Maybe button accordion, but I think it will be interesting to refresh the memory.

Yu.Veremeev Chechnya 1920-41
"The success of the operation and the loss of most of the weapons by the Murids ensured relative calm in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia until 1929. However, all this time, the tribal nobility, with support from Turkey, conducted anti-Soviet propaganda, accumulated weapons, and trained militants in Turkey and England. Not less than 20 Chechens and Dagestanis were trained in officer schools in England and France.

In 1929, taking advantage of the gross mistakes of the Soviet authorities, who were trying to carry out grain procurements in the flat parts of Dagestan and Ingushetia, the heads of a number of Chechen and Ingush teips openly called for the disruption of grain procurements, defeated a number of bulk points, took the collected grain out of them and issued an ultimatum to the central authorities, demanding to remove from the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, armed detachments of grain producers, to abolish the tax in kind, to replace the elected bodies of Soviet power with the elders of the Chechen teips.

By order of the commander of the North Caucasian Military District, the operational group of troops and units of the OGPU conducted a military operation during the period December 8-28, 1929, during which armed bands were destroyed in Goity, Shali, Sambi, Benoy, Tsontoroi and a number of others. At the same time, 26 murids were killed, 296 were arrested. The military group lost 11 killed, 7 died from wounds, 29 wounded.

However, the leaders of the armed resistance of the highlanders took into account their mistakes of 1925. The Red Army managed to seize only 25 rifles, and then, mostly from the dead. All the leaders of the Chechen and Ingush groups managed to escape and, moreover, to maintain their control structure and influence on the local population.

Therefore, in March 1930, the North Caucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to conduct a Chekist-military operation to suppress mountain political banditry. By order of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, a military volunteer group is created consisting of 4 infantry, 3 cavalry, 2 partisan (read special forces, in modern terms) detachments from among the representatives of the peoples of the Caucasus (mainly Ossetians, Georgians, Armenians, partly Azerbaijanis, partly Dagestanis) who suffered greatly from robberies and robberies, terror from the Chechens and Ingush. These detachments were reinforced by two regular rifle battalions of the Red Army and an air unit (3 aircraft), a sapper company and a communications company. In total, the group consisted of 3700 people, 19 weapons and 28 machine guns.

A good knowledge of the terrain and mountain conditions, the desire of the Ossetians, Georgians, Armenians loyal to the Soviet government to get rid of the mountain terror predetermined the success of the operation, which lasted from March 14 to April 12. 19 bandits were killed, 122 active participants in bandit raids on peaceful villages of neighboring republics were arrested, including 9 senior leaders of the rebellion. 1,500 firearms were confiscated (of which 127 were British Lee-Enfield rifles with optical sights made in 1926-28), 280 cold weapons. Ordinary gang members, after taking an oath on the Koran and disarmament, were allowed to go home. The military group lost 14 people killed. and 29 wounded.

However, the inflexible, rough policy of the Soviet government on collectivization Agriculture Chechnya, Ingushetia, which, due to local conditions, is extremely difficult, if not impossible, led to the extreme exasperation of the population. At the beginning of 1932, a large-scale uprising broke out, in which not only the Chechens, Ingush and Dagestanis of the mountainous regions took part, but also a significant part of the Russian population of the Nadterechny Cossack villages.

All disguises were dropped. Cooperatives, village councils were smashed in villages, Soviet money was destroyed. Gangs numbering 500-800 people attacked and besieged most of the military garrisons. The battles were distinguished by unprecedented ferocity, religious fanaticism, participation in the attacks of unarmed women and children. It should be noted the high level of organization and controllability of the rebellion.

However, the NKVD bodies and military units were in full readiness to repel armed uprisings. Despite huge losses. the rebels failed to defeat a single garrison, and the employees of the NKVD district departments managed to take refuge in the garrisons in a timely manner with their families. Troops operationally in the period March 15-20, 1932. managed to divide and isolate bandit groups, to block in hard-to-reach mountainous areas, which from places of reliable shelter turned into traps for murids and consistently destroy them. The rebels lost 333 people killed and 150 wounded. The Red Army and the NKVD lost 27 killed and 30 wounded.

The subsequent arrests of the leaders of the rebellion, participants in past armed uprisings, harsh court sentences, the deportation of entire villages outside the North Caucasus, the population was tired of the many years of war, the mountaineers were disappointed in the ability to eliminate them by force of arms. Soviet power led to a sharp decrease in the activity of armed confrontation.

However, very active and bloody, albeit local (within one to three districts) rebellions continued until 1936, and in mountainous regions until 1938. Separate gangs of up to 100 people continued to disturb Chechnya until the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

In total, from 1920 to 1941, only in the territory of Chechnya and Ingushetia, there were 12 major armed uprisings (with the participation of 500 to 5 thousand militants) and more than 50 less significant ones. The military units of the Red Army and the NKVD from 1920 to 1939 lost 3564 people killed and 1589 wounded.

In 1941, from January 1 to June 22, 31 bandit manifestations were registered, and from June 22 to September 3, more than 40.

Dagestan.

Dagestan, in Russian, is a country of mountains, and this name is rightfully given to it. Almost the whole country consists of a chain of mountains, intertwined and merging with each other in the most bizarre way.
Dagestan occupies a space in the east of the Caucasus from the river. Sulak and to Babadag, limited from the southwest by the Main Caucasian Range, and from the east by the Caspian Sea. Main Caucasian Range starts from Barbalo, in Dagestan itself stretches 230 versts with snowy peaks 12435-13591 f. Another ridge runs almost parallel to it. Side, which, with its bleak appearance, seems even more wild, harsh and inaccessible.
Between these two parallel ridges, however, there are transverse bridges that form depressions running from the northwest to the southeast. Dido, Tsunta, Kapucha, Antracle, Samurskaya and others. The side ridge is not expressed as clearly as the Main one, since it does not represent a continuous chain, moreover, its individual parts have different names.
The main ridge consists of rocks and scree covered with snow in places. Despite the significant average height of the Main Range, snow remains throughout the year only in hollows and hollows and rarely on peaks that do not hold it on themselves due to their sharpness and slope of the ribs. Most of the ridge is freed from snow in mid-June, and in early September the upper parts of the mountains almost along the entire length are again covered with snow, and from that time blizzards and blizzards rage on the peaks (E. I. Kozubsky) 4 . From the main upper node of these mountains to the northeast, the Andean Range separates Chechnya from Dagestan, ending with the grandiose Salatau Plateau of the Green Mountains. This ridge is also distinguished by its unusually wild appearance and inaccessible character. This severe and barren species stands out especially on the Dagestan side, while on the Chechen side it is covered with greenery and pastures. The Gimrinsky or Koysubulinsky mountains go along the right bank of the Sulatau.
The main rivers originate on the Side Range. These will be Andean, Avar, Kazikumukh and Kara-Koysu. All these Koisu merge together and form Sulak. In the southern part, the Samur flows with its tributaries Kurakh-chai and others.
Depending on your geographical location, Dagestan is divided into three parts: Nagorny, Primorsky and the Samur and Kyurinsky-Tabasaran valleys. Mountainous Dagestan lies between the Main and Andean ranges and the Sulaco-Caspian watershed. Here he represents such a plexus of waters that it is far from easy to understand. The coastal region is made up of mountain slopes to the Caspian Sea and the coastal plain. The area is very beautiful and very fertile in places. Finally, the Samur and Kyura-Tabasaran basins are rich in vegetation and significantly fertile.
"Nagorny Dagestan, occupying central position in relation to the areas adjacent to it, due to the inaccessibility and militancy of the tribes inhabiting it, it is of great strategic importance during our struggle with the highlanders. Surrounded on all sides by high ridges with a limited number of passages and accesses, extremely mountainous and rugged, it is like a natural fortress ... Thanks to this, it served as a source of all disturbances and a reliable refuge in which hordes of mountaineers took refuge after defeats (pol. Tomkeev) " . 5
So he was under Yermolov, so he is in 1878, so he is now.
Especially in this regard, the Bogosskaya Valley (12323 f.) draws attention to itself. It is located between the Andean and Avar Koisu and forms the Avar plateau, which is, as it were, an isolated island. “This mountain plateau is equally inaccessible from everywhere, and by nature itself is intended to command the peoples who settled at its foot, in the era of the Caucasian War it was of very great strategic importance. If Dagestan in general, according to Yermolov's definition, … - the page is missing (approx. OCR corrector) ... Litl, Mukratl, and others. After the Avars, the Kazikumukhs follow in numbers. if the former were distinguished by militancy and robbery, then the latter were more artisans. Of the other societies of the Highland Caucasus, one can name: Gumbet, Andia, Bagulal, Tsunta-Avah, Unkratl, etc. The main nest and stronghold of Dagestan was the Ankratl union.
In view of the natural barriers in the communication of individual parts of Dagestan, it is clear that these communities differed from each other not only in customs, customs, but also dialects and even the confession of Islam.
Lezgins are by nature people in high degree impressionable, receptive, excitable and expansive. Their natural environment, Mountainous Dagestan, poor, wild and barren, gave almost no food to the mind, and it remained all the time of their existence in a childish state. But this natural environment greatly contributed to the contemplative life, the development of fantasy and imagination. These aspects of life were so ordinary, so constant, so repeated that they could easily bring the Lezgin to ecstasy and confidence in the invisible, as if in the visible and desired and expected, as if in the present.
The poor natural environment of Chechnya did not give the Lezgin the opportunity to engage in farming, arable farming and cattle breeding, therefore the Lezgin was infinitely poor, ate little and poorly, was poorly and dirtyly dressed, lived in a sakla built of stone, dirty and full of insects, always hungry and cold. But he loved war, he loved weapons, he cherished them terribly and mastered them to perfection. He put his soul into the weapon and gave his life to its use. He was a hunter, a warrior, a robber and a robber by nature.
By social order Lezgin is the most perfect democrat. The Lezgins had neither princes, nor nobles, nor tribal foremen. They were all equal, they were all independent, they were all freedom-loving to infinity. They did not allow any violence against themselves. Even the Muslim clergy had little influence on them. They chose their elders, and they ruled not because they have had right, but because they got right. Once the Lezgin is aware of the need for something, he submits to her.
The poverty of life and the situation in mountainous Dagestan makes the Chechens think and take measures of seasonal hunting. And this natural predator, a fearless robber, living next to the soaring and reigning king of predators - the eagle, found a fishery beyond the mountains. There was fertile Kakheti. There were riches of nature, there was an abundant domestic life, there lived relaxed and degenerate Georgians. It was there that the Lezgins directed their predatory raids. In those raids, the Lezgins saw a means of subsistence, satisfaction of the predatory instinct, courage, prowess, valor and heroism. His predatory success is a heroic and public merit. And he gave her his whole life. Death itself was not terrible for him, because, living by robberies, he was complacent, and in death he found peace, which is why he treated death with contempt.
Islam fell on this soil, Islam, which sets the goal of life to help a fellow believer and an endless struggle with infidels of other faiths. And in the event of a fall in the struggle, an immediate Mohammedan paradise awaited him. Lezgin, hungry, cold, ragged, goes straight to the atmosphere of a happy paradise and houris. Yes, for such a situation, not one hungry Lezghin, but, perhaps, many of today's Christians will deliberately agree to rush into battle ...
It was on this soil that Islam fell, preaching a continuous struggle against the despicable giaour, especially against the enemies of the head of the church, the padishah, the Turkish sultan.
And the first of these damned giaurs was the Urus. That is why in all the wars between Russia and Turkey, Chechnya and Dagestan were supporters of Turkey and raised an uprising against Russia.
But there were reasons for hatred and anger among the Lezghins against the giaur Urus and special ones. Of course, Russia did not need the barren and impenetrable Dagestan. But the predatory raids of the Alozan and Dagestan Lezgins were intolerable. The interests of Georgia and Russia did not allow this. That is why Russia waged a bloody hundred-year war in Chechnya and Dagestan. She lost tens of thousands of her sons' bodies and lost rivers of her children's blood. Chechnya was defeated, but not conquered. Subdued, but not humble. The fire died down, but under the cover of ashes, the fire smoldered, and sparks flew out from time to time all the time. That is why, at the moment of aggravation of relations between Russia and Turkey, the smoldering fire of Dagestan turned into a fire.
This fire was greatly fanned by the Turkish emissaries, who were always there in abundance, as well as by the Mohammedan mullahs, who are now almost all Turkish subjects.
This fire of anger and enmity of the Lezgins was fanned sometimes by the rude and arrogant attitude of the Russian administration in Dagestan. A Chechen and a Lezghin, realizing the necessity and personal benefit from what, will endure any pressure, any oppression, any despotism from any power, if he sees the meaning in this. But if this oppression is a gross arbitrariness, serves as an expression of a personal whim and does not bring any benefit to the Chechen, in this case the Chechen becomes embittered endlessly, falls into despair and acts like a true predator. Unfortunately, the Russians acted precisely in this direction and, without giving the Chechens anything good, brought them to the last degree of bitterness against Russia and the Russians. What goes around comes around.
In this regard, the Dagestanis were distinguished by sharpness, stability, perseverance and determination. From here came the main leaders of the mountain movements, such as Kazi-Mulla, Hadji-Murat, Kibit-Magoma and Shamil.
Primorsky Dagestan is somewhat different. The mountains are lower and richer, the valleys fertile. It is also cut up by mountains, divided into departments, but more accessible and more connected. There were rich forests, abundant fields and the proximity of the sea. Seaside Dagestan is divided by the Kotka ridge into two, formerly separate, parts: Kaitag and Tabasaran. Although the mountains here are not particularly high, they are cut by deep gorges of the rivers Bugan-chai, Akusha-chai, Levashi-chai, etc. The very brave Akushinsky Lezgin society once lived here, which was first defeated by the Russians. Akushins, and now Dargins, have always been distinguished by courage and courage 6 .
Kazikumukh is in the worst position 7 . It is located in the center of Dagestan, in the upper reaches of the river, Kazikumukhsky-Koysu. This tribe is known to us under the name Kazikumukh, but they call themselves Lacu, and their country Lacras-Kana. This country consists of many gorges, it is barren, which is why the Laks often go down to Georgia and Shirvan to plunder, where they are presented with a sure and not particularly difficult prey! Being engaged in work and trade in Dagestan, Kazukumuhi in Time of Troubles hired for war with anyone and at any time. They adopted Mohammedanism in 777 from the Arab commander Abuselam, who appointed Shahbal as their ruler. The Tarkovsky shamkhals originated from him.
Mehtula also lies here, formed, as is believed, 200 years ago by Mehdi, who came from the house of Tarkov shamkhals.
In southern Dagestan, between the Main and Side ridges, the Samur basin is located with the river. Samur. This hollow is too isolated and has very limited communication with neighbors. From here, attacks were especially frequent on Georgia through Elisuy and Zagatala.
After the conquest of the Caucasus, Dagestan submitted, but did not reconcile with its position. Here, more than anywhere else, the mullahs had an influence on the people. According to Muslim teachings, the head of the Sunnis - Turkish sultan, and Russians are infidels, and the main dream of the life of every Dagestani is to overthrow the yoke of the infidel. There was no complete trust in the Russians. Therefore, any signal from beyond the Russian Sea or Erzurum easily ignited Dagestan and raised it against the Russians.
General Melikov was at the head of Dagestan. The first rebel movement in Dagestan took place in early May 1877, and the place of this uprising was the north of Dagestan, Gumbet. On May 15, Colonel Nakashidze was moved there. He had to pass the famous Andean Gate. There was something to fear, but everything went well. The Dagestanis did not set up an ambush here. The main place of origin of the rebellion was the village of Siukh. Nakashidze directed his blow there. Steadfastly and courageously, the rebels withstood the blows, but could not hold out for a long time. Soon they began to run away and went to Ciligl. A new attack by the Russians laid down 80 Gumbetovites killed and 100 wounded.
Having finished here, Prince Nakashidze hurried to Mekhelty, Artluh and Danukh. Soon the matter ended in humility here too, and by the end of May, Prince Nakashidze was already resting in Botlikh.
However, at this time, a rebellion broke out at a completely different end, in the extreme southwest, in Dido, especially Asaho. The uprising threatened the Alozani and the Tushians. Prince Nakashidze quickly rushed to Dido. The sudden arrival of the Russian detachment cooled the ardor of the rebels. But the fanaticism and militancy of the Didovites were stronger. The first on the way was Kemetl. The detachment included Russians, the Didoev militia, the Avar squad, the Telavis, the Tushins, and other not entirely reliable elements. However, the glorious onslaught of Captain Krivenko quickly crushed Kemetl, and the rebels concentrated in Asaho.
“Aul Asakho is surrounded on three sides by rocky, hard-to-reach cliffs; the fourth, the only western side convenient for the offensive, representing the gentle slope of the Asakhovsky heights, descending to the river and occupied by the inhabitants of arable land, was defended by three high towers. The river Asakho with its steep banks separated us from the village. There were two paths to climb.
All these difficulties were not difficult for the Russians. Soon the Russians were in Asakh, where a merciless massacre of saklys began. Seeing such bitterness, it was proposed to surrender, or at least take out the women and children who could die. But this was the answer:
“Our home is our grave. Our families must die with us."
Indeed, many of the women died, taking part in the battle openly on sakli.
When the outcome was clear, and the huts were already burning, the highlanders were again offered to surrender. But they again refused, and everyone with their families died on the spot.
The battle of Asaho lasted three days. A lot of ours got hurt too. But this ended the uprising in Dido, and the Didovians asked for pardon.
Dagestan has been quiet for the time being, and Dagestan detachments even went to Chechnya to Chaberloi and Ezen-am or Trout Lake.
But the Turkish emissaries did their job. A lot of indignation was helped by our hajis, who went to Mecca. On the way they were intercepted by the Turks and plentifully stuffed with fanatical nonsense. The name of Kazi-Magoma, the son of Shamil, was especially powerful. The main place where the Hajji preached was Sogratl, where there was a hundred-year-old Abdurazman-Khaji, who had already lost his mind, whose name was used by his son, Magoma-Khaji.
Ghazavat was proclaimed in the most insistent manner. Along with this, the most impudent rumors were spread about the incredible victories of the Turks and the defeats of the Russians, that the Turks were already in the North Caucasus, that the Turks were on the Terek, etc.
Of course, those who were more thoughtful saw the absurdity of the rumors, but the general excitement, which wanted victory over us, and the certainty that our military resources were insufficient in Dagestan, which forced the use of the local militia against the natives, acted too excitingly and carried everyone to freedom from Alen giaurs. The center of the rebellion now became Sogratl, where Magoma-hadji, the son of Abdurakhman-hadji, worked. In addition, the son of the famous Kibit-Magoma Murtuzali worked in Tilitla, as well as retired major Jafar, captain Abdul-Mejid and naib headquarters captain Fotali-bek worked in Kazikumukh.
It is interesting that the Kazikumukhs, mostly merchants and artisans, rarely opposed Russia, but now they were also involved in the general trend.
In Akush, the movement was led by the descendants of the Qadis - in Tabsarani Mehdi, in the Kura region of Mohammed-Ali, in Samur - Kazi-Ahmed-bek. All these leaders, through an uprising, dreamed of restoring their own position and right.
In the west, the uprising manifested itself in Andi, the Avar plateau, as well as in Uschukul and Gimry. Here, apparently, the Chechen uprising influenced the people.
A sharp uprising broke out in Central Dagestan near Gunib. The highlanders tried to capture the bridge on Kara-Koysu, the only one connecting Temi-khan-Shura with Western Dagestan.
On August 29, a crowd of Gergebil residents rushed to the soldiers guarding the bridge. Soon this small team lay down in battle. After this, the Gergebils occupied the guard buildings and began to arrange blockages. The very position of the rebels indicated that they acted deliberately and decisively. It cost us dearly to take the bridge from the rebels, but it was done. The detachment of Colonel Voyno-Oransky was small and, having taken away the bridge, he had to take only a defensive position in Gunib. Meanwhile, the rebels kept coming and coming and completely cut off Gunib from all other parts. Sogratl rejoiced. Prince Nakashidze came to the rescue of the Gunib detachment with the Dargin detachment from Khunzakh. In Kumukh, captain Fatali-bek was sent to help Sogratl with a detachment of militia. But Fatali-bek, together with his relative Abduli-Majid, declared themselves rebels and, having entered Kumukh, arrested the officials of the administration at night, and in the morning rushed to the fortification of Kumukh. The fortification was old, dilapidated, half-collapsed, the towers and barracks were not repaired, the detachment was more than small. Taken by surprise, our soldiers desperately defended themselves until they had exterminated all the cartridges, and then everyone lay down for the honor of the motherland.
On the same day. On September 8, indignation arose in Tsudakhora and Kupa.
The position of the Russians in Dagestan was unenviable. Nevertheless, the skillful and courageous actions of Prince Nikashidze, Voyno-Oransky and Tar-Asaturov everywhere brought us a glorious victory. With cruel passion, the Dagestanis rushed at ours, but everywhere they were beaten off with huge damage. Especially great were the losses of the rebels under Levash, when they lost more than 400 people and among them Fatali-bek.
In general, both in the region of Gunib, and in all other places of Dagestan, where the uprising manifested itself, everything calmed down and calmed down, at least outwardly.
Despite obvious failures and heavy defeats, the rebellious state did not stop. Already at the end of September it broke out in Tindali. and also in Tilgle. In the first half of October, the movement in Chechnya was suppressed, and the heroes of the rebellion fled from Chechnya to Dagestan. The uprising manifested itself at Etheli, Miarsu. Gangs appeared at Andi and Gumbet, waiting for the arrival of Alibek, Uma Duev and others. And indeed, on September 27, Alibek appeared at Andi. and Uma at Chamalal, a particularly rich party of rebels appeared at Godober. The rebellion in Dagestan rose with particular force, and to stop it in Chechnya, Smekalov's military forces moved to Dagestan.
By October 20, Murzateli and Uma Duev appeared at Tilitl. and this is where Smekalov headed. The brutal bombardment of Tilitl began. The highlanders hid in the huts and fired back from there. Taking by storm would cost big losses. Therefore, General Smekalov offered Murzateli to surrender and hand over Uma Duev. Seeing the significant ruin of the village and the complete impossibility of holding out against the Russian forces, Murzateli surrendered, and Uma fled. Tilitl was completely hidden, and its inhabitants were resettled.
Previously, it was indicated that the Kazikumukhs had taken the fortifications. This news, like a spark, set fire to an uprising in the districts of Kyurinsky and Tabasaransky, as well as on Samur. The leader in Tabasaran was Umalat-bek - Rustan-Kadiev, and in the Kyura district Magomet-Ali-bek - Garun-bek-Ogly, the staff captain of the police, dissatisfied with our government for being removed from the post of naib for drunkenness. But the uprising here was very soon pacified.
Meanwhile, Mekhti-bek-Utsmiyev moved to Dashlagar. Ter-Asaturov came to the aid of the Dashlagarites. Then Mehdi decided to rush to Petrovsk. Ter-Asaturov caught up with him at Kayakent. There was a fierce battle, but the rebels were badly defeated.
False rumors about glorious Turkish victories, more and more emissaries arriving, a rumor about the appearance of Kazi-Magoma - all this worried the Dagestanis to the extreme and caused an uprising even in the south of Dagestan. Kazi-Kumukh became agitated again, the Kyurinsky and Kaitago-Tabasaran districts revolted. Samur was also unreliable. Meanwhile, there were few Russians. I had to use the local police, extremely unreliable. The Dagestanis themselves have changed the way they attack. They saw that the more they were crowded, the more they were destroyed. Now they have adopted the Chechen way of gathering in small detachments: disturbing our small detachments, attacking the carts, repelling horses and separated soldiers, quickly flying from place to place; in case of defeat in one place, jump to another, and then return back again - the restoration of the auls cost nothing: there is plenty of stone, and the architecture is infantile. External obedience was false. They also gathered in large crowds, but a peculiar, terribly rugged terrain sheltered them. And yet, the Dagestanis suffered severely.
The rebels were gathering near Derbent. Our troops went there too. But ours had to carry a convoy with them. The guards at the wagon train were usually small. Such convoys were a special bait for the rebels: prey, and, moreover, quite easy. And now our convoy was in danger. He had to pass through a very wild forest and the Kisi-Mishi ridge. Of course, the rebels will take the opportunity to profit from the good and rein in the infidels.
Wanting to divert attention from the convoy, Ter-Asaturov attacked Bashly. First, the highlanders fell for the bait. But then they realized what was happening and in huge numbers rushed to Kisi-Mishi. The procession was hard. Step by step, tree by tree, they had to take it, and yet the Russians made their way almost without loss. The artillery of Colonel Lavenetsky was especially successful: "there was almost no shot that did not fall in the crowd of rebels." The soldiers were ecstatic. Soon the wagon train connected with the main detachment and became safe.
Meanwhile, there were unfavorable rumors from Derbent. The city is surrounded by rebels, the citadel is abandoned, the garrison, administration and the remaining Christian population have moved to the lower part of the city and are preparing for defense. The Muslims occupied the upper part of the city, where they fortified themselves with barricades and blockages. Middle city leave. Communication with the surrounding area is interrupted. Without cover, no one dared to go beyond the city walls. An attack was expected every minute. The entire path ahead of the Russian detachment was occupied by the rebels, who were especially concentrated at Dzhemkent and Berikey.
Leaving the gallantly passed Kisi-Mishi, the detachment led by General Komarov moved to Derbent. The night captured him over Dzhemkent. There were rebels on the heights of Mamat-Katan. From the heights of Chermi-tau, the singing of “Dhikr” rang out all night. Mehdi Utsemiyev declared a gazavat, fortified the villages of Dzhemkent and Berikei. He made a mess. He concentrated huge crowds and decided not to give way to the Russians. It was given an oath to fight in the name of Islam and put giaours. Derbent was appointed as an expiatory sacrifice. There, after the extermination of the giaurs, Umalat-bek, Asabek and Izmail - effendi were sent. In Derbent there was already a self-proclaimed Kurin khan Mohammed-Ali-Garun-bek-ogly.
Meanwhile, the Russians had a difficult journey along the Temerka valley. On September 22, the detachment moved towards Dagestan under the hidden shots of the highlanders. Again Lovetsky had to work with honor. I had to cross mountain rivers, where mountaineers lay behind every pebble. Berikey has already had a bloody skirmish. But all this did not prevent Ter-Asaturov from reaching Derbent on September 23.
Here the first resistance was offered at Khan-Mashed-Kan, where a large crowd of rebels gathered at the house of Mehdi Utsmiyev. A successful action of artillery and then the soldiers smashed Utsmiyev's house, and he himself was forced to flee with a crowd. In the evening the detachment was in Derbent.
From Derbent, Komarov already arranged a punitive campaign on Temerek and the nearest rebellious villages and collected a significant tribute.
Meanwhile, the dispersed Dagestanis began to revive again.
Jafar appeared at Chumla, Mehdi was heading there, and Umalat-bek appeared at Tabasarani. The main crowd, more than 4 thousand, was at Yagikent. That's where our combat squad went. In the evening it began to rain. The highlanders quickly hid in the sakli, and shots rained down from there. The center of the gathering was the palace of Mekhti-Utsmiyev. Russian grenades disturbed him a little too. Night stopped the advance, but the mountain volleys continued into the night. The next morning the work continued. Our battery, from 250 paces away, treated the palace of Utsmiya, built on a dominant height, with grenades. At two corners of this castle, towers for flank defense were visible, and loopholes were made in all buildings. Making a breach, however, was not easy: the shells, breaking through the very pillars, burst inside the courtyard, leaving only small round holes in the walls. At the same time, they acted against the entire village. Soon the aul was taken. The castle remained. Although part of it was collapsed, it was difficult to take it. The assault was repulsed. And at this time, a feat worthy of historical imprinting of the name was accomplished.
During the advance of the hunters, one of them, Yegor Kurbanov, was wounded in the stomach and remained in place. Comrades could not capture him. Then the private of the Samur regiment Nikolai Yudin, handing over his gun to his comrades, went to the castle, grabbed the wounded and returned back. A hail of enemy bullets rained down on the daredevil, but he returned unscathed to the detachment.
The coming night brought the fight to a halt. At night, the defenders of the castle broke through the opposite side of the house from our detachment and everyone fled. The castle was destroyed. There they found 43 dead and wounded rebels. In general, in this battle, the rebels suffered heavy losses and lost three badges. The highlanders fled to Majalik and Tabasaran. Our detachment pursued the rebels in various directions.
A new battle took place near Iran-Kharabi 8 . There was a small detachment of Colonel Myatbeli. The rebels found out about this and in the amount of more than 3 thousand attacked the detachment. However, their enterprise ended all the same with their defeat.
The main body of the rebels was now heading towards Duvek. Mekhti-Utsmiyev and Umalat-bek went there. Komarov sent his detachment to Duvek, where more than 3 thousand highlanders gathered. The roads were impossible. The rains completed the horror of the campaign. The aul is located very impregnably and is protected by fences and blockages.
It was not easy for the Russians to take Duvek, but they took it, having found more than 200 mountain bodies there. Umalat-bek fled to Tabasaran.
Mekhti-Utsmiyev went to Bashly, where again up to 2 thousand highlanders concentrated around him. The uprising in the south of Dagestan almost ended with the destruction of this gang. The main instigators of the rebellion were expelled. Upon arrival in Derbent Komarov, the Kuran Khan Mohammed-Ali-bek appeared to him with a confession.
The main points of the uprising were Sogratl - the center of Muslim learning, Kumukh - the center of industry and trade and Tsudahar - the center of military prowess, because the Akushins were considered invincible and for the first time found their winners in the person of the Russians. It was they who defeated Shah Nadir and forced the Persians to flee.
In October, information began to reach about the serious condition of Lieutenant Bulgakov's detachment on Georgievsky Bridge. The detachment consisted of only 130 people, meanwhile it was besieged by thousands of highlanders. Bulgakov was known for his courage, courage and enterprise, but these qualities will not last long before the masses.
That is why, perhaps hastily, assistance was sent to Bulgakov, delivering him from the besiegers.
Now the enemy concentrated at Tsadahar under the leadership of Abdul-Mejid. Tsudahar was a very fortified aul, in which each saklya was a fortress. The seriousness of the situation was intensified by the fact that Akushintsy worked here. The whole of Tsudahar was protected from the front by strong stone blockages with a high stone tower armed with a falconet. Accessible from other sides were also extensively protected. After a long shelling, our troops rushed to storm. After a fierce battle, most of the inhabitants fled, and those who doomed themselves to death remained to protect. They set fire to the mosque and the two-storey saklya. When they were knocked out from here too, they went down to the basement. The last attack put all the defenders in place.
In Tsudahara, many badges were taken, a lot of different weapons, property, and 116 prisoners. But that wasn't important. What mattered was that the fall of Tsudahara completely disarmed the Highlanders. The destruction of the stronghold and the model of courage and courage led the rebels not only into confusion, but into complete despondency and despair. The uprising turned out to be untenable - the care of the expulsion of the giaurs and freedom had to be postponed. The rebellion in Kumukh was over, - Gunib also fell silent. One of the prominent leaders, Jafar, and his retinue were captured.
Meanwhile, in Sogratl, where the rebellion began, began and matured, did not subside. Here the "ghazavat" was proclaimed. From here, the indignation spread to Chechnya and the whole of Dagestan, and its existence had to be put to an end. Imam Mohammed-Abdurakhman stayed here. Here arrived the main breeders of Chechnya: Alibek, Abdul-Medzhib_Fataev, Abass Pasha, Dada Zalmaev and Uma Duev. Now it was decided to put an end to Sogratl.
Russian troops arrived. The usual deadly battle began, for each of the defenders knew that he would not be spared.
Often the rebels did not wait for assaults and themselves attacked the Russians with furious fury. There were moments when the latter involuntarily leaned back and were again carried forward by the selfless courage of the officers. So it was with part of the Kabardian regiment, but General Petrov drew his saber and shouted: “Follow me, with hostility!” rushed forward and dragged the Kabardians after him. All Russian troops showed selfless stamina, courage and courage here. The battle lasted two days, and finally Sogratl was completely destroyed.
With this blow, almost all the heads of the hydra of the rebellion were cut off. The defeated rebels were extradited: Abdul-Medzhib-Fataev, Abbass Pasha, Magoma-hajdi (imam). Uma Duev with his sons, Dada Zalmaev and other prominent rebels. Finally, the hundred-year-old Abdurakhman was also brought. One Alibek-hadji managed to escape to Vedeno, where he himself gave himself up into the hands of the head of the region.
The Samur region is so separated by mountain ranges from the whole world that it was a completely separate independent region. Only in the southwestern corner did it come into contact with the Cuban region, and even there it was separated by the river. Samur. It had its good and bad sides. The isolation kept the inhabitants of the region in itself, and gossip and talk were less brought there. But on the other hand, the Russians did not have any contact with their own people, and in case of a small number they had no opportunity either to receive help, or to deliver military supplies, or even food. This latter was present just now.
Preparations for the uprising and the uprising itself on the Samur were very late. In addition, the uprising itself was coercive. A rumor was spread that Jafar was going to Samur with Turkish pashas in order to force the Samurs to take part in the rebellion. It also became known that Jafar declared ghazawat.
Meanwhile, the Russian detachment was insignificant. Panic broke out among the residents. Shops were closed, goods were hidden in pits, there was no market, people were hiding. Akhtintsy came to the head of the region, Colonel Uzbashev, and demanded that he call an army from other places, because with such a small garrison they would not go against Jafar, but would stick to him. Where could Uzbashev get troops from? I had to make up three hundred militia from Samurians, and not a single Akhtinian entered the militia. Uzbashev left the village and moved to the fortification. All this coincided with the news of the uprising in Gunib and Kumukh. But then, on September 20, the news came of the defeat of the highlanders near Levashi and Kayakent, and everything quieted down, trade resumed, and preparations for the bayram went on at full speed. On September 28, Uzbashev was with more important residents on holiday and everywhere they were nice and amiable, and on October 1 in the fortress they received a note thrown from the translator: “An uprising broke out in Akhty. All with icons. At the head of Kazi-Mahmed-bek. The management house is surrounded by guards. They are not released anywhere. Don't send soldiers to the market, they want to kill them. What should we do?".
Indeed, there was a complete uprising in the village. Several people from the fortress went to the village, and the soldiers were seized and sent as a gift to the imam in Sogratl, who executed them. Of course, as far as possible, the fortress was already in a defensive position before. Small stocks of food have been made. Take care of the well. Reduced portion of meat.
By evening, the rebels began to surround the fortress and attack. The buckshot soon sobered them up and forced them to keep a decent distance. Thousands of rebels opened fire from orchards and vineyards. The fortress was blocked. The rebels led a trench attack. Lieutenant Komarov with a detachment 50 times smaller in number fought back as best he could, and kept the enemy at a decent distance.
On October 29, Kazi-Ahmet-bek handed over a letter to Uzbashev, in which he told him that the rebels had taken Deshlagar, Qusar, and so on. and demanded surrender. Uzbashev answered this demand with grapeshot grenades. Meanwhile, the trenches of the highlanders were approaching the fortress. I had to take action. And now Major Komarov takes 60 soldiers, divides them into three detachments, rushes into the trenches, destroys everything that is horrible in them, cuts down the nearest gardens and returns to the fortress. After this damage, the rebels no longer dared to dig trenches.
The outing lasted three and a half hours. The rebels were brutally taught. But the defenders perked up, cheered up and again perked up. And then they were completely disheartened. And there was something to come from. The blockade lasted 52 days. Everyone suffered deprivation in food, clothing, and even housing. The uninterrupted guard service exhausted the workers to the extreme. And the unknown future oppressed me like a heavy stone. But now everyone is up and happy. Everywhere there was a cheerful animation. Everyone forgot about the hard work that had been done. There were distant songs. Repeatedly transmitted talk of exploits. The future was unconsciously good.
But the besiegers fell silent. Shots were heard, but somehow rarely, lazily and reluctantly. And our soldiers did not even answer them.
"Let them come closer..."
On November 4 late in the evening Magomed-Sherif-Mahmud-ogly from Akhtin appeared in the fortress and announced the good news that General Komarov was coming to the rescue. The rebels also learned about this and quickly fled. Kazi-Ahmed-bek also asked latats ... Soon others appeared with the same joyful news. On November 5, early in the morning, all the inhabitants of Akhta appeared at the fortification and begged for mercy on their knees, and a messenger from General Komarov flew in behind them, congratulating the garrison on the lifting of the siege and with the news of his imminent arrival. At the same time, our team caught Mekhti-bek-Utsmiyev, who had run away, and brought him to General Komarov.
There was also indignation in the Cuban district, and a crowd of thousands blockaded Qusar. It was mainly the Samsyr fugitives who led the horses here. But these crowds were quickly dispersed by our detachment with proper lessons.

The Alozani fertile valley was a part, but it is so fertile, so beautiful, so seductive that the Lezgins gradually ousted the Georgians and formed a special Lezgin region, partly in the form of the Elisu Khanate, partly in the form of the Jaro-Belokan community, which now forms Zagatala.
This entire valley is cut by numerous rivers and streams, starting at the Main Range and flowing into Alozan. It is covered with pastures and forests. vineyards, orchards, arable land and glades. Only to the east the valley becomes more severe.
Strictly speaking, the prosperity of the inhabitants would have had little to do with indignation. But those were Lezgins. They were Mohammedans. They were natural predators. Yes, and the neighbors - the Georgians were so insignificant in themselves that they presented an involuntary temptation to robbery and robbery, especially since they were giaurs.
Obeying the general Lezgin mood, the Alozan Lezgins made an attack on Georgia, and most importantly on the Nukhinsky district. But they were soon calmed down. They got especially good in the Elysui Gorge. Therefore, the Alozan uprising was insignificant and could easily be besieged. Thus ended the uprising in Chechnya and Dagestan.
Our general conclusions are as follows:
1. The Lezgin (Chechen, Dagestan and Alozan) movement is based on religious and political grounds.
2. It is supported by the preaching of Turkish emissaries and the suggestion by Muslim pilgrims who have communion with Turkey.
3. This movement is closely connected with the state of our relations with Turkey and has always been excited, excited and will be excited with the deterioration of Turkey's relations with Russia, the Slavs and Christians.
4. An important support for this religious-political fanaticism is the ignorance and unenlightenment of both the Mohammedan clergy and the Mohammedan mass of the population.
5. An important condition contributing to this state is the isolation of Chechnya and Dagestan in general and in particular from Russia.
6. The closest connection between Chechnya and Dagestan also contributes a lot, which adversely affect each other in bitterness against Russia.
7. To lower these adverse conditions follows:
a. Separate temporarily Chechnya and Dagestan.
b. Bring Chechnya closer to Russia by immediately annexing the North Caucasus to Russia.
in. To renew the forest clearings made by Yermolov, Paskevich, Vorontsov and others. and now overgrown.
d. To build as many roads as possible and put in the best conditions the means of communication both for commercial and military needs.
e. Immediately build a pass railroad, which will bring the Caucasus closer and connect with Russia. This need, if not economic, is undoubtedly state and national.
e. Raise education in Mohammedan schools, and, without touching at all on the teachings of Islam, put teaching in Russian so that they do not turn into malicious Jewish heders.
and. To increase the number of public schools and organize them in the manner of vocational schools, in accordance with the needs of the locality.
h. Establish high schools of a professional nature with a bright national touch general sovereign nation.
and. Give the Caucasus higher educational institution in Vladikavkaz, not in Tiflis.
j. Pay attention to the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina and, without any difficulty, direct it outside the borders of Turkey.
l. Eliminate Turkish influence as much as possible in terms of political influence.
m. Unconditionally stop access to Turkish emissaries in Chechnya and Dagestan.
n. Under no circumstances should Turkish subjects be admitted to the position of mullahs, since now almost all mullahs in Chechnya and Dagestan are Turkish subjects.
8. In the event of the slightest hint of movement, in the form of zikrism and zelimkhanism, immediately take the measures that were practiced by Yermolov, Paskevich, Smekalov and others.

From the author. Just as no political action can be considered in isolation from the surrounding political and economic situation, so it cannot be considered outside the historical framework. In order to understand the meaning and essence of the actions of a particular state, state, politician in order to be able to correctly assess the events taking place, it is necessary to at least briefly trace all the previous events related to this historical fact. This is first. And secondly, it is impossible to evaluate the events that took place in the past (albeit not distant), based on modern criteria, modern morality, modern legislative acts. Otherwise, the whole of all mankind will appear before us as a continuous chain of bloody crimes of everyone and everything. Moreover, the crimes are terrible and senseless.

In politics, nothing is done under the influence of momentary moods, humanism or anti-humanism of this or that ruler, although outwardly sometimes it looks exactly like that. In reality, any ruler is the spokesman and implementer of the interests of certain social or ethnic groups. The power of anyone statesman is in complete and absolute dependence on the opinions and aspirations of those social, ethnic groups whose interests it protects. As soon as his actions diverge from the ideas of those who elevated him to the throne, his power ends and he rolls down with a roar, be it a king, a dictator, a president, a general secretary, a leader or a chairman.

And it is these postulates that those journalists who are faced with the task of glorifying or, on the contrary, debunking this or that social system, this or that country, statesman, try to leave out of their stories and articles.

The author, in particular, has in mind the events of February 1944 in the North Caucasus, namely the deportation of Chechens and a number of other ethnic groups. The events of those days are presented in complete isolation from political environment of that time, from the history of interethnic conflict. In such a light, the deportation of Chechens appears as a result of the evil will of either one person - I. Stalin, or as a completely senseless, unjustified crime of political extremists - the Bolsheviks.

The purpose of such articles is to arouse anti-Russian sentiments, to present the history of Russia in the period 1917-91 in a negative way and to prove that Russia was and remains an "evil empire", that this state has no place on the planet, and Russians, as a nation, should be quietly and notice unnoticed.

Meanwhile, the conflict between Russia and a number of peoples of the Caucasus has a very long history. The causes of the conflict are rooted in ancient times, and this centuries-old enmity has been and is the usual struggle of countries and peoples for their place under the sun. The whole history of mankind consists of such conflicts and wars. So the events of the winter of 1944 in the Caucasus are just one of many pages in world history.

Foreword

The history of the Russian-Chechen confrontation dates back to late XVII- the beginning of the XVIII century, when Russia waged numerous long and stubborn wars with Turkey, Persia, the Crimean Khan. These countries constantly disturbed and attacked the Russian lands, scooping new slaves, food, and other material resources from them.

The Caucasian ridge was a natural barrier between Russia and Turkey, Persia. Naturally, the possession of the Caucasus region gave one side or another a clear and significant advantage.
For Persia and Turkey, the possession of the Caucasus provided the opportunity to seize the fertile lands of southern Russia, opened the shortest route to the capitals, and made it possible to exert political and military pressure on Russia.
For Russia, the possession of the Caucasus ensured the protection of the southern borders, the exclusion of the danger of a new loss of the Azov and Black Seas, the Crimea, the inclusion in the agricultural turnover and trade of the rich southern lands (Novorossia), which, although they belonged to Russia, could not be used.

The peoples of the Caucasus, depending on their ethnic and religious affiliation, leaned partly towards Russia, partly towards Persia and Turkey. However, the expansionist policy of Persia and Turkey, accompanied by partial or complete genocide of the Caucasian peoples, on the one hand, and Russia's religious tolerance, its non-interference in the internal life of the peoples, on the other hand, increasingly pushed the Caucasian states first towards an alliance with Russia. and then to join Russian Empire(Georgia, Armenia, Ossetia).

These processes worried Russia's neighbors and forced them to intensify their actions to seize the Caucasus, relying on the peoples who professed Islam (Dagestanis, Chechens, Circassians, etc.).

FROM early XVIII century, and Russia stepped up its actions to seize the Caucasus, which could not but affect the anti-Russian actions of the mountain peoples. One of the documented facts of the attack on the Russian troops is the attack of the Chechens in 1732 on the Russian battalion, which made the transition from Dagestan to the Stavropol region and its complete destruction.

The years 1785-1791 are characterized by the active actions of Chechen detachments under the leadership of the leader of one of the Chechen teips Ushurma against Russian tillers who developed the areas of the present Stavropol region. The whole area was deserted.

At the end of the wars with Napoleon, the Russian tsar, worried about the sharply increased influence of Iran and Turkey on the Caucasus and the scope of mountain banditry in southern Russia (constant robberies, robberies, mass cattle thefts, slave trade, attacks on military garrisons) in 1817 begins a series of Caucasian wars that lasted until 1864.

These wars acquire the greatest scope from 1834, when Imam Shamil becomes the head of the rebellious highlanders.

In total, from 1801 to 1864, Russia in Caucasian wars lost 801 officers and 24,143 soldiers killed, 3,154 officers and 61,971 soldiers wounded. 91 officers and 5915 soldiers were taken prisoner. The military grouping of the Russian army in the Caucasus in some periods reached 200 thousand people.

With the capture of Shamil, the destruction of a number of rebellious imams, and also with the transition under Field Marshal Paskevich to the "scorched earth" tactics, when the rebellious villages were completely destroyed and the population was completely destroyed, the organized resistance of the highlanders was suppressed.

However, until the revolution and the beginning civil war Numerous small gangs and individual bandits ("abreks") continued to exist in Chechnya. The tsarist government managed to maintain relative calm in Chechnya and Dagestan due to the actual non-interference in the internal life of the mountaineers, bribing the tribal nobility, free distribution of flour, fabrics, leather, clothes to the poor mountaineers; appointment of local authoritative elders, leaders of teips and tribes as officials. The garrisons of the Russian army, the Cossack villages were located mainly along the Terek River, thereby separating Chechnya from the rest of Russia.

During the revolution and civil war, Chechnya was left to itself. It is known that as a result of hunger, the population decreased by almost a third, the rest survived due to raids on Cossack villages north of the Terek, Stavropol Territory, Georgia. Attempts to attract the highlanders to participate in the civil war on the side of the Reds or Whites ended in vain. Chechens and Dagestanis hated both.

As the civil war ended, the new government tried to establish itself in the Caucasus mountains. However, with the formation of the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the RSFSR, the struggle of the mountain tribal nobility for the preservation of their power and privileges began to be clearly manifested. This struggle immediately takes the form of an armed struggle under the slogans of national independence, the defense of Islam and autonomy.

Chechnya in the twenties and thirties

In September 1920, Nazhmutdin Gotsinsky and the grandson of Imam Shamil Said-Bey raise a rebellion in the mountainous regions of Chechnya and the northern part of Dagestan. The few detachments of the Red Army are very quickly destroyed, and the local population from among the Russians is completely cut out. By November 1920, Said Bey's forces already numbered 2,800 foot fighters and 600 cavalrymen with twenty machine guns and four guns. At the same time, the appearance of Turkish and British instructors in the rebel detachments is noted.

The Soviet command sends a regiment of the 14th Rifle Division of the Red Army and a Regiment of Exemplary Revolutionary Discipline to suppress the rebellion. In total, about 8 thousand infantry, 1 thousand cavalry with 40 machine guns and 18 guns. Units of the 14th division of the Red Army advancing in several directions at once were immediately blocked, stopped and suffered heavy losses. In one battle near the village of Moksoh, 98 fighters were killed within an hour, and near the village of Khadzhal-Makhi, the Red Army lost 324 people killed and wounded.
On December 9, the exemplary Revolutionary Discipline Regiment set out from Vedeno and made its way to Botlikh with week-long battles. The battalion of this regiment, which marched in the direction of the Andean Koisu on December 20, 1920. near Orata-Kolo was completely destroyed. On December 24, the Chechens surrounded the main forces of the regiment in Botlikh. During the negotiations, an agreement was reached that the regiment would leave without hindrance for Vedeno, leaving it in Botlikh. But as soon as the unarmed column left Botlikh, it was attacked and completely cut out with daggers and sabers (more than 700 people). The rebels got 645 rifles and 9 machine guns. In total, during December, parts of the Red Army in Chechnya lost 1372 people killed.

The defeat of the Red Army inspired the Chechens. By the beginning of 1921, the forces of the highlanders already numbered 7200 foot fighters, 2490 cavalry with 40 machine guns and 12 guns. The frequency of raids on the regions of Stavropol, Georgia has increased dramatically. The rebels burned the Cossack villages north of the Terek, slaughtering the local population, stealing livestock and taking out grain.
In other words, there were no other means of subsistence in Chechnya. There is no arable land in mountainous Chechnya, pastures allow a very limited number of sheep to graze, mountainous terrain and climate do not allow keeping cattle and poultry, and there are no orchards and vineyards.

Having assessed the scale of the catastrophe threatening the republic, the Soviet command creates the Terek-Dagestan Group of Forces consisting of 14, 32, 33 rifle divisions, 18th cavalry division, a separate Moscow brigade of cadets, two armored detachments and a reconnaissance squadron. A total of 20 thousand infantry, 3400 cavalry with 67 guns, 8 armored cars and 6 aircraft.

At the beginning of January 1921 units of the 32nd division attacked the Chechens and captured the village of Khadzhal-Makhi, destroying about 100 militants and capturing 140. The losses of the division amounted to 24 people killed and 71 wounded. However, as soon as parts of the division were drawn into the mountains, they immediately lost about 290 people in a short-lived battle.

An attempt by the 32nd division to resume the offensive on January 22 failed due to the most difficult weather conditions. In one day, 12 people were lost killed, 10 people frozen to death, 49 wounded and more than 150 people. frostbitten.

On February 19, during the pursuit of the retreating detachment of rebels, the battalion of the division, which stopped for the night in the village of Rugudzha, was massacred by local residents of Dagestan (about 125 people).

In total for January-February 1921. 32 division lost 1387 people. (650 killed, 10 frozen, 468 wounded, 259 frostbitten).

More successful were the actions of the 14th division. Consistently occupying the villages and ousting the rebels from them with the simultaneous deportation of the rest of the inhabitants, the division by the end of March 1921. completely took possession of all the fortresses and most of the large auls. The detachments of Said Bey suffered heavy losses (mostly due to desertion that arose as a result of unsuccessful actions against the Red Army). No more than 1000 people remained under the command of the leaders with 4 machine guns. They went to the hard-to-reach mountains upstream of the Aivar Koisu.

By October 1921, the last pockets of resistance were extinguished by the use of extremely harsh measures (taking hostages, executing elders, destroying villages, destroying communications). In total, the Red Army in the battles of 1920-21 lost about 3,500 people killed and about 1,500 wounded. The leader of the rebellion, Said Bey, returned to Turkey, having significantly improved his financial situation (later he left for England). Nazhmutdin Gotsinsky hid in the mountains for several years, abducting cattle with a group of abreks. He will be arrested only in September 1925.

The inept policy of the Soviet government, based on ideas of national self-determination torn from life, combined with real measures to level out national characteristics, as well as the inability of the new government to provide the highlanders with a livelihood, combined with tough measures to curb mountain robbery (robbery, cattle theft, removal of slaves) led to discontent among the population of Chechnya and the mountainous regions of Dagestan.

Already in 1923, Sheikh Ali-Mitaev proclaimed jihad against the infidels for the creation of an independent Sharia republic. In a short time, under his banner, he gathers more than 12 thousand murids. The destruction of Soviet authorities is proceeding at a rapid pace throughout Chechnya and Ingushetia, and the remaining power structures are becoming Ali-Mitaev's structures. The timely and intelligent policy of Ali-Mitaev, who filled the police and the GPU with his people, led to the fact that the police and GPU departments in Chechnya were centers for the collection of murids, sources of weapons and ammunition, trained personnel. Russian employees of these bodies at the right time were quickly destroyed or discredited, accused of having links with bandits.

However, the rebellion is carried out by rather secretive methods, and only by the spring of 1924 does it manifest itself openly in the form of a boycott of the elections, accompanied by pogroms of polling stations. The organs of the GPU of the country, with the help of their division, carry out a number of operations to suppress open actions of the Chechens and Ingush, during which they manage to seize 2900 rifles (partly of foreign models and English manufacture), 384 revolvers, a large amount of ammunition, 22 field telephones, 3 switches and about 15 km . English-made telephone cable.

However, instead of appeasement, this action led to an open armed uprising, and in August 1925, a military grouping with a total strength of 4480 infantry, 2017 cavalry with 137 heavy and 102 light machine guns, 14 mountain and 10 light machine guns was sent to Chechnya under the command of the commander of the North Caucasian Military District I. Uborevich guns. In addition, an armored train, 16 aircraft, 341 people were involved in the operation. from the Caucasian Red Banner Army (mountain nationalities) and 307 people from the GPU.

The operation to disarm the local population lasted from August 22 to September 13, 1925. 25,299 rifles, 4,319 revolvers, 1 machine gun, 730,556 rifle cartridges, 10,678 revolver cartridges, a radiotelegraph apparatus, several telephone sets were seized, about 120 km of telephone lines were identified and destroyed. 309 murids who offered armed resistance were arrested. Of these, 11 leaders, including N. Gotsinsky.

Of the detainees, 105 people were shot in court, the rest were released under oath on the Koran.

The military group lost 5 people killed, 8 wounded. Of the civilians, 6 people were killed (by both sides). and 30 wounded.

The success of the operation and the loss of most of the weapons by the Murids ensured relative calm in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia until 1929. However, all this time, the tribal nobility, with support from Turkey, conducted anti-Soviet propaganda, accumulated weapons, and trained militants in Turkey and England. At least 20 Chechens and Dagestanis were trained in officer schools in England and France.

In 1929, taking advantage of the gross mistakes of the Soviet authorities, who were trying to carry out grain procurements in the flat parts of Dagestan and Ingushetia, the heads of a number of Chechen and Ingush teips openly called for the disruption of grain procurements, defeated a number of bulk points, took the collected grain out of them and issued an ultimatum to the central authorities, demanding to remove from the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, armed detachments of grain producers, to abolish the tax in kind, to replace the elected bodies of Soviet power with the elders of the Chechen teips.

By order of the commander of the North Caucasian Military District, the operational group of troops and units of the OGPU conducted a military operation during the period December 8-28, 1929, during which armed bands were destroyed in Goity, Shali, Sambi, Benoy, Tsontoroi and a number of others. At the same time, 26 murids were killed, 296 were arrested. The military group lost 11 killed, 7 died from wounds, 29 wounded.

However, the leaders of the armed resistance of the highlanders took into account their mistakes of 1925. The Red Army managed to seize only 25 rifles, and then, mostly from the dead. All the leaders of the Chechen and Ingush groups managed to escape and, moreover, to maintain their control structure and influence on the local population.

Therefore, in March 1930, the North Caucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to conduct a Chekist-military operation to suppress mountain political banditry. By order of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, a military volunteer group is created consisting of 4 infantry, 3 cavalry, 2 partisan (read special forces, in modern terms) detachments from among the representatives of the peoples of the Caucasus (mainly Ossetians, Georgians, Armenians, partly Azerbaijanis, partly Dagestanis) who suffered greatly from robberies and robberies, terror from the Chechens and Ingush. These detachments were reinforced by two regular rifle battalions of the Red Army and an air unit (3 aircraft), a sapper company and a communications company. In total, the grouping consisted of 3700 people, 19 guns and 28 machine guns.

A good knowledge of the terrain and mountain conditions, the desire of the Ossetians, Georgians, Armenians loyal to the Soviet government to get rid of the mountain terror predetermined the success of the operation, which lasted from March 14 to April 12. 19 bandits were killed, 122 active participants in bandit raids on peaceful villages of neighboring republics were arrested, including 9 senior leaders of the rebellion. 1,500 firearms were confiscated (of which 127 were British Lee-Enfield rifles with optical sights made in 1926-28), 280 cold weapons. Ordinary gang members, after taking an oath on the Koran and disarmament, were allowed to go home. The military group lost 14 people killed. and 29 wounded.

However, the inflexible, rough policy of the Soviet government on the collectivization of agriculture in Chechnya and Ingushetia, which, due to local conditions, is extremely difficult, if not impossible, led to the extreme exasperation of the population. At the beginning of 1932, a large-scale uprising broke out, in which not only the Chechens, Ingush and Dagestanis of the mountainous regions took part, but also a significant part of the Russian population of the Nadterechny Cossack villages.

All disguises were dropped. Cooperatives, village councils were smashed in villages, Soviet money was destroyed. Gangs numbering 500-800 people attacked and besieged most of the military garrisons. The battles were distinguished by unprecedented ferocity, religious fanaticism, participation in the attacks of unarmed women and children. It should be noted the high level of organization and controllability of the rebellion.

However, the NKVD bodies and military units were in full readiness to repel armed uprisings. Despite huge losses. the rebels failed to defeat a single garrison, and the employees of the NKVD district departments managed to take refuge in the garrisons in a timely manner with their families. Troops operationally in the period March 15-20, 1932. managed to divide and isolate bandit groups, to block in hard-to-reach mountainous areas, which from places of reliable shelter turned into traps for murids and consistently destroy them. The rebels lost 333 people killed and 150 wounded. The Red Army and the NKVD lost 27 killed and 30 wounded.

The subsequent arrests of the leaders of the rebellion, participants in past armed uprisings, harsh court sentences, the deportation of entire villages outside the North Caucasus, the population was tired of the many years of war, the disappointment of the highlanders in the possibility of eliminating Soviet power by armed means led to a sharp decrease in the activity of armed confrontation.

However, very active and bloody, albeit local (within one to three districts) rebellions continued until 1936, and in mountainous regions until 1938. Separate gangs of up to 100 people continued to disturb Chechnya until the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

In total, from 1920 to 1941, only in the territory of Chechnya and Ingushetia, there were 12 major armed uprisings (with the participation of 500 to 5 thousand militants) and more than 50 less significant ones. The military units of the Red Army and the NKVD from 1920 to 1939 lost 3564 people killed and 1589 wounded.

In 1941, from January 1 to June 22, 31 bandit manifestations were registered, and from June 22 to September 3, more than 40.

Afterword

Then there was the war. By February 1943, the gangs of the "Special Party of Caucasian Brothers" alone and only in 20 villages of Chechnya numbered more than 6540 people, and about 240 other armed groups were registered (numbering from 2-3 people to 15-20). Is it possible to consider the resolution of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 5073 of January 31, 1944 No. about the liquidation of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the deportation of Chechens, Ingush, Karachays, Balkars from their places of permanent residence?

What political regime, what state will show tolerance towards people who massively show disloyalty to the government? Leading an armed struggle against it during a period of the most difficult and dangerous war for the state with an external enemy? Where, when and what state did not wage a stubborn struggle against the separatists, did not use armed force against them?

So the USSR, the Bolsheviks, Stalin are no better and no worse than all other states, political regimes, including those that boast of their democracy and the strictest observance of the rights of peoples and people (USA - Grenada, Panama, Lebanon, Vietnam), (Great Britain - India, Northern Ireland), (France - Indochina, Algeria), .... Continue?

In total, in the period of February-March 1944, 496,460 Chechens and Ingush people, 68,327 Karachays, and 37,406 Balkars were deported.

The Chechen question did not exist from February 1944 to January 1957, when the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a resolution on the restoration of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and allowed the repressed peoples to return to their historical homeland.

The flywheel of bloody feud began to spin again. So far, the author has no information about the events in the North Caucasus in the period 1957-91, about how much and how blood was shed there. But the fact that she poured, there is no doubt. So which decision of the Soviet government was wiser for 44 or 57 years? Did it become better for ordinary people to live in Dudayev's Chechnya in 91-94, 96-99?

Sources and literature:

1. I.E. Dunyushkin. The ideological and military aspect of the struggle against the Vainakh national-clerical separatism in the North Caucasus in 1941. Report on scientific conference December 9, 2001. Collection of reports "Peace and war: 1941". Humanitarian University Publishing. Yekaterinburg. 2001
2.S.G.Volkonsky. Notes. Irkutsk. East-Siberian book publishing house. 1991.
3.G.F.Krivosheev and others. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century. OLMA-PRESS. Moscow. 2001

18.10.2011

This article was published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta in 2000. The events in question are the Russian uprising in Chechnya in 1958.

“After the XX Congress of the CPSU, the rehabilitation of both individual citizens and entire peoples who suffered during the years of lawlessness began. On January 9, 1957, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kliment Voroshilov, signed the Decree "On the restoration of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the RSFSR." “In order to create the necessary conditions for the national development of the Chechen and Ingush peoples,” representatives of these peoples were allowed to return to their former place of residence.

From the very beginning, the authorities tried to give a systematic character to the complex mechanism for the return of the Ingush and Chechens. However, the resettlement process soon got out of hand. In 1957 alone, more than 200 thousand people arrived in the autonomous republic, which significantly exceeded the figures provided for by the four-year resettlement plan. It created serious problems with employment and housing. In addition - the mass acquisition of weapons, mutual responsibility, murders on the basis of blood feuds, rape, attacks on residents of the republic representing other nationalities.

The arriving sheikhs, mullahs and teip authorities, influencing the youth in a nationalistic and religious spirit, sought to revive the ideas of muridism and obedience to Sharia law. This led to a sharp increase in criminal offenses among young people. For 9 months in 1957, 22 murders were committed in Grozny. 285 people were brought to criminal responsibility by the militia bodies. In the first half of 1958, as compared with the same period in 1957, the number of murders in the Chechen Republic of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a whole increased by 2 times, and cases of robbery and hooliganism, which caused serious bodily harm, by 3 times. Throughout the republic, quarrels over houses and household plots, scandals and group fights with the use of knives and firearms have become commonplace. So, for example, at the end of 1957, anti-Russian leaflets were distributed in Grozny, attacks by Chechen youth on students of vocational schools and officers of the Soviet Army were also recorded.

“Things are very bad,” one of the Russian residents of Chechnya wrote to her relative in Russia, “Chechens come, do whatever they want, beat Russians, cut, kill, set fire to houses at night. The people are in a panic. Many have left, and the rest are going."

And indeed, as a result of intimidation, with the full connivance of the republican authorities, during 1957, 113 thousand Russians, Ossetians, Avars, Ukrainians and citizens of other nationalities left the CHI ASSR.

The justified indignation of the population by the outrages of hooligan elements from among the Chechens, as well as the inability of the authorities to really protect non-indigenous residents, provoked the Russian population of Grozny to mass riots that took place in the city on August 26 and 27, 1958, which became a classic example of what has been described more than once in historical literature"Russian rebellion", desperate and cruel.

On the evening of August 23, 1958, in the suburb of Grozny, the village of Chernorechye, where workers and employees of the Grozny chemical plant mainly lived, a Chechen Lulu Malsagov, while intoxicated, started a fight with a Russian guy Vladimir Korotchev and stabbed him in the stomach. A little later, Malsagov, along with other Chechens, met Yevgeny Stepashin, a factory worker who had just been demobilized from the army, and stabbed him several times. Stepashin's wounds turned out to be fatal, but Korotchev was saved.

Rumors about the murder of a twenty-two-year-old Russian guy quickly spread among the workers of the plant and the residents of Grozny. Despite the fact that the killer and his accomplices were immediately detained by the police, the public reaction was unusually violent, especially among young people. Demands for severe punishment of the murderers began to be heard.

On August 25-26, many people arrived in the village of Chernorechye to say goodbye to the deceased, demanding public execution Stepashin's killers. Many of those gathered at the coffin of the deceased insisted on the need to hold a mourning meeting with the participation of the leadership of the regional committee and city committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the CHI ASSR. However, at the direction of the same regional committee, no rally was permitted. Nevertheless, announcements appeared on the territory of the chemical plant and in Chernorechye about an allegedly upcoming mourning meeting organized in connection with the murder of the worker Stepashin.

But both in the regional committee and in the city committee of the party did not consider it necessary to enter into polemics with the townspeople and give them any explanations. The authorities fenced themselves off from the indignant people with a police cordon, which was instructed not to allow the funeral procession to the building of the regional committee of the CPSU.

However, the crowd, together with the coffin of the deceased, managed to achieve their goal. Large groups of Grozny youth who joined the residents of Chernorechye overturned several cars that were set up as a barrier, and the demonstration poured into Lenin Square, where a mourning meeting began.

Meanwhile, some of the protesters made an attempt to enter the building of the regional committee, and at 19:30 they succeeded. A group of young people broke into the regional committee and tried to force Gayerbekov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Chechen Republic of the ASSR, Chakhkiev, second secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU, and other workers to the square. With great difficulty, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs managed to expel the demonstrators who broke through there from the regional committee and detain the most active of them.

To calm the audience, the secretaries of the regional party committee G.Ya. Cherkevich, B.F. Saiko, secretary of the city committee A.I. Shepelev. However, instead of a detailed conversation about the problems that concern people, they called for an end to the riots. In response, exclamations were heard from the crowd: “Get the Chechens out of Grozny”, “Let N.S. Khrushchev, we will talk to him”, “Long live the Grozny region!” etc.

The crowd kept coming and coming. From the tables of the book market organized the day before, everyone began to speak freely. The protesters began to attack military and police vehicles and roll them along with the soldiers to the streets adjacent to the square. Two Chechens who were passing by on a motorcycle were stopped and beaten. The first stones flew into the windows of the regional committee.

By 11 p.m., several more cars with soldiers from the local garrison arrived at the rally site, who, together with the police, managed to disperse the crowd and detain 41 active rioters. By half past one in the night, order was completely restored on the square.

However, on the evening of August 26, a rumor spread among those gathered that at 9 o'clock in the morning a new rally would take place at the same place, at which members of the Soviet government and the Central Committee of the CPSU, who had urgently arrived from Moscow, were supposed to speak.

The next day at 7 o'clock in the morning, groups of townspeople, mostly women, began to appear near the building of the regional committee. There were even leaflets calling for the resumption of the protest. One of these leaflets said: “Comrades! Yesterday they carried the coffin of a comrade slaughtered by Chechens past the regional committee. Instead of taking appropriate action against the killers, the police dispersed the workers' demonstration and arrested 50 innocent people. So let's quit work at 11 o'clock and go to the regional party committee demanding the release of our comrades!

By 10 o'clock in the morning a crowd had gathered near the building of the regional committee - about 2 thousand people. A critical moment came when people came close to the building of the regional committee, broke the cordon of soldiers and policemen and began to break in the doors of the main entrance.

Soon the secretary of the Grozny city committee of the party, Shepelev, and the chairman of the city executive committee, Bryskin, came out to meet the protesters, who were immediately seized by the crowd and escorted to the Lenin monument, where an impromptu tribune was built. But neither Shepelev nor Bryskin were allowed to speak. The people wanted the powers that be to listen to their opinion this time.

By noon, about 10,000 people had gathered on Lenin Square. The speakers insistently repeated their demands for the release of the comrades who had been arrested the day before. Above the heads of the people, calls were heard from the speakers: “Free the arrested youth!”, “Send the Chechens out of Grozny!” By 2 p.m., part of the crowd, numbering more than a thousand people, approached the buildings of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic. Several people entered the balcony of the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and demanded the release of all those detained the day before. Under pressure from the masses, the authorities made concessions and released everyone to freedom.

Another group managed to break into the KGB building and inflict some material damage: windows were broken, doors were broken, etc. The Chekists managed to quickly eliminate the breakthrough, and without the use of weapons.

The heated crowd immediately turned its anger on any people of Chechen nationality who appeared near the square. So, during the rally, two Chechens Mataev and Temirov were captured, who were immediately beaten. From the beatings Mataev soon died.

At about 3 p.m., a group of demonstrators, having separated from the main mass, headed towards the Grozny city committee of the CPSU. Having broken the door, people broke into the room and staged a pogrom. And two hours later, the protesters also stormed the building of the regional committee, where, having seized a dozen typewriters, several activists began to print leaflets and appeals, which were immediately read from the balcony to the audience.

A resolution of the meeting addressed to the authorities was also hastily written. “Given the manifestation on the part of the Chechen-Ingush population of the brutal attitude towards the peoples of other nationalities, expressed in massacres, murders, violence and bullying,” it said, “the working people of the city of Grozny, on behalf of the majority of the population of the republic, propose:

1. From August 27, 1958, rename the CHIASSR into the Grozny region or into the Interethnic Soviet Socialist Republic.

2. The Chechen-Ingush population is allowed to live in the Grozny region no more than 10% of total population.

3. To resettle advanced progressive Komsomol youth of various nationalities from other republics for the development of the wealth of the Grozny region and for the development of agriculture ... "

One of the activists, a truck driver, presented an ultimatum to the head of the local military aviation school, Major General Stepanov, who was in the regional committee: either go out to the crowd and make a statement to them that the Chechens would be evicted from Grozny, or be torn to pieces in a few minutes.

A group of secretaries of the primary party organizations of the city and other party workers tried to stop the rebels in the building of the regional committee. However, all of them were beaten by the demonstrators and driven out into the street.

Having captured the banner in the regional committee, part of the crowd numbering 500 people went to storm the main post office. Bursting into the building, the demonstrators demanded to be connected to Moscow.

Unable to get through to Moscow, the crowd went to the intercity telephone exchange. When trying to get inside, the worker of the chemical plant Andrianov was killed by the guards and 2 more people were injured. Under the threat of violence, telephone operators nevertheless arranged for the activists of the rally to communicate with the reception room of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Khrushchev. At 11 p.m., a group of demonstrators with a red flag headed for the Grozny railway station and delayed the departure of the Rostov-Baku train. People walked around the carriages and asked the passengers to tell residents of other cities that "in Grozny, Chechens are killing Russians, and the local authorities are not taking any measures." On the outside of the cars appeared the inscription: “Brothers! Chechens and Ingush kill Russians. The local government supports them. The soldiers are shooting at the Russians!”

Troops appeared at the station around midnight, but the protesters threw stones at them. In the course went butts. Soon the crowd nevertheless managed to disperse, and the train was sent to its destination. At the same time, the military units managed to restore order in the square near the building of the regional committee.

The next day, police and state security agencies began an intensive search for active participants in the riots. Every day there were more and more arrests, the number of which exceeded a hundred. Over the next two months, the local court barely had time to announce sentences: from a year of probation to 10 years in prison. Among the charges against 91 convicts, article 59-2 (riots) appeared. This is how the authorities dealt with those who dared to doubt the correctness of its course.

But the brutal repressions of activists of mass protests in Grozny did not have the expected intimidating effect. So, a few days after the riots, at a meeting organized by the party committee of one of the enterprises, where it was supposed to stigmatize the “anti-Soviet and chauvinist” actions of August 26 and 27, one of the workers who spoke said: “The working class of the city rose correctly, the counter-revolutionaries were not on the square, the counter-revolutionaries sat in the regional committee of the CPSU ... "

These words once again clearly testify to which direction the people's anger of the inhabitants of Grozny was directed during the two days of August 1958.

Due to their ideological blindness, both central and local authorities failed to objectively assess the causes of the outburst of popular anger. From the very beginning, the actions of the working masses were interpreted as the actions of "hooligan and criminal elements under chauvinistic and anti-Soviet slogans." Even in the course of the subsequent investigation, none of the investigators asked the detainees what exactly prompted the people to demonstrate. Only one thing worried the authorities: who wrote, who hit, who called ...

The communist leaders thus froze the solution of the problems of interethnic relations in Checheno-Ingushetia, which decades later turned into a bloody drama.

O. MATVEEV,
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, N162, 2000

The greatest tragedy of the Chechen people unfolded when the Caucasian Joseph Stalin established himself in the Kremlin. His cruel national policy led to the fact that the peoples of the Caucasus, who had previously supported the power of the Soviets, became its most implacable opponents. One of the most prominent leaders of the Chechen resistance to the Stalinist regime is the writer and publicist Khasan Israilov, who, with a handful of rebels, challenged the huge terror machine.

The path of the Chechen Komsomol member

Khasan Israilov is also known as Hasan Terloev, by a pseudonym he took from the name of his teip. Different sources give different dates of Israilov's birth: 1903 - according to the characteristics of the NKGB of the USSR, 1907 - according to a letter from the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Georgia Karanadze Lavrenty Beria with reference to Israilov's diary discovered in August 1943, 1910 - according to the Chechen historian Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov.

He was born in the village of Nashkhoy, Galanchozhsky district of Chechnya. In a family of six brothers, he was the youngest. It is noteworthy that he received both Islamic and secular education. In 1929 he graduated in Rostov-on-Don high school. In the same year, already being a member of the Komsomol, he joined the ranks of the CPSU (b).

But he did not actively participate in political affairs and devoted himself entirely to creative activity in the field of fiction, for which he had not only a personal passion, but also a great vocation. He wrote mostly poetry and plays. By virtue of his profession and inner need to tell the outside world the truth, as far as possible under Soviet conditions, Israilov became a regular correspondent for the Moscow Krestyanskaya Gazeta.

As Avtorkhanov writes, Israilov's articles in Krestyanskaya Gazeta, strong in argumentation and sharp in spirit, had only one theme: how local Soviet and party officials oppress the Chechen people. Under the guise of defending general Soviet laws from local executors, Israilov skillfully criticized these same laws using specific examples and people. Of course, such a "writing career" could not be successful and unpunished.

On the initiative of local Chekists in the spring of 1931, Khasan Israilov was arrested for "counter-revolutionary slander", "for connection with a gang" and sentenced to 10 years. Three years later, after the vigorous intervention of the Krestyanskaya Gazeta and after it turned out that some of the officials whom Israilov criticized as "robbers and bribe-takers" turned out to be them, in fact, Israilov was released and even reinstated in the party.

After his release, Israilov left for Moscow to study at the Communist University of the Workers of the East named after Stalin (KUTV), an institution of the Comintern that operated in the capital from 1921 to 1938. During this time, two books of his works of art written in prison.

Going into opposition

But Israilov is gradually moving away from poetry and moving on to active political activity. Already in Moscow, together with other Chechen-Ingush workers Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, Khusein Israilov, Khasan-Bek Atabaev, Nurdin Muzaev, Khadzhibekar Muralov, Magomed Mamakaev, Shamsudin Aishkhanov and Khasan-Bek Gelagaev, he submits an application to the Soviet government.

The statement states that the continuation of the current course of Soviet policy, which launched an attack on the religion and national heritage of the Chechen people, will inevitably lead to a general popular uprising. Therefore, Israilov and his associates demanded a change of course and the removal of Yegorov and People's Commissar of the Interior Raev.

The Soviet government forwards the application for "verification" to the place. Everything ends with the usual result: the arrest of Israilov and his friends. When, in early 1939, Raev and Yegorov were arrested as "enemies of the people", Israilov was released again. He was summoned to the regional committee to the new secretary of the regional committee Bykov and offered to apply to be reinstated in the party. Indeed, he sent a statement, but with a completely different content:

“For twenty years now, the Soviet government has been waging a war to destroy my people in parts - either as kulaks, or as mullahs and “bandits,” or as “bourgeois nationalists.” Now I am convinced that the war is now being waged to exterminate the entire people. Therefore, I decided to take the lead in the liberation war of my people.”

“I understand too well,” continues Israilov, “that it will be difficult for not only Chechen-Ingushetia, but even the entire national Caucasus to free itself from the heavy yoke of red imperialism, but fanatical faith in justice and legitimate hope for the help of the freedom-loving peoples of the Caucasus and the whole world inspire me to this in your eyes bold and senseless, but in my opinion the only correct historical step.

“The brave Finns are now proving that the great slave-owning empire is powerless against a small but freedom-loving people. In the Caucasus, you will have a second Finland, and other oppressed peoples will follow us,” he concluded.

The beginning of the uprising

Inspired by the example of the Finns who resisted the USSR, Khasan Israilov in January 1940 begins an uprising against the Stalinist regime. In the first days it was a success. By the beginning of February 1940, Khasan Israilov had already captured Galanchozh, Sayasan, Chaberloi and part of the Shatoevsky region. The rebels armed themselves by disarming and defeating the punitive detachments.

After the majority of the mountainous regions were cleared of the Bolsheviks, an armed people's congress was convened in Galanchozh and the proclamation of a "provisional people's revolutionary government of Checheno-Ingushetia" was announced, headed by Khasan Israilov himself.

The conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish treaty was a strong moral blow to Israilov's movement. However, he did not lose hope that he would be supported not only by other peoples of the Caucasus, that in the outbreak of the world war, Stalin would die under the blow of the combined forces of the democratic powers.

In his appeals to the people, Israilov prophesied just such an outcome of the war. When the Soviet-German war began, of course, the scope and scale of the Israilov uprising grew. On January 28, 1942, Israilov established the "Special Party of Caucasian Brothers" (OPKB), which set itself the goal of creating a free fraternal party in the Caucasus. Federal Republic states of the fraternal peoples of the Caucasus.

And in February 1942, that is, when the Germans were still near Taganrog - 500 kilometers from Checheno-Ingushetia, the Chechen lawyer Mayrbek Sheripov, brother of the famous revolutionary and national hero Chechnya Aslanbek Sheripov, raised an uprising in Shatoi and Itum-Kale and joined Hasan Israilov.

Accusation of links with the Germans

Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov in his book “People's murder in the USSR” writes: “When, in connection with the war, the partisan movement in the mountains of Checheno-Ingushetia, which had been continuously existing for two decades, intensified, the Soviet authorities decided that the Chechens and Ingush had a connection with the Germans». This turn of events turned out to be fatal not only for the Chechens and Ingush, but also for other peoples of the Caucasus.

It is noteworthy that, unlike the previous Caucasian uprisings led by imams and qadis, this movement was led by the Chechen intelligentsia of the new wave - the writer Khasan Israilov and the lawyer Mairbek Sheripov. This circumstance, that now people with a great education and political outlook became the head of the anti-Soviet partisan movement in the mountainous Chechen-Ingushetia, gave the NKVD a reason to build their false version that the Chechen-Ingush partisan movement the Germans are in charge.

However, it suffices to point out the fact, which is generally accessible for verification, that, even being right at the borders of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, the Germans did not transfer a single rifle or cartridge to Chechen-Ingushetia. Only individual spies and a large number of leaflets were transferred. But this was done wherever the front passed.

But the main thing is that the Israilov uprising began in the winter of 1940, that is, even when Stalin was in alliance with Hitler.

Neither the Bolsheviks nor the Nazis

Nevertheless, Israilov tried to take advantage of the military situation in the way that it was logical to do in the situation of an attack on his opponent by a third force. He proposed to take advantage of the struggle of the Nazi regime against Bolshevism to liberate the entire Caucasus and declare its complete independence.

Then a joint military headquarters of the rebels was created and the rebel government was reorganized accordingly. The rebels, through their representatives, tried to convey to the Germans that if "the liberation of the Caucasus consists in replacing some colonialists with others, then for the Caucasians this will only be a new stage in the ongoing national liberation war."

Thus, the leaders of the uprising made it very clear that they were not going to be under the rule of the Bolsheviks, nor under the rule of Nazi Germany, and that their ultimate goal was precisely the independence of the Caucasus from any world powers. But this fact was enough for the Stalinist regime not only to accuse the rebels of complicity with the Germans, but also in the bombing of the mountainous part of Chechnya and Ingushetia in 1942.

These bombings in the mountains of the Chechen-Ingush Republic led to a huge number of victims among women, children and the elderly. According to Avtorkhanova, in the villages of Shatoi, Itum-Kale and Galanchozh, there were more inhabitants killed by aerial bombardment and shelling by the Bolsheviks than those who survived. It was rare to find an uninjured person there. And this despite the fact that the Germans never entered the Chechen-Ingush territory.

Transformation of the Chechen resistance

It is worth noting that feature The rebel-partisan movement of Chechen-Ingushetia at that time was that, instead of the former spiritual authorities - imams and sheikhs, it was gradually headed by purely secular people and politically fully versed in all the intricacies of both the Soviet colonial policy in the Caucasus and its imperialist expansive aspirations on a global scale.

This was due to the fact that the Muslim peoples of the Caucasus, who at first welcomed October revolution, as liberation from the oppression of tsarism, who received equal rights with the rest, over time began to become more and more disillusioned with the Soviet regime. When the Bolsheviks launched an offensive against Islam, began to close mosques, abolish the Arabic alphabet, more and more Caucasians who believed in the Bolsheviks began to become their opponents.

Among the young Soviet intelligentsia in the Caucasus there were those who, consciously refusing the tempting prospects of an illusory personal career, became at the head of a nationwide, unprecedentedly difficult, and in the eyes of many, hopeless cause of the struggle for the freedom of their tormented and dying people. Khasan Israilov and Mairbek Sheripov belonged to the category of such young national leaders of the Chechen-Ingush people.

In the case of Mairbek Sheripov, it is noteworthy that he was the brother of the Chechen revolutionary Aslambek Sheripov, who established Soviet power in the Caucasus mountains. And already his brother Mayrbek Sheripov became disillusioned with this government and raised an uprising against it. But, be that as it may, it was not all the people who actively opposed this government, but only part of it.