Until his death in July 1996, Adolf von Thadden was a prominent and respected figure in German "right" and "nationalist" (conservative) circles. In his last book he briefly and convincingly explains why Hitler was forced, for political and military reasons, to launch a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union. His book "Stalin's Trap" is a legacy for future generations, a kind of testament for young Germans.

For decades in the United States and Europe, the official view was that the crazed Adolf Hitler attacked without warning, betraying the gullible Joseph Stalin in a treacherous surprise attack on a completely unprepared Soviet Union June 22, 1941. Von Thadden's book, which is based in large part on recently disclosed data from Russian archives, Stalin's own statements, and new revelations from Russian military experts, convincingly debunks this notion.

Many Soviet documents came to the Germans during the war, German intelligence also reported on the accumulation of Soviet troops on the border in 1941, justifying Hitler's decision to strike. Presented before an impartial tribunal, this evidence would certainly justify the German military and political leadership. Unfortunately, all these documents have been confiscated and are in the possession of the victorious allies.

In a speech dated December 11, 1941, Adolf Hitler detailed the "Red Menace" in the East, which had arisen with the assistance and instigation of England and the (still officially neutral) United States. At this historic moment, the German leader said:

"Already in 1940, it became clear that the Kremlin's plans were aimed at domination, and thus the destruction of all of Europe. I have already spoken about the buildup of Soviet troops in the East at a time when Germany had only a few divisions in the areas bordering Soviet Russia. Only a blind man may not see that there was a military build-up going on, and it was not to hold the line, but rather to attack someone who seemed incapable of defending...

When I became aware of the possibility of a threat in the east of the Reich in 1940 through [secret] reports from the British House of Commons and by observing the movements of Soviet troops on our border, I immediately ordered the formation of new tank, motorized and infantry divisions.. .
“We were very clear that under no circumstances could we give the enemy the opportunity to strike first. However, the decision in this case was very difficult ...
“A truly impressive amount of material is now available confirming that a Soviet offensive was planned. We are also certain when this offensive was to take place. In view of this danger, the extent of which we are only now truly aware of, I can only thank the Lord God that he enlightened me and gave me the strength to do what had to be done Millions of German soldiers can thank him for their lives and that Europe still exists.
"I can say today: if a wave of more than 20,000 tanks, a hundred divisions, tens of thousands of guns, along with more than 10,000 aircraft, moved against the Reich, Europe would be lost ..."

During the Nuremberg trials, former high-ranking officials of the Third Reich testified to the background of the Barbarossa plan, characterizing the Soviet threat in 1941, and what huge amounts of weapons, fuel and other materials they found when their troops invaded Soviet territory. But this fact was not accepted by the tribunal.

Von Thadden cites, for example, cites the testimony of Hermann Göring:

“We realized very quickly who was behind the coup in Yugoslavia and General Simović [in Belgrade on March 27, 1941]. Shortly thereafter, it was confirmed that the reports from Yugoslavia were correct, namely that there was a strong political influence of the Soviets, as well as facts significant financial assistance for the coup by England, later we found evidence of this.It was clear that this idea was directed against the policy of the former Yugoslav government towards Germany ...

The coup of Roman Simovich was certainly the last and decisive factor that dispelled the Fuhrer's last doubts about the intentions of the USSR, and prompted him to take preventive measures in this direction.

Von Thadden cites the testimony of General Alfred Jodl, one of Hitler's closest military advisers, who gave similar testimony:

“This is undoubtedly a purely preventive war. Later we discovered huge stores and all kinds of preparations for war right in front of our border. I will skip the details, but I can say that although we managed to achieve some degree of tactical surprise, there was no strategic surprise. Russia was fully prepared for war."

The Allies at Nuremberg restricted the defendants' access to German documents that would exonerate them. Germany's military and political leaders were hanged, committed suicide, or were deported to the Soviet Union for slave labor. As a result, the task of establishing historical truth was left to others, including scientists from Russia and the United States, as well as such respected Germans as von Thadden.

Additional evidence cited by von Thadden was provided by Andrey Vlasov, a prominent Soviet general who was captured by the Germans. During a conversation in 1942 with SS General Richard Hildebrandt, he asked if Stalin was going to attack Germany, and if so, when. Hildebrandt later said:

"Vlasov replied that the attack was planned for August-September 1941. The Russians had been preparing the attack since the beginning of the year, the preparations took quite a long time due to poor railways. Hitler correctly assessed the situation, and struck right at the time of the build-up. This, Vlasov said, is the reason for the huge initial German successes.

A significant contribution was made by Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun), a Soviet military intelligence officer, who revealed that Stalin was preparing to attack Germany and the West as part of a long-term project of global Sovietization, and that Hitler had no reasonable alternative to counter this but to launch his attack . In Stalin's Trap, von Thadden discusses and corroborates Suvorov's analysis, also referring to the findings of Russian military historians who, working in archives available since 1990, by and large corroborate Suvorov's work. Retired Soviet Colonel Aleksey Filippov wrote an article "On the readiness of the Red Army for war in June 1941" published in 1992 in the Russian military journal "Voyenny Vestnik" and Valery Danilov, another retired Soviet colonel, who wrote the article "Did the General Prepare Red Army Headquarters Preemptive Strike on Germany?," which first appeared in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and later, in translation, in the respectable Austrian military journal, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift.

More recently, two eminent European historians, a German and an Austrian, have presented further evidence of the Soviet preparations for an attack on Germany. The first of these is Joachim Hoffmann, a historian at the military history research center in Freiburg. Wrote the fundamental work Stalins Vernichtungskrieg, 1941-1945 ("Stalin's War of Annihilation"), consisting of 300 pages, which went through three reprints. The second is Heinz Magenheimer, a member of the National Defense Academy in Vienna and the Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift. His book has recently appeared on English language titled Hitler's War: German Military Strategy, 1940-1945 (London, 1998).

Von Thadden also commented on a number of articles in the German weekly Der Spiegel about the Soviet plans devised by General Georgy Zhukov to attack northern Germany and Romania in early 1941. Commenting on this, Colonel Vladimir Karpov stated:
"Just imagine if Zhukov's plan were accepted and carried out. At dawn, in May or June, thousands of our aircraft and tens of thousands of our guns would strike at a densely concentrated enemy force whose positions were known down to battalion level - a surprise even more unthinkable than a German attack on us."

Stalin's speeches

Perhaps the most revealing of Stalin's speeches is delivered at a meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939. Told in a narrow circle of his like-minded people, it shows his accurate, but absolutely cynical assessment of political forces, and reveals his cunning intentions.
Four days after this speech, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop met with Stalin in the Kremlin to sign the Soviet-German non-aggression pact.

It is important to note that Stalin could have prevented the war in 1939 by agreeing to support Britain and France in their "guarantees" of Poland's integrity, or simply by announcing that the Soviet Union would strongly object to Germany's violation of Polish territory. He instead decided to give Hitler the "green light" to attack Poland, expecting that England and France would then declare war on Germany, turning the local conflict into a full-scale pan-European war.
In this speech, Stalin outlined his cunning and prudent view of the situation in Europe:

“The question of peace or war is entering a critical phase for us. If we conclude a treaty of mutual assistance with France and Great Britain, Germany will give up Poland and seek "modus vivendi" with the Western powers. War will be averted, but in further events may assume a dangerous character for the USSR. If we accept Germany's offer to conclude a non-aggression pact with her, she will, of course, attack Poland, and the intervention of France and England in this war will become inevitable. Western Europe will be subjected to serious unrest and unrest. Under these conditions, we will have many chances to stay out of the conflict, and we will be able to hope for our advantageous entry into the war.
The experience of the last twenty years shows that in peacetime it is impossible to have a communist movement in Europe strong enough to enable the Bolshevik Party to seize power. The dictatorship of this party becomes possible only as a result of a great war."

We will make our choice, and it is clear. We must accept the German offer and politely send back the Anglo-French mission. The first advantage that we will extract will be the destruction of Poland to the very approaches to Warsaw, including Ukrainian Galicia.
Let us now consider the second assumption, i.e. German victory. Some are of the opinion that this possibility poses a serious danger to us. There is some truth in this statement, but it would be a mistake to think that this danger will be as close and as great as some imagine it to be. If Germany wins, she will come out of the war too exhausted to start an armed conflict with the USSR for at least ten years.

Her main concern will be to watch over the defeated England and France in order to prevent their recovery. On the other hand, victorious Germany will have vast territories at its disposal, and for many decades it will be busy “exploiting” them and establishing German orders there. It is obvious that Germany will be very busy elsewhere to turn against us. There is one more thing that will serve to strengthen our security. In defeated France, the Communist Party will always be very strong. The communist revolution will inevitably take place, and we can use this circumstance to come to the aid of France and make her our ally. Later, all the peoples who fell under the “protection” of victorious Germany would also become our allies. We will have a wide field of activity for the development of the world revolution.

Comrades! It is in the interests of the USSR, the motherland of the working people, that a war breaks out between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. Everything must be done to make this war last as long as possible in order to exhaust the two sides. It is for this reason that we must agree to the conclusion of the pact proposed by Germany and work to ensure that this war, declared once, lasts for the maximum amount of time. It will be necessary to intensify propaganda work in the warring countries in order to be ready by the time the war is over...”

The Soviet leader's audacious calculation was to use Germany as an "icebreaker," von Thadden argues in his "Stalin Trap."

A version of this speech has been known since 1939, but for decades it was considered a fake. However, in 1994, Russian historians found its text in special secret Soviet archives, and quickly published it in a Russian scientific journal, as well as in an academic publication of the Novosibirsk University. Shortly after this speech in August 1939, von Thadden notes, Stalin ordered a build-up of forces that culminated in the summer of 1941 with a powerful grouping of Soviet troops on the border with Germany.

On May 5, 1941, just seven weeks before the German attack, Stalin delivered another important speech at a gala banquet in the Kremlin to the graduates of the Frunze Military Academy. Members of Stalin's "inner circle" were also present, including Molotov and Beria. During the war, the Germans reconstructed the text of this speech, based on the memories of captured Soviet officers who were present at the banquet.
As von Thadden notes, a number of historians predictably deny the authenticity of the speech, accepting it as a product of German propaganda and disinformation. However, a few years ago, Russian historian Lev Bezymensky found parts of the speech in the text that had been edited for intended publication in the Kremlin archives. He published this text in 1992 in an issue of the scientific journal Osteuropa.

In this speech, Stalin emphasized that the peace-loving policy of the Soviet state had played its role. (With this policy, the Soviet Union significantly expanded its borders in the west in 1939 and 1940, "capturing" about 30 million people.) So, Stalin bluntly announced that it was time to prepare for war against Germany, a conflict that would begin in the near future. time. He mentioned the huge buildup of Soviet troops over the past few years. The recent "occupation" of Bulgaria, and the transfer of German troops to Finland, provide several "reasons for a war against Germany."

Stalin said:

"Our war plan is already prepared ... we can start a war with Germany in the next two months ... a peace treaty with Germany is only a deception, a curtain behind which one can openly prepare ...
A peaceful policy ensured peace for our country. Peace politics is a good thing. For the time being, for the time being, we carried out a line on the defensive - until we re-equipped our army, did not supply the army with modern means of struggle.

And now, when we have reconstructed our army, saturated it with equipment for modern combat, when we have become strong, now we need to move from defense to offensive.

In defending our country, we must act offensively. From defense to move on to a military policy of offensive operations. We need to reorganize our education, our propaganda, agitation, our press in an offensive spirit. The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army.

The successes of the German army are explained by the fact that it did not face an equally strong opponent. Some Soviet commanders falsely overestimate the successes of the German army...

So I propose a toast to new era which came in the development of our socialist Fatherland. Long live the active offensive policy of the Soviet state!"

In the face of all the new evidence that has become available in recent years, von Thadden argues that there is a need to reconsider official history this period.
A group of concerned scientists met at an international conference in Moscow in 1995. Historians from Europe, Israel, the United States and Canada met with their Russian counterparts to coordinate the "official" line, both in Russia and in the West, about the German-Soviet clash and its origins. These historians have simply ignored most of the new evidence to revise this chapter of history, including Stalin's speeches and other evidence provided by von Thadden, as well as some of the conclusions of Russian historians.

Von Thadden quotes the French historian Stephen Courtois:

"I am working on a reassessment of the personality of Stalin. He was the greatest criminal of our century. But at the same time he was the great politician of the twentieth century: the most competent and professional. He understood best of all how to use all available means to achieve his goal. Starting in 1917 "He got his way, and in the end, he achieved his goal ... of course, you can say that Hitler started the war. But the evidence of Stalin's guilt is staggering. Stalin wanted to eradicate everyone who opposed the Marxist-Leninist social order."

"Because of the resistance of the German soldiers," concludes von Thadden, "Russian and Anglo-American 'liberators' met each other not in Western Europe, but on the Elbe, in the very center of Germany."

Notes:

1. Von Thadden wrote numerous articles and essays, and was a co-publisher of the Coburg monthly Nation und Europe. Other books by him include Zwei Angreifer: Hitler and Stalin, 1993; Adolf Hitler, 1991; Die verfemte Rechte, 1984; Guernica: Greuelpropaganda oder Kriegsverbrechen?

2. "Hitler's Declaration of War Against the United States," The Journal of Historical Review, Winter 1988-89 (Vol. 8, No. 4), pp. 389-416.

3. This portion of Göring's testimony, given on March 15, 1946, is in the IMT "blue series" (Nuremberg), vol. 9, pp. 333-334. On March 27, 1941, Serbian officers in Belgrade, with backing from Britain, and possibly also the United States, overthrew the pro-German Yugoslav government of prime minister Cvetkovic. 6, delayed the Barbarossa attack against the USSR by several weeks, See: Germany and the Second World War (Oxford Univ. Press: 1995), vol. 3, pp. 480, 498, 499.

4. This portion of Jodl's testimony, given on June 5, 1946, is in the IMT "blue series," vol. 15, pp. 394-395.

5. See David Irving's study, Nuremberg: The Last Battle, reviewed in the July-August 1998 Journal of Historical Review. See also, M. Weber, "The Nuremberg Trials and the Holocaust," Summer 1992 Journal, pp. 167 -213.

6. Suvorov's first three books on World War II have been reviewed in The Journal of Historical Review. The first two, Icebreaker and "M Day," were reviewed in Nov.-Dec. 1997 Journal (Vol. 16, No. 6), pp. 22-34. His third book, "The Last Republic," was reviewed in the July-August 1998 Journal (Vol. 17, No. 4), pp. 30-37.

7. A portion of this speech is quoted in part in the Nov.-Dec. 1997 Journal of Historical Review, pp. 32-34, and in the July-August 1998 Journal, p. 31.

8. Works by Courtois include Histoire du parti communiste français (1995), L "etat du monde en 1945 (1994), Rigueur et passion (1994), 50 ans d" une passion française, 1991), Qui savait quoi? (1987), and, perhaps best known, Le livre noir du communisme: Crimes, terreur, repression (1997).

"New Evidence on the 1941 "Barbarossa" Attack: Why Hitler Attacked Soviet Russia When He Did" by Daniel W. Michaels

From The Journal of Historical Review, May-June 1999 (Vol. 18, No. 3), pp. 40ff.

The war against the Soviet Union was one of firm intentions Adolf Hitler. Unlike his high-ranking military, who also considered war necessary in the medium term but wanted to limit it to revanchist military campaigns against Poland and France, for the "Fuehrer" the conquest of "space in the east" was a non-negotiable goal. This was the aim of his foreign policy in the 1930s.

The latest research by the military historian Rolf-Dieter Mueller has shown that Hitler's seemingly unbalanced policy towards Poland can be called the key if it is seen as an attempt to get an ally to wage war against the Soviet Union.

Only when it became clear that Poland, relying on British and French guarantees, did not intend to give in to German demands, did Hitler decide to make an alliance with Stalin. This happened at the expense of Poland, which was then divided between two dictators.

Ideological mortal enemies

The pact between two ideological mortal enemies surprised the whole world at the end of August 1939, but Hitler from the very beginning did not intend to comply with it. Stalin quickly annexed to his empire as "trophies" most of the territories due to him, including Eastern Poland, Karelia in Finland, the Baltic states, and part of Romania. Meanwhile, the Third Reich subjugated France and the Benelux countries in the west, but he failed to establish air supremacy over Great Britain and land his troops there.

Although Stalin’s Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov was visiting Berlin in November 1940, Hitler ordered on December 18, 1940: “The German Wehrmacht must be prepared to defeat Soviet Russia as a result of a quick military campaign before the end of the war against England ( Plan Barbarossa).

He also set an exact date: "Preparations requiring a longer time should be started now - if it is not already happening - and completed by May 15, 1941." Since this day turned out to be a Thursday, and Hitler began almost all his actions on Friday or at the end of the week, it was assumed that the period from May 16 to 18, 1941, should be considered as a specific time for the attack.

"In a daring operation"

Thus, the Wehrmacht had more than six months before the start of winter in order to complete the tasks of the planned operation: “The mass of Russian troops located in the western part of Russia should be destroyed as a result of a bold operation with the active use of tank wedges, and the possibility of parts of the enemy into the depths of Russian space.

These plans turned into waste paper as Hitler's closest ally, Benito Mussolini, launched an amateurish attack on northern Greece from occupied Albania. The Greeks, after a short retreat, were able to push back the Italian troops, which outnumbered them and were armed. To prevent the defeat of Mussolini, which could pose a danger to the fascist regime, Hitler was forced to intervene.

Therefore, on January 11, 1941, Hitler ordered "for strategic, political and psychological reasons, assistance from Germany." General base ground forces after that, he developed a plan for an attack on Greece, which was to be carried out from the territory of Bulgaria, as well as the multinational state of Yugoslavia, which had to be obtained as an ally.

Yugoslavia becomes an enemy

But after the failure of the attempt to make Yugoslavia an ally and the removal of the pro-German Prince Regent Paul from power, whose place was taken by the young King Peter II as a result of an officer putsch, Hitler at the end of March 1941 decided to postpone the attack on the Soviet Union to a later date. “The military putsch in Yugoslavia changed the political situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, even if it initially makes declarations of its loyalty, be regarded as an enemy and therefore must be destroyed as quickly as possible.

Since the Balkan war had to be completed as soon as possible, tank divisions were needed for this, as well as other special divisions, which were also necessary for an attack on the Soviet Union. Therefore, there was no other alternative, and the start of the Barbarossa plan was postponed for several weeks.

It is very likely that the postponement of the start of the attack to 22 June 1941 had a decisive influence on the outcome of the war. Despite huge losses, Hitler's strategy in the Soviet Union largely worked in the first months. However, the necessary five weeks were no longer available, and therefore the big offensive against Moscow began only on October 2, 1941, although it was originally planned for an earlier date.

Would Stalin survive defeat?

When the German units reached the suburbs of the Soviet capital at the end of November 1941, the period of autumn thaw had already begun. Soon came the Eurasian winter, for which the Wehrmacht was not prepared. In anticipation of a quick victory, the German leadership abandoned winter equipment.

It seems likely, although it cannot be proven, that if the attack had begun in mid-May 1941, the Red Army in western Russia would have been largely defeated by the end of August. If the attack on Moscow had begun in September 1941, then perhaps it would have been successful. Whether Stalin would have remained in power after that or would have been overthrown - today this is just a subject for speculation.

The celebration of Victory Day has ended, but another, mourning date this time is ahead - June 22, 1941. On the eve of the next anniversary of the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, it would be useful to recall the circumstances in which Adolf Hitler made this decision. This article was written by me in continuation of the article by A.V. Ognev - a front-line soldier, professor, honored scientist - "Exposing the falsifiers. The plan" Barbarossa "was signed", in which the author proves that "Germany began to prepare for aggression against the USSR immediately after the surrender of France." In my opinion, this conclusion of A.V. Ogneva requires clarification - Hitler decided to attack the USSR not immediately AFTER the surrender of France, but immediately after the start of the evacuation of the allies from Dunkirk, almost a month BEFORE the surrender of France.

My constructions are based on the opinion of the former Major General of the Wehrmacht B. Müller-Gillebrand, who in his fundamental work "The Land Army of Germany 1933-1945." says, literally: "the second stage of the Western campaign had not yet begun, when Hitler on May 28, 1940 began to discuss with the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces the future organization of the peacetime army .... In addition, Hitler already on June 15 gave the order to reduce the size of the peacetime army up to 120 divisions, including 30 mobile formations envisaged for peacetime.

It would seem that a completely logical picture is obtained - Hitler attacked France on May 10, 1940 with 156 divisions, and for peacetime he decided on June 15, 1940 to reduce the wartime army to 120 divisions. To carry out Operation Sea Lion on July 13, 1940, instead of liquidating 35 divisions, it was decided to disband 17 divisions, and to dismiss the personnel of 18 divisions "on a long-term leave so that at any time it would be easy to restore these formations in their previous form ... On July 31, 1940, Hitler declared his determination to carry out a campaign against the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941 with the aim of defeating it. For this, he said, it is necessary to bring the strength of the land army to 180 divisions by the scheduled date. On the eve of the defeat of Greece and Yugoslavia, the Wehrmacht was reinforced with divisions intended to carry out occupational service in these countries, as a result of which the German land army before the attack on the USSR, and this is both the Wehrmacht and the SS troops, consisted of 209 divisions, including the battle group "Nord ".

The harmony of this picture is violated by the composition of the peacetime army - "120 divisions, which included 30 mobile formations." After all, an increase in 10 tank divisions, 4 motorized divisions, 2 SS motorized divisions and 1 motorized rifle brigade According to Müller-Hillebrand, Germany needed up to 20 tank and 10 motorized divisions of the peacetime army for a war only in the vast regions of the Soviet Union. "The accumulated experience, as well as the radical change in the military-political situation, which occurred as a result of the acquisition of new vast territories in the East and as a result of the fact that the Soviet Union became Germany's immediate neighbor, spoke of the need for a significant increase in the future number of motorized rifle troops, and especially armored forces. ". It turns out illogical - they created a peacetime army, but they were preparing for war with the Soviet Union, and not in the distant future, but literally in the fall of 1940.

The seeming paradox of the situation is easily eliminated by acquaintance with the entry in the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, Colonel-General F. Halder for July 31, 1940, which shows the distribution of a grouping of 180 divisions:

"7 divisions - Norway (make independent)
50 divisions - France
3 divisions - Holland and Belgium
Total: 60 divisions
120 divisions - to the East
Total: 180 divisions."

It turns out that 120 divisions is the army of the invasion of the Soviet Union. Hitler needed an additional 60 divisions to carry out occupational service in the West only after England renounced peace with Germany. 120 divisions are, on the one hand, a peacetime army for England and France, and on the other, a wartime army for the Soviet Union. In the light of new circumstances, the generally accepted picture of A. Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union is changing dramatically.

May 10, 1940, the day of the resignation of N. Chamberlain, Germany attacked France, Holland and Belgium. Relying on the conclusion of peace with England after the defeat of France and the organization of a joint campaign against the USSR, on May 24, 1940, Hitler stopped the tank offensive of his troops against the Allies defending Dunkirk. Thus, he made it possible for the British troops to evacuate from the northern "bag", and for his own - to avoid a frontal collision with a cornered, doomed and desperately resisting enemy, thus saving the lives of both British and German soldiers for the upcoming campaign against the USSR. "Stop order" surprised not only German generals to which Hitler "explained the stop tank units... the desire to save tanks for the war in Russia. "Even Hitler's closest associate R. Hess convinced him that the defeat of British troops in France would speed up peace with England.

However, Hitler did not succumb to anyone's persuasion and remained adamant - the defeat of the 200 thousandth British group undoubtedly increased the chances of peace between England and Germany, but at the same time reduced the potential of England in the fight against the Soviet Union, which was completely unacceptable for Hitler. On May 27, the number of evacuees was small - only 7669 people, but later the pace of evacuation increased sharply, and a total of 338 thousand people were evacuated from Dunkirk, including 110 thousand French. A large amount of military equipment and heavy weapons were thrown by the British Expeditionary Force. Meanwhile, "at 04:00 on May 28, the Belgian troops were ordered to lay down, as Belgium had agreed to an unconditional surrender."

On May 28, 1940, making sure that the British were evacuated from Dunkirk, Hitler began discussing an invasion army in the USSR, provided that England did not interfere in the German-Soviet conflict. On June 2, during the attack on Dunkirk, he expressed "the hope that now England will be ready to agree to a 'reasonable peace' and then his hands will be free to carry out his 'great and immediate task of confronting Bolshevism', and on 15 June, he ordered the creation of an invasion army in the Soviet Union consisting of 120 divisions with a simultaneous increase in the number of mobile formations to 30. An increase in the number of mobile formations, according to B. Müller-Hillebrand, was necessary for Hitler for the war in the vast expanses of Russia.

On June 16, 1940, the French government refused to conclude the Anglo-French alliance proposed by W. Churchill with the provision of dual citizenship to all British and French, the creation of a single government in London and the unification of the armed forces. By the night of June 16, 1940, having led a defeatist group, "Marshal Petain ... formed a government with the main goal of obtaining an immediate truce from Germany." On June 22, 1940, France capitulated. E. Halifax, had he come to power on May 10, 1940, undoubtedly, following France, he would have concluded peace with Germany, but events took a completely different turn.

The very next day, W. Churchill refused to recognize the Vichy government and began active cooperation with the Free French organization of General de Gaulle, and on June 27, 1940, he declared that if Hitler failed to defeat the British on the Island, he would "probably rush to East. As a matter of fact, he will probably do this without even trying to carry out an invasion." Fearing that the Nazis would use the French fleet against England, Churchill gave the order to destroy it. During Operation Catapult, the British Navy sank, damaged and captured 7 battleships, 4 cruisers, 14 destroyers, 8 submarines and a number of other ships and vessels.

In order to put pressure on Churchill, on July 13, 1940, Hitler gave the order to prepare a landing operation against England by early September, in connection with which he decided to disband only 17 of the planned 35 divisions, with the dismissal personnel the remaining 18 divisions on long-term leave. On July 19, 1940, Hitler offered peace to England for the sake of either participation or neutrality in the struggle of Germany against the Soviet Union, and "on July 21, ... demanded that von Brauchitsch begin" preparations "for war with Russia and, in the victorious frenzy of those days, even thought about carrying out this campaign already in the autumn of 1940.

On July 22, 1940, Churchill refused peace with Germany, and on July 24, 1940, he agreed to the transfer of old American destroyers to England to counter German submarines in exchange for the right to organize US naval bases in a number of English points, which completely confused Hitler all his plans. In a desperate attempt to turn the tide, Hitler urged Edward to return to England. However, on July 28, Edward, who fled to Spain in May 1940 from the headquarters of the Allied Command from the advancing German divisions, told Hess in Lisbon that "at the moment he is not ready to risk a civil war in Britain for the sake of the throne, but the bombing can reason with Britain and may prepare the country for his imminent return from the Bahamas, which he then took over at Churchill's suggestion."

Thus Churchill kept his post. Since Germany's action against the Soviet Union was now under threat from British and French troops, Hitler decided to increase the army to 180 divisions. It was planned to leave 7 divisions in Norway, 50 divisions in France and 3 divisions in Holland and Belgium. Total: 60 divisions. As before, 120 divisions were allocated for operations in the East. Total: 180 divisions. Since the Wehrmacht was faced with the need to increase its numbers, on July 31, 1940, Hitler announced his intention to defeat the USSR no earlier than the spring of 1941. "On August 1, 1940, the Windsors boarded a liner in Lisbon bound for the Caribbean Sea, and finally left the political scene."

As we can see, Hitler thought about an attack on the Soviet Union on May 24-28, 1940, even during military operations in France, directly linking it to the decision to allow British troops to evacuate from the "sack" near Dunkirk. The final decision to attack the Soviet Union was made by Hitler no later than June 15, 1940, when he ordered the creation of an invasion army into the Soviet Union consisting of 120 divisions with a simultaneous increase in the number of mobile units to 30. The attack on the USSR was supposed to be subject to non-intervention in the German -Soviet conflict between England and Vichy France.

Meanwhile, this plan was thwarted by Winston Churchill, who undertook to force Germany to attack the Soviet Union without any assistance from England. Hitler's attempt, either by intimidating England with the invasion of the Wehrmacht, or by returning Edward to the throne, to achieve the neutrality of England in the German-Soviet conflict did not bring success. Hitler was compelled obediently, in addition to the 120 divisions of the group for the invasion of the Soviet Union, to create 60 divisions for the occupation of Western Europe and its cover from the threat from England. The attack on the Soviet Union was postponed from the autumn of 1940 to the spring of 1941.

After the end of World War II and until the late fifties, it was generally accepted that Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union was the result of his ideological program aimed at conquering living space in the East. The basis for this conclusion was the materials of the Nuremberg trials, in the indictment of which a special section "Destruction of Slavic and other peoples" was included.

The motivation for Hitler's aggression was not in doubt even among the leading historians of that time. For example, the well-known English historian and military theorist John Fuller, in his monograph “The Second World War 1939-1945”, published in London in 1948, clearly names the conquest of living space as the main reason for the Nazi attack on the USSR:

“Why, then, did Hitler not see in an alliance with Russia, which could have been concluded a few years earlier, a much more reliable guarantee against a war on two fronts? The answer is given in the 14th chapter of the second volume of Mein Kampf. Here Hitler expounds his theory of living space in such a clear and detailed way that it is truly surprising why it is so often asked: why did Hitler invade Russia?

However, the presentation of Hitler as the main culprit of hundreds of millions of victims of World War II clearly did not suit the anti-Soviet forces of the West, under whose influence in the sixties a creeping revision of the fundamental provisions of the Nuremberg verdict began, associated with a change in the motivation that explained the reason for the Nazi attack on our country. At the same time, it was no longer the programmatic installations of the Nazi concept that were put in the forefront, but the military-strategic situation that had developed by June 1941, and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union of the pre-war period, allegedly fraught with potential aggression.

The next step of the revisionists, taken under the conditions cold war, attempts began to pass off Hitler's aggression against the USSR as protecting Europe from the threat of Bolshevism. At the same time, fascist aggression in the writings of neo-Nazis turned almost into a just, national and defensive war. At the extreme, World War II was seen as a battle between two equally bad dictators.

The delusions of the Austrian “philosopher” Topić, who in his book “Stalin’s War” went so far as to claim that the political meaning of World War II boils down to the USSR’s aggression against Western democracies, were a kind of crowning achievement of the process of historical revision of fascist aggression, while the role of Germany and Japan consisted only in that they served as puppets of the Kremlin. Thus, the Soviet leadership allegedly deliberately provoked Hitler to attack the USSR, and only in order to appear before the whole world as a victim of aggression, after which, under a plausible pretext, to seize all of Europe.

In the same series of historical anecdotes are the works of the self-styled "Suvorov", who stubbornly tries to portray Stalin as an icebreaker of the world revolution. While claiming that Stalin not only brought Hitler to power, but also constantly pushed him to war in the West, and in July 1941 he himself was preparing an attack on Germany, but the Fuhrer supposedly only a couple of weeks ahead of the Soviets purely by chance.

Was the living space already conquered enough for Hitler?

Especially vehemently modern revisionists deny the possibility that Hitler attacked Soviet Russia in order to gain living space. At the same time, the thesis is often used as the main argument that by the beginning of the attack on the USSR, the Germans had captured and subjugated so many European countries that the need to wage further wars for living space has simply disappeared from them. Here is what Rezun writes about this:

“At the beginning of 1941, Hitler had so much land that he no longer knew what to do with it. In his submission were: Austria, Czechoslovakia, most of Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, half of France, the Channel Islands of Great Britain, Yugoslavia and Greece. Under the influence of Germany were Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. In addition, the German troops fighting in North Africa. He doesn't have enough land...

Having grabbed so much in a year and a half, you need to think not about new lands, but about keeping what you have captured.

However, it is reasonable to ask Vladimir Bogdanovich if, having occupied almost half of Europe, Hitler also intended to annex to Germany most of the territory conquered by his troops?

Yes, in FIG, he needed, say, France, of course, with the exception of Alsace and Lorraine, which the Fuhrer considered to be primordially German territory. What, besides a headache, would give Hitler the accession to Germany of all of France. Would have made the Reich a multinational state, but this was completely contrary to Nazi ideology. It would increase the living space of the Germans, so where do you order the French to go, deport to Siberia? But Stalin will not let them go there.

Indeed, in Hitler's understanding, the conquest of living space was reduced to the process of Germanization of the annexed territories, i.e. to the forcible replacement of a significant part of the racially inferior indigenous population with genetically sound representatives of the Aryan race.

Thus, in accordance with Hitler's ideas, the inferior part of the natives either had to be destroyed, as was gradually done with the Jews, or previously subjected to measures aimed at artificially reducing their population, and the part of the indigenous population that survived after the genocide was relocated to designated for these purposes. reservations.

The implementation of just such a program for the development of living space was launched by the Nazis in Poland as early as 1939. For this, the Polish territory occupied by the Germans was divided into two parts. All the best western and central lands of the country were included in the Reich, and in the east of the occupied territory a reservation was formed, the so-called Governor-General, where Jews and Polish subhumans not subject to Germanization were to be resettled.

In the future, the Polish experience was planned to be fully extended to Russians, Little Russians, Belarusians, Czechs and the Balts. And only the fiercest resistance to German aggression on the part of the Soviet peoples thwarted these misanthropic Nazi plans.

However, it should be noted that Hitler was not at all the discoverer of the idea of ​​conquest of living space. These ideas were deeply rooted in the "humanistic" traditions of the West and existed long before the Nazis came to power.

The first attempts to conquer the living space were made by Europeans under the banner of Catholic expansion in the form of crusader campaigns in Palestine and the total destruction of all kinds of infidels there.

However, on a full scale, the thoughts of Europeans about the conquest of living space were embodied during their occupation of the American continent. At the time of Columbus's arrival in America, up to 10 million Indians lived in the current territory of the United States, and by the beginning of the 20th century there were only about 300 thousand descendants of the natives driven into the reservations. Although, in the normal course of events, by this time there should have been no less than 100 million people. The most brutal genocide of the indigenous population of America - such was the bloody payment for modern American "democracy".

Due to the genocide of aborigines by the British, Spaniards, French ... and was "liberated" from all sorts of unintelligent Avels, a huge living space, on which since then many generations of now triumphant Cains began to flourish. Moreover, already at the time of the development of America, the ideological thesis about underdeveloped peoples and the mental superiority of the white man played an important role in all these most heinous crimes against humanity. That is why the West so zealously denies Hitler's intentions to conquer living space in Russia.

Was there a connection between the ideology of Nazism and aggression against the USSR?

An interesting fact is that among the zealous opponents of recognizing the connection between the ideology of Nazism and Germany's aggression against the USSR are not only obvious neo-Nazis, but also, say, the Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky.

The essence of Gorodetsky's argument, set out in his book Fatal Self-Deception: Stalin and Germany's Attack on the Soviet Union, boils down to the assertion that there is supposedly no direct connection between Hitler's ideas, outlined by him in Mein Kampf, and the Fuhrer's actions after the victory over France:

“Indeed, it is doubtful that Hitler's decision naturally followed from his triumphant victory over France, being predetermined by the ideological guidelines of Mein Kampf.

To prove his position, Gorodetsky uses three main theses:

“It is too obvious that the war with England in the west and the subsequent turn towards South-Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean was contrary to Hitler's ideological aspirations. He could not ignore the new needs of Germany, determined by the course of events, even if this greatly led away from the master plan outlined in Mein Kampf..

After the victory over France, Hitler, indeed, was forced to significantly deviate from the plan outlined by him in Mein Kamph, getting involved in a war with England. However, he did it against his will. In addition, the Führer made great efforts to make peace with Great Britain and thereby ensure the continuation of his original plans for the conquest of living space. So it is completely incomprehensible why the forced departure of the Fuhrer from his initial plans can be considered as evidence that his further actions were also not due to the ideas of Mein Kampf.

The second thesis of Gorodetsky comes from the fact that there is no ideological motivation for the operational planning of Barbarossa:

“The absence of any ideological motivation for the operational planning of the invasion is indicative. Only in a single directive on the political preparation of the Wehrmacht, issued by General Brauchitsch.

Indeed, the mention of the ideological goals of the war in German operational documents is the exception rather than the rule. After all, the Wehrmacht had a very specific military task: to defeat the Red Army and occupy Soviet territory along the Volga-Arkhangelsk line, which was written down in the directive of the Barbarossa plan.

But it is one thing to occupy part of the country's territory, and quite another to determine what to do with this territory and its population after the occupation. To solve this problem, directives and plans were drawn up that did not directly concern the army, which is why they were not included in the operational directives of the Wehrmacht.

Among these documents is the so-called Goering Green Folder, where the principles for the economic exploitation of Russia's natural resources were developed. As well as the master plan "Ost", which was supposed to determine the racial principles, technology and pace of Germanization of the occupied territories.

In this regard, it is significant that the ideological motivation in the operational plans of the Wehrmacht was absent not only in the directives of Barbarossa, but also when planning the German attack on Poland, although hardly anyone can doubt that the goal of that German-Polish war was precisely the conquest of living space and its germanization. Hitler said this quite frankly at a meeting with his generals on May 23, 1939:

“Danzig is not the object because of which everything is started. For us, it is about expanding living space in the East and providing food, as well as solving the problem of the Baltic.”

Everything else: the formation of a general government, the selection of racially inferior natives, their resettlement to the east, executions, concentration camps, the genocide of Poles and Jews - was later, after the end of the occupation. All these actions of the Nazis in Poland were not spelled out in the Weiss plan, but they were carried out in strict accordance with Nazi ideology. A similar situation arose after the Nazi attack on the USSR.

It must be said that the Nazis quite consciously avoided any possible leakage of information regarding their ultimate goals. It is precisely this circumstance that explains the absence of an ideological preamble in the directives of Hitler, who even specifically discussed this issue at a meeting on July 16, 1941:

“The most important thing is that we do not give out our goal to the whole world. There is no need for this. The main thing is that we ourselves know what we want.”

According to the third thesis of Gorodetsky, the destruction of the Bolsheviks, Jews and other revolutionary (?!) manifestations of the ideological predilections of the Nazis came to the fore only after Hitler decided to attack the USSR. Moreover, all this was a departure from his rational (?!) policy and a kind of collective insanity:

“The fact that the crusade against Bolshevism and the extermination of the Jews gave a revolutionary meaning to the war in 1941 is not in itself sufficient to prove a staunch adherence to dogma.

Ideological convictions came to the fore after the decision on Barbarossa was made, and to a large extent turned Hitler away from the more rational strategic policies that had characterized his military leadership until then.

However, in Poland, the ideological considerations of the Nazis also came to the fore only after the occupation of its territory. At the same time, it would seem strange that an Israeli historian should be reminded:

That anti-communism and anti-Semitism have always been a STABLE ideological dogma of the Nazis, and the genocide of Jews since Kristallnacht, by and large, has never stopped;

That on October 7, 1939, Hitler appointed Himmler the head of the imperial commissariat for strengthening the German nation, and the task of the commissariat included the forcible deportation of Poles and Jews from the Polish regions declared German territory;

That on the same day the Fuhrer also signed a decree on the beginning of the Germanization of the population of the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and appointed Karl Frank as imperial protector;

That only during 1940-41, through the efforts of the imperial commissariat, 1,200,000 Poles and 300,000 Jews were deported from the new territories of the Reich, and 497,000 Volksdeutsche were resettled in their place;

That the imperial protector of Bohemia and Moravia soon developed and handed over to Hitler a draft plan for the Germanization of the Czech Republic, where, in particular, he proposed:

"The complete incorporation of the protectorate into the Greater German Empire and the filling of this space with Germans", while pointing out that "the most radical and theoretically perfect solution to the problem would be the total eviction of all Czechs."

Of course, a legitimate question arises why the Israeli historian needed to whitewash the Nazis so zealously. However, this casket opens quite simply. After all, the Zionists themselves actively used Hitler's ideas of conquering living space when creating their Jewish state, evicting Arabs from part of the territory of Palestine and populating it with Jewish settlers.

So was the idea of ​​conquering living space a fixed dogma of Nazi policy?

Hitler was already initially obsessed with the idea of ​​conquering living space. In this regard, the Führer, back in Mein Kampf, formulated the highest principle of Nazi foreign policy:

“We must choose as a HIGHEST PRINCIPLE (highlighted by me. - Yu.Zh.) our foreign policy: establishing the proper proportion between the population and the size of our territories! The lessons of the past again and again teach us only one thing: the goal of our entire foreign policy should be the acquisition of new lands.

“At the same time, we need such lands that are directly adjacent to the indigenous lands of our homeland. Only in this case will our settlers be able to maintain close ties with the native population of Germany. Only such an increase in land provides us with the increase in strength, which is determined by a large continuous territory.

However, at the same time, Hitler did not at all intend to turn the occupied lands into German colonies and, consequently, to focus on the use of the indigenous population as cheap labor. His the main objective- settlement of the occupied lands by the Germans:

“Our task is not colonial conquest. We see the solution of the problems facing us only and exclusively in the conquest of new lands that we could populate with the Germans.

And such lands, according to the Fuhrer, were only in the East and, above all, in RUSSIA: “When we talk about the conquest of new lands in Europe, we, of course, can have in mind ONLY RUSSIA in the first place.(highlighted by me. - Yu.Zh.) and those border states that are subject to it».

But there are no free lands adjacent to the territory of Germany, the indigenous population lives on these lands, and the Nazis, like the apple of their eye, protect the purity of their Aryan race:

“We National Socialists are the guardians of the highest Aryan values ​​on earth. That is why we have the highest obligations. To be able to fulfill these obligations, we must be able to persuade our people to do whatever is necessary to protect the purity of the race. We must ensure that the Germans are engaged not only in improving the breed of dogs, horses and cats, but, finally, would have pity on themselves.

However, according to Hitler, the Slavs, and in particular the Russians, belonged to people of a lower race:

“It was not the state gifts of the Slavs that gave strength and strength to the Russian state. Russia owed all this to the German elements - the most excellent example of the enormous state role that the German elements are capable of playing, acting within a lower race ... For centuries, Russia lived off the German core in its upper strata of the population. Now this core has been completely and completely exterminated.”

In order to populate the conquered lands with the Germans and at the same time preserve the racial purity of the Aryan settlers, it was necessary to first deport a large part of the indigenous population, but this additionally required one more large enough territory, to which it would be possible to deport all these subhumans harmful to the racial health of Germany.

Otherwise, cases of copulation of true Aryans with the indigenous population would be inevitable, which could lead to very sad consequences for the Reich. How much Hitler was preoccupied with this sexual problem can be judged, say, from a recording of his table conversations dated April 5, 1942:

“We should never forget that this war will be won only when peace reigns and the Reich maintains racial purity ... In particular, the chief warned against carrying out large-scale Germanization of Czechs and Poles ...

But, above all, it is necessary to ensure that there are no cases of copulation between Germans and Poles, otherwise fresh German blood will constantly flow into the veins of the Polish ruling stratum.

However, even after coming to power, Hitler in his public speeches repeatedly returns to the question of conquering living space in the East and its Germanization. So, on February 3, 1933, the Fuhrer delivered a speech to the generals of the Reichswehr, in which he stated : "The main task of the future army will be the conquest of a new living space in the East and its merciless Germanization".

“The German future is determined solely by the solution of the problem of the insufficiency of the present living space, and such a solution, by its nature, could only be found in a foreseeable period covering approximately one to three generations.

If the Fuhrer is destined to live to see that time, then HIS DECISION (highlighted by me.- Yu.Zh.) is: no later than 1943-45 to resolve the question of the German living space.

“Living space, corresponding to the size of the state, is the basis of any strength ... In 15 or 20 years, this decision will inevitably become necessary for us ...

If fate pushes us into a collision with the West, it is good to have a large living space in the East. .

On August 11, 1939, Hitler, in a conversation with the Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig, Karl Burckhardt, said: “Everything I do is directed against the Russians. If the West is too stupid and blind to understand this, then I will be forced to make an agreement with the Russians, beat the West and then, after its defeat, turn again against the Soviet Union with all my forces.

And even after the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact and the defeat of Poland, Hitler on November 23, 1939 at a meeting of Wehrmacht commanders again returns to the question of the inevitability of war against Russia:

“Population growth requires more living space. My goal was to achieve a reasonable ratio between the population and the size of this space. There is no fight here...

We will be able to oppose Russia only when our hands are free in the West.”

There was no fundamental change in Hitler's position on the issue of conquering living space in the East even after Germany defeated France and occupied most of the European countries. Already in the very early stages of planning an attack on the USSR, at a meeting held on July 31, 1940, Hitler directly declares to German generals his intentions to annex large territories of Soviet Russia:

“Later: Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic countries - to us. Finland to the White Sea.

At a meeting on March 30, 1941, the Fuehrer again fully confirmed the previously formulated intentions: “We are talking about a struggle for destruction ... The future picture of the states: Northern Russia belongs to Finland. Protectorates: Baltic countries, Ukraine, Belarus".

Well, for those who still doubt that, by attacking the USSR, Berlin planned the seizure and annexation of Soviet territory, I advise you to familiarize yourself with the Fuhrer's revelations made by him at a meeting on July 16, 1941, when Hitler already fully believed in his quick and final victory and allowed himself to say a little more than he did before:

“In principle, the point is how to divide the giant pie more conveniently, so that we, firstly, dominate, secondly, manage, and thirdly, be able to exploit ...

From the newly acquired eastern regions, we must make for ourselves a garden of Eden. They are vitally important for us, while the colonies, on the contrary, play a completely secondary role ...

So, we will again emphasize that we were forced to capture this or that area in order to restore order there and ensure our security ... In no case should we show that this has been done forever. Nevertheless, all the necessary measures - execution, resettlement, etc. We can and will continue to do so...

Crimea must be cleared of all strangers and populated by Germans. In the same way, Old Austrian Galicia will become the territory of the Reich ... The Fuhrer emphasizes that the entire Baltic region should become the territory of Germany.

Dreams of capturing living space did not leave Hitler, at least as long as he still imagined the coming victory. On the eve of the Battle of Kursk on July 1, 1943, Field Marshal Manstein wrote in his diary the words of the Fuhrer, which he said during a meeting with the leadership of the Wehrmacht:

“Hitler said that there could be no question of any promises to individual Soviet peoples during the war, since this would have a bad effect on our own soldiers, who should know that they are fighting for living space for their children and grandchildren” .

Manstein later wrote in his memoirs: “The politician Hitler was obsessed with the idea of ​​living space, which he considered himself obliged to provide to the German people. He could only look for this living space in the East.

Hitler regularly spoke about the goals of capturing living space in the East during the so-called table conversations:

“The goal of Eastern policy in the future should be the creation of a territory in the eastern space for the settlement of approximately one hundred million representatives of the German race ... It is necessary to make every effort to populate the East with Germans million after million with iron tenacity ... Not later than in ten years I am waiting for a report on the colonization of the eastern regions already included by that time in Germany or occupied by our troops by at least twenty million Germans.

Why did Hitler start a war with the USSR in 1941?

As follows from the surviving documents, already during the preparation of aggression against the USSR, Hitler was actively planning to seize the living space in Russia and its subsequent Germanization, but this, of course, was a long-term goal of the Nazis, the implementation of which was designed for many decades. Therefore, they did not have an urgent need to implement it before the end of the war with England. After all, under these conditions, an attack on the USSR would automatically mean the beginning of a war on two fronts, which the Fuhrer, mindful of the history of the defeat of the Germans in the First World War, tried his best to avoid.

But the fact is that at the time of the end of the war with France, Germany had a powerful land army, but there was no fleet capable of breaking the English dominance at sea. In order to defeat Great Britain, the Germans needed to drastically reduce the army and devote all material and human reserves to building a fleet and strengthening aviation.

However, with this scenario, Hitler's main foreign policy goal, the conquest of living space in the East, hung indefinitely. After all, it was relatively easy to demobilize most of the Wehrmacht, but to restore the army after a while, and most importantly to achieve its former combat capability, was a very difficult task. Yes, and Stalin during this time could achieve a significant increase in his armed forces.

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It is generally accepted that in December 1941, when the German army rushed to Moscow, its Siberian divisions saved it. These were fully equipped formations that arrived from the east along the Siberian highway. Therefore, they were called Siberian. But it's not. In fact, these were Far Eastern divisions, and they arrived from the farthest borders of the Soviet Union and entered the battle straight from the wheels.

An extra straw breaks a camel's back. The whole art of war is based on this postulate. At the right moment, you need to have this straw and put it on the appropriate ridge. Stalin had such a straw, and subsequently many, many more straws appeared. This points to the inexhaustible reserves of a vast country. But Germany did not have such straws. So why did Hitler attack the Soviet Union if he did not have the appropriate resources and capabilities?

The protracted war with the USSR was fatal for Germany. But Hitler did not intend to wage a protracted war: he counted on a blitzkrieg. But was it possible under those conditions? The Germans defeated France, but they did not have the strength to capture it entirely. And even more so there was no force to seize the French colonies. Germany did not even have the strength to completely occupy tiny Holland. This required two divisions, and Hitler allocated only one.

In 1941, the Germans could no longer fully control what they managed to capture. And then there's the war with Britain, behind which stood "neutral" America. German troops were scattered from Northern Norway to North Africa, and the fleet fought from Greenland to the Cape of Good Hope. And in such a difficult situation, Hitler launched a blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union.

And what is the Soviet Union? This is a huge country in which only four months are favorable for hostilities - from mid-May to mid-September. The rest of the time is rain, impassable mud, and then snow and frost. Hitler started the war on June 22, that is, by and large, he had only three normal months left. And for this insignificant period he was going to reach the Urals?

A full-scale war on two fronts is a mortal danger for any country, no matter how powerful militarily and industrially it is. And Germany found itself in just such a situation. On the one hand, Britain, and on the other hand, the USSR. In addition, in the occupied territories began freedom movement which only exacerbated the position of the aggressor.

Back in January 1941, Colonel General Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, wrote in his diary: “The meaning of Operation Barbarossa is unclear. It does not affect England in any way. Our economic base will not improve at all from this. If our troops are pinned down in Russia, the situation will become even more difficult. The operation is very risky and does not provide any strategic benefits to Germany.

However, the true state of affairs was fully outlined only after June 22, 1941. The same Halder recorded on July 12 that tank losses amounted to 50%, and the troops were very exhausted. And on August 7, he reported that the situation with fuel was catastrophic. The Germans planned to defeat the USSR in three months, and by August 7 they had already run out of fuel. And how were they going to get to the Urals? On carts and wagons.

As early as December 2, 1941, Halder believed that Stalin had no reserves. But already on December 5, fresh divisions appeared, and a grandiose counteroffensive near Moscow began. Subsequently, Halder admitted that the level of equipment of the German soldiers and the motorization of the army did not correspond to the Russian winter. There was no frost-resistant fuel, winter clothes, which had a devastating effect on the general course of military battles in the winter of 1941-1942.

Yes, the Germans carried out blitzkriegs in Poland, France, they captured almost all of Europe, but with their visible power they deceived only the faint of heart journalists. That is why the blitzkrieg did not happen in Russia. Only individual military operations were lightning fast, and the whole war took on a protracted character. Therefore, it became fatal for Germany, which did not have inexhaustible human reserves and corresponding industrial capacities. So why did Hitler attack the Soviet Union? What did he miss? Maybe living space or mind?

As for territories, before Germany lay the defenseless and unoccupied south of France, with vineyards, fine wines, and most beautiful women. In front of Germany lay French and Dutch colonies with heavenly climates and luxurious beaches. Take it all and enjoy. But no, for some reason the Germans dreamed of Astrakhan reeds and Arkhangelsk swamps. These dreams, absolutely incomprehensible to anyone, ruined Germany.

As for human resources, in the Soviet Union they were indeed inexhaustible. By July 1, 1941, 5.3 million people were mobilized into the Red Army. At the same time, mobilization continued in July, and in August, and in September, etc. The total mobilization resource of the USSR was 10% of the population. All of it was used during the war. The Soviet country lost 35 million people in four nightmarish years, but this did not affect its combat capability. In August 1945, the Soviet army defeated the millionth Japanese army in just two weeks and liberated China.

And what about the Germans? Their mobilization resource was an order of magnitude lower. In 1945, teenagers and the elderly began to be drafted into the army. They fought on a par with mature men and died in the same way. But Nazi Germany this did not save from complete collapse and disgrace. So why did Hitler attack the Soviet Union, to whom and what was he trying to prove?

In politics, it is of great importance who you are considered in the world - a villain or an innocent victim and a defender of the oppressed. The whole planet considered Hitler a villain and wished him death. And everyone considered Stalin a victim of aggression. On his side were the sympathies of all countries, all peoples, all governments. Both the proletarians and the bourgeois wished Stalin success. He was assisted by the richest countries in the world. And who sincerely helped Hitler? Nobody.

Here is what Winston Churchill wrote about Stalin: This man made an indelible impression on us. When he entered the hall of the Yalta conference, all of us, as if on command, got up and for some reason kept our hands at our sides. He possessed deep wisdom and logic alien to any panic. Stalin was consummate master find the right way out of hopeless situations. He was always reserved and never succumbed to illusions. It was a complex personality, the greatest, unparalleled».

And Hitler decided to attack such a person, who was at the head of a huge country with inexhaustible resources. But Stalin until June 22, 1941 did not believe that the Third Reich would decide to commit suicide. But what happened, happened. Hitler and his entourage doomed themselves to death on the specified date. It does not matter that the war lasted four years, it was already initially lost at the very moment when German planes dropped the first bombs on Soviet territory. Everything else can be called the slow death throes of the fascist regime.

And therefore, answering the question why Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, you can go through many options. But as a result, only one rational answer arises: the Fuhrer wanted to die beautifully in an underground bunker with a pistol in his hand. Nothing else comes to mind.

The German attack on the USSR can be safely considered insanity. It resulted in a terrible and absolutely senseless massacre that claimed tens of millions of lives. And the only one who is sincerely sorry for is the people who died at the behest of a stupid and absolutely short-sighted dictator.