| "Captain Saken" | ||
|---|---|---|
| Mine cruiser "Captain Saken" in the South Bay of Sevastopol | ||
| basic information | ||
| Type of | mine cruiser | |
| flag state | Russia | |
| Home port | Sevastopol | |
| Construction started | 9th May | |
| Launched into the water | April 30 | |
| Commissioned | 1889 | |
| Withdrawn from the Navy | December 22 | |
| Options | ||
| Tonnage | 742 t | |
| Length | 69.4 m | |
| Width | 7.3 m | |
| Draft | 3.1 m | |
| Booking | Deck 13mm | |
| Technical details | ||
| Power point | 2 vertical triple expansion steam engines, 3 fire tube boilers | |
| screws | 2 | |
| Power | 2341 hp | |
| Speed | 18.3 knots. | |
| Crew | 7 officers, 120 sailors | |
| Armament | ||
| Artillery | 6x1x47 mm guns, 4x1x37 mm guns | |
As a result of numerous alterations in the stern of the cruiser, instead of the superstructure, cabins were installed for officers and separately for the commander. The tank superstructure was replaced with a carapace deck. The location of the officers' cabins (in the aft part of the living deck) was approved only in November 1887. In addition, changes were made to the design of Captain Saken in order to correct the shortcomings identified during the tests of Lieutenant Ilyin. The cylinders of medium and low pressure were provided with shirts, and the coal pits were equipped with pipes for measuring the temperature of the coal. Steam lifters were removed to remove ash and slag from the furnaces. As a result of all the alterations, the displacement of the ship in full load turned out to be a quarter heavier than the design one.
Armament was limited to six 47mm and four 37mm guns. After identifying a large overload, they decided not to install rotary mine vehicles. Of the five mine vehicles, two onboard proved to be very inconvenient for loading and were subsequently removed.
Repeatedly resumed sea trials showed that the power of the mechanisms at 223 rpm did not exceed 2341 hp. Instead of the expected 21-knot speed, the ship squeezed out only 18.3 knots.
Service History
Despite the shortcomings of the ship, the Black Sea Fleet, before late XIX century, which did not receive a single cruiser, used the Captain Saken as a messenger and reconnaissance ship.
On August 25, 1899, radio communication between warships was established in Sevastopol for the first time in world history. Transceivers were placed on the battleships "George the Victorious" and "Three Saints", and the transmitter was placed on the mine cruiser "Captain Saken".
During the mutiny of 1905, the mine cruiser remained under the command of Vice Admiral Chukhnin.
April 8, 1907 renamed the port ship Bombory. Never took part in hostilities. Excluded from the lists on December 22, 1909.
Sources
- [Network resource: flot.sevastopol.info/ship/cruiser/kapitan_saken.htm Mine cruiser "Captain Saken"]
- [Network resource: wunderwaffe.narod.ru/Magazine/BKM/mkr_ru/02.htm MYSTERY PROJECT - "CAPTAIN SAKEN"]
- [Network resource: korabli.h11.ru/?nomer=154 "Captain Saken"]
- [Network resource: www.russianfleet.info/saken.html Picture]
Named after the captain of the 2nd rank Johann-Reingold von Osten-Sacken, whose double-boat on May 20, 1788 was attacked by a Turkish squadron of 30 ships. Not wanting to surrender to the enemy, Saken blew up his ship along with the Turkish galleys that boarded it.
It was assumed that the second mine cruiser would be completely the same type as Lieutenant Ilyin, laid down three months earlier. However, the Baltic Shipyard, having working drawings of the mechanisms of the Lieutenant Ilyin cruiser, undertook to manufacture the same installation on its own within 14-16 months and install it on the Captain Saken in Nikolaev. The proposal was considered profitable, and the design of the ship was redone. Without changing the contours of the hull (but having provided it with an even more menacing-looking ram-rod), the interior rooms were re-arranged to accommodate the machine and cylindrical-type fire-tube boilers instead of locomotive ones.
The replacement of locomotive boilers with fire tube boilers did not occur immediately. On January 21, 1887, it turned out that the new boilers were 25.5 tons heavier than required, as a result of which the magazine MTK No. 12 ordered the aft superstructures to be removed and the entire board to be lowered by almost 1 meter.
Proposals to change the project continued to come independently from the Chief Commander of the Nikolaev port and from the directorate of the Baltic Shipyard. The ITC approved some of them. As a result, R. Yu. Tirshtein could not exercise proper control over the implementation of the project.
In parallel with the construction of the “Captain Saken”, three gunboats (“Zaporozhets”, “Donets”, “Chernomorets”) were built in Nikolaev, the builder of which was initially appointed by the same R. Yu. Tirshtein (later he was replaced by Captain Berg). Due to the imperial status of this order, gunboats were given preference in everything. As a result, "Captain Saken" did not even receive its own mortgage board, but was included in the general text of a single (unprecedented case in the Russian fleet) board, made for three boats being built in Nikolaev. The construction of the mine cruiser was delayed, and by the time it was launched, the gunboats were already beginning sea trials.
As a result of numerous alterations in the stern of the cruiser, instead of the superstructure, cabins were installed for officers and separately for the commander. The tank superstructure was replaced with a carapace deck. The location of the officers' cabins (in the aft part of the living deck) was approved only in November 1887. In addition, changes were made to the design of Captain Saken in order to correct the shortcomings identified during the tests of Lieutenant Ilyin. The cylinders of medium and low pressure were provided with shirts, and the coal pits were equipped with pipes for measuring the temperature of the coal. Steam lifters were removed to remove ash and slag from the furnaces. As a result of all the alterations, the displacement of the ship in full load turned out to be a quarter heavier than the design one.
Armament was limited to six 47mm and four 37mm guns. After identifying a large overload, they decided not to install rotary mine vehicles. Of the five mine vehicles, two onboard proved to be very inconvenient for loading and were subsequently removed.
Repeatedly resumed sea trials showed that the power of the mechanisms at 223 rpm did not exceed 2341 hp. With. Instead of the expected 21-knot speed, the ship squeezed out only 18.3 knots.
Despite the shortcomings of the ship, the Black Sea Fleet, which had not received a single cruiser until the end of the 19th century, used the Captain Saken as a messenger and reconnaissance ship.
On August 25, 1899, radio communication between warships was established in Sevastopol for the first time in world history. Transceivers were placed on the battleships "George the Victorious" and "Three Saints", and the transmitter was placed on the mine cruiser "Captain Saken".
During the Sevastopol uprising of 1905, the mine cruiser remained under the command of Vice Admiral Chukhnin and, together with the government squadron, fired at the rebel ships.
April 8, 1907 renamed the port ship Bombory. Never took part in hostilities. Excluded from the lists on December 22, 1909.
MYSTERY PROJECT - "CAPTAIN SAKEN"
The dubious reforms of that time (naval qualification, the humiliation of engineers), the unrestrained authoritarianism of management, led to the fact that even ships conceived as the same type turned out to be different. So it happened with "Captain Saken". Noble was the idea of naming the ship - in memory of the Black Sea hero of the war with Turkey in 1787-1788. Then, on May 30, 1788, in the Bug estuary, the commander of dubel-boat No. 2 "captain of the 2nd rank R. Saken, cut off from his 11 Turkish ships, having managed to send part of the team on the boat, blew up his ship along with the Turkish boarding it galleys. Timely was the intention to give the resurgent Black Sea Fleet a ship of a new class, a reasonable desire to build ships of the same type. But the conceit and arrogance of the Russian bureaucracy were too great. She did not want to realize the specifics of destroyer shipbuilding. Even then, it was determined by especially strict observance of weight discipline and increased the culture of mine-carrying engineering, which, together with the production of torpedoes, reached the level of precision instrumentation.This level in Russia remained unattainable.It is quite possible to compare it with what the country has achieved in comparison with the world level in the automotive industry today.
Nevertheless, having successfully mastered European household items for a long time, the bureaucracy believed that the specifics of destroyer shipbuilding could not be difficult, and therefore, having undertaken the experience of building its first mine cruiser, it was decided, without waiting for results, to immediately build the second. Nobody dared to advise I.A. Shestakov to change his mind and look around. Representative of the ITC with him in 1883-1886. was the "gray horse" of the bureaucracy, Major General Octavius Peltsig, who was not marked in history, and in 1886-1888. an equally convenient Admiral Oskar Karlovich Kremer (1829-1910). The hero of the sinking in 1868, the best of the Russian frigates "Alexander Nevsky", this indifferent "phlegmatic Finn" to everything, who successfully served time in 1888-1896. also in the position of head of the Main Staff, was the personification of that deep stagnation and paralysis of thought that reigned supreme in the fleet at the time of I.A. Shestakova.
However, before inviting these two employees to the positions, the admiral offered I.F. to become the chairman of the ITC. Likhachev. But he, knowing about the complete silence and lack of rights of this position, designed according to the new order, refused the flattering appointment. And then I.A. Shestakov in August 1883, with a light heart, set in motion the filed by I.F. Likhachev's resignation. The manager did not need an independently thinking and heartfelt supporter of the fleet full of energy admiral, he did not heed (or did not have time, due to his unexpected death on November 21, 1888 in Sevastopol), to heed the arguments of the program work of I.F. Likhachev "Service of the General Staff in the Navy", published by the journal "Russian Shipping" in 1888. Therefore, the established even before I.A. Shestakov vicious order of domestic shipbuilding. About him in the work of I.F. Likhachev (p. 55) said in the following words: “She (the state treasury - P.M.) will read or hear that a cruiser was launched in England, which went on a test of 20 knots, it would be good for us to start at least one of the same. Draw up a draft in the technical committee!"
As a result of continuous redrawing and refinement of the project, which were based on the ideas of English projects that were also redrawn and outdated more than once "according to the model", as I.F. wrote. Likhachev, "some "Ajax", "Worspite" or others, are doubly late. And this lag can be so significant that due to the change in tactical views and requirements, ships built "according to the model" may not only not meet the new requirements, but even completely contradict them. With this intolerable situation, the admiral reminded, in England, when the budget for 1887-1888 was submitted to Parliament, it was proposed to establish a "department of information", or in essence a naval general staff, as the highest scientifically organized world center for planning and mobilizing the fleet and shipbuilding. "Will we, as usual, be left behind?" the admiral asked. After all, it was so important, without waiting for the example of the British, to get ahead of them "by the advantage that a more modern organization and better utilization of their forces can give." In this way, it was possible, at least in part, to compensate for the existing and, apparently, the admiral recognized, the still long-term lag in technology (p. 57).
Changes, as you know, did not happen and the Moscow State School in Russia in the 19th century. was not created. And "Captain Saken" had to go through the entire thorny path of design and construction described by the admiral, which, as it turned out, was especially complicated by the conditions of work in southern Russia. It remains a big mystery that, having apparently lost interest in the project, I.A. Shestakov assigned the order to reproduce it in Nikolaev to a purely economic institution - the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding and Supply (GUKiS). Having received a project from the MTK in the very general view, it already decided his fate in the future. This is how the wounded I.A. Shestakov's even more bureaucratic "order" than before. In the famous two-volume review of the activities of the maritime administration in Russia in the first twenty years of the prosperous reign of the Emperor Alexander Nikolayevich 1855-1880 "(Privy Councilor K.A. Mann, St. Petersburg, 1880, part 2, p. 907, 984), it was sadly noted, that in the past reign "in all departments and offices there was the most complex and intricate workflow", that "estimates, in accounting and reporting there was confusion and ambiguity, partly due to the system itself, partly due to misunderstanding of the matter, negligence or routine", that " secrecy was observed in office work", because of which "information was considered a state secret, which, on the contrary, for the benefit of the service should have been disclosed" (p. 908).
Far from all cases, it was possible to figure out how much harm and delays in the construction of the ship were brought in by the multiple authorities in charge of it: the emperor, the admiral general, the manager, the MTK, the GUKiS, the port authorities, the shipyard authorities. In the Black Sea, the influence was added, which had largely autonomous power in the theater, the Chief Commander of the Fleet and Ports. To all these factors that influenced the fate of the project, its special insecurity was added, caused by the long absence of the manager I.A. Shestakov, who went on an inspection trip to the Far East. On the same ship, the admiral sailed to San Francisco and only by the fall through America arrived in the Black Sea.
Did he himself manage to give instructions before leaving on the alteration of the project of the second mine cruiser, was it done by him during the trip, or did the head of the General Staff N.M., who replaced him, take the initiative? Chikhachev (1830-1917) and Chief Commander of the Fleet and Ports of the Black and Caspian Seas (in 1882-1890) Vice Admiral A.A. Peshchurov (7-1891), but significant uncertainty was introduced into the project. The initiative could also come from the Baltic Plant in 1883 - it reached an important milestone in ship engineering - the machines manufactured by the plant for the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" allowed it, however, to reach 17-knot speed with incomplete pa-loading. This triumph of the plant was evidenced by a picture that M.I. Kazi then presented MTK. On it, the cruiser is shown with a flag signal raised on September 30, 1883 about this speed, in response to a question with an escorted cruiser (on the way from Copenhagen) imperial yacht"Power".
The plant was justly proud success, but it is impossible not to recall that the same 17-knot speed in the USA on sail-steam cruisers of the Wampanoa type was reached in 1864. And the same Vladimir Monomakh in full load had to be content with a more modest speed of 15.4 knots. The plant, however, avoided the scandalous failure that befell Byrd's plant, which had previously had a high reputation. His machines installed on the battleship "Peter the Great" had to be replaced by sending the ship in 1881 to England. Having paid almost a million rubles and leaving Byrd's cars to the British, during tests in 1882 in England, instead of the previous 10 knots, the speed was increased to 14.26 knots. But other people's lessons are learned poorly and M.I. Kazi - whether on his own initiative or at the suggestion of I.A. Shestakova - in 1884, forgetting about the specifics of the destroyer shipbuilding, she undertakes more than dubious "economic" experience. On the new destroyer "Kotlin" built by the plant, the plant fitted (on two shafts) two machines (of the same Byrd plant!), Taken from the destroyers of 1877-1878. Thrush and Canary. As explained by M.I. Kazi, wanted "by experience to determine to what extent it is possible to use at least part of the capital spent in 1877-1878 on the construction of 100 destroyers", which, by his own admission, were now recognized as "almost unsuitable" for combat purposes. As expected, the "old shattered machines", as a result of long and painful tests, made it possible to develop only 15 knots of speed, which was hopelessly far from 18-20 knots, achieved by foreign-built destroyers.
And now, with the same light-hearted approach to the problem, a new experiment was being undertaken. It began with a request addressed on March 27, 1886 to the MTC.
GUKiS regarding the set of drawings and specifications of the mine cruiser "Lieutenant Ilyin". Developed by the plant, they, in accordance with the new procedure, entered the GUKiS, which accompanied them for consideration by the ITC. A conclusion was expected from the MTC on whether it was possible to give the Baltic Shipyard an order for the construction of a mine cruiser according to these drawings and at the same time send these drawings and specifications in copies to the Chief Commander of the Fleet and the ports of the Black and Caspian Seas for guidance during the construction of the mine cruiser "Captain Saken" in Nikolaev .
The ship was added to the lists on January 18, 1886, slightly behind the "Lieutenant Ilyin" (October 15, 1885) and, obviously, it was supposed to be completely of the same type with it. But the expected uniformity did not work. Some intrigue intervened in the matter, in which, as it should be understood, the interests of the MTK, the GUKiS, the Baltic Plant, the Chief Commander, I. A. Shestakov, and even, perhaps, the Emperor himself clashed. The chief commander, by virtue of the authority given to him, could himself, following the project, order cars abroad, but M.I. Kazi expressed his readiness to manufacture and install on a new ship in Nikolaev a set of mechanisms according to the English model within 14-16 months by the forces of his plant. The proposal in GUKiS was apparently considered economical and the ship's design began to be redone. Without changing the contours of the hull and only having provided it with an even more menacing-looking ram-rod, they began to redraw the internal layout to accommodate the Baltic Plant machine and cylindrical-type fire-tube boilers instead of locomotive ones.
This replacement is one of the mysteries surrounding the ship. Hawthorne, Leslie & Co. continued to enjoy a high reputation, and ordering her new machines with the Belleville water-tube boilers already in use could (having stipulated contractual requirements accordingly) provide the ship with the coveted 22-knot speed. But the path was chosen much more tortuous and inexplicable. The locomotive boilers were replaced with water-tube and fire-tube boilers. The replacement, apparently, did not take place immediately, and only on January 21, 1887, when it turned out that the new boilers were 25.5 tons heavier, attempts were made to unload the stern from the superstructures. MTK magazine No. 12 decided to eliminate them, and lower the entire board by 3 feet, that is, by almost 1 meter.
These changes, as usual, were followed by new ones. The ship seems to have been redesigned, both in Nikolaev and in St. Petersburg. The Baltic Shipyard developed designs and arrangements of machines and boilers in accordance with its own vision of the project, the Chief Commander proposed his own improvements, in the form of a particularly threatening form of a ram stem, the MTK occasionally approved the solutions he liked.
The position of Captain R.Yu., appointed as the builder of the Black Sea mine cruiser, was unenviable. Tirshtein (1841-?). Being a "local" ship engineer (from January 1886 in the position of a junior builder in the port of Nikolaev), he, contrary to the prevailing customs of shipbuilding, was not the author of the project and had to master it in the course of work. By virtue of the same customs, he was assigned the duties of the then combined chief builder and chief technologist. In these conditions, with a multitude of commanding authorities over him and unceremoniously disposing of the commanding authorities, he could not be the master of the project with full conviction. Equally difficult was his position as a builder.
The conditions for the construction of the ship in the Nikolaev Admiralty were strikingly different from those in which Lieutenant Ilyin was built at the private Baltic Shipyard. The patriarchal picture of the economy with chaotically scattered buildings, half of which was occupied by long-dead, but carefully, like Plyushkin, preserved old ship's rubbish, the predominant use of manual labor, was displayed by a study published in 1909. "Shipbuilding and shipyards in Russia and abroad". In it, the authors paid tribute to the fact that in these almost rural conditions, the shipyard still managed to keep the ship on the stocks for 2 years or even less, to cope with the construction of the ship in a five-year period. To complete the picture, it remains to add also the constant turnover of the labor force, due to seasonal fluctuations in agriculture south of Russia, and, accordingly, its insufficient qualifications.
The unusual fate of the ship, barely begun by the construction, was manifested both in its accelerated laying, and in close connection with the construction of six large seaworthy gunboats that began on the Black Sea on an emergency assignment from the emperor.
This decision testified that when comparing two similar-sized ships of different classes, the choice was made in favor of undoubtedly more versatile and artillery powerful ships long-distance navigation. This meant the rejection of the recent destroying euphoria. Accordingly, the attitude towards the type of mine cruiser should have changed. The new ships were mixed type artillery and mine boats, which, with a displacement increased to 1200 tons, had reinforced artillery armament of two 8-inch and one 6-inch guns (not counting small ones), light (10-mm) deck armor and two mine vehicles. It was expected (although the contracts were not fulfilled) that the speed could be up to 15 knots. It was decided to build such boats (at the beginning 900-tons of the Sivuch type) in the Black Sea under the influence of "misunderstandings on the Afghan issue" in relations with England. Convened in the spring of 1885 by the highest command, a commission chaired by the Commander of the Odessa Military District decided that for the successful defense of the Black Sea coast in the event of an invasion by the English fleet, it is necessary to urgently build six gunboats, and in addition six destroyers of the Poti type and 20 steam barges. .
The construction of canboats proceeded at an unprecedented pace in the Admiralty, already on November 22, 1885, the supposed builder of three Nikolaev boats (three more were to be built in Sevastopol) captain R.Yu. Tirshtein (1841-?) submitted to the authorities a statement of the steel order for these ships, and the preparation of slipways began.
At the same time, having the hull drawings ready and having placed an order for materials, work began on the Captain Saken. But very soon it turned out that the gunboats, by virtue of their status as an imperial order, were given an advantage over the Saken in everything. Apparently, the cooling of I.A. Shestakov to destroyers, his absence from the capital due to a business trip to the Far East and, of course, "savings". Otherwise, one cannot explain the fact that instead of its own mortgage board, as was the case at the Baltic Shipyard at Lieutenant Ilyin, Captain Saken was included in the general text of a single (unprecedented case in the Russian fleet!) Board, made for three boats of the Nikolaev Admiralty . The mine cruiser was "pulled" to the gunboats. Strictly speaking, this was a very sensible step by the treasury, which could now prepare one instead of four name plaques for the honorary participants in the laying ceremony. But the mine cruiser, due to the uniqueness of its type and separation from gunboats (in Sevastopol they also made a single board for three ships), was still entitled to rely on its own board.
Preserved in the TsVMM in St. Petersburg, two mortgage boards measuring 12.4x7.2 cm are made of silver and have an engraved inscription on the front side: Kanonerskaya 3 push. 2 screw. boats in 1500 ind. forces "Zaporozhets", "Donets", "Chernomorets" and Mine Cruiser "Kapitan Sa-ken" in 3500 ind. With. It was laid down in the Nikolaev Admiralty on May 9, 1886, in the presence of Their Imperial Majesties, the Sovereign Emperor, the Empress Empress. "On the reverse side it read:" Chief Commander of the Fleet and Ports of the Black and Caspian Seas Vice Admiral A.A. Peshchurov, Captain over the Nikolaev port, Rear Admiral V.I. Popov, Boat Builder: Ship. Eng. Headquarters-Capitan Berg, Mine Cruiser Builder: Ship. Eng. Captain Tirshtein.
The documents of the RGA of the Navy say that "for cutting on both sides of the inscriptions on 19 silver and 5 copper plates" the engraver M. Efimov presented an invoice for 84 rubles. silver. For cutting 12 silver boards on both sides, the seal cutter A. Zishman was to receive 36 rubles. Another 36 rubles. cost 6 cases pasted over with velvet and 24 rubles. - 24 locks to them. Following the royal family, vice-admiral N.M. Chikhachev (1830-1917).
The laying of the “Captain Saken”, fastened to the laying of gunboats to please the emperor, turned out to be the only event connecting them. ships) - the gunboats and the mine cruiser dispersed to their intended problems.Overshadowed by the status of the imperial order and generously provided with foreign supplies, under the watchful eye of the authorities of all ranks, the gunboats began to move rapidly in their readiness.
Having begun construction in March-April 1886, by the end of May, soundly cast stems delivered from Germany began to be attached to the structures of the bottom and sides that had grown on stocks on gunboats. But the mechanisms for boats made in England turned out to be of poor quality.
More than a dozen outfits had to be made at the request of the representative of the Napier Kledgoria factory, who recognized the marriage of his compatriots. flaws English work mooring tests were also delayed, when after checking the ejectors and cleaning the fire tubes, it was necessary to dismantle the pipelines that found cracks.
Insufficient quality of work also manifested itself at the "Captain Sakeie", where the builder had to achieve the elimination of flaws made by the artisans even more often and with even greater expenditure of time and energy. Many had to be redone and corrected already upon delivery of the ship. All this situation created special difficulties for the Baltic Shipyard, which made the first experience of large-scale work in complete isolation from its production base, which turned out to be a thousand miles away. Due to all the abundance adverse factors, in the days when the boats began their sea trials (or rather, checks for contractual power) "Captain Saken" was just getting ready for launch. It took place on April 30, 1889.
By this time, the ship had completed the painful process of redesigning with the integration of new machines and boilers manufactured by the Baltic Shipyard into the former hull and at the same time redesigning the external appearance. After repeated changes in the stern, cuttings for officers and separately for the commander were established instead of the finished superstructure. The tank superstructure was replaced with a streamlined sloping roof above the deck, following the example of the first destroyers. Only in November 1887, the MTK magazine No. 162 approved the location of the officers' quarters. This was the last of the ITC's journal resolutions on the project. All other questions on the proposals of the builder and M.I. Kazi were resolved on the spot by the authority of the Chief Commander. In particular, they corrected the miscalculations of the Lieutenant Ilyin project. The cylinders of medium and low pressure were provided with shirts, and the coal pits were equipped with pipes for measuring the temperature of the coal. Abandoned little effective steam lifts to remove ash and slag from furnaces.
Armament was limited to six 47 mm, four 37 mm guns. Of the five mine vehicles, two are airborne. turned out to be very inconvenient for loading and had to be removed by 1900. They did not dare to install rotary devices when a large overload was discovered. As a result of the outfitting work, which lasted the whole of 1888 and captured (due to the delay in materials and products for mechanisms) as early as 1889, the displacement of the ship in full load reached 742 tons. min, did not exceed 2341 hp. Instead of the expected 21-knot speed, only 18.3 knots had to be content. These results can be explained by some significant miscalculations of the Baltic Shipyard in the design and manufacture of machines and boilers, as well as by the overload that occurred against the design displacement of 525-600 tons.
Apparently, a mistake was repeated that had already been made in the manufacture of boilers for the Lieutenant Ilyin. Therefore, the lengthening of the chimneys did not bring results either. Only a special historical and technical study can help to fully elucidate the truth, but it is difficult to imagine that now someone could take on this work. So far, one has only to guess which of the information found in the literature can be recognized as corresponding to reality. The choice for today remains extensive.
In the publication "Military fleets and a marine reference book for 1892" (VKAM, St. Petersburg, 1892). Behind the "Captain Saken" was the power of the mechanisms 3400 hp. and speed 17 knots. But in the editions of the Ship's List for 1898 and 1904 they returned to the original figures: 2341 hp. and 18.3 knots. In the secret appendix to the "List" of 1901, they were not present, but the speed "on the last voyage" in 1901 was indicated only 14.3 knots. The total supply of coal was 143 tons, cruising range 10 knots at a speed of 1580 miles. The given speed characteristics and their obvious discord are another mystery of "Captain Saken". It is natural to want to compare the quality of the ship's machines with the British machines, which turned out to be not entirely impeccable, but nevertheless confirmed their contractual capacities, gunboats being built simultaneously with the Saken.
But it was not customary to ask such questions at that time. The authors of the "Report on the Naval Department 1884-1890" also diplomatically circumvented it. (St. Petersburg, 1891), which for the mine cruisers "Lieutenant Ilyin" and "Captain Saken" resulted in a speed of 18.29 knots, and for the later built in Germany "Kazarsky" - 21.05 knots. The cost of building these ships (with weapons) is also indicative: the first is 1,079,793 rubles, the second is 1,045,720 rubles. and the third only 488,230 rubles. There is no answer to these anomalies in the "Collection summary on the maritime department "(1908), nor in modern history Baltic plant. It was also very reserved about mine cruisers in the special work of Lieutenant M.A. Beklemishev (1858-?) "Special mine vessels" (St. Petersburg, 1898), there was no mention of any of their merits.
There was no place in the remarkable completeness of the information given in the book of tables "Types of destroyers". It has yet to be supplemented with the same information about mine cruisers as a result of archival "excavations". But the result, alas, can be summed up today. The author of the book, who graduated from the mine class in 1886 and from the Naval Academy in 1890, with all his indisputable mine enthusiasm, obviously could not recognize these ships as the flagships of the domestic mine fleet. The verdict of the creative activity of Admiral I.A. Shestakov, who, among his other deeds, managed to discredit the idea of a domestic mine cruiser, remains in history the lieutenant's confession that both ships are "similar in size, only the Captain Saken cruiser came out heavy, overloaded more than Lieutenant Ilyin" and has move 17 knots, while "Lieutenant Ilyin" goes up to 19".
But the fleet in the Black Sea, until the end of the XIX century. who did not receive a single cruiser, found in the "Captain Saken" a completely suitable assignment - to play the role of a messenger and reconnaissance ship with the squadron.
In 1755, in the family of a poor Russian captain (with a strangely “non-Russian”, at first glance, surname) Christoph-Adolf von der Osten-Saken and Marina-Justina, nee von Lipgart, a son was born, Johann-Reingold von der Osten Saken. He is Christian Ivanovich Osten-Saken, as he is still listed "in the pantheon of glory" of the Russian fleet. Just as in the history of the life and exploits of our previous hero, Lieutenant Ilyin (), in the description of the life of Osten-Saken there are also very few reliably known, “accurate” facts. You can start with the fact that, as in the case of Ilyin, the Fatherland does not know the exact date of birth of the person who brought him fame.
It is known that, despite the origin of a very famous family, with a "long" history, Christophe-Adolf's family was numerous (6 children), but not rich. It is no coincidence that, as for Ilyin, the road to prestigious regiments turned out to be “not for them”, and it was precisely because of this that Johann-Reingold (just like his three brothers, judging by some sources) did not continue his father’s “overland” career, but ended up in the Naval gentry cadet corps, where he entered in 1766. In March 1772, Corporal Reingold received the rank of midshipman and was assigned to the crew battleship"Chesma", named after the victory of the Russian fleet, which he owes much to the Lieutenant Ilyin mentioned by us.
From the author: There are many insufficiently reliable dates and numbers in the history of Osten-Sacken. The author takes on faith the most reliable in his opinion. More or less detailed literary sources dedicated to our hero are:
- Monograph, authored by P.I. Belavenets, "Captain 2nd Rank Johann-Reingold von der Osten-Saken, better known as Captain Saken." - St. Petersburg: Printing house of the Naval Ministry in the Main Admiralty, 1907. - 36 p.
- Essay “Under the walls of Ochakov. The feat of captain Saken "Yu.S. Kryuchkov from Nikolaev.
On May 8 (19), 1772, the Fourth Archipelago Squadron left Revel under the flag of Rear Admiral V.Ya. Chichagov. On August 15 (26), the squadron arrived in Livorno, where Chichagov transferred command and left for Russia. "Chesma" (and Osten-Saken, respectively) took part in the Battle of Patras on October 26, 1772. Having practically suffered no losses (on the Chesma, judging by one of the sources, one officer was killed, another officer and five sailors were wounded), the Russian squadron of 2 battleships, 2 frigates and 3 auxiliary ships burned 7 Turkish frigates and 8 shebeks . Another frigate sank the day after the battle. After such a defeat, the Turks did not disturb the Russian fleet in the Archipelago until the very end of the war.
In August 1774, the battleship Chesma left the Archipelago and went to Port Mahon for repairs. In August 1775 - the transition to the Baltic, which ended on October 9 (20) in Revel.
In the Baltic, Osten-Saken was transferred to the frigate Maria, where he served until 1786.
In 1777 he received the rank of lieutenant, in 1784 - captain-lieutenant.
In 1786, Osten-Saken was transferred to the Black Sea Fleet. In 1787 he received the rank of captain of the 2nd rank. Served as a galley captain cargo ship on the Dnieper estuary, adviser to the quartermaster expedition of the Black Sea Admiralty Board and commander of the detachment of flippers on the Liman (I.A .: Such a strange name immediately evokes images of “war seals” in my head, but only means small port floating craft, barges, boats, scaffolds of the Russian sailing fleet).
In August 1787 he was sent by Prince Potemkin with a detachment of 600 people to Poland for logging and building ships, from where he brought 18 armed boats and longboats to Kherson.
Kryuchkov's essay indicates that in 1787 Osten-Saken was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th class, for 18 naval campaigns. But Osten-Saken (in any possible variations of the surname and name) was not found in the list of Sudravsky by the author of this material. Neither in 1787 nor after early years. Although, perhaps this is a mistake when publishing the list? The lists were different...
In the same August 1787, another Russian-Turkish war. In 1788, the captain of the 2nd rank Osten-Saken was appointed commander of the new double-boat No. 2 in the rowing flotilla of Prince Nassau-Siegen.
Regarding the technical data of the vessel, there are serious discrepancies in the sources. We present one of the versions. Length - 22 meters, armament of 2x1-pood unicorns, 1x12-pound and 4x4-pound guns, 4 falconets. Crew - 52 people. There are data on 20-21 pairs of oars, but 42 oars for 52 people - it seems a little extra! And who will shoot, manage the sails, command? Maybe 20 oars, not steam?
In the first days of May, a small detachment of Russian ships, consisting of dubel-boat No. 2 under the command of Osten-Saken and two gunboats, was sent to Kinburn to maintain communication between the flotilla command and the corps of A.V. Suvorov. Then the ships went to Ochakov to monitor the entrance to the estuary, because. the appearance of the Turkish fleet was expected. Turkish ships appeared on May 18 and soon Turkish light ships began to enter the estuary. Saken, who had retreated to Kinburn, received an order from Suvorov to retreat in the direction of Deep Pier in order to warn the command of the Liman flotilla about the appearance of the Turks. Saken sent both gunboats with a report, he himself decided, with the consent of Suvorov, to linger and determine the composition of the Turkish forces.
And these forces turned out to be very “strong”. By May 20, 13 Turkish battleships, 15 frigates and about 50 small ships gathered near Ochakovo. Saken received a report from Suvorov and an order to urgently leave Kinburn (I.A .: According to the descriptions of some other sources, the dubel-boat Osten-Saken patrolled the entrance to the estuary and was driven by approaching Turkish ships at the mouth of the Bug, but the version with the report is more common and seems more probable). Meanwhile, the Turkish fleet entered the estuary, as a result of which the Saken ship had to break through to its own, bypassing the Turkish troops.
At about 10 am on May 20, dubel-boat No. 2 left Kinburn towards the mouth of the Dnieper. But it didn't work out unnoticed. The Turks rushed to a lone Russian ship (IA: The number of Turkish ships seriously differs in different sources. 11 and 13 and even 30 Turkish ships are mentioned, but the ABSOLUTE superiority of the Turks in forces remains a fact).
The maneuvers did not lead to anything, it was not possible to break away and at about 6 pm the Turks approached and opened fire. The balance of forces left no chance for a successful outcome, so Osten-Saken put 9 crew members into the boat that he had on the backboard. Suvorov's letter from Nassau-Siegen and the stern flag of the dubel-boat were also transferred to the boat. In the future, this boat managed to escape under the shore, because. The Turks focused all their attention on the Osten-Sacken ship, trying to capture it. About a year ago, at the very beginning of the war, the battleship "Mary Magdalene" under the command of an Englishman in the Russian service Tizdel fell into a storm, during which he lost the bowsprit, all the masts and the rudder. Then, after 5 days of drifting, the ship was carried straight to the Bosphorus, where it surrendered to the Turks. At the beginning of October 1787, near Gadzhibey, they also managed to take a Russian floating battery under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Verevkin, although this was after fierce resistance, which ran aground with more than half knocked out artillery and shot ammunition. So the desire of the Turks to get another trophy was quite understandable (I.A .: VERY SORRY that for the memoirs of Tizdel, who handed over his ship without a fight, there were more places in the highly respected author of the Naval Collection than for all the mentions of the exploits of the lieutenant Ilyin and Captain Saken. These memoirs were published in 1863, v. 68, No. 10, in the amount of 116 pages!).
The details of the last stage of the pursuit are not exactly known. Various sources, depending on the degree of their "optimism" and exaltation, differ in numbers. The fact remains that the Russian sailors preferred death to captivity and blew up their own ship along with the Turkish galleys that went on board. The number of Turkish galleys at the same time diverges from 2 to 4, while the most “optimistic” sources add up to 3 more Turkish galleys disabled at the stage of artillery combat. They write that Osten-Saken "personally entered the kruyt-chamber with a torch in his hand." Who could see it? And small details don't matter. Some sources mention that a few days later the body of Saken was discovered, “identified only by the Order of St. George in the buttonhole” (I.A .: Not to mention minor inaccuracies about the order itself, the author has already mentioned).
In a report to Empress Catherine II on Saken's feat, Potemkin emphasized that "the fearlessness with which he fought and his heroic death showed the Turks what kind of enemies they have."
The Empress also remained indifferent to the feat. It was not accepted at that time to give orders posthumously. Osten-Saken did not have a wife or children.
For the heroic and selfless feat of Saken, Catherine II rewarded his relatives with pensions and presented them with an estate near Mitava. In the church of the Sea cadet corps where he studied, a marble plaque was installed in memory of the former pupil.
By order of Catherine, a lithograph about last fight Captain Osten-Saken.
The list of numerous navigational landmarks of modern Ukraine includes the Sakensky leading sign. It is located at Cape Saken, protruding into the waters of the Dnieper-Bug estuary from the territory of the Ochakovsky district of the neighboring Nikolaev region. This sign indicates the turning point from the seventh to the eighth bend of the Dnieper-Bug Liman Canal. It is located on the slope of a vast beam. Initially, the cape was called Sarykal. This name had a Turkic origin and in translation means “yellow clay” (“sary” - yellow, “killi” - clay). After the renaming of the cape, which took place on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the feat, the Sakensky leading sign allows ships built in Nikolaev and Kherson to pass through safe firth canals.
On November 15, 2013, a memorial sign was erected by the initiative group on Cape Saken, and on the outskirts of the village of Dmitrievka, on the high bank, a worship cross was erected, which was consecrated by the rector of the local Orthodox Church.
From the author: Digressing a little away from the main topic of the article, we also mention that Johann-Reingold Osten-Saken was not the first Russian (yes, a Russian sailor, despite the specific national origin and surname!) A sailor who accomplished such a feat, preferring death in battle to surrender. On July 10, 1737, a boat armed with 4 three-pounder guns, carrying a mortar from Genichesk to Azov, was attacked by a Turkish squadron consisting of 1 battleship and 30 galleys. When it became clear that it would not be possible to leave, the commander of the boat (more precisely, a detachment of a boat and 10 large boats, but the boats had previously been released for independent navigation with the wounded on board), Captain 2nd Rank Peter Defremery, threw the boat ashore, released the entire team , and then fired at the Turks from all 4 guns and blew up the bot and the Turks who boarded. Another sailor of the Russian fleet with a "non-Russian surname." In fact, his name was Pierre de Fremery, and he came to serve in Russia from France, obviously not "to catch happiness and rank." It turns out that it was de Fremery and Osten-Saken who laid down the tradition of the Russian fleet, expressed in the motto "I die, but do not give up!" ...
100 years have passed since the death of Captain 2nd Rank Osten-Saken. Russian fleet revived after another (alas!) period of devastation.
On May 9, 1886, the mine cruiser Kapitan Saken was laid down in Nikolaev, which was supposed to be (theoretically) completely the same type as the first Russian mine cruiser Lieutenant Ilyin. "Peculiarities of national shipbuilding", which the author mentioned a little in the material dedicated to Lieutenant Ilyin, fully affected in this case. In particular, being "of the same type", these ships turned out to be very different. In the fight against the overweight of the ship, its builders went even further than in the case of Lieutenant Ilyin. As a result, the performance characteristics of the ship still fell.
TTX mine cruiser "Captain Saken".
Displacement 742 tons (design - 610 tons).
Power -2341 hp
Speed - 18.3 knots (on tests).
Booking - deck, 13 mm.
Armament - 3 fixed TA, 381 mm., 6x1-47mm and 4x1-37 mm guns.
Crew - 7 officers, 120 sailors.
April 30, 1889 the ship was launched. It took three years to build instead of a year for Ilyin! And one more "nuance" seems to be unique for the Russian fleet. The fact is that each ship "relied" a mortgage board. This is a fairly ancient world tradition, which has become such in Russia, it seems, since the 18th century. In some place of the ship (usually it is a special "pocket" in the section of the ship installed first), a plate with the name and data about the ship is inserted.
As a matter of fact, the “laying down of a ship” is often not the beginning of its construction, but the date of the “official” placement of this plate (often with the invitation of the “highest” persons) in the ship’s structure. Copies of such tablets, quite often precious, are distributed to honored guests invited to lay the ship down. So, on the "Captain Saken" obviously saved. He did not get such a plate; a single plate was made for three gunboats being built simultaneously with a mine cruiser. To them, on this plate, "added" and "Captain Saken".
Preserved in the TsVMM in St. Petersburg, two mortgage boards measuring 12.4x7.2 cm are made of silver and have an engraved inscription on the front side: Kanonerskaya 3 push. 2 screw. boats in 1500 ind. forces "Zaporozhets", "Donets", "Chernomorets" and Mine Cruiser "Kapitan Saken" in 3500 ind. With. It was laid down in the Nikolaev Admiralty on May 9, 1886, in the presence of Their Imperial Majesties, the Sovereign Emperor, the Empress Empress. "On the reverse side it read:" Chief Commander of the Fleet and Ports of the Black and Caspian Seas Vice Admiral A.A. Peshchurov, Captain over the Nikolaev port, Rear Admiral V.I. Popov, Boat Builder: Ship. Eng. Headquarters-Capitan Berg, Mine Cruiser Builder: Ship. Eng. Captain Tirshtein.
But it's not a boat!
The bacchanalia of redesigns, alterations and corrections led to the acceptance into the fleet of a ship that does not have the slightest combat value, but for "mad money"! The cost of "Captain Saken" was 1,045,720 rubles! For comparison, the Varyag cruiser cost about 6 million rubles, the battleships of the Borodino series cost 13-14.5 million rubles. But the characteristics of the ships are incomparable !!! The famous destroyers of the Novik type, the best destroyers in the world at the beginning of the First World War, cost about 2 million rubles!
The Captain Saken clearly could not perform any tasks assigned to the destroyers and counter-destroyers. With "dreams" of 21-22 knots, he gave a speed of 18.3 knots in tests, but in real life he could not go faster than 17, the speed recorded in 1901 was a dull 14.5 knots.
True, taking into account the fact that until the beginning of the 20th century the Black Sea Fleet had no cruisers in principle, even at such a speed, the Captain Saken, which was included in the Black Sea Practical Squadron on May 30, 1890, was the only ship that could carry out reconnaissance missions. and messenger functions at the squadron.
With the service of "Captain Saken" one interesting and important date. On August 25, 1899, radio communication between warships was established in Sevastopol for the first time in history. It was on the "Captain Saken" that the transmitting radio equipment was installed, while the receivers were on the battleships "George the Victorious" and "Three Saints".
The mine cruiser did not participate in any battle with the enemy, but he had to shoot "on his own". During the uprising in the Black Sea Fleet in 1905, "Captain Saken" remained subordinate to Vice Admiral Chukhnin. There is information that he took part in the shelling of the rebellious ships (I.A.: "Specific information" was not found by the author).
On April 8, 1907, the ship was renamed the port ship Bombora. December 22, 1909 - excluded from the lists of the fleet.
There are inaccuracies in the "history" of the mine cruiser. Anyone can look at the page dedicated to the ship on Wikipedia. An attentive reader will certainly be surprised by the list of ship captains, which lists S.S., Pogulyaev in 1911 and A.A. Ostolopov in 1920! It is clear that in these years the named officers could not be the captains of THIS "Captain Saken".
The fact is that "Captain Saken", as well as "Lieutenant Ilyin", was not alone!
As part of the shipbuilding program of 1903-1923. It was planned to build 4 destroyers of the same type with a displacement of 350 tons for the Black Sea. However, the experience of the beginning Russo-Japanese War immediately showed the weakness of such small ships. Already in 1904, it was decided to build ships of larger displacement. The project was adopted not as a destroyer, but as a mine cruiser of the "Rider" type with a displacement of 570 tons.
As a result, in 1906, 4 mine cruisers were laid down (as they were classified until 1907, then they were called destroyers) of the Lieutenant Shestakov type.
"The Hero of Our Romance" was laid down on September 16, 1906 at the shipyard of the Naval plant. And he was named - "Lieutenant Pushchin." But in March 1907, the name of the ship was changed to Captain Saken. It was at this moment that the past "Captain Saken" was being withdrawn from combat strength fleet, besides, the 120th anniversary of the feat of Osten-Saken was about to be celebrated. The 350-ton destroyer was named after Lieutenant Pushchin ...
In September 1907, the ship was launched, and on October 13, 1909, the destroyer, which managed to change both the name and type in the classification of ships during construction, went into operation.
And this ship has not escaped the epidemic of redesigns and rebuilds. As a result, there was also a “long-term construction” and frank weakness compared to the destroyers of the Novik type, which began to enter service before the First World War.
TTX destroyer "Captain Saken".
Displacement 802 tons.
Armament 1 - 120/45, 5 - 75/50, 4 machine guns, 3 NTA 456 mm, 40 mine barriers
After 1909 2 - 120/45, 4 - 75/50, 2 machine guns, 3 NTA 456 mm, 40 min barriers
After 1914 2 - 120/45, 2 - 47 mm anti-aircraft guns, 2 machine guns, 3 NTA 456 mm, 50 mine barriers
No booking
Machinery 2 vertical triple expansion steam engines 7100 hp Nikolaev plant, 4 Norman boilers, 2 propellers
Maximum test speed 24.78 knots Cruising range 1944 miles. Crew 5 officers and 89 sailors
During the First World War, he participated in raid operations on enemy communications, carried out blockade service off the coast of Turkey, fired at coastal fortifications and port facilities, covered the raid and mine-blocking actions of other fleet forces, landed reconnaissance and sabotage groups and escorted transports with troops Caucasian Front. In January 1915, together with other ships, he sank the Turkish steamer Georgius and 3 sailboats in Sinop.
It underwent a major overhaul of the hull and mechanisms in 1915.
December 16, 1917 became part of the Red Black Sea Fleet. Since March 1918 he was in storage at the Sevastopol military port. On May 1, 1918, it was captured by German troops and on October 12, 1918, under the letter "R 04", it was included in the German Navy on the Black Sea, and on November 24, 1918 it was captured by the Anglo-French invaders and soon taken to the port of Izmir on the Sea of Marmara.
From October 1920 he was part of the White Guard naval forces of the South of Russia. On November 14, 1920, he was taken away by the Wrangelites during the evacuation from Sevastopol to Istanbul and then to Bizerte, where on December 29, 1920 he was interned by the French authorities.
On October 29, 1924, it was recognized by the French government as the property of the USSR, but due to the complexity of the international situation, it was not returned;
Just about 230 years have passed since the feat accomplished by Osten-Saken. And for almost 100 years in the history of the country and the fleet there is no place for the name Johann-Reingold von der Osten Saken (Christian Ivanovich Osten-Saken)!
Maybe not enough ships...
Perhaps such names as Admiral Chabanenko and Vice-Admiral Zhukov are more important for the country than Captain Saken and Lieutenant Ilyin (although for the latter the minesweeper was still “found”) ...
Perhaps, unlike the same Ilyin, there were no fellow countrymen who managed to push through "the corresponding decision ...
The latter is very likely. The surname Osten-Sakenov left the history of the country, giving more than one well-deserved celebrity. Mitava, where Catherine II allocated land for the hero's relatives, is no longer “Russia”. Yes, and the Dnieper-Bug estuary, where the feat was accomplished - too. And the former possessions of the branched family of Osten-Sacken - mainly Belarus and the Baltic states. You can find photos of the picturesque ruins of the count's castle Osten-Sakenov on the border of the villages of Nemeshaevo and Mirotskoe in the Kyiv region on the net.
As they say, "sik transit gloria mundi" ...
