1990 March 22
Laid down at the production association "Sevmashpredpriyatie" in Severodvinsk as KrPL;
1993 April 6
Got a name "Kursk" in honor of the victory at the Kursk Bulge in 1943;
1993 October
The crew arrived at the Sevmashpredpriyatie to receive the ship from the industry. Subordinated to the command of the 339th ObrSRPL BelVMB;
1994 October 4 - December 30
Factory running and state tests were carried out;
1995 January
Made the transition from the city of Severodvinsk to the place of permanent deployment in the Ara Bay;
1995 March 1
Included in the Northern Fleet, became part of the 7th DiPL of the 1st FPL of the Northern Fleet, based on the Ara Bay (Vidyaevo);
1997 December - 1998 February
Sevmashpredpriyatie underwent a warranty repair with docking in the Sukhona floating dock;
1998 September
Carried out a program of extended hydroacoustic tests in the White Sea;
1998
At the end of the year, the crew was recognized as the best in the connection;
1999 August 3 - October 19
He completed the tasks of autonomous combat service (commander - cap.1r. Lyachin G.P., senior - cap.1r. Kobelev V.V.) in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea, as a result of which the commander of the agro-industrial complex cap.1r. Lyachin G.P. was presented to the title of Hero of the Russian Federation, and 72 crew members - to government awards;
1999
At the end of the year, the crew was declared the best in the Northern Fleet. The crew was awarded the challenge prize of the Governor of the Murmansk region "The best submarine of the Northern Fleet";
2000 July
The agro-industrial complex began preparations for performing combat service tasks as part of the aircraft carrier grouping of ships of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea Fleet, with an estimated release date of October 15;
2000 July 30
Participated in the parade of ships in honor of the Navy Day on the roads of Severomorsk;
2000 August 11
After reloading the ammunition in the Okolnaya Bay, the agro-industrial complex went to the combat training ground to participate in the exercises of the various forces of the fleet, the plan provided for the implementation of rocket and torpedo firing;
2000 August 12
In the morning, the agro-industrial complex conditionally attacked with a cruise missile a squadron led by the TAKR "Admiral Kuznetsov" and the flagship of the fleet, the nuclear cruiser "Pyotr Veliky". According to the exercise plan, the APK was to begin preparations at 09.40, and from 11.40 to 13.40 to carry out a training attack on an aircraft carrier group of ships. The Norwegian seismic station recorded 2 shocks at the point with coordinates: 69°38’ N, 37°9’ E. The first, at 11.30.42 with a force of 1.5 points on the Richter scale, which can be equated to an explosion of 100 kg of TNT, the second - at 11.32.57 with a force of 3.5 points on the Richter scale, which corresponds to an explosion of 1 - 2 tons of TNT. After not contacting the APK K-141 a combat alert was announced in the fleet at 23.00;
2000 August 12
During the exercises of the fleet, after internal explosions in the torpedo room, she sank in the Barents Sea at a depth of 108 m, the entire crew (118 people) died. The reasons for this explosion have not been finally established. According to the conclusion of the government commission, the most likely is an emergency in the torpedo compartment (according to the official report prepared in 2002 by Prosecutor General Ustinov, at 11 hours 28 minutes 26 seconds Moscow time, a torpedo 65-76A (“Kit”) exploded in torpedo tube No. 4 , the cause of the explosion was the leakage of torpedo fuel components (hydrogen peroxide). After 2 minutes, the fire that arose after the first explosion led to the detonation of torpedoes and missiles located in the first compartment of the boat. The second explosion led to the destruction of several compartments of the submarine);
2000 August 13
At 00.55, the operational duty officer of the Northern Fleet gave permission for the release of the Mikhail Rudnitsky rescue vessel, on board of which there were two underwater vehicles: AS-32 and AS-34. At 02.22, the nuclear cruiser "Peter the Great" established hydroacoustic contact with an underwater object, and at 03.20, clear knocks of 5 hits lasting 8 seconds were recorded. In total, two magnetic anomalies were found at the alleged crash site at a distance of 1 nautical mile from each other. At 10.30 the commander of the fleet gave the order to the deep-water station AS-15 follow the disaster area. At 16.20 technical contact was established with the sunken submarine, and at 18.32 with the submersible AS-34 discovered submarine classified as APC K-141. arrived in the area warships and support vessels of the Northern Fleet;
2000 August 14
At 14.22, the coordinates of the sunken APC were specified: 69°37.075’ N, 37°34.58’ E;
2000 August 16
From 14.30 to 23.00 deep-water station AS-15 inspection and documentation of the destruction of the agro-industrial complex building K-141;
2000 August 19
The Norwegian rescue ship "Normand Pioneer" arrived in the rescue area;
2000 August 20
The ship "Seaway Eagle" with Norwegian deep-sea divers arrived in the rescue area. In view of the failure of numerous attempts to suction to the coaming platform of an emergency submarine, diving underwater vehicles AS-32, AS-34 and AS-36 terminated;
2000 August 21
At 07.36, the underwater vehicles controlled from the Seaway Eagle opened the upper hatch cover of the submarine, and at 12.25 - the lower one, after which an intensive release of air from the 9th compartment began, which continued until 13.40. An analysis of the air remaining in the 9th compartment showed that the oxygen content in it did not exceed 7 - 8%. The death of the entire crew was legally ascertained;
"At present, the survey of the Kursk APRK located in the Roslyakovo floating dock is coming to an end. Despite the fact that the cause of the disaster is still unknown to date, it is now possible, based on the conclusions of experts and specialists of the Navy, to restore the picture of the events that took place in boat, both at the time of the explosion and after it.
The first explosion (the cause of which is still unclear) caused an instant intense fire in the 1st compartment. All the people who were there died within the first few seconds. APRK "Kursk" at that time was at periscope depth, preparing for a training torpedo attack, and therefore its retractable devices were raised.
The blast wave of the first explosion passed into the Central Post (CP), located in the 2nd compartment. Some of the people who were there probably died immediately, others were stunned by the impact. Further, the blast wave passed through the ventilation pipelines, bent the rods of the hydraulic lifters of the retractable devices, which is why they all remained raised. The same blast wave threw into all the compartments and the smell of burning. That is why all the survivors by that time personnel, immediately turned on the portable breathing apparatus(PDA), and the officers who were on the control panel of the Main Power Plant (GEM) of the nuclear reactor, into hose breathing apparatus (ShDA).
Due to the fact that the entire staff of the CPU was out of order, and there was no one to control the boat, the Kursk began to sink rapidly. The fire in the 1st compartment continued, and therefore the submariners in the 3rd compartment began to move towards the stern. However, they did not manage to go further than the 4th compartment.
Even before sinking to the bottom, the emergency protection of the reactor worked on the Kursk and almost immediately this was followed by a second explosion (only some 130 seconds had passed since the first), much more powerful than the first. The cause of this explosion was the ongoing fire in the 1st compartment, which reached the racks with torpedoes, followed by their detonation.
New shock wave was several times more powerful than the first. From her impact, the bulkhead between the 1st and 2nd compartments, working like a piston, moved to the stern, crushing and sweeping away everything in its path, cutting off even high-pressure air pipelines (HP). As a result, HP air began to intensively flow from the tanks into the 1st, 2nd and 3rd compartments and exit through a hole in the 1st compartment. A new blast wave destroyed the ventilation pipelines, up to the 5-bis compartment. This wave caught up and killed all those who tried to find salvation in the 4th compartment. They were found there, thirty people lying on top of each other in the corridor of the 4th compartment.
In the 5th compartment from the impact of the blast wave, the combat shift of the power plant control panel died in full force: captain 2nd rank V.Isaenko, captain 3rd rank D.Murachev, lieutenant commanders D.Pshenichnikov, A.Vasiliev, S.Lyubushkin and senior lieutenant A .Mityaev. Some of the officers were thrown out by the wave into the cut-off corridor. All of them remained in the SDA.
The murderous tornado of the second shock wave was stopped only by the aft bulkhead of the 5-bis compartment. In the interval between the first and second shock waves (130 seconds), one of the submariners who were in the 6th compartment managed to slam the light bulkhead door, thereby giving the personnel of the aft compartments a chance to escape. When the "Kursk" was raised and placed in the floating dock, it turned out that the aft bulkhead of the 5-bis compartment was arched. However, she completed her task and still withstood the residual force of the explosion.
The surviving submariners in the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th compartments at that time did everything possible to seal their compartments. There was no panic, let alone flight to the 9th compartment. The compartment commanders kept in touch with each other and consulted on further joint damage control. Then the specialists will find deployed emergency telephones in all 4 aft compartments, through which this communication was carried out.
At the same time, the personnel of the 6th compartment, under the leadership of Lieutenant Commander Rashit Aryapov, despite all the tragedy of what was happening to him, manually connected an additional group of high-pressure gas to compensate for the thermal expansion of the 1st circuit of the reactor. By this they ensured reliable tightness of the reactor for the environment.
Later, after the ascent of the Kursk, experts would be unanimous that it was the actions of the personnel of the 6th compartment that turned out to be decisive for maintaining a normal radiation situation.
At the same time, it still remains a mystery why the personnel of the 8th compartment did not ensure the ascent of the signal buoy, which was achieved by turning the lever from the 8th compartment, especially since the system was not affected by the explosion.
However, intensive filtration of water into the 6th compartment from the flooded 5-bis soon began, and therefore the divers decided to retreat to the aft compartments. It was established that the 6th, 7th and 8th compartments were left in an organized manner and without panic. When leaving, the submariners took with them all the V-64 regeneration kits, individual breathing apparatus for ascent (IDA-59) and SGP rescue diving suits. They did not run away from the battlefield, but retreated in order to gain a foothold on their last line and take the last unequal battle in the 9th compartment.
By 18-19 pm on August 12, all 23 submariners who had survived by that time gathered in the aft compartment 9. "On August 13, all survivors of the explosions died.
2000 August 22
At 00.18 the order of the commander of the Northern Fleet was announced: “In connection with the death of the nuclear submarine Kursk on August 22, 2000, the flags on all ships of the Northern Fleet should be lowered from 08.00. Finish rescue work";
2000 September
a detailed survey of the hull of the agro-industrial complex was carried out using deep-sea manned vehicles "Mir-1" and "Mir-2" from the research vessel "Akademik Mstislav Keldysh";
2000 October
The operation to extract the bodies of submariners from the aft compartments using divers;
2000 October - November
A detailed survey of the hull of the agro-industrial complex was carried out by uninhabited underwater vehicles and divers of the Norwegian company Halliburton AS from the Regalia vessel;
2000 December 4
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet Kuroyedov V.I. gave the prize cup "For the best shooting at a sea target", won by the crew of the agro-industrial complex K-141 "Kursk", for eternal storage in the museum of the 7th DiPL;
2001 September - October
After a preliminary separation of the bow, it was raised by the Dutch company "Mammmoet Transport Antilles N. V." by order of the Russian government;
2001 October
It was put into a floating dock in the village of Roslyakovo to study the causes of the accident, conduct investigative measures and subsequent disassembly for metal. All the bodies of the dead submariners were removed, identified and interred;
2002 April 14
In Roslyakovsky dock, in accordance with the plan, the main work was completed to prepare the agro-industrial complex for the last trip - for disposal at the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "SRZ" Nerpa "(Snezhnogorsk);
2002 April 26
Transferred from PD-50 to PD-42 and towed to Federal State Unitary Enterprise "SRZ "Nerpa" for disposal;
2002 May - June
Operation to lift fragments of the 1st compartment and destroy the remains at the bottom;
2002 August 12
On the anniversary of the death in Moscow, a solemn ceremony was held to open a monument to the deceased crew of the APKR. The monument by Lev Kerbel was inaugurated in front of the Museum of the Armed Forces in Moscow. The composition is called "Grieving Sailor" and is a bronze figure of a sailor and a submarine lying at his feet;
2003 January - February
The core was unloaded at the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "SRZ "Nerpa" in Kut Bay (Snezhnogorsk);
2003 August 12
On the anniversary of the death in St. Petersburg, a solemn ceremony of opening a monument to the deceased crew of the APKR took place. In the center of the memorial (a necropolis of 32 graves), according to the plan of the architect Gennady Peychev, there is an 11-ton black cube (denoting the thickness of the ocean) with a bronze petrel - a "symbol of trouble";
2003 summer
According to RIA Novosti, it was planned to install a submarine cabin in Murmansk near the Church of the Savior on the Waters. The cabin of the "Kursk" in granite design was to become part of the memorial complex in memory of the dead sailors. By this time, the project of the monument was already ready. felling apkr "Kursk" by this time she was in Snezhnogorsk at the Nerpa shipyard. The monument to the dead sailors was planned to be installed in Murmansk as soon as the regional administration finds the necessary funds for this. However, the felling ended up in a scrap yard, where it was discovered in March 2009. The attention of the authorities to the relic was attracted by submariners and journalists. It was decided to turn the cabin into a monument to submariners who did not return from campaigns in peacetime;
2003 - 2004
Dismantled at the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "SRZ" Nerpa "(Snezhnogorsk) with the formation of the reactor block, which was later transferred and put afloat for temporary storage in the temporary storage facility" Saida ";
2009 August 12
Opening of a monument to submariners who did not return from campaigns in peacetime, next to the Church of the Savior on the Waters in Murmansk. The basis of the monument is the front end of the fence felling APKR "Kursk";
2015 spring
The block continued to be stored afloat in the Saida storage facility, awaiting to be placed on the storage facility for long-term storage.
Finished model length: 154 cm
Number of sheets: 44
Sheet format: A3
Description, history
K-141 "Kursk" - nuclear submarine with cruise missiles of project 949A "Antey", (NATO designation - "Oscar-II"). Laid down at Sevmash in 1992, put into operation on December 30, 1994. From 1995 to 2000 - as part of Northern Fleet of Russia, Vidyaevo base point.
| K-141 "Kursk" | ||
|---|---|---|
| Ship history | ||
| flag state | Russia | |
| Home port | Vidyaevo, Ara-lip | |
| Launching | 16th of May 1994 | |
| Withdrawn from the Navy | 12th of August 2000 (sank) | |
| Modern status | disposed of, felling fence preserved | |
| Main characteristics | ||
| ship type | SSGN | |
| Project designation | 949A "Antey" | |
| NATO classification | "Oscar II" | |
| Speed (surface) | 15 knots | |
| Speed (underwater) | 33 knots | |
| Operating depth | 420 m | |
| Maximum immersion depth | 500 m | |
| Autonomy of navigation | 120 days | |
| Crew | 130 people | |
| Dimensions | ||
| Displacement surface | 14 700 t | |
| Underwater displacement | 23 860 t | |
| The maximum length (according to KVL) | 154 m | |
| Hull width max. | 18.2 m | |
| Height | 18.4 m [source? ] | |
| Average draft (according to design waterline) | 9.2 m | |
| Power point | ||
| Nuclear, 2 reactors OK-650V, thermal output 2 x 190 MW, shaft power 2 x 50,000 hp | ||
| Armament | ||
| Torpedo- mine armament |
2x650mm and 4x533mm TA 24 torpedoes |
|
| Missile weapons | RCC complex P-700 Granite 24 missiles ZM-45 |
|
Sunk in the Barents Sea, 175 km from Severomorsk, ( 69°40?00? With. sh. 37°35?00? in. d.) at a depth of 108 meters as a result of the disaster that occurred on August 12, 2000. All 118 crew members on board were killed. By number of dead the accident was the second in post-war history domestic submarine fleet, after the explosion of ammunition on the B-37.
Building
The crew of the K-141 APRK was formed in the Northern Fleet in June 1991, the first commander was Captain 2nd Rank Rozhkov Viktor Nikolaevich.
Laid down in Severodvinsk ( PO "Northern Machine-Building Enterprise", serial number 662) in 1992, launched in May 1994, put into operation on December 30, 1994.
In April 1993, in honor of the feat of the Soviet people on the Kursk Bulge during the Great Patriotic War By directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, K-141 was given the honorary name "Kursk".
Service History
In August-October 1999, the boat participated in an autonomous trip to Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, having previously performed “excellent” rocket firing for the prize of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy.
The campaign of the Kursk APRK was carried out according to the plan and under the control of the commander of the KSF, Admiral Popov V.A., who gave him the following description: “The commander of the Kursk managed to fully realize our plan. The ship secretly broke into the Mediterranean through Gibraltar. It was not a breakthrough, but a song!”
"Kursk" conducted covert surveillance of the group 6th Fleet of the US Navy in the Mediterranean Sea, including aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt, aircraft from which attacked Serbia during NATO operations against Yugoslavia. During the Mediterranean campaign, the Kursk worked out 5 conditional attacks on real targets. As a result of the campaign, 72 crew members were presented for government awards.
The sudden appearance in the Mediterranean of the latest "aircraft carrier killer" caused panic in the ranks of the US 6th Fleet. The anti-submarine forces of all Mediterranean NATO countries were involved in the search for the Kursk ...
However, K-141 disappears as suddenly as it appeared, dealing a devastating blow to American ego. Several chiefs at once, including the commander of the anti-submarine defense of the Gibraltar zone, are deprived of their posts, and the Kursk and its commander, in fact, are elevated to the rank of " personal enemies America." The commander of the nuclear submarine was presented to the title of Hero of Russia.
From official document
| In the course of carrying out the tasks of combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, the Kursk anti-submarine missile system operated in conditions of overwhelming superiority of the anti-submarine forces of a potential enemy. Carried out the task of monitoring enemy carrier strike multi-purpose groups. He monitored them and carried out a passing search for nuclear submarines of foreign states, while maintaining secrecy and combat stability. Based on the results of combat service, 72 crew members were presented for government awards. Captain 1st rank G. Lyachin presented to the title of Hero of Russia. APRK "Kursk" is recognized as the best submarine of the Northern Fleet. The governor of the Murmansk region presented the commander of the ship with the prize "The Best Submarine of the Northern Fleet". |
According to the results of the competition for 1999, the K-141 Kursk was the best in the 7th division. Five of its combat units are "excellent". 23% of the crew members are masters of military affairs. The remaining 77% are specialists of the 1st and 2nd classes.
AT Last year of the 20th century, Captain 1st Rank G.P. Lyachin is preparing the crew for a new long-distance voyage, but not alone, but as part of a powerful group. Russia, after the collapse of the USSR, was again preparing to return to the Mediterranean Sea.
July 30, 2000 the crew of the Kursk took part in the naval parade, dedicated to the Day Navy in Severomorsk.
On the On October 15, 2000, it was planned to leave Severomorsk for Mediterranean Sea aircraft carrier maneuver group of the Northern Fleet, which included the Kursk.
Catastrophe
AT 2002 Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Vladimir Kuroyedov said that in the course of preparation, the command committed a number of violations that did not contribute to the favorable conduct of the exercises, but at the same time were not the cause of the accident. On board the boat were 24 P-700 Granit cruise missiles and 24 torpedoes. It was necessary to launch a cruise missile and torpedo fire at a training target. The ascent and communication with the report was planned for 13 or 15 hours. The captain of the 1st rank G.P. Lyachin commanded the ship.
According to the exercise plan, the Kursk was supposed to start preparations at 09:40, and from 11:40 to 13:40 to carry out a training attack on an aircraft carrier group of ships. The last entries in the logs are marked 11 hours 15 minutes on August 12, 2000.
Possible causes of death
Training torpedo explosion
Official version
Official report published in 2002 by Prosecutor General Ustinov: at 11 hours 28 minutes 26 seconds Moscow time, an explosion occurred torpedoes 65-76A ("Kit") in torpedo tube No. 4. The cause of the explosion was the leakage of torpedo fuel components ( hydrogen peroxide). After 2 minutes, the fire that arose after the first explosion led to the detonation of torpedoes located in the first compartment of the boat. The second explosion led to the destruction of several compartments of the submarine. Torpedoes on hydrogen peroxide have not been used in most fleets of the world for more than 50 years precisely for reasons of safety and reliability, on the Kursk there were such torpedoes - model 65-76 "Kit", developed in 1976 - since they are cheaper than torpedoes with expensive silver-zinc batteries. Shortly after the investigation, the hydrogen peroxide torpedo, which had been attempted to be returned to the Navy in order to save money, was finally withdrawn from service.
Version of Vice Admiral Ryazantsev
According to Valery Dmitrievich Ryazantsev, who was a member of the government commission to investigate the causes and circumstances of the Kursk submarine disaster, the cause of the first explosion was the so-called "thick" torpedo 65-76 PV, replenished with non-fat high pressure air on August 11, 2000. Until August 12, non-skimmed air could not enter the oxidizer tank, since the practical torpedo was on the rack, the air shut-off valve on it was closed, and safety devices were installed on the air trigger valve. The uncontrolled decomposition reaction of hydrogen peroxide began after the torpedo was loaded into the torpedo tube. Due to the lack of design of submarines of this class, the crew, in order to prevent an increase in pressure in the 1st compartment during salvo firing with torpedoes, leaves the flaps of the ship's general ventilation system open, as a result of which the shock wave from the explosion of a torpedo 65-76 PV hit the 2nd compartment and the entire personal the composition of the command compartment received severe contusions and was inoperable. The second explosion, according to Valery Ryazantsev, occurred due to a nuclear submarine collision with the ground, and not as a result of a massive fire in the first compartment - the K-141 Kursk nuclear submarine, with the first compartment filled with water, at a speed of about 3 knots, with a trim of nose 40-42 degrees at a depth of 108 meters collided with the ground. Torpedo tubes No. 1, 3, 5 and 6 with live torpedoes equipped with fuses were crushed and destroyed, which caused the live torpedoes to explode.
torpedoing
Immediately after the disaster, several admirals and officials claimed that the Kursk had been torpedoed by an American submarine. Then this version began to be silent in favor of the official version. However, the French director Jean-Michel Carre (Jean-Michel Carr?), in his film Kursk. Submarine in troubled water"(Fr. Koursk: un sous marin en eaux troubles ), which was shown on January 7, 2005 on French television France 2, claims that the Kursk was torpedoed by the American submarine Memphis. According to his version, the Kursk carried out a demonstrative shot of the new Shkval torpedo, these tests were observed by two American submarines Memphis and Toledo.
"Toledo" was walking dangerously close under the cover of "Memphis", which was "in the shadows." At one point, the Kursk and the Toledo collided (the video of the Kursk lying at the bottom shows long gaps on its hull) and, in order to prevent the Kursk from firing at the Toledo, (it is assumed that the opening of the torpedo tube was heard apparatus "Kursk"), "Memphis" opened fire with a torpedo Mk-48 on the "Kursk".
Carre claims that Russian President Vladimir Putin deliberately concealed the truth about what happened in order to prevent a sharp deterioration in relations, and possibly a military conflict with the United States.
Canadian documentarians and some retired military men adhere to the same version.
Mina from the 2nd World WarWhen analyzing the version about the torpedoing of the Kursk APRK, it must be taken into account, however, that the information that was called official in the film directed by Carré was actually put forward in the first days after the tragedy in a presumptive manner along with other versions, including the most incredible ones. The materials available today do not provide any basis for its confirmation. Strictly speaking, even in the French film itself, the only actual proof of its plausibility is a freeze-frame showing a hole in a light hull on the right side. However, this hole is located in close proximity to the cut-off line of the bow compartment, but there are no clear signs of the origin of this defect from a torpedo hit, and the strong hull is intact in this area. The American Mk-48 torpedoes discussed in the film explode outside the hull and do not leave such holes. As a result, it can be assumed that the hole could have been formed as a result of lifting and towing operations, when docking the boat, etc. Another strong counterargument against the torpedoing version is the discrepancy between the powers of the 1st and 2nd explosions on the Kursk, recorded by seismologists, and the power of an American torpedo.
Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov expressed the version of the collision between the Kursk and anti-ship mine during the Second World War, which may also have led to the detonation of the torpedo. After selection official version"torpedo explosion" the assumption has disappeared by itself.
Experts familiar with the strength characteristics of nuclear submarines of this class initially rejected this version.
Collision with an underwater object
One of the members of the state commission, who accepted this submarine from the industry, captain of the first rank Mikhail Volzhensky believes that the torpedo in the apparatus could have jammed due to a strong mechanical blow to the hull of the boat. Volzhensky considers the most likely cause of the disaster to be a collision with a foreign submarine. In his opinion, "a sliding blow of the steering pen (horizontal rudders) could lead to severe deformation of the Kursk torpedo tubes."
This conclusion is very similar to the probable causes of the Kursk disaster, outlined on November 29, 2000 in “ Nezavisimaya newspaper". Indeed, both practical torpedoes: USET-80 and 65-76, as a rule, are loaded into the right torpedo tubes (TA). In a collision at a sharp heading angle with a foreign nuclear submarine, the right outer TA of 650 mm caliber, in which the practical 65-76 torpedo lay, would be the first to be crushed. With a relative approaching speed of the submarines of about 20 knots (10 m/s), this TA was crushed together with the torpedo in one second. During this second, almost instantly, the entire supply of fuel (kerosene) and oxidizer (hydrogen peroxide) were combined in a closed volume, which led to their explosive ignition, enhanced by the explosion of a powder accelerator installed in the tail section of the torpedo. The pressure of the hull of the foreign nuclear submarine from the head of the torpedo to its tail sent this explosion (equivalent to an explosion of 150 kg of TNT, as recorded by the Norwegian seismic station) to the rear cover of the TA, which was torn out, and the force of fire hit the first compartment, which instantly led to a fire.
The commander of the Northern Fleet, which included the Kursk, Admiral Popov also expressed strong confidence in such a version. According to him, an unidentified submarine unintentionally hit "the most vulnerable spot of this submarine project", as a result of which, having lost its buoyancy, it hit the ground with high speed and trim, where the torpedo ammunition exploded.
Missile hit
Captain of the first rank Alexander Leskov, indicating that a submarine of this size was not authorized to be under water in this place according to physical reasons, suggested that an anti-ship ballistic missile hit the boat. However, the chairman of the St. Petersburg club of submariners, Captain 1st Rank Igor Kurdin, said that this version is "complete nonsense."
On September 8, 2000, an article appeared in the Berlinliner Zeitung newspaper with a version that the Kursk was sunk by an accidental hit by a P-700 missile equipped with a new warhead designed to destroy underwater targets launched from nuclear missile cruiser "Peter the Great". This version was kept silent due to the fact that it could "discredit the entire Russian military command." This version does not explain the origin of the hole. In addition, in service with the Russian armed forces there is no such "diving" modification of the P-700 anti-ship missiles.
The resulting fire caused the torpedoes to detonate, causing a series of explosions.
rescue work
Rescue work was carried out by the Northern Fleet and took place from August 13 to 22, but were unsuccessful. Underwater vehicles (autonomous projectiles) AS-15, AS-32, AS-34 and AS-36 were used. The press service of the Main Staff of the Navy attributed the failures to a strong undercurrent, low water transparency, rough seas and a large roll of the Kursk - about 60 degrees.
However, the captain of the 3rd rank A. Sholokhov, who dived three times on deep-sea submersible "Priz", claimed that the speed of the undercurrent was not more than 0.7 knots, the visibility was acceptable for rescue operations, and there was no roll. All attempts at suction to the coaming area of the boat were unsuccessful, since the rubber anti-noise coating on boats of this type does not properly cover the hatch coaming area and interferes with docking.
On August 20, the Norwegian ship Seaway Eagle was allowed to work, divers from which were able to open the aft rescue hatch of the nuclear submarine the next day.
The reaction of the authorities
President Vladimir Putin interrupted his vacation, which he spent in Sochi, only five days after the tragedy - August 17, 2000.
When asked by Larry King about what happened to the submarine, V.V. Putin replied: “She drowned.” On August 28, 2000, ORT went on air Sergey Dorenko's author's program with the latest issue and sharp criticism of Putin over the death of the Kursk APRK.
In accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of August 26, 2000 No. 1578, all those on board were posthumously awarded Order of Courage, and the commander of the ship was given the title Hero of the Russian Federation.
Investigation
On August 14, at the direction of President V.V. Putin, a Government Commission headed by Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation I. I. Klebanov.
detailed survey at the end of September with the help of deep-sea manned submersibles "Mir-1" and "Mir-2" from the research vessel " Academician Mstislav Keldysh»,
In September 2000, all Russian ships participating in the exercises were inspected at the pier from the outer surface and inner underwater sides. Inquiries about the possible participation of foreign objects were sent, many of them were answered, but they did not contain permission to inspect the alleged objects.
AT In 2000, several surveys of the sunken submarine were carried out [
- in October - November - by uninhabited underwater vehicles and divers of the Norwegian company Halliburton AS from the vessel Regalia.
AT In 2001, an investigation team of 43 people was created to examine the raised Kursk. The group gathered in full force on September 27, its core was made up of investigators who had been working since the initiation of the criminal case. From September 27 to October 22, the group underwent special training; a submarine of the same project, along with the crew, was placed at its disposal. In the process of preparation, a certain compartment was assigned to the investigators, and movement in gas masks and with gas cylinders behind their backs was also practiced. About 50 specialists of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, as well as compartment commanders from submarines of the same project, were involved in the inspection of the raised Kursk.
According to one commentator, there was a strong smell in the compartments after lifting, in some compartments there was a large concentration of carbon monoxide. The 9th compartment was waist-deep filled with fuel oil, water and other substances, the 5th and 6th were relatively clean, there was practically no water and carbon monoxide.
In the bulkheads between the compartments there are airtight bulkhead cups designed to save items in case of unforeseen situations. There were two of them between the 8th and 9th compartments, in both there were only blank sheets of paper with pencils provided for by the regulations.
The investigation established the reason why the rescue apparatus could not stick to the site in the area of the 9th compartment, up to 6-7 suction experiments were carried out per day. This reason was the chips of the "mirror" platform.
It was found that there were more people in the 4th compartment than there should have been.
Logs and recorders
According to the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Vladimir Kuroyedov, in the 5th compartment of the nuclear-powered ship, where the control panel of the main power plant"Kursk", a recorder and watch documentation badly damaged by water were found. According to him, a search was carried out for a recorder and watch documentation in the 3rd compartment, where the combat posts of radio operators, chemists and radiometrists were located. The decoding of 22 cassettes of tape recordings from the Kursk nuclear-powered ship was carried out by specialists from the St. Center for Speech Technologies».
It was found that on the day of the accident, the Snegir tape recording equipment was turned off, recording the conversations over the speakerphone, the corresponding toggle switch was in the “off” position. According to the regulations, during the preparation of a training attack, the Snegir equipment must be turned on. It also turned out that the emergency buoy signaling was not turned on on the nuclear-powered ship and the emergency antenna ejection system was turned off for several years. The factory fastening device was not removed from the emergency buoy, which prevented the buoy from surfacing.
Logs of the central atomic post, a draft logbook, logbooks for the control of the left and right side of the nuclear submarine were found. There were no records of an emergency or an emergency situation in them. Three divers' notes were also found.
On the basis of one of the notes, an assumption was made about the absence of light and smoke in the 9th compartment.
Identification of the dead
During the year, part of the investigators collected identification signs, interviewing relatives, friends, colleagues of the dead submariners, requesting information from medical institutions, up to children's clinics. 9 volumes were collected. Also, the medical books found in the 4th compartment were provided to the forensic doctors.
In February 2002, it was reported that the commander of the crew, captain 1st rank Gennady Lyachin, and the senior in the campaign, the chief of staff of the seventh division of the Northern Fleet, captain 1st rank Vladimir Bagryantsev, were identified.
To On March 20, 2002, the bodies of 115 dead submariners were found and identified. The bodies of two sailors - Dmitry Kotkov (Koshkov) and Ivan Nefedkov (Nefednov), as well as the chief specialist of the Dagdiesel, Mammad Gadzhiev, could not be found.
According to the conclusion of the forensic medical examination, the submariners who were in the 9th compartment died from acute carbon monoxide poisoning within 7-8 hours after the disaster.
Trial involving Boris Kuznetsov
Lawyer B. A. Kuznetsov in 2002-2005 represented the interests of the victims in the criminal case “On the death of the Kursk APRK and members of its crew.” To them, including in his book “She drowned. The truth about the Kursk, which Prosecutor General Ustinov hid, "was subjected to sharp criticism of the results of the official investigation into the circumstances of the disaster. He believed that if the Russian authorities had immediately asked for foreign help, “they managed to save those 24 sailors who were in the ninth compartment and lived for more than two and a half days” (according to official data, the sailors were alive only for a few hours). At the same time, he agreed with the conclusions of the investigation that there was an explosion of torpedoes on the boat and rejected the version of her collision with an American submarine.
destruction
The first explosion caused an intense fire in the first compartment, the shock wave passed into the second compartment. Through the ventilation pipelines, the smell of burning was thrown into other compartments.
The second explosion cut off the bulkhead between the first and second compartments (22nd frame), which, moving like a piston, crushed equipment and 22 mm decking, cut off the welds into a strong hull. After lifting, the bulkhead of the first / second compartments was found at the site of the bulkhead of the second / third compartments (frame 43). The second shock wave was stopped only by the aft bulkhead of the 5 bis compartment. The bulkhead was arched, but held.
Ascent of the Kursk
On August 19, 2000, I. D. Spassky, chief designer of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, reported to the President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin on the work plan to eliminate the consequences of the Kursk nuclear submarine disaster.
On August 28, 2000, the Government of the Russian Federation issued Decree No. 1190-R, which entrusted the organization of preparatory work for the evacuation of the bodies of the dead from the Kursk nuclear submarine and its rise to Federal State Unitary Enterprise "TsKB MT" Rubin "".
Kursk lifting project
Strict requirements were imposed on the lifting of the Kursk nuclear submarine - to raise it without heeling and trim, without affecting the outer hull, etc. They were dictated by the fact that as a result of the explosion, the mechanisms of the nuclear submarine were torn off their foundations, and the state of the ammunition is unknown.
In February 2001, Mammoet Transport BV (Holland) proposed the following technical solution: to raise the boat using hydraulic jacks installed on the vessel. Each jack was provided with a dynamic compensator, which was supposed to compensate for the dynamic forces when the Kursk was lifted off the ground and at the final stage of its ascent when approaching the surface. Its mechanism, based on gas compensation (nitrogen), damped each of the jacks and made it possible to have vertical movements of up to two meters under dynamic influences.
In turn, the Central Design Bureau MT "Rubin" together with the Institute. Academician Krylov, the 1st and 40th institutes of the Navy developed the design of the grips of lifting devices. The essence of the project was as follows: holes were cut out in the strong hull of the boat between the frames, and hooks with retractable paws were inserted there. Department of strength of the Institute. Academician Krylov, it was calculated that the frames and a strong hull could withstand such a load.
- A detailed project for directly lifting and transporting the Kursk was carried out by Mammoet Transport BV (Holland)
- The overall project of the entire operation as a whole is the Rubin Central Design Bureau of MT, with the participation of the Academician Krylov Central Research Institute, the 1st and 40th institutes of the Navy (Russia)
Manufacture of technical means of lifting, principles of their work
All lifting equipment was placed on the Giant 4 barge. The barge has undergone a major modernization at the Shipdock Amsterdam shipyard (Holland). The hull of the barge was reinforced in many places. Twenty-six jacks and compensators with large-diameter coils with all the necessary energy and working media were installed on it. All this was equipped with appropriate systems and control panels. On the barge, a living block and storage for the supply of working media (nitrogen and the like) were organized. Each jack provided lifting with 54 strands.
- Strand - a kind of cable with a diameter of 18 mm, consisting of seven strong metal rods: one central, close in shape to a cylinder, and six trapezoidal sections.
The strands were wound on coils with a diameter of about three meters. The working part of the strands from the jack went through the hawse pipe welded into the barge hull to the hook and was fixed on it. A bundle of 54 strands withstood a load of about 1000 tons.
The bottom of the barge was redesigned for the configuration of a submarine with a depression for the cabin of the Kursk and "saddles" along the entire length of the submarine pressing against the bottom of the barge. During the lifting operation, the barge was pulled down by the force of the jacks and increased its draft. As a result, an Archimedean force arose and actually tore the Kursk off the ground. Further, the "Kursk" was attracted to the bottom of the barge with the help of cable hydraulic jacks, while the bundles of strands were wound on coils.
The lowering of the hooks to the holes was carried out along two of the four special guide cables attached to the guide ring. The ring, in turn, was attached to a "basket" installed directly above the hole cut in the Kursk's rugged hull. After inserting the hooks into the holes, their paws were moved apart using hydraulics and fixed with a stopper.
To bring the boat into the floating dock PD-50, two L-shaped pontoons were made, designed by Mammoet Transport BV. The fact was that the maximum depth of the dock allows ships with a draft of no more than 14 meters to be brought into it. The draft of the Giant barge with the Kursk pulled to its bottom was 20.7 meters. Consequently, the "Giant" - "Kursk" system had to be raised by about 7 meters. The weight of the system was 19,500 tons. The rise of the barge and the boat to the required height was carried out by placing two pontoons under its sides.
- The development of the control system for jacks and compensators was carried out by lgH (Germany)
- Supply of jacks and compensators with related equipment - Hydrospex (Holland)
- Supply of holds - Huisman company (Holland)
- Model seaworthy tests and strength testing of load-carrying ties - Academician Krylov Central Research Institute (Russia)
- Production of giant pontoons - Sevmashpredpriyatie (Russia)
- And also about a dozen factories - equipment suppliers from different countries.
Calculation of lifting parameters
When calculating the lifting parameters, the specialists of the Rubin Central Design Bureau of MT solved two complex technical problems.
The first was that it was impossible to accurately calculate the force with which the ground attracted the boat. Soil studies by three specialized institutes gave a very wide range of results.
Second: the degree of destruction of the first compartment made it possible to assume its possible detachment from the body of the boat during the ascent, which could lead to serious, irreparable consequences.
As a result, it was decided to preliminarily give a uniform load to the lifting system, equal to approximately 50% of the weight of the boat, withstand about 6 hours, then increase the load on the stern asymmetrically. In addition, a fallback was also provided in case the boat still did not come off the ground. Under the aft end of the Kursk, a cable was wound up. The cable was attached to two tugs: SmitWijs Singapore and Artek. The tugs were ready, if necessary, to stretch the cable along the boat under the keel as far as it would be possible.
As for the problem of the first compartment, it was decided to cut it off.
Preparing the Kursk for lifting
"Academician Mstislav Keldysh"
To start organizing the recovery of the Kursk, a detailed external examination of the ship and the bottom surface in the area of flooding, as well as radiation monitoring, was necessary. For these purposes, two expeditions were carried out. The first - from September 3 to September 15, 2000 with the involvement of the rescue vessel of the Northern Fleet "Mikhail Rudnitsky" with AS-34 deep-sea submersibles
Fragment notes of Dmitry Kolesnikov
In October 2000, Operation Regalia also took place to open the hull of the Kursk nuclear submarine and search for the dead sailors. The operation was carried out by Halliburton (Norway) with the involvement of Russian divers. The divers were based on a special Norwegian semi-submersible platform "Regalia". As a result of the operation, 12 bodies of dead sailors were evacuated from the ninth compartment, including the body of Lieutenant Commander Kolesnikov, who left a suicide note. It was not possible to penetrate into the remaining compartments, as well as evacuate 11 more bodies found from the 9th compartment.
Halliburton also carried out a detailed inspection of the bow of the dead boat, lifting heavy structures from the seabed, cutting off fragments of the light hull in the area of the destroyed first compartment and lifting them, which, using the technical means of the Mikhail Rudnitsky and "Academician Mstislav Keldysh" was not possible.
Next, it was necessary to carry out a segment of the part of the first compartment destroyed by the explosion, cutting holes for hooks in the part durable housing in areas with coordinates indicated by Rubin. Smit and Mammoet Transport BV proposed to cut the first section using the technology used for cutting large diameter pipelines. A kind of saw is used as the main link in this cutting system. It consists of a cable, cylindrical elements strung on it, the surface of which has the appearance of a mountain surface with randomly located pointed peas of different heights, made of high-strength cutting material. The run of the cable in one direction is about 20 meters.
On both sides of the boat in the area of the first compartment, large cylindrical towers with only upper bottoms were to be installed. On the towers there were wheel guide blocks with running saw cables and hydraulic cylinders for the cross-return pulling of the cable. When water was pumped out of the tower, due to the pressure drop on the upper bottom, a huge force was created from the outside, which pressed the tower into the ground as it sawed with a saw thrown over the top of the boat.
As the saw was checked, changes were made to its design, control systems, and cutting elements. The sawing off of the first compartment itself was very difficult, it required frequent labor-intensive connections of divers to rebuild the system in case of breaks in the running or cutting saw cable, as well as when manually cutting off individual elements of hull structures. This operation took place in August 2001 and involved two vessels: the barrage Carrier (Smit) with cutting equipment, the ship Mayo (DSND) providing all diving operations.
The results of the operation of lifting the "Kursk"
The act on the completion of the operation of lifting, transporting and docking the nuclear submarine "Kursk" was signed by the management of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "TsKB MT" Rubin "and the company" Mammut Transport Antilless N. V. " October 22, 2001.
As a result of the operation of lifting the Kursk boat, 115 bodies of dead submariners were found and buried. Three bodies were never found. From the bottom of the Barents Sea, the potentially dangerous ammunition of the boat and two nuclear reactors were evacuated. The study of the boat in dry dock made it possible with a high degree accurately restore the sequence of tragic events of the last hours of the life of the boat and its crew, as well as establish the cause of the disaster.
Disposal
In March 2009, the cutting fence was located in Murmansk, on the street. IndustrialIn February 2003, an operation began to remove the Imandra floating technical base with spent fuel from the dry shed of the Nerpa plant.
"Kursk" and the Russian Orthodox Church
In March 1995, the rector of the Kursk Theological Seminary, Bishop of Belgorod Vladyka John, consecrated the nuclear submarine. Then he presented the crew with a list of the 700-year-old Kursk Icon of the Mother of God, and each submariner with small icons depicting Saint Nicholas, the patron and protector of sailors. August 15, 2000 Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexy II and members of the Bishops' Council of Russia Orthodox Church offered a prayer for the salvation of the crew of the Russian submarine Kursk, which was in distress in the Barents Sea.
Commemorative events and monuments, the city where the ship was built.
- Memorial to the crew of the nuclear submarine "Kursk"- in Moscow opposite Museum of the Armed Forces.
On the Communards cemetery in the Sevastopol
A memorial plaque was installed in the 12th North Sea School.
Suburban electric train ED4M-0107 of the Ramenskoye locomotive depot of the Moscow railway, departing from the Kazansky railway station in Moscow, is named after the crew of the nuclear submarine Kursk.
In the Crimea, one of the caves on the Ai-Petri plateau is called "In memory of the Kursk submariners."
Secondary school No. 134 in St. Petersburg is named after Sergei Dudko, one of the crew members of the deceased submarine.
Secondary school No. 29 in Belgorod bears the name of captain of the third rank Dmitry Borisovich Murachev, commander of the propulsion division of the nuclear submarine cruiser Kursk.
In the village of Gerasimovo, Suvorov District, Tula Region, a chapel was built, which is dedicated to the memory of the sailors who died on the Kursk. At the entrance there is a mourning memorial plaque, and inside there is a stand with photographs of 118 submariners.
The press service of the Navy reports that during the planned exercises of the Northern Fleet on August 12, 2000, the multi-purpose nuclear submarine of project 949 A "Kursk" did not contact at the scheduled time. As a result of promptly taken measures, it was possible to quickly determine the exact location of the damaged nuclear submarine: latitude 69° 36′ 59.6" north, longitude 37° 34′ 28.7" east and start a rescue operation under the leadership of the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Vyacheslav Popov . Unfortunately, a multi-day rescue operation with the subsequent involvement of Norwegian and British rescuers did not allow saving the crew of the Kursk nuclear submarine, since the submarine received damage that did not allow the use of its own rescue equipment and made it extremely difficult to use the resources of the Navy rescue ships.
The results of the rescue work led to the conclusion that the entire crew of the nuclear submarine "Kursk" died. But, despite this, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Kuroyedov, ordered the operation to be carried out until the body of the last sailor was removed from the compartments of the submarine
death version
More than 3 months have passed since the sinking of the submarine. But the reasons for the death of the nuclear-powered ship are still a mystery to the general public. From media reports it is known that:
1. The submarine received a hole in the bow of the pressure hull in the 1st and 2nd compartments in the area of the 24th frame.
2. The edges of the hole are bent inward, and the destruction is very extensive. Raised retractable devices, including the periscope.
3. Seismic stations in Norway and Russia recorded 2 underwater explosions with an interval of 2 minutes 15 seconds.
4. Arriving at the scene, Russian rescuers found 2 underwater objects of comparable size, one of which was identified as the emergency submarine "K-141" "Kursk".
5. All compartments of the submarine are flooded, there are traces of fire in the examined ones. The personnel remaining after the explosion in the amount of 23 people grouped in the end 9th compartment.
None of the widely discussed versions of the death stand up to scrutiny.
In total, there are more than a dozen major versions. Here are the main ones:
1. "Kursk" was hit by an anti-ship missile from the nuclear cruiser "Peter the Great" or another ship of the Northern Fleet, which was at the site of the exercises. An anti-ship missile cannot hit a submarine at a depth of 11 meters. If it were not an anti-ship missile, but some other weapon, for example, an anti-submarine missile, a depth charge or a torpedo, then the naval command would immediately know the place and time of the accident and the rescuers would not have to look for the submarine until the evening of August 12. Yes, and it is not currently practiced during the period of exercises for firing weapons with a warhead, it is usually replaced by a weight equivalent.
2. "Kursk" was killed as a result of the explosion of his own torpedo, which he was supposed to shoot according to the exercise plan, that is, "an emergency situation on board." The torpedo, which was planned to be fired according to the exercise plan, did not have combat equipment, and the explosion of the propulsion unit of this torpedo cannot make a hole in a strong hull. Since the edges of the hole are bent inward, it is unambiguously clear that the root cause is an external influence. Even if we assume that the fired torpedo was aimed at the Kursk due to a malfunction of the guidance system (and such cases took place, for example, on the wheelhouse of the lead cruiser of the same K-525 project, Arkhangelsk, there is still a mark from its own torpedo, which was also in inert equipment), even then it is not clear where such significant damage came from.
3. "Kursk" was blown up by a floating mine during the war. A wartime floating mine cannot inflict such damage on the top of a pressure hull.
4. "Kursk" rammed by a surface ship. If it were a surface ship of the Northern Fleet or another vessel, then with a large hole in the underwater part, it could not go far and hide, if at all it would remain afloat.
5. The press published assumptions that the surface vessel only touched the light hull of the submarine, damaging only the tanks of the main ballast, jammed the rudders to dive and the Kursk crashed into the rocky ground, which is why it died. But then where did the hole come from in the robust case, and even in its upper part?
6. "Kursk" rammed by a submarine. This version of the discussed is the most plausible. But it is unlikely that an American or British submarine with a displacement of about 9000 tons received less damage than a nuclear submarine with more than twice the tonnage. Moreover, American and British submarines similar in design have the strength of hull structures and much lower survivability reserves. Imagine, for example, that a Zhiguli car crashed into a KamAZ, after which the KamAZ was left lying on the side of the road broken, and the Zhiguli, although with difficulty, drove on. Or another example. On February 11, 1992, while working out combat training tasks in the Barents Sea, a Russian submarine of project 945 (currently called Kostroma) collided in a submerged position with the US Navy SSN 689 "Baton Rouge" submarine. Our submarine received damage to the cabin fence, periscope and fairing of the HAC and returned to the base under its own power. The damage was soon repaired. "Baton Rouge" also, albeit with difficulty, but reached its native shores, after which, due to a serious crack in a strong hull, it was withdrawn from the Navy, decommissioned and soon cut into metal. So where is the second submarine?
Now let's try to present another version which explains everything or almost everything.
As is known, foreign submarines were in the area of the Russian naval exercises on August 12, 2000. This is a common practice and it is not a secret for anyone. Russian submariners have long been accustomed to the presence of uninvited "probable partners" and do not waste time on them when working out their tasks. So this time, the Kursk carried out strictly defined activities according to the exercise plan, and even if it detected a foreign submarine, it would not waste time and effort on an anti-submarine operation. Having completed rocket fire and preparing for torpedo fire, the Kursk maneuvered at a shallow depth. Nearby was a foreign submarine, which was aimed at the Kursk area by NATO base patrol aircraft and Norwegian reconnaissance ships Marjata or Sverdrup-2, which are almost constantly in neutral waters near the combat training areas of the Northern Fleet.
The foreign submarine did not have constant hydroacoustic contact with the Kursk and therefore accidentally ended up in the firing sector at a short distance. At this time, torpedo firing is carried out. Imagine the commander of a foreign submarine, to whom the acoustician suddenly reports a shot and the approach of a torpedo. What should he do at this moment? Foreign submarine is on combat patrol in immediate readiness to start fighting, on board nuclear weapon, and only a few seconds to think, and no one knows that the approaching torpedo is without a warhead! Another important point: the American commander is allowed to use weapons at his discretion. At this moment, the foreigner turns on her hydroacoustic station in active mode for radiation, because it seems that there is no point in remaining secretive, she accurately measures the distance to the torpedo and the Kursk and, based on the information she has, the commander, or maybe the watch officer, who was at that moment in the central post, considers the training firing of the Kursk to be combat and orders to respond from the on-duty torpedo tubes with the already combat remote-controlled torpedoes MK-48 along the bearing of the going torpedo, hoping to destroy it. To no avail. "MK-48" continue to move towards the "Kursk". The commander of the Kursk detects them and, unable to evade or expose sonar countermeasures due to the minimum distance, turns the cruiser to meet the torpedoes head-on, believing that this will reduce the impact of the explosion. That is why the rudder of the Kursk has been shifted to starboard. This was seen in one of the frames of the report on the work of divers on the aft emergency hatch. But the torpedoes go above the hull and explode above the bow of the Kursk at the junction of the 1st and 2nd compartments. The first torpedo makes a hole in a light hull, and the second is already in a strong one. Both nasal compartments die instantly. No one even managed to blow out the tanks of the main ballast either remotely or manually. The control panel of the power plant and the power plant itself have not yet been damaged. From the information of foreign media, it is known that one of the American submarines recorded both explosions and noises before and after the explosion. They claim that the first explosion was double! These are explosions of two torpedoes with a small interval. After that, sharply increased noises of the Kursk propellers were heard.
It is logical to assume that the surviving officers on the power plant control panel independently attempted to perform an emergency maneuver by reversing both turbines for the entire supply of steam. But alas. The boat acquired a negative buoyancy of about 4000 tons and rushed into the ground from a height of a hundred meters. After 2 minutes or so, the hull hits the rocky ground. At this moment, perhaps, there was an explosion of ammunition in the first compartment. The version that the Kursk was re-torpedoed by several torpedoes 2 minutes after the first is untenable, since it is no longer possible to direct them into the bow, at best into the stern at the noisy propellers, and there these damages would certainly have been noticed by Norwegian divers. As a result of explosions and impact on the ground, the Kursk received damage to all emergency devices. It was no longer possible to save the remaining crew, because there are no ship-lifting equipment capable of quickly raising such a submarine from such a depth. Therefore, hysterical cries about "the betrayal of the admirals who interfere with the salvation of people", "delay in asking for help from the West", etc., are nothing more than the nonsense of hysterics like Valeria Novodvorskaya (see MK No. 47 (171) for 15 - 22 November 2000, p. 11), which sober-minded people should not pay attention to.
The remaining compartments after some time, approximately three days, were also filled with water under a pressure of 10 atmospheres, filtering through leaks in bulkhead fittings formed after hull shaking. In the 9th compartment, counterpressure was not created from the compressed air reserves, otherwise it would not have been flooded under the very ceiling. This means that the remaining submariners, in addition to sealing the bulkhead, did not fight the incoming water, as they died very soon, poisoned carbon monoxide, after all, the supply of the respiratory mixture in one IDA-59M apparatus is enough for no more than 5 hours of breathing, provided that the pressure in the compartment is normal. Statements that the aft compartments are flooded due to destruction at the exit of the shaft lines, which were displaced by inertia at the time of impact, are also not logical. In the 9th compartment there are thrust bearings that perceive the movement and emphasis from the rotating screw through the shaft line. The force with which the shaft line presses the submarine at full speed is much greater than the force that was created at the moment the boat hit the ground. Therefore, the lines of the shafts could not move and destroy anything.
On January 27, 1961, the Soviet diesel boat S-80 with the entire crew sank in the Barents Sea near the place of the death of the Kursk due to the ingress of water into the pressure hull through the RDP mine valve that did not close. Then, after hitting the ground, the first, sixth and seventh compartments remained unflooded, which, due to water filtration through leaky bulkheads, were nevertheless filled. The seventh - by the end of the day, and the first - much later. 14 divers gathered in the 7th compartment died while trying to exit through the aft emergency hatch by flooding the compartment, and the personnel of the 1st compartment in the amount of 5 people died due to the depletion of air supplies in the volume of the compartment and IDA-59 devices . Now let's remember the second object lying next to the "Kursk" and the buoy, which was seen from the board of the "Peter the Great".
It remains to be assumed that the foreign submarine also received damage and lay on the ground for some time, until it coped with them. But the cause of the damage is not a collision, but the very practical torpedo that was fired by the Kursk. A steel cigar weighing almost 2 tons, moving at the speed of a courier train, is quite capable of breaking through the solid hull of an American boat. We know that shortly after these events, the American Los Angeles-class submarine Memphis entered the Norwegian port of Haukosvern “as planned” and also docked “as planned”. But according to the system of cyclical use of American submarines, the submarine is scheduled to dock only after returning from combat service and only after the change of the crew, which goes on vacation. And the second crew prepares the boat for the next cycle. So why rush to the dock, especially in the nearest Norwegian port? Naturally, Memphis did not have much damage. Somehow there was a message in the press that she also did not have an emergency rescue buoy at a regular place. But the possibility is not ruled out that Memphis performs only demonstrative actions, diverting attention from the real culprit - also the American Toledo submarine, which is hiding from prying eyes in some kind of shelter.
And a few more questions that we will leave unanswered.
What did the presidents of the United States and Russia talk about on the phone immediately after the tragedy?
How to explain the urgent arrival of the director of the CIA in Moscow after this?
Why was the resignation of the Minister of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and Commander of the Northern Fleet not accepted?
Why was the order signed to reward the submariners before the end of the investigation?
Where did the “extrabudgetary” money come from to help relatives, urgent organization of an ineffective operation to raise the bodies of the dead, an operation to raise the corps and to upgrade the rescue forces?
Why was it promised on November 8, that is, after receiving the preliminary results of the vote on the choice of the President of the United States, to unambiguously name the cause of the accident?
But let's not be like journalists who have begun to accuse the command of the Navy of all conceivable and unimaginable sins. Let's leave it up to them. This is their bread. But God forbid someone should be in the place of the Commander of the Northern Fleet. On TV they showed an interview with him recorded on August 11, that is, a day before the tragedy, and then on August 16 they showed a live report from the place of the rescue operation. During these five days, Admiral Vyacheslav Alekseevich Popov has aged ten years. He was not afraid for his prestige and the admiral's chair. He submitted his resignation. Yes, the command knows more about the accident than we do.
Read carefully the interview with Popov in Komsomolskaya Pravda. Not a word of untruth. Yes, he left many of the journalist's questions without comment. Yes, for the first time in his interviews he stated his assumptions on the basis of the information available at that time about the situation on board the sunken ship, until the last moment believing in the possibility of saving at least someone. But where does the lies and concealment of the truth? Of course, the dead cannot be returned, the pain of loss is incommensurable with anything. But does anyone really think that by satisfying the curiosity of the townsfolk, by making public all known details catastrophe could change something? The commander not only gives orders, he also bears full responsibility for the consequences of his orders, for his actions or inactions. And above all, he is responsible to himself, to his conscience. The time will come and all will be known. You don't trust the commander? But then we have a president. He is well aware of everything. He did not accept the resignation, did not begin to tear off shoulder straps from anyone. You don't trust the president? Then why is he popularly elected? And in general, is it really from whether we find or not the most important culprit will make it easier for everyone?
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list of personnel
TRAVELING HEADQUARTERS
Captain 1st Rank Bagryantsev Vladimir Tikhonovich - Chief of Staff of the Submarine Division, born in 1958, ChVVMU, VMA im. N. G. Kuznetsova
Captain 2nd rank Belogun Viktor Mikhailovich - Deputy NEMS, born in 1960, SVVMIU
Captain 2nd rank Yury Tikhonovich Shepetnov - flagship missile officer, born in 1964, ChVVMU
Captain 2nd rank Isaenko Vasily Sergeevich - NEMS assistant, born in 1961, SVVMIU
Captain 3rd rank Baygarin Murat Ikhtiyarovich - Acting flagship miner, born in 1964, VVMUPP
CREW K-141 "KURSK"
SHIP COMMAND
Captain 1st rank Lyachin Gennady Petrovich - commander of the nuclear submarine, born in 1955, VVMUPP
Captain 2nd rank Dudko Sergei Vladimirovich - senior assistant commander, born in 1969, VVMURE
Captain 2nd rank Shubin Alexander Anatolyevich - deputy commander for educational work, born in 1959, SVVMIU
Captain-Lieutenant Repnikov Dmitry Alekseevich - assistant commander, born in 1973, VVMUPP
COMBAT-1
Captain-Lieutenant Safonov Maxim Anatolyevich - commander of BCH-1, born in 1974, VVMUPP
Senior Lieutenant Tylik Sergey Nikolaevich - commander of the ENG, born in 1975, VVMUPP
Senior Lieutenant Bubniv Vadim Yaroslavovich - ENG engineer, born in 1977, St.Petersburg Military Medical Institute
Senior midshipman Ruzlev Alexander Vladimirovich - senior boatswain, born in 1976, Vidyaevo settlement
Senior midshipman Fesak Vladimir Vasilyevich - ENG technician, born in 1962, Donetsk region, Shakhtersk
Midshipman Kozyrev Konstantin Vladimirovich - ENG technician, born in 1976, Vidyaevo settlement
Michman Polyansky Andrey Nikolaevich - ENG technician, born in 1974, Tikhoretsky
Petty officer 2 articles contract service Leonov Dmitry Anatolyevich - commander of the helmsman department, born in 1979, Moscow region, Yakhroma
Sailor Mirtov Dmitry Sergeevich - steering signalman, born in 1981, Komi Republic, Ukhta
COMBAT -2
Captain 3rd rank Andrey Borisovich Silogava - commander of BCH-2, born in 1970, KVVMU
Captain-Lieutenant Shevchuk Aleksey Vladimirovich - Commander of the Main Directorate, born in 1974, VVMUPP
Senior Lieutenant Panarin Andrey Vladimirovich - engineer of the State University, born in 1975, St.Petersburg VMI
Captain-lieutenant Geletin Boris Vladimirovich - commander of the GS, born in 1975, KVVMU
Senior Lieutenant Uzkiy Sergey Vasilievich - Commander of the Main Control Center, born in 1977, St. Petersburg Military Medical Institute
Michman Vishnyakov Maxim Igorevich - technician of the State Central University, born in 1977, Krivoy Rog
Midshipman Keslinsky Sergey Alexandrovich - SG technician, born in 1974, Kostroma region, Tarecha village
Foreman of the 2nd article of the contract service Anenkov Yury Anatolyevich - mechanic, born in 1979, Kursk region, village of Podazovka
Sailor Kotkov Dmitry Anatolyevich - mechanic, born in 1981, Vologda region, village Novinki
Sailor Pavlov Nikolai Vladimirovich - mechanic, born in 1980, Voronezh region, p. Leskovo
COMBAT-3
Senior Lieutenant Ivanov-Pavlov Aleksey Aleksandrovich - Commander of BCh-3, born in 1977, St. Petersburg Military Medical Institute
Senior midshipman Ildarov Abdulkadyr Mirzaevich - foreman of the torpedo team, born in 1960, Republic of Dagestan, p. Huchni
Sailor Nefedkov Ivan Nikolaevich - commander of the torpedo squad, born in 1980, Sverdlovsk region, p. Red Mountain
Sailor Borzhov Maxim Nikolaevich - torpedo pilot, born in 1981, Vladimir region, Murom
COMBAT-4
Captain 3rd rank Rudakov Andrey Anatolyevich - commander of BCH-4, born in 1968, TOVVMU
Captain-Lieutenant Fiterer Sergey Gennadievich - commander of the GKS, born in 1976, KVVMU
Captain-lieutenant Nasikovsky Oleg Iosifovich - commander of the GZAS, born in 1971, KVVMU
Senior warrant officer Chernyshev Sergey Serafimovich - GKS technician, born in 1968, Sevastopol
Senior warrant officer Kalinin Sergey Alekseevich - GZAS technician, born in 1970, Kyiv region, p. Lilyaki
Senior midshipman Svechkarev Vladimir Vladimirovich - GZAS technician, born in 1973, Nizhny Novgorod
COMBAT-5
Captain 2nd rank Sablin Yury Borisovich - commander of BCh-5, born in 1966, SVVMIU
Captain 3rd rank Murachev Dmitry Borisovich - commander of the DD, born in 1969, SVVMIU
Captain-Lieutenant Kolesnikov Dmitry Romanovich - commander of the TG DD, born in 1973, VVMIU
Captain-Lieutenant Andrey Evgenievich Vasiliev - commander of the GA DD, born in 1972, VVMIU
Senior Lieutenant Mityaev Aleksey Vladimirovich - engineer of the Civil Aviation Department, born in 1977, St. Petersburg Museum of Fine Arts
Lieutenant Commander Pshenichnikov Denis Stanislavovich - commander of the GDU-1, born in 1974, VVMIU
Captain-Lieutenant Lyubushkin Sergey Nikolaevich - commander of the GDU-2, born in 1972, VVMIU
Captain-Lieutenant Sadilenko Sergey Vladimirovich - engineer of GDU-1, born in 1975, VVMIU
Senior Lieutenant Alexander Vladimirovich Brazhkin - engineer of GDU-2, born in 1977, VVMIU
Captain-Lieutenant Aryapov Rashid Ramisovich - commander of the TG DD, born in 1971, VVMIU
Captain 3rd rank Shchavinsky Ilya Vyacheslavovich - ETD commander, born in 1969, VVMIU
Captain 3rd rank Belozerov Nikolai Anatolyevich - ETG commander, born in 1968, VVMIU
Senior Lieutenant Kuznetsov Vitaly Evgenievich - ETG-1 engineer, born in 1976, VVMIU
Senior Lieutenant Rvanin Maxim Anatolyevich - ETG-2 engineer, born in 1975, VVMIU
Captain 3rd rank Milyutin Andrey Valentinovich - commander of the J, born in 1972, VVMIU
Lieutenant Commander Vitaliy Mikhailovich Solorev - commander of the Civil Aviation Institute, born in 1974, VVMIU
Captain-Lieutenant Kokurin Sergey Sergeevich - commander of the TG DZh, born in 1973, VVMIU
Senior Lieutenant Kirichenko Denis Stanislavovich - Engineer J., born in 1976, VVMIU
Senior warrant officer Kuznetsov Viktor Viktorovich - foreman of the turbinist team, born in 1972, Kursk
Senior warrant officer Kozoderov Vladimir Aleksevich - turbinist technician, born in 1967, Lipetsk
Michman Ishmuradov Fanis Malikovich - turbinist technician, born in 1974, Republic of Bashkiria, village of Bakhtigarievo
Senior Warrant Officer Borisov Andrey Mikhailovich - GA DD technician, born in 1970, Ryazan region, p. Perkino
Michman Balanov Aleksey Gennadievich - foreman of the hold team, born in 1978, Republic of Chuvashia, p. Anastasovo
Michman Ivanov Vasily Elmarovich - foreman of the team of electricians, born in 1977, Republic of Mari El, village of Chuksollo
Michman Shablatov Vladimir Gennadievich - electrical technician, born in 1977, Yoshkar-Ola
Senior warrant officer Tsymbal Ivan Ivanovich - electrical technician, born in 1970, Luhansk region, Makartetino village
Senior Warrant Officer Gorbunov Evgeniy Yurievich - Diesel Technician, born in 1964, Nizhny Novgorod Region, Zavolzhye settlement
Michman Khivuk Vladimir Valerievich - technician, born in 1974, Kursk region, p. Belitsa, st. Pinery
Michman Baybarin Valery Anatolyevich - foreman of the hold team, born in 1975, Chelyabinsk region, Kopeysk
Michman Bochkov Mikhail Aleksandrovich - bilge technician, born in 1977, Sevastopol
Chief ship foreman of the contract service Gesler Robert Alexandrovich - commander of the turbinist department, born in 1978, Republic of Bashkiria, Zapadny settlement
Foreman 2 articles of the contract service Sadovoy Vladimir Sergeevich - commander of the turbinist department, born in 1979, Nizhny Novgorod region, Yuganets village
Sailor Kubikov Roman Vladimirovich - turbinist born in 1978 Kursk
Matros Nekrasov Alexey Nikolaevich - turbinist, born in 1981, Kursk region, Tim
Sailor Martynov Roman Vyacheslavovich - turbinist born in 1981, Komi Republic, Ukhta
Sailor Sidyuhin Victor Yurievich - turbinist, born in 1980 Komi Republic, Ukhta
Sailor Borisov Yuri Alexandrovich - turbinist, born in 1981, Republic of Komi., Blagoevo village
Sailor Naletov Ilya Evgenievich - turbinist, born in 1981, Vologda region, village of Ivachino
Foreman 2 articles of the contract service Anikeev Roman Vladimirovich - spec. bilge, born in 1978, settlement of Vidyaevo
Chief foreman of the contract service Mainagashev Vyacheslav Vissarionovich - special. hold, born in 1976, Republic of Khakassia, settlement of Nizhny Kurlugash
Sailor Borkin Alexey Alekseevich - spec. bilge, born in 1981, Arkhangelsk
Chief foreman of the contract service Neustroev Alexander Valentinovich - electrician, born in 1979, Tomsk region. Loskutovo
Foreman of the 1st article of the contract service Zubaidulin Reshid Rashidovich - electrician, born in 1979, Chelyabinsk region, Mezhozerny village
Sailor Dryuchenko Andrey Nikolaevich - electrician, born in 1979, Severodvinsk
Sailor Larionov Alexey Aleksandrovich - bilge man, born in 1981, Komi Republic, Yemva
Sailor Shulgin Aleksey Vladimirovich - bilge man, born in 1981, Arkhangelsk region, Kotlas
Sailor Tryanichev Ruslan Vyacheslavovich - bilge, born in 1980, Cherepovets
Sailor Staroselydev Dmitry Vyacheslavovich - bilge officer, born in 1980, Kursk
Sailor Khalepo Alexander Valerievich - turbinist, born in 1981, Komi Republic, p. Ust-Lyzha
Sailor Loginov Igor Vasilyevich - turbinist born in 1980, Komi Republic, Blagoevo village
Sailor Kolomeytsev Alexey Yurievich - turbinist, born in 1980, Republic of Komi, Pyt-Yakh
COMBAT-7
Captain 3rd rank Sadkov Alexander Evgenievich - commander of BCH-7, born in 1967, TOVVMU
Captain-lieutenant Loginov Sergey Nikolaevich - commander of the GAG, born in 1973, TOVVMU
Senior Lieutenant Korovyakov Andrey Vladimirovich - engineer GAG-1, born in 1976, VVMURE
Senior Lieutenant Korobkov Alexey Vladimirovich - engineer GAG-2, born in 1975, VVMURE
Captain-Lieutenant Radionov Mikhail Olegovich - commander of the VG, born in 1973, VVMUPP
Senior Lieutenant Erakhtin Sergey Nikolaevich - VG engineer, born in 1977, VMIRE
Senior Lieutenant Gudkov Alexander Valentinovich - commander of the GRR, born in 1977, KVVMU
Senior midshipman Fedorichev Igor Vladimirovich - foreman of the radiometric team, born in 1973, Tula region, Olchisin
Michman Tavolzhansky Pavel Viktorovich - GAG technician, born in 1976, Belgorod region, p. Klinentsy
Michman Paramonenko Viktor Alexandrovich - GAG technician, born in 1973, Nikolaevsk
Michman Zubov Aleksey Viktorovich - GAG technician, born in 1974, Dnepropetrovsk region, Pavlograd
Michman Belov Mikhail Alexandrovich - GAG technician, born in 1974, Nizhny Novgorod region, Bogorodsk
Midshipman Gryaznykh Sergey Viktorovich - technician of the VG, born in 1978, Severodvinsk
Senior warrant officer Vlasov Sergey Borisovich - technician of the GR RR, born in 1957, Vidyaevo village
MEDICAL SERVICE
Captain of the medical service Stankevich Aleksey Borisovich - head of the medical service, born in 1974, Military Medical Academy
Midshipman Romanyuk Vitaliy Fedorovich - paramedic, born in 1971, Sevatopol
CHEMICAL SERVICE
Captain 3rd rank Vyacheslav Alekseevich Bezsokirny - chemical service officer, born in 1970, SVVMIU
Michman Troyan Oleg Vasilievich - technical technician, born in 1971, Baku
Michman Rychkov Sergey Anatolyevich - Technician, chemical engineer, born in 1965, Tashkent
Senior midshipman Hafizov Nail Khasanovich - senior instructor, x / s, born in 1960, Republic of Bashkiria, p. Slack
SUPPLY SERVICE
Senior midshipman Kichkiruk Vasily Vasilyevich - foreman of the supply team, born in 1967, Zhytomyr region, p. Old Maidan
Senior midshipman Belyaev Anatoly Nikolaevich - senior cook-instructor, born in 1954, Ryazan region, Proletarsky village
Chief ship foreman of the contract service Yansapov Salovat Valerievich - commander of the Kokov department, born in 1977, Republic of Bashkiria, Ishimbay
Sailor Vitchenko Sergey Alexandrovich - cook, born in 1980, Leningrad region, Kirovsk
Matros Evdokimov Oleg Vladimirovich - cook, born in 1980, Kursk
SECRET PART
Midshipman Samovarov Yakov Valerievich - head of the secret unit, born in 1977, Arkhangelsk region, Lupovetsky settlement
Senior warrant officer Erasov Igor Vladimirovich - SPS, born in 1965, Voronezh
BONDED
Senior Lieutenant Borisov Arnold Yurievich - Leading Engineer of the Air Defense Ministry, born in 1976, VVMUPP
Gadzhiev Mamed Ismailovich - representative of the Dagdiesel plant, born in 1958, Republic of Dagestan, p. oink
Exactly 15 years ago, a tragedy occurred - the Kursk submarine sank in the Barents Sea, killing all 118 crew members. The result of the investigation was the dry wording "the criminal case was dismissed for lack of corpus delicti".
That is, more than a hundred people died, but no one is to blame. Naturally, few people were satisfied with such an interpretation of events, so journalists, experts and sailors began to build their own hypotheses about the death of the nuclear-powered ship. On the day of the 15th anniversary of this tragic date, the site collected the most common versions about the causes of what happened.
Official version
The official version says that at 11 hours 28 minutes 26 seconds Moscow time, a torpedo 65-76A ("Kit") exploded in torpedo tube No. 4, which was caused by a leak of torpedo fuel components, or rather hydrogen peroxide. The resulting fire led to the detonation of the main ammunition and the death of the submarine.
Although this version has a lot of questions. If everything is so simple, then why, two days after the death of the Kursk, the director of the CIA suddenly visited Moscow, and Russia was forgiven a large debt and even given a loan of 10 billion. Perhaps it was these events that became the cause of numerous speculations.
World War II mine
According to one of the very first versions, there was a mine explosion. But the waters where the exercises are held have been repeatedly checked and trawled for a long time, they have been used for decades. In addition, the Kursk was equipped with a special sonar system that was capable of detecting mines.
Photo: news. pn The damage received by the ship is also not in favor of a mine explosion. Firstly, they had to have a characteristic shape, and secondly, a mine of those years cannot cause such significant damage to a ship. And if there had been a mine explosion during the First or Second World War, other versions would not have arisen. By the way, Ilya Klebanov, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, adhered to this point of view.
Criminal negligence
In the book “In the wake of death,” Vice Admiral Valery Ryazantsev, who in 1999 led the commission that conducted the inspection of the submarine division, which included the Kursk submarine, expressed his version. Having the opportunity to observe what is happening from the inside, the author directly names the perpetrators, due to whose criminal negligence in August 2000 there was a disaster in the Barents Sea.
According to Ryazantsev, the cause of the tragedy was the explosion of a torpedo 65-76 PV, which was mistakenly replenished with non-fat high-pressure air on August 11, 2000. This was due to incorrect instructions being given to the crew.
Until August 12, non-skimmed air could not enter the oxidizer tank, since the practical torpedo was on the rack, the air shut-off valve on it was closed, and safety devices were installed on the air trigger valve.
After loading the torpedo into the torpedo tube, an uncontrolled decomposition reaction of hydrogen peroxide began. All Project 949A Antey boats have a design flaw, due to which, in order to prevent an increase in pressure in the first compartment during salvo firing of torpedoes, submariners always leave the shutters of the ship's general ventilation system open.
Therefore, in the case of the Kursk, after the detonation of the torpedo 65-76 PV, the blast wave hit the second compartment and the entire personnel of the command compartment received severe shell shock and was inoperable.
After the explosion, the boat lost control and, at a speed of about 3 knots, with a bow trim of 40-42 degrees, hit the ground at a depth of 108 meters. During the collision, the live torpedoes equipped with fuses in the vehicles No. 1, 3, 5 and 6 were crushed and destroyed. At that moment, the ammunition itself detonated.
Torpedoing by a foreign submarine
On the part of the Kursk that was raised from the seabed, a smooth round hole is clearly visible, the edges of which are bent inward. Many experts take this hole as the impact point of the American MK-48 torpedo, which is able to pass through the steel skin thanks to a special mechanism that is located on the nose and is able to melt copper.
On the day of the tragedy, the Russian submarine was immediately followed by two foreign ones: the American Memphis and Toledo (peeping at each other is a common practice for the Russian and NATO fleets). The last nuclear submarine was "in the shadow" of its American counterpart. At some point, Toledo and Kursk collided (if you carefully look at the video of the Russian nuclear submarine lying on the days, you can see long gaps on the hull), and it seemed to the Americans that the Russians were opening the cover of the torpedo tube. As a result, Memphis fired an MK-48 torpedo at the Kursk.
This version is also called the French version, as the French director Jean-Michel Carré dedicated an entire film to it. movie"Kursk. Submarine in troubled waters.
Collision with an unknown submarine
There is a version according to which the Kursk was rammed by the American submarine Memphis. This scenario looks quite plausible - on that day, Memphis really conducted observations of the exercises in the Barents Sea. Also nearby were the nuclear submarines Memphis, Toledo of the US Navy and the nuclear submarine Splendid of the British Navy.
The Memphis hull is made of a special alloy that can withstand not only a 1-kilometer dive, but also a collision with another submarine. It is likely that the collision occurred at a sharp heading angle at a speed of about 20 knots. From the impact, the right torpedo tube, where the ill-fated torpedo 65-76 was located, was crushed in less than a second. In an instant, the entire supply of fuel (kerosene) and oxidizer (hydrogen peroxide) was mixed, which led to their explosive ignition, enhanced by the explosion of a powder accelerator installed in the tail section of the torpedo.
The power of the explosion under such conditions could be about 150 kg of TNT (by the way, the explosion of just such a power was recorded on that day by the Norwegian seismic station). As a result, a severe fire broke out in the first compartment, causing a short circuit in the main power supply network. Kursk lost its course, the emergency protection of nuclear reactors worked, and the temperature in the compartment jumped to 500-700 degrees, which caused the detonation of 18 rack combat torpedoes lying in this compartment. Also, a short circuit caused a fire in the main electrical distribution boards and control panels in the turbine compartments 7 and 8. When the opportunity finally arose to raise the bodies of the dead, many of them were with traces of burns received in the struggle for the survivability of the boat.
By the way, subsequently, on the seabed, rescuers discovered a conning tower fence, which is usually installed on American submarines.
In addition to those listed, there are many more versions of the death of the Russian submarine, but none of them can accurately explain what happened that day.
The surviving submariners could shed light on what happened. But by a strange coincidence, foreign specialists with all the necessary equipment were allowed to participate in the rescue operation only a week after the flooding of the Kursk. The Norwegian ship Normand Pioneer with the British mini-rescue boat LR5 arrived at the scene of the tragedy only on 19 August.
The Norwegians managed to make a special tool for opening the hatch and on August 21 at 13:00 they entered the 9th compartment of the nuclear submarine. But by this time it was all over, there were no living witnesses left on the Kursk. Therefore, today only one thing is known for sure: “she drowned.”
12 years ago, on August 12, 2000, the Kursk nuclear submarine sank., which was part of the Northern Fleet of Russia. On board were 118 crew members, all of them died.
In 1992, the nuclear submarine K-141 of the Antey project was laid down at the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise in the city of Severodvinsk. The main designers were Pavel Petrovich Pustyntsev and Igor Leonidovich Baranov. On April 6, 1993, the boat was given the name "Kursk" - in honor of the victory at the Kursk Bulge. In May 1994, the Kursk submarine was launched and put into operation on December 30 of the same year.
On March 1, 1995, the Kursk nuclear submarine was added to the lists of the Northern Fleet and became part of the 7th division of the 1st flotilla of the nuclear submarine (base: Zapadnaya Litsa (Bolshaya Lopatka).
August 12, 2000 during exercises in the Barents Sea, the Kursk nuclear submarine (submarine commander - captain 1st rank Gennady Lyachin), which was in the Northern Fleet combat training range in order to carry out training torpedo firing at a detachment of warships, did not get in touch at the scheduled time. At 23:44, an explosion was recorded in the area where the nuclear submarine was located.
August 13 A group of ships headed by the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Vyacheslav Popov, went in search of a nuclear submarine cruiser. At 04:51, the nuclear submarine was found lying on the ground at a depth of 108 meters. At 07:15, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev reported the incident to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
August 14 at 11:00 command Russian fleet made the first public statement that the submarine "Kursk" lay on the bottom. The Navy said in a statement that radio contact was being maintained with the submarine. Later, representatives of the fleet stated that communication with the submarine was carried out only through tapping, that there was no danger to the life of the crew, that fuel and oxygen were supplied through the Kolokol rescue apparatus and the nuclear submarine systems were purged. When examining the boat from the descent vehicles, it turned out that the nuclear submarine stuck into the bottom of the sea at an angle of about 40 degrees and its bow was torn apart, and the pop-up rescue chamber was disabled. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, made a statement that there were few hopes for saving people.
August 15 The main headquarters of the Navy officially announced the start of the rescue operation. It was planned to evacuate the Kursk crew members with the help of rescue shells. Vessels of the emergency rescue service of the Northern Fleet were concentrated in the area of the disaster. A submarine, the nuclear cruiser Peter the Great and about 20 more ships and rescue vessels arrived in the disaster area. However, the storm prevented rescuers from starting work. Representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense in Brussels at that time were negotiating with NATO about the possibility of providing assistance to Russia.
On the same day, a representative of the headquarters of the Northern Fleet told reporters that as a result of tapping, it was established that the crew members of the Kursk submarine were alive, but it was not known whether any of them were wounded. He also stated that there were 103 people on board the boat. Later it turned out that there were 118 people there.
August 16 at a sea state of about 2 points, a deep-sea rescue apparatus "Priz" was launched from the rescue ship "Rudnitsky". During the night, several futile attempts were made to get to the boat.
August 17 The Norwegian ship "Seaway Eagle" with deep-sea divers on board and the transport ship "Normand Pioneer" with British specialists and equipment (departed from the Norwegian port of Trondheim) headed to the scene of the tragedy.
August 19 In the afternoon, the Norwegian ship Normand Pioneer arrived at the site of the accident of the Russian submarine Kursk with a British mini-rescue boat LR5. A new, international phase of the operation to rescue the crew of the submarine began.
August 20 Norwegian divers examined the submarine for damage and the presence of air cushions in the aft compartments. The Norwegians managed to unlock the emergency hatch valve, but they failed to get on the boat. They urgently made a special tool to open the hatch.
August 21 in the morning, Norwegian divers managed to open the upper escape hatch of the 9th compartment, the lock chamber was empty. At about 13.00, divers opened the inner hatch into the 9th compartment of the nuclear submarine, inside of which there was water. At 15.27, a video camera was introduced into the hull of the submarine, with the help of which experts tried to determine the state of the 7th and 8th compartments of the nuclear submarine. The body of a sailor was found in the 9th compartment of the nuclear submarine.
On the same day, at 17:00, the Chief of Staff of the Northern Fleet, Vice Admiral Mikhail Motsak, officially confirmed the death of the crew of the K-141 Kursk nuclear submarine.
The operation to raise the bodies of the dead sailors-submariners began October 25, 2000 and was completed November 7, 2000. The operation to lift the submarine itself from the bottom of the Barents Sea was launched on October 7, 2001, and on October 10 it was towed to the Roslyakovo Shipyard of the Navy.
During the period of autumn 2000 and autumn-winter 2001, 115 out of 118 dead submariners were recovered and identified from the submarine compartments.
Eight investigation teams were formed to work on the Kursk nuclear submarine, which began work in full after the complete pumping of water from the submarine. The groups included specialists from the Northern Fleet, representatives of the Moscow and St. Petersburg military districts. Members of the investigation teams underwent a special psychological selection, and also studied the structure of the nuclear submarine for a year in order to know where and what parameters to take for the necessary examinations.
October 27, 2001 Russian Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov said that a visual inspection of the nuclear-powered ship allows us to conclude that the fire occurred throughout the boat. At the epicenter, the temperature reached 8 thousand degrees Celsius. The boat was completely filled with water "within six or seven, maximum eight hours." Ustinov noted that the submarine "Kursk" was badly damaged, all the bulkheads of the pressure hull were "cut off like a knife." However, the barrier that separated the 6th reactor compartment remained intact, so the reactor was not damaged. The 22 cruise missiles on the sides of the submarine were also not affected.
July 26, 2002 The Prosecutor General of Russia said that the death of the Kursk occurred "as a result of an explosion, the center of which is localized at the location of the training torpedo, inside the fourth torpedo tube, and further development explosive process in the combat charging compartments of torpedoes located in the first compartment of the nuclear submarine. " Ustinov also said that the Prosecutor General's Office closed the criminal case on the death of the Kursk nuclear-powered icebreaker due to the absence of corpus delicti. According to him, in the actions of officials responsible for conducting exercises in the Barents the sea, the manufacture, operation and installation of the torpedo that caused the death of the Kursk, there is no corpus delicti.
For courage, heroism and bravery shown in the performance of military duty, the crew members of the nuclear submarine Kursk were awarded the Order of Courage by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation (posthumously), and the ship's commander, Captain 1st Rank Gennady Lyachin, was awarded the title Hero of the Russian Federation (posthumously).
In August 2003 in St. Petersburg, work was completed on the creation of a memorial complex at the Serafimovsky cemetery, where 32 submariners who died on the nuclear submarine are buried.
March 19, 2005 in Sevastopol, at the Communards cemetery, a monument to the Sevastopol residents who died on the Kursk nuclear missile submarine was solemnly unveiled.
AT 2009 in Murmansk observation deck near the Church of the Savior on the Waters, the cabin of the nuclear submarine "Kursk" was installed. It became part of the memorial "To the sailors who died in peacetime."
July 31, 2012 relatives of the dead sailors from the nuclear submarine "Kursk", participants in the fourth international rally of veterans of the Navy and representatives of the command of the Northern Fleet at the bottom of the Barents Sea.
The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti
