The convoy of the Russian army - "goods", "carts"
In the middle of the 9th - beginning of the 10th centuries. The main routes of movement in the lands of the Eastern Slavs were rivers. Geographic conditions had an impact on the means of transportation and convoys of the troops.
The army of Russian princes consisted of Scandinavian squads and militias of the Slavs. Sources practically did not leave any mention of the convoys of the troops of the Eastern Slavs. As an exception, one can cite reports from Byzantine sources about one-trees (Gr. Monoksilion). K. V. Bazilevich in his work “From the history of sea voyages in the 7th-12th centuries.” Based on the testimony of the Venetian Barborough, who lived in Russia in the second quarter of the 15th century, he noted that about 8-10 horses and the same number of people could transport one-tree ships.
And if it is difficult to draw a conclusion about the capabilities of the Slavic ships due to the lack of sources, then with the ships of the Scandinavian squads the state of the sources is different.
The transport of the "Varangians" was the sea ships "Drakars", which, among other things, performed the tasks of a convoy. Archaeological evidence indicated that the Scandinavian ships in the lands of the Eastern Slavs differed from the ships used by the "Normans" in Western Europe. The difference was in size. If the "Norman" ship had a length of about 20 - 30 meters, then the Scandinavian ship moving along the rivers of the Slavs was 8 - 12 meters. Sea vessels"Normans" were not suitable for movement in the lands of the Eastern Slavs, not only because of the narrow river channels. They were much harder to "drag".
The size of the ships influenced not only the routes of movement. For example, Western European chronicles mentioned that the "Normans" transported horses on ships for the cavalry. As it was in England in 885
Chronicles about the events of the second half of the 9th century. - X century. they were silent about this side of the Russian ships, as well as about the Russian cavalry. A. N. Kirpichnikov, based on archaeological data, argued that already in the 10th century. cavalry existed in Russia. According to written sources, the first Russian cavalry were detachments of Pecheneg khans in the army of Igor Rurikovich in 944, possibly regiments of the Hungarian cavalry in 967 and an army of Pecheneg mercenaries in 971 in the army of Svyatoslav Igorevich. It is likely that the "Russian" cavalry in the X century. were nomads, not Scandinavians or Slavs.
If the first mention of raids on Byzantium under 860, 907, 944, testified that the actions were carried out along the coastal strip. The nomads followed the army overland. That evidence under 985, 1060, 1103 confirmed that the Russian river convoy even in the 11th century. did not have boats for transporting horses. The absence of cavalry ships did not change until the 15th century. It is possible that during the conquest of Perm in 1472 by the governor Fyodor Motley, Russian cavalry was transported by rafts, but there are no exact facts about this.
Naturally, the lack of river transport for the cavalry did not mean that in Kievan Rus in the X century. in general, all ships were only river. For example, in the “Large Russian Pravda” in article 73 we find a mention of the division of boats into river and sea. Probably, this message perfectly demonstrated that various courts existed in Kievan Rus. M. N. Tikhomirov attributed the emergence of the “Large Russian Pravda” to the beginning of the 13th century. (Velikiy Novgorod). It may not be entirely correct to use later evidence. However, it is important to note that even in the XIII century. the Russian cavalry troops did not have ships for transporting horses, despite the fact that the merchants had at their disposal sea and cargo ships. The absence of river transport for the cavalry was not the result of the absence of transport in Russia, but the result of strategic tasks. The princes did not need the delivery of cavalry. Horses followed along the rivers, accompanying the army.
The capacity of the ships did not in any way affect the main tactical superiority of the Scandinavian warriors over the enemy, both in Western Europe and in Russia - the surprise and swiftness of the attacks.
Probably, after an unsuccessful raid on Byzantium in 1043, the aggressive foreign policy Russia and the hiring of Scandinavian squads. As a result, campaigns against Byzantium and Bulgaria ceased. From the 50s of the XI century. the number of princes' troops decreases and the need for a river wagon train disappears.
However, the return to the experience of river transport occurred almost a century later. In the first half of the 12th century, when in the North-East of Russia the princes began to make river raids on the Volga Bulgars. The tradition consisted in the use of many river boats and foot troops, without mercenaries. In the raid of 1120, there were no Scandinavian squads in the army of Yuri Dolgoruky, although there were descendants of the Scandinavians among the command staff. For example, George Semenovich, the grandson of Shimon Afrikanych, brother of Yakun the Blind, who fought in the army of Yaroslav I, was the governor of Yuri. This moment can be called the birth of the Russian river convoy.
The changes were reflected in the attitude of sources to this topic. In contrast to the messages for the 9th - 10th centuries. it became known about the emergence of new courts, which can be traced by the names. In the XII century. in the South of Russia a “nasad” appears, in the Northeast “boat”, “plow”, “galley”. Under 1182, it was reported that the river convoy had its own guards (the Belozersky regiment in 1182). In the XIV century. In addition to boats and nasads, we meet “kerbats”, “ouchans”, “poroms”, “loivas”.
The creation in 1469 of the "ship's armies" probably turned the river convoy into a complex and large structure, which included both purely military ("boyar children") and civilian components (gunsmiths, cloth makers, merchants). Under 1469, it was mentioned that the "ship's rati" consisted of large and small courts. Large ships were placed away from the fighting, they unloaded booty.
A few facts suggest that the river convoy passed long haul development. From the river convoy to the "ship's troops". The ships carried warriors, food, weapons, armor, booty. Convoys were universal and fully met the strategic objectives. The main advantage of the river convoy was that it did not impede the movement of the troops, did not depend on weather conditions. Large stocks of collateral made Russian army mobile, which made it possible to maintain tactical superiority - the surprise of attacks.
According to sources, the first mention of the overland convoy of the Russian army is found in Vladimir Monomakh's "Instruction", which was preserved in the Laurentian Chronicle under 1096, "weapons were sent ahead on the wagon." From the words of Prince Vladimir it followed that the wagon train was probably served by smerds. The convoy had no security. What animals were used in the convoy is not known, as is not known the number of convoys, wagons and many others. others
According to I. I. Sreznevsky, the word for convoy appeared in the sources about the events of the late 11th - early 12th centuries. and corresponded to the word "goods". F. P. Sorokoletov also noted that the Russian convoy was called a “goods”.
The first mention of the "goods", which can be confidently attributed to the testimony of an eyewitness, was related to the events of the end of the 11th century. During the princely congress of 1097 in Lyubech, the princes settled for the night in the “goods” “at Vasilko v. four . november. and moved to Vıdobıch. and the idea to bow to Styam Michael in the monastery. and that dinner. and put your goods on Ruditsi. in the evening I would come with my goods. The use of the word "goods" in this certificate most likely meant "convoy".
Appearance in written sources of the late XI century. references to the land convoy was not accidental. First, the heyday of Kievan Rus under Yaroslav the Wise led to the relative development of overland routes, which contributed to the active use of new means of transportation. Secondly, in the 70s of the XI century. in the South-East of Russia, a new rival appeared - the Polovtsians. This, at first glance, an insignificant event, led to a change in Russian military art: strategy, tactics, types of troops. The strategy began to consist in the defense of the southern Russian borders. For this purpose, other types of troops were needed, taking into account the territorial features of southern Russia (steppe) and types of enemy troops. The swiftness of the lightly armed cavalry of the Polovtsy demanded similar activity from the Russian troops. Probably, from that moment on, the Russian princes begin to move from the formation of a heavily armed foot army to a heavily armed cavalry army. Heavy weapons did not allow the Russian soldier to be in combat readiness for a long time. However, the Polovtsians had to pursue for a long time and penetrate deep into the steppes. The cavalry army began to need a convoy, which did not slow down the movement. For the sake of the mobility of the convoy, the princes reduced it, or did without it at all. For example, in 1042, the horse army of Vladimir Yaroslavich, without convoys, attacked the Yemi tribes (tavasts, khame, Soviet Finland). However, during the raid, a "peace" suddenly appeared among the horses and the army "became" on foot.
The relief of convoys was due to a decrease in food supplies.
How did it affect? A small wagon train did not burden the army, creating the advantage of a surprise attack (“in the fight”, “exile”, “exit”). Many of the successes of the Russian troops were achieved thanks to an unexpected attack on the enemy. For example, the victory of Yaropolk Vsevolodovich in 1125 over the Polovtsy, the victory in 1228 of the posadnik Vladislav over the tribes of Yemi, the success of Alexander Nevsky over the Swedes in 1240, the attack early morning May 21, 1469, the Russian troops to Kazan "still sleeping to everyone." The above Russian victories would be in question if the army collected carts, and then attacked the enemy with them. For example, chronicles preserved evidence of how a large convoy caused the defeat. In 1151, after an unsuccessful attempt to take Kyiv, the army of Yuri Dolgoruky retreated to join with the allied prince Volodymyrko of Galicia. Yuri was pursued by Prince Izyaslav Mstislavich. The army of the Rostov prince could not break away from Izyaslav. The reason for the defeat of Yuri Dolgoruky was his own convoy, which did not allow him to escape from the enemy. Izyaslav still managed to overtake the enemy's carts and began to take them away. Yuri Vladimirovich was forced to stop the movement of the troops and turn around for the battle “before hitting the rear of their regiments. and carts take them away. and tacos turning around. their shelves. and stash against them. we go and fight them.” At the Maly Rutets River, Yuri Dolgoruky was defeated and fled.
Izvestia testifies that a large convoy fettered the actions of the troops, depriving them of maneuverability. A small convoy in relation to raiding tactics was an absolute plus, allowing the army to unexpectedly attack, hide, maneuver or pursue the enemy.
The disadvantage of rapid attacks was the loss of initiative when the enemy could beat off the first Russian onslaught. In this situation, the small size of the wagon train had a negative effect, which limited food supplies "a little more with them, they had a stock, they were more exiled." Famine could arise in the army, given the hostile territories. The mention of this is found more than once on the pages of chronicles. Famine in the army of Svyatoslav Igorevich in Bulgaria in 972, famine in 1194 in the army of Novgorodians in a raid on Yugra, famine in the army of Ivan III sent to Kazan in 1468. It was also necessary to take into account that help from the Russian lands would not pass away. The practice of delivering food in foreign possessions to the Russian army was not used until the 80s of the 15th century.
However, while examining historical sources, although not often, we come across references that even in actions over short distances, being in Russian lands, there was a famine. For example, in 1016, after a long “standing” in the army of Yaroslav I, food began to run out, because of which the soldiers began to scatter. In 1160, famine arose after 6 weeks of “standing” near Minsk in the army of Zhiroslav Nazhirovich. During the siege of Novgorod in 1169, famine arose 4 days later in the army of Andrei Bogolyubsky. In 1213, famine arose during the retreat from Galich in the army of Daniel Romanovich. In 1316, retreating from Novgorod, the army of Prince Mikhail of Tver got lost, which caused famine.
Evidence from sources about the famine in the Russian army, when it fought in foreign countries and in Russian territories, indicated that, in addition to small convoys, the Russian army was not able to establish contact with local residents. For example, in 1169, on the road to Novgorod, the army of Andrei Bogolyubsky destroyed everything in its path “having come only to their land. you do a lot of evil. and the wives and children of the estate took. and poimasha cattle. Therefore, it is not surprising that famine occurred in Novgorod after 4 days. The army that attacked Kazan in 1468 found itself in the same situation. Fighting in the lands of the enemy, the Russians robbed the local population, and after everything was burned, and the surviving inhabitants fled, hunger arose in the Russian army.
And if we are faced with evidence of famine in the Russian army over long and short distances, in actions on foreign and domestic lands, then there are facts of hunger occurring right during the conduct of hostilities. The Novgorod first chronicle reported under 1234 that, while pursuing the Lithuanian army, some of the soldiers of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich ran out of provisions. The prince was forced to let the soldiers go home.
It is likely that the matter was not in large or small distances, but in tactical features, due to which the princes, in order to achieve victory through a surprise attack, put the army under the threat of starvation.
From the previous observations it follows that at the end of the X century. in the South of Russia, a river convoy appeared, and in the 20s of the XII century. a land convoy arose - "goods", which consisted of wagons, sledges. The Russian convoy was called “goods” in the South of Russia, “carriage”, “pavoski” in the North-West, “carts” in the North-East. The convoy was small. His task was to deliver weapons, armor and occasionally store booty. Ruining other people's possessions, the princes mostly immediately sent the booty home with carts. For example, in 1445, sources reported that Prince Boris of Tver seized the booty of Moscow, Novgorod and Torzhkov merchants in Torzhok and sent a convoy of 40 wagons to Tver "forty pavos brought to Tfer, and other pavos drowned in the river with goods." The convoy did not have security, because it continuously followed the army or returned through the plundered lands. For tactical purposes, the wagon train was often thrown "tossed by carts", after the faults were armed and began to pursue the enemy. As an exception, one can cite the case when Prince Yaroslav Vsevolodovich remained to guard the convoy. In this state, the land convoy will exist without undergoing changes until almost the 15th century.
When comparing river and land carts, the superiority was on the side of the river. This was indicated by the constant development of river carts. From the river convoy in the X century. to "ship's men" in the 15th century, from vehicles to a fortified camp ("jail"), from a merchant-warrior to "boyar children", princely-boyar servants, blacksmiths and merchants.
The above facts related to what the Russian convoy was like in the 9th - 15th centuries. And what could he be? In comparison with the carts of the "Crusades", the Russian system of carts was clearly inferior because it could not cope with such large-scale actions. But, it should also be noted that the need for such actions " Crusades The Russian princes did not have.
The Rurikovichs did not set themselves the task of conquering new lands outside the lands of the Eastern Slavs. The princes were focused on solving internal tasks. Therefore, the absence complex system carts was the result of a lack of challenging tasks.
The article with notes can be downloaded
To function properly, Gribeauval's system had to have skilled carters for guns and ammunition boxes. Previously, they were provided by private contractors and were civilians. As a result, episodes repeatedly occurred when they refused to transport guns because of their unwillingness to be under enemy fire.
As an officer, Napoleon could not tolerate the use of civilian drivers, and as a commander of troops in the 1790s, he was many times on the verge of being thwarted by civilian contractors, because he could not be completely sure that his guns and ammunition boxes would delivered at the right time and the right place. At that time he had practically no power to change such a completely unsatisfactory system, and had to limit himself only to the desire to achieve the greatest possible efficiency from the teamsters at his disposal. In Italy, he managed to partially subordinate his contract drivers to military discipline, first in May 1796, detaching soldiers into convoy units, and then forming even more militarized “transport brigades” in his Italian army for each artillery battery. In Egypt, far from the metropolis and lobbyists for private contractors, he went even further and simply organized an army artillery convoy in the form of a battalion of 12 companies.
Artillery convoy on the march, 1805 Napoleon in 1800 transferred this important service to the military department, thus significantly increasing its effectiveness. A team of six horses was used in horse artillery to carry 12-pounder field guns.
In 1800, Napoleon, who returned to France, was already the First Consul, and as the first person in the state, led the army of the republic. Almost immediately after receiving power, he decreed, on January 3, 1800 and August 4, 1801, the formation of an artillery convoy, each of which consisted of six companies attached to foot and horse artillery. General Marmont, who later claimed in his memoirs that it was he who proposed the militarization of the baggage train, was put in charge of this process, which consisted mainly in the selection, equipment, training and distribution of former civilian drivers into companies. Henceforth they had to obey military laws and discipline. All of the above measures were quickly completed, and in the future, the delivery of guns and charging boxes to their destination was much easier and more reliable. Each foot artillery field gun and its load box were carried by a team of four horses (six for 12-pounder guns), at least in principle. Later, during the campaigns in Spain and Portugal, the use of mules, which were the usual means of transport in these countries, became widespread in regiments of foot artillery.
Since these battalions were auxiliary troops that could be under fire, but at the same time the soldiers were not required to take a direct part in the battles, except in self-defense, the baggage companies were led by sergeants. In general, we can say that in the battle the wagonmen were more like spectators than actors. To indicate this difference from the field troops, their uniforms were light grey-blue or azure with a dark blue applied color in contrast to the gunners' uniforms, which were dark blue with a scarlet applied color; their personal weapons were limited to a short cleaver (hanger). Command staff the transport battalion included a captain, a lieutenant and a quartermaster; they were subordinate to the corresponding artillery commander. Initially, as mentioned above, there were eight baggage battalions, in 1804 their number increased to 10, in October 1805 to 11 and in April 1808 to 13. By an imperial decree of April 18, 1810, the number of battalions was doubled and thus reached 26; The 27th battalion was added in August 1809 by including the Dutch army's artillery train.
In addition to the above, in Spain since December 1810, companies of artillery convoy workers were formed, whose task was to repair and manufacture charging boxes and field forges. They wore the uniform of the supply battalions with the addition of azure epaulettes and white grenades on the lapels, as they were considered elite companies.
In addition, the consular, later imperial, guards had their own transport companies for their artillery counterparts.
Mikhail PresnukhinRussian army of the era of the anti-Napoleonic wars of 1799-1815. was saturated with "technique", i.e. first of all, vehicles necessary for the transportation of ammunition, food, uniforms, weapons and much more that was needed for the conduct of hostilities.
The most "technical" branch of the troops of that time was, of course, artillery. Artillery guns themselves were engineering structures, and many types of simple machines and mechanisms were used for their maintenance, such as, for example, for lifting and moving heavy loads, and for various other types of work.
"Park" of combat and Vehicle artillery consisted of several types of artillery systems, means of their transportation and supply of ammunition; as well as from a variety of auxiliary carts, which transported tools, spare structures, parts and materials for the repair of guns, this also included camping forges, carts for pontoon bridges, all kinds of carts to ensure the life of artillery personnel, hospital wagons, apothecary boxes and many others. . others
Field artillery guns of the Russian army and artillery line convoy
Artillery of the Russian army 1799 - 1815 It was subdivided into field, siege and garrison (or fortress). Field artillery guns, in turn, were divided into
battery or heavy and light, the differences between which were significant, including in appearance.
In this era, field artillery was armed with guns of different years of manufacture, starting from the reign of Catherine, then Pavlovsk and Alexander,
samples of which for each caliber were somewhat different from each other, both in weight and linear characteristics, and in appearance, even after
"Transportation" of old trunks according to new models.
Battery artillery
1. 1/2-pood (half-pood) unicorn of the artillery system of 1797, with the barrel of the modification of 1805, on the carriage of the modification of 1805.
The unicorn is the most "national" type of artillery gun of the Russian army; it had no analogues in other European armies. The unicorn got its name from the mythical
the animal depicted on the coat of arms of General Feldzeugmeister Count Shuvalov, under whose leadership the tools of this system were developed back in the middle of the 18th century.
An artillery gun of this caliber belonged to heavy artillery and was in service with battery companies. It was called half a pound by the weight of the projectile, which
shot - grenades weighing half a pood or 20 pounds.
It consists of a gun barrel, a wooden carriage, as well as a special “front end” necessary for transporting a unicorn, and a special charging box for storing and
transportation of charges, which was a regular accessory of each gun.
The unicorn carriage was a two-wheeled machine, the main bearing part of which was two beds or carriage boards mounted on the axis, diverging towards
trunk. These boards were bound around the perimeter with iron strips and fastened together with four wooden pillows through which iron bolts were passed.
Airborne pillows, i.e. the bars connecting the carriage beds have the following names: combat, medium and trunk. The frontal or combat airbag is located in the front
carriage parts. The two middle pads serve as the base for the wedge pad in which the lifting wedge moves. Trunk pillow, with a hole in the form of a truncated cone,
bursts the bed in the trunk and serves to connect the gun carriage with the limber. It also had brackets (large and small) for inserting rules - wooden levers,
employees for turning the gun carriage to the sides. Initially, two brackets for one rule were installed on all field carriages. Right in the center of the trunk pillow,
then the brackets were moved from the center to the right frame, and later four brackets for two rules were made on battery carriages, because. battery guns were very
heavy to turn.
The wedge pad does not have a purpose similar to other pads. A long copper tube with a screw thread inside is fixed in it, in which the lifting screw moves.
wedge. To rotate the screw, there is a handle at its rear end. The screw was fixed in the desired position with the help of a pawl that descended into the grooves located on the screw near
star handles. The wedge pad is bolted to the two middle pads.
The field artillery had two wedges - one for battery carriages, and the other for light ones. They differed only in the size of their parts.
The carriage or combat axis consisted of a middle part in the form of a tetrahedral beam, called an axis blade, and two rounded ends of the axis, having the shape of truncated
cones. To better secure the axis in the carriage, cutouts were made in it, corresponding to the cutouts of the frame. Wooden axles had some advantage over
iron, adopted in other armies, because. were slightly lighter, significantly cheaper and, in the event of a breakdown, easier to manufacture in the field.
The wheel consisted of a hub, which was put on the axle with its through hole, spokes and a rim. The hub and rim were fastened with iron fittings. The rim consisted of six
parts called shanks. Battery artillery used wheels 41/2 feet in diameter. Wheel diameter 1369 mm.
Barrel caliber - the diameter of the gun channel of a half-pood unicorn was 6 inches and 1 1/3 tenths of an inch, or 155.5 mm, the barrel length (without vines) was 10 calibers and 24
parts of caliber (10 1/2 cal.), or 1630 mm.
The weight of the gun barrel is from 41 poods to 42 1/2 poods, i.e. from 671.5 kg to 696 kg,
The length of the carriage is 11 feet, the weight of the carriage is 36 pounds. 10 pounds - 38 pounds = 627.5 kg.
2. 12-pound cannon of medium proportions of the artillery system of 1797, with the barrel of the modification of 1805, on the carriage of the modification of 1805.
The cannons were named for the weight of the projectiles applied to them, and the 12-pound cannon fired 12-pound iron cannonballs.
Caliber 4.75" (4" and 7 1/2 tenths), or 120.5 mm.
Barrel length 16 caliber 12 parts (16.5 cal.), or 1990 mm (without vingrad).
Barrel weight 49-50 pounds, or 802.5 - 819 kg.
The length of the carriage is 10 feet, the weight of the carriage is 35 pounds. 10 lb.
Wheel diameter 1369 mm.
3. 12-pounder gun of a smaller proportion of the artillery system of 1797, with the barrel of the modification of 1805, on the carriage of the modification of 1805.
Caliber 4.75 inches, or 120.5 mm. Barrel length 13 calibers (without vineyard), or 1570 mm. Barrel weight 28 - 30 pounds, or 458.5 - 491.5 kg.
The carriage had a carriage box for accessories, and, if necessary, for 2-3 buckshots with charges. The box had a hinged sheet iron lid and was held in a gun carriage.
on three iron strips, reinforced across the beds.
Carriage length 9 feet 2 1/2 inches, carriage weight 35 pounds. 10 lb.
Wheel diameter 1369 mm.
4. Front end for battery artillery guns of the modification of 1805 (the so-called "model of 1805").
For the movement of a half-pood unicorn on the battlefield and on the march, a special limber was used, directly into which a horse harness was harnessed, and on which
the instrument itself rested. The front end consisted of two wheels with an axle to which the drawbars, a drawbar and a slab were attached. The connection of the gun with the limber was carried out as follows
Thus, the trunk (rear) pillow of the unicorn gun carriage was put on the kingpin (pivot) - the vertical pin of the limber through a special hole and was fixed with a chain.
The pivot was moved back to the end of the slants, which made it easier to apply and remove from the front end, increased agility (small with the carriage beds diverging towards the trunk) and
reduced the horizontal oscillations of the drawbar with sufficient balance. But with the pressure of the trunk on the drawbars, the drawbar rose strongly upwards, especially with an empty front end,
and when hauling one limber, the drawbar was pressed down.
On the battery limber, a small box with a flat roof was installed in front of the axle, in which artillery supplies were placed, and during the fighting they could
place two or four charges.
6 horses were used to harness a half-pood unicorn, in rare cases it was allowed to have a team of 8 horses. The harness was used collar.
The limber wheels were smaller in diameter than the carriage wheels, to increase agility, with a diameter of 4 feet, or 1219 mm.
The weight of the forged front end with wheels without sockets is 16 pounds 30 pounds, the weight of the front end is 17 pounds, or 280.7 kg.
The total weight of the artillery system, i.e. guns with a limber in the stowed position was 96 pounds - 101.5 pounds, or 1536 - 1624 kg.
5. Charging box (the so-called "model of 1805", with frames for a half-pood unicorn and 12-pound guns).
The charging box served for storage and transportation of charges. For the transportation of ammunition (120 charges) of a half-pood unicorn and 12-pound guns, it was envisaged
the use of three charging boxes, each of which contained 40 charges.
The charging box was two-wheeled, furious, with a wooden axle, on which the frame was fixed, and a box with a gable roof, upholstered with sheet iron, was installed on it.
The roof was openable on hinges nailed to the left side of the box. The box itself was fastened at the corners with iron squares, and on the sides with strips that fastened it to the frame.
The interior of the box was divided by a wooden insert frame into cells for shells. All battery and light guns used the same chargers.
boxes that differed only in the size of the frame nests.
The frame of the box for the 1/2-pood unicorn had 40 sockets, for the 12-pound gun - 40 sockets and 6 compartments for storing pulp, wick, scorching candles, quick-firing
tubes, as well as, if necessary, a firecracker, a night lamp and a candle case.
Three horses were harnessed to the charging box, one between the shafts, the other two - on the sides of it. The box was controlled by a rider, who sat astride the left harness horse,
transportation of the gun crew on the box itself was not allowed.
Wheels with a diameter of 4 feet, or 1219 mm.
The weight of a forged box with wheels without nests is 18 pounds 30 pounds.
The weight of nests for 1/2 pood of a unicorn is 1 pood. 35 pounds, for 12-pound guns - 1 pood 30 pounds and 2 1/2.
Light and horse artillery
1. 1/4-pood unicorn for foot artillery of the artillery system of 1797, with a barrel of the sample of 1783 (?), modification of 1805, on a carriage of modification of 1805.
Barrel length 11 calibers (without vineyard), or 1350 mm.
Barrel weight 21 pounds 20 pounds - 22 pounds., Or 347 - 360 kg.
Carriage length 8 feet, 5 1/2 inches, carriage weight 20 pounds. 20 lb.
The light and horse artillery used wheels 4 feet in diameter. Wheel diameter 1219 mm.
2. 1/4-pood unicorn for horse artillery of the artillery system of 1797, with a barrel of the sample of 1799 (?), modification of 1805, on a carriage of modification of 1805
The gun barrels of the quarter-pound horse artillery unicorns were shorter and their walls thinner than those of the foot artillery unicorns, so the weight of the former was slightly less,
than a similar foot gun. This was done ostensibly to reduce the load on the draft horses and provide the unicorn with more mobility. But on
practice failed to achieve this, the carriages of horse unicorns did not become lighter, and the weight of the entire artillery system of a horse quarter-pood unicorn (gun, gun carriage and
front) was only 1 pood less than the foot one. The beds of this unicorn were parallel, and not diverging towards the trunk, which made it possible to install between
the beds of a special removable box, in which artillery supplies were placed during transportation, and sometimes charges in combat conditions.
Caliber 4.85 inches (4 inches and 8 1/2 tenths), or 123 mm.
Barrel length 10 calibers (without vineyard), or 1230 mm.
Barrel weight 19 pounds, or 310 kg.
Carriage length 8 feet, 5 1/2 inches, carriage weight 21 pounds. 10 lb.
Wheel diameter 4 feet, or 1219 mm.
3. 6-pounder gun of the artillery system of 1797, for foot and horse artillery, with a barrel of the model of 1795, modification of 1805, on a carriage of modification of 1805.
The carriage of the 6-pound gun differed from those described above not only in size, but also in individual structural elements, in particular, a smaller number of fittings. Beds
the carriage of this gun was parallel, and not diverging towards the trunk, which made it possible to install a special removable box between the beds, in which, when
artillery supplies were stowed for transportation, and in combat conditions, sometimes charges.
Caliber - 3.767 inches (3 inches and 7 2/3 tenths of an inch), or 95.5 mm, barrel length 17 calibers, or 1620 mm. barrel weight 22 - 22.2 pounds, or 360 - 364 kg,
Carriage length 8 feet, carriage weight 20 pounds. 10 lb. - 395 kg.
The wheel diameter of the 6-pounder is 4 feet, or 1219 mm.
4. 3-pound unicorn(In practice, he almost did not participate in wars).
Caliber - 3.25 inches (3 inches and 2 1/2 tenths of an inch), or 82.5 mm.
5. Front for light artillery guns: 6-pounder guns and ¼ pood unicorns and 3-pound unicorns of the 1805 modification.
The limbers for transporting these guns had special boxes for shells, the so-called "first shots". The boxes differed from the forward battery boxes
carriages large sizes, rounded roof, and the fact that they were mounted directly above the axle, and not in front of it, and were heavier than the first when fully equipped. Inside
The limber box was placed in a wooden frame, divided by partitions into cells, where part of the set of charges intended for the guns was stored. In front charger
a box of a 6-pounder gun contained 20 shots, mostly grape shots. For a 3-pound unicorn, there were 30 such nests in the frame, for both 1/4-pood ones - 12.
To move the gun on the battlefield and on the march, the trunk (rear) carriage cushion was put through a special hole on the kingpin (vertical pin) of the front end,
mounted on top of the slab, and secured with a chain. Unlike the battery limber, this limber for light guns did not have a snitche cushion, its function
tying the ends of the ribs was performed by a croaker, and it also did not have an axial cushion, instead of which a wide board was laid on the ribs.
The wheels and axles of all limbers of light and horse artillery were the same as those of light carriages.
Four horses were used to transport a 6-pound cannon and 1/4-pood unicorns. Since 1811, in the 6-pound cannon and 1/4-pound unicorns of the guards
horse artillery was harnessed not by four, as in a foot company, but by six horses. The harness was used collar. Two riders sat on the left horses.
The weight of the forged limber with wheels without nests is 16 pounds 20 pounds, the weight of one nest for a 6-pound gun is 25 pounds, for 1/4-pound unicorns - 30 pounds, for
A 3 pound unicorn is 23 pounds.
The total weight of this entire artillery system in the stowed position, together with the limber, is 1090 kg.
6. Charging box (the so-called "model of 1805" with frames for a 6-pound gun, 1/4-pood unicorns and a 3-pound unicorn).
For transportation of ammunition for light and mounted guns, two charging boxes were intended. For a 6-pounder gun - 120 charges, charges in each, and 18 charges in
front box.
Structurally, this box did not differ from the battery artillery charging box, there was a slight difference only in the dimensions and arrangement of the inner frame of the box, in the cells
which the charges were placed.
The box frame for the 6-pounder had 51 slots for charges, 2 large and 4 small compartments for wick, scorching candles, rapid-firing pipes and more. For
1/4-pood unicorns - 54 nests. For a 3 pounder - 88 sockets, and moreover, there were free place for pulp, wick, scorching candles, quick-firing pipes and
Two horses were harnessed to the box of a 6-pound cannon (as well as a 3-pound unicorn), as follows, between the shafts, a root horse, and a harness on the left, on
which the rider was sitting. And three horses, like those of battery artillery boxes, were harnessed to boxes of 1/4-pood unicorns.
The weight of a shackled charging box with wheels without sockets is 18 pounds 30 pounds.
The weight of nests for 1/4 pood of a unicorn is 1 pood. 30 pounds, for 6-pound guns - 2 pounds 20 pounds, for 3-pound unicorns - 2 pounds 35 pounds.
Siege artillery
A two-pound mortar of siege artillery, model 1805.
The siege artillery of the Russian army was widely used in the foreign campaigns of 1813 during the sieges of fortresses, in particular in the famous siege of Danzig.
A two-pound mortar was mounted on a special machine without wheels, which was an oak frame on which a gun carriage was mounted from two beds connected
pillows.
Dissolutions of siege artillery of the 1807 model.
For the transportation of siege mortars, special four-wheeled wagons were used - dissolutions.
The forward course of dissolutions consists of an axle with wheels and a drawbar, (connected to the ends of the axle by rope braces).
The reverse gear had wheels of a larger diameter, on the axle of which a special pillow was attached to install a mortar machine on it. The front and rear were connected by a sling.
Two pairs of horses were harnessed to the dissolution of the siege mortar, which were driven by two riders sitting on horseback.
For the transportation of siege mortar ammunition, dissolutions of the 1807 model were also used, with boxes, boxes and chairs installed on them, each type for
own type of shells or artillery accessories; other types of wagons were also used: artillery decks with canvas of the 1806 model, and
roofed artillery decks.
The convoy of siege artillery was the most numerous and varied in design.
Dismissal of siege artillery:
- simple , of the same design as the battery ones, but not the shafts, but the drawbars, were intended for the transportation of kegor mortars.
The forward course of dissolutions consists of an axle with wheels and a drawbar, (connected to the ends of the axle by rope braces). A pillow is fixed on the blade of the rear axle, in which longitudinal round beds are embedded, fastened with a pillow with shackles, a wooden pillow is attached to the front ends of the beds, based on an axis
forward run. Through this pillow and the front axle, a kingpin is passed, the front cushion of the release is fastened to the back cushion of the seat, to which the forward course is tied with ropes by two arcuate beams, put on by the ends on the rear axle.
Boards are placed on the front and back pillows of the dissolution; staples are attached to the front cushion, and arcuate bars inserted into them to the upper ends the latter are suspended on ropes for harnessing harness horses, these rollers are hinged at one end to the beds of the drogues.
Stroke width - 48 dm, stroke length - 90 dm. The diameter of the front wheels with tires is 36 dm, the rear wheels are 45 dm. Tire thickness ½ dm, width - 2 ½ dm.
The length of the axle or the total width of the wagon is 67 dm. The length of the wagon without a drawbar is 131 dm. The height of the wagon is 37 dm.
Stability - 24 degrees, independence of moves - small, angle of inclination of the traces - 10-12 degrees, width of the road for a circular race - 294 dm,
- with armchairs , of the same design as the previous ones, but a box consisting of wooden arcs, sheathed with boards and fastened with longitudinal and cross beds. They were intended for the transportation of shells, empty weighed 41 pounds, and loaded - 90 pounds. The dimensions and characteristics are the same as for ordinarydissolutions, except that the height of the wagon was 50 dm.
- with box , the same design as simple ones, but with a box installed on them, sheathed with boards or bast; intended for the transport of spare timber. Height wagons - 54 dm, other dimensions are similar to those indicated above.
- with drawer , of the same design, but with a 4-coal box with a roof attached to them; were intended for the transportation of incendiary shells and buckshot, for which the box had nests. The height of the wagon is 57 dm, other characteristics are similar to the previous ones. The weight of empty dissolutions is 43 pounds.
Artillery deck model 1806.
Carts of this type belonged to the non-combatant convoy of artillery, there were two types: a deck with a roof; and a deck with a tarpaulin.
- artillery deck with tarpaulin . It was intended for the carriage of barrels of gunpowder and other ammunition. In siege artillery, they were used to carry bombs and quick-firing pipes and scorching candles, previously laid in barrels or boxes.
A drawbar cart on wooden axles, with a pivot on the axle, with a rectangular body covered with a leather tarpaulin. Harnessed by three horses.
The front course of the wagon consists of a wooden axle with wooden slats fixed on it, at the front ends of which a vaga with headstock for lines is fixed; The vaga is connected to the ends of the axle with braces, a drawbar is inserted between the ribs.
The reverse gear is connected to the front seatpost and pivot, passing through the front tie bar of the box frame and the front axle, the base of the box is a wooden frame, consisting of longitudinal beds fastened with transverse bars.
In the longitudinal beds, vertical posts are strengthened, connected by upper longitudinal beds. Instead of a rear shield, it is tied to vertical posts with ropes a wooden frame (mark), in the space between which and the box is placed fodder; brackets are attached to the upper beds of the box to strengthen the canvas arches;
the latter are covered with a tarpaulin covering the mark.
- artillery deck with roof . A deafening wagon, intended for carrying workshop and laboratory tools in field artillery, and in siege - for hauling ready-made frames and luminous cores.
It was harnessed by three horses, had an arched body and wheels of different diameters. It was similar in design to the deck described above, except that instead of arcs for a tarpaulin, a roof covered with canvas is attached to the upper beds of the box.
Blacksmith convoy
Camping smithy model 1807.
Each artillery company was supposed to have one field forge mounted on a two-wheeled wagon. This forge was intended for the production of minor repairs of guns and numerous carts of an artillery convoy, for manufacturing in field conditions by forging the simplest metal parts and fixtures. The forge was serviced by one blacksmith and two artisans. They repaired wheels, axles, gun carriages, charging boxes, trucks, making nails, wedges, tires, fittings, horseshoes and more for this. others
The forge was a special wooden machine, on which a furnace lined with bricks, furs and a rocker were fixed to set them in motion. To facilitate inflation in the forge of charcoal, a counterweight, usually an empty mortar bomb, was attached to the end of the lever. On the back of the frame, a box with a blacksmith's tool was strengthened, on the lid of which a bag of coal was placed. To keep the wagon in a horizontal position during the work of the forge, each shaft was equipped with a stand.
The wagon itself weighed 31 pounds, and loaded in the stowed position - about 70 pounds.
The smithy was harnessed by a trio of horses, which were driven by a rider who sat on the left harness horse.
The anvil, blacksmith's and various other tools were transported in a special tool semi-furca of the 1807 model. The supply of charcoal was also transported in a special wagon, a deck of the 1806 model or artillery dissolutions of the 1807 model.
Thus, for the reconstruction of the traveling forge and the entire economy associated with it, it will be necessary to manufacture three types of wagons.
Instrumental half fur coat of the 1807 model.
It was used in artillery to transport workshop and laboratory instruments. It was a deafening wagon, two-axle, with wheels of different diameters, with an arched lattice body that had an iron roof. A seat for the driver was arranged in front of the body, and a wooden frame-mark was reinforced with ropes at the back.
A half-furok was harnessed by a trio of horses.
Semi-furk axles are wooden. The forward course consists of an axle, on the ends of which shafts with rope braces are put on; longitudinal beds are fixed on the reverse axis, in the front part of which there is a pillow lying on the blade of the front axle; the kingpin is on the front axle and passes through the axle and cushion; on the beds, a body was strengthened, consisting of wooden arches, sheathed with boards and connected at the top with longitudinal beds. At the back of the body, a wooden frame is marked with ropes, the body is closed with a sheet metal roof, lockable, and a seat for the driver is arranged in front of the body.
Arc-shaped bars are attached to the pillow with rollers suspended from them on ropes for attaching harness horses; the rolls are hinged to the body at one end, while the other end is fastened with a rope brace with beds of dissolutions, a step is attached to the front end of the latter.
Stroke width - 60 dm, stroke length - 81 dm. The diameter of the front wheels with tires - 36 dm., rear - 45 dm. Bar thickness ½ dm, bar width 2 dm. The length of the axle or the total width of the wagon is 87 dm, the length of the wagon without a drawbar is 132 dm.
Body length - 87 dm, height with roof - 42 dm, width at the top - 51 dm.
The height of the entire wagon is 76 dm.
Battery dissolutions of the 1807 model (deafening) - were used in field artillery.
A stunning wagon with a three-horse harness, designed to carry spare items. The weight of empty dissolutions is 35 pounds, full - 94 pounds.
The front stroke of the dissolutions consists of an axle with wheels and a shaft, connected to the ends of the axle by rope braces. A pillow is fixed on the blade of the rear axle, into which longitudinal round beds are cut, fastened to the pillow with forgings, a wooden pillow is attached to the front ends of the beds, resting on the forward axle. Through this pillow and the front axle, a king-pin is passed, the front cushion of the release is fastened to the rear cushion of the seat, to which, near the forward stroke, two arched beams are tied with ropes, put on the ends on the rear axle.
Boards are placed on the front and back pillows of the dissolution; brackets are attached to the front cushion, and with arcuate bars inserted into them, to the upper ends of the latter, rolls are hung on ropes for harnessing harness horses, these rolls are hinged at one end to the beds of the drogues.
Stroke width - 48 inches, stroke length - 89 inches; diameter of front wheels with tire - 36 dm, rear - 45 dm. Tire thickness - ½ dm, width - 2 ½ dm.
Axle length - 67 dm. The length of the wagon without a drawbar is 131 dm. The height of the wagon is 37 dm.
The stability of the wagon is 20 degrees, the independence of the moves is small, the angle of inclination of the traces is 10-12 degrees, the width of the road for a circular race is 294 dm.
Sanitary convoy
A wagon with an apothecary's box, model 1799 and model 1812.
In each infantry, cavalry and pioneer regiment, as well as in artillery and pontoon companies, it was supposed to have a pharmacy wagon. It was a two-axle four-wheeled structure, to the frame of which the body was suspended on four wooden springs with the help of belts, and removable boxes were attached to the front and rear axles. The body of the wagon was divided into sections inside, in which there were pharmacy boxes with surgical instruments, medicines and dressings.
A pair of horses were harnessed to the wagon with the help of a drawbar, driven by a driver sitting on the front removable box. There was room on the back box for a lightly wounded or sick soldier.
In 1812, the troops began to receive a new model of a pharmacy wagon, which, in terms of design and functional purpose, was generally similar to the model of 1799, differing significantly only in the dimensions and design of the box. Also, to increase the reliability of the chassis, the wagon received iron axles.
Infirmary carriage of the model of 1797.
For the transportation of the sick and wounded in each regiment, separate battalion or company, the states provided for special wagons, in particular, infirmary carriages of the 1797 model were assigned for officers. The carriages were drogs on wooden axles, with a pivot on the front axle, with wooden springs, on which the body was suspended with the help of chains. The body, in which the wounded officers were transported, was closed from the sides with doors and folding shields, which could be folded back on hinges in good weather in order to allow air to freely penetrate inside. For the lying wounded in the carriage, two stretchers with braid bindings were installed along the body, which served as beds.
The carriage at the front had a seat for the driver who drove the horses, and at the back there was a seat for the infirmary attendant caring for the wounded. Special frames covered with canvas were hinged to the front and rear walls of the body, which served to protect the rider and paramedic from rain and sun.
Such a carriage was harnessed with the help of a drawbar with four horses in a row, like a modern cart.
To transport the sick and wounded, the lower ranks used regular army wagons, or often simple philistine wagons and carts.
non-combat train
Church wagon.
In all infantry and cavalry regiments of the Russian army, the states provided for a special wagon for the regimental church. It was an ordinary two-axle drawbar wagon with a lattice body. She had wooden axles, on the front she was strengthened with a slug circle. The reverse gear consisted of an axle with a long and high body mounted on it. The body had a roof that was locked with a lock, a seat for the driver was arranged in the front of the body, and steps were attached to the sides. For ease of turning, the front and rear wheels were of different diameters.
Provisional or bread truck of the 1811 model.
It was an ordinary four-wheeled drawbar cart on wooden axles, with a pivot on the front axle, with a narrow body and wheels of different diameters. Harnessed, apparently, three horses.
The front course consists of lashes of natural curvature, fastened to the front axle and having a vag at the ends connected to the axle by cords, a drawbar is fixed between the slants; a sill is attached to the reverse axis, connecting the reverse with the front, in addition, the reverse is connected to the front pivot located on the front axle and passing through the bottom of the body and the axle blade. The body is based on a wooden frame, consisting of longitudinal and transverse bars; side, front and rear walls consist of vertical posts, horizontal bars sheathed with boards; vertical boards at the top are fastened with longitudinal bars. The body is closed by a roof sheathed with sheet iron, which is hinged to one of the side walls and locked with a lock. There are steps on the side of the cart, and a driver's seat in front.
Stroke width - 66 dm, stroke length - 80 dm. The diameter of the front wheels together with the tire is 42 dm, the rear - 52 dm. Tire thickness - ¾ dm, tire width - 2 dm.
The length of the axle or the width of the wagon is 84 dm, the length of the wagon is 144 dm.
Body length - 124 dm, height - 46 dm, width at the bottom - 40 dm, width at the top - 50 dm.
The height of the wagon is 80 dm.
Furshtat semi-furok or park wagon model 1807.
Carts of this type were used to transport uniforms, ammunition, spare gunpowder and ammunition, food and fodder, various equipment, tools and other military equipment.
They were a drawbar cart with a harness of three horses. They had wooden axles and front and rear wheels of the same diameter. Due to the fact that the wagon did not have a turn to drive back, it was necessary to rearrange the drawbar from forward to reverse. Despite the fact that the wagon had large diameter wheels to increase mobility, it remained clumsy and heavy. An empty wagon weighed 40 pounds, and loaded - 108 pounds.
How sedentary she was can be judged from the presentation of Grand Duke Nikolai Pavlovich by the inspector general engineering troops made by him in 1821 about new-style wagons for the troops sponsored by him. He reported that during the war of 1813-1814. when the sapper companies of the Russian army were already near Paris, their convoy remained in the principality (duchy) of Warsaw or even in the inner provinces of Russia.
The front and rear of the truck had the same design and thus constituted one whole. On the blades of each of the axes, lashes were strengthened, with naked ends, and a drawbar was attached between the slants. Both axes were interconnected tightly by a sill, there was no swivel at all.
A body was installed above the blades of the axles, which had straight walls, and consisted of lower and upper longitudinal beds connected by vertical struts. The walls were sheathed with boards, which were pasted over with canvas to eliminate cracking, as well as the boards of the bottom of the body, the lower surface of which was tarnished.
The body was covered with a roof upholstered in thin sheet iron, which was hinged to one of the sides. Steps were attached to the sides, and a wooden pin for one spare wheel was attached to the front and rear of the body.
The cost according to the state of 1821 is 150 rubles in banknotes.
The wagon did not have flexibility and independence of moves at all. Independence of moves - 0 degrees. Flexibility - 0 deg. Stability - 20 degrees. The angle of inclination of the traces is 7 degrees.
The width of the road for a round trip is 672 dm.
Stroke width - 39 dm, stroke length - 75 dm. Wheel diameter with tires - 54 dm, tire thickness - ½ dm, tire width - 2 ½ dm.
The length of the axle or the total width of the wagon is 72 dm. The length of the wagon without a drawbar is 140 dm.
Body size: length - 100 dm, width - 42 dm, height with roof - 40 dm.
The height of the wagon is 74 dm.
Instrumental semi-furkas of sapper troops, model 1807.
It is similar in design to the Furstadt semi-furk, but had the following dimensions: stroke width - 56 dm, stroke length - 88 dm, wheel diameter with tire - 56 dm, tire thickness ½ dm, tire width - 2 dm, axle length - 73 dm, wagon length 158 dm, body length - 110 dm, body width - 36 dm, height - 36 dm, wagon height - 76 dm.
Providing the army with food
The total sown area in Russia in 1802 was 38 million acres, in 1812 - 40 million. 155 million quarters (a quarter is a Russian unit for measuring the volume of bulk solids equal to 209.91 liters). Moreover, 120 million quarters went to meet the internal needs of the rural population. There were no more than 35 million quarters of marketable grain, of which up to 2.5 million quarters (food and oats) went to the armed forces. The yield of rye (the main marketable bread) did not exceed sam-3.5, wheat sam-4.5, sam-5.
Quite sharp fluctuations in prices were observed in the country over the years, in different provinces. So, in 1812, the price for a quarter of rye ranged from 7 rubles. 20 kop. in the Kursk province, up to 12 rubles. 50 kop. in Moscow and 14 rubles. in the Petersburg provinces. Such fluctuations in prices caused serious difficulties in providing the troops with food and fodder, since the commissariat received money at an average price. But under the conditions of the war that began in 1805, the commissariat had to carry out urgent purchases at prices that were set in each individual province.
The daily allowance of an ordinary soldier consisted of 3 pounds of baked bread, a quarter of a pound of crackers, 24 spools of cereals (the spool is 4.2 g). 24 kopecks were allocated for salt, 72 kopecks for meat. in year. Troop food supply system back to top Patriotic War 1812 has undergone certain changes. In the first decade of the 19th century, the Russian army led fighting at a considerable distance from the supply centers. Therefore, the provision was built on the basis of the following system: basic (stationary) warehouses - mobile warehouses - military convoys in combination with purchases from the local population. During the campaign of 1805, the Russian army, while stationed on Russian territory, was supplied from stationary warehouses, which were organized in the border areas. After the transfer of troops to Austria, they, according to an agreement with Vienna, were to be provided by the Austrian authorities. The Russian government paid the bills for supplies. In preparation for the campaign of 1806, the government was able to create a 2-3 month supply of food in the western and northwestern directions. Besides Russian command hoped to organize the purchase of food and fodder in East Prussia. The organization of military roads that provide the supply of troops did not attach much importance. As a result, the troops were in a very plight.
During the war with Sweden 1808-1809. the supply of Russian troops was better organized. Troops were provided through a special mobile store for 500 wagons, which was based on basic warehouses. The situation with the regimental warehouses was also improved: they received 12 provisions, 12 cartridge carts and 10 wagons special purpose. Local funds were also used.
By the war of 1812, the provision of food to the troops received a more definite organization, which was expressed in the "Institution of the Army in the Field". The management of the food part was freed from the guardianship of the central authorities and began to depend only on the army headquarters. The commander-in-chief of the army received military and civil administration of the territory where the troops were located during the hostilities. In peacetime, the troops were provided with funds for current supplies and the formation of reserves. For this, stationary warehouses were created. Basic warehouses by the beginning of the war were created in Riga, Dinaburg, Polotsk, Disna, Bobruisk and Kyiv. Bases in Riga, Dinaburg and Disna had a monthly supply of food for 27 infantry and 17 cavalry divisions, warehouses in Polotsk, Bobruisk and Kyiv - for 26 infantry and 12 cavalry divisions. Spare stores relied on the base warehouses. Six months before the start of the war, the military economic department received an order to increase stocks in a number of stores and create new ones in Drissa, Novgorod, Pskov, Velikiye Luki, Tver, Sychevka, Gzhatsk, Sosnitsa and Trubchevsk. Particular attention was paid to the Drissa base - the Drissa fortified camp had great importance in the pre-war plans of St. Petersburg. 44,000 quarters of flour, 4,000 quarters of cereals, 54,000 quarters of oats and 50,000 poods of hay were concentrated here, and 40 bakeries were also built. In 27 warehouses, which were located in the Western theater of operations, by the middle of 1812 it was required to have: 435 thousand quarters of flour, 40.5 thousand quarters of cereals, 561 thousand quarters of oats. In fact, it was collected: flour - 353 thousand quarters, cereals - 33 thousand, oats - 468 thousand.
In principle, all these reserves were enough to meet the needs of three armies for six months. However, the whole picture was spoiled by the fact that the main food supplies were concentrated in border shops, and the rear shops were no more than half full. Therefore, in the event of a withdrawal of troops beyond the line of border shops, the troops could find themselves in a difficult situation. The reason for the shortage of food was not only fluctuations in the process of developing a military plan, but also a crop failure that engulfed the central and western provinces, which led to a lack of marketable bread in 1811-1812. The government, in order to facilitate procurement, ordered the collection of taxes in 8 provinces to be carried out not with money, but with food.
In connection with this problem, we decided to create spare stores in the St. Petersburg direction. True, the bases in Pskov, Velikiye Luki, Ostrov began to be filled only in June 1812. Their filling went on in the following months, already in the course of the war. Also during the war, they began to create bases in Novgorod, Sosnitsa and Trubchevsk. These bases were supposed to contain a two-month supply for 8 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions. In addition, with the outbreak of war, food bases began to be created in Tver, Gzhatsk, and Sychevka.
Thus, according to the state of food bases, it becomes clear that St. Petersburg did not plan the retreat of the field army inland. Stocks were provided with areas designated for border battles and maneuver forces within a given theater of operations. They were not going to retreat further than the Western Dvina. As a result, while the army retreated in the region prepared for defense, it did not experience difficulties with food and fodder. Food was forced to take away with them, destroy on the spot or leave. But the retreat beyond the line of the Dnieper and the Western Dvina immediately showed a drawback in the absence of good mobile shops. The troops were forced to carry food with them, this led to an overload of military convoys, reduced the maneuverability of the army, forced to reinforce the rearguards, which covered the withdrawal of the main forces. Preparing for war, the War Department was unable to fully solve the problem of supplying troops.
Providing troops with clothing allowances
The main materials for the manufacture of uniforms were cloth, karaseya (loose woolen fabric used for lining) and linen. AT early XIX century in Russian Empire there were 155 manufactories that produced cloth and karaseya. The main center of production was the Moscow province - 45 manufactories. In addition, cloth enterprises were in Ryazan, Voronezh, Tambov, Saratov, Simbirsk provinces and in Ukraine. Their total productivity in 1802 was 2 million 690 thousand arshins of cloth, 685 thousand arshins of karazei.
All large enterprises were obliged to supply the military department with a certain amount of cloth and karazei. Every year, the armed forces absorbed up to 40-50% of all the production of cloth enterprises. In 1809, the number of manufactories increased to 209. They produced 3 million 674 thousand arshins of cloth and karazei. At the same level, production was maintained in 1810-1811. The needs of the army, however, were not fully satisfied. So, in 1812, 1 million 648 thousand arshins of cloth were required, and 1 million were supplied. 170 thousand arshins, Karazei needed 316 thousand, 190 thousand arshins were delivered. The main reason for this was the lack of wool: with an annual need of 200,000 poods, the domestic market could produce 170,000 poods. Therefore, during the war, I had to go for the purchase of simple peasant cloths. However, this decision did not cover all the needs of the field army.
An even more deplorable situation was the army in terms of supplying it with sheepskin coats. There were almost no winter clothes in the warehouses. The commander-in-chief of the army, Kutuzov, was forced to give an order to the governors of the Kaluga, Tula, Oryol and Ryazan provinces to urgently send the necessary things to the troops. However, until November 1812, the troops received nothing, although Kutuzov demanded to urgently send sheepskin coats. The armies received winter uniforms only in November-December 1812, when the main hostilities were completed.
The production of linen since 1810 covered not only the needs of the army and navy, but also the whole domestic market. So, in 1812, at the registered 170 linen enterprises (there were more of them), 13 million 998 thousand arshins of various linens were produced. The need of the armed forces in 1806-1808. averaged 10 million arshins. In 1812-1815. - 12 million arshins.
Equipment and footwear. The infantryman's equipment consisted of a black leather knapsack - for carrying a three-day supply of crackers, linen and cleaning supplies, a cartridge bag for 60 rounds, a bayonet scabbard, a manner and a trench tool. The total weight of the equipment was 25 pounds. A company was supposed to have 20 axes, 10 shovels, 5 picks and 5 hoes.
The equipment of the cavalryman included a 30-round casket (for hussars, 20 rounds), a wooden flask covered with leather, and a trench tool. The cuirassier's horse equipment consisted of a German saddle with a mouthpiece and headdress, a saddle and ingots (a leather pistol case), as well as a round cloth suitcase. The dragoons and hussars - from the Hungarian saddle with a mouthpiece and headdress, a saddle cloth and a suitcase.
Leather for shoes and equipment was supplied by the state-owned Losinaya factory on Klyazma, the St. Petersburg factory and private tanneries (in 1814 there were 840 of them). These enterprises covered the current needs of the Russian armed forces. But the experience of the campaigns of 1798-1800 and 1805. showed that the troops are in a difficult position if there are no stocks in the warehouses in excess of the set. It turned out to be impossible to solve this problem with the help of state-owned enterprises. In order to meet the annual demand, it was necessary to switch to a system of contracts.
Rope production met the requirements of the armed forces. In 1812 there were up to 50 enterprises, each producing annually an average of 4-5 thousand pounds. This volume of production met the needs of artillery and the fleet. They made in 1812 249 thousand pounds of ropes, cables and gear.
The supply of the army with clothing allowances was usually carried out through the depot. There were no mobile warehouses. Sometimes spare warehouses were created closer to the theater of war. So, in the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812. a reserve warehouse was created in Tiraspol, he received the necessary things from the Kryukovsky depot. In the anti-French campaign of 1806-1807. the troops were supplied by the Vilna depot. Better prepared for the war of 1812. Along with stocks in the depot, the troops received 25% of the norm in the stock directly into divisional wagon trains. However, these measures did not completely solve the problem. The size of the army increased (including due to the militia), part of the reserves was lost during the retreat, a long retreat and constant battles had an extremely negative effect on uniforms (especially on shoes). As a result, cash reserves were immediately absorbed, and emergency measures had to be taken to repair and supply new uniforms. In addition, believing that the war would be waged by the same methods and with the onset of winter, hostilities would be stopped, no measures were taken to supply the troops with warm clothes.
Financing
Constant wars meant that the government was forced to issue a significant amount of paper money to cover military expenses. Military spending absorbed up to 60% of all Russian income, led to the depreciation of money.
In 1803, 34.5 million rubles were allocated for the army, 11 million for the fleet (with the country's income of 95.5 million). In 1805, the expenditure on the armed forces amounted to more than 57 million rubles, with a total income of 100.8 million rubles. In 1806, military spending rose to 60 million rubles, with state income of 103 million rubles. In 1807, in the conditions of the war with France and Turkey, the expenses for the army increased to 63.4 million rubles, for the fleet 17.1 million rubles, that is, only 80.5 million rubles with an income of 121.6 million .rubles In 1808-1809. spending on the armed forces exceeded state revenues (the shortfall was covered by internal appropriations). In 1808, 140 million rubles were spent on the army and navy, with an income of 111.5 million rubles. In 1809, the armed forces needed 136 million rubles, with an income of 127.5 million rubles. In 1810, 147.6 million rubles were allocated for the armed forces, with an income of 191.5 million rubles, and together with internal banknotes - 278.6 million rubles. In 1811 from total amount income of 337.5 million rubles, 122.5 million rubles were allocated for the army, 14.5 million rubles for the fleet.
In 1812 it was assumed that the income would be is equal to the sum 287 million rubles, they were going to allocate 160.8 million rubles for the army, 20 million rubles for the fleet. The outbreak of war destroyed all calculations. The revenue part of the Russian budget has sharply declined - on January 1, 1813, the treasury received less than 172.5 million rubles. Expenditures for military purposes are known only approximately. In general, during the three years of hostilities (1812-1814), 721.6 million rubles were spent, that is, approximately 240 million rubles each. in year. Moreover, the costs of the militia and a number of other expenses of a military nature are not included here. The lack of funds in the treasury was made up for by issuing banknotes, the number of which was constantly growing. So, in 1803, there were banknotes worth 250 million rubles in circulation, in 1807 - 382 million rubles, in 1810 - 579 million rubles. Before the start of the war of 1812, more than 600 million rubles worth of banknotes were circulating in the Russian Empire. As a result, the exchange rate of the banknote ruble fell sharply. If in 1803 1 ruble in banknotes was equal to 88.4 kopecks. silver, then in 1807 it cost 66.3 kopecks, and in 1812 - 38.8 kopecks. silver.
Such a sharp depreciation of the ruble had a negative effect on armed forces. The military and naval departments sought to allocate funds to them in silver. The military leadership pointed out that with a general increase in spending on the army and navy, there was a significant drop in real amounts. Troop commanders often found themselves in a difficult situation when purchasing food and fodder.
All-army wagon - a covered wagon of an army convoy used to transport food, ammunition, tents, ammunition for infantry and cavalry, as well as tools. Depending on the purpose, the trucks had a special marking (white paint); ammunition, food, military property, etc. Trucks were opened from above. For greater tightness, a cloth or leather canopy was installed on the lid of food and cartridge trucks. At the back there was a folding feeder where fodder for horses was placed. Depending on the weight, the wagons were transported in teams of two or four horses. The convoy also included ambulance wagons, containing four to six wounded. With an insufficient number of trucks, peasant carts were used.
Walking forge. It was used for minor repairs and the manufacture of simple fixtures in the field. The forge was serviced by a blacksmith and two artisans. They repaired wheels, axles, carriages, charging boxes, trucks, made nails, wedges, horseshoes. Horn, bellows, lever mounted on a machine with two wheels. The charcoal in the furnace was blown with the help of bellows driven by a lever. To facilitate work, a counterweight was attached to the end of the lever - an empty mortar bomb. The anvil and blacksmith's tools were transported in a special wagon, and charcoal supplies were transported in another wagon. One forge was attached to 36-48 guns.
At the disposal of each infantry and cavalry regiment was a wagon drawn by two horses with apothecary boxes (1). In removable boxes, in addition to medicines and dressings, there were surgical instruments. One of the drawers contained a leather bag for ten surgical instruments. In addition, each doctor had a pocket set of surgical instruments. The truck was driven by a coachman who sat on the front removable box (3). On the back box (2) there was room for a lightly wounded or sick person.
And other formations to organize the transportation of supplies and equipment (artillery convoy, engineer convoy, sanitary convoy, etc.); before the mass introduction of vehicles in the armed forces - a horse-drawn military transport unit, following the division, regiment and other formations and designed to deliver materiel to the formations to carry out their tasks.
In the army of the Russian state, the senior head of the convoy in the regiments is a convoy officer, later a military convoy, or Wagenmeister - an official of the furstadt (that is, convoy), who was entrusted with the supervision of horses, harness, wagons and other accessories of the convoy, and the Wagenmeister General was in charge, including all convoys of the army (armed forces).
- The marching convoy with artillery and engineering supplies was called the park.
- Fire convoy - a disciplined detachment (fire brigade), equipped with all the devices for extinguishing fires and rescuing people.
- Sewer convoy - a set of transportation devices (hermetically locked barrels, etc.) for the removal of sewage.
In the literature there is a word for the designation of military personnel of these formations - convoy.
Story
Russian military theorist and practitioner Dmitry Milyutin predicted the use and appearance in the armed forces of Russia and the world of military equipment for combat and its support, such as a car, an armored car, tanks and self-propelled artillery installations.
Is there anything impossible, for example, that cars will not only completely replace wagons in wagon trains, but will even make their way into field artillery; instead of field guns with horse harness, mobile armored batteries will enter into competition on the battlefield, and a land battle will become like a sea battle.
In the XX century, in connection with the widespread introduction in the troops military equipment the word convoy lost its relevance and how the term fell out of use in the governing documents and was replaced by the phrase - transport, military transport.
In Russia
Convoy in Russia from the old Russian to transport, deliver, the collective name of horse-drawn formations (later motorized and mechanized traction) that performed logistics tasks: transportation, maintenance and transportation of materiel.
In the Russian army, all stocks of materiel or "feed" followed with the squad and regiments on packs, and later in a wheeled (sledge) convoy or were delivered by water. In the regular army, Peter I introduced a convoy into the regular structure of the regiments (soldiers - 63 wagons, dragoons - 60 wagons). Since 1708, regimental wagon trains were divided into light - “necessary things for the battle” and heavy - “extra burdens”, later the wagon train of the 1st and 2nd category began to be called. Alexander I reduced the convoy in the regiments but formed it in divisions, including in their composition the Furshtadt battalions of 6 companies (108 wagons, with a 9-day supply of crackers and other provisions), for each infantry or cavalry division.
In the Russian Imperial Army (RIA) there were several types of military carts:
- in order of formation:
- state-owned, that is, belonging to the treasury, the state; in peacetime, his carts, along with harness and accessories, were completely kept in the RIA, but there were only a small number of horses (during mobilization, a set of horses was replenished on the basis of military horse duty);
- philistine, that is, belonging to the citizens of the state, formed in wartime for hire, requisition or on the basis of underwater conscription.
- by service affiliation
- quartermaster
- special
- artillery
- engineering
- sanitary
- by appointment:
- the food and clothing, food and clothing convoy was the First Department of the divisional convoy, and consisted of wagons raising the materiel of the infantry division (pd): food supply (crackers, cereals, salt, tea, sugar - for 4 days, canned meat and vegetables - for one day), a trench tool, a supply of clothes and shoes. With him, there was an equestrian supply of pd. The 1st department consisted of 5 platoons, of which the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th platoons each had a one-day supply of food. The commander of the 1st division was also the commander of the divisional convoy.
- sanitary, sanitary convoy was the Second Department of the divisional convoy, and consisted of wagons raising the divisional infirmary and two field hospitals, and if necessary, military ambulance transport joins the divisional convoy.
- officer
- staff.
- by formations:
- by distribution between formations:
- company (squadron, battery), that is, each company, squadron, battery had its own wagons, horses and team
- battalion (divisional)
- regimental, for infantry and rifle regiments, was part of the unit, they raised materiel, in which personnel needed for battle and campaign. Therefore, the regimental convoy followed on the march as part of its regiment and had to constantly be with it or not far from it.
- brigadier, for rifle brigades
- divisional, for infantry divisions and consisted of two departments: 1st - food and clothing and 2nd - sanitary. The cavalry divisions of the RIA did not have a divisional convoy.
... At the review of the head of the division, one platoon of the Tersko-Gorsky regiment was left behind the front, to cover the regimental convoy, which, by the way, consists entirely of Caucasian two-wheeled carts. …
Compound
The wagon convoy consisted of wagons, horses and a convoy team which included:
- Management (as part of the 1st department before)
- 1st department - food and clothing
- 1st Platoon
- 2nd Platoon
- 3rd Platoon
- 4th Platoon
- 5th Platoon
- 2nd department - sanitary
The wagon convoy consisted of 287 wagons with 748 horses.
The wagons for transporting essentials, following along with the troops, made up the convoy of the 1st category, it included:
- charging boxes, single-horse projectile and double cartridge carts (ammunition)
- tool carts (travel forge, tools and horseshoes)
- pharmacy gig
- infirmary ruler
- officer's double.
