The corps, which included the SS Reich division, rushed to Moscow, but the position of the Germans became critical: the resistance of the Red Army was constantly growing, and the Soviet command, regardless of losses, threw more and more fresh units into battle. On October 14, the SS division entered the legendary Borodino field and attacked the positions of the 32nd Infantry Division. During the battle, Hausser's soldiers attacked the positions on the Semenov flushes, took them and went to the Borodino-Mozhaisk road. The positions of the Siberian regiments were broken through, the 32nd division was almost completely destroyed. New battle of Borodino ended with the defeat of the Red Army. But in these battles, the division was to lose its creator and commander. On October 14, 1941, Paul Hausser was seriously wounded by fragments of a shell that exploded nearby: the right side of his face was badly damaged, his right eye and jaw were especially affected.After Hausser was wounded, SS-Oberführer Wilhelm Bittrich took command of the division.] In Germany, where Hausser was immediately evacuated, he underwent several operations, and then followed by a fairly long course of rehabilitation. Health was generally restored, but the right eye stopped seeing forever. On May 9, 1942, Hausser was awarded the Silver Wound Badge. In general, the campaign of 1941 in the East turned out to be extremely difficult for the German troops, and the SS Reich division was no exception - its losses amounted to 40% of the personnel.

SS Panzer Corps

For more than six months, Hausser had to recover from his injury. He was no longer destined to return to his division. And not only because of the consequences of the injury. At this time, Himmler managed to take the next step in the development of the SS troops: the undeniable advantages of the SS divisions on the Soviet-German front removed all the objections of the Reich leadership about creating the next level of SS military headquarters. If earlier Himmler's undoubted success was the formation of SS divisions, which was so opposed by the Wehrmacht leadership, now he received the "go-ahead" for the creation of the headquarters of the SS corps. This corps was supposed to include the best and most combat-ready SS divisions - the Leibstandarte, the Reich and the Dead Head. In principle, in fact, Himmler planned the creation of a powerful - perhaps the most powerful in the German army - strike formation, which would be capable of solving the most important tasks, and its use in the direction of the main attack promised great benefits (and even greater fame). Hausser was quite logically scheduled for the post of commander of the new corps. Who else, besides the creator of the SS reinforcement units, could be entrusted with command? Neither Eike nor Dietrich were ready for such a high post - to be honest, Dietrich, although he later became the commander of the army, still did not rise above the level of the division (but rather, his limit was the post of regiment commander, and even then in the military time). Hausser was still a Lieutenant General of the Reichswehr, that is, he had the necessary level of training to command a corps. So, in general, there was no one to choose from.

On May 13, 1942, the order was given to start the formation of the SS Panzer Corps (SS-Panzerkorps), and on May 28, SS Obergruppenführer and General of the SS Troops Paul Hausser officially headed it. The formation of the headquarters and corps units was carried out in Bergen-Belsen. In general, the states were standard for tank corps; in the end, the following parts of the corps were formed (initially they did not have a number, but then - with the advent of other SS corps - they received the number 102, and even later, during the next reorganization, a number of them - the number 502):

aviation squadron (Fliegerstaffel);

SS Motorized Corps Cartographic Service;

SS heavy tank battalion (Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung);

SS artillery command (SS-Artillerie Kom-mandeur);

SS artillery division (SS-Artillerie-Abteilung);

SS mortar company (SS-Granatwefer-Kompanie);

SS anti-aircraft company (SS-Flugabwehr-Kompanie 102);

SS rocket mortar division (SS-Werfer Abteilung);

Corps communications battalion of the SS (SS-Korps-Nachrichten Abteilung);

SS scooter company (SS-Kraftfahrzeug-Kompanie);

military geographical company of the SS (SS-Wehrgeologen-Kompanie);

SS repair company (SS-Werkstatt-Kompanie);

Corps Sanitary Company of the SS (SS-Korps-Sanitats-Kom-panie);

SS Field Post Office (SS-Feldpostamt);

a motorized company of SS war correspondents;

motorized part of the SS field gendarmerie;

SS corps security company (SS-Korps Sicherungs-Kompanie 102);

SS field reserve brigade (SS-Feldersatz-Brigade).

It should be noted that, among other things, the mentioned tank battalion and a company of the first "Tigers" - PzKw VI tanks were attached to the corps.

The three SS divisions mentioned above were subordinated to Hausser, and initially, at the stage of formation of the corps, all of them were reorganized. In camps in northern France, they were transferred to the states of motorized (panzergrenadier) divisions (they officially received such names in November 1942), and each received a tank battalion - all together they were quite an impressive force. Thus, initially, the motorized divisions of the Leibstandarte entered the Hausser corps. Adolf Gitler"SS Obergruppenführer and SS General Sepp Dietrich, "Das Reich" SS Gruppenfuehrer and SS Lieutenant General Georg Keppler and "Dead Head" SS Obergruppenfuehrer and SS General Theodor Eicke. As you can see, Hausser had a hard time with such well-deserved commanders, only Keppler was his “pupil”, and the rest were independent individuals, in some cases who had much stronger and wider ties in the party leadership and in the SS. As chief of staff, Hausser received not an SS man - this position was taken by the General Staff, Colonel of the Wehrmacht Müller.

In August, the corps, still at the stage of reorganization, was included in the active army and subordinated to the 15th Army stationed in Northern France. In the fall of 1942, Hausser's SS men (among other German troops in France) had a chance to take part in the occupation of Southern France, which until that time had formally been under the jurisdiction of the legitimate French government of Marshal Henri Petain.After the German attack on France, Petain led a group calling for an early end to the war and a truce with Germany. On June 16, 1940, he was quite legitimately appointed prime minister and soon concluded an armistice with Germany. Petain chose the resort town of Vichy in southern France as the headquarters of his government. On July 10, 1940, the National Assembly (with 569 votes in favor, with 80 against and 17 abstentions) transferred to Petain full power in the unoccupied French territory. Thus Petain (like Hitler in 1933) received a mandate to govern the state absolutely legally, from the hands of the highest legislative body of the country. In fact, from that moment on, France, which broke off diplomatic relations with Great Britain, was an ally of Germany.] The operation was carried out rather quickly, but the Germans failed to achieve the main task - to capture the French fleet based in Toulon: in fact, this meant the failure of the operation and only expanded the territory controlled by the Germans, which required an even greater increase in the occupying troops. And this despite the fact that there was a significant lack of forces on the Soviet-German front.

Despite the fact that, in general, Hausser needed some more time to bring his corps to full combat readiness, including the training of very significant replacements, the divisions that arrived in France suffered heavy losses in Russia and, in addition, left almost all the equipment at the front, - he soon received orders to depart for the East. The situation on the Soviet-German front was close to critical. The Soviet offensive in January 1943 led to the destruction of the Stalingrad grouping of Paulus, and a powerful blow in Ukraine brought the entire southern flank of the German troops to the brink of disaster. In January 1943, the transfer of the SS Panzer Corps to Ukraine began, and initially only the Leibstandarte and Reich arrived here, the Dead Head was somewhat lagging behind - its losses were the most significant and it took Eike more time to train replenishments. Hausser himself on January 30, 1943 received from Hitler one of the highest party awards - the Golden Party Badge.By status, the badge was automatically given only to those who had an NSDAP number less than 100,000. In other cases, the badge was, as it were, Hitler's personal insignia. Hausser received it in advance - as the commander of the elite SS units. Note that Dietrich and Eike, subordinates of Hausser, by this time had been wearing the Golden Party badges for quite some time.]

6th SS Panzer Army

The formation of the headquarters was started on September 6, 1944 by the command of the SS troops "Dislots". In Sept. 1944 the army was placed under the control of Army Group B in the West. Feb. 1945 the army was transferred to the Army Group "South" in Hungary. In May 1945, the army headquarters surrendered in Krems (Austria) to the American troops of Gen. D. Patton.

The army consisted of the I and II SS Panzer Corps and the LXVII Army Corps.

Commander: SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer, Colonel General of the SS Troops Josef Dietrich (09/06/1944 - 05/08/1945)

I SS Panzer Corps "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" (I SS-Pz.Korps "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler")

The corps headquarters was formed on 14/8/1943 (the formation of the corps was completed in December 1943) in Berlin-Lichterfeld; The Corps was originally headquartered in Brussels. As part of the ground forces, it was used from Aug. 1943. In Dec. 1943 subordinated to the command of the 14th Army in Italy, and in Jan. 1944 transferred to the reserve of army group "D" in France. In June 1944 he joined the 7th Army in Normandy. The following month, he became an integral part of the Zapad tank group, which in August. 1944 was deployed to the 5th Panzer Army.

In Sept. - Oct. 1944 fought as part of the 7th Army in the Eiffel region in France. Nov. 1944 assigned to rest in Westphalia, and the following month transferred to the reserve of the main command in the West. In Jan. 1945 as part of the 5th Panzer Army participated in the offensive in the Ardennes. After a holiday in Germany (February - March 1945) in April. 1945 transferred to the 6th SS Panzer Army in Hungary.

The 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitler Youth", the Training Panzer Division (in Normandy), and the 101st (501st) SS heavy tank battalion fought as part of the corps. Corps subordinate units wore numbers 101 (501). In May 1945, together with the army, he retreated to Lower Austria and surrendered to the Anglo-American troops in the Vienna region.

Commanders: SS Oberstgruppenführer, Colonel General of the SS troops Josef Dietrich (4.7.1943 - 9.8.1944); SS Brigadeführer, Major General of the SS Troops Fritz Kremer (08/09/1944-08/16/1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Georg Keppler (16.8.1944-30.10.1944); SS Gruppenfuehrer, Lieutenant General of the SS troops Hermann Priss (10/30/1944-5/8/1945).

II SS Panzer Corps (II SS-Pz.Korps)

Formed in June 1942 in Bergen-Belsen under the name of the SS Panzer Corps, received the number "2" on 1/6/1943. In Aug. 1942 - Feb. 1943 was in France as part of Army Group D, and then transferred to the southern sector of the Eastern Front near Kharkov and in March 1943 included in the 4th Panzer Army. As part of the ground forces, it was used from March 1943; at that time, it included the 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich", the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".

Fought at Kharkov and Belgorod (summer offensive 1943). In July 1943, together with the army, he was transferred to Kursk. After the fall of the fascist regime in Italy in Aug. 1943 was transferred to the Apennines (only the SS division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler remained on the Eastern Front) and in December. became part of the 14th army. In Jan. 1944 transferred to France in the Alençon area. As of March 1944, the 9th SS Panzer Division "Hohenstaufen", the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg", the training tank division and the 349th Infantry Division operated as part of the corps.

From Apr. 1944 fought in the Lviv region in Northern Ukraine as part of the 1st Panzer Army, but in July 1944 he returned to France again and took part in the battle in Normandy as part of the Zapad Panzer Group. From Aug. 1944 - in the 5th tank army. Oct. - Nov. 1944 fought as part of the 1st Parachute Army, and in January. 1945 in the ranks of the 6th SS Panzer Army participated in the offensive in the Ardennes. After a vacation in Germany (February - March 1945), as part of the same army, he participated in the offensive near Budapest. Having suffered heavy losses, he retreated to Lower Austria and in May 1945 surrendered to the Anglo-American troops.

Commanders: SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Paul Hausser (1.6.1942-28.6.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Wilhelm Bittrich (10.7.1944-8.5.1945).

Volunteer legion "Norway", 1942 As an interesting fact, the absence of buttonholes should be noted. There were several samples of the sleeve patch of the Norwegian volunteers. The one shown in this photo is in the shape of the Norwegian flag with a blue and white cross on a red background. Another type of this patch was an image of a red shield with a black outline and a cross located in the center.

III (German) SS Panzer Corps (HI germanisches SS-Pz.Korp)

It was formed on March 30, 1943, and it included mainly SS units formed from the “Germanic” peoples and the Volksdeutsche. They were new formations of the SS, primarily the 11th SS Motorized Division "Nordland" and the 4th SS Volunteer Motorized Brigade "Netherlands". As part of the ground forces, it was used from Sept. 1943, when he was included in the 2nd Panzer Army in the Balkans. Here he fought against the partisans of Marshal I. Broz-Tito, and after Italy left the war, he participated in the disarmament of Italian units and the occupation of Northern Italy. In Sept. - Nov. 1943 was again thrown against the partisans. Only during one operation at the end of Nov.

1943 500 people The 1st battalion of the 24th SS Panzer Regiment was destroyed in the Glina area approx. 5 thousand partisans (however, then the partisans defeated the 23rd and 24th regiments near Glina). At the end of Nov. 1943 began its transfer to the front of the 18th Army, which occupied positions in the Oranienbaum area near Leningrad. In March - Sept. 1944 fought as part of the army group "Narva", and in November. 1944 returned to the 18th Army, which was defending in Courland. Feb. 1945 transferred to Arnswald, where he was included in the 11th Army of the Vistula Army Group. From March 1945 he was part of the 3rd Panzer Army, which fought in the Stettin area. In the last days of the war, he occupied positions near Mecklenburg.

Commanders: SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Felix Steiner (10.5.1943-9.11.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Georg Kepler (9.11.1944-4.2.1945); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (4.2.1945-11.2.1945); Lieutenant General Martin Unrein (11.2.1945-5.3.1945); SS Brigadeführer, Major General of the SS Troops Joachim Ziegler (03/05/1945-05/01/1945).

IV SS Panzer Corps (IV SS-Pz.Korp)

Formed 14/8/1943 in Poitiers (France). On June 30, 1944, units of the disbanded VII SS Panzer Corps became part of it. As part of the ground forces, it was used from Aug. 1944, when he was included in the 9th Army, operating in the Warsaw area on the Soviet-German front. Oct. - Dec.

1944, the corps included the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Dead Head", the 5th SS Panzer Division "Viking", the 104th (504th) Heavy Artillery Battalion, as well as different time 711th, 96th Infantry, 118th Jaeger and 211th People's Grenadier Divisions were attached. Dec. 1944 transferred to the reserve of Army Group Center (in Warsaw), and in January.

1945 - Army Group South in Hungary. From Feb. 1945 fought in Hungary as part of the 6th SS Panzer Army. After the defeat near Budapest, he withdrew to Enns (Austria), where in May 1945 he was disbanded.

Commanders: SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS and Police Troops Alfred Wünneberg (8.6.1943 - 23.10.1943); SS Gruppenfuehrer, Lieutenant General of the SS Troops Walter Krueger (10/23/1943-3/14/1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (1.7-20.7.1944); SS Brigadeführer, Major General of the SS troops Nikolaus Heilmann (20.7.1944-6.8.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Herbert Otto Gille (6.8.1944-8.5.1945).

V SS Volunteer Mountain Corps (V SS-Freiwilligen-Gebirgskorps; V SS-Frw. Geb. Korp)

Formed 14/8/1943 in Prague, used in the Balkans for anti-partisan operations. Oct. In 1943, the corps included the 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Rifle Division "Prince Eugene", the 13th SS Mountain Rifle Division "Handzhar", the 369th (Croatian) and 181st Reserve Infantry Divisions; in addition, the 21st mountain rifle division of the SS troops "Skanderbeg" and the 23rd mountain rifle division of the SS troops "Kama" were under the operational subordination of the headquarters of the corps. Then he was transferred to Germany. As part of the ground forces, it has been used since November. 1943, when he was included in the 2nd Panzer Army operating in Bosnia. Feb. 1945 transferred to the 9th Army of the Vistula Army Group, which occupied positions on the Oder. As of March 1945, the 32nd SS Volunteer Grenadier Division "January 30", the 286th and 391st Infantry Divisions, the garrison of the Frankfurt an der Oder fortress and the 5th SS assault battalion operated as part of the corps. He capitulated in May 1945 near Berlin.

Commanders: SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Arthur Phleps (4.7.1943-21.9.1944); SS Brigadeführer, Major General of the SS Troops Karl Ritter von Oberkamp (September 21-October 1, 1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS and Police Troops Friedrich Jeckeln (10/1/1944-5/8/1945).

VI SS Army Corps (Latvian) (VI Waffen - A.K. der SS)

It was formed on 10/8/1943, and it included the Latvian SS formations: the 15th and 19th Grenadier Divisions of the SS troops, as well as the grenadier (Latvian No. 7) regiment of the SS troops, etc. It was used as part of the ground forces from January. 1944, when he was included in the 16th Army, operating in the North of Russia in the Pleskau region. Until the end of the war, he fought in the ranks of this, as well as the 18th Army, retreating with battles to Courland, where in May 1945 he surrendered to Soviet troops.

Commanders: SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS and Police Troops Karl von Pfeffer-Wildenbruch (8.10.1943-11.6.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS and Police Troops Friedrich Jeckeln (11.6.1944-21.7.1944); SS Gruppenfuehrer, Lieutenant General of the SS Troops Karl Fischer von Troyenfeld (21-25.7.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Walter Krueger (25.7.1944-8.5.1945).

VII SS Panzer Corps (VII SS-Panzerkorp)

Possibly formed in Oct. 1943. Composition unknown; On July 20, 1944, it was disbanded and its units were merged into the IV SS Panzer Corps.

Commander: SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (10.1943-20.7.1944).

IX Mountain Corps of the SS Troops (Croatian) (IX Waffen Gebirgskorps (Kroatisches)

It began to form in June 1944 in Baksalmas (Hungary), where it included the 22nd Mountain Division of the SS Kama and the 509th SS Heavy Artillery Division. Oct. 1944 transferred to Croatia. It was used for anti-partisan operations until the end of 1944, when it was transferred to Hungary. Dec. In 1944, the 8th SS Cavalry Division Florian Geyer, the 22nd SS Volunteer Cavalry Division Maria Theresa, the Felhernhalle Panzer Division and the 13th Panzer Division operated near Budapest as part of the corps. In addition, several unreliable Hungarian divisions were subordinated to the command of the corps. 12/2/1945 destroyed near Budapest by Soviet troops. Only 170 servicemen managed to escape from the encirclement.

Commanders: Gruppenführer, Lieutenant General of the SS Troops Karl Gustav Zauberzweig (21.6-12.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS and Police Troops Karl von Pfeffer-Wildenbruch (12.1944-12.2.1945).

X SS Army Corps (X SS-A.)

Formed in Jan. 1945 (possibly from the headquarters of the anti-gang units). In March 1945 destroyed in Pomerania.

Commanders: SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS and Police Forces Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski (26.1-10.2.1945); Lieutenant General Gunther Krappe (10.2-7.3.1945); SS Standartenführer Herbert Goltz (7.3.1945-3.1945).

XI SS Panzer Corps (XI SS-Pz.Korp)

As part of the ground forces, it was used from Aug. 1944 (possibly formed at the same time).

Commander: SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (08/06/1944 - 05/08/1945).

Officers of the Khanjar division. They were photographed, probably early stage the history of this formation. Their buttonholes are not yet decorated with the symbols of the division - they are either clean or bear SS runes. One of the officers (on the left) can hardly be seen on the left sleeve of the army eagle. This way of wearing this type of emblem was common, although it had to be located on the chest. Judging by the shade of the image, in this case, red fezzes serve as headdresses. Of note is the use of two different types of "Styrian" mountain gaiters and mountain boots. All officers have standard buckles on their belts.

XII SS Army Corps (XII SS-A.K.)

Formed in Aug. 1944. As part of the ground forces, it was used from Sept. 1944. In Dec. In 1944, the corps included the 176th Infantry and 1.83rd People's Grenadier Divisions, as well as SS units under corps subordination. 16/4/1945 destroyed in the Ruhr pocket.

Commanders: SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (1.8-6.8.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, SS and Police General Kurt von Gottberg (6.8-18.10.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Karl Maria Demelhuber (10/18-10/20/1944); General of the Infantry Ponter Blumentritt (20.10.1944-20.1.1945); Lieutenant General Fritz Bayerlein (January 20-January 29, 1945), Artillery General Eduard Grasemann (January 29, 1945-April 16, 1945).

XIII SS Army Corps (XIII SS-A.K.)

Formed in Aug. 1944 in Breslau. As part of the ground forces, it was used from Sept. 1944. Soon transferred to France. If in Nov. 1944, the 17th SS Panzer Division "Götz von Berlichingen" was part of the corps, but since December. 1944, only parts of the Wehrmacht remained subordinate to the headquarters of the corps: the 19th People's Grenadier and 347th Infantry Divisions, the 566th Anti-tank Division, the 9th Anti-Aircraft Division, etc. Fought on the Western Front and ended the war in the Alps.

Commanders: SS Gruppenfuehrer, Lieutenant General of the SS troops Herman Priss (7.8-20.10.1944); SS Gruppenfuehrer, Lieutenant General of the SS Troops Max Simon (10/20/1944-5/8/1945).

XIV SS Army Corps (XIV SS-A.K.)

Formed in Nov. 1944. Disbanded on January 25, 1945, and the remaining units were included in the X SS Army Corps. Use in the ground forces has not been confirmed.

Commanders: SS Gruppenfuehrer, Lieutenant General of the SS and Police Forces Heinrich Friedrich Reine-fart (11.1944-12.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, SS and Police General Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski (12.1944-25.1.1945).

XV Cossack Cavalry Corps (XV Kosaken Kav. Korps)

Created by order of G. Himmler on 25.2.1945 on the basis of the command of the 1st Cossack division of the SS troops. It included the Cossack formations, which were transferred on November 4, 1944 for the duration of the war to the jurisdiction of the Reichsfuehrer SS. The corps included the 1st and 2nd Cossack divisions, as well as the plastun brigade.

Commander: SS Gruppenfuehrer, Lieutenant General of the SS Troops Helmut von Panwitz.

XVI SS Army Corps

Formed in Jan. 1945. Use in the ground forces has not been confirmed.

Commander: SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Karl Maria Demelhuber (1.1945-8.5.1945).

XVII SS Army Corps (Hungarian) (XVII Waffen-Armee Korps der SS (Ungarisches)

Formed in March 1945. Surrendered to American troops on 4/5/1945.

Commanders: SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Ferenc Fekethalmi-Ccheidner (3.1945-4.1945); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops Eno Rushkai (4.1945-5.1945).

XVIII SS Army Corps (XVIII SS-A.K.)

Formed Dec. 1944. As part of the ground forces, it was used from Feb. 1945.

Paul Hausser, commander of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps

The corps and division commanders, however, faced completely different problems. Although both SS divisions underwent more than a year of training, their combat readiness still remained incomplete. We already wrote about the situation with tanks, so the 1st tank battalions of the 9th and 10th SS divisions remained in France, because they did not receive the Panthers they were supposed to. Moreover, the lack of equipment and equipment did not allow the anti-tank divisions of both divisions to be sent to the East. Thus, both SS divisions were tank divisions only on paper.

SS soldiers in the USSR, spring 1944

For the fastest transfer of divisions to the front, 72 railway echelons were allocated for each. Sending parts was accompanied by significant difficulties, the main of which were air raids by allied aviation. One of the strongest occurred on March 28, when at the station, while waiting for dispatch, an echelon with headquarters units of the 3rd battalion of the 22nd SS regiment was raided twice. As a result, even before arriving at the front, the battalion suffered the first losses, and 5 officers were killed, including battalion adjutant SS Obersturmführer Werner Maksimov and quartermaster SS Untersturmführer Walter Volkmann. It is interesting to note that during the raid, the personnel of the battalion became subordinate to the local anti-aircraft units, thereby providing all possible assistance in repelling it. It is worth adding that the military personnel who survived the raid received a special 10-day leave, as a result of which they had the opportunity to celebrate Easter at home, with their families.

However, neither the air raids of the Anglo-Americans, nor the sabotage of the European Resistance could disrupt the transfer of the division to the front. The Frundsberg route to the front ran along the route: Nantes - Paris - Metz - Trier - Koblenz - Kassel - Halle - Cottbus - Breslau - Krakow - Lviv. So already in early April, cold and snow, in complete contrast with warm France, where spring had already begun, “greeted” the soldiers of the 10th SS division in Western Ukraine.

On April 1, 1944, the headquarters of the corps headed by Hausser arrived in Lvov. As already mentioned, the II SS Panzer Corps was included in the 4th Panzer Army of General of the Panzer Troops Erhard Raus. On April 2, Hausser received a special order from Routh, according to which the divisions of the corps were ordered to prepare for battle as soon as possible. Considering that most of the corps had just arrived or were even on the way, it was not possible to quickly fulfill this order. In addition to parts of "his" corps, Hausser was also subordinated to the 100th Jaeger and 367th Infantry Divisions, who arrived from Hungary, as well as the 506th Heavy Tank Battalion.

The divisional supply units were almost the first to unload in Lvov. Wasting no time, the commander of the 10th SS economic battalion, SS-Sturmbannführer Gerhard Schill launched a stormy activity and quickly organized a supply point. Bakers from the 1st company of the battalion were ordered to bake 12,000 loaves of bread on the first day - after all, the arriving soldiers needed to be fed quickly. The preparation of such a quantity of bread required 20,000 liters of water and 10 tons of flour. Meanwhile, SS-Obersturmführer Richard Bohler, an officer from the household battalion, arrived at the German army supply depot in Vinniki, 6 kilometers southeast of Lvov, with orders to get fresh meat. According to conservative estimates, the division needed 147 head of cattle, 120 pigs and 240 sheep per day.

Equipment of the SS division "Frundsberg" in Ukraine

The bulk of the division began to arrive on April 3, 1944. Since the Lvov station could not receive all parts of the arriving tank divisions, many of them had to unload at the "neighboring" stations. The 6th company of Leo Franke from the 10th SS Panzer Regiment arrived in the Zolochiv area (a city east of Lvov) by noon on April 2. Since there was no equipment for unloading wagons with equipment at this station, bales of hay, prudently captured by the SS men from France, were used to unload the tanks. The commander of the 3rd platoon, Edmund Erhard, recalled: “At the station, the company commander called the platoon commanders for a briefing. The enemy was advancing on Lvov, and we were sure that we would be in battle before the end of the day. We checked the schedule of the march to the collection point on the maps. The 1st platoon under the command of Hans Quandel was advanced forward, followed by the 3rd platoon, parts of the company headquarters and the 2nd platoon of SS Untersturmführer Rudolf Schwemmlein. The company commander, Leo Franke, on a nimble Volkswagen, moved along the moving column, accompanied by two connected motorcyclists. The route of the company ran through several surrounding villages; soon the SS tankers reached the Slovit area. During the march, the main enemy for the SS division "Frundsberg" was the cold, piercing wind and slush of early spring on impassable terrain, with completely muddy roads. The movement was slow. The column of the 6th tank company moved along a narrow road, and as soon as the tank or truck bogged down, the entire column stopped. Therefore, the 6th company of the 10th tank regiment reached the assembly point in Berezhany only at 5 am on April 4th. Tanks from 2nd Platoon, many of them bogged down in the mud or driven off the road, joined the company during the day.

On April 2-3, units of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion Heinrich Brinkmann unloaded from the trains at the station near Zolochev. The battalion had time to reorganize after the 1,600 km road. After everything was ready for the march, Brinkmann moved to Berezhany, to the assembly area. Like other mobile SS units, muddy roads interfered with the movement of the battalion. All paths were clogged with columns of troops, which moved almost at a pace. Once in a traffic jam, the armored vehicles almost stopped. Almost 15 hours (!) were spent on the route of 35 kilometers. Therefore, only on April 4, Brinkmann arrived in the indicated sector.

While the division was just gathering, hasty preparations for a powerful deblocking strike had already begun in the German headquarters. On April 3, Routh ordered both of Hausser's subordinate army divisions to secure a place to deploy mobile parts II SS Panzer Corps in the Rohatyn-Berezhany area. According to Routh's plan, as soon as the main elements of the II Panzer Corps arrived, all 4 divisions would have to strike to the southeast, in the general direction of Buchach, and break through the encirclement around the 1st Panzer Army. Here we note that since the units of the 1st Panzer Army had been fighting in the encirclement for more than a week, an important task for the units of the II SS Panzer Corps was the task of quickly organizing supplies for the units of Hube after they were released. Therefore, behind the attacking wedge, trucks with supplies for the encircled units, mainly fuel and ammunition (about 600 tons of various cargoes) were supposed to move.

Officers of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion in Zolochiv

The Germans concentrated opposite the right flank of the 18th Guards Rifle Corps of the Red Army, General I.M. Afonina. This corps held a sector of the outer front of the encirclement of the 1st Panzer Army from the west and was exhausted by previous battles, experienced a shortage of personnel and weapons. With two battered rifle divisions, the corps occupied a defense line 35 kilometers long from Podgaitsy to Mariampol on the Dniester. It is clear that the Soviet troops did not create a solid defense in this sector, and in addition, reconnaissance on the outer front was conducted unsatisfactorily. The successful actions of the corps were also not facilitated by the fact that organizationally it was subordinate to the 1st Guards Army, the main forces of which fought with the 1st Tank Army in the Proskurov area (now Khmelnitsky), 100 kilometers to the south.

On April 4, German chasseurs and infantrymen began to advance to their original positions. The conditions in which the march took place were more than difficult - ice, slush, bad roads. Subsequently, the thaw that began on April 5 further exacerbated the problem. Soon the entire space turned into a sea of ​​mud, making movement nearly impossible. Technique got stuck. All available sappers and special snow plows were thrown to clear the roads. These measures managed to achieve some results, the movement was partially normalized. But now the enemy's opposition was added to the difficulties with the weather: the Soviet planes, as soon as the weather allowed, immediately attacked the Germans.

Commander of the 21st SS Regiment Eduard Deisenhofer

Nevertheless, both army divisions went on the attack on April 4, as planned, despite all the difficulties. The 367th Division of Major General Georg Zvade successfully captured a bridgehead across the Naraevka River, southeast of Rohatyn, and the 100th Jaeger Division of Lieutenant General Willibald Utz created bridgeheads near the Zlota Lipa River near Litvinovo, 10 kilometers northwest of Podgaitsev and in the area southeast of Berezhany. Interestingly, according to Soviet reports, only reconnaissance in force was recorded that day in the Podgaytsy area (!): allegedly, the Germans unsuccessfully attacked with the forces of an infantry regiment supported by 30 tanks. Further more. Commander of the 18th Corps I.M. Afonin reported that 11 tanks and 2 armored personnel carriers were burned and knocked out that day, up to 300 enemy soldiers were destroyed. However, these data are not confirmed by German sources: the 100th Jaeger Division just achieved some success, and, according to all sources, it acted without tank support. The Podgaites were taken by units of Utz by the morning of April 5th.

By the evening of April 4, 57 trains with units of the SS division "Frundsberg" (and only 35 trains with units of "Hohenstaufen") had already arrived in Lvov and its environs. There was no time to wait for all the components of both divisions to arrive, and Hausser decided to bring the Frundsberg into battle. Some units (mainly those that unloaded in the vicinity of Lvov) set out immediately upon arrival, such as the already mentioned 6th tank company or the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion. After 24 hours, the division was already more or less deployed, but its real strength was still small: Troenfeld reported to Hausser that only 32 Pz-IV tanks and 38 Stug-III self-propelled guns were in combat readiness.

But, despite all the problems, it was necessary to act urgently. Hausser posted his panzer divisions (or rather, a division) in the center, while the 100th Jaeger Division covered the left flank and the 367th Infantry covered the right.

The goal set by Raus for the II SS Panzer Corps was simple: attack southeast along the line Rohatyn - Berezhany, and then hit south of Podgaitsev and move through Monastyriska to Buchach.

The first formation of the SS division "Frundsberg" to receive a baptism of fire was the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion. On the morning of April 5, Brinkmann's battalion reached Podgaitsy, which had just been taken by units of the 100th Jaeger Division. According to the memoirs of SS Unterscharführer Franz Widmann, a liaison from the battalion headquarters, the rangers made a good impression on the SS men with their equipment and equipment. Something irritated the SS men: “They (huntsmen. - R.P.) had white camouflage robes, which we didn’t have,” Widmann recalled. The battalion command post was equipped in a typical Ukrainian hut with a thatched roof. Soon Troienfeld also arrived in Podgaitsy. At 11.00 a meeting was held, in which Troienfeld, Brinkmann, Willibald Utz and the staff officers of both divisions took part. As a result of this "council", Brinkmann received an order to reconnoiter the approaches to Buchach and to protect the sector to the north of Buchach, creating a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Strypa River.

Commander of the 10th SS Panzer Regiment Franz Kleffner

The weather forecast for that day was disappointing - snow and rain. The disgusting condition of the roads did not allow the use of wheeled armored vehicles, so the 1st company of the battalion (equipped with just these vehicles) remained in reserve, southeast of Podgaitsy. For the speedy execution of the received order, three reconnaissance patrols were created from the units of the 2nd and 3rd companies - two patrols had to go to Buchach in different ways, and one to Osovitsa (10 kilometers east of Buchach).

Around 2:00 pm on April 5, the armored personnel carriers began to move forward. On a small 12-ton bridge built by sappers of the 100th Jaeger Division with the active involvement of the inhabitants of Podgaytsy, they crossed the Koropets River and continued to move towards the enemy. Soon parts of the 1st and 2nd patrols came to a fork in the road to Podgaitsy, 6 kilometers south of the city. Here, the forward reconnaissance squads of SS-Untersturmführer Kurt Scholler's 1st Patrol stumbled upon a Soviet anti-tank position, probably units of the 563rd Anti-Tank Fighter Regiment. Scholler decided not to get involved in the battle, but preferred to bypass the Soviet defense center, making a detour to the side, 1 kilometer to the north. However, he did not take into account the state earth's surface, and his maneuver failed: two armored personnel carriers were hopelessly bogged down in the mud, and the rest could barely move. As a result, the movement of the 1st patrol stopped somewhere four kilometers southeast of Podgaytsy.

Meanwhile, the 2nd patrol of SS Untersturmführer Rudolf Hoffmann reconnoitered the approaches to the village of Madzelovka. Taking advantage of the moment, the headquarters company of the battalion, led by Brinkmann himself, and parts of the 3rd company of SS Obersturmführer Gerhard Hinze, reinforced by two artillery and one anti-tank platoons taken from the 2nd company, approached him. At about 5 p.m., the Hinze group, together with the headquarters company, attacked to the southeast and took Madzelovka almost without a fight - Soviet troops they just ran. However, progress was slowed down, both by rain and mud, and by mines, with which the Soviet troops plentifully "dotted" all the surrounding roads.

Commander of the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion Heinrich Brinkmann

The reinforced 3rd company of Hinze launched an attack and captured the village of Kurdvanovka. True, the enemy failed to inflict heavy losses: the bulk of the Soviet troops managed to retreat across the Strypa River near the village of Osovitsy. On the shoulders of the retreating enemy, by 21.00 Hinze took Osovitsy and established control over the intact bridge over the Strypa. The SS outposts were posted on the heights east of Osovitsa. Thus, Hinze managed to create a small foothold. However, the poor condition of the roads and the lack of fuel did not allow the main parts of the reconnaissance battalion to reinforce the Hinze detachment that had pulled ahead. As a reinforcement, only the 3rd patrol of SS Hauptscharführer Gottfried Kuffner (commander of the 3rd platoon of the 2nd company, on the basis of which this patrol was created), arrived to him, and the main part of the reconnaissance battalion, led by the headquarters company, concentrated at Kurdvanovka, where gathered up to 50 different armored vehicles. During the first day at the front, the battalion's losses amounted to 2 people killed and 4 wounded. Going back a little, we note that Kuffner's 3rd patrol was the most successful of all three. Advancing north of the other two patrols, Kuffner managed to capture the village of Kotuzov, 12 kilometers southeast of Podgaytsy, where 7 trucks and 1 motorcycle with a sidecar were taken as trophies. Developing success, the patrol captured the village of Vishnevoe on Strypa, but its advance stopped there, as the Soviet troops blew up the bridge over the Strypa during their withdrawal. Realizing that nothing more could be achieved in the area, Brinkmann reoriented Kuffner, giving him the order to reinforce the German units in Osowice.

As evidenced by the facts, on April 5, the Germans did not waste time in vain. The 100th Jaeger Division attacked to the northeast and achieved partial success. After that, in full accordance with the preliminary plans, it was time to bring the main forces of the 10th SS Panzer Division into action.

While Brinkmann's scouts were fighting at Osovitsa, the Frundsberg tank companies reached the Podgaitsy. In an attempt to stop the German advance, the Soviet aircraft heavily bombarded Podgaitsy. Although this raid could not greatly influence the course of events, it nevertheless delayed the deployment of the division's tank companies to attack. The town was literally stuffed with troops and equipment: in addition to various Frundsberg units, there were units of the 100th Jaeger Division and advanced detachments of the 653rd Heavy Anti-tank Division (it was equipped with Ferdinand self-propelled guns). Traffic jams arose in the narrow streets of a provincial town, and the personal intervention of division commander Karl von Troyenfeld, who was among the soldiers and regulated the flow of traffic, was required to restore order.

In the end, tanks and self-propelled guns of the 2nd Battalion Leo-Hermann Reinhold from the 10th SS Panzer Regiment attacked the enemy south of the positions of the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion, between 5-6 pm. Without further ado, Troienfeld decided to strike at Buchach along the shortest path. It so happened that the tanks followed in the footsteps of Scholler's 1st reconnaissance patrol.

The forward detachment was the 6th tank company of Leo Franke. At first, everything developed in the spirit of a swift march typical of the SS troops, but then the tanks got bogged down in the mud and the pace of the offensive slowed down noticeably. In addition, Franke took into account Scholler's warning about the enemy's anti-tank nest on his way and, most importantly, drew the appropriate conclusions. Slowly, the 6th tank company approached the Soviet anti-tank position, from which, as we remember, the 1st reconnaissance patrol did not dare to contact. Events developed very quickly - at first the Red Army men opened fire on the leading tank, but failed to hit it. The Germans responded with accurate fire from tank guns. In a short-lived battle, 10 Soviet anti-tank guns along the road were destroyed. Division veteran Bernhard Westerhoff described what was happening as "a real night battle." The Germans did not suffer losses and continued the offensive, but the Soviet infantry, taking advantage of the darkness, took cover on both sides of the road and now constantly tried to attack the tanks separately. Nevertheless, the offensive continued, and in order to strengthen the blow, Troyenfeld threw forward the 8th tank company of SS-Obersturmführer Wilhelm Stock, armed with self-propelled guns.

SS Untersturmführer Georg Siebenhuner

Soon, in this direction, the SS took the villages of Marinopol and Delievo. According to Soviet data, the Soviet 563rd anti-tank regiment, which was defending in this area, reported the destruction of 15 enemy tanks and two armored personnel carriers in a day, but at the same time suffered significant losses. German data do not confirm such high losses; not a single tank was lost that day at all.

By the end of the day on April 5, despite the terrible condition of the soil and the strong resistance of the enemy, german tanks nevertheless, they reached Kovalevka (a village 15 kilometers from Buchach), while during the battle Franke was wounded. At nightfall, the vanguard units of the 1st Battalion of SS-Sturmbannführer Heinz Laubscheer from the 21st SS Regiment joined the tankers. As most researchers note, the results of the first day of fighting for the SS division "Frundsberg" were very successful. In just April 5, according to Soviet data, the Germans pushed parts of the 18th Rifle Corps up to 10 kilometers in depth.

During the night of April 5-6, the remaining units of the 21st SS Regiment reached the positions of the advance detachments of tankers near Kovalevka, and by the middle of the day on April 6, the division strike group was ready to continue the offensive on Buchach. The attack was personally led by SS Gruppenführer Troienfeld. However, already during the attack, plans changed, and the infantrymen were redirected to Monastyriska, as expected according to the Routh plan, and the tanks, without infantry support, continued the attack on Buchach alone. Nevertheless, by 17.00 on April 6, the 6th tank company, at the cost of losing two tanks, broke the strong resistance of the 8th rifle division of the Red Army, reinforced by the 520th anti-tank regiment, and broke into Buchach. Soviet troops retreated to the northeast. 15 minutes later, 8 Pz-IV tanks (according to other sources, 5) collided with the advanced units of the German 6th Panzer Division - it was Major Stal's 114th Panzer-Grenadier Regiment, which stormed Buchach from the east. As P. Karel pathetically said: “Five minutes later, the soldiers of Frundsberg and the 6th Panzer Division slapped each other on the back:“ We could! Thus, communication between the 1st and 4th tank armies, broken for two weeks, was restored. However, the connection in Buchach was only the beginning of the final breakthrough of the 1st Panzer Army. The strike groups of both the SS Frundsberg division and the 6th Panzer Division were in a very vulnerable position in Buchach. This was especially true of the Frundsberg tanks, which had no infantry support and were therefore very vulnerable. The tankers had to "dismount" and take up all-round defense, especially since the Soviet command, realizing the full significance of Buchach, threw into battle parts of the front reserve - the 52nd and 74th rifle corps, which resolutely attacked. As a result, the forward detachments of both German armies were cut off from the main forces and now fought in encirclement, and the narrow corridor connecting the 1st and 4th tank armies was again blocked by the enemy.

Group of division soldiers in Ukraine

The quick arrival of reinforcements near Buchach - a grenadier from the 21st SS regiment - was a big question. They are led by others tank units 2nd Battalion, 10th SS Panzer Regiment, advanced on the right flank. Their target, according to Routh's orders, was the village of Monastyriska, which was controlled by the southern flank of the division. The land on which the attack was going turned into a swamp, the armored personnel carriers of the 1st "armored" battalion of Laubscheer got stuck in the mud and practically stopped. In addition, at Monastyriska, the SS ran into units of the 280th Infantry Division, which were not going to retreat. The Red Army put up strong resistance, and the pace of the German attack slowed down sharply, and after the commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 21st SS Regiment, SS Sturmbannführer Karl-Günther Molt, was wounded, the division's offensive stopped altogether. In this difficult situation, the regimental commander, SS-Obersturmbannführer Deisenhofer, asked for air and artillery support. For this, the 1st division of SS-Sturmbannführer Harry Jobst was involved. Adjutant of the 1st Battalion of the 10th SS Artillery Regiment and temporary commander of the Hummel battery, SS Untersturmführer Hans-Dietrich Sauter led his battery to positions near Podgaitsy to support the attack on Monastyryska with fire. Although the soldiers equipped their firing positions according to the charter, Sauter was faced with the fact that his young artillerymen stubbornly did not want to dig deep trenches, in contrast to the same Red Army men, whose trenches (captured and carefully examined by the Germans) met all the requirements. Soon the Hummels opened fire.

As a result, around 16.00, after an air strike by dive bombers from the 77th assault squadron, the 2nd battalion of SS-Sturmbannführer Fritz Mauer from the 21st SS regiment took Monastyriska by storm. After that, progress in the offensive for Frundsberg ended, and only the next day, on April 7, parts of the 21st SS regiment reached Buchach, along with the 1st company of the 10th SS engineer battalion.

Meanwhile, the bulk of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion was unable to reinforce the bridgehead of the 3rd company in Osovice. The units assembled at Kurdvanovka (headquarters company, units of the 2nd and 4th companies) were practically immobilized due to lack of fuel and mud spread everywhere. The requested fuel almost did not arrive. In addition, the 1st company, armed with wheeled armored vehicles, still remained in Podgaytsy, since it could not move along muddy roads. The situation in this area was unstable: for example, the anti-tank platoon of SS Untersturmführer Theo Henke from the 5th company was involved in battles with the retreating units of the Red Army west of Kurdvanovka. Among other things, Troienfeld ordered Brinkmann to secure the northern flank of the division, for which the latter needed to gather all available forces. The regrouping of the battalion began.

Hans Lingner, Georg Martin and Rudolf Reinecke in Ukraine

During April 6, soldiers of the reconnaissance battalion shot down 3 Soviet aircraft with rifle fire, the pilots were taken prisoner. Judging by the German description (“we never saw such primitive aircraft”), these were Po-2 aircraft. It is curious that on August 1, 1944, the battalion was awarded a special award - a special letter from Adolf Hitler, in which the Fuhrer personally thanked the soldiers of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion for the destruction of three enemy aircraft near Kurdvanovka.

Meanwhile, the Soviet command also did not sit idly by. Realizing the importance of such a key point as Podgaitsy, which was to become the basis for further development Soviet offensive, on April 6, the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front gave the following order: “The 4th Panzer Army, having subjugated the 147th Infantry Division, advance in motor vehicles to the western bank of the river. Strypa, strike at Podgaitsy and throw the enemy back. Koropets". However, the terrible state of the roads did not allow this order to be carried out: the Soviet troops, like the Germans, got bogged down in the mud and lost precious time, and when the situation with the weather and roads improved, it was already too late.

Nevertheless, this and other orders intensified the actions of the Red Army. On the afternoon of April 6, Soviet troops, with the forces of 2-3 companies of infantry, supported by 4 tanks, broke through to the north of Osovitsa, at Vishnevchik (pressing out the 100th Jaeger Division), and then at Bobulintsy (pressing out parts of the Khinze group) and created dangerous intrusion. After that, the threat of encirclement loomed over the Germans in Osowice. Since the attempt to reinforce the bridgehead failed due to lack of fuel, Brinkmann ordered Hinze to leave his positions and retreat to Kurdvanovka. During the night, the SS men evacuated their small bridgehead on Strypa and by 3 o'clock in the morning they reached Kurdvanovka. Realizing what was happening, the Soviet troops did not waste time: they crossed the Strypa and entrenched themselves on both banks of the river. Thus, from Vishnevchik to Osovitsa, a dangerous Soviet bridgehead was created with a key point in Bobulintsy. It should be noted that, despite a rather active day, the losses of the reconnaissance battalion amounted to only one person wounded.

On April 7, the 367th Infantry Division, acting on the right flank of the II SS Panzer Corps, struck in the direction of the confluence of the Strypa with the Dniester. The attack was successful, and on the left flank, the army infantrymen established contact with the 21st SS regiment, thereby creating a solid front. On the same day, the 100th Jaeger Division, reinforced by Major Eberhard Lange's 506th heavy tank battalion, repelled all Soviet attacks and entrenched itself on the east bank of the Strypa near Zolotniki, in the north of the corps' defense sector. The next day, heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinad" from the 653rd anti-tank division approached the division.

Heinz Harmel

Heinz Harmel on exercises (coincide in time)

At that moment, the main units of the 1st Panzer Army were stuck on muddy roads in the area of ​​the Seret River, 25 kilometers east of Strypa. In front of Hube's army, there was an open treeless area that stretched west to the Dniester. The chances that the army would quickly receive reinforcements or supplies were very small, given that the Frundsberg could not expand the bridgehead at Buchach in any way, and the bulk of the SS Hohenstaufen division was still in the Berezhany area and still had not entered to battle. And although small infantry reinforcements from the 21st SS regiment reached the position of the 6th company in Buchach by April 7, the bulk of the Frundsberg forces were still in the area northwest of Monastyriska.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Germans failed to create a solid front along Strypa. The 15-kilometer gap between the right flank of the 100th Jaeger Division at Zolotniki and the weak Frundsberg forces in Buchach was covered only by the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion. And then he covered it purely formally, since by this moment, on April 7, the reconnaissance battalion was in Kurdvanovka almost completely isolated, communication with its neighbors (the 100th Jaeger Division to the north and the 22nd SS Regiment to the south) was not established. Because of the mud, only half-tracked vehicles could move more or less successfully, so the 1st company of SS Obersturmführer Karl Ziebrecht on wheeled armored vehicles, which could not overcome the mud, still remained in Podgaitsy as a reserve.

Under these conditions, Heinrich Brinkmann and his men did everything in their power to keep control of the area. Since one of the most important tasks of the battalion was to cover the front near Buchach from the north, mobile patrols were sent to the gap between Buchach and Zlotniki. The composition of such a patrol included two armored personnel carriers with a 20-mm gun and one radio armored personnel carrier. In addition, a reinforced combined patrol was formed under the command of SS Untersturmführer Rudolf Harmstorf, commander of the 2nd company. Their task was simple - without getting involved in battles, imitate the German presence along the entire front at Strypa. It is clear that patrols of such strength could not seriously affect the situation, but still it was better than nothing, especially since the enemy did not show much activity at first.

Since the threat of an attack by Soviet troops was brewing from the northeast, in order to cover this dangerous area, Brinkmann sent a reinforced Harmstorf patrol to the area north of the village of Kuydanovo. The rest of the patrols were engaged in patrolling near Strypa, periodically coming into fire contact with small groups of Soviet troops. We add that on April 7, Gottfried Kuffner's patrol destroyed a Soviet reconnaissance aircraft that had landed on an emergency landing.

Meanwhile, in preparation for a potential Soviet attack, the battalion was actively entrenched in Kurdvanovka. Defense work was carried out under the leadership of the veteran of the Demyansk cauldron, SS Untersturmführer Helmut Temanns, an officer at large of the battalion headquarters. Some armored personnel carriers were dug into the ground and turned into firing points. The soldiers dug up firing cells, and some houses were turned into strongholds. Hinze's company, advanced closer to the front, dug in on the right flank, but suffered losses from sniper fire and was forced to withdraw, entrenched in front of Kurdvanovka itself.

On the night of April 8, Rudolf Harmstorf attacked the area of ​​​​the Soviet bridgehead in Bobulintsy and Vishnevchik, despite the significant superiority of the enemy. Losses amounted to two killed and six wounded, plus one cannon armored personnel carrier, but on the whole the raid was successful: prisoners were taken who gave evidence. It was established that the enemy had concentrated large forces here, including units of the 10th Guards Tank Corps. Considering that much attention had not been paid to this site before, this valuable information was of particular importance. The 2nd company of Harmstorf fought almost the whole day at the front near this bridgehead, "providing fire pressure on the enemy," as the Germans noted in documents.

Now it immediately became clear to the German command that if the Soviet troops in this sector successfully forced the Strypa and turned south, they would be able to encircle the 1st Panzer Army again, and even the SS Frundsberg division to boot. After analyzing the situation, Raus at 20:35 ordered the SS division "Hohenstaufen" to attack through Kosovo and cross Strypa north of Zolotniki. In turn, Frundsberg was supposed to strike northeast of the bridgehead in Buchach and, acting on the eastern bank of the Strypa, connect with them, creating a more or less continuous front.

During the night of April 7-8, the 1st Battalion of SS-Sturmbannführer Alois Wild of the 22nd SS Regiment reached Buchach and in the morning joined units of the 2nd Tank Battalion in their attack to the northeast, on the connection with the Hohenstaufen. The 1st division of the 10th SS artillery regiment also arrived in Buchach, supporting the attack. During the battle, 40 Soviet anti-tank guns and several self-propelled guns were destroyed by tanks and artillery, as a result, the SS men somewhat expanded the bridgehead northeast of Buchach. True, the threat on the flank was not completely eliminated, and the SS men entrenched themselves in new positions. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 22nd SS Regiment also crossed Strypa and established contact with Wild's units, which further strengthened the bridgehead. On the same day, the 367th Infantry Division took control of a line from Buchach southwest to the Dniester, 30 kilometers long.

While the Frundsberg desperately expanded its bridgehead, the 1st Panzer Army also did not sit idle: the opposing Soviet troops on the Buchach front were driven back, and communication between the German armies was again restored. At noon on April 8, Model, Hube and Hausser met in Buchach, formally demonstrating to the world the stability of the German position on this sector of the front and achieved success in the rescue of the 1st Panzer Army. Now a new phase of the operation began. The Germans had two main tasks: firstly, to hold and expand the corridor in Buchach, through which units of the 1st Panzer Army would be withdrawn as soon as possible, and secondly, to unblock the garrison of encircled Ternopil, which was unequivocally declared a "fortress".

Heinz Harmel on exercises

Meanwhile, the enemy was not going to give up. At 21.45 on April 8, Soviet troops launched a heavy attack in the Terebovlya region, 35 kilometers south of Ternopil, in order to close the corridor at Buchach. Raus immediately ordered the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions and the 100th Jaeger Division to strike towards the advancing Soviet troops and destroy them. Serious difficulties arose with the implementation of this order. The next day, Hohenstaufen and the 100th Jaeger Division began to move to their original positions for a decisive attack, but got bogged down in battles with fiercely attacking Soviet units, while Frundsberg spent the whole day in local battles in the Buchach area, mainly against units of the 18th Guards Rifle Corps. The success of these defensive battles showed that although the planned attack of Routh was thwarted, the enemy was also stopped and the situation for the Germans stabilized.

SS tank in Ukraine in the spring of 1944

The new commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Walter Model, personally planned the operation to de-siege Ternopil. To this end, the 9th SS Division "Hohenstaufen" was temporarily withdrawn from the II SS Panzer Corps and reassigned to the IIL Panzer Corps of General of the Panzer Troops Hermann Balck. Hohenstaufen strengthened battle group"Friebe", created on the basis of the 8th Panzer Division. This group was supposed to strike the main blow. The attack began on April 11 in heavy rain. Despite heavy losses, two panzer divisions managed to cover only half the distance separating them from Ternopil, and the operation ended in failure.

Meanwhile, units of the 1st Panzer Army continued to leave the encirclement through the Buchach corridor, but all this was carried out extremely slowly. On April 10, the 21st and 22nd SS regiments, with the support of the 2nd battalion of the 10th SS tank regiment, entered into a heavy battle with the 18th Guards Rifle Corps for the expansion of the German bridgehead northeast of Buchach. This was necessary to widen the corridor so that most of the 1st Panzer Army could finally get out of the pocket. The situation was not in favor of the Soviet troops, exhausted by previous battles: in the divisions of the corps (141, 226, 280 rifle divisions) there were only 300-350 active bayonets, there was almost no artillery. Therefore, despite the arrival of some units of the 67th Rifle Corps to Afonin, the operation for the Germans was successful, and by dawn on April 11, the German bridgehead was expanded by 10 kilometers, and the 18th Guards Rifle Corps was pushed back to the northeast and south of Buchach . The expansion of the bridgehead made it possible to somewhat speed up the exit of units of the 1st Panzer Army from the encirclement.

Between April 11-15, the 21st and 22nd SS regiments, plus the 2nd battalion of the 10th SS tank regiment, with the support of the 1st division of the 10th SS artillery regiment, continued to defend the bridgehead northeast of Buchach against violent attacks of the Soviet troops, who sought to prevent the breakthrough of the 1st Panzer Army. The intensity of the fighting was reflected in the combat report of the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the Supreme Commander of April 14, 1944: west of Kaitanovka, took possession of Bobulintsy, Kurdybanovka (southern) and went to an unnamed stream four kilometers southwest of Osovtsy. During the day of the battle, 5 tanks and self-propelled guns and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed.

The most severe tests fell on the 21st SS regiment, in which 7 company commanders were lost only by the dead on April 10-15. On April 14, Heinz Laubscheer, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 21st SS Regiment, was wounded; Leo-Hermann Reinhold took command of the battalion right on the battlefield. It was no easier for the 22nd SS regiment: in these battles, the commander of the 22nd SS regiment, SS Obersturmbannführer Ernst Schutzek (April 11) and the commander of the 1st battalion of this regiment, SS Sturmbannführer Wild, were seriously wounded (Wild died in the field hospital on April 19) . In support of the 22nd Regiment, the only tank battalion of the 10th SS Panzer Regiment, the 2nd, was sent.

At the same time, the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion was fighting hard in the sector opposite the Soviet bridgehead at Osovitsa, 12 kilometers north of Buchach. As we remember, the Soviet bridgehead on Strypa posed a serious threat, it was obvious to everyone that if this bridgehead was not quickly liquidated, then the Soviet troops would be able to use it for another attempt to encircle the 1st Panzer Army. This was not easy to do, given that Brinkmann's battalion was the only German unit in the gap between the positions of the SS division "Frundsberg" at Buchach and the 100th Jaeger Division at Zolotniki in the north. On April 10, Soviet troops from the bridgehead in Bobulintsy attacked the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion. Although the attack was repulsed, the situation remained serious. Losses per day amounted to 7 killed and 16 wounded, 2 armored personnel carriers. On April 11, Brinkmann launched a counterattack with the forces of the reinforced 3rd company of Hinze, which in the afternoon captured the heights on the outskirts of Bobulintsy. On the same day, the 4th company of SS-Obershurmführer Pauli, which established a line of defense on Stryp, and without any heavy weapons, was subjected to a counterattack by Soviet troops supported by tanks. The Red Army managed to penetrate the German line, but after one KV-1 tank was hit by a PAK-40, Pauli corrected the situation with a counterattack. Despite the "active day", the losses of the battalion amounted to only 4 soldiers wounded. Then parts of the battalion were drawn into stubborn defensive battles. There was no continuous line of defense, in some places Soviet troops infiltrated into the German rear, to eliminate these breakthroughs, Brinkmann abandoned the patrols created in a hurry. SS Unterscharführer Franz Nowak of the 4th company recalled: “Russian infantrymen will bleed to death on our lines. We shoot to the last bullet, the Russians are driven back. I touched with my machine gun a Russian soldier dying from a wound in the stomach. I light a cigarette and give it to the dying man ... After a few puffs, he closes his eyes.

In the heavy fighting that dragged on for several days, the battalion also suffered heavy losses. The 3rd company of Hinze was surrounded at Bobulintsy, but on April 14 managed to break out of the ring and retreat to Kurdvanovka. At dawn on April 15, the enemy penetrated the positions of the 2nd platoon of the 3rd company near Kurdvanovka with infantry supported by two tanks. The Soviet troops did not show great determination, limiting themselves to occupying only a few houses on the outskirts. Around 14.00, SS Unterscharführer Gstottner destroyed one Panzerfaust tank from 30 meters, after which SS Untersturmführer Rudolf Hoffmann, commander of the 2nd platoon, counterattacked with the support of the sapper platoon of SS Hauptscharführer Hartmann. During this bold attack, Hoffmann, who was in the forefront, was killed, but the Red Army men were driven out of Kurdvanovka.

Brinkmann then sent several patrols forward to clear up the situation. A patrol by SS-Untersturmführer Georg Siebenhuner of the 3rd Company was sent north to pinpoint the enemy's position. During reconnaissance, Siebenhuner ran into a Soviet position at the edge of the forest. Two camouflaged tanks opened fire on the lead armored personnel carrier. In seconds, several German cars were on fire. Siebenhuner himself was killed. The rather battered patrol returned to Kurdvanovka. It was also hot in Kurdvanovka itself: in the afternoon, Soviet artillery opened harassing fire on the village, and the battalion suffered losses in killed and wounded. On April 15, 9 people were lost killed (of which 1 officer) and 44 wounded (one of them, SS Untersturmführer Hans Oetjens from the 4th company, was slightly wounded and remained in the ranks).

While Brinmann's scouts held the front along the Strypa, the headquarters of the II SS Panzer Corps was preparing its operation to eliminate the enemy bridgehead. On April 14-15, units of the 7th Panzer Division replaced the 21st SS Regiment at positions near Buchach. The released units were concentrated on the eastern bank of the Strypa, together with the 22nd SS Regiment, to participate in the planned attack against the Soviet bridgehead. A little further north, on the western side of the river, the 3rd Battalion of the 21st SS Regiment, units of the 73rd Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 19th Panzer Division and 20 Tigers of the 506th Heavy Tank Battalion were concentrated. Parts of the 100th Jaeger Division, in particular the 54th Jaeger Regiment, prepared for an attack from the north, and the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion from the west. At 4:00 pm on 15 April, the 3rd Battalion, 21st SS Regiment launched a limited attack to the north to improve their position before the attack.

A concentrated German attack began on the morning of 16 April. It should be noted that in the last two days the weather has improved, and the roads have dried up a little, which facilitated the operation of the German mobile forces. The 1st Battalion of the 21st SS Regiment attacked from the east of Strypa, while the 3rd Battalion of the 21st SS Regiment attacked from the west bank. Then the 22nd SS regiment entered the action, by noon the 1st battalion of the regiment knocked out Soviet troops from the forest near the village of Starye Petlikovtsy. On the right flank, the 9th company of the 22nd SS regiment crossed Strypa and captured Hill 392; here, to the right, the 1st company of the 21st SS regiment reached the height of 380 - two kilometers northeast of Osovitsa. To the south of Kurdvanovka, units of the 73rd Panzer-Grenadier Regiment and the "Tigers" of the 506th Tank Battalion began to concentrate. Seeing that the situation is not changing in better side, Soviet troops unexpectedly withdrew from their positions in the southeast of Kurdvanovka. Upon learning of this, Brinkmann decided to immediately attack Bobulintsy in order to block the enemy's withdrawal routes.

The day before, reconnaissance established that the Soviet troops had seriously fortified themselves in Bobulintsy and on the heights next to them, digging tanks into the ground. The rather battered 137th Rifle Division of the Red Army defended itself here (according to the testimony of the prisoners, there were about 600 people in it). The attack was carried out by the forces of the 4th company of SS-Hauptsturmführer Kurt Pauli, reinforced by two cannon armored personnel carriers. Before the attack, a single Stug-III self-propelled gun from the Das Reich SS division came out to Kurdvanovka, fighting off its division. Brinkmann gave the self-propelled gun to the 4th company.

Pauli went 1 kilometer deep into enemy territory, where his company came under fire from Soviet anti-tank artillery and tanks. The SS men were supported by army "Tigers", which knocked out two Soviet tanks, another tank was destroyed by soldiers of the 4th company from a 75-mm anti-tank gun on an armored personnel carrier. After that, the enemy turned to flee. Pursuing him, Pauli went out to the Bobulins. At the same time, the 54th Jaeger Regiment of the 100th Jaeger Division broke into the northern outskirts of Bobulintsy, and attacked the 73rd Panzer-Grenadier Regiment from the south. At this moment, units of the 2nd company of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion under the command of SS Untersturmführer Harmstorf approached the company of Kurt Pauli. The sapper platoon of SS Hauptscharführer Hartmann, without special equipment, manually cleared the passages for equipment and the grenadier. Despite this, two armored personnel carriers were lost to the mines. However, this did not stop the attack of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion. Two positions of Soviet anti-tank artillery were destroyed. At 1700, a height 1 km west of Bobulintsy was captured. By 19.00, the Bobulintsy were completely surrounded by the Germans, and the SS men were drawn into fierce street fighting in the village. The Red Army soldiers fought to the last, but by 20.00 Bobulintsy were taken, about which Pauli immediately informed the command. Brinkmann immediately transferred two platoons of the 3rd company here. The SS men dug in in the village, and the Harmstorf patrol was sent out to reconnoiter, further east. In the north, contact was made with the 100th Jaeger Division, and units of the 21st SS Regiment approached from the south. This success was paid dearly: three armored personnel carriers were lost, one cannon armored personnel carrier, in addition, the Das Reich self-propelled gun attached to Pauli was blown up by a mine. 10 people were killed, 7 wounded, two were missing. Among the wounded was the commander of the 3rd platoon of the 4th company, SS-Hauptscharführer Karl Keller.

After the capture of Bobulintsy, the Soviet bridgehead was liquidated, and now the Germans firmly controlled the front along the Strypa and the bridgehead at Buchach. Now some parts of the SS division "Frundsberg" were withdrawn to the reserve, in particular the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion.

On April 20, the last units of the 1st Panzer Army safely crossed the Strypa, and thus the army successfully completed the evacuation and finally broke out of the encirclement. As Paul Hausser wrote after the war: “Seeing the remnants of the army leaving the encirclement after fighting during the Russian winter is a difficult sight for any soldier. To ensure the care of the wounded and sick, a lot of preparatory work was required from the corps doctor and quartermaster. Needless to say, the medical staff and supplies of the SS division "Frundsberg" laid down a significant part of the concerns in assisting units of the 1st Panzer Army.

On April 21, the 3rd battalion of the 21st SS regiment, the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion and the divisional escort company took up positions in the Bobulintsy area, where they remained until the division was replaced. On this day, a reconnaissance battalion at the front near Strypa destroyed one Soviet 150-mm self-propelled gun.

The exit of the 1st Panzer Army from the encirclement was a major success for the German command. After the war, G.K. Zhukov bleakly noted in his memoirs: “Neither I nor the front headquarters could accurately determine how many people broke through from the encirclement. There were different numbers. Apparently, it wasn’t dozens of tanks with landing forces that got out of the encirclement, as the troops then reported, but much more. ” It is noteworthy that it was the SS division "Frundsberg" that played one of the main roles in this operation.

On April 25, two army divisions replaced the Frundsberg in positions near Buchach, and the 59th Army Corps of Infantry General Friedrich Schulz replaced the II SS Panzer Corps in this sector. Thus, the first military campaign for the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg" ended. One of the young soldiers of the reconnaissance battalion summed up its peculiar result: “The draft born in 1925 went through its baptism by fire! Now we were real front-line soldiers!”

The losses of the division in its “first test” amounted to 2076 people, of which 577 were killed and died from wounds, of which 18 officers (of which SS Untersturmführer Werner Gutgessel died on May 10 in the infirmary from his wounds; the above-mentioned SS Sturmbannführer Wild also died in the infirmary ), 1432 wounded and 67 missing.

On April 27, the division commander was replaced. Von Treuenfeld was recalled for a "special assignment", and his position was taken by SS-Standartenführer Heinz Harmel, holder of the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves. He gained fame as the commander of the SS Regiment "Deutschland" of the SS division "Das Reich". In March-April 1944, Harmel graduated from the courses for division commanders, after which he was appointed commander of the Frundsberg. On May 18, he was promoted to SS Oberfuehrer.

Harmel noted his appointment with an order for the division:

“Officers and soldiers of the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg!

The Reichsführer SS appointed me commander of the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg". Today I took command. I am happy that I will be commanding a division whose name reflects the glorious traditions of Frundsberg being revived in the army. Discipline and an inexhaustible aggressive spirit are decisive in the transition to these traditions. I am proud that the young division showed itself worthy in the first battle and received full recognition. I have faith in my officers and soldiers and expect the division to take its place alongside the old SS divisions. And this place won't be the last! For the Fuhrer, the people and the Reich!

Another reshuffle in the command staff was the change of commander in the 10th SS Panzer Regiment. In April, SS Obersturmbannführer Franz Kleffner was appointed commander of the 6th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment "Theodor Eicke", as a result, the 10th SS Panzer Regiment was left without a commander at all. True, this did not cause any particular difficulties or inconvenience, since the division did not conduct combat operations, and the regiment itself consisted of only one battalion (2nd). Looking ahead, we note that only on June 22 was a new regiment commander appointed - SS Obersturmbannführer Otto Petsch.

The remainder of April and May II SS Panzer Corps spent in the reserve of Army Group "Northern Ukraine" in the region of Lvov. Here, the main task of Frundsberg was to prepare to repel the expected Soviet offensive in the sector at the junction between Army Groups Center and Northern Ukraine. Weekdays were spent in constant training alerts and work on equipping stationary defensive positions on Buta. Part of the personnel of the division was involved in anti-partisan actions. In particular, in the combat report of the II SS Panzer Corps, it was noted that the Jagdkommandos from the 9th and 10th SS divisions took part in the liquidation of the Soviet "gang" of almost 300 people, among whom were 20 "Soviet paratroopers" (that is, dropped on parachutes of military specialists from the Red Army) in the Bobrka area. The nationalist forces also got it: in addition, in the Berezhany region, the SS men defeated a detachment of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (moreover, Bandera), numbering about 200 people.

It is characteristic that, despite operations against Ukrainian nationalist forces, during their stay near Lviv, Ukrainians were enrolled in the division, mainly as translators and voluntary assistants (Khivi - Hilfswillige - voluntary assistant), there were about 200 of them in total.

On June 1, 1944, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps became subordinate to the 1st Panzer Army, but in light of further developments For a long time in its composition, he did not stay.

On June 1, there were 426 officers, 2432 non-commissioned officers and 14,165 soldiers in the ranks of the SS division "Frundsberg" - a total of 17,023 people. However, on June 30, the strength of the division's personnel was reduced to 13,552 people, therefore, it is likely that part of the division's personnel was transferred to replenish other units.

The actions of the division were highly appreciated and recognized by the German command. The true expression of this was the special order of Field Marshal Model (issued on the day when the II SS Panzer Corps was leaving for France), in which he emphasized the merits of the Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg divisions. In this document, we are primarily interested in the part dedicated to the SS division “Frundsberg”: “The corps played a major role in strengthening the front in a very difficult time and in creating a shield for the defense of the Motherland. With the restoration of contact with the 1st Panzer Army in Buchach, you… soldiers of the 10th SS Panzer Division helped save the day in a critical situation… I acknowledge your services and thank you. The Führer is now calling you to a new mission. I am sure that you will carry out his order in accordance with our motto: "There are no better soldiers in the world than the soldiers of Adolf Hitler!"

An objective analysis shows that the first baptism of fire of the SS division "Frundsberg" ended in complete success. Still "green", having no combat experience, and in addition, not yet fully equipped division turned out to be on top, fully confirming its high rank"SS Panzer Division" Although it should be noted that since the division had only one tank battalion, in fact, "Frundsberg" acted as a panzer-grenadier division, and not a tank one.

The division successfully fought both offensive and defensive battles. AT " best traditions"SS troops threw her into battle almost from the march, not yet completing a full deployment. Dirt and off-road were serious obstacles, but they were successfully overcome. During the battle, the advance detachment in Buchach was cut off for a while, but successfully held out in the encirclement. True, it should be said that the Soviet troops opposing the Frundsberg, mainly the 18th Guards Rifle Corps, were exhausted by previous battles, experienced a significant shortage of personnel and weapons. Nevertheless, "Frundsberg" was also still far from the "best form" of the SS Panzer Division.

Sons of the Reich. P.4.

List of killed officers of the division. Personal archive of R. Ponomarenko. L. 1. We add that the next day, March 29, the list of losses of the division was replenished by the doctor of the 3rd battalion of the 22nd SS regiment, SS Hauptsturmführer Dr. Ingo Riedl and the commander of the 3rd battalion of the 21st SS regiment, SS Hauptsturmführer Werner Schmid.

Interestingly, as early as March 26, radio intelligence of the 1st Ukrainian Front detected the operation of the radio network of a tank division, of an unidentified numbering, in the Zolochev area, on March 27 they detected the concentration of two tank divisions in this area, and on March 28 - infantry and tanks on the outskirts of Podgaitsy. This gave grounds to some domestic historians, such as B. Sokolov, to conclude that the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps were already near Lviv at that time, which, as we have seen, is not true. (Cm. Sokolov B. The Red Army against the Waffen-SS. S. 283). So it is not clear what exactly the Soviet radio intelligence detected and whether it was German disinformation.

Chronique de la SS-Pz-AA 10 S. 151. Needless to say, this statement contrasts sharply with the generally accepted myths about the superiority of SS units over the Wehrmacht in terms of equipment and equipment.

A tributary of the Dniester.

Due to the condition of the supply routes, supply at that moment could only be carried out by dropping containers from the air.

Afonin I.M. Difficult, but glorious was the way. S. 139.

Cm., Reynolds M. Sons of the Reich. P.5.

Moskalenko K.S. On the Pivdeno-Zakhidny straight line S. 342. It should be noted that, having absolutely no knowledge of the material, the Russian historian B. Sokolov, obviously relying on Soviet memoirists, claims that on the morning of April 5, both SS tank divisions and the two above-mentioned army divisions (Red Army against the SS troops. S. 292). Such a statement is unfounded, given the material we have cited above about the SS division "Frundsberg". As for the Hohenstaufen, on April 5, only one battalion from this division, the 1st battalion of Ernst Hagenlocher from the 19th SS regiment, was able to enter the battle. The rest of the 9th SS division was still arriving at the front by this time.

From the Dnieper to the Vistula. S. 187.

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By the beginning of the Russian campaign, three volunteer regiments were created in the ranks of the SS from foreign citizens, and with the outbreak of hostilities, the number of foreign units began to grow steadily. Participation foreign legions in the war against the USSR, according to Himmler's plan, it was supposed to show a pan-European desire to destroy communism. Participation of all citizens European countries in the war against the Soviet Union gave rise to the post-war identification of the SS Troops and the European Community.

In 1941, foreign volunteers were recruited into the national volunteer legions and corps, in strength from one battalion to a regiment. Similar names were given to various anti-communist units created in 1917-1920 in Europe. In 1943, most of the legions were reorganized into larger military units, the largest of which was the German SS Panzer Corps.

SS-Standart "Nord West"

The formation of this German regiment began on April 3, 1941. The regiment was dominated by Dutch and Flemish volunteers, organized into companies along national lines. Training "Nordwest" took place in Hamburg. After the start of the war with Soviet Union it was decided to use the cadre of the regiment for the speedy formation of independent national legions. By August 1, 1941, there were 1,400 Dutch, 400 Flemings and 108 Danes in the regiment. At the end of August, the regiment was transferred to the Arus-Nord training area in East Prussia. Here, on September 24, 1941, according to the order of the FHA SS, the regiment was disbanded, and the existing personnel were distributed among the national legions and units of the V-SS.

From the moment of formation until the last day, the regiment commander was SS-Standartenführer Otto Reich.

Volunteer Legion "Netherlands"

The creation of the legion began on June 12, 1941 in the Krakow region, a little later the legion's frame was transferred to the Arus-Nord training ground. The basis of the legion was the Dutch battalion from the disbanded Nordwest regiment. Another contingent that arrived at the formation was a battalion created from the ranks of the assault detachments of the Dutch National Socialist Movement. The battalion departed Amsterdam on October 11, 1941, and joined up with volunteers already trained in Arus.

Already by Christmas 1941, the legion was a motorized regiment of three battalions and two companies (the 13th infantry gun company and the 14th anti-tank company). Before being sent to the front, the total number of the legion exceeded 2600 ranks. In mid-January 1942, the legion was transferred to Danzig, and from there by sea to Libava. From Libava, the Dutch were sent to the northern sector of the front in the area of ​​Lake Ilmen. By the end of January, the legion arrived at the positions assigned to it in the region of the Novgorod-Tosna road. The legion received its baptism of fire in the battle near Gusya Gora near Volkhov (to the north of Lake Ilmen). After that, the Dutch took part in long defensive and then offensive battles near Volkhov. Then the legion operated at Myasny Bor. In mid-March 1942, a reinforced field hospital with Dutch personnel, which was part of the legion, arrived on the Eastern Front. The hospital was located in the Oranienburg region.

During the fighting, the legion earned the gratitude of the OKW, but lost 20% of its strength and was withdrawn from the front line and replenished with ethnic Germans from Northern Schleswig. After a short rest and resupply, in July 1942 the legion participated in the destruction of the remnants of the Soviet 2nd shock army and, according to some reports, participated in the capture of General Vlasov himself. The legion spent the rest of the summer and autumn in operations near Krasnoye Selo and later around Shlisselburg, slightly deviating from the Leningrad direction. At the end of 1942, the legion operated as part of the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade. Its number at that time decreased to 1755 people. On February 5, 1943, news came from Holland that the honorary chief of the legion, General Seiffardt, had been killed by the Resistance. After 4 days, the FHA SS issued an order to give the first company of the legion the name "General Seiffardt".

In addition to the gratitude of the OKW, the legion had another distinction, its rottenführer Gerardus Muiman from the 14th anti-tank company knocked out thirteen Soviet tanks in one of the battles and on February 20, 1943 was awarded a knight's cross, thus becoming the first of the German volunteers to be awarded this honor. On April 27, 1943, the legion was withdrawn from the front and sent to the Grafenwer training ground.

On May 20, 1943, the Netherlands Volunteer Legion was officially disbanded, to be reborn on October 22, 1943, but already as the 4th SS Nederland Volunteer Tank Grenadier Brigade.

Volunteer Corps "Denmark"

Eight days after the German attack on the USSR, the Germans announced the creation of the Danish Volunteer Corps, independent of the Nordland regiment. On July 3, 1941, the first Danish volunteers, having received the banner, left Denmark and headed for Hamburg. By order of the FHA SS of July 15, 1941, the unit was named the Volunteer Unit "Denmark", and then renamed the Volunteer Corps. By the end of July 1941, a headquarters and an infantry battalion of 480 people were organized. In August, one officer and 108 Danes from the disbanded Nordwest regiment were added to the battalion. At the end of August, a communications department was created at the battalion headquarters. In September 1941, the corps was expanded to become a reinforced motorized battalion. On September 13, 1941, the unit was moved to Treskau to join the reserve company of the corps. By December 31, 1941, the strength of the corps increased to 1164 ranks, and about a month later it increased by another hundred people. Until the spring of 1942, the personnel of the corps were trained.

On May 8–9, the Danish battalion was transported by plane to the Heiligenbeil area ( East Prussia), and then to Pskov, to Army Group North. Upon arrival, the corps was tactically subordinated to the SS division "Totenkopf". From May 20 to June 2, 1942, the corps took part in the battles north and south of the Demyansk fortifications, where it distinguished itself by destroying the Soviet bridgehead. In early June, the Danes were operating along the road to Byakovo. On the night of June 3-4, the battalion was transferred to the northern section of the Demyansk corridor, where it fought off strong enemy attacks for two days. The next day, June 6, the Danes were relieved and camped in the woods near Vasilivshino. On the morning of June 11, the Red Army launched a counterattack and returned Bolshie Dubovichi, occupied by the Germans, by the middle of the day the situation worsened even more and von Lettow-Vorbeck ordered the corps to retreat. After this battle, the number of companies fluctuated from 40 to 70 people in each. Having taken up defensive positions in the Vasilivshino area, the corps was replenished with a reserve train that arrived from Poznan. On July 16, the Red Army attacked and occupied Vasilivshino, and on the seventeenth attacked the Danish battalion with tanks and air support. Vasilivshino was again occupied by the Germans on July 23, the extreme left flank of this position was occupied by the corps. On the twenty-fifth of July, the Danes were withdrawn to the reserve. By August 1942, the battalion had lost 78% of its initial strength, which was the reason for its withdrawal from the Demyansk region and being sent to Mitava. In September 1942, the Danes returned to their homeland and paraded through Copenhagen and were disbanded to their homes, but on October 12 all the ranks were again gathered in Copenhagen and returned to Mitava. On December 5, 1942, a reserve company was introduced into the battalion, and the corps itself became part of the 1st SS Infantry Brigade.

In December 1942, the corps served in the fortified area of ​​Nevel, and later fought defensive battles south of Velikiye Luki. After that, the corps spent three weeks in reserve. On Christmas Eve, the Danes were attacked by a Soviet division and retreated from Kondratovo, which they occupied, but on December 25 the corps recaptured Kondratovo. On January 16, 1943, the boiler at Velikiye Luki was closed, and the Danes moved to a position north of Myshino-Kondratovo, where they remained until the end of February. On February 25, the corps attacked and captured the enemy stronghold on Taide - this was the last battle of the Danish volunteers.

At the end of April 1943, the remaining Danes were sent to the Grafenwöhr training ground. On May 6, the corps was officially disbanded, but most of the Danes remained to continue serving as part of the Nordland division being formed. In addition to the Danes, a large number of ethnic Germans from northern Schleswig served in this unit. White emigrants also preferred to serve in the Danish corps.

The Volunteer Corps was commanded by: Legion-Obersturmbannführer Christian Peder Krussing July 19, 1941 - February 8–19, 1942, SS-Sturmbannführer Christian Frederick von Schalburg March 1 - June 2, 1942, Legion-Hauptsturmführer K.B. Martinsen 2–10 June 1942, SS-Sturmbannführer Hans Albrecht von Lettow-Vorbeck 9–11 June 1942, again K.B. Martinsen June 11, 1942 - May 6, 1943), Legion Sturmbannführer Peder Nirgaard-Jacobsen May 2–6, 1943

In April 1943, after the disbandment of the volunteer corps from its veterans who returned to Denmark, Martinsen created the Danish analogue of the German SS. Officially, this unit was first called the Danish German Corps, and then the Schalburg Corps in memory of the deceased corps commander. This corps was not part of the B-SS and in no way belonged to the organization of the SS. In the second half of 1944, under pressure from the Germans, Schalburgkorpset was transferred to the V-SS and reorganized into the SS training battalion Schalburg, and then into the SS security battalion Zeeland.

Volunteer Legion "Norway"

With the outbreak of the German war against the USSR in Norway, the idea of ​​the need for a real participation of the Norwegians in the hostilities on the side of Germany was widely circulated.

Recruiting centers were opened in major Norwegian cities, and by the end of July 1941, the first three hundred Norwegian volunteers went to Germany. After arriving in Kiel, they were sent to the Fallinbostel training area. Here, on August 1, 1941, the volunteer legion "Norway" was officially created. In mid-August, another 700 volunteers from Norway arrived here, as well as 62 volunteers from the Norwegian community in Berlin. On October 3, 1941, in the presence of Vidkun Quisling, who arrived in Germany, the first battalion of the legion took the oath in Fallinbostel. As a sign of continuity, this battalion was named "Viken" - the same as the 1st Hirda Regiment (military detachments of the Norwegian National Samling). The staff of the legion, according to the order of the FHA SS, was to consist of 1218 ranks, but by October 20, 1941, the unit numbered more than 2000 people. The Norwegian Legion was organized according to the following principle: a headquarters and headquarters company (anti-tank company), a platoon of war correspondents, an infantry battalion of three infantry companies and one machine gun company. A reserve battalion, created in Halmestrand, was also considered part of the legion.

On March 16, 1942, the legion arrived at the Leningrad sector of the front. A few kilometers from Leningrad, the Norwegians were introduced into the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade. After the arrival of the legion, they began to carry out patrol service, and then took part in the battles at the front until May 1942. In September 1942, the reserve battalion of the legion, which had already transferred the main part of the ranks to the legion, was reduced to a company, but, in addition to this company, a new one was created on the territory of Latvia in Jelgava (Mitava). At the same time, the first of four police companies of the Norwegian Legion arrived at the front, created in Norway from pro-German police officers. Its commander was SS-Sturmbannführer and leader of the Norwegian SS Janas Lie. The company operated as part of the legion, which at that time was on the northern sector of the front, where it suffered heavy losses in defensive battles near Krasnoe Selo, Konstantinovka, Uretsk and Krasny Bor. In February 1943, the 800 remaining legionnaires were connected with reserve companies, and at the end of March the legion was withdrawn from the front and sent to Norway.

On April 6, 1943, a parade of legion ranks took place in Oslo. After a short vacation, the legion returned to Germany in May of the same year, the Norwegians were assembled at the Grafenwöhr training ground, where the legion was disbanded on May 20, 1943. However, most of the Norwegians responded to the call of V. Quisling and continued to serve in the ranks of the new "German" SS division.

After the creation of the 1st police company and its excellent service on the Eastern Front, the creation of other police companies began. The second company was created by the Norwegian police major Egil Hoel in the autumn of 1943, it included 160 officers of the Norwegian police. After completing the training, the company arrived at the front and was introduced into the 6th SS reconnaissance unit of the Nord division. Together with the specified unit, the company operated at the front for 6 months. The company commander was SS-Sturmbannführer Egil Hoel.

In the summer of 1944, the 3rd police company was created, in August 1944 it arrived at the front, but due to Finland's withdrawal from the war and the retreat of German troops from its territory, the company did not have time to take part in the battles. One hundred and fifty people of its composition were sent to Oslo, and in December 1944 the company was disbanded. At the time of formation, the company was commanded by SS-Hauptsturmführer Age Heinrich Berg, and then by SS-Obersturmführer Oskar Olsen Rustand. The last of these officers tried to form the 4th police company at the end of the war, but nothing came of his idea.

The Legion was commanded by: Legion Sturmbannführer Jürgen Bakke from August 1, 1941, Legion Sturmbannführer Finn Hannibal Kjelstrup from September 29, 1941, Legion Sturmbannführer Arthur Quist from autumn 1941.

Finnish volunteer battalion

Even before the start of the war with the Soviet Union, the Germans secretly recruited Finns into the V-SS. The recruiting campaign gave the Germans 1,200 volunteers. During May - June 1941, volunteers arrived in batches from Finland to Germany. Upon arrival, the volunteers were divided into two groups. Persons with military experience, i.e. participants " winter war", were distributed among the divisions of the Viking division, and the rest of the volunteers were assembled in Vienna. From Vienna, they were transferred to the Gross Born training area, where they were formed into the Finnish SS Volunteer Battalion (formerly known as the Nordost SS Volunteer Battalion). The battalion consisted of a headquarters, three rifle companies and a heavy company. Part of the battalion was a reserve company in Radom, which was part of the reserve battalion of the German legions. In January

In 1942, the Finnish battalion arrived at the front at the location of the Viking division on the line of the Mius River. According to the order, the Finns who arrived first became the fourth and then the third battalion of the Nordland regiment, while the third battalion itself was used to make up for the losses of the division. Until April 26, 1942, the battalion fought on the Mius River against units of the 31st Infantry Division of the Red Army. Then the Finnish battalion was sent to Aleksandrovka. After heavy fighting for Demidovka, the Finns were withdrawn from the front for replenishment, which lasted until September 10, 1942. The change in the situation at the front required the participation of the battalion in the bloody battles for Maykop, in which the German command used the Finns in the most difficult areas. First

In 1943, the Finnish volunteer battalion, in the general flow of the German retreat, went all the way from Malgobek (through Mineralnye Vody, villages and Bataysk) to Rostov, participating in rearguard battles. Having reached Izyum, the Finns, along with the remnants of the Nordland regiment, were withdrawn from the division and sent to the Grafenwer training ground. From Grafenwöhr, the Finnish battalion was transferred to Ruhpolding, where it was disbanded on July 11, 1943.

During the existence of the battalion, Finnish volunteers also served as part of the war correspondents unit and as part of the Totenkopf reserve infantry battalion No. 1. Attempts to create a new entirely Finnish SS unit in 1943-1944 were unsuccessful, and the formation of the Kalevala SS unit was discontinued . The most famous Finnish volunteer was Obersturmführer Ulf Ola Ollin from the 5th SS Panzer Regiment, of all the Finns he received the most awards, and his Panther tank with number 511 was known to the entire Viking division.

The battalion commander was SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans Collani.

British Volunteer Corps

By the beginning of 1941, about 10 Englishmen served in the ranks of the V-SS, but, however, until 1943, no attempts were made to form an English legion in the Waffen-SS. The initiator of the creation of the English division was John Amery, the son of the former British Minister for India. John Amery himself was a well-known anti-communist and even participated in the Spanish Civil War on the side of General Franco.

Initially, from the British living on the continent, Amery created the British Anti-Bolshevik League, which was supposed to create its own armed formations to be sent to the Eastern Front. After a long debate with the Germans, in April 1943 he was allowed to visit the camps of English prisoners of war in France to recruit volunteers and promote his ideas. This venture was codenamed "Special Compound 999". It is interesting to note that this number was Scotland Yard's phone before the war.

In the summer of 1943, a special unit was transferred to the control of the D-1 department of the XA SS, which dealt with European volunteers. In the autumn of 1943, the volunteers changed their former English uniform to that of the Waffen-SS, while receiving SS soldiers' books. In January 1944, the former name "St. George's Legion" was changed to the "British Volunteer Corps", more in line with the tradition of the B-SS. It was planned to increase the size of the corps to 500 people at the expense of prisoners of war, and to put Brigadier General Parrington, who was taken prisoner in 1941 in Greece, at the head.

After some time, the composition of the British was divided into groups for use at the front. Volunteers were distributed to various parts of the Waffen-SS. Largest number volunteers were taken to the Kurt Eggers regiment of military correspondents, and the rest were distributed between the 1st, 3rd and 10th SS divisions. Another 27 British remained in the Dresden barracks to complete their training. In October 1944, it was decided to transfer the BFK to the III SS Panzer Corps. After the famous air raid of the Western Allies on Dresden, the BFC was transferred to the Lichterfelde barracks in Berlin, where those who returned from the front also arrived. After completing their training in March 1945, the British were transferred partly to the headquarters of the German SS Panzer Corps, and partly to the 11th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion. In the ranks of this battalion, the BFK took part in the defense of Schonberg on the western bank of the Oder on March 22.

With the beginning of the assault on Berlin, most of the British went on a breakthrough to the Western allies, to whom they surrendered in the Mecklenburg area. The remaining individual volunteers took part in street fighting along with the Nordland division.

The BFC, in addition to the British, recruited volunteers from the colonies, Commonwealth countries and America.

BFK commanders: SS-Hauptsturmführer Johannes Rogenfeld - summer 1943, SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans Werner Ropke - summer 1943 - May 9, 1944, SS-Obersturmführer Dr. Külich - May 9, 1944 - February 1945, SS-Hauptsturmführer Doctor Alexander Dolezalek - until the end of the war.

Indian Volunteer Legion

The Indian Legion was created at the beginning of the war in the ranks of the German army as the 950th Indian infantry regiment. By the end of 1942, the regiment consisted of about 3,500 officers. After training, the legion was sent to security service, first in Holland, and then in France (guarding the Atlantic Wall). On August 8, 1944, the legion was transferred to the SS troops with the designation "Indian Legion of the Waffen-SS". Seven days later the Indian volunteers were transported by train from Lokanau to Poitirz.

Upon arrival in the Poitirz region, the Indians were attacked by the "maquis", and at the end of August the soldiers of the legion entered into battle with the Resistance on the way from Shatrou to Allier. In the first week of September the legion reached the Berry Canal. Continuing the movement, the Indians fought street battles with French regulars in the city of Doon, and then retreated in the direction of Sancoin. In the region of Luzi, the Indians fell into a night ambush, after which the legion proceeded at an accelerated march in the direction of Dijon through Loir. In the battle with enemy tanks at Nuits - Site - Georges, the unit suffered heavy losses. After this battle, the Indians retreated on a march through Relipemont in the direction of Colmar. And then they continued to retreat to the territory of Germany.

In November 1944, the unit was designated the "Indian Volunteer Legion of the Waffen-SS". By the beginning of December of the same year, the legion arrived at the garrison of the city of Oberhoffen. After Christmas, the legion was transferred to the Heuberg training camp, where it remained until the end of March 1945. In early April 1945, the legion was disarmed by order of Hitler. In April 1945, the Indian Legion began moving towards the Swiss border in the hope of obtaining asylum there and avoiding extradition to the Anglo-Americans. Breaking through the Alps to the area of ​​Lake Constance, the Indian volunteers were surrounded and captured by the French "maquis" and the Americans. Since 1943, as part of the Indian regiment, there was a so-called guards company, located in Berlin and created for ceremonial purposes. During the war, the company, apparently, continued to remain in Berlin. During the storming of Berlin, Indians in the form of the SS took part in its defense, one of them was even taken prisoner by the Red Army, all of them, probably, were the ranks of the mentioned “guards” company.

The commander of the legion was SS Oberführer Heinz Bertling.

Serbian Volunteer Corps

Until the creation in August 1941 of the Serbian government of General Milan Nedich, no attempts were made to organize Serbian armed units. General Nedić announced the creation of various state police forces. Their combat effectiveness left much to be desired, so they were mainly used for local security tasks. In addition to these formations, on September 15, 1941, the so-called Serbian Volunteer Team was created. This unit was created from the activists of the ZBOR organization and the radical military. Colonel Konstantin Mushitsky, who was adjutant of the Yugoslav Queen Mary before the war, was appointed commander of the unit. The team soon turned into an excellent anti-partisan unit, which was recognized even by the Germans. Like the rest of the Serbian and Russian units, the team "made" peace with the Chetniks and fought only against Tito's troops and the Ustasha arbitrariness. Soon departments of KFOR began to spring up throughout Serbia, these departments were known as "detachments", during 1942 their number increased to 12, the detachment usually included 120-150 soldiers and several officers. The KFOR detachments were widely used by the Germans for anti-partisan actions and, in fact, were the only Serbian formation that received weapons from the Germans. In January 1943, the SDKomanda was reorganized into the SDKorpus, which consisted of five battalions of 500 men each. The corps did not hide its monarchist orientation and even went to parades in Belgrade under a banner with monarchist slogans. At the beginning of 1944, the KFOR and new volunteers were reorganized into 5 infantry regiments (Roman numbers from I to V) of 1200 fighters each and an artillery battalion of 500 people. In addition, KFOR later established a recruiting school and a hospital in Logatec. On October 8, 1944, parts of the corps began to retreat from Belgrade. The next day, the SDKorpus was transferred to the Waffen-SS with the designation "Serbian SS Volunteer Corps". The hull structure was left unchanged. The ranks of the Serbian Corps did not become the ranks of the Waffen-SS and continued to bear their former ranks and obey the Serbian command. After the retreat from Belgrade, the KFOR units, together with the Chetniks and the Germans, left for Slovenia. In April 1945, by agreement with the Germans, KFOR became part of one of the Chetnik divisions in Slovenia. At the end of April, two regiments of KFOR (I and V regiments), on the orders of the Chetnik commander in Slovenia, General Damjanovich, left in the direction of the Italian border, crossing which they capitulated on May 1. The remaining three regiments II, III and IV, under the command of the chief of staff of the KFOR, Lieutenant Colonel Radoslav Tatalovich, participated in the battles with the NOAU near Ljubljana, after which they retreated to Austrian territory and surrendered to the British.

The commander of the Serbian Corps was Colonel (general at the end of the war) Konstantin Mushitsky.

Estonian Volunteer Legion

The legion was formed according to the states of the usual three-battalion regiment in the SS training camp "Heidelager" (near the city of Debitz, on the territory of the General Governor). Shortly after the full complement of the legion was designated as the "1st Estonian Volunteer Grenadier Regiment of the SS." Until the spring of next year, the regiment was trained in the above camp. In March 1943, the regiment received an order to send the first battalion to the front as part of the Viking SS Panzergrenadier Division, which was operating at that time in the Izyum region. The German SS-Hauptsturmführer Georg Eberhardt was appointed commander of the battalion, and the battalion itself became known as the Estonian SS Volunteer Grenadier Battalion Narva. From March 1944 he acted as the 111/10th SS Regiment "Westland". Without engaging in major battles, the battalion, together with the division, operated as part of the 1st Panzer Army in the Izyum-Kharkov region. The Estonians' baptism of fire took place on July 19, 1943, in the battle for Hill 186.9. Supported by fire from the artillery regiment of the Viking division, the battalion destroyed about 100 Soviet tanks, but lost its commander, who was replaced by SS-Obersturmführer Koop. The next time Estonian volunteers distinguished themselves on August 18 of the same year in the battle for heights 228 and 209 near Klenovaya, where, interacting with a company of "tigers" from the SS tank regiment "Totenkopf", they destroyed 84 Soviet tanks. Apparently, these two cases gave the spacecraft analysts the right to indicate in their intelligence reports that the Narva battalion had extensive experience in fighting with machine tools. Continuing fighting in the ranks of the Viking division, the Estonians, along with it, ended up in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky pocket in the winter of 1944, upon leaving which they suffered huge losses. In April, the division received an order to remove the Estonian battalion from its composition, a touching send-off was arranged for the Estonians, after which they departed for the place of the new formation.

Caucasian SS military unit

In the first years of the war, a large number of units from the natives of the Caucasus were created as part of the German army. Their formation took place mainly on the territory of occupied Poland. In addition to front-line army units, various police and punitive units were formed from Caucasians. In 1943, in Belarus, in the Slonim district, two Caucasian police battalions of the Schutzmannschaft were created - the 70th and 71st. Both battalions participated in anti-partisan operations in Belarus, being subordinate to the head of the anti-bandit formations. Later, these battalions became the basis for the North Caucasus security brigade being formed in Poland. By order of Himmler dated July 28, 1944, about 4,000 officers of the brigade, along with their families, were transferred to the region of upper Italy. Here, together with the Cossack camp, the Caucasians formed the backbone of the anti-partisan forces that were subordinate to the HSSPF "Adriatic Coast" of the SS-Obergruppenführer Globochnik. On August 11, by order of Berger, the brigade was reorganized into the Caucasian Corps, and less than a month later it was renamed the Caucasian Connection. The recruitment of the unit was accelerated by the transfer of 5000 employees from the 800, 801, 802, 803, 835, 836, 837, 842 and 843 Army field battalions. The connection consisted of three national military groups - Armenian, Georgian and North Caucasian. It was planned to deploy each group into a full-fledged regiment.

At the end of 1944, the Georgian and North Caucasian groups were located in Italian city Paluzza, and the Armenian group - in Klagenfurt. In December 1944, the Azerbaijani group, which had previously been part of the Eastern Turkic SS formation, was transferred to the formation. Azerbaijani participants in the events after the war claimed that their group managed to arrive in Verona before the end of the war.

Groups located in Italy were constantly involved in anti-partisan operations. At the end of April, the North Caucasian group began to retreat to the territory of Austria, and the small Georgian group was disbanded by its commander. In May 1945, the ranks of the formation were issued by the British to the Soviet side.

Unlike the next unit, all command positions were occupied by Caucasian emigrant officers, and the commander of the unit itself was SS-Standartenführer Arvid Toyerman, a former officer of the Russian Imperial Army.

Eastern Turkic SS military unit

The German army created a large number of volunteer units from the inhabitants of Soviet Central Asia. The commander of one of the first Turkestan battalions was Major Mayer-Mader, who in the pre-war years was a military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. Mayer-Mader, seeing the limited and unpromising use of Asians by the Wehrmacht, dreamed of the sole leadership of all Turkic units. To this end, he went first to Berger, and then to the head of the VI Department of the RSHA, SS-Brigadeführer and Major General of the B-SS Walter Schellenberg. To the first, he proposed an increase in the number of V-SS by 30,000 Turkestans, and to the second - the implementation of sabotage in Soviet Central Asia and the organization of anti-Soviet speeches. The major's proposals were accepted and, in November 1943, the 1st East Muslim SS Regiment was created on the basis of the 450th and 480th battalions.

The formation of the regiment took place near Lublin, in the town of Poniatowo. In January 1944, it was decided to deploy the regiment to the SS division Neue Turkestan. For this purpose, the following battalions were taken from the active army: 782, 786, 790, 791 Turkestan, 818 Azerbaijani and 831 Volga-Tatar. At this time, the regiment itself was sent to Belarus to participate in anti-partisan operations. Upon arrival, the headquarters of the regiment was located in the town of Yuratishki, not far from Minsk. On March 28, 1944, during one of these operations, the commander of the regiment Mayer-Mader died, his place was taken by SS-Hauptsturmführer Billig. Compared to his previous commander, he was not popular with his men, and a number of excesses occurred in the regiment, as a result of which Billig was removed, and the regiment was transferred to the von Gottberg battle group. In May, the regiment took part in a major anti-partisan operation near Grodno, after which, together with other national units, it was withdrawn to Poland in late May - early June. In July 1944, the regiment was sent to the Neuhammer training ground for replenishment and rest, but soon it was sent to Lutsk and subordinated to the special SS regiment Dirlewanger. With the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944, the Muslim regiment and the Dirlewanger regiment were sent to suppress it. Upon arrival, on August 4, both regiments became subordinate to the battle group Reinefarth. In Warsaw, the Turkestans operated in the urban area of ​​Wola. In early October, the Warsaw Uprising was over. When the uprising was suppressed, the Turkestans received recognition from the German command. On October 1, the deployment of the regiment to the Eastern Turkic SS military unit was announced. The Muslim regiment was renamed the military group "Turkestan" with a force of one battalion, the rest of the regiment, together with replenishment from the Volga-Tatar units of the army, constituted the military group "Idel - Ural". In addition, an SS assembly camp for Turkic volunteers was set up in the vicinity of Vienna. On October 15, the formation, together with the Dirlewanger regiment, was sent to suppress a new, now Slovak uprising.

By the beginning of November 1944, the formation had 37 officers, 308 non-commissioned officers and 2317 soldiers in its ranks. In December, the military group "Azerbaijan" was taken from the formation. This group was transferred to the Caucasian connection. In December, the connection presented an unpleasant surprise to the Germans. On December 25, 1944, the commander of the Turkestan group Waffen-Obersturmführer Gulyam Alimov and 458 of his subordinates went over to the Slovak rebels near Miyava. At the request of the Soviet representatives, the rebels shot Alimov. For this reason, about 300 Turkestans again defected to the Germans. Despite this sad experience, two days later the Germans organized officer courses for training native officers of the formation in the town of Poradi.

On January 1, 1945, the military group "Crimea", created from the disbanded Tatar brigade, became part of the formation. At the same time, SS-Obersturmbannführer Anton Ziegler gathered another 2227 Turkestans, 1622 Azerbaijanis, 1427 Tatars and 169 Bashkirs in the Vienna assembly camp. All of them were preparing to join the ranks of the Turkic SS formation. In March 1945, the formation was transferred to the 48th Infantry Division (2nd Formation). In April 1945, the 48th division and the Turkic formation were in the training camp Dollersheim. The national committees planned to transfer the formation to northern Italy, but nothing is known about the implementation of this plan.

The Eastern Muslim SS Regiment and the Eastern Turkic SS formation were commanded by: SS-Obersturmbannführer Andreas Mayer-Mader - November

1943–28 March 1944, SS-Hauptsturmführer Biellig - 28 March - 6 April 1944, SS-Hauptsturmführer Hermann - 6 April - May 1944, SS-Sturmbannführer of the Reserve Franz Liebermann - June - August

1944, SS-Hauptsturmführer Rainer Oltzsha - September - October 1944, SS-Standartenführer Wilhelm Hintersatz (under the pseudonym Harun al Rashid) - October - December 1944, SS-Hauptsturmführer Fürst - January - May 1945. Mullahs were attached to all parts of the compound, and the supreme imam of the entire compound was Nagib Khodiya.

Losses of SS troops

During the Polish campaign, the losses of the B-SS amounted to several dozen people. The superiority of the German army in armament and the lightning-fast course of the campaign reduced the losses of the Waffen-SS to almost a minimum. In 1940, in the West, the SS men faced a completely different enemy. High level training English army, positions prepared in advance and the availability of modern artillery from the allies became an obstacle to the SS's path to victory. During the western campaign, the Waffen-SS lost about 5,000 men. Officers and non-commissioned officers during the fighting carried the soldiers into the attack by personal example, which, according to the Wehrmacht generals, led to unreasonably large losses among the Waffen-SS officers. Undoubtedly, the percentage of casualties among the officers of the Waffen-SS was higher than in the units of the Wehrmacht, but the reasons for this should not be sought in poor training or in the method of warfare. In parts of the Waffen-SS, a corporate spirit dominated and there was no such clear line between an officer and a soldier as in the Wehrmacht. In addition, the structure of the Waffen-SS was built on the basis of the "Fuhrer principle" and that is why in the attacks the SS officers were ahead of their soldiers and died with them.

On the Eastern Front, the SS faced fierce resistance from the Soviet army and, as a result, during the first 5 months of the war, Waffen-SS units lost more than 36,500 people killed, wounded and missing. With the opening of the second front, the losses of the SS increased even more. According to the most conservative estimates, between September 1, 1939 and May 13, 1945, the SS troops lost more than 253,000 soldiers and officers killed. During the same time, 24 Waffen-SS generals died (not counting those who committed suicide and police generals), and two SS generals were shot by court order. The number of wounded in the SS by May 1945 was about 400,000, and some SS men were wounded more than twice, but after recovery they still returned to duty. According to Leon Degrel, of the entire composition of the Walloon division of the Waffen-SS, 83% of the soldiers and officers were wounded one or more times. Perhaps in a number of units the percentage of those who were wounded was less, but I think it did not fall below 50%. The SS troops had to operate mainly in the occupied territories, and by the end of the war they had lost more than 70,000 people missing.

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