For which Vladimir Putin awarded the order to the head of Gazprom, Alexei Miller. How the head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, loses money. Analysts' report dropped VTB shares. Russian industry resumed its fall.
Gazprom: medal for losses
For 9 months of 2017, Gazprom showed losses for the first time after the 1998 crisis. They amounted to 9.2 billion rubles. The reason is not entirely clear: the company's revenue increased, and the jump in expenses occurred under the "other" item. Perhaps these are paper losses (from the revaluation of exchange rate differences). But if the result is the same for the year, then the budget will miss dividends from Gazprom ... The losses did not prevent two remarkable events from happening for the management of the state-owned company. They issued themselves a reward for 9 months in the amount of 2.1 billion rubles. - almost a quarter of the company's losses! And the next day after the announcement of unsuccessful financial results, Vladimir Putin presented the head of Gazprom, Alexei Miller, with the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, first degree. Even the head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, does not have this… It is a strange habit of the authorities to reward businessmen. They work for profit (bonuses), for their own pocket. What is there to reward?
Rosneft: moving abroad?
The Russian state-owned company signed agreements worth $3 billion with Iraqi Kurdistan. And in its statements, it confirmed that the government of Iraqi Kurdistan had received $1.3 billion in advance during 2017 under an oil supply contract. The Iraqi parliament last week suggested that Rosneft simply cancel the contract due to its invalidity. However, Iraqi Ambassador to Russia Haidar Mansour Hadi Al-Azari, who then hastily spoke, said that the Iraqi government has no obligations under the oil agreements signed by the Russian side represented by Rosneft with the autonomous region of Kurdistan, but promised to "find a mechanism to find a solution" ... How much will Rosneft lose when renegotiating contracts with the Iraqi state oil company?
Our state-owned company is in a similar situation in Venezuela, where, under exactly the same contracts for the future supply of oil, it provided $6 billion in advances to the state-owned company of this country, PDVSA ($1.2 billion has already been paid off). Now the President of the country, Nicolas Maduro, has announced a virtual default. At the same time, he renegotiated the agreement on state loans with Moscow (installment payments for 10 years). But a possible default by PDVSA would actually put Rosneft in front of a $4.8 billion loss.
And in the next 4 years, Rosneft intends to invest another $2 billion in the Egyptian Zohr gas field (in October 2017, it already paid $1.1 billion for its share in it). Also not the most stable region.
Why is Rosneft pursuing such a risky policy? Maybe because of the agreement between Russia and OPEC, according to which the company cannot increase production in Russia? Rosneft has already announced the suspension of the commissioning of two of its major projects - the Russian and Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye fields ... But the risks that the state-owned company takes on in foreign projects are still too great. And the frank "moving" of the Russian state-owned company abroad looks somewhat strange.
However, Rosneft itself, in its report, believes that it has acquired first-class assets, and estimates the “synergy” from their integration at $5 billion. And it is proud of expanding its presence in “key energy consumption regions” and participating in new production projects, which “will strengthen position of the company as a leading player in the global commodity markets”. Indeed, against the background of rising world oil prices, the company's revenue for 9 months of 2017 grew by almost a quarter. But for some reason, net profit fell by 4%.
Where's the money?
VTB: analyst wars
A new form of corporate wars in Russia is the reports of investment analysts to clients, which are immediately leaked to the media. Sergey Gavrilov, an analyst at Alfa Capital, began this wave with a story about the future problems of 4 banks of the Moscow ring. Sberbank-SIB continued with an attack on Rosneft and the personal ambitions of the company's president, Igor Sechin. Now - an attack by Raiffeisenbank analysts on VTB on November 10th. Raiffeisenbank pointed to VTB's huge debt to the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank (0.9 trillion rubles), which indicates a "growing structural deficit of ruble liquidity" in the bank. And also the fact that "impaired loans" at the end of 2016 in VTB exceeded 1 trillion rubles. and are covered by reserves only by 65%. Later, at the insistence of VTB management, the report was corrected and these conclusions were removed from it. But the market heard them.
VTB shares fell 17% on Tuesday-Thursday (by the end last week). Analysts connected this not so much with the report of Raiffeisenbank (the figures from which were already known), but with the tough position of the bank's management in relation to VTB minority shareholders who do not agree with the reorganization (joining VTB24): they decided to buy shares from them at 3.8 rubles at a market price in early November of about 6 rubles. Perhaps the minority shareholders decided to dump their shares in advance at higher prices. But are our state-owned companies interested in the price of their shares on the stock exchange? Nothing depends on this...
False start
The industry of Russia "got excited". Back in the second quarter of 2017, according to Rosstat, it showed an increase of 3.8% (against the same quarter a year ago). In the third quarter, growth fell to 1.4%. And in October (against October last year) - 0.0%. With the exception of seasonal and calendar factors, in October the industry even fell (against September) by 0.1%.
There is no demand in the economy. In the middle of the year, industrialists filled warehouses with their products. And they couldn't sell. Now we have to reduce production volumes again, wait for sluggish demand to empty warehouses.
We have to admit that the jump in the second quarter was a false start, the industrialists believed in the optimism of the government. And in vain. Such jerks lead only to increased use of loans and loss of interest, and in the worst case, to an increase in delinquency on loans or even bankruptcy. The number of bankruptcies in the third quarter of 2017 amounted to 3,227, which is 12.4% higher than in the third quarter of last year. And only 2.1% below the historic high of October 2009 (data from the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis). The margin of safety is running out. How little it looks like a way out of the crisis and “good recovery growth”, which our Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev was proud of at the ASEAN summit in Manila.
By the way, GDP growth has ceased to inspire. The 2.5% surge in the second quarter is a statistical mirage, half explained by rising inventories. In the third quarter, Rosstat reported GDP growth of only 1.8%, which is noticeably worse than the forecasts of the Ministry of Economic Development. It is unrealistic to reach the 2.1% expected by the Ministry of Economic Development in 2017: for this, GDP should grow by 2.9% in the fourth quarter, which looks unlikely against the backdrop of a slowdown in the dynamics of industrial output and government investment, analysts of the CR HSE considered. According to their forecast, GDP growth in 2017 will be 1.6%, a quarter below the government’s forecast.
$40 per barrel of oil
- the return of prices to this level, the head of the Central Bank, Elvira Nabiullina, considered it possible, although in the coming year the probability of higher prices increased. Alas, the Russians are "neither warm nor cold" from the high price of oil. All profits from prices above $40/bbl. our population will not see - in accordance with the "budget rule" the Ministry of Finance will save them, not spend them.
RUB 60.41/USD
- this value was reached on Tuesday, November 14, the exchange rate of the national currency of Russia. Its fall is associated with the strengthening of the dollar against world currencies, the fall of oil and the beginning of a gradual outflow of speculative foreign capital from our market. Since then, it has corrected slightly and dropped below 60.
9,2%
amounted to the level of innovation in Russia. This is the lowest figure since 1999, according to a study by ISSEK HSE. The share of large and medium-sized companies that implement in their work high tech and fundamentally new solutions, in 2004 it was 10.5%, in 2012 - 9.9%, in 2015 - 9.5%.
Petr Sarukhanov / "New"
An interesting trend has emerged in the life of Russian state oil and gas companies. Until recently, these companies collected private assets for themselves. It was believed that in the damned 90s, the oligarchs stole the state property to private corners, and now state-owned companies are restoring the integrity of the state.
Now there is exactly the opposite trend. State-owned companies are loudly talking about huge debts and inevitable losses.
The only way to cover losses and debts is to sell shares - and at the very moment when Russia's reputation is at zero and, therefore, shares are inexpensive.
Let's take Rosneft. According to the company's consolidated financial statements, its debt at the end of 2016 amounted to a record figure of $61.74 billion, while net profit decreased by 49% to RUB 181 billion. Even Gazpromneft, which produces three times less oil, shows a much better result: its net profit amounted to 200 billion rubles.
It was the large debt load and the purchase of Bashneft that served as the official reason for the sale of 19.5% of Rosneft to a consortium from the Dubai Investment Fund, Intesa Bank and Glencore. Whether these companies were real stock buyers or fronters is hard to say. Now the sold shares belong to the Singaporean QHG Shares Pte, which is owned by the British QHG Investment, which is controlled by the British QHG Holding, which is owned by the Cayman offshore QHG Cayman Limited.
From this intricate corporate structure, it can be seen that since the time of the Baikalfinancegroup company, registered at the address of the London drink shop in Tver, our statesmen have grown a lot.
No less significant example "Gazprom". The company's financial plan for the next three years provides for an annual excess of expenses over income. In other words, Gazprom plans to be unprofitable within three years. Even if oil prices hold at current levels, the hole in the company's budget will be at least $15 billion.
First, I want the reader to understand the size of the problem.
Let us recall Gazprom under Vyakhirev and 1999, the year of a terrible crisis, when oil cost $12 per barrel. Gazprom at that moment had three markets where gas was sold at different prices: these were the domestic market, the CIS countries and Europe.
year 2000. And about. President Vladimir Putin, head of Gazprom Rem Vyakhirev. Photo: RIA Novosti In 1999, Gazprom sold gas to Europe for an average of $65 per thousand cubic meters and made a profit from exports. At the same time, deliveries to the domestic market were planned unprofitable. In October 1999, the average price of gas supply to industrial consumers was about $10 per 1,000 cubic meters. The price at which gas was sold to some CIS countries was comparable to the domestic one.
The amount of payment for current gas supplies by consumers was about 28%, and to pay off the debt, the Primakov government introduced reducing coefficients (in addition to devaluation). If in January 1998 the enterprise owed Gazprom a million dollars, then on December 31, 1998, in order to pay it off, it was enough for him to pay 173 thousand dollars.
All this was superimposed on the so-called commodity credit, that is, the obligation of Gazprom to supply gas to Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, and most importantly - Russian army and the village without any guarantee of payment. They didn't pay at all. The rest of Russian industry tried to take an example from them.
And with such inputs, Gazprom remained a profitable enterprise in the 90s! It showed a loss only in 1998, and even then this loss was only on paper: it was associated with the recalculation of the exchange rate difference. Even in the same 1998, Gazprom paid 8 billion rubles. income tax!
At the same time, Rem Ivanovich was not an angel. In "Gazprom" every creature was found in pairs. Viktor Vyakhirev, brother of Rem Vyakhirev, headed the Burgaz corporation, which performed most of the drilling work for Gazprom. Vyakhirev's daughter Tatyana Dedikova and Chernomyrdin's sons Vitaly and Andrey were shareholders in Gazprom's main pipeline contractor, Stroytransgaz. On the foreign market, Gazprom's gas was sold by Gazexport. It was headed by the son of the head of Gazprom, Yuri Vyakhirev.
Now fast forward to 2016 and see how things are in the markets now.
Alexey Miller. Photo: RIA Novosti Russian gas in 2016 was sold in Europe at a price three times higher than in 1999. It is true that it has fallen compared to 2014, when it was $349 per 1,000 cubic meters. But compared to 1999, it has at least tripled.
The price in the CIS markets rose sharply and in many cases even overtook the European one. For example, in 2015 Lithuania paid an average of $280 per 1,000 cubic meters for Gazprom's gas. No less sharply increased the price of gas for domestic market. Before the crisis, it was more than $100 per 1,000 cubic meters; now it fluctuates around $70 per 1,000 cubic meters for industrial consumers. This is often higher than the price of US gas at the Henry Hub. This is higher than the cost of shale gas production.
Question: how, by raising gas prices for Russian consumers by seven or more times, by raising prices for the CIS by 10-15 times, by raising European prices by three times compared to 1999, Gazprom manages to plan for three years forward losses?
Answer. Very simple. Gazprom's planned losses for the next three years are made up of three factors.
The first is the increase in cost. Under Vyakhirev, the cost of gas production was $3-4 per 1,000 cubic meters. Now Gazprom estimated the cost of production at $38 in 2014 and about $20 in 2016.
The second is the loss of markets. Attempts to use gas as a weapon ended with the fact that buyers stopped looking at it as a commodity, and therefore, they stopped buying without fear. For example, Ukraine, which took 50 billion cubic meters of Russian gas in the 1990s, now buys exactly zero. All the gas that Ukraine needs, it buys on the reverse, and it costs it cheaper.
Europe and the CIS countries also realized the danger of monopoly dependence on Russian gas and began to diversify both the entire energy sector and suppliers. For example, the share of natural gas in the total volume of energy produced in Germany in 2016 was 12%, while the share of renewable energy was 30%.
But the third, most important component, which is why Gazprom, in fact, announced the planned unprofitability, is the construction of gas pipelines. "Forces of Siberia", "Turkish Stream" and "Nord Stream-2".
One of the main goals foreign policy The Kremlin in recent years was, of course, the desire to conclude contracts at any cost that would allow Russia to build gas pipelines. For example, it was Turkey's refusal to build the Turkish Stream that was the real reason for the sharp deterioration in relations with this country, which ended in mutual claims, sanctions, etc. As soon as Turkey agreed to build the Turkish Stream, the Kremlin's dissatisfaction quickly dissipated.
However, the question is: why should we build the Turkish Stream at all, if as a result of this construction, as it turns out, Gazprom will suffer losses for three years?
All over the world, commercial companies are building gas pipelines to make money. Gazprom seems to be building gas pipelines to absorb the money.
But the most interesting thing is how Gazprom plans to cover the hole. Namely, due to loans, and, let's pay attention, - through the sale of assets.
Interfax reports that Gazprom may sell 49.98% in Gascade Gastransport GmbH, which operates more than 2,400 km of gas networks in Germany. He acquired these shares just two years ago, in 2015, through a swap with BASF SE. There is also a possibility that Gazprom, like Rosneft, will sell 6.6% of its shares.
Question: I wonder if 6.6% of Gazprom's shares will be bought by the same Cayman offshore that owns 19.5% of Rosneft's shares, or by another?
In the 1990s, a simple way of self-buying enterprises was very popular with management. The enterprise was ruined, the money was withdrawn to companies controlled by managers, and with this money they bought the ruined enterprise. First, it was cheaper. Secondly, the number of competitors decreased: what kind of fool would buy a ruined nest?
Don't you think that all our politics recent years- "Krymnash", deputy Milonov, Poklonskaya with her emperor Nikolai, a coup in Montenegro, interference in the American elections - is it all the same scheme, only being implemented on a national scale?
All of a sudden we start from the wrong premise?
Do we think that all this is done in order to acquire territories, amuse the imperial greatness and brainwash the voters? What if all these deafening failures, over and over again ending in a fall in the prestige of the country outside and inside, are nothing more than a planned process of lowering the cost of all the largest state-owned companies in the country, followed by their purchase for pennies and without competition?
Gazprom was the most expensive company in Russia until April 2016 - then Rosneft overtook it for the first time: its quotes were raised by good reporting, there was no positive news from Gazprom.
A year ago, Sberbank became the first. And now he is the leader in terms of capitalization on the Moscow Exchange: 4.87 trillion rubles. at 19:00 Thursday. Over the year, Sberbank has risen in price by almost 1.4 trillion rubles. Analysts attribute the growth of its quotes to excellent results: Sberbank's net profit under RAS for the nine months of 2017 amounted to 496 billion rubles, which is 31.7% more than for the nine months of 2016.
On Wednesday, Gazprom also reported for the nine months under IFRS: revenue grew by 7.4% compared to the nine months of 2016 and reached 4.6 trillion rubles. Revenues from gas sales to Europe, the company's main market, also slightly increased, physical deliveries increased by 8%. The investment program of Gazprom for 2017 after adjustment increased from 911 billion to 1129 billion rubles, and in 2018 and 2019. it will amount to 1.28 trillion and 1.4 trillion rubles. respectively.
Gazprom's secret fairway
Denmark will be able to block the construction of Nord Stream 2 in its territorial waters: on November 30, its parliament adopted amendments to the law on the continental shelf, which fundamentally changed the pipeline approval process, Reuters reported. Nord Stream 2 was supposed to pass a few kilometers east of Bornholm Island, but now the route may become inaccessible to Gazprom.
According to the previous Danish law, the application for Nord Stream 2 was to be considered by the Danish Energy Agency, and it could only refuse because of the negative impact of the project on environment. The first Nord Stream 1 was laid in the same corridor, so a negative conclusion was unlikely. New law passes the approval to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - it can block the project for foreign policy reasons..
The Danish government is against Nord Stream 2 - the new pipe will increase Europe's dependence on Russian gas, Foreign Minister Anders Samuelsen said in September. And the deputy from the People's Party of Denmark (the second largest political force in the country) Marie Krarup suggested that the parliament would decide to close the territorial waters for the project ..
Gazprom is ready for this and is exploring alternative routes for the pipe, Nord Stream 2 AG CFO Paul Corcoran said, for example, through an exceptional economic zone Denmark north of Bornholm. Corcoran did not say how the length and cost of the gas pipeline will change. “We continue to work according to the plan and the submitted application and monitor the development of the situation,” said a Gazprom spokesman. The route is optimal from the point of view of the regulatory framework, ecology and safety,” a representative of Nord Stream 2 AG assured and declined to say how the change in route would affect them.
The cost of Nord Stream 2 (55 billion cubic meters of gas per year) is $9.5 billion, the length is 1200 km: through the territorial waters of Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany, the Danish section is 139 km. The construction of the underwater part should begin in 2018, by the end of 2019 the pipe should be ready..
Artur Toporkov
Gazprom’s reporting affected quotes, which is why there was a local change in the leader in terms of capitalization, as Promsvyazbank analyst Ilya Frolov calls the situation: “But Rosneft has an advantage - rising oil prices can generate positive free cash flow for it, and with comparable EBITDA, its capital investments are almost twice as low as those of Gazprom.”
“Gazprom's financial results are much better than everyone expected. This is due to the growth of gas sales to Europe, and to rising prices. Free cash flow is also higher than expected,” says Raiffeisenbank analyst Andrey Polishchuk, but the market price of Gazprom will largely depend on the implementation of the investment program, but it is too high for the company to be able to increase dividends: “If capital investments decline, there will be free cash the flow that can be directed to dividends, Gazprom will cost more.” But, predicts Polishchuk, capital investments will grow and the cash flow will be small.
Rosneft shares are more likely to grow: the company will increase oil production. But both Rosneft and Gazprom are cheaper than their Western competitors, Polishchuk recalls: “Risks in Russia are higher in the understanding of investors.”
“The shares of Gazprom and Rosneft are still attractive to investors, the companies are extremely cheap due to sanctions and other political risks,” says Vladislav Kochetkov, president of Finam. – Both securities are worthy of inclusion in the portfolio, but from the point of view of liquidity, Gazprom is more interesting than Rosneft. Their capitalization, most likely, will be approximately the same.
The quotes of both companies sank a lot: the peak was in early January - 158 rubles. from Gazprom, 420 rubles. at Rosneft; and on Thursday at the close - 132.15 and 293.6 rubles.
Rosneft and Gazprom did not respond to Vedomosti's requests.
Yesterday, the Federal Property Management Agency sent directives to the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade for the Gazprom shareholders' meeting on voting for candidates to the gas monopoly's board of directors. The directive is sensational: instead of the special representative of the President Igor Yusufov and the former Minister of Property of the Russian Federation Farit Gazizullin, the council will include presidential aide Igor Shuvalov and head of Rosenergo Sergey Oganesyan. Recall that Oganesyan is known for his closeness to the head of the Rosneft company, Sergei Bogdanchikov. It was the conflict between Gazprom and Rosneft over the merger that led to a split within the president's inner circle.
The Board of Directors of JSC "Gazprom" includes 11 members. Of these, 6 are representatives of the state: Dmitry Medvedev, head of the presidential administration, Viktor Khristenko, minister of industry, minister economic development and trade German Gref, chairman of the board of the monopoly Alexey Miller, as well as Igor Yusufov and Farit Gazizullin. The last two have long lost their positions in the fuel and energy complex, their rotation looks quite logical. However, the "changers" were just unexpected.
In general, the current election of government representatives to Gazprom is especially interesting. After all, the "state" has split in relation to this company, and each of the warring parties is interested in maximizing its representation and minimizing the representation of a competitor.
Recall that since the autumn of last year, a conflict broke out between the company "Rosneft" and OJSC "Gazprom" in connection with the unwillingness of the former to "surrender" to the latter. The president set a goal - liberalization of the market for the monopolist's shares - and proposed a means - to exchange Gazprom shares for Rosneft shares. Rosneft did not object to liberalization, but trade for a "price" entered the public space and aggravated relations between the president's closest people. Moreover, the situation was extremely dynamic: quite recently it seemed that Gazprom had won, and Rosneft had no choice but to come to terms with the takeover. However, it soon became clear that everything was wrong: Rosneft not only retains its independence, but also incorporates "its" people into Gazprom.
It is clear that Dmitry Medvedev's group, which wanted the takeover of Rosneft by Gazprom, was interested in promoting to the board of directors figures who were not influential in the fuel and energy sector or were functional and unbiased. According to Kommersant, the head of the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS), Igor Artemiev, was initially supposed to be sent to Gazprom. Who will take the second place, it was not known. However, it was the Federal Property Management Agency that recommended Oganesyan's candidacy, which Dmitry Medvedev opposed: in his opinion, he should have been replaced by a more loyal official - for example, from the Federal Property Management Agency or the Ministry of Industry and Energy.
However, in the end, it was Sergey Oganesyan and Igor Shuvalov who were nominated to the board of directors. Hovhannisyan is a former vice-president of the Rosneft company. In the conflict between Rosneft and Gazprom, he openly supported the position of the former. As for Shuvalov, now his influence is highly debatable. Previously, he was considered a man of the former head of the presidential administration, Alexander Voloshin. After joining the presidential administration in the summer of 2003, Shuvalov was instructed to actually lead the presidential administration economic policy. Then he was predicted almost for the role of the shadow head of the cabinet. However, in reality, his group, which was supposed to develop recommendations for solving strategic problems (doubling the GDP, fighting poverty and modernizing the army), so far has not distinguished itself in anything. In general, Shuvalov's nomination is quite logical: he is actually responsible for economic policy in the Presidential Administration.
At the same time, it is still impossible to say that Sergei Oganesyan is guaranteed to enter the board of directors. If we recall the history of the struggle for the takeover of Rosneft, it is obvious that even the most seemingly final decisions were soon revised. So, a few months ago, Alexey Miller and Sergey Bogdanchikov confirmed the merger deal in front of television cameras, and a few days later it became known that there would be no such thing. On the whole, it can be said that Rosneft has so far managed to beat Gazprom twice: by refusing to take over and by lobbying its man for the board of directors.
https://www.site/2018-02-28/vladimir_putin_idet_na_vybory_s_nevypolnennymi_obechaniyami_pedagogam_i_uchenym
“The country does not need educated people - they are difficult to manage”
"Catastrophic transformations": what did they come to Russian science and education
Kremlin press service
Tomorrow, March 1, Vladimir Putin will read his next pre-election Address to the Federal Assembly. In early February, while visiting Novosibirsk scientists, the president promised that he would pay special attention to science in his Address. “Strengthening the scientific potential for the future of the country is a matter of fundamental importance. Cardinal technological changes are taking place in the world, in their scale they are comparable to the era of technological revolutions and the era of discoveries and scientific revolutions that radically changed the way of life of people on our planet. Obviously, now the leader will be the one who will have their own technologies and knowledge, competencies. They are becoming the most important resource for development, ensuring the sovereignty of the country - without any exaggeration," Putin said in Novosibirsk. And the day before yesterday it became known that the Address will be followed by specific presidential decrees implementing it.
Meanwhile, the famous "May Decrees" of six years ago have not yet been executed. The order of the head of state to increase the salaries of scientists and educators is being carried out: for the sake of accountability, the states scientific organizations employees are laid off, employees are transferred to part-time jobs, while maintaining real employment and under the threat of "repressions". According to Andrey Klepach, Deputy Chairman of Vnesheconombank, “in real terms, funding for science has not grown, but has fallen over the past four years, and we are losing the competition to everyone.”
Research data from the Higher School of Economics: as of 2016, 720,000 Russians are employed in science, and slightly more than half, 370,000, are directly involved in research and development. This is the absolute minimum since 1995. The average portrait of a Russian scientist: 47 years old, without degree. From which we conclude that young people do not aspire to science.
In recent months, academicians and corresponding members of the Russian Academy of Sciences twice addressed the president with open letters: “The situation requires immediate action ...” The last time was a week ago. In both cases, there was no response from Vladimir Putin and his administration. But in Novosibirsk, during the presidential visit of a 52-year-old doctor of physical and mathematical sciences, who went to a single protest picket. The court fined the scientist "for disobeying the police."
On the eve of tomorrow's speech by the president on the real state of affairs in higher education and science, we are talking with a professor at Saratov state university Vera Afanasyeva. Vera Vladimirovna is the author of another open letter, which thundered all over Russia last year and also remained unanswered.
Website of the Saratov National Research State University
“Everything rests on old frames, and there are fewer and fewer of them”
- Vera Vladimirovna, in one of his 2012 election articles, Vladimir Putin wrote: “The Russian economy can not only buy, it can generate innovations. A high level of education of the population, a huge heritage of fundamental science, the presence engineering schools, the base of pilot production that has been preserved in many industries - we are obliged to use all these factors. In your opinion, today, six years after the article was written, are these factors still strong? Can we still rely on them?
- I'll be honest and from the position of a scientist. I think that many of these factors were already absent at the time of writing that article. Domestic education has been systematically destroyed for almost a quarter of a century and is now in a catastrophic state. Every year it becomes impoverished, it has a weak material base, it is based on a structure thoughtlessly written off from the West and not adapted to Russian realities. It is crushed by bureaucratic requirements, littered with a bunch of useless papers. All this has an extremely negative effect on the level of our education, so it cannot be called high today.
As for the legacy of Soviet fundamental science, it has long since become intellectually old. Fundamental science is always expensive, and if its funding is less than the cost of a military presence in Syria, then one cannot expect a return from it. And the reform of the Russian Academy of Sciences has made fundamental science also dependent on bureaucratic incompetence and voluntarism.
If we talk about applied science, then most of the branch research institutes ordered to live long back in the nineties, the remnants drag out a miserable existence. The money that could revive them is thrown at the "Potemkin villages", imitations like Skolkovo, which have already demonstrated their failure and even disgraced themselves.
Russian engineering is also dying. Over the past quarter of a century, the young and middle generations of specialists have dropped out of it, everything rests on old cadres, and there are fewer and fewer of them. So, in my opinion, this statement was already purely populist then, but today things are much worse.
— Another quote from the same article by the president: “Restoring the innovative nature of our economy must begin with universities — both as centers of fundamental science and as a personnel basis for innovative development. The international competitiveness of our higher education must become our national goal. By 2020, we should have several world-class universities across the entire spectrum of modern material and social technologies… Russian research universities should receive R&D resources equal to 50% of their education funding, just like their international competitors.” How, according to you, are the goals set by the President in the field of higher education being carried out, and what are the results?
- While in our country there are almost no world-class universities, even Moscow State University in various university rankings is only in the second hundred. In most of them, the situation was extremely difficult. I know firsthand, because for a decade and a half I have been working as a professor at the Saratov State National Research University. Last year, in my open letter to the Minister of Education Olga Vasilyeva, “Five Signs of a Serious Illness,” I formulated the main problems of Russian higher education: the poverty of teachers and their complete lack of rights, huge “scissors” between the incomes of ordinary employees and university administrations, and the extreme formalization of all university activities , poor preparation of applicants and low final level of graduates.
Press Service of the President of the Russian Federation
The Russian higher school has long turned into a huge office, littered with piles of useless papers. Teachers spend time and energy on writing them, which they should devote to the educational process, science, and their own development. But the pursuit of ratings, on which salaries and positions depend, force university staff to imitate scientific and methodical activity, lies and falsifications reign everywhere. And the arbitrariness of administrations, the virtual absence of their election leads to a constant and widespread fear of dismissals, makes people silent, and kills university solidarity. Teachers become uncomplaining proletarians of mental labor. And most importantly, universities have long lost their original spirit, they have ceased to be that sacred place where intellectual, cultural, ethical samples are passed on to the younger generation. So, inefficient enterprises in the service sector for the issuance of diplomas.
In research universities, the situation is not much different: state funding goes primarily to window dressing and huge salaries of administrations. As for the international competitiveness of our universities, so far they are popular, and even then relatively, only in the countries of Asia and Africa. In order for our universities to become prestigious throughout the world, the diplomas they issue must be quoted abroad. This is not yet possible, and this cannot be achieved by presidential decrees alone.
- Then we read an article by Vladimir Putin. "For Russian Academy sciences, leading research universities and state research centers, ten-year programs of fundamental and exploratory research must be approved. There will be several times - up to 25 billion rubles in 2018 - the funding of state scientific funds that support the initiative development of research teams will be increased. The size of the grants should be comparable to what they provide to their scientists in the West.” Were you able to fulfill your plans in the field? fundamental research?
- Firstly, it is completely incomprehensible how this will happen, where will the money come from when the economy stagnates? Secondly, Scientific research They require not only cash injections, but also the most important thing - specialists, professionals. With the current university training, there are fewer and fewer of them, and the best of them go abroad. So strong scientific schools very little remains in the country. And thirdly, of course, we cannot do without research programs, but we must not forget that fundamental science It's a slow business, you can never count on quick results. The knowledge of truth is difficult to manage. Remember the movie "Taming the Fire"? There, the hero, performed by Kirill Lavrov, says: “Understand, the cognitive process is going on! Nothing can speed it up!" Such processes do not obey directives from above.
— In 2012, Vladimir Putin set clear goals for bringing Russian science and the entire innovation infrastructure to the global arena: “It is important for us that the leaders of the global technology market… create new technologies and new products in Russia. But they will come here only if they see world-class competitive technical universities and scientific centers". What results in this regard can we talk about today?
- I teach philosophy at my native physics department and I see that at laboratory workshops there are the same 1960s electronic oscillators used by students in the 1980s. I sometimes visit the huge electronics institute where I worked in the nineties - there is complete devastation and desolation. Recently I was at a congress in Moscow, in the building where several academic institutes are located, including the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, I saw a deplorable sight. This is the "world-class research centers"? Where and how should new technologies and products be created? At best, this is a utopia; at worst, we are being deliberately misled.
"Today's transformations in education lead to the loss of Russia's sovereignty"
— In another programmatic pre-election article, Putin pointed out that higher education have almost 60% of Russian youth, people 25-35 years old, and the next generation, he said, will be covered by higher education by 80%. “The economy must become such that citizens with high level education, with a high level of inquiries could find a worthy place for themselves,” Putin declared. “Creating 25 million new, high-tech, well-paid jobs for highly educated people is not beautiful phrase. This is an urgent need, a minimum level of sufficiency.” Is 25 million jobs for graduates already a reality?
I have already spoken about the economy. As for the large number of educated people in the near future, in Russia there is a completely different strategy - "caste" education. This means that fundamental, "human" education, due to its high cost, will be preserved only for the elite - the rich or very capable. For the majority, only cheap computer training will be available. The number of universities in Russia may be reduced to 200-250.
Let me remind you that in one of his open lectures, Dmitry Peskov, director of the “Young Professionals” direction of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives, described the model of “caste formation” like this: one group of people are those who govern; the second - the so-called "one-button people", who should not have the skills and abilities of leadership and creativity, but only the ability to use ready-made developments. Deputy Prime Minister of the federal government Olga Golodets echoes Peskov: two-thirds of the population do not need higher education. So 25 million citizens with good education in the foreseeable future, there will obviously not be, and even 25 million high-tech jobs for them - and even more so. The country does not need educated people- they are difficult to manage, and it is possible to maintain gas pipelines and work in the service sector without higher education.
Sergey Kovalev/Global Look Press
- As candidates for advanced industries that, apparently, should accept a highly educated workforce, Vladimir Putin named pharmaceuticals, chemistry, composite and non-metallic materials, the aviation industry, information and communication technologies, nanotechnology, as well as the nuclear industry six years ago and space. In general, according to the president's plans, by the end of this decade, the share of high-tech and intellectual industries in GDP should increase one and a half times. Do you have a sense of growth?
— It is difficult for me to judge pharmaceuticals and the chemical industry. But the space industry constantly shows us its failures, sometimes completely ridiculous. Rockets sometimes do not take off, sometimes they fall, satellites are lost, and recently, when launching, the Vostochny cosmodrome was confused with Baikonur. And the fact that in the country that launched the first artificial satellite Earth, today produces less than 2% of the world's satellite telecommunications technology? The state of the aviation industry is reflected by factories closed all over the country. In Saratov, for example, a huge enterprise that produced Yaks was literally razed to the ground. What advanced industry can we talk about then?
In addition, there is clearly a territorial imbalance in our industry: what is happening in Central Russia, in the belt around Moscow, differs markedly from the situation in many regions - in Siberia, Far East. There are also openly industrially stagnant regions, the same Saratov region And she's not the only one. Even with our traditionally good mathematical education and excellent programmers, the improvement of industrial technologies and the creation of new ones require huge investments - in the creation of advanced enterprises, in the training of good engineers, highly skilled workers. And with the current quality technical education they won't show up in required quantity and in the near future, years must pass. At the same time, for example, they began to invest in Far Eastern production only relatively recently, the last five years. This also applies to nanotechnology: in Russia there are many talented specialists in this field and interesting laboratory developments, but they are very far from industrial production. So, there is no need to talk about global competitiveness in these industries, about the declared increase in the share of high-tech industries by 2020. This is a project, not a project.
There is another consideration, at the level of common sense. Any industries become competitive on a global scale if they first “learn” to compete within the country. But Russian high-tech industries are often monopolists in the domestic market, they have no one and no reason to compete. So first you need to create conditions for full-fledged competition within the country, and then talk about global competitiveness.
Today, only some of the production facilities of the defense complex seem to be competitive and high-tech in Russia. These are, for example, rocket science, air defense systems, aviation equipment, land systems, automatic and small arms. But their competitiveness is also limited by political reasons: sanctions can significantly narrow the market for their sales.
— In theory, higher education itself can be an advanced industry with high-performance and well-paid jobs. In another campaign article, social policy, Putin wrote: “During 2013-2018, the average salary of professors and university teachers will be gradually increased by 2 times (from the average level for the region) and brought to 200% of the average for the economy. Increased salaries should be immediately established for those who have scientific results and are respected by students and graduates. By singling out worthy, competitive teachers, we will ensure the necessary renewal of higher education personnel.” Are university professors satisfied with their salaries? Have you been able to attract high school"fresh blood"?
- The double excess of the salaries of university teachers relative to the national average was guaranteed by the so-called "May decrees" of the president. The Ministry of Education and Science reported on their implementation at the end of last year. The average salary of a teacher was named - about 60 thousand rubles. Otherwise, you can't call it a lie. In the country as a whole, teachers' salaries remain miserable. There is a Facebook group called "Problems of Education and Science" where teachers' salaries are regularly monitored. A professor on average receives about 30 thousand rubles, an associate professor - 15-17 thousand rubles, an assistant - 12 thousand rubles. The amounts named by the Ministry of Education are the “average temperature in the hospital”. The trick is not at all tricky: the millions of incomes of university administrations are added to the tiny salaries of teachers and divided by the number of employees. Well, no one has yet canceled registration in Russia. There is no influx of "fresh blood" in these conditions. Education gets older every year.
In general, today's transformations in education can be regarded as catastrophic. They exclude the reindustrialization of the country, the revival of science, the construction of civil society. And as a result, they lead to the loss of Russian sovereignty in the field of education, that is, to the destruction national security generally.
The material was prepared with the participation of Alexander Zadorozhny.
