Lend-Lease is a program under which the United States provided its allies in World War II with everything they needed - weapons, food, production equipment and raw materials.
Most often, however, under "lend-lease" is understood precisely the supply of weapons, not paying attention to other goods.
Causes and conditions
The American leadership reasonably believed that in World War II, those countries whose defense was of vital importance to the United States should be helped.
Initially, the Lend-Lease program included China and the British Empire, but then other countries, including the USSR, joined it.
Adopted in March 1941, the Lend-Lease Law established the following supply rules:
- Equipment, weapons, food, materials and other goods used or destroyed during the war were not subject to payment.
- The goods left after the war, if they could be suitable for civilian purposes, were paid for on the basis of loans provided by the United States.
- If the United States is interested in returning this or that product after the war, it must be returned.
Thus, the supplies were a kind of "gift" to the allies during the war, and in peacetime they turned into a commodity and could be bought at quite reasonable prices.
Lend-Lease in the USSR
Lend-lease in the USSR is still the subject of fierce disputes between opponents and supporters of Soviet power. The former claim that without American supplies, the USSR is unlikely to have won the war, while the latter argue that the supplies were insignificant and did not play a special role in the fight against fascism.
Both of them are gravely mistaken. The Western "superpower" organized large-scale deliveries of weapons and other goods to European countries due to the fact that the US GDP was several times higher than this indicator in any developed European country, including the USSR.
Hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo were imported into the Soviet Union. More than 12 percent of the tanks and aircraft in the Red Army were of American and British production, and armored personnel carriers were completely imported: in our country, such equipment has not yet been produced.
But such Lend-Lease also had weaknesses. First, the agreements on the supply of weapons and equipment were not fully implemented. Of the 800 aircraft and 1,000 tanks destined for the USSR in 1941, only 669 aircraft and 487 tanks were sent. The situation more or less normalized only in 1943.
Secondly, a large amount of foreign aid to the Soviet Union did not mean best quality. And here the point is not only that the United States deliberately supplied not the most modern and best of its equipment, but also that American military production generally lagged behind Soviet and European.
The USSR and Germany at that time invested most of their production forces in the development of weapons, including tanks, as a result of which they surpassed all other states in this; therefore, against the background of Soviet and German technology, American and even British technology often looked weak.
A more acceptable situation was with the supply of aircraft, less acceptable - tanks. The share of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns was very small, since the USSR had enough of its own similar equipment. Small arms were also supplied, but on an absolutely microscopic scale - the share of American "trunks" in the Red Army was less than 1 percent.
Could the USSR do without Lend-Lease?
It is known that most of the Lend-Lease deliveries occurred in the period after 1943, when the turning point in the war came. That is, in the most terrible period of the war, the early one, the help of the allies was minimal, and in more successful years it was not so noticeable.
There are those who ask: if the Allies produced a large number of weapons, why did they not send more of them? In fact, the reason was not the stinginess of the "capitalist comrades", but the tonnage of the American and British cargo fleet - it was very insufficient for mass deliveries.
There is another version that the deliveries were simply delayed. And one more thing, the Americans were waiting for someone to help, either the USSR or Germany. depending on the course of the war. The more losses the parties have, the more investments. They have a calculation, as always.
Could the Soviet Union do without Lend-Lease at all? It seems that he could. It was enough to redistribute their own production capacities. However, this would have to mobilize a huge amount of manpower, which means the weakening of the army. Recall that America was an ally of the USSR.
It would be possible to turn a blind eye to the lack of the necessary equipment, but then the army would also be weakened. The war for the USSR would have turned into an even more protracted conflict, the Soviet Army would still have won the war, perhaps later. R. Sherwood (American historian) quoted Harry Hopkins, who did not consider American assistance important in the victory of the USSR over fascism. He said: "The victory was achieved by the heroism and blood of the Russian army."
Benefit for the Americans
Many political scientists, and even politicians themselves, do not hide the benefits of the states from the supply of not quite new and serviceable weapons. But since World War II, they have received their debt from Russia. The exhausted and destroyed USSR could not give it away, and there were all sorts of other reasons, for example, a tense relationship between the two countries. Fully profited.
From the series “The Difficult Way to Victory Parade,
or what I would tell Eddie about World War II”
The contribution of the USSR to achieving victory over the German Wehrmacht was decisive. The Soviet-German front remained the decisive front of the Second World War in terms of the number of troops involved, the duration and intensity of the struggle, its scope and final results. Losses of the German fascist troops in the Second World War on the Soviet-German front were huge. In tanks and assault guns, they accounted for 75% of the number of tanks and guns, in aviation - 75%, in artillery pieces - 74%. The decisive contribution of the USSR to the victory is also determined by the fact that the Wehrmacht suffered more than half of the total losses in battles and battles on the eastern front.
And this is understood by people and leaders of countries around the world. It is not for nothing that monuments to Russian soldiers-liberators have been erected in many countries. So, in the United States, in West Hollywood in 2005, a Memorial was erected Soviet Wars- participants of the Second World War with the image of a wedge of white cranes. On it in Russian and in English are inscribed the words of a song we all know:
Sometimes it seems to me that the soldiers
From the bloody fields that did not come,
Not in our land once perished,
And they turned into white cranes.
US military supplies contributed to the acceleration of the defeat of the fascist troops in the East, but it can hardly be assumed that without such assistance the victory would not have taken place. It would take place, only it would have to pay an even greater price in manpower. The losses of the USSR amounted to more than 27 million people, but this fact can hardly be cited as proof of the greatest contribution of the USSR to the defeat of fascism. Our losses are our pain for the dead people, for the often inept and heartless military leadership.
Many of us proudly sing Bulat Okudzhava's song from the movie "Belarusian Station":
And that means we need one victory!
One for all, we will not stand up for the price.
Considering the events of World War II, one should neither exaggerate nor underestimate the economic assistance of the allies of the USSR in the fight against a common enemy - fascist Germany. In March 1941, the US Congress passed a law providing allied countries with targeted loans for the purchase of weapons and other military materials from the United States. The debt for such deliveries was declared written off. This system was called lend-lease.
Warren F. Kimball's article "The Lend-Lease Act (1941)" in the American Encyclopedia states that during the Lend-Lease debate, opponents tried to exclude the Soviet Union from the program. But American strategists knew that only the Red Army could defeat Hitler, and that lend-lease assistance to it would facilitate this.
England was the first country to receive American aid. She remained the main recipient of military materials. From November 1941, the Soviet Union was also connected to American lend-lease assistance. In 1942, less than 30% was sent to the Soviet Union, and 43% to Great Britain - 43% of all Lend-Lease supplies from the USA. The total volume of these deliveries for the period 1941-45 to the USSR and Great Britain amounted to 11.3 and 30.3 billion dollars, respectively, or less than 22% and more than 63% of the total value. In 1941-1945, the USSR received about 312,000 cars of almost 50 models from American, British and Canadian firms, which exceeded the capacity of the Soviet automobile industry, which produced 219,000 units.
The most widespread and demanded was the Studebaker truck, the deliveries of which exceeded 100,000 units. In 1944, Studebakers and Jeeps made up 70% of the Red Army's vehicle fleet, and the former became the base chassis for the famous Katyushas and largely replaced horse traction and tractors in towing artillery systems. Good performance was also shown by the Dodge truck and the Willys passenger car, which turned out to be a reliable means of reconnaissance, communications and command and control.
The Soviet Union received 18,000 aircraft, more than 11,000 tanks, and 44,000 jeeps. American equipment was supplied under Lend-Lease fully equipped - with equipment and even small arms for the crew. Soviet Navy more than 500 warships and boats were delivered under lend-lease. Among them are 28 frigates, 89 minesweepers, 78 large submarine hunters, 60 patrol boats, 166 torpedo boats, and 43 landing craft.
The Allies plugged almost all the holes in Soviet industry with their supplies. One can give such an example. The base of the tank turret is a huge bearing, the diameter of which directly affects the caliber of the gun that can be placed in the turret. However, in the Soviet Union there were only two machines that made it possible to make a turret shoulder strap for a gun of eighty-five millimeters and above. On the T-34 tank, it was possible to put a turret with a gun of this caliber only after receiving the third machine. In addition, for the production of tanks, the USSR received a lot of armored products from the Allies.
By January 1942 exactly half of our industry remained. The production of gunpowder and explosives suffered greatly. Of the three aluminum plants, only one remained - the smallest in the Urals. The production of aluminum requires a huge amount of electricity. Therefore, the factories were located on the Dnieper and Volkhov near power plants, but the Germans came there. During the war, our country produced 263,000 tons of aluminum, and received 328,000 tons from the allies. In other words, more than half of our aircraft were made from American and Canadian aluminium.
The Allies delivered to the USSR one and a half times more cars than the entire Soviet Union produced during the war years. During the war years, there was no production of locomotives in the USSR, and the Americans delivered 1,900 steam locomotives and 66 diesel-electric locomotives to our country. In addition, they delivered us 10 times more wagons than they produced in all war time Soviet Union. A third of all explosives is the help of the allies. The deliveries have doubled our cobalt production and tripled our tin production.
The Soviet Union received all this practically for free. The United States did not demand compensation for military equipment destroyed during the battles. The Lend-Lease Act provided for payment only for civilian supplies: railway transport, power plants, steamships, trucks and other equipment that was in the recipient countries as of September 2, 1945. The Americans reduced the cost of the debt several times - as a result, by 2006 Russia paid off its lend-lease debts, partially paying $ 722 million, or about 7%. At the same time, today's dollar is “lighter” than the dollar of 1945 by about 11 times. Harriman, instructing the US delegation, repeated: "Give, give and give without expecting a return, no thought of getting anything in return."
For a number of other positions, the volume of allied assistance was close to the volume of domestic production and sometimes even exceeded it several times. These are strategic materials - copper (76% of domestic production), aluminum (106%), tin (223%), cobalt (138%) and alloy steel, equipment and materials for railway transport (the USSR received 2.4 times more locomotives than produced, wagons - an order of magnitude, rails - more than 50% more), as well as machine-tool equipment and components for the military-industrial complex itself, including explosives (gunpowder, dynamite, TNT, toluene, detonators, etc.). Of particular note is the delivery of 445 radars.
G.K. Zhukova: "The Americans gave us so many materials, without which we could not form our reserves ... We received 350 thousand vehicles, but what cars! .. We did not have explosives, gunpowder. There was nothing to equip rifle cartridges. The Americans "They really helped us out with gunpowder, explosives. And how much sheet steel they drove us! How could we quickly set up the production of tanks if it were not for American help with steel?" Almost 50% satisfaction of demand for high-octane gasoline due to imports can also be noted (although the total share of American, Canadian and British petroleum products was close to 10%).
According to the Third (London) Protocol, the tonnage of food supplies reached a third of all Lend-Lease cargo. American stew saved hundreds of thousands of our people from starvation. The volumes of canned meat and animal fats supplied by the allies in 1941-45 amounted to 480% and 107%, respectively, in relation to their Soviet production. The fact that, from the end of 1942, American food products, primarily stewed pork, began to arrive under Lend-Lease, to a certain extent, made it possible to reduce tension in the domestic agro-industrial complex and reduce internal supplies to the army. Together, in 1941-45, up to 4.5 million tons of food was received from the USA and Canada, or a little more than 10% of its total expenditure for army needs; the average annual import of grain, cereals and flour (in terms of grain) reached 3% of grain procurements in the USSR.
In Soviet sources of the post-war period, there is a deliberate underestimation of the role of Lend-Lease supplies. However, it is indisputable that the weapons, strategic materials and food received by the Soviet Union from the allies contributed to the successful completion of the war against a common enemy - Nazi Germany. However, the defeat of Nazi Germany Soviet Army, which played a major role in the destruction of fascism, was carried out mainly by domestic Soviet weapons and domestic military equipment.
At the same time, one should also note the great contribution of the Americans to the victory, especially over Japan, as well as the assistance to the USSR with military materials. Americans have every right to be proud that American troops, together with the countries of the British Commonwealth, have inflicted significant damage to the naval and air force Japan, as well as the military-industrial complex of Germany.
Lend-lease from Mongolia also turned out to be a significant help to the warring USSR during the Second World War. World War II was the last great war of cavalry and horses. Unlike cars, horses as a draft force had a number of advantages - they moved better off-road and conditional roads, did not depend on fuel supplies, could for a long time make do with pasture, and they themselves were sometimes used as feed. Budyonny was right when he said in the 1930s that the horse would still show itself in the war. Then, in the 1940s, off-road of Eastern Europe the horse played its non-alternative role - the time of mass tracked amphibious all-terrain vehicles came much later.
By the time of the invasion of the USSR, the Wehrmacht used over a million horses, 88% of which were in infantry divisions. By the beginning of the war, the number of horses in the Red Army was 526.4 thousand. But by September 1, 1941, there were 1,324,000 of them in the army. Later, the maximum one-time number of horses in our army exceeded 1.9 million. It is believed that more than a million horses died on the battlefield during the Second World War. No less German losses in horses.
With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the USSR had the only third-party source of horses - Mongolia, from where supplies of horses began already in 1941. During the four years of the war, about 500 thousand “Mongol” horses were delivered to the Soviet Union. The horses were supplied at a conditional price, mainly by offsetting for the Mongolian debts of the USSR. Thus, all the political, military and economic investments of the Bolsheviks in Mongolia paid off. Semi-wild, unpretentious and hardy, the Mongolian horses were much better adapted to the extreme conditions of the Eastern Front than their European counterparts. In fact, in 1943-45, every fifth horse at the front was a "Mongolian".
During the war years, Mongolia also delivered almost 500,000 tons of meat to the USSR. Such a tough mobilization of resources made itself felt - in the winter of 1944, famine began in Mongolia, just like in the rear areas of the warring USSR. From the Mongolian steppes throughout the war, another strategic product of the war went to our country - wool. And these are soldier's greatcoats, without which it is impossible to survive in the trenches of Eastern Europe even in summer. We then received 54,000 tons of wool from the USA, and 64,000 tons from Mongolia. Every fifth Soviet overcoat in 1942-45 was "Mongolian".
Mongolia was also the most important source of raw hides and furs. Deliveries of fur coats, fur hats, mittens and felt boots began already in the first military autumn. By November 7, 1941, several Soviet infantry divisions from reserves preparing for a counteroffensive near Moscow were fully equipped with Mongolian winter uniforms. In Mongolia, there was also the only industrial source of tungsten available to the USSR during the war years, the most refractory metal on Earth, without which it was impossible to make shells capable of penetrating the armor of German "panthers" and "tigers".
In 1942-45, the Mongolian Arat air squadron and the Revolutionary Mongolia tank brigade fought on the Soviet-German front. Of course, a few dozen fighters and tanks are too few against the general background. But in the east of our country, where the USSR was forced to keep a million-strong group against Japan throughout the war, the Mongols played a completely strategic role. During the Second World War, non-belligerent Mongolia spent over 50% of the state budget on its armed forces. Mongolian troops became an additional counterweight to the Japanese Kwantung Army. All this made it possible for the USSR to take additional forces from the Far East, several divisions, which were already a noticeable size even on the scale of the huge Soviet-German front.
Five Mongolian divisions, together with the Soviet troops, fought their way to the Great Wall of China on the distant approaches to Beijing. In our country, this war is considered quick and easy with small losses against the backdrop of the monstrous massacre of the Great Patriotic War. But for Mongolia, with a population of only 800 thousand people, it was a completely different scale - everyone took part in the war with the Japanese! Mongol man of military age. In this regard, Mongolia surpassed the USSR in terms of “mobilization tension”. In percentage terms, the losses suffered by Mongolia in August 1945 are equal to the losses of the United States in the entire Second World War. For our Mongols allies, the Soviet-Japanese war was neither easy nor painless.
The joint efforts of the allied countries in the fight against the Nazi troops led the world to the Great Victory. More on that in the last post in the series.
To be continued.
Reviews
Allah, good afternoon! A very good title for a number of texts is "What I know about the Second World War." Here you can do something that was officially and for ideological reasons kept silent.
They heard about Lend-Lease, but to know specifically this side of the war without cuts ...
Most likely, those in power were comfortable with huge human losses, material and psychological considered only the result of the predominance of the power of the Germans and the weak and late help of the allies.
But with such global aid The United States and other countries raise quite a few questions.
Did Germany get help too?
I don't understand why it started cold war if the US was so concerned about helping the USSR and defeating fascism
Maybe the numbers of their help in the form of steel, equipment and canned meat with clothes looked against the backdrop of our devastation and inhuman efforts to "everything for victory?" impressively. But what was it for the USA? Weren't they the last to help? It is known that the war enriched everyone except the winner. With the beginning of the Second World Economy, the United States was only on the rise and cleared the path to prosperity and development through Lend-Lease, opened the way for new technologies and weapons. Was it worth helping?
But the appeal of the name lies in the fact that it is under different angle may be considered.
In my opinion, Okudzhava's lines "We won't stand up for the price" were not invented by him, and not by his ill-conceived move.
But judging by the all-encompassing mood from the first days of the war, this is natural and
the semi-mystical prevailed in consciousness and there could be no other way - only victory and all forces for one thing - to save the country and its future from the invader. Sincerely.
The daily audience of the Proza.ru portal is about 100 thousand visitors, who total amount view more than half a million pages according to the traffic counter, which is located to the right of this text. Each column contains two numbers: the number of views and the number of visitors.
It’s worth starting with the “deciphering” of the term “Lend-Lease” itself, although for this it’s enough to look at English-Russian dictionary. So, lend - "to lend", lease - "to lease". It was under such conditions that the United States during the Second World War transferred military equipment, weapons, ammunition, equipment, strategic raw materials, food, various goods and services to the allies in the Anti-Hitler coalition. These conditions will still have to be remembered at the end of the article.
The Lend-Lease Act was passed by the US Congress on March 11, 1941, and authorized the President to grant the above species to countries whose "defence against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States." The calculation is understandable: to protect yourself with the hands of others and to preserve your strength as much as possible.
Lend-Lease deliveries in 1939-45. received 42 countries, US spending on them amounted to more than 46 billion dollars (13% of all military spending of the country for the Second world war). The main volume of supplies (about 60%) fell on the British Empire; against this background, the share of the USSR, on whose share the brunt of the war fell, is more than indicative: slightly higher than 1/3 of the British supplies. The largest part of the remaining deliveries came from France and China.
Even in the Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941, it was said about the desire to "supply the USSR with the maximum amount of those materials that it needs most of all." Although the United States officially signed the supply agreement with the USSR on July 11, 1942, the Lend-Lease Law was extended to the USSR by presidential decree on November 7, 1941 (clearly “for the holiday”). Even earlier, on 10/01/41, an agreement was signed in Moscow between England, the USA and the USSR on mutual deliveries for a period up to 06/30/42. Subsequently, such agreements (they were called "Protocols") were renewed annually.
But again, even earlier, on August 31, 1941, the first caravan came to Arkhangelsk under the code name "Dervish", and more or less systematic Lend-Lease deliveries began in November 1941. At first, sea convoys were the main delivery method , arriving in Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk). In total, 1530 transports followed this route, consisting of 78 convoys (42 - to the USSR, 36 - back). By the actions of submarines and aviation of Nazi Germany, 85 transports (including 11 Soviet ships) were sunk, and 41 transports were forced to return to their original base.
In our country, the courageous feat of the sailors of Britain and other allied countries who participated in the escort and protection of convoys along the Northern route is highly valued and honored.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEND-LEASE FOR THE USSR
For Soviet Union, who fought with an exceptionally strong aggressor, the supply of military equipment, weapons and ammunition was important, especially given their huge losses in 1941. It is believed that according to this nomenclature, the USSR received: 18,300 aircraft, 11,900 tanks, 13,000 anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, 427,000 vehicles, a large amount of ammunition, explosives and gunpowder. (However, the figures given may vary considerably from source to source.)
But we did not always receive exactly what we especially needed, and within the agreed time frame (apart from inevitable combat losses, there were other reasons for this). So, in the most difficult period for us (October - December 1941), the USSR was underdelivered: aircraft - 131, tanks - 513, tankettes - 270 and a whole range of cargoes. For the period from October 1941 to the end of June 1942 (the terms of the 1st Protocol), the United States fulfilled its obligations on: bombers - less than 30%, fighters - 31%, medium tanks - 32%, light tanks - by 37%, trucks - by 19.4% (16,502 instead of 85,000)
SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT UNDER LEND-LEASE
Soviet ace A.I. Pokryshkin near his Airacobra fighter
This type of supply, of course, was of paramount importance. Lend-lease planes came mainly from the USA, although a certain part (and a lot) also came from the UK. The figures indicated in the table may not coincide with other sources, but they very clearly illustrate the dynamics and range of aircraft deliveries.
In terms of their flight performance, the Lend-Lease aircraft were far from equivalent. So. the American Kittyhawk fighter and the English Hurricane, as A.I. Shakhurin in September 1941, "are not the latest examples of American and British technology"; in fact, they were significantly inferior to the German fighters in terms of speed and armament. "Harry-Kane", moreover, had an unreliable engine: due to its failure in battle, the famous North Sea pilot, twice Hero of the Soviet Union B.F. Safonov. This fighter Soviet pilots frankly called the "flying coffin."
The American fighter Airacobra, on which the Hero of the Soviet Union A.I. Pokryshkin fought three times, was practically not inferior to the German Me-109 and FV-190 in speed and had powerful weapons (37-mm aircraft cannon and 4 machine guns 12.7 mm), which, according to Pokryshkin, "broke the German planes to smithereens." But due to miscalculations in the design of the "Aero-Cobra", with complex evolutions during the battle, it often fell into a hard-to-remove "flat" tailspin, deformation of the fuselage "Aerocob-Of course, such an ace as Pokryshkin brilliantly coped with a capricious aircraft, but among ordinary pilots had many accidents and disasters.
The Soviet government was forced to present a claim to the manufacturer ("Bell"), but she rejected it. Only when our test pilot A. Kochetkov was sent to the USA, who over the airfield of the company and in front of its management demonstrated the deformation of the Aerocobra fuselage in the tail area (he himself managed to jump out with a parachute), the company had to redesign the design of his car . The improved model of the fighter, which received the marking P-63 "Kingcobra", began to operate at the final stage of the war, in 1944-45, when our industry mass-produced excellent fighters Yak-3, La-5, La-7 , which surpassed the American ones in terms of characteristics.
A comparison of the characteristics shows that American vehicles were not inferior to the German ones of the same type in terms of basic indicators: the bombers also had an important advantage - night vision bombsights, which the German Yu-88 and Xe-111 did not have. Yes, and the defensive weapons of the American bombers were machine guns of 12.7 mm caliber (for the German ones - 7.92), and their number was large.
The combat use and technical operation of American and British aircraft, of course, brought a lot of worries, but our technicians relatively quickly learned not only to prepare "foreigners" for combat missions, but also to repair them. Moreover, on the part of British aircraft, Soviet specialists managed to replace their rather weak machine guns of 7.71 mm caliber with more powerful domestic weapons.
Speaking of aviation, it is impossible not to mention the provision of fuel. As you know, the shortage of aviation gasoline was an acute problem of our Air Force even in peacetime, holding back the intensity of combat training in combat units and training in flight schools. During the war years, the USSR received 630 thousand tons of aviation gasoline from the USA under Lend-Lease, and more than 570 thousand more from Great Britain and Canada. The total number of light fraction gasoline supplied to us was 2586 thousand tons - 51% domestic production of these varieties in the period 1941 - 1945. Thus, one has to agree with the statement of the historian B. Sokolov that without imported fuel supplies, Soviet aviation would not have been able to act effectively in the operations of the Great Patriotic War. Unprecedented was the difficulty of ferrying aircraft from the United States "under its own power" to the Soviet Union. Particularly long - 14,000 km) was the ALSIB air route (Alaska-Siberia), laid in 1942 from Fairbanks (USA) to Krasnoyarsk and beyond. The uninhabited expanses of the Far North and taiga Siberia, frosts up to 60 and even 70 degrees, unpredictable weather with unexpected fogs and snow loads made ALSIB the most difficult haul route. The ferry air division of the Soviet Air Force operated here, and, probably, more than one of our pilots laid down his young head not in battle with the aces of the Luftwaffe, but on the ALSIBA track, but his feat is as glorious as the front. 43% of all aircraft received from the USA passed through this air route.
Already in October 1942, the first group of American bombers A-20 "Boston" was overtaken by ALSIB near Stalingrad. Airplanes made in the USA could not withstand the severe Siberian frosts - rubber products burst. The Soviet government urgently provided the Americans with a recipe for frost-resistant rubber - only this saved the situation ...
With the organization of the delivery of goods by sea across the South Atlantic to the Persian Gulf region and the creation of assembly aircraft workshops there, aircraft began to be ferried from the airfields of Iran and Iraq to the North Caucasus. The southern air route was also difficult: mountainous terrain, unbearable heat, sandstorms. 31% of the aircraft received from the United States was transported through it.
In general, it must be admitted that the supply of aircraft under lend-lease to the USSR undoubtedly played a positive role in intensifying the combat operations of the Soviet Air Force. It is also worth considering that although, on average, foreign aircraft accounted for no more than 15% of their domestic production, for certain types of aircraft this percentage was significantly higher: for front-line bombers - 20%, for front-line fighters - from 16 to 23%, and for naval aircraft - 29% (especially the sailors noted the Catalina flying boat), which looks very significant.
ARMORED VEHICLES
In terms of importance for combat operations, in terms of the number and level of vehicles, tanks, of course, took second place in Lend-Lease deliveries. We are talking specifically about tanks, since the supply of self-propelled guns would not be very significant. And again, it must be noted that the corresponding figures fluctuate quite significantly in different sources.
"Soviet Military Encyclopedia" provides the following data on tanks (pieces): USA - about 7000; Great Britain - 4292; Canada - 1188; total - 12480.
The reference dictionary "The Great Patriotic War of 1941-45" gives the total number of tanks received under Lend-Lease - 10800 units.
The latest edition of Russia and the USSR in Wars and Conflicts of the 20th Century (M, 2001) gives the figure of 11,900 tanks, as does the latest edition of The Great Patriotic War 1941-45 (M, 1999).
So, the number of lend-lease tanks amounted to about 12% of the total number of tanks and self-propelled guns that entered the Red Army during the war (109.1 thousand units). Further, when considering the combat characteristics of Lend-Lease tanks, some, for brevity, omit the number of crew and the number of machine guns.
ENGLISH TANKS
They made up most of the first lots of Lend-Lease armored vehicles (together with two types of American tanks of the M3 series). These were combat vehicles designed to escort infantry.
"Valentine" Mk 111
It was considered infantry, weighing 16.5 -18 tons; armor - 60 mm, gun 40 mm (on parts of tanks -57 mm), speed 32 - 40 km / h (different engines). On the fronts, it proved to be positive: having a low silhouette, it had good reliability, comparative simplicity of device and maintenance. True, our repairmen had to weld spurs on the Valentine's tracks to increase patency (tea, not Europe). They were delivered from England - 2400 pieces, from Canada - 1400 (according to other sources - 1180).
"Matilda" Mk IIA
By class, it was a medium tank weighing 25 tons, with good armor (80 mm), but a weak 40 mm caliber gun; speed - no more than 25 km / h. Disadvantages - the possibility of loss of mobility in the event of freezing of dirt that got into the closed undercarriage, which is unacceptable in combat conditions. In total, "Matild" was delivered to the Soviet Union 1084 units.
"Churchill" Mk III
Although it was considered infantry, by weight (40-45 tons) it belonged to the heavy class. It had a clearly unsatisfactory layout - the caterpillar contour covered the hull, which sharply worsened the visibility of the driver in battle. With strong armor (board - 95 mm, forehead of the hull - up to 150), it did not have powerful weapons (guns were installed mainly 40 - 57 mm, only for some vehicles - 75 mm). Low speed (20-25 km / h), poor maneuverability, limited visibility reduced the effect of strong armor, although Soviet tankers noted the good combat survivability of the Churchills. There were 150 of them delivered. (according to other sources - 310 pieces). The engines on the "Valentines" and "Matildas" were diesel, on the "Churchills" - carburetor.
AMERICAN TANKS
For some reason, the M3 index for some reason designated two American tanks at once: the light M3 - "General Stuart" and the medium M3 - "General Lee", aka "General Grant" (in everyday life - "Lee / Grant").
MZ "Stuart"
Weight - 12.7 tons, armor 38-45 mm, speed - 48 km / h, armament - 37 mm caliber gun, carburetor engine. With good armor for a light tank and speed, one has to note reduced maneuverability due to the characteristics of the transmission and poor maneuverability due to insufficient adhesion of the tracks to the ground. Delivered to the USSR - 1600 pcs.
M3 "Lee / Grant"
Weight - 27.5 tons, armor - 57 mm, speed - 31 km / h, armament: 75 mm cannon in the sponson of the hull and 37 mm cannon in the turret, 4 machine guns. The layout of the tank (high silhouette) and the location of the weapons were extremely unfortunate. The bulkiness of the design and the placement of weapons in three tiers (which forced the crew to be brought up to 7 people) made the Grant a fairly easy prey for enemy artillery. Aviation gasoline engine aggravated the position of the crew. We called him " mass grave for seven." Nevertheless, in late 1941 - early 1942, 1,400 of them were delivered; in that difficult period, when Stalin personally distributed the tanks individually, and the "Grants" were at least some kind of help. Since 1943, the Soviet Union has abandoned them.
The most effective (and, accordingly, popular) American tank of the period 1942 - 1945. the medium tank M4 "Sherman" appeared. In terms of production during the war years (a total of 49324 were produced in the USA), it takes second place after our T-34. It was produced in several modifications (from M4 to M4A6) with different engines, both diesel and carburetor, including twin engines and even blocks of 5 engines. Under Lend-Lease, we were supplied mainly with M4A2 Shsrmams with two diesel engines of 210 hp each, which had different cannon weapons: 1990 tanks - with a 75-mm gun, which turned out to be insufficiently effective, and 2673 - with a 76.2 mm caliber gun capable of hitting armor 100 mm thick at ranges up to 500 m.
"Sherman" М4А2
Weight - 32 tons, armor: hull forehead - 76 mm, turret forehead - 100 mm, side - 58 mm, speed - 45 km / h, gun - indicated above. 2 machine guns of 7.62 mm caliber and anti-aircraft 12.7 mm; crew - 5 people (like our modernized T-34-85).
A characteristic feature of the Sherman was a removable (on the bolts) cast front (lower) part of the body, which served as a cover for the transmission compartment. An important advantage was given by a device for stabilizing the gun in a vertical plane for more accurate shooting on the move (it was introduced on Soviet tanks only in the early 1950s - on the T-54A). The electro-hydraulic mechanism for turning the turret was duplicated for the gunner and commander. The large-liberal anti-aircraft machine gun made it possible to fight low-flying enemy aircraft (a similar machine gun appeared on the Soviet heavy tank IS-2 only in 1944.
Scouts on the English tankette "Bren Carrier"
For its time, the Sherman had sufficient mobility, satisfactory armament and armor. The disadvantages of the car were: poor roll stability, insufficient reliability of the power plant (which was the advantage of our T-34) and relatively poor cross-country ability on slippery and frozen soils, until during the war the Americans replaced the Sherman tracks with wider, with lugs. Nevertheless, in general, according to tankers, it was a completely reliable combat vehicle, easy to set up and maintain, very maintainable, since it used the most automotive units and assemblies, well mastered by the American military - thinking. Together with the famous "thirty-fours", although somewhat inferior to them in certain characteristics, the American "Shermans" with Soviet crews actively participated in all the largest operations of the Red Army in 1943 - 1945, reaching the coast of the Baltic Sea , to the Danube, Vistula, Spree and Elbe.
The sphere of Lend-Lease armored vehicles should also include 5,000 American armored personnel carriers (half-tracked and wheeled), which were used in the Red Army, including as carriers of various weapons, especially anti-aircraft for rifle air defense units (their armored personnel carriers were not produced in the USSR during World War II, only reconnaissance armored cars BA-64K were made)
AUTOMOTIVE EQUIPMENT
Automotive equipment supplied to the USSR in quantity exceeded all military equipment not at times, but by an order of magnitude: in total, 477,785 vehicles of fifty models were received, manufactured by 26 automobile firms in the USA, England and Canals.
In the total number of vehicles, 152,000 Studebaker trucks of the US 6x4 and US 6x6 brands, as well as 50,501 command vehicles (“jeeps”) of the Willys MP and Ford GPW models were delivered; it is also necessary to mention the powerful Dodge-3/4 all-terrain vehicles with a carrying capacity of 3/4 tons (hence the number in the marking). These models were real army models, most adapted to front-line operation (as you know, we did not produce army vehicles until the early 1950s, the Red Army used ordinary national economic vehicles GAZ-AA and ZIS-5).
Truck "Studebaker"
Deliveries of cars under Lend-Lease, which exceeded their own production in the USSR by more than 1.5 times during the war years (265 thousand units), undoubtedly, were of decisive importance for a sharp increase in the mobility of the Red Army during large-scale operations 1943-1945. After all, for 1941-1942. The Red Army lost 225 thousand cars, which were missing by half even in peacetime.
The American Studebakers, with strong metal bodies that had folding benches and removable canvas awnings, were equally suitable for transportation. personnel, and various cargoes. Possessing high-speed qualities on the highway and high off-road patency, the US 6x6 Studebakers worked well as tractors for various artillery systems.
When the deliveries of "stude-bakers" began, only on their all-terrain chassis were the "Katyushas" BM-13-N, and since 1944 - BM-31-12 for heavy rockets M31. It is impossible not to mention auto covers, of which 3606 thousand were delivered - more than 30% of domestic tire production. To this we must add 103 thousand tons of natural rubber from the "bins" of the British Empire, and again recall the supply of light-fraction gasoline, which was added to ours, "native" (which was required by the Studebaker motors).
OTHER EQUIPMENT, RAW MATERIALS
Deliveries from the USA of railway rolling stock and rails helped in many ways to resolve our transport problems during the war years. Almost 1,900 steam locomotives were delivered (we ourselves built 92 (!) steam locomotives in 1942-1945) and 66 diesel-electric locomotives, as well as 11,075 wagons (with our own production of 1087). The supply of rails (if we count only broad gauge rails) accounted for more than 80% of their domestic production during this period - the metal was needed for defense purposes. Taking into account the extremely intense work of the railway transport of the USSR in 1941 - 1945, the importance of these deliveries can hardly be overestimated.
As for communications equipment, 35,800 radio stations, 5,839 receivers and 348 locators, 422,000 telephone sets and about a million kilometers of field telephone cable were delivered from the USA, which basically satisfied the needs of the Red Army during the war.
Of certain importance for providing the USSR with food (of course, in the first place for the army in the field) were also deliveries of a number of high-calorie foods (4.3 million tons in total). In particular, the supply of sugar accounted for 42% of its own production in those years, and canned meat - 108%. Even though our soldiers nicknamed the American stew mockingly “the second front”, they ate it with pleasure (although their own beef was still tastier!). To equip the fighters, 15 million pairs of shoes and 69 million square meters of woolen fabrics became very useful.
In the work of the Soviet defense industry in those years, the supply of raw materials, materials and equipment under Lend-Lease also meant a lot - after all, in 1941, large production facilities for smelting cast iron, steel, aluminum remained in the occupied regions, production of explosives and gunpowder. Therefore, the supply of 328 thousand tons of aluminum from the USA (which exceeded its own production), the supply of copper (80% of its smelting) and 822 thousand tons of chemical products were, of course, of great importance "as well as the supply of steel sheet ( our "lorries" and "three-tons" were made in the war with wooden cabins precisely because of the shortage of sheet steel) and artillery gunpowder (used as an addition to domestic ones). Deliveries of high-performance equipment had a tangible impact on raising the technical level of domestic mechanical engineering: 38,000 machine tools from the USA and 6,500 from Great Britain worked for a long time after the war.
ARTILLERY GUNS
Automatic anti-aircraft gun "Bofors"
The smallest number of Lend-Lease deliveries turned out to be the classic types of weapons - artillery and small arms. It is believed that the share of artillery pieces (according to various sources - 8000, 9800 or 13000 pieces) was only 1.8% of the number produced in the USSR, but if we consider that most of them were anti-aircraft guns, then their share in similar domestic production during the war (38,000) will rise to a quarter. Two types of anti-aircraft guns were supplied from the USA: 40-mm automatic guns "Bofors" (Swedish design) and 37-mm automatic "Colt-Browning" (actually American). The Bofors were the most effective - they had hydraulic drives and were therefore guided by the entire battery at the same time with the help of the AZO launcher (artillery anti-aircraft fire control device); but these tools (in the complex) were very complex and expensive to manufacture, which was only possible for the developed US industry.
SUPPLY OF SMALL ARMS
In terms of small arms, the deliveries were simply miserable (151,700 units, which amounted to somewhere around 0.8% of our production) and did not play any role in the armament of the Red Army.
Among the samples supplied to the USSR: the American Colt M1911A1 pistol, Thompson and Reising submachine guns, as well as Browning machine guns: easel M1919A4 and large-caliber M2 HB; English light machine gun "Bran", anti-tank guns "Boys" and "Piat" (English tanks were also equipped with machine guns "Beza" - an English modification of the Czechoslovak ZB-53).
At the fronts, samples of Lend-Lease small arms were very rare and did not enjoy much popularity. The American "Thompsons" and "Raising" our soldiers sought to quickly replace with the usual PPSh-41. The Boys PTR turned out to be clearly weaker than the domestic PTRD and PTRS - they could only fight German armored personnel carriers and light tanks (there was no information about the effectiveness of the Piat PTR in parts of the Red Army).
The most effective in their class were, of course, the American Brownings: the M1919A4 were mounted on American armored personnel carriers, and the large-caliber M2 HBs were mainly used as part of anti-aircraft installations, quad (4 machine guns M2 HB) and built (37-mm anti-aircraft gun "Colt-Browning" and two M2 HB). These installations, mounted on Lend-Lease armored personnel carriers, were very effective means Air defense of rifle units; they were also used for anti-aircraft defense of some objects.
We will not touch on the naval nomenclature of Lend-Lease deliveries, although in terms of volumes these would be large quantities: in total, the USSR received 596 ships and vessels (not counting captured ships received after the war). In total, 17.5 million tons of Lend-Lease cargo were delivered along ocean routes, of which 1.3 million tons were lost from the actions of Hitler's submarines and aviation; the number of heroes-sailors of many countries who died at the same time has more than one thousand people. Deliveries were distributed along the following routes of delivery: Far East- 47.1%, the Persian Gulf - 23.8%, Northern Russia - 22.7%, the Black Sea - 3.9%, along the Northern Sea Route) - 2.5%.
RESULTS AND ASSESSMENTS OF LEND-LISA
For a long time, Soviet historians pointed out only that Lend-Lease deliveries amounted to only 4% of the products of domestic industry and Agriculture during the war years. True, from the data presented above it can be seen that in many cases it is important to take into account the specific range of equipment samples, their quality indicators, the timeliness of delivery to the front, their significance, etc.
As a repayment for Lend-Lease supplies, the United States received from allied countries various goods and services worth 7.3 billion dollars. The USSR, in particular, sent 300 thousand tons of chromium and 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, and in addition, platinum, gold, furs and other goods for a total amount of 2.2 million dollars. The USSR also provided a number of services to the Americans, in particular, opened its northern ports, took over the partial provision of the Allied troops in Iran.
08/21/45 The United States of America stopped Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR. The Soviet government turned to the United States with a request to continue part of the deliveries on the terms of a loan to the USSR, but was refused. was advancing new era... If most of the other countries' debts on deliveries were written off, then with the Soviet Union negotiations on these issues were conducted in 1947 - 1948, 1951 - 1952 and in 1960.
The total amount of lend-lease deliveries to the USSR is estimated at $11.3 billion. At the same time, according to the law on lend-lease, only goods and equipment that have survived after the end of hostilities are subject to payment. Such Americans were estimated at 2.6 billion dollars, although a year later they reduced this amount by half. Thus, initially the United States demanded compensation in the amount of 1.3 billion dollars, paid over 30 years with an accrual of 2.3% per annum. But Stalin rejected these demands, saying, "The USSR fully paid off its Lend-Lease debts with blood". The fact is that many models of equipment supplied to the USSR immediately after the war turned out to be morally obsolete and no longer represented any combat value. That is, American assistance to the allies in some way turned out to be a “pushing” of obsolete and obsolete equipment that the Americans themselves did not need, which, nevertheless, should have been paid for as something useful.
To understand what Stalin meant when he spoke of “payment in blood”, one should quote an excerpt from an article by a professor at the University of Kansas Wilson: “What America experienced during the war is fundamentally different from the trials that befell its main allies. Only the Americans could call the Second World War a “good war”, since it helped to significantly raise living standards and demanded too few victims from the vast majority of the population ... ”And Stalin was not going to take away resources from his already war-ravaged country in order to give them to a potential enemy in Third world.
Negotiations on the repayment of Lend-Lease debts resumed in 1972, and on 10/18/72 an agreement was signed on the payment by the Soviet Union of 722 million dollars, until 07/01/01. 48 million dollars were paid, however, after the introduction by the Americans of the discriminatory Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the USSR suspended further Lend-Lease payments.
In 1990, at new negotiations between the presidents of the USSR and the USA, the final maturity of the debt was agreed upon - 2030. However, a year later the USSR collapsed, and the debt was "reissued" to Russia. By 2003, it was about $100 million. Adjusted for inflation, the US is unlikely to receive more than 1% of its original cost for its supplies.
(The material was prepared for the site "Wars of the XX century"
Almost everyone knows about American deliveries to the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. The Studebakers and the American stew, nicknamed the “second front” by the Soviet soldiers, immediately pop up in my memory. But these are, rather, artistic and emotional symbols, which are actually the tip of the iceberg. The purpose of this article is to create general idea about Lend-Lease and its role in the Great Victory.
AT initial period During the Second World War, the so-called neutrality act was in effect in the United States, according to which the only way to provide assistance to any of the warring parties was the sale of weapons and materials exclusively for cash, and transportation was also assigned to the customer - the cash and carry system . Great Britain then became the main consumer of military products in the United States, but very soon it exhausted its foreign exchange funds. At the same time, President Franklin Roosevelt was well aware that in the current situation, the best way out for the United States was to provide all possible economic support to the countries fighting against Nazi Germany. Therefore, he actually "pushed through" on March 11, 1941 in Congress the "Law to ensure the protection of the United States", also called the Lend-Lease Act. Now any country whose defense was recognized as vital to the United States, and strategic raw materials were provided on the following conditions:
1. Weapons and materials lost in the course of hostilities are not subject to payment.
2. The property left after the end of the war, suitable for civilian purposes, must be paid in whole or in part on the basis of long-term loans provided by the United States.
3. Equipment not lost after the war must be returned to the United States.
Joseph Stalin and Harry Hopkins, 1941
After the German attack on the USSR, Roosevelt sent his closest aide, Harry Hopkins, to Moscow, as he wanted to find out "how long Russia would hold out." This was important, since in the United States at that time the prevailing opinion was that the resistance of the USSR would not be able to provide significant resistance to the Germans, and the supplied weapons and materials would simply fall into the hands of the enemy. On July 31, Harry Hopkins met with Vyacheslav Molotov and Joseph Stalin. As a result, the American politician left for Washington with the firm conviction that the Germans would not have a quick victory and that the supply of weapons to Moscow could have a significant impact on the course of hostilities.
However, the inclusion of the USSR in the Lend-Lease program took place only in October-November 1941 (until that moment, our country paid for all American military supplies). Roosevelt needed such a long period of time to overcome the resistance of a sufficiently large number of American politicians.
Signed on October 1, 1941, the first (Moscow) protocol provided for the supply of aircraft (fighters and bombers), tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, trucks, as well as aluminum, toluene, TNT, oil products, wheat and sugar. Further, the number and range of deliveries were constantly expanding.
Delivery of goods took place along three main routes: the Pacific, Trans-Iranian and Arctic. The fastest, but at the same time dangerous, was the Arctic route to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The escort of the ships was carried out by the British fleet, and on the approaches to Murmansk the security was reinforced by the ships of the Soviet Northern Fleet. At first, the Germans practically did not pay attention to the northern convoys - their confidence in an early victory remained so great, but as the hostilities became protracted, the German command pulled more and more forces to the bases in Norway. The result was not long in coming.
In July 1942, the German fleet, in close cooperation with aviation, practically defeated the PQ-17 convoy: 22 out of 35 transport ships died. North Africa forced the British to stop escorting the northern convoys before the polar night. Beginning in 1943, the balance of power in Arctic waters gradually began to shift towards the Allies. There were more convoys, and their wiring was accompanied by fewer losses. In total, there are 4027 thousand tons of cargo along the Arctic route in the USSR. Losses did not exceed 7% of the total.
The Pacific route was less dangerous, along which 8376 thousand tons were delivered. Transportation could only be carried out by ships flying the Soviet flag (the USSR, unlike the United States, did not fight Japan at that time). Further, the received cargo had to be transported by rail almost through the entire territory of Russia.
The trans-Iranian route served as a definite alternative to the northern convoys. American transport ships delivered cargo to the ports of the Persian Gulf, and then they were delivered to Russia by rail and road transport. In order to ensure full control over transport routes in August 1941, the USSR and Great Britain occupied Iran.
To increase throughput, they carried out a large-scale modernization of the ports of the Persian Gulf and the Trans-Iranian railway. Also, General Motors built two factories in Iran, where cars intended for delivery to the USSR were assembled. In total, during the war years, these enterprises manufactured and sent 184,112 cars to our country. The total cargo flow through the ports of the Persian Gulf for the entire period of the existence of the trans-Iranian route amounted to 4227 thousand tons.
Aircraft under the lend-lease program
Since the beginning of 1945, after the liberation of Greece, the Black Sea route began to function. In this way, the USSR received 459 thousand tons of cargo.
In addition to those noted above, there were two more air routes along which aircraft were ferried "under their own power" in the USSR. The most famous was the Alsib air bridge (Alaska - Siberia), through which 7925 aircraft were transferred. Also, planes flew from the USA to the USSR through the South Atlantic, Africa and the Persian Gulf (993 aircraft).
For many years, in the works of Russian historians, it was indicated that Lend-Lease deliveries accounted for only about 4% of the total output of Soviet industry and agriculture. And, although there is no reason to doubt the reliability of this figure, nevertheless, "the devil is in the details."
It is well known that the strength of a chain as a whole is determined by the strength of its weakest link. Therefore, when determining the range of American supplies, the Soviet leadership sought, first of all, to close the "weak points" in the army and industry. This is especially evident when analyzing the volumes of strategic raw materials supplied to the USSR. In particular, 295.6 thousand tons of explosives received by our country accounted for 53% of all produced at domestic enterprises. Even more impressive is the ratio of copper - 76%, aluminum - 106%, tin - 223%, cobalt - 138%, wool - 102%, sugar - 66% and canned meat - 480%.
General A.M. Korolev and Major General Donald Connelly shake hands in front of a Lend-Lease train.
The analysis of deliveries of automotive equipment deserves no less close attention. In total, the USSR received 447,785 vehicles under Lend-Lease.
It is significant that during the war years the Soviet industry produced only 265,000 vehicles. Thus, the number of vehicles received from the Allies exceeded their own production by more than 1.5 times. In addition, these were real army vehicles adapted for operation in front-line conditions, while the domestic industry supplied the army with ordinary national economic vehicles.
The role of Lend-Lease vehicles in combat operations can hardly be overestimated. To a large extent, they ensured the success of the victorious operations of 1944, which were included in the “ten Stalinist blows”.
A considerable merit of allied deliveries is also in the successful functioning of the Soviet railway transport during the war years. The USSR received 1,900 steam locomotives and 66 diesel-electric locomotives (these figures look especially clear against the background of its own production for 1942-1945 in 92 locomotives), as well as 11,075 wagons (own production - 1,087 wagons).
In parallel, the "reverse Lend-Lease" functioned. During the war years, the Allies received from the USSR 300 thousand tons of chromium and 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, as well as wood, gold and platinum.
During discussions on the topic “Could the USSR do without Lend-Lease?” many copies were broken. The author believes that, most likely, he could. Another thing is that now it is not possible to calculate what the price of this would be. If the volume of weapons supplied by the allies to one degree or another could well be compensated by the domestic industry, then with regard to transport, as well as the production of a number of types of strategic raw materials, without the supply of allies, the situation would very quickly turn into a critical one.
The lack of rail and road transport could easily paralyze the supply of the army and deprive it of mobility, and this, in turn, would slow down the pace of operations and increase the growth of losses. A shortage of non-ferrous metals, especially aluminum, would lead to a decrease in the production of weapons, and without food supplies, it would be much more difficult to fight hunger. Surely our country would be able to survive and win even in such a situation, but it is not possible to determine how much the price of victory would increase.
The lend-lease program was terminated at the initiative of the American government on August 21, 1945, although the USSR requested to continue deliveries on a loan (it was necessary to restore the country destroyed by the war). However, by that time F. Roosevelt was no longer among the living, and a new era of the Cold War was loudly knocking on the door.
During the war, no Lend-Lease payments were made. In 1947, the United States estimated the USSR's debt for supplies at $2.6 billion, but a year later the amount was reduced to $1.3 billion. It was planned that repayment would be made within 30 years with an accrual of 2.3% per annum. I.V. Stalin rejected these accounts, saying that "the USSR paid off its Lend-Lease debts in full with blood." As a justification for its point of view, the USSR cited the precedent of writing off debts for Lend-Lease deliveries to other countries. In addition, I.V. Stalin, quite reasonably, did not want to give the funds of a country devastated by the war to a potential enemy in the Third World War.
An agreement on the procedure for repaying debts was only concluded in 1972. The USSR undertook to pay $722 million by 2001. But after the transfer of $48 million, the payments stopped again due to the adoption by the United States of the discriminatory Jackson-Vanik Amendment.
Again, this issue was raised in 1990 at a meeting of the presidents of the USSR and the USA. A new amount was set - $674 million - and a final maturity date of 2030. After the collapse of the USSR, obligations on this debt passed to Russia.
Summing up, we can conclude that for the United States, lend-lease was, first of all, according to F. Roosevelt, "a profitable investment of capital." Moreover, it is not the profits directly from supplies that should be assessed, but the numerous indirect benefits that the American economy received after the end of World War II. History was pleased to dispose that the post-war well-being of the United States was to a large extent paid for by the blood of Soviet soldiers. For the USSR, lend-lease became practically the only way to reduce the number of victims on the way to Victory. Here's a "marriage of convenience" ...
Traditionally, in Russian society, it is generally accepted that the United States and Great Britain downplay the exploits of the USSR in World War II. However, this statement is also true in the opposite direction: in Soviet historiography, it was customary to underestimate the contribution of allied assistance to the overall victory. As the latest research shows, US and British assistance went far beyond military cooperation, and in many areas contributed to the development of Soviet industry.
Indications of the depth and ubiquity of American assistance to the USSR can be found in abundance in the military literature. “Svetlookov was a captain, but his tunic of American yellow-green gabardine must have inspired a greater impression,” Georgy Vladimov described one of the heroes in the novel “The General and His Army”. And Nikita Khrushchev rewarded military officers with gift American watches with a black dial and gold hands. In turn, in the book The Gulag Archipelago, Alexander Solzhenitsyn described the traditional breakfast of Soviet soldiers as follows: “A light breakfast? Of course I understand. It's still in the dark, in the trench, one can of American stew for eight and - hurrah! for the Motherland! For Stalin!" You can also find traces of American assistance in the description of the camp commanders: “Buslov knew both how to deceive the prisoners and how to send them to dangerous places, he never spared their strength, or stomach, and even more so pride. Long-nosed, long-legged, in yellow American low shoes received through UNRRA for those in need Soviet citizens, he was forever rushing around the floors of the construction.
It was through UNRRA, the United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Administration, established in 1943, that the USSR and other countries affected by the German occupation received humanitarian aid from the allies. But not only through it, assistance was provided until 1943.
Soviet point of view
In the USSR, the question of the help of the allies has always been considered in the political plane. In 1947, the book by the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Stalin's People's Commissar Nikolai Voznesensky, The Military Economy of the USSR, was published, which for many years determined the perception of the military economy in the Soviet Union and the main economic consequences of the war.
Help from the allies, Nikolai Voznesensky did not deny. “The military efforts of the United States of America and England, which together with the Soviet state waged a war against imperialist Germany, served the cause of the war of liberation,” he believed. Moreover, the head of the State Planning Committee attributed both the USSR and the USA to democratic states: “The democratic states - the USSR, the USA and England - had a population of 372 million people, while the fascist states - Germany, Japan and Italy - had 186 million people " .
The value of the work of Nikolai Voznesensky primarily lies in the assessment of the economic losses of the USSR. According to him, as a result of military losses, as well as the evacuation of hundreds of enterprises, the gross industrial output of the USSR from June to November 1941 decreased by 2.1 times. The output of rolled ferrous metals - the basis of the military industry - in December 1941 decreased by 3.1 times compared to June 1941, and the production of rolled non-ferrous metals, without which military production is impossible, decreased by 430 times over the same period. The production of ball bearings, without which no aircraft, no tanks, no artillery can be produced, has decreased by 21 times. As Nikolai Voznesensky admitted, the increase in imports of goods, mainly raw materials and materials, occurred due to the supplies of the USSR's allies.
The main issue was to assess this assistance and the volume of supplies. “If we compare the volume of deliveries by the allies of industrial goods to the USSR with the volume of industrial output at the socialist enterprises of the USSR for the same period, it turns out that the share of these deliveries in relation to domestic production during the period of the war economy will be only about 4%,” the researcher claimed. This phrase of Voznesensky laid the foundation for future monographs on this topic and was automatically accepted by Soviet economic historians.
By the standards of his time, Nikolai Voznesensky was considered one of the most advanced Soviet economists. In particular, he was called one of those who insisted on the transition to a freer market from a planned economy, although this idea was not expressed in his book for obvious reasons. In 1949, two years after the publication of the book, Nikolai Voznesensky was accused of plotting against the Soviet regime and became one of the defendants in the so-called "Leningrad case". According to investigators, he decided to separate Russia from the USSR and make Leningrad the capital of the new state. In March 1949, Voznesensky was removed from all posts, and less than a year later he was shot, but his work determined the perception of economic assistance from the US and Great Britain in the USSR for a long time.
Real score
According to contemporary scholars, the evaluation of Allied assistance in Voznesensky's book and subsequent Soviet documents was greatly underestimated. According to Oleg Budnitsky, director of the International Center for the History and Sociology of World War II and Its Consequences, the Allied assistance was not 4%, but 7% of the USSR's production capacity, and in some areas was simply critical. For example, in the field of transport and communications, the deliveries of the Allies were decisive - 70% of the vehicles used by the Red Army, primarily trucks, were received under Lend-Lease, since Soviet troops in 1941 they lost 58% of their fleet.
Deliveries of explosives and aluminum, the most important component in the aircraft industry, reached 120-125% of the volume of Soviet production (Soviet aluminum production during the war is estimated at 263 thousand tons, then 328 thousand tons were supplied). The United States delivered about 15 thousand aircraft, which were used by Soviet aviation. Moreover, in the first half of 1942, the supply of tanks was three times the losses of the Red Army. In terms of the 2005 exchange rate, taking into account inflation, the volume of these supplies amounted to $110 billion, and taking into account supplies from the UK and Canada, $130 billion.
It is equally important that according to the first lend-lease protocol (there were four in total), only 20% of deliveries were military equipment, and 80% were industrial production and food. The Allies delivered 1900 steam locomotives to the USSR, during the same time only 446 steam locomotives were produced in the country itself, as well as over 11 thousand wagons, while a little more than one thousand of them were produced in the USSR.
The help of the allies was also no less important in restoring production in the liberated regions of the country - from across the ocean, in particular, seeds of agricultural crops were delivered to the USSR. It was also about the supply of specific products: the allies supplied 610 thousand tons of sugar to the USSR, while the USSR itself produced 1.46 million tons. In his book Strange Alliance: A History of Collaboration with Russia during the War, John Dean collected data on US aid to the USSR from October 1941 to May 31, 1945: 427,284 trucks, 35,170 motorcycles, 2.67 million tons of gasoline, 4, 48 million tons of food.
In turn, the USSR began to receive assistance from Great Britain back in June 1941 - almost immediately after the German attack, 40 Hawker Hurricane fighters arrived in Murmansk, designed to protect the Arctic ports. In total, by May 1945, the Soviet authorities received from Great Britain more than 3,000 such fighters, 5,218 tanks, 5,000 anti-tank guns, 4,020 trucks, 1,720 motorcycles, 15 million pairs of boots and 4 million tons of various cargoes, including food. Basically, British equipment was used to break the blockade of Leningrad and during the Battle of Kursk. True, mostly allied equipment, with the possible exception of the American Sherman, did not cause enthusiasm among Soviet tankers, since it was in many ways inferior to domestic models.
All cargo from the USA to the USSR was delivered along three routes: the Arctic, Trans-Iranian and Pacific. The first route was the shortest, but also the most dangerous: in total, 3.964 million tons of cargo were delivered along this route, of which 7% was lost along the way (the exact number of human losses among the allies who delivered goods under Lend-Lease to the USSR is unknown, however , according to the Australian journalist John Dale, 30 thousand British and American sailors died on Arctic convoys in the USSR, and only merchant fleet). Due to the neutrality agreement between the USSR and Japan, only humanitarian non-military cargo could be delivered along the Pacific route: in total, 8.244 million tons of cargo, or half of all allied assistance, was delivered here. 4.16 million tons of cargo was delivered to the USSR through the Persian Corridor.
war for history
The Cold War put an end not only to the political alliance of the USSR with the United States and Great Britain, but also to record economic ties. According to Budnitsky, even before the end of the war, US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau advised President Roosevelt to provide the USSR with a $10 billion loan for the purchase of American goods for 35 years at 2% per annum.
In January 1945, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, handed over a note to the American Ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, stating that the USSR would like to receive a $6 billion loan for the purchase of American industrial goods for 30 years at 2.25% per annum, but it was not possible to develop economic ties.
One of the reasons is the distrust of the Soviet leadership towards partners. In particular, the Yugoslav communist Milovan Djilas recorded a statement by Joseph Stalin about the Western partners of the USSR: “Churchill, he is such that if you don’t take care, he will steal a penny from your pocket. Yes, a penny from your pocket! By God, a penny from your pocket! And Roosevelt? Roosevelt is not like that - he sticks his hand only for larger pieces. And Churchill? Churchill - and for a penny. As a result, the USSR refused to join the new global financial institutions: the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In addition, the Soviet leadership received an invitation to join the "Marshall Plan", but refused it.
As Yegor Gaidar noted in his book The Fall of an Empire, military cooperation between the United States and the USSR was never the same; even in 1991, when Mikhail Gorbachev tried to negotiate with the American authorities on the allocation of "grain loans", it was only about $7 billion. As an argument, the Soviet leader used the $100 billion that the US and coalition troops spent on the war in the Persian Gulf. Even then, the Soviet authorities did not use data on military aid under Lend-Lease as an argument.
Cooperation between the USSR and the allies was forgotten not only in Russia. According to a study conducted in late March - early April by the British agency ICM Research commissioned by Sputnik News, more than half of the respondents believe that Europe was liberated primarily by the US army: in particular, 61% of the French are convinced of this (they can be understood, because Soviet troops did not fight in France) and 52% of the Germans. Only 13% of respondents in Germany, France and Great Britain believe that the army of the USSR was the main liberator of Europe from Nazism. In turn, according to the official American point of view, "without the incredible efforts of the Soviet Union to Eastern Front It would be extremely difficult for Britain and the United States to defeat Nazi Germany." However, no one specifies the size of these “efforts”.
