At the same time when southern front events developed around Stalingrad, a key city on the Volga, another The largest city USSR - Leningrad became the center of an important campaign on the northernmost wing of the German front. Leningrad is the most powerful sea fortress in the Baltic, the base of the Navy, the cultural pearl of Russia, the second largest city in terms of population Soviet Union with 3 million inhabitants. Everything that happened between the northern seas and Lake Ilmen after September 1941 had to do with Leningrad. Instead of taking Leningrad with a mighty tank attack - as prescribed by the plan of Operation Barbarossa - Hitler around mid-September 1941 unexpectedly stopped the offensive right on the outskirts of the city and ordered Field Marshal von Leeb to limit himself to a blockade. Hitler provided the explanation for this to his officers in a document classified "top secret" dated October 7, 1941: "The Führer confirms his decision that the surrender of Leningrad or subsequently Moscow will be rejected, even if it is proposed by the enemy. Our moral justification for such a measure is clear to the whole world. In Kyiv, the German troops were exposed to a huge risk by encountering time mines, and the same, even on a larger scale, is to be expected in Moscow and Leningrad. The fact that Leningrad is mined and will be defended until the last soldier, was announced on Soviet radio. There is also a serious risk of epidemics. Therefore, none German soldier should not enter these cities. Any attempt to leave the city in the direction of our positions must be resolutely suppressed. Leave small, not completely closed passages through which the population can retreat into the depths of Russia. Do the same in all other cities: before capturing, weaken with artillery fire and bombardment from the air, encourage the withdrawal of the population ... Bring to the attention of all commanding officers that this is the will of the Fuhrer. "Perhaps this is Hitler's rationale and does not reveal the true reason for his decision not to take Leningrad. Nevertheless, the arguments he chose made the transition to the blockade strategy much easier. First of all, they allowed Hitler to win over the generals, who, of course, would prefer to capture the city, but to refute Hitler's arguments it was difficult. Indeed, after the occupation of Kyiv in September 1941, the German troops suffered significant losses due to the time mines set by the Russians. Entire blocks of houses were mined, as a result, the entire central street was destroyed. Reports of this kind of unusual, risky and " fanatical" actions made a deep impression on Hitler, and he was inclined to overestimate them. Four weeks after his secret order, on November 8, 1941, Hitler again explained to the surprised German public and the world at large why the attack on Leningrad had been halted. They were somewhat different from the document intended for combat commanders, but were filled with the same pathos. In a traditional speech in a Munich beer cellar, he said: "Anyone who has come from the border East Prussia to Leningrad, can overcome the last ten kilometers and enter the city. However, this is not necessary. The city is surrounded. No one is going to release him, and he will fall at our feet. "He was wrong. And this mistake was the first link in a sad chain of events at Army Group North, events that undoubtedly contributed to the outcome of the war. Hitler forced the whole German army to stand watch at a single city. He allowed the enemy to keep an important center of military industry and the naval base of the Baltic Fleet. He did not even close the Oranienbaum bag, that large Soviet bridgehead on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland west of Leningrad. He decided, as the Finnish Field Marshal Mannerheim well said, "drag this heavy backpack on your back throughout the war." It is even more incomprehensible that instead of capturing Leningrad and thus establishing a direct land connection with allied Finland, Hitler blocked his own road and, moreover, saved Russians from the loss of about forty-two divisions, which were in Leningrad and the Oranienbaum bag. Eastern Front Hitler at the end of September 1941 did not take a decisive step. Instead of achieving final victory, he recklessly launched a nine hundred-day, demanding blockade that ended in his defeat. What led Hitler to this mistake? Why did he ignore the opinion of combat commanders? Why did he count on the imminent collapse of Leningrad? Hitler underestimated the steadfastness and perseverance of the Communist Party in that city. Leningrad was led by Zhdanov, a Ukrainian born in Mariupol in 1892, he was an extraordinary man. His firmness, determination and personal courage inspired the whole city to resist. Zhdanov for the first time in recent history showed the world what ruthless total war in a limited area means. Hitler's dislike of anything to do with water or the sea contrasts strangely with his fascination with military operations on land. Just as in Dunkirk, in Leningrad he was again let down by the fear of water. He was sure that the city was surrounded, but did not take into account that, although Leningrad was cut off from the Soviet front by land in the summer, it was impossible to consider its encirclement complete. The suburbs of Leningrad overlook the western shore of Lake Ladoga, the width of which in this place is no more than thirty kilometers. No wider than the English Channel between Dover and Calais. And along the eastern shore of the lake was the main line of the Soviet front. During the day, for example, navigation on the lake was controlled by the Luftwaffe, but at night everything was different. Thus, from the first day of the siege of Leningrad, Lake Ladoga was the road of salvation. Attempts by German mobile formations on the 39th tank corps in October and November 1941, passing around the lake, connecting with the Finns on the Svir and closing the blockade ring were unsuccessful. Accordingly, after leaving Tikhvin, the German 18th Army held only a fifteen-kilometer strip on the southern coast of Ladoga, limited by Shlisselburg and Lipka. Access to this strip was carried out along a very dangerous narrow corridor: on the right was the Volkhov Front, which constantly exerted serious pressure, on the left, the Neva, behind which the 67th, 55th and 42nd armies of the Leningrad Front were entrenched. In the middle of the corridor, a swampy area was controlled from the hills near Sinyavin. At the southern end of this section was Kirovskaya Railway, connecting Leningrad with the Urals through Volkhovstroy. However, what would have been true a year ago was now wrong. Because in the summer of 1942 the south was the strategic center of gravity of the German front, where an offensive was going on in the direction of the Volga and the Caucasus. There, in this decisive place, it was necessary to concentrate all available forces. Including 11th Army. However, Hitler then did not stoop to listening to criticism. Leningrad must fall. Manstein's plan was simple and at the same time cunning: he intended to break through the Soviet positions from the south with three corps, reach the outskirts of the city, then wait until two corps advanced east and force the Neva. And then they take the city. Not a bad plan. So far, everything that Manstein planned has succeeded. However, Leningrad was destined to confirm the well-known adage about "ebb and flow in the affairs of people: things undertaken at high tide succeed; but if the moment is missed, enterprises are doomed to shallows and failures." Manstein's plan didn't work!
On December 18, 1940, Hitler, in his infamous "Directive No. 21", consolidated the main provisions of the Barbarossa plan, an attack on the Soviet Union. It listed the "occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt" as the central condition for the continuation of the "offensive operation to take the important transport and military center, Moscow." This task has been assigned ground forces, who were supposed to conduct an offensive between the swamps of Pripyat in the south and the Baltic Sea towards the Baltic.
Nine months later, in the first days of September 1941, the troops of Army Group North approached the suburbs of Leningrad. But it was no longer about the rapid capture of the city. Instead, Hitler ordered the city to be cut off from the outside world and left in his own care. What this meant specifically - starvation for three million inhabitants (of which 400 thousand children) and about 500 thousand soldiers of the Red Army who defended the city. The blockade lasted almost 900 days, until the end of January 1944. It claimed the lives of one million people among the civilian population.
With the change in the directive for Army Group North, it became clear that the course of the operation had taken a different turn. On the other hand, it unequivocally showed that the main motive of the offensive remained unchanged - to destroy the Soviet Union as a means of the "Jewish-Bolshevik worldwide conspiracy" through racial-ideological genocide on an unprecedented scale.
Of the three army groups that attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the North group was the weakest. It had only the so-called tank group (tank army) at its disposal, which, moreover, had fewer weapons than the Army Group Center, which was supposed to advance on Moscow.
The troops of Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb very quickly realized what it meant to wage war in the expanses of the East. The supply routes stretched to the very outskirts, and some divisions were faced with the impossible task of controlling a front line one hundred kilometers wide.
It became clear that the planned blitzkrieg would not be realized within a few weeks, the offensive slowed down. In addition, it became clear that the Red Army, despite huge losses, still had sufficient reserves to give battle to the Wehrmacht and fight for every house. It was the greatest success of the Germans in the first months of the war, the conquest of Kyiv, that was to demonstrate this clearly. In addition, there was the task of supplying hundreds of thousands of Soviet prisoners, as well as the city, the logistics of which were completely destroyed.
Context
Leningrad is surrounded, Kyiv is taken, further - Moscow
ABC.es 05/24/2014World War II through the eyes of Western media
06.11.2015Leningrad, 1944 - the beginning of the end for the Wehrmacht
Die Welt 01/31/2014About the war 1939-1945
01.02.2019The collapse of Operation Barbarossa
Arbejderen 06/23/2016The fact that German logistics was now practically unable to deliver the most necessary things to the front, and instead identified the conquered territories in the east, the granaries of Ukraine as future food suppliers of the Third Reich, the Nazi regime came to a different solution. The famine was supposed to literally wipe out the second largest city in the Soviet Union, the cradle of the Bolshevik revolution. In this sense, Hitler forbade his soldiers to enter the city even in the event of surrender. Namely - "for economic reasons", because otherwise the Wehrmacht will be "responsible for providing nutrition to the population."
After the allied Finnish army stopped the advance on the line, which until the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. marked the border, Leeb was faced with a lack of funds for a direct attack on the city. Instead of reinforcements, he received an order to send most of his tanks in support of Army Group Center for the planned attack on Moscow.
On September 21, a note from the Wehrmacht High Command was dated, which analyzed the serious consequences for the besiegers. Concerns were expressed about epidemics and waves of refugees, which would further aggravate the supply situation.
But above all, Hitler's headquarters worried about the morale of the Wehrmacht: it is a moot point whether our soldiers would have the courage to start shooting at women and children. In this regard, it was recommended to destroy Leningrad with the help of artillery and aircraft, and thereby drive the unarmed deep into the country. After the winter of 1941/1942, the fortified areas were to be left to their own devices, the survivors were to be sent inland or captured, and the city was to be wiped off the face of the earth by bombing.
These arguments clearly show that the strategy of famine was no longer military target, the goal was to destroy the city and its inhabitants with the help of genocide. And the fact that the Fuhrer's concern extended only to the moral side of his troops shows the nature of German warfare, says military historian Rohl-Dieter Müller.
The fact that these plans were not realized is due to the courage and willingness to bear the sacrifices of the defenders, as well as to the heartless rigidity of Stalin. He sent General Zhukov, whom he had previously dismissed from the post of Chief of the General Staff due to criticism against him, to the city with instructions to keep him by any means.
In the spirit of Stalin, who forbade any sentimentality, Zhukov explained to the soldiers that the families of all those who surrendered to the enemy would be shot, like themselves, if they returned from captivity. Half a million civilians were obliged to participate in the construction of fortifications. At the same time, the NKVD established a terrorist regime in the city that threatened death to anyone who was identified as an enemy agent, defeatist or counter-revolutionary.
Spy mania went so far that food reserves were not distributed, but were stored centrally in warehouses so that they could be better guarded. This made them an easy target for German bombers. The result was a famine winter in which the daily ration was reduced to 125 grams of bread, which consisted of half wood flour and cellulose. People ate bark, rats and cats. There was no electricity, no wood for stoves.
“People were so weak from hunger that they did not resist death, they died as if falling asleep. And the people lying nearby did not notice this. Death became a phenomenon that could be observed at every turn,” wrote the survivor. Only through Lake Ladoga did a minimal amount of supplies enter the besieged city, in which mountains of bodies lay on the streets, because no one had the strength to bury them.
Soldiers of the German 18th Army received military orders to hold the siege. Thus, the German military leadership under Hitler made them complicit in a terrible crime that was in the spirit of the ideology and logic of the war of annihilation.
On the early stages war, the German leadership had every chance to capture Leningrad. And yet, this did not happen. The fate of the city, in addition to the courage of its inhabitants, was decided by many factors.
Siege or assault?
Initially, the Barbarossa plan involved the rapid capture of the city on the Neva by the North army group, but there was no unity among the German command: some Wehrmacht generals believed that the city needed to be captured, while others, including the chief of the general staff, Franz Halder, assumed that you can get by with the blockade.
At the beginning of July 1941, Halder made the following entry in his diary: “The 4th Panzer Group should set up barriers from the north and south of Lake Peipus and cordon off Leningrad. This record does not yet allow us to say that Halder decided to limit himself to blockade the city, but the mention of the word "cordon" already tells us that he did not plan to take the city right away.
Hitler himself advocated the capture of the city, guided in this case by economic rather than political aspects. The German army needed the possibility of unhindered navigation in the Baltic Gulf.
Luga failure of the Leningrad blitzkrieg
The Soviet command understood the importance of the defense of Leningrad, after Moscow it was the most important political and economic center of the USSR. The city housed the Kirov Machine-Building Plant, which produced the latest heavy tanks of the KV type, which played an important role in the defense of Leningrad. And the name itself - "City of Lenin" - did not allow it to be handed over to the enemy.
So, both sides understood the importance of capturing the Northern capital. The Soviet side began the construction of fortified areas in places of possible attacks by German troops. The most powerful, in the Luzhek area, included more than six hundred bunkers and bunkers. In the second week of July, the German 4th Panzer Group reached this line of defense and could not immediately overcome it, and here the German plan for the Leningrad blitzkrieg collapsed.
Hitler, dissatisfied with the delay in the offensive and the constant requests for reinforcements from Army Group North, personally visited the front, making it clear to the generals that the city must be taken and as soon as possible.
Dizzy with success
As a result of the Fuhrer's visit, the Germans regrouped their forces and in early August broke through the Luga line of defense, rapidly capturing Novgorod, Shiimsk, and Chudovo. By the end of the summer, the Wehrmacht achieved maximum success in this sector of the front and blocked the last railway going to Leningrad.
By the beginning of autumn, it seemed that Leningrad was about to be taken, but Hitler, who focused on the plan to capture Moscow and believed that with the capture of the capital, the war against the USSR would be practically won, ordered the transfer of the most combat-ready tank and infantry units from Army Group North. near Moscow. The nature of the battles near Leningrad immediately changed: if earlier the German units sought to break through the defenses and capture the city, now the first task was to destroy industry and infrastructure.
"Third Option"
The withdrawal of troops was fatal mistake for Hitler's plans. The remaining troops for the offensive were not enough, and the encircled Soviet units, having learned about the confusion of the enemy, tried with all their might to break through the blockade. As a result, the Germans had no choice but to go on the defensive, limiting themselves to indiscriminate shelling of the city from distant positions. There was no question of a further offensive, the main task was to preserve the siege ring around the city. In this situation, the German command had three options:
1. Taking the city after the completion of the encirclement;
2. The destruction of the city with the help of artillery and aircraft;
3. An attempt to deplete the resources of Leningrad and force him to surrender.
Hitler initially had the highest hopes for the first option, but he underestimated the importance of Leningrad to the Soviets, as well as the resilience and courage of its inhabitants.
The second option, according to experts, was a failure on its own - the density of air defense systems in some areas of Leningrad was 5-8 times higher than the density of air defense systems in Berlin and London, and the number of guns involved did not allow fatal damage to the city's infrastructure.
Thus, the third option remained Hitler's last hope for taking the city. It resulted in two years and five months of bitter confrontation.
environment and hunger
By the middle of September 1941 german army completely surrounded the city. The bombing did not stop: civilian objects became targets: food warehouses, large food industry plants.
From June 1941 to October 1942, many residents of the city were evacuated from Leningrad. At first, however, very reluctantly, because no one believed in a protracted war, and even more so they could not imagine how terrible the blockade and battles for the city on the Neva would be. Children were evacuated to the Leningrad region, but not for long - most of these territories were soon captured by the Germans and many children were returned back.
Now the main enemy of the USSR in Leningrad was hunger. It was he, according to Hitler's plans, who was supposed to play decisive role in the surrender of the city. In an attempt to establish a food supply, the Red Army repeatedly attempted to break through the blockade, organized "partisan convoys" that delivered food to the city right across the front line.
The leadership of Leningrad also made every effort to fight hunger. In November and December 1941, terrible for the population, active construction of enterprises producing food substitutes began. For the first time in history, bread was baked from cellulose and sunflower cake, and in the production of semi-finished meat products, offal was actively used, which no one would have thought of using in food production before.
In the winter of 1941, food rations hit a record low: 125 grams of bread per person. The issuance of other products was practically not carried out. The city was on the verge of extinction. The cold also became a severe test, the temperature dropped to -32 Celsius. And the negative temperature kept in Leningrad for 6 months. In the winter of 1941-1942, a quarter of a million people died.
The role of saboteurs
The first months of the siege, the Germans shelled Leningrad from artillery almost without hindrance. They transferred to the city the heaviest guns they had, mounted on railway platforms, these guns were capable of firing at a distance of up to 28 km, with 800-900 kilogram shells. In response to this, the Soviet command began to deploy a counter-battery fight, detachments of reconnaissance and saboteurs were formed, who discovered the location of the Wehrmacht's long-range artillery. Significant assistance in organizing counter-battery combat was provided by Baltic Fleet, whose naval artillery hit from the flanks and rear of the artillery formations of the Germans.
International factor
A significant role in the failure of Hitler's plans was played by his "allies". In addition to the Germans, Finns, Swedes, Italian and Spanish units participated in the siege. Spain did not officially participate in the war against the Soviet Union, with the exception of the volunteer Blue Division. There are different opinions about her. Some note the steadfastness of its fighters, others - a complete lack of discipline and mass desertion, soldiers often went over to the side of the Red Army. Italy provided torpedo boats, but their land operations were unsuccessful.
"Road of Victory"
The final collapse of the plan to capture Leningrad came on January 12, 1943, it was at that moment that the Soviet command launched Operation Iskra and after 6 days of fierce fighting, on January 18, the blockade was broken. Immediately after this, a railway was laid to the besieged city, later called the "Road of Victory" and also known as the "Corridor of Death". The road was so close to military operations that German units often fired cannons at trains. However, a flood of supplies and food poured into the city. Enterprises began to produce products according to peacetime plans, sweets and chocolate appeared on store shelves.
In fact, the ring around the city held out for another year, but the encirclement ring was no longer so dense, the city was successfully supplied with resources, and the general situation on the fronts did not allow Hitler to build such ambitious plans anymore.
Question 01. Why did JV Stalin think that Germany would not attack the USSR in the summer of 1941? What were the consequences of this position of Stalin?
Answer. I.V. Stalin believed that Hitler would not attack the USSR as long as he continued the war against Great Britain (although only a small part of the Wehrmacht ground forces was involved in this war (in Africa)). In addition, not only correct intelligence information came to Moscow, but also cleverly fabricated disinformation, which turned out to be more convincing. The result was the unpreparedness of the Red Army for war, for example, in many parts it was on the day of the attack that rearmament was going on: the old weapons had already been handed over by the fighters, but the new ones had not yet been received.
Question 02. What were the forces of the parties on the eve of the Great Patriotic War?
Answer. In terms of the number of troops and the number of artillery pieces, the forces of the parties were approximately equal, the number of tanks and aircraft in the USSR was greater, but the equipment itself was inferior to that of the German one. It must also be taken into account that big number forces and means of the Red Army was destroyed as a result of the first unexpected blow.
Question 03. What do you see as the reasons for the failures of the Red Army in the first months of the war?
Answer. The reasons:
1) significant forces of the Red Army were concentrated near the very border;
2) the border units of the Red Army were not properly camouflaged, because their location was well known to the enemy, which significantly increased the accuracy of the Wehrmacht's first strike;
3) the border forces of the Red Army were not put on alert, the attack came as a complete surprise to them;
4) the German blitzkrieg tactics, which included coordinated maneuvering strikes by aircraft and tanks, the destruction of communications between enemy combat units, showed its real effectiveness;
5) weakened by repression command staff The USSR in most cases was unable to counter the blitzkrieg with organized resistance;
6) from Moscow for a long time came directives that did not respond to the situation on an immediate transition to a counteroffensive, because of which the surviving forces did not have time to concentrate into a single fist and prepare an offensive, but were simply wasted;
7) the main part of the armor and aircraft of the Wehrmacht surpassed the most massive models of similar Soviet equipment in terms of basic characteristics.
Question 04. What measures did the Soviet leadership take to repel aggression?
Answer. Measures taken:
1) general mobilization into the Red Army began;
2) there was a call for the mobilization of all labor reserves;
3) an order was given to the troops for an immediate counteroffensive, although this was not advisable in the current situation;
4) another batch of "pests" was shot, among them the entire leadership Western Front led by commander D.G. Pavlov.
Question 05. How was the Battle of Moscow? What is its meaning?
Answer. Moscow battle
On September 30, 1941, the Wehrmacht attacked Moscow. The offensive was postponed several times both because of the stubborn resistance of the Red Army in other sectors of the front, and because of Hitler’s personal order to deviate from the original Barbarossa plan (the Fuhrer at one time hoped to take Moscow into giant pincers). As a result, they did not manage to carry out the offensive before the start of the thaw, which the Wehrmacht did not learn how to properly resist until the end of the war.
By mid-October 1941, despite the heroic resistance of the Red Army, the enemy came close to the capital.
Unbelievable for this time of year, early and severe frosts struck, for which the Wehrmacht was not ready.
On November 7, 1941, the famous parade took place on Red Square: troops went straight from the parade to the front.
In mid-November, the offensive of the Wehrmacht was continued with renewed vigor. It was stopped with great difficulty, but as a result, the German troops were also weakened, and their communications were unacceptably stretched, while the railway network of the occupied regions was underdeveloped (in particular, because of this, ready-made winter clothes could not be delivered to the front from warehouses in Germany ).
Reliable information was obtained by intelligence: Japan will wage war in pacific ocean, therefore, is not going to attack the USSR. This made it possible to transfer a significant number of troops to Moscow, preparing to repel the Japanese invasion. These fresh forces arrived at the end of November. They made it possible to organize a powerful counterattack against the weakened by long battles and climatic conditions Wehrmacht with stretched lines of communication on December 5-6, 1941. As a result, 38 divisions of the Wehrmacht were defeated, the enemy was driven back in different areas 100-250 km from Moscow.
As a result of the battle, the USSR avoided defeat, the myth of the invincibility of the Wehrmacht was debunked. It seemed to many that this retreat would be the turning point of the invasion (as the turning point was the retreat of Napoleon from Moscow), but the reality turned out to be different.
Question 06. Why did the Germans fail to capture Leningrad?
Answer. The reasons:
1) the heroism of the defenders and the stubbornness of the command made it possible to stop the enemy on the outskirts of Leningrad;
2) there were no food riots in Leningrad, which the Nazis counted on (which happened both thanks to the courage of many residents, and as a result of emergency measures by the NKVD, quite in the style of Stalin's time);
3) the famous Road of Life was organized on the ice of Lake Ladoga, along which food was brought to the city;
4) the Finnish army did not block the Road of Life, although in the opinion of many it had the opportunity to do so;
5) Soviet scientists developed a composition that was applied to the ceilings of a predominantly wooden city, which prevented it from burning out;
6) during the arrival of heat in 1942, despite all the hardships of the past winter and no less hungry spring, Leningraders were able to organize measures for the sanitation of the city (during the winter, a lot remained on its streets, including corpses) and prevent the occurrence of epidemics.
Almost 2 years ago, I published in my journal the memoirs of a former Red Army officer who, fortunately, fled to the West.
His memoirs are fundamentally different from the parade-victory memoirs that came out for a long time in the USSR and in present-day Russia.
Comparable with this book is that Nikulin's memories of the war
Both of them served on the Leningrad front and their memories of that time seem to complement each other.
But this is what moment in the history of the defense of Leningrad drew my attention then, 2 years ago, and now (somehow everything coincided in time).
This is a fact that the Germans could easily enter Leningrad without encountering any resistance.
Here is what D.V. Konstantinov writes in his book. I fought in the red army. - Buenos Aires: New Word, 1952 about this moment in the defense of Leningrad:
Someday history will reveal the secret of these days. For me personally, it still remains unclear why the German army did not enter Leningrad these days. The city could be taken with bare hands.
On the front, passing in a number of places along the outskirts of the city, the remnants of the already significantly demoralized troops were fighting, defending, or rather, retreating to Leningrad. Their resistance was not in any way a serious obstacle to the German army. New reinforcements have not yet arrived. The German tanks freely walked around the southern part of the city, reached the Narva Gate, aroused fear in one and curiosity in the other part of the population, and slowly left back.
And today, I read an interview with a writer, Daniil Granin, who also fought against the German socialists on the Leningrad front. and he also talks about how the Germans could safely enter Leningrad:
On September 17, 1941, I left Pushkin. We did not run, but we left Pushkin. And when they left, there were Germans in the park. We reached the tram ring, there was no outpost, no pickets, the city was wide open. I got on the tram, came home, I could no longer move. And when I woke up, I was sure that the Germans were in the city. Then it began: the defense was created, some units, the Red Navy. But that day never left my mind. Why didn't they come in?
About seven or eight years ago, the picture began to clear up, from German sources it became known that on September 14 or 15 Hitler gave the order not to enter the city. This caused outrage among the German generals.
In my soldier's psychology, I could not understand what it means to reach the city and not enter. But Germans are Germans. We would not have resisted, we would have entered. Hitler rightly counted on the capitulation of Leningrad, Moscow, and the Soviet government in general. All the essentials have already been taken. It was decided to strangle the city. They knew: if the city turns into a cemetery, then there will be no Leningrad Front. But the city did not capitulate. Although there was everything inside.
Two people, independently of each other, one emigrant, the other Soviet writer favored by the authorities, are talking about the same thing.
By the way, the opinion of both about militia are also very similar.
Very intersting.
It is also very informative in terms of the fact that the “great Soviet people” didn’t really want to fight, a change in consciousness has not yet occurred, people have not yet understood that German socialism is not nearly better than Soviet, and maybe even worse for them personally. ..
The realization that it is necessary to fight for ourselves, and not for power, has not yet come.
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