4 shock army 1 Baltic front. Liberation of cities. heroes of the breakthrough near Nevel

- (UdA) military association of the Red Army, consisting of armed forces USSR, during the Great Patriotic War. They were part of a number of fronts and were intended to defeat enemy groupings in the most important (main) directions, were ... ... Wikipedia

shock army- IMPACT ARMY. Created from Nov. 1941. Intended to defeat the prka group on the most important direction front actions. To con. dec. 1942 were created. 5 U.A., 3 of them were in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (1st, 3rd and 5th) and one each - on ... ...

Type: combined arms Type of troops: land Numbers ... Wikipedia

This term has other meanings, see 1st army. 1st shock army (1 Ud.A) Type: shock army ... Wikipedia

3UA Emblem of the Armed Forces Years of existence converted from 60A, December 25, 1941 Country ... Wikipedia

This term has other meanings, see 5th army. 5th shock army 5UA Emblem of the Armed Forces Years of existence transformed from December 9, 1942 December 1946 ... Wikipedia

4th shock army- FOURTH STRIKE ARMY, formed in Dec. 1941 to the North. Zap. fr. (by converting 27th A). As of 1 Jan. 1942, the army included 249 I, 332 I, 334 I, 358 I and 360 I sd, 21 I sbr, a number of tanks., ski, art. and other parts. At first, the army defended the line ... ... Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Encyclopedia

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Books

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  • First shock, G. I. Berdnikov. Military history essay on combat way, military skill of the 1st shock army and the years of the Great Patriotic War. The army marched with battles from Moscow to the Baltic states. The book is intended for the general public…

25.12.1941 - 09.05.1945

The army was formed on December 25, 1941 by reorganizing the 27th Army as part of the Northwestern Front. The army defended the frontier along the eastern shore of lakes Velye, Seliger.

From January 9 to February 6, 1942, she took part in the Toropetsko-Kholmskaya offensive operation. January 22, 1942 was reassigned to the Kalinin Front, from October 20, 1943 as part of the 1st Baltic Front.

From June 29 to July 4, 1944, the army participated in the Nevelsk-Gorodok and Polotsk offensive operations. In the second half of 1944, the army troops were fighting as part of the 2nd Baltic Front - from July 4 and the 1st Baltic Front - from August 8.

Parts of the army took part in the Rezhitsko-Dvina, Riga and Memel offensive operations, in the blockade of the enemy grouping on the Courland Peninsula.

On February 9, 1945, the army was reassigned to the 2nd Baltic Front, and on April 1, it was included in the Leningrad Front.

Army commanders:

  • Colonel General Eremenko Andrei IvanovichDecember 1941 to February 1942
  • Lieutenant General Filipp Ivanovich Golikov February to March 1942
  • Lieutenant General Kurasov Vladimir Vasilyevich March 1942 to April 1943
  • Major General Seleznev Dmitry Mikhailovich April to May 1943
  • Lieutenant General Shvetsov Vasily Ivanovich May to December 1943
  • Lieutenant General Malyshev Pyotr Fedorovich December 1943 to May 9, 1945

Members of the Military Council:

  • Brigadier Commissar Rudakov Mikhail Vasilyevich December 1941 to November 1942
  • Major General Tevchenkov Alexander Nikolaevich November 1942 to April 1943
  • Major General Belik Trofim Yakovlevich April 1943 to May 9, 1945

Compound:

  • 6th Railway Brigade
  • 40th Army Penal Company
  • 154th field evacuation point to December 1944
  • 169th field evacuation point from December 1944

Composition of the army

from June 1944

Shooting, airborne troops and cavalry

  • 1st Rifle Corps - from January to February 1945
  • 14th Rifle Corps - from August to February 1944
    • - since January 1945
    • 158th Rifle Division - from December 1944 to January 1945
    • 239th rifle division - from August 1944 to January 1945
    • 251st Rifle Division - November 1944
    • 311th Rifle Division - from August to November 1944
    • 378th Rifle Division - from July 1944 to January 1945
  • 19th Rifle Corps - from January to May 1945
    • 70th Rifle Division
    • 344th Rifle Division
  • 22nd Guards rifle corps - from August to September 1944
    • 51st Rifle Division
  • 60th Rifle Corps - for June 1944 to July, from November to December 1944
    • 119th Rifle Division - for June to July 1944
    • 216th Rifle Division - from November to December 1944
    • 311th Rifle Division - from November to December 1944
    • 332nd Rifle Division - for June to July 1944
    • 334th Rifle Division - from November to December 1944
    • 101st Rifle Brigade - for June to July 1944
  • 83rd Rifle Corps - for June to January 18, 1944
    • 51st Rifle Division - for June to July 1944
    • 119th Rifle Division - from June to January 18, 1945
    • 158th Rifle Division - from September to October 1944
    • 239th Rifle Division - January to January 18 1945
    • 332nd Rifle Division - from July 1944 to January 18 1945
    • 357th Rifle Division - for June to July 1944
    • 360th Rifle Division - for June to January 18 1945
  • 84th Rifle Corps - from October 1944 to February, from April 17, 1945
    • 47th Rifle Division - from December 1944 to January 1945
    • 158th Rifle Division - from October to December 1944
    • 191st Rifle Division - from November to December 1944
    • 251st Rifle Division - from October 13 to December 2, 1944
    • 270th Rifle Division - since April 17, 1945
    • 332nd Rifle Division - from January to February 1945
  • 92nd Rifle Corps - from February 1945
    • 156th Rifle Division - since January 1945
    • 179th Rifle Division - from February 1945
    • 257th Rifle Division - since March 5, 1945
  • 100th Rifle Corps - from July to September 1944
    • 21st Guards rifle division
    • 28th Rifle Division
    • 200th Rifle Division
  • 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division - from July 1944 to August, from February to March 1945
  • 32nd Rifle Division - from May 1945
  • 101st Rifle Brigade - from July to August 1944
  • 155th fortified area - from July to September 1944

RVGK artillery, army and corps artillery

  • 21st breakthrough artillery division - from January to February 1945
    • 64th Heavy Cannon Artillery Brigade
    • 55th howitzer artillery brigade
    • 94th Heavy Howitzer Artillery Brigade
    • 103rd howitzer artillery brigade of high power
    • 25th Mortar Brigade
  • 8th Cannon Artillery Division - from January to February 1945
    • 26th Guards cannon artillery brigade - since January 1945
    • 28th Guards cannon artillery brigade - from September 1944 to October, from January 1945
  • 138th Cannon Artillery Brigade - June 1944
  • 93rd Heavy Howitzer Artillery Brigade - from January to February 1945
  • 1224th howitzer artillery brigade - from January to February 1945
  • 64th howitzer artillery regiment - for June 1944 to July, from February to March 1945
  • 376th howitzer artillery regiment - from February to March 1945
  • 283rd howitzer artillery regiment - for June to July 1944
  • 480th howitzer artillery regiment - for June to July 1944
  • 45th anti-tank artillery regiment - from November 1944 to January 1945
  • 587th anti-tank artillery regiment - June 1944
  • 20th Mortar Brigade - from January to February 1945
    • 20th breakthrough artillery division
  • 31st Mortar Brigade - from September 1944 to October, from November to February 1945
  • 408th Mortar Regiment - from September to March 1944
  • 556th Mortar Regiment - June 1944
  • 2nd Guards rocket artillery mortar division - from January to February 1945
    • 17th Guards rocket artillery mortar brigade
    • 20th Guards rocket artillery mortar brigade
    • 26th Guards rocket artillery mortar brigade
  • 2nd Guards rocket artillery mortar regiment - from January to February 1945
  • 22nd Guards rocket artillery mortar regiment - from February to May 1945
  • 34th Guards rocket artillery mortar regiment - from January to February 1945
  • 39th Guards. rocket artillery mortar regiment - from October to November 1944
  • 49th Guards. rocket artillery mortar regiment - from January to February 1945
  • 72nd Guards. rocket artillery mortar regiment - from August to September 1944
  • 99th Guards. rocket artillery mortar regiment - for June to August 1944
  • 7th Separate Aeronautical Battalion of Artillery Observation Balloons - from July to August 1944
  • 2nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division - from January to March 1945
    • 1069th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
    • 1086th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
    • 1113th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
    • 1117th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
  • 42nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division - from August to September 1944
    • 620th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
    • 709th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
    • 714th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
    • 729th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
  • 46th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division
    • 609th anti-aircraft artillery regiment - for June to July 1944
    • 617th anti-aircraft artillery regiment - for June 1944 to August, from November to February 1945
    • 618th anti-aircraft artillery regiment - for June 1944 to July, from November to February 1945
    • 717th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment - for June 1944 to July, from November to February 1945
  • 73rd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division - from March 1945
    • 205th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
    • 402nd anti-aircraft artillery regiment
    • 430th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
    • 442nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment
  • 1624th anti-aircraft artillery regiment - June 1944
  • 1714th anti-aircraft artillery regiment - from October to November 1944
  • 622nd anti-aircraft artillery battalion - from July to August 1944

Armored and mechanized troops

  • 3rd Guards mechanized corps - from January to February 1945
    • 9th Guards mechanized brigade
    • 35th Guards. tank brigade
    • 380th Guards. heavy self-propelled artillery regiment
    • 1823rd self-propelled artillery regiment
    • 129th Mortar Regiment
    • 334th Guards. rocket artillery mortar battalion
    • 743rd separate anti-tank artillery battalion
    • 1705th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment
    • 1st Guards motorcycle battalion
  • 34th Guards tank brigade - from January to February 1945
  • 39th Guards tank brigade - from September 1944 to October, from January to February 1945
  • 105th Separate Tank Regiment - from August to October 1944
  • 47th Separate Flamethrower Tank Regiment - January to February 1945
  • 119th Engineer Separate Tank Regiment - January to February 1945
    • 10th Assault Engineer Brigade
  • 171st separate tank battalion - for June to September 1944
  • 333rd Guards. heavy self-propelled artillery regiment - from September to February 1944
  • 335th Guards. heavy self-propelled artillery regiment - from November to December 1944
  • 336th Guards. heavy self-propelled artillery regiment - from January to February 1945
  • 346th Guards. heavy self-propelled artillery regiment - from January to February 1945
  • 957th self-propelled artillery regiment - from October to February 1944
  • 999th self-propelled artillery regiment - from August to October 1944
  • 1022nd self-propelled artillery regiment - from November to February 1944
  • 1051st self-propelled artillery regiment - from January to February 1945
  • 1056th self-propelled artillery regiment - from February to March 1945
  • 1297th self-propelled artillery regiment - from August to September 1944
  • 1403rd self-propelled artillery regiment - from August to September 1944
  • 1476th self-propelled artillery regiment - from August to September 1944
  • 272nd Separate Motorized Special Purpose Battalion - from February 1945
  • 285th separate motorized battalion OSNAZ - from April 1944
  • 44th separate division of armored trains - from February 1945
  • 60th separate division of armored trains - for June to October 1944

Engineering Troops

  • 2nd Engineer Brigade - from July 1944
  • 10th Assault Engineer Brigade - from January to February 1945
  • 21st Motorized Assault Engineer Brigade of the RGK - from December to February 1945
    • 229th Motorized Assault Engineer Battalion - from February to March 1945
  • 106th motorized pontoon bridge battalion - from December 1944 to February, from May 1945

Flamethrower parts

  • 12th Separate Flamethrower Battalion - June 1944
  • 35th Separate Flamethrower Battalion - from January to February 1945
  • 45th Separate Flamethrower Battalion - from January to March 1945

PERSONNEL

Total: 6

Officers:

  • Art. lieutenant Andreev Vasily Andreevich, commander of a platoon of junior lieutenant courses 1909 - 08/01/1944
  • Captain Bezizvestny Ivan Yegorovich, was at the disposal of the Military Council 1914 - 08/02/1944
  • Air Force Major Dokolin Pavel Pavlovich, head of the field communications department 1904 - 10/19/1944
  • military major general Logadyuk Yakov Osipovich, head of the signal troops 1898 - 07/27/1944
  • Captain Sedykh Stepan Grigorievich, commandant of the rear department 1908 - 04/12/1945

Ordinary composition:

  • Evsin Vasily Mikhailovich, served in the quartermaster department of the headquarters 1899 - went missing

If your family archive contains photographs of your relative and you send his biography, this will give us the opportunity to perpetuate the memory of a soldier, a participant in the hostilities of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, on the territory of the Republic of Latvia.

The feat that the soldiers performed during the defense and liberation of the Republic of Latvia led to Our Victory, and the memory of the people who gave their lives for this will not be forgotten.

On December 13, an offensive began on the right flank of the Soviet troops standing on the border of Belarus - the Gorodok offensive operation of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of I.Kh. Bagramyan.

“On the morning of December 13,” recalls the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, Marshal Soviet Union THEM. Bagromyan, - on the day of our offensive, it got warmer again, the sky was overcast, visibility deteriorated to critical, and the commander of the 3rd Air Army, Lieutenant General of Aviation M.P. Papivin reported to me that it would be very difficult to use aviation. Thus, the task of artillery became more complicated ... The artillery preparation of the front line, which began at 9.00, lasted two hours, but with interruptions, because there was not enough ammunition. Then the fire was moved into the depths of the defense. At the same time, the rifle units went on the attack.

To stop the offensive of the Soviet troops, the Nazi command sent new reinforcements near Vitebsk - two infantry divisions. Relying on the defensive lines with which Gorodok was fortified, the enemy put up stubborn resistance. Three lines of defense were created on the outskirts of the city.

In the direction of the operation, the Soviet command was waiting for frosts that could facilitate the advancement of tanks and other equipment through the wetlands. However, the tankers of the 5th tank corps, operating here as part of the 1st Baltic Front, sought other ways to overcome the swamps. So, if in the troops of Rokossovsky the infantrymen made peculiar “wet-shoes” skis, then the tankers of the 5th shopping mall at Bagramyan mounted special additional plates on the tracks, increasing their width by about 1.5 times. Fascines, logs, additional cables were busy on the tanks.

The enemy kept 1 tank division and 8 infantry divisions on the Gorodok ledge, and also had 120 tanks and 800 guns and mortars here. The 5th Panzer Corps already had experience in fighting in this direction, and not entirely successful. In November 1943, the 24th brigade of the corps, fighting a night battle (one of the new tactics of Soviet tankers), broke into Gorodok. However, it was not possible to consolidate and develop success then.

On December 13, the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Army (which included the 5th Tank Corps) began the Gorodok offensive operation. The 4th Army, unlike the 11th Guards, was able to break through the enemy's main line of defense. However, the pace soon slowed down. Soviet troops 25 enemy batteries came under fire, and the actions of the tanks were complicated by the beginning of the thaw. But on December 14, on the right flank of the 11th Guards Army, the 1st Tank Corps was brought into battle. On December 16, he went to the Bychikha station, where he joined up with the 5th Panzer Corps. Thus, the encirclement of the 4 infantry divisions of the enemy was completed. Skillfully restrained the pressure of enemy tanks, trying to break through the encirclement, the 41st Tank Brigade of Colonel P.I. Korchagin 5th shopping mall. The tankers of the 70th Tank Brigade showed particular bravery in the battle for the station. Tank junior lieutenant V.V. Martens, for example, were rammed by an enemy train trying to leave the station.

Commander of the 1st Baltic Front I.Kh. Bagromyan wrote: “Despite the unsatisfactory weather conditions, which completely ruled out the actions of our aviation, the 11th Guards, 4th shock and 43rd armies broke through the German defenses on a 15-kilometer front and on December 16 advanced 25 km deep into the enemy’s defenses. The 1st and 5th tank corps (commanded by generals V.V. Butikov, M.G. Sakhno), who were put into battle, encircled units of the enemy’s 4th infantry division in the area of ​​Bychikha station, which was defeated. Until December 20 Soviet troops liberated over 500 settlements.

Army General I.Kh. Bagromyan pointed out in his memoirs the failures during the offensive operation. So he noted: “Nevertheless, we did not achieve the full expected success. The town was not taken, our plan to encircle the main enemy forces defending on its approaches was in jeopardy. The enemy skillfully maneuvered and stubbornly resisted. The matter was also complicated the need to withdraw the 1st Panzer Corps from the battle. Unfortunately, shortcomings in command and control were also revealed. I had to go to the command post of K. N. Galitsky and help him on the spot. "

Marshal Baghramyan recalls: “The decisive battle for Gorodok began on December 23, 1943. Before the attack, reconnaissance was carried out. It revealed the most dangerous pockets of German resistance. At 11.00 on December 23, artillery preparation began. and the 43rd Army. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting broke out in the trenches and passages of the formations. The battle lasted 36 hours, was fought not only during the day, but also at night ".

The attack was not easy, the Nazis clung to the city, which was an important strategic railway junction. THEM. Baghramyan recalled: “The blow of the guardsmen was furious and unstoppable. Having overcome the riverbed on the ice, they broke into the northern outskirts of the city. The battalion of senior lieutenant S. Ternavsky was the first to do this. The fighters of the battalion of senior lieutenant F. Merkulova He and his political officer captain Rudnev were inseparably in the ranks of the attackers, inspiring them by personal example.

Having burst into the city, both of these units fought assertively and boldly: breaking through to the flanks and rear of the strongholds, they fired continuous mortar and machine-gun fire at them. Suffering heavy losses and fearing isolation and encirclement, the fascist garrisons began to flee. Seeing this and not having free reserves, the enemy command removed part of the forces from the eastern front of the city bypass. This was immediately used by Major General A.I. Maksimov, commander of the 11th Guards Division. He put machine gunners on several tanks attached to him and threw them on the southeastern outskirts of the city. In a short but fierce battle, tankers and assault riflemen knocked out the Nazis, who had settled in stone houses turned into pillboxes.

On the evening of December 24, Moscow saluted the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, who stormed the city and the large railway station Gorodok. In total, during the Gorodok operation, 1220 settlements were liberated, more than 65,000 were destroyed and 3.3 thousand Nazis were taken prisoner.

December 24 Gorodok was taken. In the battles near Gorodok, the 5th TC suffered heavy losses. So, in the 24th brigade, only 12 tanks remained in service. The experience of the Gorodok battles also showed that in the conditions of a swampy and wooded area, a timely, quickly and secretly performed maneuver was of exceptional importance. And what is also very important - continuous artillery escort of combat vehicles throughout the entire depth of their operations to suppress enemy defenses. Therefore, here, as a rule, each tank battalion was given a battery, and sometimes 2 self-propelled gun batteries. This made it possible to move forward faster, carry out a wide maneuver, unexpectedly deliver frontal and flank attacks on the enemy, and capture large settlements.

During the Gorodok operation, in the most difficult terrain and weather conditions, overcoming the exceptionally stubborn resistance of the Germans, the troops of the front liberated over 1,220 settlements, destroyed over 65,000 enemy soldiers and officers, captured 3,300 Nazis, and captured a lot of military equipment and other military property.

The main executor of the Gorodok operation I.Kh. Bagromyan recalled: “The Gorodok operation, which was not large in scale, has been preserved in my memory as one of the most difficult among those carried out under my leadership during the last war. This is due not only to the fact that it was the first one I carried out as a front commander. There were many purely objective reasons that determined its complexity. Firstly, the operation was prepared and carried out in exceptionally difficult conditions against large enemy forces, with purely German scrupulousness, fortified on terrain advantageous for defense, which dominated the initial position of our troops ".

Thus, it is obvious that the offensive operations in the autumn - December 1943 were of great importance both militarily and politically.

The Nazis pinned great hopes on the autumn thaw and impassability in this wooded and swampy area. The fascist generals, not without reason, believed that in the mud and slush, the Soviet troops would not be able to overcome the defenses and successfully advance along broken dirt roads.

But, despite their calculations, the offensive of the Red Army began in October and was carried out on a wide front until the end of 1943.

Home Encyclopedia History of wars Liberation of Belarus Details

I. Offensive of the Kalinin (1st Baltic) Front in the Nevelsk, Gorodok and Vitebsk directions

In July 1943, having repelled enemy attacks in the area of ​​the Kursk salient, the Soviet Armed Forces launched large-scale offensive operations. In accordance with the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the main blow in the summer-autumn campaign was dealt in the south-western direction in order to liberate the Donbass and the richest agricultural regions of the Left-Bank Ukraine, access to the Dnieper and capture bridgeheads on its right bank. At the same time, an offensive began in the western direction. Thus, the prerequisites were created for the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Belarus and the advance of the Red Army to the borders East Prussia and Poland.

Assessing the future prospects for armed struggle, the General Staff ground forces Germany, not without reason, believed that a strike by the Soviet fronts in the western direction could lead to serious consequences. In this regard, the Department of Foreign Armies of the East, considering the situation in the zone of the Army Group Center, emphasized in its conclusions that after the capture of Smolensk, "new operational opportunities will open up before the command of the Red Army ...". Using them, the Soviet troops will seek to "break through as far as possible to the west and provide ... profitable starting areas for subsequent operations against the Minsk region ...".

Therefore, even before the end of the summer of 1943, the enemy began to prepare numerous echeloned defensive lines and lines. On August 11, A. Hitler ordered the immediate construction of a defensive line of strategic importance, the so-called Eastern Wall, which was supposed to run from the Kerch Peninsula along the Molochnaya, Dnieper and Sozh rivers to Gomel, further east of Orsha, Vitebsk, Nevel, Pskov and north Lake Peipsi along the river Narva. In pursuance of the Fuhrer's instructions, the German troops launched intensive work to create long-term and field fortifications, focusing on road junctions and river banks, settlements and tank-hazardous areas.

In this situation, the Kalinin, Western and Bryansk fronts, having launched the Smolensk (August 7 - October 2) and Bryansk (August 17 - October 3) offensive operations in August, overcame the stubborn resistance of Army Group Center by the beginning of the third decade of September and went north -eastern and eastern borders of Belarus. At the same time, the armies of the Central Front created favorable conditions for the liberation of the southeastern regions of the republic. The results achieved in the western direction, as well as intelligence reports that the enemy suffered heavy losses here, was demoralized and had no reserves, prompted the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to decide to continue the offensive to a greater depth in order to capture Riga, Vilna (Vilnius. - Approx. ed.) and Minsk. But first it was supposed to defeat the groupings of German troops in Eastern Belarus. To do this, the troops of the Kalinin Front had to strike in the Vitebsk-Polotsk direction in order to cover Army Group Center from the north. From the south, advancing to Gomel and Bobruisk, it was to be captured by the Central Front. The Western Front received the task of operating in the Orsha and Mogilev directions.

It should be said that the Headquarters did not have sufficient grounds for optimistic forecasts and setting such decisive tasks for the fronts. They did not have much superiority over the enemy: in terms of people only 1.1 times, tanks - 2 times, guns and mortars - 1.8 times. Only on aircraft it was tangible - 3.7 times. In addition, during the previous long offensive, formations and units suffered heavy losses, lacked people, equipment, ammunition, fuel, food and other materiel. The situation was aggravated by the wooded and swampy terrain, which made it difficult to maneuver and supply the troops, and the coming autumn thaw. All this had a negative impact on the subsequent hostilities of the Kalinin (1st Baltic), Western and Central (Belarusian) fronts.

Back in August 1943, long before the completion of the Smolensk offensive operation, the commander of the troops of the Kalinin Front, General of the Army A.I. Eremenko received from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command the task of developing a preliminary plan for an offensive in the Vitebsk-Polotsk direction. At the same time, it was planned to strike another blow on the right wing of the front with the aim of capturing the city of Nevel. Such actions made it possible to cut enemy communications on the adjacent wings of the North and Center Army Groups, disrupt the interaction between them and thereby isolate the German troops in Belarus from the receipt of reserves.

However, the difficult situation prevailing at that time in the western direction did not allow the implementation of these plans in the shortest possible time. The command of the Kalinin Front was able to return to them only at the end of September, when they began preparing the Nevelsk offensive operation (it was carried out with the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Belarus. - Approx. Aut.). In accordance with the plan of Army General A.I. Eremenko, the main role in it was assigned to the 3rd shock army of Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky. She was supposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of Nevel, capture the city, and then gain a foothold to the north and west of it in the inter-lake defile zone. Another blow, in the direction of Gorodok, was inflicted by the 4th shock army of Major General V.I. Shvetsov.

By October 1943, the 3rd Shock Army was operating in a 105 km wide zone. She was opposed by five divisions of the German 2nd airfield and 43rd army corps. Being on the defensive for six months, they created several echeloned defensive lines and lines, equipped with trenches, full profile communication passages, dugouts and wood-and-earth gun emplacements. The forward edge was covered by two lanes of minefields 40-60 m deep each, as well as two rows of barbed wire. The total depth of the first strip reached 6-7 km.

The wooded-marshy, rugged terrain with an abundance of natural barriers also contributed to the creation of a stable defense with relatively small forces. Nevel itself was bordered on all sides by numerous lakes, separated by several defiles no more than 2 km wide. Between the lakes, the enemy dug anti-tank ditches, and on the roads he set mines and reinforced concrete gouges in 5-8 rows. He turned the settlements on the outskirts of the city into centers of resistance. The Nevel garrison consisted of the 343rd security battalion, the construction battalion of the 43rd army corps, rear units and institutions - more than 2 thousand people in total.

The 3rd shock army united five rifle divisions, three rifle brigades, one tank brigade, seven cannon, howitzer and mortar regiments, an anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery regiment and two field fortified areas. The number of rifle divisions averaged 5-6 thousand, rifle brigades - 3-4 thousand people. It was not realistic to conduct an offensive with such limited forces in the entire strip. Therefore, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky decided to break through the enemy defenses in a narrow area, the width of which was only 4 km. In a short time, in compliance with camouflage measures, in fact, all combat-ready formations, as well as all tanks (54 units) and almost all artillery of the army (814 guns and mortars out of 886) were concentrated to it. In the rest of the zone, two field fortified areas, an army reserve regiment, four barrage detachments and two poorly manned rifle divisions took up the defense.

The operational formation of the army included: the first echelon (28th and 357th rifle divisions); success development echelon (78th tank brigade, 21st guards rifle division, one of the regiments of which was supposed to operate on vehicles, three artillery regiments); reserve (46th Guards Rifle Division, 31st and 100th Rifle Brigades). Such a separation of forces and means was due to the conduct of hostilities in a wooded and swampy area, when maneuver along the line of contact between the parties was extremely difficult, and the need, in connection with this, to continuously increase the force of strike from the depths.

The transition of the main forces to the offensive was preceded by reconnaissance in force, which began at 5 o'clock in the morning on October 6. For its implementation, one rifle company, supported by artillery, was allocated from each of the two divisions of the first echelon. And although the advanced units were unable to capture individual sections of the first trench, their actions made it possible to clarify the enemy's firing points, identify several mortar and artillery batteries, as well as observation posts. At 08:40, the artillery preparation of the attack began, which lasted 1 hour and 35 minutes and ended with a volley of two regiments of rocket artillery. After that, several groups of 6-8 aircraft of the 211th assault aviation division, Colonel P.M. Kuchma struck at the strongholds of German units at the forefront and in tactical depth.

After artillery and aviation strikes, the 357th and 28th rifle divisions of Major General A.L. Kronik and Colonel M.F. Bukshtynovych went on the attack. Within two hours, units of the 28th Rifle Division penetrated the enemy defenses in a 2.5 km wide area and advanced up to 2 km. But the 357th division did not achieve success: its advanced units were stopped in front of barbed wire by heavy fire from tactical reserves transferred by the enemy command. In order to prevent the strengthening of the grouping of German troops in the direction of the emerging success and the slowdown in the pace of the offensive, the army commander decided to enter the success development echelon into the battle. At 12 o'clock, the battalions of the 78th Tank Brigade (Colonel Ya.G. Kochergin) with a landing of machine gunners began to be drawn into the narrow neck in two columns, and behind them - the regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division, whose units moved by car. In each column, in addition to tanks and vehicles, artillery and mortar batteries, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, as well as sappers followed.

At first, the pace of the group's advance was slow due to the presence of wetlands and minefields. In the current situation, a responsible task was assigned to sappers. Under artillery and machine-gun fire, they reconnoitered and cleared the road, moving ahead of the tanks. The battalions of the 59th Guards Rifle Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel N.P. Chebotarev.

Close interaction of tankers with sappers, rifle units and artillery, their decisive collaboration ensured success. By 2 p.m. on October 6, the mobile group overcame the defenses of the German troops and rushed at top speed to Nevel, destroying the retreating carts, artillery and pushing back the surviving small enemy groups to the north and south. Tankers went to the river. Shestikha, forestalled the 2nd airfield division retreating to it in occupying an advantageous defensive line, crossed over serviceable bridges across the river and captured artillery pieces abandoned by the enemy in firing positions.

Already at 4 p.m., tank battalions with a landing of submachine gunners, having defeated the German units on the outskirts of Nevel, entered the city, captured the telegraph, railway station and bridges. They were followed by advanced units of the 59th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division. By the end of October 6, Nevel was cleared of the enemy. Soviet troops destroyed up to 600 of his soldiers and officers, captured about 400 prisoners.

In fact, the 3rd shock army achieved the goal of the operation within one day, moving forward more than 35 km, which, in the conditions of a well-prepared defense in terms of engineering and a wooded and swampy area, was a great success. Not giving the enemy the opportunity to restore the position and control of the troops, the army commander brought the 31st rifle brigade into battle. Destroying the retreating groups of the enemy, by the morning of October 7, she expanded the breakthrough to 10-12 km. By the end of the day, the brigade took possession of the Pechishche line, Lake. Yemenets (south of Nevel). To the north of the city, the 46th Guards Rifle Division, Major General S.I., entered into battle on the morning of October 8, entrenched. Karapetyan.

In an effort to prevent further advance of the 3rd shock army in the north-western direction, the German command began to hastily transfer reserves from other sectors to the threatened direction - the 58th and 122nd infantry divisions from the Volkhov and Staraya Rusa regions, the 281st security division from near Novorzhev. At the same time, large aviation forces were aimed here, which, operating in groups of 20-40 aircraft, began to strike at the battle formations of the Soviet troops.

On the morning of October 8, the enemy brought into battle newly arrived units with a total strength of at least two divisions. He struck the strongest blow west of Nevel at the positions of the 69th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division. Here in the counterattack participated up to infantry regiment with twelve tanks supported by aviation. They managed to get closer to the city on one of the sites. However, the further advance of this grouping was stopped by units of the 47th Guards Artillery Regiment and the 78th Tank Brigade. With their support, the 69th Guards Rifle Regiment restored its lost position. But even after that, the enemy did not give up hope of breaking through to Nevel, continuously attacking for two days, on October 9 and 10.

Moving part of the forces to the defense, the army at the same time tried to develop the offensive. On October 9, the 46th Guards Rifle Division liberated ten settlements and expanded the breakthrough to 20-25 km. The next day, her regiments, having crossed the river. Emenka, occupied the Opukhliki railway station and reached the line of the river. Balazdyn. The 28th and 357th rifle divisions continued to press the enemy, as well as the 185th rifle division and the 153rd army reserve regiment, which delivered an auxiliary strike. However, in all directions, numerical superiority has already passed to the enemy.

On this, the Nevelsk offensive operation ended. In its course, the 3rd shock army inflicted serious damage on the German 263rd infantry and 2nd airfield divisions, which lost more than 7 thousand people killed and wounded. Soviet troops captured more than 400 prisoners, 150 guns and mortars, over 200 machine guns, up to 40 different warehouses, a large amount of small arms, ammunition and other military equipment. At the same time, the losses of the army were relatively small - almost 2 thousand people, of which about 500 were irretrievable. In the 78th tank brigade, out of 54 tanks, only seven were lost.

At the same time, a successful offensive in the Nevel area could not compensate for the failures of the Kalinin Front in the direction of the main attack, in the center and on its left wing, where military operations were carried out with the aim of capturing Vitebsk. The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of October 16 noted on this occasion: “The troops of the Kalinin Front did not fulfill their task - to capture Vitebsk by October 10 - did not fulfill. One of the reasons for this is the lack of organization of the offensive ... It is not carried out by all the forces of the front, more or less simultaneously, but by individual armies in separate sectors, ... which makes it possible for the enemy to maneuver with his own forces and create fists to counter. In the October battles, the front lost 56,474 people killed, wounded and missing. Despite this, he was forced to quickly prepare an offensive in two directions at once - Vitebsk and Gorodok.

After the completion of the Nevelsk offensive operation, the formations of the right wing of the Kalinin Front, until the end of October, repelled the blows of the German troops, which they undertook in order to restore their lost position on the adjacent wings of the North and Center Army Groups. Only at the beginning of November did the 1st Baltic Front (created on October 20, 1943 on the basis of the Kalinin Front) resume the offensive. In the middle of the month, his 4th shock army, in cooperation with the 3rd shock army of the 2nd Baltic Front (created on October 20, 1943 on the basis of the Baltic Front), broke through the enemy’s defenses in a narrow sector west of Nevel and wedged into his location at 45 55 km. However, with the release of the formations of the 4th shock army to the Dretuni area, to the distant approaches to Polotsk, and the 3rd shock army to Pustoshka, their further advance was stopped, as a result of which both armies, numbering up to fifteen divisions, found themselves in a very difficult situation. . They occupied an area stretched for 100 km from north to south and for 55 km from west to east, while the width of the breakthrough area at the base of the wedging was only 9-10 km. In fact, this group fell into a huge "bag" and was under the threat of encirclement. The configuration of the line of contact between the parties and the two-year experience of the war indicated that the enemy was unlikely to miss such an opportunity. This was also evidenced by intelligence data, according to which he was preparing a strike with the aim of destroying Soviet troops in the resulting ledge.

Under such conditions, the commander of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, Colonel-General I.Kh. Bagramyan sought to deprive the German command of the initiative in hostilities and preempt it in going over to the offensive. To do this, he decided to conduct an offensive operation (received the name - "Gorodokskaya") with the aim of encircling and defeating the enemy grouping south of Nevel and in the Gorodok area. The headquarters supported the idea of ​​the Military Council of the front and transferred the 11th Guards Army to its structure, the former commander of the 3rd shock army, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky. According to I.Kh. Bagramyan, this army was supposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of Kudena, Bychikha station, Gorodok, and towards it from the "bag" - the 4th shock army of Major General V.I. Shvetsov in the direction of Bychikha station. As a result, it was supposed to encircle six German divisions, which occupied the defenses in the ledge north of Gorodok, and defeat them. Subsequently, the 11th Guards Army was given the task of capturing Gorodok and attacking Vitebsk, bypassing it from the northwest, and the 4th Shock Army was to assist it, moving in the direction of Shumilino from the north. An offensive by the 43rd Army was planned from the east to Vitebsk.

The 11th Guards Army included four rifle corps (eleven rifle divisions), the 1st Tank Corps (97 tanks and self-propelled guns), the 10th Guards Tank Brigade (46 tanks), the 2nd Guards Heavy Tank Regiment (17 tanks) , two artillery divisions breakthrough, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, three guards mortar brigades M-31, five guards mortar regiments M-13, four cannon, howitzer and mortar regiments, engineering team, three separate engineer battalions. In addition, it was supported by two assault aviation divisions and was covered by front fighter aircraft.

The army was opposed by an enemy grouping consisting of units of the 211th, 129th, 87th infantry, 2nd and 6th airfield divisions. In the operational depth, the German command concentrated the 20th Panzer and 252nd Infantry Divisions. According to intelligence data, in the direction of the upcoming offensive of the Soviet troops, the enemy prepared two lines in the main line of defense. The first consisted of several echeloned trenches equipped with dugouts, communication passages, wood-and-earth firing points and engineering barriers. On the second defensive line there were separate trenches, machine-gun platforms, artillery firing positions. To the east of the Bychikha station, several intermediate lines were created, consisting of separate strongholds located along the highway and railways. A serious advantage of the defending side was the hard-to-reach terrain, saturated with numerous rivers, streams, swamps, most of which did not freeze through until the end of December.

Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky decided to deliver the main blow in the center of the army strip with the forces of the 36th and 16th Guards Rifle Corps. In addition, two auxiliary strikes on the flanks were envisaged: on the right - by the 29th and 5th Guards Rifle Divisions, united under the command of Major General A.S. Ksenofontov; on the left - the 83rd rifle corps. After breaking through the tactical defense zone, it was planned to bring into battle a mobile group - the 1st Tank Corps of Major General V.V. Butkov.

The 4th shock army, which occupied the defense in a wide strip, could only involve two rifle corps (five rifle divisions), the 5th tank corps (91 tanks and self-propelled guns), the 34th guards tank brigade (24 tanks) and 3 th Guards Cavalry Corps, however, significantly weakened in previous battles and numbering about 12 thousand people. She received eight artillery and mortar regiments for reinforcement, including the M-13 regiment, and three separate engineer battalions. An assault aviation division was allocated to support the army.

In accordance with the plan of Major General V.I. Shvetsov, the main blow was delivered from the isthmus between lakes Bernovo and Chernovo in the direction of Bychikha station by the forces of the 2nd Guards Rifle and 5th Tank Corps. Behind them were the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps and the 166th Rifle Division, intended to develop success. The 22nd Guards Rifle Corps and the 34th Guards Tank Brigade acted in the direction of another strike.

Due to the ensuing thaw, the start of the operation was postponed several times. Since dirt roads became impassable, the delivery of ammunition to firing positions was carried out by horse-drawn vehicles, and often by hand. Every day in the 11th Guards Army, up to 2 thousand soldiers were allocated from each division to carry shells, mines and other cargo. This made it possible to accumulate about 1.5 rounds of ammunition for guns and mortars. However, in the 4th shock army, the provision of artillery did not exceed 0.6-0.9 ammunition.

The offensive began on the morning of 13 December. From its first minutes, the weather made its own adjustments to the developed plan. That day it got warmer, the sky was covered with clouds, fog fell on the ground, which almost completely ruled out the use of aviation. This greatly complicated the actions of artillery. In the 11th Guards Army, artillery preparation lasted 2 hours. On targets on the front line, the fire was quite effective, but the artillery and mortar batteries located in the depths of the defense, as well as strong points in the villages, hidden from ground observation, were weakly suppressed. Within 7-10 minutes after the infantry units, supported by tanks, went on the attack, German artillery opened concentrated and barrage fire. Having captured a number of strongholds and trenches in the first position, the Soviet troops were forced to stop.

I had to organize artillery preparation again, and then repeat the attack. It took a lot of time. In addition, the German command pulled up reserves, which put up stubborn resistance. By the end of the day, most of the divisions and regiments had advanced an insignificant distance. For example, the penetration of the 16th Guards Rifle Division (Major General E.V. Ryzhikov) into the enemy defenses was only 400-600 m. Only the 84th Guards Rifle Division, Major General G.B. Petersa broke through the first position, breaking 2 km in a strip 1.5 km wide.

This development of events required Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky, with the permission of the commander of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, to change the plan of operation and begin organizing the entry into battle of the 1st Tank Corps and the 83rd Guards Rifle Division, which is being advanced from the reserve, not where it was envisaged, but in the direction of the emerging success. They received the task of completing the breakthrough of the enemy defenses and reaching the Bychikha station area.

The 4th shock army operated more successfully on the first day of the operation. After a 1.5-hour artillery preparation of the formation of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps, Major General A.P. Beloborodov, with the support of tanks and under the cover of a smoke screen, attacked the enemy and quickly broke through the first position. By the end of the day, the 47th Infantry Division of Colonel G.I. Chernov with the 24th tank brigade of Colonel V.K. Borodavkina moved forward up to 5 km, overcoming the main line of defense. At the same time, the 90th Guards Rifle Division, Colonel V.E. Vlasova, having penetrated to a depth of 3 km, reached the second position. The prerequisites were created for the entry into battle of the 5th tank corps of Major General M.G. Sakhno and the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant General P.S. Oslikovsky.

The relatively successful start of the offensive by the strike force of the 1st Baltic Front caused alarm among the German command. At dawn on December 14, it began to conduct counterattacks against units of the 11th Guards Army, involving up to an infantry battalion with the support of 7-15 tanks from the 20th Guards Army. tank division. Having met their strong opposition, the 16th, 11th and 31st Guards Rifle Divisions, which tried to attack in the center and on the left flank, remained at their former lines. At the same time, they attracted enemy reserves to themselves, which made it possible to develop success on the right flank of the army, in the zone of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, Lieutenant General P.F. Malyshev. Here two armored and one motorized rifle brigade 1st Tank Corps, which, together with the 84th Guards Rifle Division, moved forward 4 km by the middle of the day and cut the Nevel - Gorodok highway.

The further task of the corps was to strike along the highway to the south, in the direction of Gorodok. Fulfilling it, tank subunits met several strongholds of the enemy. Trying to get around them, the combat vehicles hit the swampy soil and got stuck in the marshy ground. It took a long time to pull them out, and the pace of the offensive dropped sharply. In the afternoon, the army commander brought the 83rd Guards Rifle Division into battle on the right flank. By 17 o'clock, its units went to the rear of the German 211th Infantry Division.

On that day, they continued to develop the success achieved the day before by the formation of the 4th shock army. Having broken the resistance of the enemy, the 5th Guards Cavalry and 47th Rifle Divisions reached railway Nevel - Town. Parts of the 90th Guards and 381st (Colonel I.I. Serebryakov) rifle divisions, in cooperation with the 70th tank brigade, were surrounded to an infantry regiment in the large settlement of Vyrovlya. At the same time, the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps, Major General N.B., began an offensive on the left flank of the army. Ibyansky, who overcame 1.5 km in difficult conditions of a wooded and swampy area.

On December 15, both armies, attacking in converging directions, defeated the 211th Infantry Division. The next morning, the 1st Tank Corps and the forward detachment of the 1st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N.A. Kropotin) of the 11th Guards Army and the 5th Tank Corps with advanced units of the 90th Guards Rifle Division of the 4th shock army united in the area of ​​Bychikha. As a result, parts of the German 83rd, 87th, 129th, 252nd Infantry and 2nd Airfield Divisions, as well as six separate special and security battalions, were surrounded. During December 16 and 17, after refusing to lay down their arms and accept the ultimatum of the Soviet command, they were destroyed. Only small scattered groups were able to break through to the west.

In general, during the five-day battles, the strike force of the 1st Baltic Front defeated the enemy in the entire northwestern part of the Gorodok ledge, successfully completing the task of the first stage of the operation. Thus, the neck of the breakthrough south of Nevel was expanded to 30-35 km, which, in turn, led to a significant improvement in the operational position of the 3rd shock army. At the same time, conditions were created for the development of an offensive in the directions of Gorodok and Vitebsk.

In an effort to prevent the strengthening of the Gorodok grouping of the enemy with reserves, Colonel General I.Kh. Bagramyan already on the morning of December 18 set new tasks for the 11th Guards, 4th Shock and 43rd Armies. He still assigned the main role in the second stage of the operation to the 11th Guards Army. She was ordered to take possession of Gorodok, by the end of the next day to reach the line of lakes Losvido and Convenient, and subsequently to liberate Vitebsk.

In accordance with the decision of Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky, the main blow was delivered in the zone of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, which was attached to the 10th Guards Tank Brigade. He was to conduct an offensive along the railway to Bolshoi Prudok (4-5 km north of Gorodok), bypass the latter from the west with the forces of the 83rd and 26th Guards Rifle Divisions and reach the river. Berezhanka. From the east, the city was supposed to bypass the 16th Guards Rifle Corps. It was planned that the 5th Guards Rifle Division would attack it from the north.

However, to complete the task of capturing Gorodok, the army spent not one, as envisaged by the commander of the front, but as many as five days. The German command attached great importance to the retention of the city area. Here, units of the 20th Panzer, 256th, 129th Infantry and 6th Airfield Divisions occupied the defense sectors. On the approaches to Gorodok and on its outskirts, the enemy prepared four defensive lines. Skillfully using the rugged terrain, replete with dominant heights, lakes and rivers, he put up fierce resistance to the Soviet troops who continued the offensive. Already in the first days, the 1st Tank Corps, which had suffered heavy losses in military equipment, had to be withdrawn from the battle. Only by the end of December 21, the shock group of the army broke through the first two defensive lines. If the advance of the formations operating in the center of its zone was 35 km, on the right flank it did not exceed 15 km. As a result, it was not possible to carry out the plan to encircle and encircle the enemy grouping, which occupied the defense north of Gorodok.

Fights with the aim of breaking through the third defensive line, which took place along the southern shore of the lake. Kosho, the Gorozhanka and Palminka rivers and was equipped with full profile trenches, barbed wire and minefields, began on December 23, were fought all day and were of an extremely fierce nature, turning into hand-to-hand combat. Unable to withstand the offensive impulse of the Soviet troops, the enemy, under the cover of the rearguards, began to retreat.

The commander of the 11th Guards Army planned to resume the offensive at dawn on December 24th. However, the Military Council of the front decided to carry out a night assault on Gorodok. The main argument in favor of this decision was that in the dark the main advantage of the enemy was minimized - his firepower. At about two in the morning, the 83rd, 26th and 11th Guards Rifle Divisions attacked Gorodok from the west and east. The German units, after some stupor caused by the suddenness of the strike, put up strong resistance in both directions with fire and counterattacks using tanks and assault guns. After the fighting on the western and eastern outskirts of the city reached its highest intensity, the 5th Guards Rifle Division began its assault from the north. During the night and morning, the enemy garrison was divided into groups isolated from each other. Gradually, his resistance began to weaken. By noon, Gorodok was completely cleared of the enemy, who lost up to 2.5 thousand soldiers and officers in the battles for him. In addition, the Soviet units captured 29 guns, 2 tanks, 48 ​​mortars, 41 vehicles, a lot of small arms and ammunition.

After the liberation of Gorodok, the troops of the front continued the offensive without a pause in order to capture Vitebsk on the move by December 30-31. By the evening of December 25, formations of the 11th Guards Army, advancing 4-5 km, reached the first (external) defense line of Vitebsk, which was 25 km from it along the Belodedovo, Sloboda, Borovka line, Zaluchye junction, Shpaki. 6-8 km to the south was the second frontier, stretching from the Zvyazya through Gorodische to the lake. Losvido. The third line was equipped 5-8 km from the city. Especially thoroughly German troops strengthened the roads leading to Vitebsk from Gorodok, Sirotino, Polotsk. In addition, the enemy command significantly strengthened the Vitebsk direction, transferring formations here from other sectors. By December 26, the 3rd and 4th airfield, 256th and 197th infantry divisions were operating against the 11th Guards and 4th shock armies, battle groups 87th, 211th and 129th Infantry Divisions, part of the forces of the 12th Infantry Division, a separate tank battalion, a division of heavy assault guns, an artillery division of the RGK, a number of other separate units and subunits.

The front had a slight advantage in infantry, but was inferior to the enemy in the number of tanks. In addition, the problem of supplying it with ammunition was never solved, since the removal of warehouses from artillery firing positions began to be 180 km. Divisions and regiments, having suffered heavy losses in previous battles, were not replenished with people. The combat potential of the strike force of the front has significantly decreased, while the enemy's ability to repel its offensive, on the contrary, has increased.

The main blow of the 11th Guards Army was delivered along the Gorodok-Vitebsk highway, on which the German command concentrated its main defense efforts. At the same time, in order to mislead the Soviet troops, it deliberately withdrew its units from the northern shore of the lake. Losvido, located west of the highway. After army reconnaissance established the absence of the enemy in this area, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky decided to bypass his strongest strongholds on the ice of the lake, the length of which from north to south was about 8 km. For this, the 11th and 18th Guards Rifle Divisions, as well as a regiment of the 235th Rifle Division, were allocated.

Encountering no resistance from the enemy, units of three divisions, moving in columns, crossed almost the entire lake. However, when a few hundred meters remained to the southern coast, they were met by concentrated fire of guns, mortars and machine guns. From explosions of shells and mines, the ice on the lake was destroyed, and extensive polynyas and areas with open water formed on its surface. The result of the ensuing tragedy was the death of virtually the entire group. No more than 30 people were able to escape.

After that, the solution of the problem of capturing Vitebsk by the new year, 1944, was unlikely. Indeed, despite the efforts made, the formations of the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Armies by the end of December 1943 overcame only 5 to 7 km in some directions, after which they went on the defensive. This ended the Gorodok offensive operation. In its course, Soviet troops eliminated the threat of encirclement by the enemy of the 3rd and 4th shock armies, liberated over 1220 settlements, captured 3.3 thousand soldiers. German soldiers and officers, seized a lot of military equipment and military property.

In his memoirs, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.Kh. Bagramyan called this operation "one of the most difficult" among those that were carried out under his leadership during the war years. He motivated this by the fact that “firstly, the operation was prepared and carried out in exceptionally difficult conditions against large enemy forces, with purely German scrupulousness, fortified on terrain advantageous for defense, which dominated the initial position of our troops. Due to bad weather and limited visibility, the operation took place with very little participation of aviation and artillery. Secondly, we did not have a significant superiority over the enemy, especially in the second phase of the operation. The possibilities for maneuvering troops, especially mobile formations, during the entire operation were also extremely meager. Thirdly, the front, having a powerful defensive system in front of it, was extremely poorly provided with ammunition and fuel. Fourthly, our troops were conducting active offensive operations at a time when the neighbors - the 2nd Baltic Front to the north and the Western Front to the south - having not achieved success in the offensive, went over to the defensive.

In general, in the last months of 1943, the 1st Baltic Front was forced to conduct an offensive in extremely difficult conditions, in fact, at the limit of its strength. As I.Kh. Bagramyan later noted: “The setting of tasks that exceeded the capabilities of the troops in terms of their scope was a kind of method, a special method of leadership, aimed at achieving the maximum activity of our offensive operations in Belarus ...”. This led to large losses of the front in people. During October - December they amounted to 168,902 people, including 43,551 people - irrevocably.

Considering the future prospects for armed struggle, the Supreme Command Headquarters planned to launch a large-scale offensive in the northwestern and southwestern directions during the winter and spring of 1944. At the same time, the troops operating on the central sector of the Soviet-German front were assigned a supporting role. They were supposed to attract the main forces of Army Group Center and prevent them from maneuvering to reinforce the Wehrmacht grouping in Right-Bank Ukraine. To this end, the 1st Baltic, Western and Belorussian fronts received the task of continuing the offensive operations launched in the fall of 1943 to liberate eastern regions Belarus and reach the line of Polotsk, Lepel, Mogilev, r. Bird. The total depth of the planned advance to the west did not exceed 50-150 km. At the same time, front-line and army formations were supposed to operate in the same grouping of forces and means, without receiving additional reinforcement from the Headquarters, all of whose reserves were involved near Leningrad, Novgorod and Ukraine.

The immediate task of the 1st Baltic Front was still to capture Vitebsk, which was considered by the command of Army Group Center as a "gateway to the Baltic." Attaching great importance to holding the city, it concentrated on the approaches to it the 3rd Panzer Army, which included fifteen divisions, including one tank, seventeen separate divisions field artillery RGK, six mortar battalions, five assault gun brigades, two tiger tank battalions, and two heavy anti-tank gun battalions.

By the beginning of January 1944, the front united the 4th shock (Lieutenant General P.F. Malyshev), the 11th Guards (Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky), the 39th (Lieutenant General N. E. Berzarin), 43rd (Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev) and 3rd Air (Lieutenant General of Aviation N.F. Papivin) armies. In accordance with the plan of the new offensive operation, it was planned to strike the main blow with the forces of the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Armies. They were opposed by up to eight to nine enemy divisions. Taking into account the low staffing of the formations and units of both armies, the Military Council of the Front ordered the creation in all rifle regiments of one assault battalion, reinforced with tanks (eight - ten units), two - three batteries of 45-mm and 76-mm guns, one - two guns caliber 122 mm and a sapper company.

Combat operations in the Vitebsk direction resumed on January 3 with the transition of the 4th shock army to the offensive. During the day, its formations broke through the enemy defenses to a depth of 5 km and reached the line of the Pestunitsa and Zaronok rivers. Here their advance slowed down, and the next day, as a result of stubborn resistance from parts of the German 9th Army Corps, it was completely stopped. The 84th and 5th Guards Rifle Corps (Major Generals E.V. Dobrovolsky and I.S. Bezugly) from the 39th Army, which delivered an auxiliary strike, also could not succeed. Their wedging through the Vitebsk-Orsha highway to the west was eliminated by German counterattacks.

Only on January 6, the rifle divisions of the 11th Guards Army, together with the brigades of the 1st Tank Corps, joined the offensive of the 4th shock and 39th armies. In some areas, they were able to overcome 1-2 km, however, the very next day, as a result of heavy fire from enemy artillery, they suffered heavy losses in people and tanks. So, in the 89th tank brigade, 43 out of 50 combat vehicles were put out of action.

The advance of advancing formations and units was held back by tank ambushes widely used by the enemy command and individual tanks, which often changed firing positions, by heavy mortars and guns advanced for direct fire. In the same place where the Soviet troops achieved success, the enemy immediately launched counterattacks. For example, on January 8, the 29th Infantry Division, Major General Ya.L. Shteiman was liberated by Zapolye, but in the evening German units forced her to leave this settlement.

Until January 18, the divisions of the 4th shock, 11th guards, 39th and additionally brought into battle 43rd armies fought hard battles. They managed to break through the enemy defenses north of Vitebsk, reach the nearest approaches to the city, cut the section of the Polotsk-Vitebsk railway and cover the Vitebsk grouping of the German 3rd Panzer Army from the north-west. But this time the troops of the 1st Baltic Front failed to capture the city. Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan again had to give an order to temporarily stop the offensive "in order to better prepare and resupply the troops ...".

To conduct the next offensive operation, by the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, troops were involved not only of the 1st Baltic, but also Western fronts. It was planned that their strike groups, concentrated on adjacent wings, would strike at the directions converging on Zaozerye (southwest of Vitebsk), surround the enemy in the Vitebsk ledge and complete his defeat in a short time. From the composition of the 1st Baltic Front, the 4th Shock and 11th Guards Armies were involved in the operation, which were supposed to operate in the same bands, practically without reinforcement with additional forces and means. Only rifle companies and battalions of the first echelon were slightly replenished with people, and even those at the expense of rear and special units of regiments and divisions.

The fighting began on 3 February. On that day, the formations of the two armies attacked the front line of the enemy’s defense in a strip up to 12 km wide, in some directions wedged into a depth of 5-6 km and captured heavily fortified strongholds - Volkovo, Zapolye, Gurki, Toporino, Kislyaki, Mashkino, Bondarevo. On this occasion, the commander of the German 3rd Panzer Army, Colonel-General G. Reinhardt, in his order, was forced to admit that "today's very difficult day of combat, unfortunately, brought us a significant loss of territory." In an effort to make a difference in the situation, he immediately began to advance infantry units, tank battalions, heavy anti-tank and mortar divisions, batteries of assault guns, and sapper units to the threatened direction. In the following days, the reserves of Army Group Center also began to arrive here.

After that, the advantage in forces and means went over to the side of the enemy. The 4th shock and 11th guards armies simply did not have real opportunities to complete the task. Until mid-February, their rifle formations and units repelled numerous counterattacks by German troops, trying to hold the captured lines. Gradually, positional forms of struggle began to prevail in the actions of the parties, and soon the situation in the zone of the 1st Baltic Front stabilized. It remained almost unchanged until the summer of 1944.

Valery Abaturov,
leading Researcher Research
Institute ( military history) Military Academy
of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Historical Sciences

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