Lenin called Brest Peace"obscene", although he was a supporter of its signing. Trotsky compared his visit to Brest-Litovsk to a visit to a torture chamber.

Paradoxically, the treaty, which meant for Russia a way out of the war, became one of the most shameful and controversial pages in the history of the country.

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

In 1918, a separate peace was signed between the RSFSR and the Quadruple Union.

For reference: a separate peace is a peace treaty with the enemy, signed by a member state of the military coalition without the consent of the allies.

In World War II, Russia was on the side of the Entente. But, after a few years, the country was already exhausted. Even under the Provisional Government, it became obvious that Russia would not be able to continue the war any longer.

In 1917, the Bolsheviks came to power. Their position was simple: "a world without annexations and indemnities." This slogan became the main thesis of the Decree on Peace. The authorities demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities.

It is worth noting: in November, negotiations were held on a truce with Russia's former adversaries - the Quadruple Alliance. The Entente countries ignored the invitation.

Stage one: start of negotiations

The table shows who led the delegations from the countries participating in the negotiations.

Negotiations began on 9 December. The Bolsheviks, based on the principles of the "Decree on Peace", put forward their position: the rejection of annexations and indemnities and the self-determination of peoples up to secession (by free referendum). Of course, Germany was not going to accept such conditions.

The German side stated that it would accept the conditions if the Entente countries also take such a step. The Bolsheviks initiated a 10-day break in hopes of persuading Russia's former allies to join the talks.

Soon the Germans put forward their understanding of the self-determination of peoples. Poland, Lithuania and Courland have already "self-determined" and declared their "independence", and now they can freely join Germany, which was not regarded as an annexation. In other words, the German side did not renounce its territorial claims.

The Soviet side proposed a compromise option for the exchange of territories. The German side did not accept this proposal. The Russian delegation left for Petrograd the next day.

On December 22, a delegation from the Central Rada arrived with the intention of negotiating separately from the RSFSR. Three days later, the Russian delegation returned, but already led by Trotsky himself. His goal is to delay negotiations.

Worth considering: The Central Rada is a Ukrainian political body. He was elected legally, but at the time of the negotiations, he no longer controlled almost the entire territory of Ukraine - the Bolsheviks occupied it.

Second stage: "no peace, no war"

On December 27, the Germans openly declared that they rejected the principle of "no annexations and indemnities", since the Entente did not accept it.

The head of the CR delegation expressed his position. They will negotiate separately from the RSFSR. The Central Powers put forward conditions: Germany and Austria-Hungary did not give up the territories they occupied. The Bolsheviks asked for a break for 10 days.

Lev Davidovich Trotsky (1879-1940) - one of the organizers of the October Revolution of 1917, one of the founders of the Red Army. In the first Soviet government - People's Commissar for foreign affairs, then in 1918-1925 - People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR.

In Petrograd, this course of events provoked an aggravation of the intra-Party struggle. In the end, Trotsky's vague position of "no peace, no war" won out.

Third stage: ultimatum

On January 17, together with Trotsky, a delegation from Soviet Ukraine arrived for the talks. The German side did not recognize her.

January 27 is a turning point in the negotiations. The Central Powers and the CR made peace. Ukraine passed under the protectorate of Germany.

Wilhelm II (Friedrich Wilhelm Victor Albert of Prussia (1859-1941) - the last German emperor and king of Prussia from June 15, 1888 to November 9, 1918. Wilhelm's reign was marked by the strengthening of Germany's role as a world industrial, military and colonial power.

Wilhelm II put forward an ultimatum to the Soviet side - the border along the Narva-Pskov-Dvinsk line.

The next day, Trotsky surprised Germany and her allies with his statement: cessation of hostilities, demobilization, while refusing to sign peace. The delegation left the negotiations. What happened, Germany would later take advantage of.

January 31 The CR asks its German allies for help against the Bolsheviks. On February 18, the truce ends.

Russia no longer had an army as such, and the Bolsheviks could not resist the offensive. The Germans advanced quickly and captured Minsk on 21 February. It was a real threat to Petrograd.

The Soviet side was forced to ask for peace. On February 22, the Germans put forward a tougher ultimatum, according to which Russia abandoned vast territories.

The Bolsheviks agreed to such conditions. On March 3, 1918, peace was signed. March 16 - final ratification.

What were the conditions of the Brest peace

Lenin admitted that such a world is "obscene". Germany's demands were tough, but Russia did not have the opportunity to fight. The position of the Germans allowed them to dictate any conditions.

Briefly about the main provisions of the Brest peace:

• liberate the Baltic lands;
• withdraw troops from Ukraine, recognize the UNR;
• liberate the Kars and Batumi regions;
• withdraw troops from the Ottoman Empire.

The text included other provisions:

• demobilization of the army;
• disarmament Black Sea Fleet;
• the cessation of propaganda on the territory of the Central Powers;
• payment of indemnities.

Russia was finally left without an army (imperial) and lost territories.

Position of Lenin, Trotsky and Bukharin

Petrograd did not have an unequivocal position on a separate peace. Lenin insisted on signing an agreement, albeit unfavorable. However, the left communists, led by Bukharin, were categorically against any peace with imperialism.

When it became obvious that Germany would not renounce annexations, Trotsky's compromise position was taken as the basis. He was against military action, but he counted on an early revolution in Germany, which would save the Bolsheviks from having to agree to unfavorable conditions for them.

Lenin insisted that it was Trotsky who led the delegation. But with the condition: delay until the ultimatum, then surrender. However, the delegates rejected the ultimatum, and this became a formal reason for the Central Powers to reopen the Eastern Front.

The German army advanced rapidly, and Lenin insisted on accepting any conditions of the opponents.

The question arises: why did Lenin call the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk shameful, but insisted on signing it further? The answer is simple - the leader of the revolution was afraid of losing power. Without an army, Russia could not resist the Germans.

The position of the left had more supporters, and only the intervention of Trotsky saved Lenin from failure. As a result, the Bolsheviks signed the treaty.

Reasons and prerequisites for the signing of the Brest Peace

Was there really any reason to negotiate with the clearly losing war Central Powers? And why did Germany need it?

The Bolsheviks came under the slogan of ending the war. BUT the country really could not fight(It is worth noting that the policy of the Bolsheviks contributed to the fact that Russia was left without an army).

Initially, Lenin counted on a general peace without annexations, and not on an unfavorable treaty with Germany, which had almost lost the war.

Since the beginning of the war, the Germans were interested in closing the Eastern Front. Germany and Austria-Hungary were starving and urgently needed food supplies. No wonder it was the agreement with the UCR that became a turning point in the course of negotiations.

Russia's withdrawal from the First World War

The signing of a separate peace meant that Russia withdrew from the war. This event had its pros and cons, but it can not be called a victory.

On the one hand, the war still stopped. On the other hand, Russia has lost most of its territory and population.

The country also could not take advantage of the victory of the Entente. England and France did not accept the Bolshevik regime, and the treaty with Germany all the more deprived the country of the right to reparations.

The conclusion of the Brest Peace

On March 1, the Russian delegation arrived in Brest-Litovsk (the German offensive was still ongoing).

Trotsky did not want to sign the shameful document. His views were shared by other Bolsheviks.

Who signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on behalf of Russia? Grigory Sokolnikov, who at first also refused to be the chairman of the delegation.

The Soviet side immediately declared that the country was accepting the conditions of its opponents, but would not enter into a discussion. The German side objected that they could either accept Germany's conditions or continue the war.

On March 3, 1918, the famous Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was concluded. This happened in the White Palace of the Brest-Litovsk Fortress.

The document consisted of 14 articles, 5 annexes (including new card borders of Russia) and additional agreements.

Outcomes, meaning and results

The separate peace was a heavy blow for Russia.

However, Germany lost the war, and one of the conditions for a truce with the Entente was the annulment of the Brest Treaty. On November 13, the agreement was also canceled by the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

Brest peace until today receives an ambiguous description of historians. Some consider it a betrayal, others a necessity. In general, modern estimates come down to one thing: the negotiations were the debut of the Bolsheviks in the international arena, but such a debut ended in failure.

Of course, the consequences were not so catastrophic for the new government: they still managed to return the lands, but it took time. And peace with the Central Powers will be used as proof of Lenin's sponsorship by the Germans for a long time to come.

The Brest peace is one of the most humiliating episodes in the history of Russia. It became a resounding diplomatic failure of the Bolsheviks and was accompanied by an acute political crisis within the country.

Peace Decree

The "Peace Decree" was adopted on October 26, 1917 - the day after the armed coup - and spoke of the need to conclude a just democratic peace without annexations and indemnities between all warring peoples. It served as the legal basis for a separate agreement with Germany and the other Central Powers.

Publicly, Lenin spoke about the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war, he considered the revolution in Russia only initial stage world socialist revolution. In fact, there were other reasons as well. The warring peoples did not act according to Ilyich's plans - they did not want to turn bayonets against the governments, and the allied governments ignored the peace proposal of the Bolsheviks. Only the countries of the enemy bloc that were losing the war went for rapprochement.

Terms

Germany declared that it was ready to accept the condition of peace without annexations and indemnities, but only if this peace was signed by all the belligerent countries. But none of the Entente countries joined the peace negotiations, so Germany abandoned the Bolshevik formula, and their hopes for a just peace were finally buried. The talk in the second round of negotiations was exclusively about a separate peace, the terms of which were dictated by Germany.

Betrayal and necessity

Not all Bolsheviks were willing to sign a separate peace. The left was categorically opposed to any agreements with imperialism. They defended the idea of ​​exporting the revolution, believing that without socialism in Europe, Russian socialism is doomed to perish (and the subsequent transformations of the Bolshevik regime proved them right). The leaders of the left Bolsheviks were Bukharin, Uritsky, Radek, Dzerzhinsky and others. They called for guerrilla war with German imperialism, and in the future they hoped to conduct regular fighting we are creating the Red Army.
For the immediate conclusion of a separate peace was, above all, Lenin. He was afraid of the German offensive and the complete loss of his own power, which, even after the coup, was largely based on German money. It is unlikely that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was directly bought by Berlin. The main factor was precisely the fear of losing power. Considering that a year after the conclusion of peace with Germany, Lenin was ready even for the division of Russia in exchange for international recognition, then the terms of the Brest Peace would seem not so humiliating.

Trotsky occupied an intermediate position in the inner-party struggle. He defended the thesis "No peace, no war." That is, he proposed to stop hostilities, but not to sign any agreements with Germany. As a result of the struggle within the party, it was decided to drag out the negotiations in every possible way, expecting a revolution in Germany, but if the Germans present an ultimatum, then agree to all conditions. However, Trotsky, who led the Soviet delegation in the second round of negotiations, refused to accept the German ultimatum. Negotiations broke down and Germany continued to advance. When the peace was signed, the Germans were 170 km from Petrograd.

Annexations and indemnities

Peace conditions were very difficult for Russia. She lost Ukraine and Polish lands, renounced her claims to Finland, gave away the Batumi and Kars regions, had to demobilize all her troops, abandon the Black Sea Fleet and pay huge indemnities. The country was losing almost 800 thousand square meters. km and 56 million people. In Russia, the Germans received the exclusive right to freely engage in entrepreneurship. In addition, the Bolsheviks pledged to pay the royal debts of Germany and its allies.

At the same time, the Germans did not comply with their own obligations. After signing the treaty, they continued the occupation of Ukraine, overthrew the Soviet regime on the Don and helped the White movement in every possible way.

Rise of the Left

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk almost led to a split in the Bolshevik Party and the loss of power by the Bolsheviks. Lenin hardly dragged the final decision on peace through a vote in the Central Committee, threatening to resign. The split of the party did not happen only thanks to Trotsky, who agreed to abstain from the vote, ensuring the victory of Lenin. But this did not help to avoid a political crisis.

The Brest Peace was categorically rejected by the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party. They got out of government, killed the German ambassador Mirbach and raised an armed uprising in Moscow. Due to the lack of a clear plan and goals, it was suppressed, but it was a very real threat to the power of the Bolsheviks. At the same time, in Simbirsk, the commander of the Eastern Front of the Red Army, the Social Revolutionary Muravyov, raised an uprising. It also ended in failure.

Cancellation

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on March 3, 1918. Already in November, a revolution took place in Germany, and the Bolsheviks annulled the peace agreement. After the victory of the Entente, Germany withdrew its troops from the former Russian territories. However, Russia was no longer in the camp of the winners.

In the coming years, the Bolsheviks were unable to return power over most of the territories torn away by the Brest Peace.

Beneficiary

Lenin received the greatest benefit from the Brest Peace. After the annulment of the treaty, his authority grew. He gained fame as a farsighted politician, whose actions helped the Bolsheviks gain time and hold on to power. After that, the Bolshevik party consolidated, and the Left Socialist-Revolutionary party was crushed. The country has a one-party system.

Peace delegation led by Ioffe and Kamenev, defended the principle of self-determination in relation to Ukraine and the peoples of the Baltic states, which only played into the hands of the Germans, who saw in this position of the Bolsheviks a convenient form for their aggressive plans. In addition, General Hoffmann demanded that this principle should not apply either to Poland or to the occupied part of the Baltic States, which were considered by the Germans as already separated from Russia.

At this point, the negotiations broke down. The Germans agreed only to extend the truce for a month, until 15 January.

On January 9, 1918, negotiations resumed. It was clear to everyone that the Germans would resolutely insist on their terms - the seizure of the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine under the guise of "the will of their governments", which, according to General Hoffmann, was understood by the German government as a "policy of self-determination."

Trotsky, who headed the new Soviet delegation, with the consent of Lenin, dragged out the negotiations in Brest. At the same time, hasty talks were being held secretly for help with the British representative Bruce Lockhart and American Colonel Robins. B. Lockhart has already informed even his government that the resumption of war on the German front is inevitable.

Not only B. Lockhart, but also many Bolsheviks did not see the two main points why Lenin, at all costs, on any conditions, wanted to conclude a peace treaty with the Germans. Firstly, he knew that the Germans would never forgive him for violating the secret agreement and could easily find another, more convenient protege, at least like left SR Kamkov, who also collaborated with them during the war, back in Switzerland. With German support, however, was associated the receipt of significant monetary subsidies, without which, with the complete collapse of the old state organism, it was hardly possible to maintain the party and the new Soviet apparatus of power. Secondly, the resumption of the war with Germany, for the sake of at least the "socialist fatherland", in the conditions of the beginning of 1918, meant the inevitable loss of power in the country by the Bolsheviks and its transfer into the hands of the national democratic parties, primarily into the hands of the right SRs and Cadets.

After the German terms of peace became known, open indignation arose in the party. A majority was formed that considered it impossible to sign a peace treaty that would lead to the complete dismemberment of Russia - moreover, henceforth making the country completely dependent on Germany. This majority, which became known as " left communists”, threw out the slogan about “defending the socialist fatherland”, arguing that since the proletariat seized power, it must defend its state from German imperialism.

On January 10, the plenary session of the Moscow regional bureau of the party called for the termination of peace negotiations with Germany. Here they acted as "left communists" Bukharin, Lomov, Osinsky (Obolensky), Yu. Pyatakov , Preobrazhensky, Bubnov, Muralov and V. M. Smirnov.

The Moscow regional bureau, having demanded the convocation of a party congress, thereby expressed its lack of confidence in the Central Committee. The Ural Party Committee took the side of the "Left Communists". The Petrograd Committee split. Central Committee members Uritsky and Spunde took the side of the opponents of "peace at any cost", and the journal Kommunist, published in Petrograd not only as an organ of the Petrograd Committee, but also as a theoretical organ of the Central Committee, became an organ of the "Left Communists". The "Left Communists" actually had a majority in the party. In their theses, written Radek, they argued that the Leninist point of view is a reflection of the peasant populist ideology, "sliding down onto petty-bourgeois rails ...". It is impossible to build socialism on the basis of the peasantry, the theses asserted, the proletariat is the main support, and it must not make concessions to German imperialism...

These reproaches of the “left communists” against Lenin reflected reality, for he, as the main argument for the need to conclude peace, in his theses of January 20, brought to the fore the idea that the overwhelming mass of the peasantry would undoubtedly vote even “for an aggressive peace” . And what's more, if the war is renewed, the peasantry will overthrow the socialist government. Lenin denied that he had ever spoken of a "revolutionary war" and, as always in critical moments, with surprising composure, "did not hold on to the letter," as he put it, of what he had previously said.

The Left Social Revolutionaries, who were members of the Council of People's Commissars, believed that the Germans would not dare to go on the offensive, and if they did, they would cause a strong revolutionary upsurge in the country to defend the fatherland.

Trotsky and Lenin agreed with this and feared the continuation of the war, not so much in terms of a deep advance of the Germans, but because of the impossibility of preventing the mobilization of national, patriotic forces under war conditions. They foresaw the inevitable rallying of these forces around the Right Social Revolutionaries and the Cadets, around the idea of ​​a Constituent Assembly and, as a result, the overthrow of the communist dictatorship and the establishment in Russia of a national democratic government based on the majority of the population.

This argument, which posed the question not of war or peace, but of the preservation of power, was put forward by Lenin later, on February 24, when he bluntly wrote that "risking war" means making it possible to overthrow Soviet power.

While Trotsky dragged out the negotiations (he returned to Petrograd on January 18), a meeting of the most prominent party workers was prepared, convened for January 21. It could have called itself a party congress with far greater justification than the 7th Congress convened in a hurry in March 1918.

The meeting was attended by 65 delegates, including members of the Central Committee. Reports on peace and war were made by Bukharin, Trotsky and Lenin. Each with their own point of view. Trotsky, like Lenin, understood the danger of the “left communists” slogan about “revolutionary war” (in terms of holding power at that moment) and at the same time, trying to fence off a separate peace with the Germans, put forward the formula “neither peace, nor war !" This formula, directed primarily against the supporters of the war, helped Lenin at that stage to fight for peace, because the decision on war, on which the majority stood, if adopted, would deal Lenin's policy and Lenin himself a mortal blow. At first glance, Trotsky's somewhat anarchic formula was nothing more than a temporary bridge between Lenin and his opponents, who had a majority behind them.

On January 25, in the Council of People's Commissars, with the participation of the Left Social Revolutionaries, the overwhelming majority also passed Trotsky's formula - "No peace, no war."

Therefore, Trotsky's later noisy accusations that he "treacherously", allegedly acting against the majority of the Central Committee, "arbitrarily" broke off negotiations with the Germans on February 10, are without any foundation. AT this case Trotsky acted on the basis of the decision of the majority in both the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. These accusations, made in 1924-1925 mainly by Zinoviev and Stalin in the course of internal party struggle against Trotsky, even then little reckoned with historical reality.

The tense week after the break in negotiations was spent in almost continuous meetings of the Central Committee. Lenin, who remained in the minority, tried in every possible way to find "such a formulation of the question" of a "revolutionary war" that would show its impossibility - putting, for example, on February 17, even before the German offensive, the question - "should a revolutionary war be declared Germany? Bukharin and Lomov refused to vote on such an "unqualifiedly posed" question, because the essence of revolutionary defencism was in response to the German offensive, and not in their own initiative, the fatality of which was beyond doubt.

On February 18, the Germans went on the offensive. The remnants of the demoralized and, after the assassination of General Dukhonin, deprived of the head of the army (the "commander-in-chief" Krylenko devoted himself to the liquidation of the headquarters and command still surviving in certain sectors of the front) could not offer any resistance, and very soon Dvinsk, with its huge warehouses of weapons and supplies, and after him and Pskov, were occupied by the Germans. In the center and especially in the south, the Germans quickly moved forward, meeting scattered resistance from the remnants of the frame of some units and volunteers. Czechoslovak Corps.

On the evening of February 18, Lenin achieved a majority of 7 to 6 on the question of sending a radio telegram to the Germans offering peace. Lenin owed his success entirely to Trotsky. Trotsky's buffer position was revealed at a moment of direct threat to the authorities themselves: he went over to the camp of Lenin, and his vote gave the majority. (For the offer of peace to the Germans voted: Lenin, Smilga, Zinoviev, Stalin, Sokolnikov, Sverdlov, Trotsky; against - Uritsky, Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky, Krestinsky, Lomov and Ioffe).

The offer of peace was to be sent on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars, where 7 people's commissars were leftists. Probably, the decision of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries would have been different if they had known that Lenin received the majority by just one vote and, moreover, by the voice of the author of the formula "no peace, no war." But not knowing the results of the vote in the Bolshevik Central Committee and also afraid of losing power, the Left SR people's commissars voted for the peace proposal by 4 votes to 3.

The German command saw that it could quickly move deep into Russia and easily occupy Petrograd and even Moscow. However, it did not take this step, limiting itself to the occupation of Ukraine, where a sham "hetman" government was created. As indicated Ludendorff, the German command was most afraid of an explosion of patriotism in Russia. Even during the Tarnopol breakthrough in July 1917, Ludendorff gave the order not to develop the offensive, so as not to cause the threat of a deep German invasion to improve the Russian army. A deep invasion now, in 1918, the occupation of Petrograd and the exit to Moscow could lead to the overthrow of the Bolshevik government, could justify the efforts of the generals Alekseeva and Kornilov who collected volunteer army in Rostov-on-Don.

First two pages of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in German, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Turkish and Russian

Thus, the German strategy and policy towards Russia fully coincided with the Leninist policy of peace at all costs.

It is interesting to note that in his report on peace and war at the 7th Party Congress in March 1918, Lenin proved the need for peace by the collapse of the army, devoting a significant part of his report to characterizing the army as a “sick part of the body”, capable only of “flight”, “panic” , "selling their own guns to the Germans for pennies," etc. Lenin nowhere now says that the main blame for the disintegration of the army under the slogan of immediate peace "without annexations and indemnities" lay with the Bolshevik party itself. Having deceived the soldiers with the chimera of the possibility of such a world ( Peace Decree), Lenin now shifted the blame for the shameful conditions of the German world for Russia.

Lenin, speaking of the army, deliberately concealed the facts; the demobilization conference in December showed that those units that retained the best combat capability were the most anti-Bolshevik. That is why Krylenko did absolutely nothing for two months, did not want to, and could not do, despite the decision of the Council of People's Commissars on measures to organize and strengthen the army. During the days of the February crisis, the regimental committee of the Preobrazhensky regiment proposed, on behalf of the regiment, which was already stationed in Petrograd, to speak to the Pskov front, but after negotiations with Smolny, they received not only a refusal to do so, but also an order to demobilize.

At the call of Lenin, Krylenko and Raskolnikov made reports to the Central Executive Committee on the state of the army and navy, impressing the Left SR Steinberg that both deliberately exaggerate and dramatize the situation in the army and navy. A decree was issued on the organization of the Red Army, but this army was not intended by Lenin to fight the Germans : already on February 22, a German response was received with consent to sign peace, but on even more difficult conditions. The borders of Russia were thrown back to Pskov and Smolensk. Ukraine, Don, Transcaucasia were separated. Huge, multimillion-dollar indemnity, paid in grain, ore, raw materials, was imposed by the Germans on Russia.

When the terms of the peace became known, Bukharin, Lomov, V. M. Smirnov, Yu. Pyatakov and Bubnov in Moscow, and Uritsky in Petrograd resigned from all their responsible posts and demanded the right to free agitation in the party and outside it against peace with Germans (Lomov, Bukharin, Uritsky, Bubnov were members of the Central Committee). On 23 February, after discussing German terms, a decisive vote took place. Lenin won again only thanks to Trotsky and his supporters who abstained - these were Trotsky, Dzerzhinsky, Ioffe, Krestinsky. Voted against: Bukharin, Uritsky, Bubnov, Lomov. For the immediate signing of peace: Lenin, Zinoviev, Sverdlov, Stalin, Smilga, Sokolnikov and Stasova, who was the secretary. Thus, Lenin had 7 votes in favor (actually, excluding Stasova's vote, 6) against 4, with 4 abstentions.

During the discussion, Stalin tried to offer not to sign the peace, delaying the negotiations, for which he was cut off by Lenin:

“Stalin is wrong when he says that we can not sign. These terms must be signed. If they are not signed, this means a death sentence for the Soviet government "...

Again decisive role Trotsky played, splitting in half the majority that was against the signing of the treaty.

Lenin's concession was the decision to convene the 7th Party Congress, since, according to the decision of the Central Committee to convene the congress, "there was no unanimity in the Central Committee on the issue of signing peace."

The next day, upon learning of the Central Committee's decision, the Moscow Regional Party Bureau announced that it considered the Central Committee's peace decision "absolutely unacceptable." The resolution of the Moscow Regional Bureau, adopted unanimously on February 24, read:

“Having discussed the activities of the Central Committee, the Moscow Regional Bureau of the RSDLP expresses its distrust of the Central Committee, in view of its political line and composition, and will, at the first opportunity, insist on its re-election. Moreover, the Moscow Regional Bureau does not consider itself obliged to obey at all costs those decisions of the Central Committee that will be connected with the implementation of the terms of the peace treaty with Austria-Germany.

This resolution was adopted unanimously. Members of the Moscow Regional Bureau - Lomov, Bukharin, Osinsky, Stukov, Maksimovsky, Safonov, Sapronov, Solovyov and others believed that the split in the party "can hardly be eliminated in the near future." But at the same time, they avoided what the Stalinist “ Short course All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" - collusion of the "Left Communists" with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. If such an agreement had taken place, then, without a doubt, the bloc of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries with the "Left Communists" had every chance of winning. The "Left Communists" were led by faith in the German revolution, without which they saw no possibility for the continued existence of socialist Russia. Lenin shared this view, which he repeatedly repeated in his report at the 7th Congress, and only did not connect the issue of retaining power, as did, for example, Kollontai, with the German Revolution over the next three months. He considered the time before the revolution only as a period during which it was necessary to strengthen power in every possible way, to use a respite. This orientation of the “left communists” towards revolution in the West, ignoring the national problems of Russia, was their main weakness. Lenin remained for them, for all their disagreements with him, the only possible ally. They did not look for support in the forces of national democracy, moreover, they started from it, and therefore, in the real balance of forces outside the party, they were not any significant factor.

After the transfer of power into the hands of the Bolsheviks on October 25, 1917, a truce was established in the Russian-German fleet. By January 1918, not a single soldier remained in some sectors of the front. The truce was officially signed only on December 2. Leaving the front, many soldiers took away their weapons or sold them to the enemy.

Negotiations began on December 9, 1917 in Brest-Litovsk, which was the headquarters of the German command. But, Germany made demands that contradicted the previously proclaimed slogan "A world without annexations and indemnities." Trotsky, who led the Russian delegation, was able to find a way out of the situation. His speech at the talks came down to the following formula: "Don't sign peace, don't wage war, disband the army." This shocked German diplomats. But it did not deter the enemy troops from decisive action. The offensive of the Austro-Hungarian troops along the entire front continued on February 18. And the only thing that hindered the advance of the troops was the bad Russian roads.

The new Russian government agreed to accept the conditions of the Brest Peace on February 19. The conclusion of the Brest peace was entrusted to G. Skolnikov. However, now the terms of the peace treaty turned out to be more difficult. In addition to the loss of vast territories, Russia was also obliged to pay an indemnity. The signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk took place on March 3 without discussion of terms. Russia lost: Ukraine, the Baltic States, Poland, part of Belarus and 90 tons of gold. The Soviet government moved from Petrograd to Moscow on March 11, fearing the capture of the city by the Germans, despite the peace treaty already concluded.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was valid until November, after the revolution in Germany it was annulled by the Russian side. But, the consequences of the Brest peace had time to affect. This peace treaty became one of the important factors in the beginning civil war in Russia. Later, in 1922, relations between Russia and Germany were settled by the Rapallo Treaty, according to which the parties renounced their territorial claims.

Civil War and intervention (briefly)

The civil war began in October 1917 and ended with the defeat of the White Army in the Far East in the autumn of 1922. During this time, various social classes and groups in Russia used armed methods to resolve the contradictions that arose between them.

The main reasons for the start of the civil war include: the discrepancy between the goals of transforming society and the methods for achieving them, the refusal to create a coalition government, the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly, the nationalization of land and industry, the elimination of commodity-money relations, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the creation of a one-party system, the danger of the spread of revolution on other countries, the economic losses of the Western powers during the regime change in Russia.

In the spring of 1918 British, American and French troops landed in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The Japanese invaded the Far East, the British and Americans landed in Vladivostok - intervention began.

On May 25, there was an uprising of the 45,000th Czechoslovak corps, which was transferred to Vladivostok for further shipment to France. A well-armed and well-equipped corps stretched from the Volga to the Urals. Under the conditions of decayed Russian army, he became the only real force at that time. Supported by the Social Revolutionaries and the White Guards, the corps put forward demands for the overthrow of the Bolsheviks and the convening of the Constituent Assembly.

In the South, the Volunteer Army of General A.I. Denikin was formed, which defeated the Soviets in the North Caucasus. The troops of P.N. Krasnov approached Tsaritsyn, in the Urals, the Cossacks of General A.A. Dutov captured Orenburg. In November-December 1918, an English landing landed in Batumi and Novorossiysk, the French occupied Odessa. In these critical conditions, the Bolsheviks managed to create a combat-ready army by mobilizing people and resources and attracting military specialists. tsarist army.

By the autumn of 1918, the Red Army had liberated the cities of Samara, Simbirsk, Kazan, and Tsaritsyn.

The revolution in Germany had a significant impact on the course of the civil war. Recognizing its defeat in the First World War, Germany agreed to annul the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and withdrew its troops from the territory of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states.

The Entente began to withdraw its troops, providing only material assistance to the Whites.

By April 1919, the Red Army managed to stop the troops of General A.V. Kolchak. Driven into the depths of Siberia, they were defeated by the beginning of 1920.

In the summer of 1919, General Denikin, having captured Ukraine, moved towards Moscow and approached Tula. The troops of the first cavalry army under the command of M.V. Frunze and the Latvian riflemen concentrated on the Southern Front. In the spring of 1920, near Novorossiysk, the "Reds" defeated the Whites.

In the north of the country, the troops of General N.N. Yudenich fought against the Soviets. In the spring and autumn of 1919 they made two unsuccessful attempts to capture Petrograd.

In April 1920, the conflict between Soviet Russia and Poland began. In May 1920, the Poles captured Kyiv. The troops of the Western and Southwestern fronts launched an offensive, but failed to achieve a final victory.

Realizing the impossibility of continuing the war, in March 1921 the parties signed a peace treaty.

The war ended with the defeat of General P.N. Wrangel, who led the remnants of Denikin's troops in the Crimea. In 1920, the Far Eastern Republic was formed, by 1922 it was finally liberated from the Japanese.

Reasons for victory Bolsheviks: support for the national outskirts and Russian peasants deceived by the Bolshevik slogan "Land to the peasants", the creation of a combat-ready army, the absence of a common command among the whites, support for Soviet Russia from the labor movements and communist parties of other countries.

Brest peace (Brest peace treaty, Brest-Litovsk peace treaty) - peace treaties between the participants of the First World War: Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other, signed on March 3, 1918 in the Brest Fortress. Ratified by the Extraordinary IV All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

The signing of peace at that moment was urgently demanded by the internal and external situation in Soviet Russia. The country was in a state of extreme economic ruin, the old army actually disintegrated, and a new one was not created. But a significant part of the leadership of the Bolshevik Party was in favor of continuing revolutionary war(a group of "left communists" led by. At the peace negotiations, the German delegation, taking advantage of the fact that the offensive of its army was rapidly developing at the front, offered Russia predatory peace conditions, according to which Germany would annex the Baltic states, part of Belarus and Transcaucasia, and also receive indemnity.

“To continue this war over how to divide the weak nationalities captured by them between strong and rich nations, the government considers it the greatest crime against humanity and solemnly declares its determination to immediately sign the terms of peace ending this war on the specified nationalities equally fair for all without exception. conditions” - With these words, the Leninist Decree on Peace, adopted on October 26 by the Congress of Soviets, formulated the essence of the Bolshevik foreign policy. Only that peace will be just, which will allow all occupied and oppressed peoples, both in Europe and on other continents, to determine their fate by a free vote, which should take place after the withdrawal of all occupying armies. Having set this bold goal, achievable only after the overthrow of all colonial empires, Lenin cautiously adds that the Soviets are ready to enter into peace negotiations even if their program is not accepted - the Bolshevik government is ready to consider any other conditions for peace. It has firm intention conduct all negotiations completely openly before the whole people and declare, unconditionally and immediately, the secret imperialist treaties confirmed or concluded by the former governments of the landlords and capitalists. As Lenin explained to the congress, this message is addressed to the governments, as well as to the peoples of the belligerent countries. Indirectly, it called on the peoples to rise up against existing governments, but directly urged these governments to conclude an immediate truce. This dual appeal was the key dilemma of the foreign policy of the Bolsheviks and the beginnings of the Brest-Litovsk tragedy.

Russia, exhausted by the war, accepted the decree on peace with a sigh of relief. Official and patriotic circles in France and Britain responded with indignant cries. Allied ambassadors and heads of allied military missions in Russia more or less imagined that Russia was incapable of waging war.

Despite the revolutionary calls, the Bolsheviks wanted to establish diplomatic contacts with the allies. Immediately after the defeat of Kerensky's troops, Trotsky proposed to resume normal relations with the British and French. The Bolsheviks, and Trotsky more than others, feared that the Germans, by setting unacceptable peace conditions, might again draw Russia and the Entente into the war. In Russia, Trotsky's proposal was ignored. Allied embassies ignored him.

The Allied ambassadors held a meeting at which they decided to ignore Trotsky's note and recommend that their governments leave it unanswered on the grounds that the Soviet regime was illegal. The governments of the allied countries followed the advice and decided to establish official relations only with the High Command of the Russian Army, that is, with General Dukhonin, who was in Mogilev. By this act, they, so to speak, elevated the headquarters of the army to the level of a rival government. In addition, Dukhonin was warned against any negotiations on a ceasefire and hinted in no uncertain terms that if Russia pulled out of the war, they would be retaliated by a Japanese attack on Siberia. Trotsky immediately protested and threatened that he would arrest any Allied diplomat who tried to leave Petrograd to contact anti-Bolshevik circles in the provinces. He appealed to the diplomats of neutral countries with a request to use his influence to conclude peace. On the same day, General Dukhonin, who refused to comply with the order to cease fire, was removed - later, his own soldiers brutally dealt with him, having learned that he did not want to stop the war. Krylenko, a former ensign of the tsarist army and one of the leaders, was appointed to the place of the Supreme Commander military organization Bolsheviks.

Relations between Russia and Europe immediately hardened, which predetermined the future intervention. It couldn't be otherwise. With the determination of the allied powers to continue the war, their ambassadors could not help but use their influence against the authorities, which threatened to withdraw Russia from the war. This alone inevitably led them to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia. The circumstances from the very beginning pushed the embassies and military missions to get involved in the Civil War.

Trotsky wanted to prevent this and prevent the British, French and Americans from binding themselves with indissoluble obligations. With Lenin's consent, he did his best to impress them: Europe should be interested in Russia not feeling abandoned and forced to sign peace with Germany on any terms.

On November 14, the German High Command agreed to begin negotiations for an armistice. Krylenko ordered a ceasefire and "brotherhood fronts", hoping that through contact with the Russian troops, the German army would be infected with the revolution. On the same day, Trotsky notified the Western powers: “The Supreme Commander of the Armies of the Republic, Ensign Krylenko, proposed postponing the start of armistice negotiations for 5 days until November 18 (December 1), in order to again invite the allied governments to determine their attitude to the matter of peace negotiations ... »

Even as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Trotsky remained the chief propagandist of the revolution. He staked on the possible or actual antagonism between the authorities and the people and turned to the first so that the second could hear him. But since he did not give up trying to reach an understanding with existing governments, he combined his revolutionary appeals with an extremely flexible and subtle diplomatic game.

On November 19, a meeting of peace delegations took place, and the Germans immediately proposed to conclude a preliminary truce for a month. The Soviet delegation refused and instead asked for an extension of the ceasefire for a week to give the other Western powers time to reflect on the situation. Trotsky again turned to the Allied embassies, and again he was met with icy silence. However, he instructed the Soviet negotiators not to sign a truce until the Central Powers pledged not to transfer troops from the Russian front to the Western and—a rather unusual condition—until they allowed the Soviets to carry out revolutionary agitation among the German and Austrian troops. german general Hoffmann, commander of the Russian front, rejected both demands. For a moment it seemed that the negotiations were broken and Russia was returning to the war.

Until now, all the important questions arising from the truce have remained open. The Bolsheviks and the Left SRs decided in favor of separate peace negotiations, but not a separate peace. And even those who, like Lenin, were already inclined towards a separate peace, were not yet ready to achieve it at any cost. The main goal of the Soviet government was to buy time, to loudly declare their peaceful aspirations amid a sudden lull on the fronts, to determine the degree of revolutionary ferment in Europe and to probe the positions of allied and enemy governments.

The Bolsheviks had no doubts about the imminence of a social upsurge in Europe. But they began to wonder whether the road to peace goes through revolution or, conversely, the road to revolution is coming through the world. In the first case, the revolution will put an end to the war. In the second Russian revolution, for the time being, we will have to negotiate with the capitalist authorities. Only time could show in which direction events were moving and to what extent the revolutionary impulse from Russia determined or did not determine their direction. There is no doubt that the proletariat of Germany and Austria is restless, but what does this indicate - about the imminent collapse of the enemy or about a crisis in the distant future? The peaceful delegations of the Central Powers showed a strange willingness to make concessions. On the other hand, the hostility of the Entente seemed to weaken for a moment. The allied countries still refused to recognize the Soviets, but in early December they agreed to exchange diplomatic privileges, which are usually granted to recognized governments. Soviet diplomatic couriers were allowed to travel between Russia and Western Europe, the countries mutually recognized diplomatic passports, Chicherin was finally released from prison and returned to Russia, and Trotsky exchanged diplomatic visits with some Western ambassadors.

But at the same time, the Bolsheviks feared that the Entente would conclude a separate peace with Germany and Austria and, together with them, strike a blow at the Russian revolution. Most often, this fear was voiced by Lenin, both in public speeches and in private conversations. When the inside story of the war was revealed, it showed that his fears were well founded. Austria and Germany repeatedly and secretly, together and separately, probed their Western enemies for peace. Fear of revolution was growing in the ruling circles of France and Great Britain, and the possibility of reconciliation between the Entente and the Central Powers, a reconciliation prompted by fear, could not be ruled out. It was not a real, but only a potential threat, but it was enough to convince Lenin that only a separate peace in the East could prevent a separate peace in the West.

The peace conference in Brest-Litovsk began on 9 December. Representatives of the Central Powers let it be known that they "agreed to immediately conclude a common peace without forcible annexations and indemnities." Ioffe, who led the Soviet delegation, proposed "to take a ten-day break so that the peoples whose governments have not yet joined the current negotiations on universal peace" have the opportunity to change their minds. During the adjournment, only the peace conference commissions were in session, and their work proceeded strangely smoothly. The actual negotiations did not begin until December 27, before Trotsky's arrival.

Meanwhile, the Council of People's Commissars took a number of demonstrative steps. He activated propaganda against German imperialism, and Trotsky, with the help of Karl Radek, who had just arrived in Russia, edited the leaflet "Die Fackel" ("Torch"), which was distributed in the German trenches. On December 13, the government allocated 2 million rubles for revolutionary propaganda abroad and published a report on this in the press. On the 19th, the demobilization of the Russian army began. In addition, German and Austrian prisoners of war were released from compulsory work, they were allowed to leave the camps and work at large. The Soviet government canceled the Russian-British treaty of 1907, according to which the two powers divided Persia among themselves, and on December 23 ordered Russian troops to leave Northern Persia. Finally, Trotsky instructed Joffe to demand that the peace negotiations be moved from Brest-Litovsk to Stockholm or any other city in a neutral country.

Exactly two months after the uprising, on December 24 or 25, Trotsky went to Brest-Litovsk. On the way, especially in the front area, he was greeted by delegations from local Soviets and trade unions, who asked him to speed up the negotiations and return with a peace treaty. He saw with amazement that the trenches on the Russian side were practically empty: the soldiers simply dispersed. Trotsky realized that he was going to face the enemy with no military force behind him.

The meeting took place in a deserted and gloomy setting. The city of Brest-Litovsk, at the beginning of the war, was burned and razed to the ground by the retreating Russian troops. Only the old military fortress remained intact, and the general staffs of the eastern German armies. Peaceful delegations settled in gray houses and huts inside the fenced area of ​​the temporary camp. The Germans insisted that negotiations be conducted there, partly for reasons of their own convenience, partly to humiliate the Soviet envoys. They behaved with diplomatic courtesy. Ioffe, Kamenev, Pokrovsky and Karakhan, intellectuals and hardened revolutionaries, behaved at the negotiating table with the clumsiness that is natural for newcomers to diplomacy.

When Trotsky arrived, he was not satisfied with this state of affairs. At Lenin's urging, he went to the conference to give it a completely different look. The first meeting he attended as head of the Soviet delegation took place on 27 December. Opening it, Kühlmann stated that the Central Powers agreed to the principle of "peace without annexations and indemnities" only in the event of a general peace. Since the Western Powers have refused to negotiate and only a separate peace is on the agenda, Germany and her allies no longer consider themselves bound by this principle. He refused, as the Soviets demanded, to transfer the talks to a neutral country and lashed out at Soviet agitation against German imperialism, which, he said, cast doubt on the sincerity of the Soviets' peaceful disposition. His colleagues turned the Ukrainians against the Soviet delegation, who declared that they represented an independent Ukraine and denied Petrograd the right to speak on behalf of Ukraine and Belarus.

Trotsky got involved in this tangle of interests, characters and ambitions when, on December 28, he spoke for the first time at the conference. He simply dismissed the Ukrainian machinations. The Soviets, he announced, had no objection to Ukraine's participation in the talks because they had proclaimed the right of nations to self-determination and intended to respect it. Nor does he question the credentials of the Ukrainian delegates representing the Rada, a provincial copy or even parody of the Kerensky government. Kuhlmann again tried to provoke an open quarrel between Russians and Ukrainians, which would allow him to benefit from the struggle of the two opponents, but Trotsky again avoided the trap. Remembering the accusations and protests of the previous day, he refused to apologize for the revolutionary propaganda that the Soviets were carrying out among the German troops. He came to negotiate peace terms, Trotsky said, not to restrict his government's freedom of expression. The Soviets do not object to the fact that the Germans are conducting counter-revolutionary agitation among Russian citizens. The revolution is so sure of its rightness and the attractiveness of its ideals that it is ready to welcome an open discussion. Thus, the Germans have no reason to doubt the peaceful mood of Russia. It is the sincerity of Germany that causes doubts, especially when the German delegation announced that it no longer binds itself to the principle of peace without annexations and indemnities.

Two days later, the delegations discussed the preliminary peace treaty presented by the Germans. The treaty's preamble contained the polite cliché that the signatories expressed their intention to live in peace and friendship. This was followed by a dramatic dispute over the principles of self-determination and the fate of the nations located between Russia and Germany. The dispute was mainly between Trotsky and Kuhlmann, occupied more than one meeting and took the form of a conflict between two interpretations of the term "self-determination". Both sides argued in the tone of supposedly dispassionate, academic debates on legal, historical, and sociological topics; but behind them gloomily stood the realities of war and revolution, of conquest and forcible annexation.

In almost every paragraph of the preliminary agreement, some noble principle was first affirmed, and then it was refuted. One of the first reservations provided for the liberation of the occupied territories. This did not prevent Kuhlmann from declaring that Germany intended to occupy the occupied Russian territories before the conclusion of a general peace and for an indefinite period after it. In addition, Kühlmann argued that Poland and other German-occupied countries had already exercised their right to self-determination, as German troops had restored local authority everywhere.

Each stage of the competition became known to the whole world, sometimes in a distorted form. The occupied nations, whose future was at stake, listened with bated breath.

On January 5, Trotsky asked for a break in the conference so that he could acquaint the government with the German demands. The conference had been going on for almost a month. The Soviets had won a lot of time, and now the party and the government had to make a decision. On the way back to Petrograd, Trotsky again saw the Russian trenches, the very abandonment of which seemed to cry out for peace. But now he understood better than ever that peace could be achieved only at the cost of complete submission and disgrace to Russia and the revolution. Reading the newspapers of German and Austrian socialists in Brest, he was shocked by the fact that some of them considered the peace conference a staged spectacle, the outcome of which was clear in advance. Some of the German socialists believed that in fact the Bolsheviks were agents of the Kaiser. One of the main motives driving Trotsky's actions at the negotiating table was the desire to wash away the stigma from the party, and now it seemed that his efforts had borne some fruit. Finally, demonstrations and strikes in support of peace began in enemy countries, and loud protests were heard from Berlin and Vienna against Hoffmann's desire to dictate terms to Russia. Trotsky came to the conclusion that the Soviet government should not accept these conditions. We must play for time and try to establish between Russia and the Central Powers a state that will be neither war nor peace. In this conviction, he appeared at Smolny, where they were waiting for him excitedly and impatiently.

Trotsky's return coincided with a conflict between the Soviet government and the finally convened Constituent Assembly. Against the expectations of the Bolsheviks and sympathizers, the Right SRs received the majority of votes. The Bolsheviks and the Left SRs decided to dissolve the assembly and carried out the intention after it refused to ratify Lenin's decrees on peace, land and the transfer of all power to the Soviets.

On January 8, two days after the dissolution of the assembly, the Central Committee was completely immersed in the debate about war and peace. In order to sound the mood of the party, it was decided to conduct them in the presence of Bolshevik delegates who had arrived at the Third Congress of Soviets from the provinces. Trotsky reported on the Brest-Litovsk mission and presented his formula: "no peace, no war." Lenin urged to accept the conditions of the Germans. Bukharin advocated a "revolutionary war" against the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs. The vote brought a striking success to the supporters of the revolutionary war - the left communists, as they were called. Lenin's proposal for an immediate peace was supported by only fifteen people. Trotsky's resolution received sixteen votes. Thirty-two votes were cast for the Bukharin call for war. However, since outsiders took part in the voting, it was not binding on the Central Committee.

Soon the entire Bolshevik party was divided into those who advocated peace and those who supported the war. Behind the latter stood a significant but heterogeneous majority, with the powerful support of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who, as one, were against peace. But the faction of supporters of the war was not sure that they were right. She opposed peace rather than defended the resumption of hostilities.

On January 11, at the next meeting of the Central Committee, the military faction furiously attacked Lenin. Dzerzhinsky reproached him for cowardly abandoning the program of the revolution, just as Zinoviev and Kamenev had abandoned it in October. To agree to the Kaiser's dictate, Bukharin argued, means to stick a knife in the back of the German and Austrian proletariat - a general strike against the war was just going on in Vienna. According to Uritsky, Lenin approached the problem from a narrowly Russian rather than an international point of view, and he made the same mistake in the past. On behalf of the Petrograd party organization, Kosior rejected Lenin's position. The most resolute defenders of peace were Zinoviev, Stalin and Sokolnikov. As in October, so now Zinoviev saw no reason to wait for a revolution in the West. He argued that Trotsky was wasting time in Brest and warned the Central Committee that later Germany would dictate even more painful conditions.

Lenin was skeptical of the Austrian strike, to which Trotsky and the supporters of the war attached such importance. He painted a picturesque picture of Russia's military impotence. He admitted that the world he defends is an "obscene" world, implying a betrayal of Poland. But he was convinced that if his government renounced peace and tried to fight, it would be destroyed and another government would have to accept even worse terms. He did not neglect the revolutionary potential of the West, but believed that the world would accelerate its development.

So far, Trotsky has tried his best to convince the communist left of the impracticability of a revolutionary war. At the suggestion of Lenin, the Central Committee authorized Trotsky to delay the signing of the peace by all means, only Zinoviev voted against. Then Trotsky proposed the following resolution: "We are ending the war, we are not concluding peace, we are demobilizing the army." Nine members of the Central Committee voted in favor, seven against. So the party formally allowed Trotsky to stick to his former course in Brest.

In addition, during the same break, Trotsky delivered a report at the Third Congress of Soviets. The overwhelming majority of the congress was so categorically in favor of the war that Lenin kept a low profile. Even Trotsky spoke more emphatically of his objections to peace than to war. The congress unanimously approved Trotsky's report, but made no decision and left it to the discretion of the government.

Before Trotsky set out on his return trip, he and Lenin entered into a personal agreement that introduced one significant change in the decisions of the Central Committee and the government. The reason for the unauthorized departure of Trotsky and Lenin from the official decision of the Central Committee and the government was the uncertainty of the decision itself: having voted for the formula "no peace, no war", the Bolsheviks did not foresee the probability that haunted Lenin. But the personal agreement of the two leaders, as it turned out later, allowed for a double interpretation. Lenin was under the impression that Trotsky promised to sign a peace at the first threat of an ultimatum or a resumption of the German offensive, Trotsky believed that he undertook to accept the terms of the peace only if the Germans actually launched a new offensive, and that even in this case he undertook to accept only those conditions which the Central Powers have hitherto proposed, and not the more severe ones which they will dictate later.

By mid-January, Trotsky was back at the negotiating table in Brest. In the meantime, strikes and peaceful demonstrations in Austria and Germany were either crushed or deadlocked, and opponents greeted the head of the Soviet delegation with new confidence in own forces. On the this stage discussions came to the fore Ukraine and Poland. Kuhlman and Chernin were secretly preparing a separate peace with the Ukrainian Rada. At the same time, the Bolsheviks were hard at work promoting the Soviet revolution in Ukraine: the orders of the Rada were still in force in Kyiv, but Kharkov was already under the rule of the Soviets, and a representative of Kharkov accompanied Trotsky on his return to Brest. Ukrainian parties strangely changed places. Those who, under the tsar and Kerensky, stood for an alliance or federation with Russia, tended to separate from their big brother. The Bolsheviks, who had previously favored secession, now called for a federation. The separatists turned into federalists and vice versa, but not for reasons of Ukrainian or Russian patriotism, but because they wanted to separate from the prevailing in Russia state structure or, on the contrary, unite with him. The Central Powers hoped to capitalize on this metamorphosis. Disguising themselves as supporters of Ukrainian separatism, they hoped to seize Ukraine's desperately needed food and raw materials and turn the dispute over self-determination against Russia. The weak, insecure Rada, on the verge of falling, tried to rely on the Central Powers, despite the oath of allegiance given to the Entente.

Even now Trotsky did not object to the participation of the Rada in the negotiations, but officially notified the partners that Russia did not recognize separate agreements between the Rada and the Central Powers. Trotsky, of course, understood that his opponents managed to confuse the issue of self-determination to a certain extent. It is unlikely that Trotsky would have been particularly tormented by remorse because of the imposed Ukraine Soviet power: it is impossible to strengthen the revolution in Russia without extending it to the Ukraine, which has cut like a deep wedge between Northern and Southern Russia. But here, for the first time, the interests of the revolution clashed with the principle of self-determination, and Trotsky could no longer invoke it with the same clear conscience as before.

He again took an offensive stance on the question of Poland and asked why Poland was not represented in Brest. Kuhlmann pretended that the participation of the Polish delegation depended on Russia, which must first recognize the then Polish government. Recognition of Poland's right to independence does not imply recognition that it enjoys de facto independence under German-Austrian tutelage.

On January 21, in the midst of the discussion, Trotsky received news from Lenin about the fall of the Rada and the proclamation of Soviet power throughout Ukraine. He contacted Kyiv himself, checked the facts, and notified the Central Powers that he no longer recognized the right of the Rada to represent Ukraine at the conference.

These were his last days in Brest-Litovsk. Mutual accusations and reproaches reached such a pitch that the negotiations reached an impasse and could not drag on any longer.

On the last day before the break, the Central Powers confronted Russia with a fait accompli: they signed a separate peace with the Rada. The separate peace with Ukraine served as a pretext for the Central Powers to take Ukraine under their control, and therefore the powers of the Ukrainian partners did not matter in their eyes. It was precisely for this reason that Trotsky could not continue the negotiations, for to do so would be to promote a coup d'état and all its consequences: the overthrow of the Ukrainian Soviets and the separation of Ukraine from Russia.

The next day there was a famous scene at the meeting of the subcommittee, when General Hoffmann unfolded a large map with marked on it the lands that Germany was going to annex. Since Trotsky said that he was "ready to bow before force" but would not help the Germans save face, the general apparently thought that by laying out the German claims directly, he could shorten the road to peace. On the same day, January 28 (February 10), a second meeting of the political commission took place, Trotsky got up and made the last statement:

“We are leaving the war. We inform all peoples and their governments about this. We give the order for the complete demobilization of our armies ... At the same time, we declare that the conditions offered to us by the governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary are fundamentally contrary to the interests of all peoples. These conditions are rejected by the working masses of all countries, including the peoples of Austria-Hungary and Germany. The peoples of Poland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Courland and Estonia consider these conditions to be violence against their will; for the Russian people, these conditions mean a constant threat ... ".

Before the delegations left, however, something happened that Trotsky had overlooked—something that confirmed Lenin's worst fears. Kuhlman said that in view of what had happened, hostilities would be resumed, because "the fact that one of the parties demobilizes its armies does not change anything, either in fact or in law" - only its refusal to sign peace matters. Kühlmann himself gave Trotsky some reason to ignore the threat when he asked if the Soviet government was even prepared to establish legal and commercial relations with the Central Powers and how they could communicate with Russia. Instead of answering the question, as his own conviction suggested, what could oblige the Central Powers to adhere to the "no peace, no war" formula, Trotsky arrogantly refused to discuss it.

He stayed in Brest for another day. He became aware of a quarrel between Hoffmann, who insisted on the resumption of hostilities, and civilian diplomats, who preferred to agree to a state between war and peace. It seemed that on the spot the diplomats got the better of the military. Therefore, Trotsky returned to Petrograd confident and proud of his success. He gave humanity the first unforgettable lesson in truly open diplomacy. But at the same time he allowed himself to be optimistic. He underestimated the enemy and even refused to heed his warnings. Trotsky had not yet reached Petrograd when General Hoffmann, with the consent of Ludendorff, Hindenburg and the Kaiser, was already ordering the German troops to march.

The offensive began on February 17 and was not met with any resistance. When the news of the offensive reached Smolny, the Central Committee of the party voted eight times, but never came to an unequivocal decision about how to get out of the situation. The committee was equally divided between the supporters of peace and the adherents of war. Trotsky's single voice could break the deadlock. Indeed, in the next two days, February 17 and 18, only he could accept fateful decision. But he did not join any of the factions.

He was in a very difficult position. Judging by his speeches and actions, many identified him with the military faction, and indeed he was politically and morally closer to it than to the Leninist faction. But after all, he gave Lenin a personal promise that he would support peace if the Germans resume hostilities. He still refused to believe that this moment had come. On February 17, he, along with the supporters of the war, voted against Lenin's proposal to immediately request new peace negotiations. Then he voted with the peaceful faction against the revolutionary war. Finally, he came up with his own proposal, advising the government to wait with new negotiations until the military-political results of the German offensive were clarified. Since the military faction supported him, the proposal passed by a margin of one vote, his own. Then Lenin raised the question of concluding peace if it turned out that the German offensive was a fact and if no revolutionary opposition came out against it in Germany and Austria. The Central Committee answered the question in the affirmative.

Early the next morning, Trotsky opened the meeting of the Central Committee with a review of recent events. has just informed the world that Germany is protecting all peoples, including her opponents in the East, from the Bolshevik contagion. It was reported about the appearance in Russia of German divisions from the Western Front. German planes were operating over Dvinsk. An attack on Revel was expected. Everything pointed to a full-scale offensive, but the facts have not yet been reliably confirmed. Lenin insistently suggested that we immediately turn to Germany. We must act, he said, there is no time to waste. Either war, revolutionary war, or peace. Trotsky, hoping that the offensive would cause a serious public outburst in Germany, continued to argue that it was too early to ask for peace. Lenin's proposal was again rejected by a one-vote margin.

But on the same day, February 18, before evening came a dramatic change. Opening the evening meeting of the Central Committee, Trotsky announced that the Germans had already captured Dvinsk. Rumors spread widely about a pending offensive into Ukraine. Still hesitating, Trotsky proposed to "probe" the Central Powers for their demands, but not yet ask for peace talks.

Three times Trotsky opposed asking the Germans for peace talks, and three times offered only a preliminary test of the waters. But when Lenin again put his plan to the vote, Trotsky, to everyone's surprise, voted not for his own proposal, but for Lenin's. The peaceful faction won by one vote. The new majority asked Lenin and Trotsky to draft an appeal to the governments of enemy countries. Later that night, a meeting of the central committees of the two ruling parties, the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, took place, and during this meeting the military faction again gained the upper hand. But in the government, the Bolsheviks managed to defeat their partners, and the next day, February 19, the government officially turned to the enemy with a request for peace.

In anxious expectation and fear, four days passed before an answer came to Petrograd from the Germans. In the meantime, no one could say on what terms the Central Powers would agree to reopen negotiations, or if they would agree at all. Their armies were advancing. Petrograd was open to attack. A committee of revolutionary defense was formed in the city, and Trotsky headed it. Even while seeking peace, the Soviets had to prepare for war. Trotsky asked the Allied embassies and military missions whether the Western powers would help the Soviets if Russia entered the war again. However, this time the British and French were more responsive. Three days after the request for peace was sent, Trotsky informed the Central Committee (in Lenin's absence) that the British and French had offered military cooperation. To his bitter disappointment, the Central Committee flatly rejected him and thereby rejected his actions. Both factions turned against him: the defenders of peace because they feared that accepting help from the Allies would reduce the chances of a separate peace, and the advocates of war because considerations of revolutionary morality, which prevented them from entering into an agreement with Germany, prevented them from agreeing to cooperate with " Anglo-French imperialists. Then Trotsky announced that he was leaving the post of Commissar for Foreign Affairs. He cannot remain in office if the party does not understand that the socialist government has the right to accept aid from the capitalist countries, provided that it maintains complete independence. In the end, he convinced the Central Committee, and Lenin firmly supported him.

Finally, a response arrived from the Germans, shocking everyone. Germany gave the Soviets forty-eight hours to think about a response and only three days to negotiate. The conditions were much worse than those offered in Brest: Russia must carry out a complete demobilization, abandon Latvia and Estonia and withdraw from Ukraine and Finland. When the Central Committee met on February 23, it had less than a day to make a decision. The outcome again depended on Trotsky's single vote. He yielded to Lenin and agreed to ask for peace, but nothing obliged him to accept new, much more difficult conditions. He did not agree with Lenin that Soviet republic totally unable to defend. On the contrary, he leaned more towards the military faction than before. And yet, despite his fears about peace, despite his confidence in the ability of the Soviets to defend themselves, he again ensured with his voice the victory of the peaceful faction.

His strange behavior cannot be explained without a closer look at the arguments and motives of the factions and the balance of power between them. Lenin sought to obtain a "breathing space" for the Soviet Republic, which would make it possible to restore relative order in the country and create new army. For a respite, he was ready to pay any price - to leave Ukraine and the Baltic countries, to pay any indemnity. He did not consider this "shameful" world to be final. Lenin hoped that during the respite in Germany, a revolution could mature and reverse the Kaiser's conquests.

To this, the military faction objected that the Central Powers would not allow Lenin to use the respite: they would cut Russia off from Ukrainian grain and coal and Caucasian oil, subdue half of the Russian population, finance and support the counter-revolutionary movement, and stifle the revolution. In addition, the Soviets are unable to form a new army during a short respite. Armed forces will have to be created in the process of struggle, because this is the only possible way. It is true that the Soviets may be forced to evacuate Petrograd and even Moscow, but they will have enough room to retreat where they can muster their strength. Even if it turns out that the people do not want to fight for the revolution, as well as for the old regime - the leaders of the military faction did not at all consider that this would necessarily happen - then every advance of the Germans, accompanied by horrors and robberies, will shake off fatigue and apathy from the people, will force resist him and, finally, arouse truly popular enthusiasm and raise him to a revolutionary war. On the wave of this enthusiasm, a new, formidable army will rise. The revolution, untainted by miserable capitulation, will be revived, it will stir the soul of the foreign proletariat and dispel the nightmare of imperialism.

Each faction was convinced of the disastrous course proposed by the other side, and the discussion took place in an electrified, emotional atmosphere. Apparently, Trotsky alone argued that from a realistic point of view, both lines have their pros and cons, and both are admissible, based on principles and revolutionary morality.

It has long been a hackneyed thought among historians - to which Trotsky himself later had a hand - that the Leninist course had all the virtues of realism, and that the military faction embodied the most quixotic aspect of Bolshevism. Such a view is unfair to the leaders of the supporters of the war. Indeed, the political originality and courage of Lenin elevated him in those days to the height of genius, and further developments- the fall of the Hohenzollerns and the Habsburgs and the abolition of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk before the expiration of the year - confirmed his correctness. It is also true that the military faction often acted under the influence of conflicting feelings and did not propose a coherent course of action. But in their best moments, its leaders proved their case convincingly and realistically, and for the most part their arguments were also justified in practice. The respite that Lenin received was, in fact, half illusory. After the peace was signed, the Kaiser government did everything in its power to crush the Soviets. However, he put the struggle on Western front, which took great strength. Without a separate peace in the West, Germany would not have been able to achieve more, even if the Soviets had not accepted the Brest-Litovsk Diktat.

The other argument of the military faction, that the Soviets would have to create a new army on the battlefield, in battles, and not in the barracks during a quiet respite, paradoxically, was very realistic. This is how the Red Army was ultimately created. Precisely because Russia is so exhausted by the war, she could not raise a new army in relatively calm times. Only a severe shock and an inevitable danger, forcing to fight, and to fight immediately, could awaken the energy hidden in the Soviet system and force it to act.

The weakness of the military faction was not so much in its wrongness, but in its lack of leadership. Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky, Radek, Ioffe, Uritsky, Kollontai, Lomov-Oppokov, Bubnov, Pyatakov, Smirnov and Ryazanov, all prominent members of the party, were the main spokesmen for its opinion. Some were distinguished by great intelligence and were brilliant orators and publicists, others were brave men, people of action. The position of the leader of the military faction was empty, and she threw inviting glances at Trotsky. At first glance, there was little to prevent Trotsky from meeting their expectations. Although he said that the Leninist strategy, like the opposite, had its merits, he did not hide his internal rejection of this strategy. It is all the more striking that at the most critical moments he supported Lenin with all his authority.

He was in no hurry to become the leader of the military faction, as he understood that this would immediately turn the differences into an irreparable split in the Bolshevik party and, possibly, into a bloody conflict. He and Lenin would have ended up on opposite sides of the barricades; as leaders of warring factions, divided not by the usual differences, but by matters of life and death. Lenin had already warned the Central Committee that if he again did not receive a majority of votes on the question of peace, he would leave the committee and the government and turn against them to the rank and file members of the party. In this case, Trotsky remained the only successor to Lenin as head of government. It was precisely in order to prevent the party from sliding into a civil war in its own ranks that Trotsky voted for Lenin at the decisive moment.

The peaceful faction won, but its conscience was troubled. Immediately after the Central Committee decided on February 23 to accept the terms of the Germans, it unanimously voted to begin immediate preparations for a new war. When it came to appointing a delegation to Brest-Litovsk, a tragicomic episode occurred: all members of the committee shied away from dubious honor; no one, even the most ardent supporter of peace, wanted to put his signature on the treaty. Trotsky asked the Central Committee to consider his resignation from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which was actually under the control of Chicherin. The Central Committee asked Trotsky to remain in office until peace was signed. He only agreed not to publicly announce his resignation and said that he would not appear in any government office again. At Lenin's insistence, the Central Committee obliged him to attend at least those government meetings where foreign affairs were not discussed.

After recent tensions, victories and failures, Trotsky was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. It seemed that his efforts in Brest had gone to waste. He was reproached, not without reason, for giving the party a false sense of security, as he repeatedly assured them that the Germans would not dare to attack.

On March 3, Sokolnikov signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, making it more than clear that the Soviets were acting under pressure. In less than two weeks, the Germans captured Kyiv and a significant territory of Ukraine, the Austrians entered Odessa, and the Turks entered Trebizond. In Ukraine, the occupying authorities liquidated the Soviets and restored the Rada, though only in order to disperse the Rada a little later and put Hetman Skoropadsky at the head of the puppet administration in its place. The temporary victors flooded the Leninist government with demands and ultimatums, one more humiliating than the other. The most bitter was the ultimatum, according to which the Soviet Republic was to immediately sign a peace treaty with "independent" Ukraine. The Ukrainian people, especially the peasants, offered desperate resistance to the invaders and their local tools. By signing a separate treaty with Ukraine, the Soviets would unequivocally renounce all Ukrainian resistance. At a meeting of the Central Committee, Trotsky demanded that the German ultimatum be rejected. Lenin, not for a moment forgetting about future revenge, was determined to drink the cup of humiliation to the end. But after each German provocation, both in the party and in the Soviets, opposition to peace grew stronger. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had not yet been ratified, and ratification was in doubt.

On March 6, an emergency congress of the party was held in the Tauride Palace, which was supposed to decide whether to recommend ratification to the future Congress of Soviets. The meetings were held in strict secrecy, and the minutes were not published until 1925. An atmosphere of deep despondency reigned at the congress. The provincial delegates discovered that in the face of the threat of a German offensive, the evacuation of government offices from Petrograd was being prepared, although even the Kerensky government refused to take this step. The commissars were already "sitting on their suitcases" - only Trotsky was to remain in place to organize the defense. Until recently, the desire for peace was so strong that it overthrew the February regime and brought the Bolsheviks to power. But now that peace has come, reproaches fall primarily on the party that achieved it.

At the congress, the main controversy inevitably flared up around Trotsky's activities. In his sharpest speech, Lenin urged the ratification of peace.

At the party congress, Lenin made the cryptic remark that the situation was changing so rapidly that in two days he himself might oppose ratification. Therefore, Trotsky tried to get the congress to formulate a resolution that was not too harsh. However, in the depths of his soul, Lenin did not expect an encouraging response from the Entente, and again he was right.

At that time, the appointment of Trotsky as Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs was just being discussed or decided in the inner-party soviets. On behalf of the Leninist faction, Zinoviev assured Trotsky that Trotsky's tactics "were by and large the correct tactics, which were aimed at rousing the masses in the West." But Trotsky must understand that the party has changed its position, that it is pointless to argue about the wording "neither peace nor war." When it came to electing the Central Committee, he and Lenin received the most votes. While condemning his line, the party nevertheless placed full confidence in him.

Four hectic months have passed since the Soviets ratified peace. The Council of People's Commissars moved from Petrograd to Moscow and settled in the Kremlin. Allied diplomatic missions also left Petrograd, but in protest against a separate peace they left for provincial Vologda. Trotsky became People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and began to "arm the revolution." The Japanese invaded Siberia and occupied Vladivostok. German troops crushed the Finnish revolution and forced the Russian fleet to withdraw from the Gulf of Finland. In addition, they occupied the whole of Ukraine, Crimea and the coasts of the Azov and Black Seas. The British and French landed at Murmansk. The Czech Legion rebelled against the Soviets. Encouraged by the foreign interventionists, the Russian counter-revolutionary forces resumed the deadly war against the Bolsheviks, subordinating principles and conscience to it. Many of those who only recently called the Bolsheviks German agents, first of all Milyukov and his comrades, accepted help from Germany to fight the Bolsheviks. Famine began in Moscow and the cities of Northern Russia, cut off from the granaries. Lenin announced the complete nationalization of industry and called on committees of the peasant poor to requisition food from wealthy peasants in order to feed the urban workers. Several real rebellions and several imaginary conspiracies were put down.

Never before has the conclusion of peace brought so much suffering and humiliation as the Brest “peace” brought to Russia. But Lenin, throughout all these troubles and disappointments, cherished his offspring - the revolution. He did not want to denounce the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, although he violated its terms more than once. He did not stop calling the German and Austrian workers to revolt. Despite the stipulated disarmament of Russia, he gave sanction to the creation of the Red Army. But under no circumstances did Lenin allow his supporters to take up arms against Germany. He summoned to Moscow the Bolsheviks, who led the Ukrainian Soviets, who wanted to strike at the occupying authorities from the underground. Throughout Ukraine, the German war machine crushed the partisans. The Red Guard watched their agony from behind Russian border and languished with the desire to rush to help, but Lenin curbed her with a firm hand.

Trotsky had long ceased to resist the conclusion of peace. He agreed with the party's final decision and its consequences. Solidarity with the people's commissars and party discipline in equal measure obliged him to adhere to the Leninist course. Trotsky faithfully followed this course, although he had to pay for his loyalty with internal struggle and hours of bitter torment. Supporters of the revolutionary war among the Bolsheviks, deprived of a leader, confused, fell silent. All the louder and more impatiently did the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries speak out against peace. In March, immediately after the treaty was ratified, they withdrew from the Council of People's Commissars. They continued to participate in almost all government departments, including the Cheka, as well as in the executive bodies of the Soviets. But, embittered by everything that was happening, they could not be in opposition to the government and at the same time be responsible for its actions.

Such was the situation when, at the beginning of July 1918, the Fifth Congress of Soviets met in Moscow. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries decided to go through with the matter and disengage from the Bolsheviks. Again there were angry protests against peace. The Ukrainian delegates went up to the podium to talk about the desperate struggle of the partisans and beg for help. The leaders of the Left Social Revolutionaries Kamkov and Spiridonova condemned the "Bolshevik treason" and demanded a war of liberation.

Trotsky on July 4 asked the congress to sanction an emergency order issued by him in his capacity as commissar for military and naval affairs. By order in Russian partisan detachments severe discipline was introduced, as they threatened to break the peace with unauthorized skirmishes with German troops. Trotsky said that no one has the right to appropriate the functions of the government and independently decide on the start of hostilities.

On July 6, noisy debates were interrupted by the assassination of the German ambassador, Count Mirbach. The murderers Blyumkin and Andreev, two Left SRs, senior officials of the Cheka, acted on the orders of Spiridonova, hoping to provoke a war between Germany and Russia. Immediately after this, the Left SRs rose in revolt against the Bolsheviks. They managed to arrest Dzerzhinsky and other chiefs of the Cheka, who headed for the headquarters of the rebels without protection. The Social Revolutionaries occupied the post office and the telegraph office and announced the overthrow of the Leninist government. But they did not have a leader and a plan of action, and after two days of skirmishes and skirmishes, they surrendered.

On July 9, the Congress of Soviets met again, and Trotsky reported on the suppression of the uprising. He said the rebels had taken the government by surprise. It sent several reliable detachments from the capital to fight against the Czechoslovak legion. The government entrusted its security to the same Red Guard, which consisted of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who staged the uprising. The only thing that Trotsky could put up against the rebels was a regiment of Latvian riflemen under the command of Vatsetis, a former colonel of the General Staff and in the near future commander in chief of the Red Army, and a revolutionary detachment of Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war under the command of Bela Kun, the future founder of the Hungarian Communist Party. But the uprising had an almost farcical character, if not from a political, then from a military point of view. The rebels were a band of bold but unorganized guerrillas. They were unable to coordinate their attack and eventually surrendered not even to force, but to the persuasion of the Bolsheviks. Trotsky, who was just establishing discipline in the ranks of the Red Guards and partisans and reforming their detachments into a centralized Red Army, took advantage of the uprising as an objective lesson that clearly showed the correctness of his military line. The leaders of the uprising were arrested, but amnestied after a few months. Only a few of them, those who abused their high position in the Cheka, were executed.

Thus, while Trotsky fought back the stubborn echo of his own passionate protest against peace, the fateful Brest-Litovsk crisis ended.

In the west, a territory of 1 million square meters was torn away from Russia. km, in the Caucasus, Kars, Ardagan, Batum retreated to Turkey. Russia pledged to demobilize the army and navy. According to an additional Russian-German financial agreement signed in Berlin, she was obliged to pay Germany an indemnity of 6 billion marks. The treaty was ratified on March 15, 1918 by the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

On the Soviet side, the agreement was signed by the deputy. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs and secretary of the delegation. The Brest Treaty remained in force for 3 months. After the revolution in Germany 1918–1919, the Soviet government on November 13, 1918 unilaterally annulled it.

According to the frankly predatory terms of the treaty, Poland, the Baltic States, part of Belarus, Ardagan, Kars and Batum in Transcaucasia departed from Soviet Russia. Ukraine (actually occupied by the Germans by agreement with the Central Rada) and Finland were recognized as independent. The total losses amounted to 780 thousand square meters. km, 56 million people, up to 40% of the country's industrial proletariat, 70% iron, 90% coal. Russia pledged to demobilize the army and navy and pay a huge indemnity of 6 billion gold marks.

The Russian government pledged to completely demobilize the army, withdraw its troops from Ukraine, the Baltic states and Finland, and conclude peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic.

The Russian fleet was being withdrawn from its bases in Finland and Estonia.

Russia paid 3 billion rubles in reparations

The Soviet government pledged to stop revolutionary propaganda in the Central European countries.

The November Revolution in Germany swept away Kaiser's empire. This allowed Soviet Russia to unilaterally annul the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on November 13, 1918 and return most of the territories. German troops left the territory of Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Belarus.

Effects

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, as a result of which vast territories were torn away from Russia, which consolidated the loss of a significant part of the country's agricultural and industrial base, aroused opposition to the Bolsheviks from almost all political forces, both from the right and from the left. The treaty almost immediately became known as the "obscene peace". Patriotically minded citizens considered him a consequence of the previous agreements of the Germans with Lenin, who was called as early as 1917 German spy. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were in alliance with the Bolsheviks and were part of the "red" government, as well as the faction of "Left Communists" that had formed within the RCP (b) spoke of "betrayal of the world revolution", since the conclusion of peace on eastern front objectively strengthened the Kaiser's regime in Germany, allowed him to continue the war against the allies in France and at the same time liquidated the front in Turkey, allowed Austria-Hungary to concentrate its forces on the war in Greece and Italy. The agreement of the Soviet government to stop propaganda work in the territories occupied by the Germans meant that the Bolsheviks surrendered the Ukraine, the Baltic states and most of Belarus.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk served as a catalyst for the formation of a "democratic counter-revolution", expressed in the proclamation of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik governments in Siberia and the Volga region, and the uprising of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in June 1918 in Moscow. The suppression of speeches, in turn, led to the formation of a one-party Bolshevik dictatorship and a full-scale civil war.

Literature

1. Lenin's decree on peace. - M., 1958.

3. “Trotsky. Armed Prophet. years." Part 2. / Per. from English. . - M.:, 2006. S.351-408.

4., Rosenthal. 1917: Package-set of documentary materials on history. - M., 1993

6. Reader on the history of the CPSU: A guide for universities. This year / Comp. and others - M., 1989.

7. Shevotsukov of the history of the civil war: A look through decades: Book. For the teacher. - M., 1992.