-Bugulma railway. The White Guards, however, managed to cut off the units that had broken through. The Ufa workers' regiment, after two days of fighting, despite heavy losses, made an almost 100-kilometer heroic campaign behind enemy lines, made its way across the front line to its troops and carried out all the wounded and sick.
The delay in the offensive forced the Kolchak command to regroup its forces again. On March 29, two White Guard corps (3rd and 6th) were combined into the so-called "Ufa group", which was supposed to break the resistance of the Soviet troops south of Ufa. But this measure also failed. On March 31, the chief of staff of the Western Army, General Shchepikhin, was forced to admit that "the Ufa group was bleeding to death."
The Soviet units could not continue to hold back the onslaught of the ever-increasing enemy forces, and on April 1 they again began to withdraw. The command of the Western Army of the Whites tried to pincer and encircle the retreating Soviet troops between the Samara-Zlatoust railway and the Sterlitamak tract. But this attempt was unsuccessful, thanks to the heroic actions of the 26th division. She made a bold flank march with fighting in order to leave the Sterlitamak direction to the Samara-Zlatoust railway south of Belebey. This maneuver was carried out in very difficult conditions. The White Guards captured Sterlitamak on April 5, and Belebey on April 6. They sought to cut off the retreat of the 26th division. Some regiments had to fight their way out of the encirclement. A detachment of hunter-skiers from the workers of the Minyar plant showed particular stamina and perseverance in the battles during the withdrawal.
Back in February, the Minyar workers, fleeing from mobilization in the Kolchak army, left their native factory and went into the forest, and then made their way through the front to the location of the Soviet troops. Here, a detachment of hunters-skiers was formed from them, numbering 200 people, including 50 communists. The detachment actively participated in the first battles, when the Kolchak offensive against Ufa began. Then he courageously fought with the Whites during the retreat from Ufa to the south. There was never such a difficult situation when the Minyar would be confused and falter. On April 9, near the village of Popovka, they were surrounded by an enemy several times superior in number. Despite heavy losses, Detachment j in a fierce battle fought its way through the White Guard [deisky] ceii and left the encirclement. On the 15th of this battle, the commander of the detachment, Akhmatov, was killed. Surrounded by enemies, he fired back to the last bullet, and then, in order not to be captured, committed suicide. Together with him, the commissar of the detachment Goryachev also died a heroic death.
Stubborn battles also took place in the Bugulma direction, where the 3rd brigade of the 27th rifle division made a withdrawal. However, here the enemy advanced faster, as the 27th division was bled dry by heavy fighting near Ufa and lost almost all of its artillery. In early April, her 3rd Brigade, with the help of the Samara Workers' Regiment and the Special Purpose Regiment, attempted to stop the Whites' advance. After a fierce bayonet battle on April 5, with the support of an armored train, she even advanced 20-30 kilometers. east of the river Hic. 11o the lack of reserves and the withdrawal of neighboring units forced her to stop counterattacks and on April 7 to start withdrawing again. The Whites, resuming the offensive, captured Bugulma on April 10.
An extremely dangerous situation has developed in the Menzelinsky direction, at the open junction of the 5th and 2nd armies. Here, against the fresh Kolchak units, the only barrier was the guard company of the Menzelip district military registration and enlistment office. On March 22, Menzelinsk was captured by the Whites. On March 27, Soviet units detached from the 2nd Army managed to recapture the city. But they could not hold out there for a long time and on April 5 they left the city again. For the Whites, the road to Chistopol was now open, where millions of grains were concentrated and steamships, barges and the bottom of the destroyer plowed. In case of a fall
Sending a working regiment to the Bostochny front. Samara (Kuibyshev). 1919 (Photo.)
Chistopol, a serious threat would have been created for Kazan.
The withdrawal of the 5th Army put the 1st Army in a difficult position, which advanced rather deeply into the South Urals. She was also forced to withdraw due to the threat to her flank and rear. Making long marches with battles, by April 10, the 20th Rifle Division of the 1st Army withdrew to a line 40 kilometers south of Sterlitamak and covered the direction to Orenburg from the north. The 24th Rifle Division, which was operating on the right flank of the 1st Army, left Orsk on April 6 and retreated to the Bugulchan area and to the south. In the following days, it concentrated in the Mikhailovsky (Sharlyk) area, and the 20th division withdrew across the Salmysh River.
In early April, the Orenburg White Cossack) army of Dutov approached the Orsk-Aktyubinsk line and captured Aktyubinsk on April 11, cutting the Orenburg-Tashkent railway. The Soviet troops of Turkestan, who were near Aktobe, were forced to withdraw to the area of Chelkar stations - the Aral Sea. Turkestan was again cut off from Soviet Russia. With the approach of the whites in the Orenburg region, riots began in the Cossack villages located along the Ural River.
In mid-April the White offensive reached its peak. Their armies were located 85 kilometers from Kazan, a little over 100 kilometers from Simbirsk, 85 kilometers from Samara, capturing over 300 thousand square kilometers of territory with a population of more than five million people. The following cities fell into the hands of the enemy: Osa, Okhansk, Votkinsk, Birsk, Ufa, Menzelinsk, Sterlitamak, Belebey, Bugulma and many others. settlements. The center of the Eastern Front was broken through. A huge gap was created between the 5th and 2nd armies - more than 150 kilometers - where large enemy forces were operating. The further advance of the Whites to the Volga in the Samara region threatened to cover the entire right wing of the Eastern Front, and the withdrawal of the Soviet armies beyond the Volga would inevitably lead to the connection of Kolchak with Denikin and would put the central regions of the Soviet country under attack.
The position of the Soviet Republic was further complicated by the fact that, simultaneously with the offensive of Kolchak's troops in the east, offensive operations of counter-revolutionary forces began on other fronts.
At the beginning of 1919, Kolchak went on the offensive along the entire Eastern Front. In the northern direction (Perm - Vyatka), the Siberian army of Kolchak continued to operate against the III Red Army. But thanks to the decisive actions of comrades Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, the Kolchak Siberian army could no longer advance further than Glazov. Kolchak's Western Army in March and the first half of April 1919 captured Ufa, Bugulma and Buguruslan. There was a direct threat to Simbirsk and Samara. middle group Kolchak's troops, linking the Siberian and Western armies, threatened Kazan. Finally, south of Ufa and further into Turkestan, the White Cossack armies of Dutov and Tolstov acted, threatening Orenburg and Uralsk. Kolchak's offensive assumed menacing proportions and created the danger of uniting the Eastern and Southern counter-revolutions. Kolchak intended to unite with Denikin in the Saratov region, so that from there they could march on Moscow in a united front. Denikin at that time captured part of the Donbass. Yudenich launched an offensive against Petrograd.
A deadly threat hung over the country. It was necessary to take quick and decisive measures to defeat Kolchakism.
On April 12, Pravda published "Theses of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in connection with the situation on the Eastern Front." In the theses written by Lenin, it was emphasized that "The most extreme exertion of forces is necessary to defeat Kolchak" (Lenin, Soch., vol. 29, p. 251).
The party put forward the slogan: "Everyone to the Eastern Front!". In response to the appeal of the party and Lenin, Moscow and Petrograd sent to the front a fifth of all communists and a tenth of trade union members. The Komsomol sent several thousand of the best youth to the Eastern Front. Volunteer enrollment covered all cities. In the rear, women replaced the men who went to the front.
The task of defeating Kolchak was entrusted to M. V. Frunze, appointed commander of the southern group of troops of the Eastern Front, and V. V. Kuibyshev, appointed member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the southern group of troops of the Eastern Front. In the battles of the civil war, the old Bolshevik Mikhail Vasilievich Frunze grew into a remarkable proletarian
commander. Back in December 1918, he was sent as commander of the IV Army to reinforce the Eastern Front. Relying on the textile workers who came to his aid, Frunze quickly restored revolutionary order in the army and launched a successful offensive against the White Cossacks, and then against Kolchak. Together with Frunze, at the forefront against Dutov, the White Cossacks and Kolchak, in the most dangerous places was
V. V. Kuibyshev. Frunze and Kuibyshev brought up many remarkable proletarian commanders and military political workers. One of these heroes-commanders was the legendary V. I. Chapaev.
Vasily Ivanovich Chapaev was born in Chuvashia. As a child, he worked as a carpenter with his father and grandfather in the Volga villages, in his youth he went through a harsh drill tsarist army, gave the best years of his life to the fronts of the imperialist war. In these difficult wanderings, hatred for the oppressors and exploiters ignited in his heart. Returning after the February Revolution in the Volga region, Chapaev joined the Bolshevik Party and from the first days October revolution took the path of struggle for the power of the Soviets.
The southern group formed by Frunze at the end of April 1919 launched a general offensive. In early May, Chapaev's 25th Division successfully fought battles near Buzuluk and Buguruslan. On May 13, the Red Army captured Bugulma. The Whites began to retreat to Ufa. At this decisive moment, Trotsky treacherously proposed to delay the offensive of the Red Army on Ufa, withdraw part of the troops from the Eastern Front and transfer them to the Southern. The implementation of this plan would leave the Urals with its factories in the hands of Kolchak and would give him the opportunity to recover from defeat. Frunze strongly objected to Trotsky's order. Lenin supported Frunze, demanding the liberation of the Urals before the onset of winter.
Under the leadership of Frunze, the Red Army crossed the Belaya River and fought for Ufa.
The Chapaev division repulsed the counterattacks of Kappel's elite Kolchak corps. As a result of fierce battles, Ufa was occupied by the Red troops. Kolchak's army quickly rolled back to the east. Pursuing Kolchak, the Red Army entered into
16 History of the USSR, part Ill
Chapaev in battle. From a painting by P. Vasiliev.
foothills of the Urals. On July 13, Zlatoust was occupied, opening the way to Siberia, on July 14 - Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk).
At this time, in the rear of Kolchak, a fierce struggle unfolded between partisan detachments, consisting of workers and peasants of the Urals and Siberia. At the same time, the Red Army began offensive operations against Kolchak's allies - the White Cossacks.
The 25th division of Chapaev was transferred to the Ural front. With battles, Chapaev moved to the aid of Uralsk, which heroically withstood a two-month siege. Having liberated Uralsk, Chapaev drove the White Cossacks to the Caspian Sea. On September 5, 1919, in the village of Lbischenskaya, the Chapaev headquarters was surrounded by Cossacks who broke through to the rear. Shooting back from the enemies surrounding him, Chapaev rushed into the Ural River, was already wounded in the water and drowned. The image of Chapaev will forever remain in the memory of the Soviet people.
The Red Army dealt a crushing blow to Kolchak, but he still retained part of his forces and tried to resist. In August, Lenin, in his “Letter to the Workers and Peasants on the occasion of the victory over Kolchak,” warned: “The enemy is far from being destroyed. He's not even completely broken.
It is necessary to strain every effort to expel Kolchak and the Japanese with other foreign robbers from Siberia ... ”(Lenin, Soch., g. 29, p. 511).
At this time, Denikin in the south and Yudenich in the west came to the aid of Kolchak.
§ 11. The defeat of Kolchak
By the beginning of June, the armies of the eastern front approached the banks of the Kama and Belaya rivers. Kolchak's armies intended to gain a foothold here, relying on the Ural Range. At this moment, Trotsky, influenced by the advance of Denikin's armies to the north and northwest, demanded that the armies of the eastern front stop on the line of the Belaya River (near Ufa) and that several divisions from the east be transferred to the southern front. Trotsky's proposal ran counter to Lenin's directive of May 29, quoted above, in which he proposed not to weaken the offensive to the east. Trotsky's "concern" about the southern front to the detriment of the eastern front was again explained, as was observed by some workers on the Ukrainian front, by the denial of the international significance of our civil war, by the denial of the decisive importance of the defense of Soviet Russia in any sector for the cause of the world proletarian revolution. Regardless of anything, Trotsky proposed to pay maximum attention to the offensive towards the borders of Western Europe, without a revolution in which, in his opinion, the Soviet republics still could not hold out. A further offensive against Kolchak, according to Trotsky, moved the Red Army forces away from the western borders of the Soviet state. On the contrary, a strike against Denikin, if successful, would again bring the large forces of the Red Army to the Ukraine, bringing them closer to the borders of Western Europe.
Meanwhile, it was completely obvious that it was impossible “to leave the Urals in the hands of Kolchak with its factories, with its railway network, where he can easily recover, gather his fist and find himself again at the Volga - you must first drive Kolchak beyond the Ural Range, into the Siberian steppes , and only after that do the transfer of forces to the south " (Stalin, On the opposition, p. 110).
Stopping the victorious offensive against Kolchak would lower fighting mood Red Army units. Moreover, in this case, the Red Army would lose the support of tens of thousands of Ural workers and Siberian peasant partisans, who, under the leadership of the party, did not stop fighting against Kolchak and were preparing to take on their bayonets, spears and pitchforks the White Guards defeated and thrown back by the Red Army.
Even during the spring offensive of Kolchak, uprisings of workers and peasants under the leadership of underground Bolshevik organizations unfolded in his rear. One of the first uprisings - Kustanai - in March - April 1919, although it was suppressed by the Kolchakites with exceptional cruelty (the number of victims is up to 18 thousand people!), But it played its role: the whites were forced to remove large strength.
Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev and Chief of Staff P. P. Lebedev.
Even more important were the uprisings and partisan struggle in the rear of the Kolchak armies in the second half of 1919, carried out in accordance with the decisions of the II Conference of Underground Party Organizations in Siberia and under the leadership of the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party. In turn, the Sibburo of the Central Committee of the party coordinated its activities with the plans of the command of the eastern front, and later on the 5th army. On July 19, the Central Committee of the Party adopted a special resolution on the Siberian partisan detachments. This resolution proposed that the disparate detachments unite, move to a centralized command, and establish closer ties with underground party organizations. The workers of the eastern front were asked to establish close contact with the partisans, to coordinate the actions of the Red Army with the actions of the partisans.
This decision played decisive role in the deployment and activation of the partisan movement in Siberia. AT Western Siberia along the Altai railway, detachments of Mamontov (in the Slavgorod district) and Gromov (in the Kamensky district) operated, with 3-4 thousand fighters each. Altai partisans played a huge role in the capture of Barnaul and Semipalatinsk.
In the Yenisei province, outstanding assistance was provided to units of the Red Army partisan detachments tt. V. G. Yakovenko, P. E. Shchetinkina and A. D. Kravchenko. The Cheremkhovo workers who rebelled on December 19, the Minyar, Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk workers, the railroad workers - all of them, by their selfless struggle for the power of the soviets, hastened the liquidation of Kolchakism.
It was precisely this support of the Ural and Siberian workers and peasants, more than anything else, that made it possible, in the final analysis, after the final defeat of Kolchak, to withdraw part of the troops of the eastern front and transfer them to the southern. This could have been made all the easier since, with the exit to Siberia, the eastern front was reduced in length from north to south to 400 kilometers, and the farther, the more - compared to 1,200 kilometers by the beginning of our counterattack.
In the event of the suspension of the Red Army's offensive against Kolchak, as Trotsky suggested, Kolchak would be able to recover, he would be able to drown the partisan movement in blood and move on Moscow with renewed vigor.
Proceeding from this, the Central Committee rejected the plan - Trotsky as a plan that threatened Soviet Russia with the gravest consequences, and removed Trotsky himself from participating in the affairs of the eastern front. At the same time, the Central Committee replaced the supporter of Trotsky's plan - the then commander-in-chief Vatsetis - with the new commander-in-chief S. S. Kamenev and demanded the continuation of the offensive against Kolchak. The rout of Kolchak that followed soon after fully confirmed the correctness of the line of the Central Committee of the Party, the correctness of Lenin's demands.
In the struggle for the Urals in the Ufa, Zlatoust and Chelyabinsk operations, as well as in previous operations and battles, the armies of the eastern front showed exceptional stamina and heroism. Communists, commanders from junior to commanders of divisions and armies, inspired tired fighters with their personal example.
In the battles for Ufa, when crossing the Belaya River, there was such a case. The Ivanovo-Voznesensky regiment crossed to the enemy shore, pushed the whites back, but, having shot all the cartridges, was forced to gain a foothold in anticipation of reinforcements. The enemy took advantage of this. “And so,” says a participant in this battle, the late proletarian writer Dm. Furmanov, “when, instead of demonstrative attacks, the enemy launched a real broad offensive, the chains trembled, the soldiers could not stand it, they backed away. The commander and commissar stop the soldiers. They jump along the flanks, shout in order to stop the retreating, they quickly and quickly explain that there is nowhere to run anyway - behind the river, it is impossible to transport, that you need to get up, gain a foothold, you need to accept the attack. ", they jumped to the ground. This is Frunze, with him the head of the political department of the army Trallin, several close people ... He ran forward with a rifle: "Hurray! Hurrah! Comrades, forward!"
All those who were close recognized him. With the speed of lightning, the news rushed through the chains. The fighters were seized with enthusiasm, they rushed forward with fury. The moment was exceptional. Rarely, rarely, they fired, there were few cartridges, they rushed with bayonets to the avalanches of the advancing enemy. And the strength of the heroic upsurge is so great that now the enemy’s chains have trembled, they turned, they ran ... The turning point was made, the situation was restored " (Dm. Furmanov; Chapaev).
In the battle near Ufa, the 25th, now Chapaevskaya, division fought selflessly with its glorious commander in front. It was here, in the region of Krasny Yar - the village of Turbasly, that Kolchak’s shock officer and cadet units conducted a “psychic attack” on the Chapaevites from June 7 to 9, the same attack that is shown with such exciting skill in the film “Chapaev”.
From these battles, the division emerged victorious. Shortly after the capture of Ufa, the 25th division was transferred to the southern Urals and here, in the battle near Lbischensk, on September 5, Chapaev died (drowned in the Ural River). One of the reasons for the success of the White Cossacks was the poorly organized guarding of the headquarters of the Chapaev division.
In many battles, the direct assistance of the workers who rebelled in the rear of the Whites, or the performances of partisans, ensured the success of the Red Army. For example, “the battle for Chelyabinsk lasted several days and cost us 1,500 killed and wounded. The city changed hands. At the most critical moment, the Chelyabinsk workers came to the rescue, who, in the amount of four hundred, got involved in the fight. The appearance of these people in work blouses with rifles in their hands aroused great enthusiasm among the Red Army. It was important not that 400 new fighters came, but those that the Red Army felt with all their being that the people were with them. And despite the fact that there were fewer of us and that there were so few cartridges that we had to go with hostility to the enemy more than once without a single charge, the moral superiority decided the matter ”(from the memoirs of a participant).
The heroism of the Red Army soldiers, workers and peasants, led by the Bolshevik Party led by Lenin, ensured the victory of the Red Army in the east. Kolchak was defeated, the Urals were liberated from the Whites. The Red armies victoriously moved across the Siberian steppes. The first combined campaign of the Entente failed.
V. I. CHAPAEV
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Home strike force interventionists and White Guards in the spring of 1919 was the army reorganized and equipped with the latest weapons by the Western powers Kolchak.
Kolchak managed to forcibly mobilize a significant part of the middle peasantry into their troops. In March 1919, the troops Kolchak they took Ufa and launched an offensive. It was supported by kulak revolts in the rear of the Red Army. The number of Kolchak's troops significantly exceeded the number of troops of the Eastern Front of the Red Army. In addition, the Soviet troops were exhausted by long and heavy battles in the winter of 1918/19. During March - April, the Kolchak troops captured the basins of the Belaya and Kama rivers. Simultaneously with the offensive of Kolchak's army, the offensive of other white armies was supposed (Denikin - from the south, Miller - from the north, Yudenich - from the north-west, and the troops of bourgeois-landlord Poland - from the west). Strategic and tactical plans for combat operations were developed and carried out by the military command of the White Guards under the control of French and British advisers.
In the spring of 1919, temporary setbacks befell the Red Army on the Southern Front. The White Guard army of Denikin captured the North Caucasus, the Kuban, almost the entire Don region and part of the Donbass. Denikin's men sought to unite on the Volga (near Saratov) with Kolchak's troops.
In the spring of 1919, units of the Red Army, under the onslaught of superior forces of the interventionists and the White Guards, left the Baltic states and Belarus.
For guard Soviet Republic huge material resources and human reserves were required. The Central Committee of the RCP (b) and V.I. Lenin at that time considered Kolchak's troops the main danger to the Soviet state. A program of measures was developed to organize the defeat of the interventionists and the White Guards on the Eastern Front, set out in the “Theses of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in connection with the situation on the Eastern Front”, written by V. I. Lenin in April 1919. revolutionary energy, and Kolchak will be quickly defeated. The Volga, the Urals, and Siberia can and must be defended and recaptured,” the theses emphasized (V. I. Lenin, Poli. sobr. soch., vol. 38, p. 274). Across the country, communists, Komsomol members, and workers were mobilized. The best party workers were sent to the front. A large number of the most organized and class-conscious workers were sent to the Red Army, Petrograd and other big cities and industrial centers of the Soviet state. The production of weapons and uniforms needed by the front increased.
The labor heroism of the working class was clearly manifested in the communist subbotniks. On April 12, 1919, the railway workers of the Moscow-Sorting depot of the Kazan Railway, on the initiative of the Communists, held the first communist subbotnik. Working for free during the night, they repaired three locomotives intended to send military trains to the Eastern Front. The example of the railway workers was followed by the workers of factories and factories in Moscow, Petrograd, Tver and other cities. V. I. Lenin called the revolutionary initiative of the workers a great initiative and pointed out that it was a manifestation of the communist attitude to work.
The Soviet military command decided to stop Kolchak's offensive by delivering the main blow by the forces of the Southern Group of Forces of the Eastern Front. The command of the group was assigned to M.V. Frunze. Due to the fact that Kolchak's troops wedged in the center of the Eastern Front and the location of the Soviet troops, M.V. Frunze decided to launch a counterattack from the south to the flank of the main forces Kolchak.
On April 28, 1919, the Southern Group of Forces of the Eastern Front launched a counteroffensive. After stubborn battles, Soviet troops captured Buguruslan, Bugulma, and Belebey. In early June, after fierce fighting, in which the troops of the 25th Infantry Division under the command of V.I. Chapaev distinguished themselves, the Belaya River was forced and Ufa was liberated. As a result of the successful actions of the Southern Group, the offensive of the Soviet search began along the entire Eastern Front. The White Guard armies retreated, suffering heavy losses. in the rear Kolchak partisan detachments and underground rebel organizations were active. Mass uprisings of the working people of the Urals and Siberia began against the interventionists and the White Guards.
During the successful offensive of the Red Army on the Eastern Front, Trotsky and Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis gave the order to stop the offensive. However, at the request of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), this order was canceled and the Eastern Front was given a directive to continue a decisive offensive until the final defeat of Kolchak. Fulfilling this directive, the troops of the front liberated the Urals in July and began the liberation of Siberia.
KOLCHAK OFFENSIVE of 1919, the strategic offensive operation of the Kolchak armies, carried out March 4 - May 19, with the aim of defeating the Soviet troops of the Eastern Front, linking up with other white armies in the north and south of Russia and creating a united front against the RSFSR. By the beginning of spring 1919, Soviet troops (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th armies; Volga military flotilla - a total of 95 thousand bayonets, 9 thousand sabers, 362 guns, about 1.9 thousand machine guns, 9 armored trains, about 30 aircraft, 38 ships and vessels) of the Eastern Front (commander S. S. Kamenev, since May 5 A. A. Samoilo) reached the line of Lbischensk, Aktyubinsk, Orsk, east of Ufa, Okhansk and further north. They were opposed by the troops of Admiral A.V. Kolchak, which included the Siberian and Western armies, the Kama military flotilla, as well as the Cossack Separate Orenburg and Ural armies that were under his operational subordination (a total of 100-120 thousand bayonets, about 26 thousand sabers, 211 guns, 1 3 thousand machine guns, 5 armored trains, 12 armored vehicles, 15 aircraft, over 40 ships and vessels). On March 4-6, they went on the offensive, inflicting the main blows on the Ufa-Samara (Western Army) and Izhevsk-Kazan (Siberian Army) directions. Having inflicted a number of defeats Soviet troops, the Siberian army at the end of April reached the approaches to Yelabuga and Glazov, and the advanced units of the Western Army were 100-120 km from Samara and Kazan. The Cossacks fought for Orenburg and Uralsk. The center of the Eastern Front was broken through, a gap about 200 km wide formed between the Soviet 2nd and 5th armies, where the group of Kolchak troops rushed. The further advance of Kolchak's armies and the retreat of units of the Red Army across the Volga inevitably led to the connection of Kolchak's troops with units of the All-Union Socialist Republic and created a threat to the central regions of Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, the troops of the Eastern Front, having withstood the blow of the enemy, retained their combat effectiveness, gained time to concentrate reserves and prepare a counteroffensive. At the same time, they stepped up operations against the Western Army. A number of private counterattacks by the Soviet troops (on the Salmysh and Dema rivers, in the Buzuluk region) led to the defeat of several Kolchak formations and created the conditions for a counteroffensive. On April 28, the Southern Army Group (M.V. Frunze) of the Eastern Front launched a counterattack on the left flank of the Western Army and defeated it. The counterattack marked the beginning of the defeat of Kolchak's troops (see Counteroffensive of the Eastern Front 1919). The Siberian army at that time continued the offensive and by mid-May its units reached the Vyatka and Kilmez rivers. However, the retreat of the Western Army forced the Siberian Army to first weaken its onslaught, and on May 19 to completely stop the offensive.
Despite the fact that during the Kolchak offensive, parts of the Western and Siberian armies inflicted a number of defeats on the Soviet troops, threw them back to a depth of more than 400 km to the west and reached the approaches to the Volga, the main task was to connect with parts of the white armies operating in the north and south European part of Russia - was not implemented.
Lit .: Eikhe G. Kh. Kolchak's Ufa adventure (March - April 1919). M., 1960. See also the literature under the article Kolchak's army.
