In the second half of July 1944, the RONA brigade crossed the borders of the General Government, following the direction of the Upper Silesian city of Ratibor. On the territory of the Reich, almost without food, subordinates of B.V. Kaminsky along the way they dug potatoes, engaged in illegal confiscation of food and material property from local residents. Such actions led to conflicts, as food and belongings were confiscated from the Reichsdeutsche. For this, the Germans shot several soldiers and officers of the RONA, including the commander of the 3rd regiment, Major N.I. Proshina.
At the very end of July, not far from the city of Oppeln, where at that moment there were parts of the brigade, B.V. Kaminsky was called to Berlin. He finally received word from SS-Obergruppenführer Kurt von Gottberg, who secured an audience for him with the chief of the guard detachments.
I must say that back in July 1944, the Kaminsky formation was included in the SS troops and became known as the SS RONA Assault Brigade (SS-Sturmbrigade RONA). Himmler, who became commander-in-chief of the Reserve Army after July 20, 1944 (after an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Hitler), was empowered to create new military formations. RONA was a combat-ready formation, and it was planned to deploy an SS division on its base. This explains why a brigade of Russian collaborators was taken to Upper Silesia, and not left on the territory of the General Government, where the Wehrmacht had difficulty restraining the onslaught of the Red Army.
On July 31, 1944, a meeting took place between B.V. Kaminsky with Heinrich Himmler. The head of the "Black Order" thanked Kaminsky for the successful actions of the brigade and personally awarded him the Iron Cross 1st degree.
On August 1, 1944, the Main Operations Directorate of the SS issued an order to deploy the RONA in the 29th Waffen-Grenadier Division of the SS / Russian No. 1 / (29. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS / Russische Nr. 1 /). It was planned to form the 72nd (on the basis of the 1st rifle regiment), the 73rd (on the basis of the 2nd and 3rd rifle regiments) and the 74th (on the basis of the 4th and 5th rifle regiments) waffen– grenadier regiments, 29th supply regiment, fusilier, engineer and reserve battalions, anti-tank division, communications battalion, anti-aircraft artillery division, sanitary and veterinary companies. The artillery regiment of the brigade was reorganized into the 29th Waffen Artillery Regiment (according to real states - a division). Parts of the guards battalion were distributed among the regiments and units of the new division. The formation was armed with about 20 guns, 30 mortars, more than 100 machine guns.
Of particular interest is the number of armored vehicles in the division. For example, at the beginning of 1944, the armored division consisted of 12 tanks (KV, eight T-34s, three BT-7s), six armored vehicles. However, it is known that, according to tradition, armored vehicles were available not only in it, but also in rifle units, and in considerable quantity. So, for the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, a self-propelled artillery mount Su-76 was allocated. A photograph of the BA-10 armored car, which also operated in Warsaw, is known. By November 1944, the dilapidated division had two KVs and twelve T-34s.
During a personal conversation, Himmler promised Kaminsky to withdraw his unit for reorganization into a military training camp in Neuhammer, and to evacuate refugees (approximately 10,500 people) to Hungary as soon as conditions were created. However, here, as the historian S. Drobyazko notes, new problems arose. The Russian-German evacuation committee operating in Budapest was not informed of the transfer of refugees, and the Hungarian government, whose consent was also not asked, did not feel any joy about the possible arrival of the Kaminians. A lively exchange of radiograms began between Berlin and Budapest, and, finally, the Higher SS and Police Fuhrer in Hungary, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Otto Winkelmann, obtained the consent of the Hungarian authorities to Himmler's request to accept refugees. But the latter created new and new difficulties, demanding that part of the RONA brigade with weapons remain to protect families. Many Kaminians also counted on the fact that in the new place they would be given the right to create the same self-governing region as in Lokta, Lepel and Dyatlovo. It goes without saying that the Hungarian side could not agree to such demands that infringe on its sovereignty.
Extract from the order on awarding Kaminsky the rank of Waffen Brigadeführer and Major General of the SS troops
Nevertheless, certain agreements were reached. However, as soon as the trains with refugees set off, in Slovakia, through whose territory the transfer was to be carried out, a national uprising broke out, and the evacuation was stopped. The families of the “Kaminians”, who did not have the opportunity to accommodate anywhere, were forced to live in cars, which especially annoyed the representatives of the Imperial Railway Administration, who urgently demanded that the rolling stock be returned for military transportation as soon as possible. The food supplies of the refugees also soon ran out, after which the robbery of the German population began. Gauleiter of Upper Silesia Fritz Bracht threatened to prosecute the SS officers who accompanied the echelons if they did not remove the "Kaminians" from the territory under his jurisdiction.
All these unpleasant incidents took place against the backdrop of the August 1944 uprising in Warsaw. As you know, the commander of the Home Army (AK) Tadeusz Komorowski (nicknamed "Bur") gave his units in the capital (about 40 thousand people) an order to start an open armed struggle against the German garrison of the city. He took this step, guided by the idea that the Poles would liberate Warsaw before the arrival of the Red Army and win independence for themselves. BUT Soviet troops, the purpose of the summer offensive of which, according to Komorowski, is the capture of the Polish capital, will complete the defeat of the Germans.
One of the Warsaw streets in a moment of calm
In our opinion, the Warsaw Uprising was initially doomed to failure. The fate of post-war Poland had already been decided at a conference in Tehran at the end of 1943, and Stalin was not going to provide full-fledged military assistance to the forces that had to be suppressed anyway (the Soviet leadership limited itself to the supply of weapons and food).
In addition, for some reason, the allies did not take into account the stubbornness and stamina of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS troops. They were not yet demoralized and did not think of giving up. The position of the Germans was, of course, difficult, but by no means critical. Only the 2nd Soviet tank army lost 500 tanks and self-propelled guns on the outskirts of the Polish capital. In early August, the Wehrmacht stopped the offensive of the Red Army, concentrated a significant force of tanks and motorized infantry northeast of Prague (a suburb of Warsaw), and created a continuous defense front, which it was impossible to break through on the move, without careful preparation.
The uprising in Warsaw did not come as a surprise to the German authorities. Back in July, the agents of the security police and the SD reported on the preparation of an armed uprising. The Gestapo set the exact date and time when the fighting. Warsaw Governor SA Gruppenführer L. Fischer, City Commandant Luftwaffe Lieutenant General R. Stagel and SS and Police Chief SS Oberführer P.O. Geibel already on the night of July 31 to August 1 took counter-actions. At 13.00, an alarm was announced in German institutions, at 14.00–15.00 skirmishes began in the Wola and Zholibozh districts (they are located on the western bank of the Vistula, in the same place as the districts Old city, Hunt, Mokotov, Chernyakov, Oketsie and Central). At 17.00, on the signal "Storm", the Craiova Army proceeded to active operations.
There was no close interaction and constant communication between the German units, which the rebels took advantage of. By the end of the day, they managed to capture the Old Town area, but the Poles suffered heavy losses (according to German data, from 2 to 2.5 thousand AK fighters were killed in the first two days of fighting). The large casualties among the rebels (as well as the civilian population that found themselves at the epicenter of the confrontation) are explained by the fact that the members of the AK were poorly armed. They had mainly small arms and automatic weapons (about 1100 heavy and 60 light machine guns; 300 machine guns, 1400 rifles and 25 thousand grenades), but even this was barely enough to arm 10% of the participants in the uprising. Subsequently, the rebels received help from the Allies and the Red Army. They delivered 3,247 small arms, 169 mortars, 55,000 mines and grenades, 5,700,000 rounds of ammunition, and 35,000 tons of food. This help allowed the Poles to hold out longer than they themselves expected, but the tragic ending was inevitable.
One of the German barricades in Warsaw
The operational department of the German General Staff immediately reacted to the uprising that broke out in Warsaw, preparing an analytical report on the situation in the city. Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General G . Guderian personally approached Hitler with a proposal to declare Warsaw part of the operational zone of the 9th Wehrmacht Army and send troops into it, but the Fuhrer, after a recent assassination attempt on him organized by senior army officers, rejected Guderian's proposal and entrusted the task of suppressing the uprising to the SS. At the same time, the Wehrmacht had to coordinate all its actions with the SS and provide Himmler's people with all the help they need.
The Reichsführer SS entrusted the command of the operation to destroy the rebels to SS Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach, a specialist in the fight against "gangs". The SS chief gave him detailed instructions. Referring to Hitler's order, which stated that "every Warsaw citizen should be killed, not excluding women and children, and Warsaw should be destroyed" , Himmler demanded to act mercilessly: “You can call me a barbarian. Yes, I agree, but I have no choice" . Although, as von dem Bach later claimed, he opposed the instructions of the head of the Black Order, the SS and police units operating in Warsaw were well aware of them.
E. von dem Bach-Zelewski
As a matter of fact, von dem Bach's repentant testimonies have long raised doubts among historians about their sincerity. His post-war complaints about the disproportionate use of force by the SS troops, including the Kaminians, should be recognized as hypocritical, especially since von dem Bach himself committed so many bloody deeds during the war that they cannot be compared with the Warsaw events. So, one can recall the barbaric massacres carried out by von dem Bach in November 1941 near Mogilev, when he, when he was the High Fuhrer of the SS and Police of Central Russia, led the actions of his headquarters team and units of the 322nd police battalion to exterminate Jewish women and children.
On August 2, 1944, von dem Bach left for Warsaw. Meanwhile, the commander of the 9th Army, General of the Tank Forces Nikolaus von Forman, asked to support the Wehrmacht. By August 6, almost half of the troops (7496 people) allocated to suppress the uprising entered Warsaw. Gradually, the composition of the von dem Bach grouping of forces and means was determined (its number eventually reached 16,696 people):
SS Police Regiment "Poznan";
Special SS Regiment "Dirlewanger";
III division of the 5th artillery regiment of the SS Panzer Division "Viking";
Consolidated regiment of the 29th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS;
I and II battalions of the 1st Eastern Muslim Regiment of the SS;
II (Azerbaijani) battalion of the Highlander Special Forces;
Cossack SS police battalion;
Convoy-guard hundred SD;
III Cossack cavalry battalion of the 57th security regiment;
5th Kuban Regiment of the Cossack Camp;
572nd, 580th, 631st Cossack battalions;
Three Ukrainian companies in the SD;
Battalion of the 608th security regiment of the Wehrmacht;
Reserve battalion of the tank parachute division "Hermann Goering";
Flamethrower battalion "Krone";
Sapper company No. 500;
Mortar Company No. 1000;
Battery of jet mortars (Nebelwerfer) No. 201;
Howitzer Battery No. 638;
218th and 302nd tank companies;
Training battery of self-propelled artillery installations;
The fact that the RONA soldiers were involved in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, Kaminsky learned while in Berlin. He, as historian K. Semenov writes, received a telegram from Himmler with the following content: "I'm waiting for your help in this matter" .
Upon arrival at the formation, Kaminsky held a meeting, which was attended by the chief of staff of the division, I.P. Shavykin, head of intelligence B.A. Kostenko, adjutant of divisional commander R.K. Belay, head of the military investigation department G.S. Protsyuk, commanders of the 1st, 2nd and 5th regiments I.D. Frolov, Golyakov and Romanov, commander of a separate guards battalion Burygin. Kaminsky said that the formation was renamed the division of the German SS troops and it was assigned No. 29; he was promoted to the rank of major general and ordered to send part of the division to Warsaw. Each regiment commander must allocate 400 people ("according to the battalion of reliable people"). It was necessary to form a combined regiment under the command of the Waffen-Obersturmbannführer SS I.D. Frolov (Chief of Staff of the Waffen-Hauptsturmführer SS Nochevkin) and prepare for transfer to the former Polish capital.
The consolidated regiment was formed from both family and unmarried servicemen, and consisted of four rifle battalions, four T-34, Su-76 tanks and two 122-mm howitzers. The number of the regiment, according to German documents, was 1700 people, according to the testimony of officers of the division I.D. Frolova and P.R. Mayorova - from 1500 to 1600 people.
Early morning On August 3, the personnel boarded vehicles and advanced to the designated area. The regimental convoy, according to the diary of the RONA fighter Ivan Vashenka, moved at maximum speed along the route: the suburbs of Ratibor - Czestochowa - Tomaszow - Radomsko - Warsaw, and on August 4, the Kaminians entered the battle. According to Frolov, the column moved more slowly - on August 5, the Russian SS men only passed Częstochowa (which is consistent with German documents). On August 8, the regiment arrived in the village of Rakov, located four kilometers southwest of Warsaw. The next day, Kaminsky arrived at the unit with an order from the German command for an offensive.
Frolov's regiment was included in the battle group of the SS Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the SS troops and police Heinz Reinefarth (Kampfgruppe "Reinefarth") - it was he who von dem Bach instructed to suppress the uprising. The Reine Fart combat group was divided into several operational formations that carried out the cleansing of Warsaw - these were the Rek, Rohr, Dirlewanger, Schmidt combat groups, the Sarnov cover group, etc. Each group was assigned a site divided into sectors. The assault units assigned to clean up the sectors were obliged not only to destroy the rebels, but also to capture the leaders of the militants, for which each group had special SD teams. These formations, which consisted of members of the security police and the SD of Warsaw, Radom, Lodz, Lublin and Poznan, were part of the Sonderkommando of SS Hauptsturmführer Alfred Spilker (Sonderkommando "Spilker-Warschau"). Spilker worked closely with the headquarters of the Reinefart battle group and von dem Bach's headquarters in Krakow.
On August 9, subordinates of Frolov and Nochevkin became part of the combat group of Major General Günter Rohr (Karfgrupre "Rohr"). Parts of the latter operated in the "South" sector, sector "D". In addition to the "Kamintsy" in the group "Ror" (total number of 6161 people) were the 627th engineer battalion, engineer company No. the police of Colonel W. Rodewald and the Birkner SD team (Teilkommando "Birkner"). The unit was tasked with clearing quarters from the rebels in the areas of Volya, Okhota, Oketsie and Mokotov.
"Kamintsy" fought against the rebels, entrenched in the Okhota region. The firing points of the Poles were suppressed with the help of artillery. Participants in those battles recalled how Frolov personally fired from a 122-mm howitzer at houses, from where AK fighters offered resistance.
The battles for residential quarters were distinguished by great cruelty, both sides did not take prisoners. Already on the first day, when the offensive was launched from Rakov to Okhota, the Kaminians had to take up defensive positions, since the losses from the insurgents' fire were sensitive (50 people were killed and wounded). But, having got used to it, the RONA soldiers began to push the Poles, clearing street after street.
SS Gruppenfuehrer H. Reinefarth and Waffen Brigadeführer B.V. Kaminsky. Warsaw, August 1944
AT historical literature there is an opinion that Kaminsky's subordinates were not ready to fight in the city, therefore they suffered prohibitively high losses and, in fact, did not fight, but were engaged in the killing of civilians, robberies, etc. This statement, in our opinion, is not entirely objective. The “Kaminians” had a certain experience in conducting military operations in urban-type settlements (one can recall the battles in Sevsk, Lepel and Chashniki). In Warsaw, the Kaminians certainly had difficulties, but they should not be exaggerated. The losses of the Frolov regiment were less than those of the German and other collaborationist units (the assault units of O. Dirlewanger suffered the heaviest damage).
Street fighting in Warsaw
Fighting in the city for any military unit is a test and often leads to great casualties. According to Frolov, two German companies fought together with the Kaminians, each of which lost approximately 30% by August 13 personnel. Frolov gave orders for the offensive only after fire support was provided. That is why some friction arose between him and Kaminsky, due to the fact that the units of the regiment were extremely slowly clearing the designated area from the Poles, while orders were received from the German command to do it faster.
On August 11, the Kaminians tried to take over a factory in the suburbs of Warsaw. After some time, one of the battalion commanders arrived at the headquarters of the regiment and reported to Frolov that it was impossible to take the factory by force of the infantry. Frolov reported this to Kaminsky, to which he replied: “If it’s impossible for you, then it’s possible for me, I myself will lead the offensive”. On August 12, after a two-hour battle, the factory was taken. The regiment lost about 70 men. For this battle, Kaminsky and Shavykin were presented by the German command to the awards that they received on August 18. According to Frolov, a German general arrived at the headquarters of the divisional commander, who handed Kaminsky "some unknown order" (possibly, the SS badge "For the fight against partisans"), and Shavykin - the Iron Cross 1st class. After the war, Frolov testified that he used Shavykin's award certificate, erased the last name, first name, and patronymic of the murdered man, and typed his initials on a typewriter with a German font. And he allegedly removed the 1st class cross from the murdered German liaison officer at his headquarters. In our opinion, Frolov this case misled the investigation, trying to hide the fact that he was awarded for the Warsaw operation, which aggravated his guilt.
On August 16, RONA soldiers continued to fight in the streets. After clearing several blocks, the assault groups stopped. Three German tanks who supported the SS with fire were burned. In this battle, the Kaminians lost another 40 people killed and wounded. Subsequently, the regiment lost daily from 5 to 20 people.
"one. The Germans are not entirely happy with our progress, that we are slowly advancing, while other groups have advanced more.
2. I raised the question of assigning the regiment to a separate independent sector, to which the command agreed.
3. The Germans attach serious importance to the troubles that have arisen with the Germans, but this is nothing.”
By August 19, the Okhota region was more than half cleared of the rebels, but the Kaminians could not complete the task to the end in 10 days - to reach the Vistula River in their area. Having accepted Kaminsky's proposal, the German command decided to change the regiment. Frolov received an order to advance to an area located 25–30 km northwest of Warsaw and comb the forests where Polish partisans had become more active.
RONA soldiers in Warsaw
Historians sometimes explain the withdrawal of the regiment from Warsaw by the fact that among the "Kaminians" discipline seriously fell, they killed several Germans and robbed the population. Some facts of this kind actually took place. But it should be remembered that the Germans themselves gave carte blanche to marauding actions. Kaminsky was allowed to engage in robberies personally by the commander of the 9th Army, von Forman (in a conversation with Reinefart, he said: “I had to offer them something so that these people fought well” ).
"Kamintsy" seized the things of the civilian population, but not in such numbers as other parts of the SS and the Wehrmacht. In the first ten days of the uprising alone, the Germans took out about 7,000 railway wagons with various property. The SS men of Dirlewanger were the absolute leaders in this matter. British researcher Colin Heaton states: “Dirlewanger's units were even worse than Kaminsky's group; the soldiers of this SS regiment caused problems and got out of hand ” . Historian A. Pishenkov notes: “Dirlewanger was firmly convinced that he was personally subordinate to the Reichsführer SS Himmler, and therefore often ignored the orders of the local command. In the presence of von dem Bach-Zelewski, he once threatened his chief of staff, SS-Standartenführer Goltz, that he would kill him if he continued to interfere in his affairs ... and Dirlewanger clearly did not throw words into the wind - after that, the von dem Bach headquarters building several times subjected to machine-gun fire from the positions of the Sonderkommando" .
Running a little ahead, we note that after the suppression of the uprising (October 2, 1944), the Germans tried to analyze the events that had taken place and give them an appropriate assessment. At the same time, they did not forget to mention how Kaminsky's subordinates operated in Warsaw. So, in the report of the head of the SS and police in the Warsaw district, SS Brigadeführer Paul Geibel on the uprising in Warsaw noted: “I learned about the use of Kaminsky’s troops through two telephone conversations with Rodewald. Commander of the 2nd Company of the Shupo Reserve(security police. - Note. ed.), who were garrisoned in the southwestern part of the city, said that it was constantly fired upon by strange-looking troops, most likely Russians. He already has the facts of the attack, but he cannot contact them. The second call was from a Pole who in the area turned to the German police for help. The behavior of the Russians was so inhumane that civilians asked for urgent help. Rodewald explained to him that we were surrounded by an uprising, and that the police stationed nearby were too weak and poorly armed to intervene. Then I learned through Stagel from his staff officer that Kaminsky's gangs deliberately avoid serious battles, do not advance, but only rob, drink and rape. The right to plunder, most likely, was given to them by Himmler.” .
German soldiers in between battles
From the report of P. Geibel it is clear that the Germans tried to put all the blame for the atrocities and massacres of the Polish population on Kaminsky and his fighters. Geibel modestly kept silent about how the assault units of Dirlewanger and the Poznan SS police regiment acted, which on August 5 (when the Frolov regiment was not yet in Warsaw) shot a total of about 2,000 people on the territory and near the Wilski hospital, "hospital buildings were completely burned with non-walking patients inside". The same fate befell the hospital of St. Lazarus, where more than 300 people were burned alive.
Of course, Kaminsky's subordinates did not miss the opportunity to rob, drink and commit other unworthy acts. However, the Germans themselves did the same. As for the slow advance of the Kaminians, it was due to the extremely difficult conditions of hostilities. Other German and collaborationist units were in the same position. They, like the soldiers of the Frolov regiment, met stubborn resistance and did not always complete their tasks on time. It is enough to refer to the telegram of the commander of the 9th Army, von Forman, dated August 9, 1944, where he writes that the German troops are suffering very heavy losses, the situation is difficult, in order to suppress the uprising, it is necessary "strong, combat division, equipped with heavy weapons". That is, in the period from 1 to 9 August, parts of the Wehrmacht did not achieve serious success in the city.
Frolov's interrogation protocol contains the following words: “Yes, the suppression of the uprising in Warsaw was carried out with cruel methods. Tanks, artillery and aircraft were used against the rebels who had taken refuge in houses. The rebels, on the other hand, had only rifles and, in some cases, machine guns and machine guns. In most cases, in the basements of the houses where the rebels were hiding, the peaceful civilian population was hiding, who died due to the destruction of these buildings by aircraft and artillery from direct fire. The same methods of struggle were used by the units of the combined regiment of the Kaminsky brigade, which I commanded. In addition, the fighters of the combined regiment were allowed to rob the civilian population with complete impunity. Such an indication was given by Kaminsky. In addition, units of the combined regiment took part in the forcible evacuation of civilians from Warsaw. At the same time, citizens were allowed to take with them a minimum of essentials, the property remaining in the apartments was looted”.
The SS battle group advances to a new position in Warsaw
Regarding the crimes of the regiment, Frolov answered the following: “The divisions of the combined regiment of the Kaminsky brigade did not take part in the executions of the civilian population. The facts of the mass execution of civilians in Warsaw are not known to me at all, with the exception of those cases when the civilian population died en masse during the shelling of houses in which the rebels were hiding, with artillery and bombardment of them from the air with aircraft " .
It is difficult to find out how honest Frolov was, recalling these events. There is undoubtedly a certain amount of truth in his testimony, although it seems doubtful that he did not know what measures, besides artillery and air strikes, were used by German troops against insurgents and civilians. There is an opinion that after the Warsaw operation, the council of officers of the division condemned Frolov for the actions of his fighters in the city. However, according to the commander of the combined regiment himself, he was condemned "not for brutal sadistic actions to suppress the uprising, but for failure to comply with the order of the German command to comb the forest 25–30 km northwest of Warsaw" .
At the same time, Frolov's testimony testifies that the combined regiment used the same methods against the Poles as the field units of the Wehrmacht, the SS and the police. And, therefore, Geibel’s report, where only “Kaminians” are depicted as the perpetrators of the outrages in Warsaw, is, to put it mildly, “subjective”. Nevertheless, the state authorities of the Reich were not going to delve into the nuances of this case, and therefore they were quite satisfied that the military personnel of the formation, by that time already disbanded, were accused of atrocities against the civilian population.
Subsequently, the combined regiment of Kaminsky - Frolov was again presented as an uncontrollable gang that disrupted the negotiations, and the inhuman actions of the Russian SS men allegedly pushed the passive Polish civilian population towards the rebels, due to which fierce battles went on until early September, until favorable conditions reappeared. conditions to negotiate with Komorowski. This point of view appears in the final report of the Governor of the Warsaw District, Ludwig Fischer, to the Governor-General of the Reich Minister Hans Frank (December 1944):
“Temporarily, the position of the population of Warsaw as a whole changed in the period from August 10 to 20, when Kaminsky’s Cossacks who found themselves in Warsaw took action against Polish women and children. Referring to this, the AK launched campaigning activities, saying that this would be the way to treat all Polish women and children. At that time, many people contacted AK or supported AK in some other way.
After the troops under the command of Kaminsky were withdrawn from the city due to the fact that they did not behave in accordance with the requirements of discipline for German soldiers, the broad masses of the population again turned their backs on AK, and from that moment they took a passive position in relation to to rebellion" .
"Cossacks" of Kaminsky, behavior that did not comply with the requirements of "discipline for German soldiers" - formulations of this kind were unlikely to give an impartial assessment of the actions of the "Kaminsky" to the end, as well as the true attitude of the Polish population towards the Germans. This idea is confirmed by the words of the division officer A.C. Perkhurov, told by him to the investigator of counterintelligence "Smersh" of the MGB of the group of Soviet occupation forces in Germany, senior lieutenant Vlasov: “Having committed the shameful fact of the massacre of the population of Warsaw, which became the property of the entire world community, the Germans obviously wanted to wash their hands and shift the blame for the cruelty towards the civilian population on the “volunteer” units, including the combined regiment of the Kaminsky brigade.
RON fighter. Warsaw, August 1944
On August 19, Frolov's regiment was ordered to withdraw from Warsaw. The battalions of the regiment were withdrawn gradually, as their positions were occupied by German units, so the Kaminians continued to fight until August 28 inclusive. From the diary of the Russian SS man I. Vashenka, it is known that by August 18, the losses of the regiment amounted to about 500 people killed and wounded. According to P.R. Mayorov, more reliable, in our opinion, the losses amounted to more than 200 people. But these were not the last casualties in Warsaw, since on August 22 the combined company of the 16th battalion was almost completely killed. The death of the company, according to Vashenka, was due to the indiscipline of the personnel.
Having occupied one of the houses, the soldiers dispersed through the floors in search of jewelry, food and vodka. Polish fighters, hiding in the basements and on the upper floors, suddenly opened fire from machine guns and threw grenades and Molotov cocktails at the Russian SS men. It is not known how the command of the battalion and regiment reacted to this unpleasant episode. There is no mention of this case in the testimonies of the former Kaminians.
While the regiment's units were leaving Warsaw, around August 22, an officer from von dem Bach's headquarters arrived at the unit's headquarters. From him, Kaminsky received an order to arrive in Krakow, and the regiment was to advance to the area of Augustowska Forest, where by that time significant forces of Polish partisans had concentrated - about 14,000 people. Before leaving, as Frolov recalled, Kaminsky drew him on the map the route of the regiment and the place where the unit was to concentrate. According to Frolov, Kaminsky was also supposed to come there, and only after his arrival should the fight against the partisans begin. But about three days later, on August 25, when some units of the regiment were still in Warsaw, an unknown general (according to another version, an officer) arrived at the headquarters, saying that Kaminsky and Shavykin had been killed by partisans in the Krakow region. Having reported this sad news, the general said to Frolov: “You will command the regiment on your own and proceed to carry out the combat mission of combing the forest”. Frolov answered the following:
"one. The fate of Kaminsky is unknown to me, he ordered me to wait for him.
2. The existing weapons in the regiment are out of order and completely unsuitable for combat. You can't fight with this weapon.
3. The personnel are very tired and worried about their families.
To this, the general replied that it would take you 5 days to clear the forest. I again replied that I had been ordered by Kaminsky to wait for him. The weapon is useless and I can’t fight with such weapons, I ask you to send the regiment to the location of the brigade. After that, a weapons inspection commission came to the regiment, which also found that the weapons were unsuitable for combat. However, even after the work of the commission, the general twice offered (albeit not in an orderly tone) to carry out the task. To which I replied that it was impossible to conduct offensive operations with such weapons, but if you insist, then replace the weapons. .
From Frolov's further testimony, it follows that he received an order to withdraw from the regiment and proceed to the railway station for loading into trains. Loading had to wait for 6 days, after which the unit departed for the brigade's deployment point, in the city of Ratibor. But, based on other documents, we can say that everything looked a little different. By August 28, the regiment was withdrawn from Warsaw (the German commission that examined the state of weapons and personnel had already completed its work, recognizing Frolov's demands as justified). On the same day, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the part was built. Frolov made a short speech, calling on the personnel to honor the memory of dead soldiers and commanders. After that, he completed the task. Then the regiment, despite all the shortcomings discovered by the commission, was still thrown to fight the partisans - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe settlement of Truskav (20 km from Warsaw), where it concentrated. Frolov was inactive, did not conduct active operations, which the Polish partisans took advantage of. On the night of September 2-3, 1944, Lieutenant "Dolina" detachment attacked Truskav, where they caught two battalions of the combined regiment by surprise. During the fighting, the regiment allegedly lost about 100 people killed and about 100 wounded. The AK fighters captured 1 75-mm gun, 2 heavy machine guns, 23 light machine guns, 16 machine guns, 2 82-mm mortars, 48 rifles, 10,000 rounds of ammunition, 11 horses, 4 carts with food and uniforms, as well as a field radio station.
It seems that it was the unsuccessful battles of the Kaminians in Truskava that finally convinced the German command to withdraw and send the regiment to Ratibor. By the end of the first decade of September 1944, Frolov's subordinates arrived in the town of Shamrau, 10 km from Ratibor. Here they most likely learned about the recent attack by partisan detachments on the brigade, as a result of which 150 soldiers were killed. Further, as already noted, an officer council took place, at which the actions of the Frolov regiment during the Warsaw Uprising were discussed. According to the testimony of division officer A.S. Perkhurov, the officer council was assembled at the direction of the German command. The Waffen-Obersturmbannführer R.K. Belay, already appointed by that time to the post of unit commander (Waffen-Sturmbannführer Romanov became the chief of staff). First of all, the case of Frolov was heard. According to A.S. Perkhurova, Frolov told how “Together with his subordinates, he broke into the quarters of Polish citizens with the aim of robbery and personally shot Polish citizens who tried to hide. The size of the robbery of the Polish population in Warsaw could be judged by the fact that each soldier of the combined regiment after returning from the Warsaw operation could be found up to 15-20 gold watches " .
Division officers, as shown by A.S. Perkhurov, condemned the brutal, sadistic actions of Frolov in relation to the civilian population. Frolov tried to justify himself. In his post-war testimony, he denied the accusations of A.S. Perkhurov, presenting to the investigator his version of how his case was heard at the officers' council: “Having arrived at the brigade, I was removed from the command of the regiment on the accusation that I had not coped with the assigned task, thereby lowering the authority of the brigade, which is why the Germans wanted to disarm the brigade and send it to camps. This accusation was brought against me at a meeting of officers. At this meeting, Belay declared that "in view of this, I made a promise to the Germans to correct the mistakes made." All this was artificially created by Belai, as I later learned, in order to create an unhealthy environment around me, since after the murder of Kaminsky, many officers of the brigade were talking about appointing me as a brigade commander. .
Despite serious proceedings, the Frolov case was not given a move. After spending 15 days behind the staff, he was then appointed to the post of assistant chief of staff of the division (A.S. Perkhurov claimed that he was the commander of the 1st regiment).
Below we will try to partially clarify the question of the causes of the death of the commander of the 29th division. The most widespread version in the literature was the version according to which Kaminsky was shot on the orders of von dem Bach because of the facts of disobedience, looting and the fall in discipline in the units of the combined regiment. Kaminsky was killed on the road in his car along with his companions (Chief of Staff of the Waffen-Obersturmbannführer I.P. Shavykin, doctor F.N. Zabora, translator G . Sadovsky and personal driver).
In his memoirs, . Guderian writes that von dem Bach reported to him about the atrocities perpetrated by the fighters of Kaminsky and Dirlewanger. Guderian informed Hitler about everything and demanded the removal of SS units from the city. Hitler refused to meet these demands, but after Himmler's representative, SS Gruppenführer Hermann Fegelein, confirmed Guderian's words, the Fuhrer ordered the withdrawal of SS troops from Warsaw. Guderian further remarks: "Von dem Bach made sure that Kaminsky was shot" .
According to historian Heinz Hehne, Hitler allegedly gave von den Bach the opportunity to remove Kaminsky, as "unwanted witness and chief marauder" .
According to von dem Bach himself, it turns out that he gave the order to shoot Kaminsky on his own initiative, because deep down, as he admitted after the war, he opposed the inhuman order of the Reichsfuehrer to kill women and children: "I obstructed Himmler's orders and even shot the head of that brigade and its employees, because they carried out these orders" .
However, in his testimony given to the British military, von dem Bach gave a completely different reason for the execution: “Both the position I took in Warsaw as a whole, and the execution of Kaminsky go beyond the usual decisions. I ask the witness Rode (cell 389) to be interrogated on the occasion of Himmler's indignation over this.
Under SS rule, every death sentence handed down on a member of the SS had to be personally approved by Himmler. I informed him about the fait accompli immediately after the action.
Kaminsky was killed not because he appropriated the stolen property of German institutions, but because, according to Himmler's order, he continued to rob himself and allowed others to rob. As a witness, I can name Kaminsky's immediate superior, Major General Rohr, after whose official report I pronounced the death sentence. The loot found at Kaminsky's was a confirmation of Major General Rohr's report.
A military court can issue an expedited sentence if the perpetrator is caught red-handed, as well as for crimes such as refusing to comply with an order, robbery and murder. The appropriation of looted property is considered by a military court. It was impossible to apply the military court procedure, since Kaminsky robbed with the permission of Himmler.
Thus, the basis for the application of the military court procedure could only be a refusal to carry out orders in the face of the enemy " .
Von dem Bach, therefore, ordered Kaminsky to be shot because he did not follow his orders. But what those orders were, he did not specify. In this regard, it is not entirely clear why exactly Kaminsky was sentenced to an exceptional measure of punishment in combat conditions and why Himmler (who later resented the commander of the grouping of forces and means) was not informed about this.
As far as the documents permit, Kaminsky, on the contrary, tried his best to carry out all the orders of the German command.
There is a version that there was a very strained relationship between Kaminsky and von dem Bach. According to some accounts, the commander of the Russian SS was outraged by the ugly supply of his units and showed his displeasure personally to von dem Bach.
On what day was Kaminsky executed, and where did it happen? According to some historians, Kaminsky and the people accompanying him were shot by a team from the Kulmhof (Chelmno) concentration camp under the leadership of SS Hauptsturmführer Hans Botman. The shooting took place on August 28, 1944 in the forest near Litzmanstadt (Lodz), not far from the Jewish ghetto. According to another version, Kaminsky was sentenced by the SS military field court, and the execution took place on August 19 (this version is no longer valid, since no SS court considered Kaminsky's case).
There is a curious opinion that Kaminsky allegedly illegally left Warsaw and began to make his way to the Carpathians in order to meet with representatives of the UPA. Not far from Tarnow, his official car was stopped by the employees of the Krakow SD. Their chief, SS Brigadeführer Walter Birkampf, ordered a staged attack for the purpose of robbery, of which Kaminsky allegedly fell victim, who was shot after detention. But this version looks far-fetched and does not inspire confidence (why did the Ukrainian nationalists suddenly need a half-German, half-Polish, to whom the Russians and Belarusians are subordinate?).
Another version was expressed by NTS member Roman Redlikh, who served in RONA for some time. According to him, Kaminsky was summoned by the Germans before the start of the Warsaw Uprising, and he disappeared without a trace, and then there were rumors about his execution. As far as is known, the members of the NTS themselves were going to liquidate Kaminsky, since he refused to voluntarily enter into submission to the command of the ROA and his activities, according to the entees, compromised the "Russian liberation movement." However, for a number of reasons, the operation to eliminate Kaminsky could not be carried out.
AT recent times often there is a point of view according to which the death of Kaminsky was facilitated by those who sympathized with Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, high-ranking SS men (Gottlob Berger and Gunther d "Alken), since the commander of the 29th division allegedly claimed to be the leader of Russian collaborationism.
By the fall of 1944, Vlasov was actually chosen to be the commander of the united Russian armed formations. On September 16, 1944, after a personal meeting with the former Soviet general at his headquarters in Rastenburg, Himmler gave Vlasov a promise to start organizing the armed forces of the ROA soon (and indeed, after some time, the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia - the Armed Forces of the KONR - were created). Until that moment, Vlasov was just a "wedding general" in the service of the German propaganda machine.
RON soldiers. August 1944
Unlike Vlasov, Kaminsky since October 1941 really showed himself in combat operations against partisans (although German propaganda was silent about this experience, as well as about the existence of the RONA and the Lokot autonomy). In principle, given the ambitious character of the commander of the 29th division, his claims to a leading position in the "Russian liberation movement" cannot be completely ruled out. However, if Kaminsky seriously counted on this role, he would undoubtedly begin to take some concrete steps for this. While none of his former subordinates after the war remembered anything like that.
It is unlikely that Kaminsky was afraid of the possibility of being subordinate to Vlasov. It is known that a number of commanders of Russian collaborationist formations (for example, the commander of the so-called "Russian National Army" General B.A. Holmston-Smyslovsky) refused to join the KONR Armed Forces. The fact that parts of the RONA were eventually transferred to the Vlasov army is explained solely by the fact of the death of Kaminsky. At the same time, Vlasov himself and his entourage were not at all delighted with such a “gift”.
According to another version, events developed differently. On August 19, 1944, when the fighting in Warsaw reached its climax, Kaminsky drove his car to von dem Bach's headquarters in order to arrive at a meeting. At the entrance to Litzmannstadt, Polish partisans attacked the car, as a result of which Kaminsky and his companions were killed. On the same day, the car was found and taken to von dem Bach's headquarters. The vehicle was presented for identification. officers divisions.
In Frolov's testimony, the version of Kaminsky's death looked like this: “On August 19, the regiment was replaced and concentrated on the southwestern outskirts of the suburbs. On August 20, Kaminsky told me that he and the chief of staff were on their way to headquarters. He told me where I should follow with the regiment and at what points to concentrate the regiment on the approaches to the forest, and then wait for his arrival. On August 21, Kaminsky and the chief of staff of the brigade left for headquarters, and I set off with the regiment to the indicated point, where I was waiting for Kaminsky. After 2 or 3 days (I don’t remember exactly), the German general informed me that Kaminsky and Shavykin were killed by partisans in the Krakow region, and told me to proceed with the task. .
There is also a version that the attack on Kaminsky's official car was organized not by Polish partisans, but by Soviet saboteurs who arrived from the territory of Slovakia. This version was shared by the former head of counterintelligence division F.A. Kapkaev. Moreover, the circumstances and methods of the murder - an ambush attack, the shooting of a car by people in german uniform, - are reminiscent of similar operations already carried out by Soviet saboteurs: the murder of Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky) in April 1944, Ataman S.V. Pavlov in June 1944, etc. Indirect confirmation of this version can be found in the memoirs of Chekist Vasily Zasukhin, who during the war years led a special department of the headquarters of the united partisan detachments (brigades) in the Bryansk region. Zasukhin describes in detail how his subordinates Dragunov and Grigorov made an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Kaminsky back in the summer of 1943 in Lokta, trying to eliminate the chief burgomaster with the help of an electromine embedded in the book. Zasukhin notes “The case helped Kaminsky, he is alive and unharmed. But the traitor did not have long to live on Soviet soil. It was destroyed in 1944" .
It should be noted that back in June 1944, the Chekists approved the “Plan of organizational and operational measures to intensify the fighting of the partisans of Ukraine and assist the fraternal communist parties in organizing partisan movement in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Poland for the period July - September 1944. According to this document, to the territory of Poland "except for the two partisan brigades previously transferred to the Polish headquarters, one formation and one detachment, with a total number of up to 2000 partisans" it was planned to send 4 partisan detachments from the northern part of the Lviv region to the southern regions (Krosno, Zhuszow) and 7 detachments from the Volyn region to the Krakow province in the Turnow region. In addition, from among the best partisans-saboteurs of the N.M. Podkorytov, a detachment of 150-200 people was formed, which was sent to act on railways Sedlec - Warsaw and Zaremba - Warsaw. Until August 15, he ordered to transfer the axis on airplanes and 4 organizational and sabotage detachments, each numbering 12-15 people.
Thus, Soviet saboteurs acted on the territory of Poland during the period of interest to us. Unfortunately, we do not yet know if they had anything to do with Kaminsky's death. However, in any case, it is clear from the material presented that the death of Kaminsky was beneficial primarily to the Soviet side and A.A.'s entourage. Vlasov, who, as you know, could not stand the murdered SS general.
One cannot write off the fact that von dem Bach could indeed order the execution of Kaminsky, guided by a verbal order from Hitler (which still needs to be confirmed) or personal considerations. In the latter case, von dem Bach's appeal to the cruel and predatory behavior of the "Kaminians" should, in our opinion, be taken into account in the very last turn, since the German units did the same in another large sizes. In addition, we should not forget that the post-war testimony of von dem Bach, who wanted to avoid execution at all costs, bears the imprint of opportunistic subjectivism, which determined not only the form, but also the actual content of his testimony, which still raises many questions.
Of course, the death of Kaminsky was a heavy loss for the refugees and servicemen of the 29th division, who lost their commander. The National Socialist Care Service took care of Kaminsky's wife and child.
After the death of Kaminsky, the SS did not abandon, contrary to popular belief, the idea of forming the 29th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS, but with a new, German command. But after the death of the commander and chief of staff, the division lost its restraining beginning and began to rapidly decompose.
Nevertheless, on August 30, the SS Brigadeführer and Major General of the SS troops Christoph Diem was appointed commander of the division, who commanded the unit until September 27, after which 3000 "Kamins" were transferred to Neuhammer (Silesia), where the 600th Wehrmacht Infantry Division was created ( Russian). According to some reports, the rest of the personnel, under the leadership of the new acting division commander - SS Gruppenführer and Police Lieutenant General Heinrich Jursa - were used in the suppression of the Slovak National Uprising in early October 1944.
After October 11, an inspection led by SS Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger completed its work, which recognized the unit as incapable of combat and subject to disbandment.
All this time, the division was held by the authority of individual commanders. Belay himself, "a staunch supporter of General Vlasov", refused the offer to head the division and demanded a transfer to the newly created Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia. This decision was also supported by Major B.A. Kostenko. Such uncertainty, which dragged on for 2 months, only contributed to the decomposition. However, at the same time, despite the fall in discipline, the high authority of the commanders remained among the soldiers, weapons and equipment were maintained in excellent condition.
In November 1944, the 29th SS division was transferred to the Münsingen training ground, where the 1st division of the KONR Armed Forces was formed. Some of the soldiers joined the refugees. Separate groups of fighters decided to continue the fight on their own on the territory of Belarus and, possibly, the Bryansk region. As part of the KONR Armed Forces, the Kaminians were not united into one unit. As part of the 1st division, they made up the 2nd infantry regiment(3000–3500 people). Small groups of "Kaminians" were included in other parts of the division. Almost completely from the former military personnel of the 29th SS division, a Separate reconnaissance battalion of the 1st division of the Armed Forces of the KONR was formed, which was headed by Major of the Armed Forces of the KONR (Waffen-Sturmbannführer) B.A. Kostenko. The former commander of the armored division of the 29th SS division, Captain of the Armed Forces KONR (Waffen-Sturmbannführer) Yu. Samsonov, became the deputy commander of the tank battalion of the division.
A little later, about 1000 "Kaminians" were included in the 2nd division of the Armed Forces of the KONR. In addition, individual officers and soldiers served in almost all parts of the KONR Armed Forces. However, there were only a few in leadership positions. Lieutenant Colonel of the Armed Forces of the KONR R.K. Belay became the head of the officer reserve of the Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the KONR. The former chief of artillery of the 29th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS, Colonel of the Armed Forces KONR A.S. Perkhurov took up the positions of deputy chief of the 13th (artillery) department of the Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the KONR and an inspector for artillery weapons.
It remains to add that on the part of the "Vlasovites" Kaminsky's former subordinates met with an extremely negative attitude towards themselves. The leadership of the Armed Forces of the KONR defiantly did not want to recognize the titles and awards received by the Russian SS men. All this forced the commander of the 1st division of the Armed Forces of the KONR S.K. Bunyachenko issue an order (dated December 5, 1944), which read:
“Recently, there have been cases when individual soldiers and officers who arrived to form a division throw an illegal, insulting reproach to the soldiers and officers of the former Kaminsky division that they are supposedly robbers, bandits, etc. All these reproaches are based on the fact that in the former. divisions of Kaminsky there were separate cases of robberies, looting and other outrages that can take place in any part ...
Individual cases cannot characterize the behavior of the entire part as a whole. The 1st Russian SS division in its past fought against the Stalinist regime in Russia and its composition is now ready to continue this struggle. These are Russian warriors, on the labor and blood of which, like all Russian people, our own mother, Russia, must and will be built.
I order:
1. Root out insults against the soldiers and officers of the former 1st Russian SS division.
2. Explain to all personnel that the incoming reinforcements to the first Russian division from different fronts must merge together into a friendly, ideologically and organizationally united family to fight under the Russian banners for the salvation of Russia and all the peoples inhabiting it " .
The further fate of the “Kaminians” is beyond the scope of our study, since it is connected with the history of the Armed Forces of the KONR. It should be noted that most of the former Russian SS men shared the fate of their new colleagues and were extradited to the USSR. Only a few of them managed to avoid repatriation, in particular, intelligence chief B.A. Kostenko and the head of counterintelligence F.A. Kapkaev, as well as most of their subordinates. This is not surprising, since the Western - primarily American - intelligence agencies were very willing to use the services of former Nazi and collaborationist "invisible front" fighters.
Notes:
MacLean F.L. The cruel hunters. SS-Sonderkomando Dirlewanger. Hitler's most notorious anti-partisan unit. Atglen, RA., 2009. P. 187.
Burovikhin spoke German, because before the October Revolution he was a farm laborer for the German colonists from the Volga region, the Shultz family. At the beginning of the war, Burovikhin was wounded and ended up in a prisoner of war camp in Bryansk. Taking advantage of his knowledge of the German language, Burovikhin passed himself off as Otto Schulz, the son of his former colonist master. This helped him to leave the camp and start reconnaissance activities in favor of Saburov's partisans. Before Burovikhin was sent to Lokot, he managed to complete several tasks. For example, under the guise of a merchant of wooden utensils, he visited Trubchevsk, where he revealed the strength of the German police garrison. Burovikhin's next task was to infiltrate the organs of the Lokot administration. He made friends with the burgomaster of Trubchevsk Pavlov, using whose patronage he managed to gain confidence in the commandant of Sevsk, and through him to get acquainted with Voskoboinik. Cm.: Saburov A. Behind the front line. (Guerrilla records). Book One: Partisan Land. M., 1953. S. 131, 222.
There. pp. 223–224. Needless to say, all this is a clear exaggeration.
Dunaev F. Genocide - in rank public policy Germany // Book of Memory ... S. 138.
Kolpakidi A.I. KGB liquidators. M., 2009. S. 384. After the formation of the 29th division of the SS troops (1st Russian), SS Hauptsturmführer G. Leleit was appointed to the post of liaison officer with the Reichsfuehrer SS (See Appendix No. 4).
Ermolov I.G. History of the Lokotsky district ... S. 53.
Steenberg S. Decree. op. S. 93.
Bogatyr Z.A. Decree. op. S. 61.
Saburov A.N. Decree. op. pp. 224-225.
September 1, 1946 From the handwritten testimony of the commander of the consolidated regiment of the RONA brigade, I.D. Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 660.
July 25, 1945, camp No. 284. From the protocol of interrogation of an officer of the combined regiment of the RONA brigade P.R. Mayorova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 600.
Klietmann G.K. Die Waffen-SS. Eine Documentation. Osnabruck, 1965. S. 265.
Semenov K. The fate of a European // Volunteer. 2005. No. 1 (5). P. 10.
The combat schedule of the 29th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS // "Echo of War". 2007. No. 1. S. 32; Gribkov and. Combat use of the 29th SS division // "Echo of War". 2008. No. 2. P. 13.
RGASPI. F. 69, op. 1, d. 710, l. 162.
Aleksandrov K.M. Army of General Vlasov. M., 2006. S. 98.
Drobyazko S.I. Lokot Autonomous Okrug ... S. 206.
There. pp. 206–207.
Garmatny V.P. The tragedy and heroism of the Warsaw insurgents // Military History Journal. M., 2009. No. 1. S. 37.
Semiryaga M.I. Anti-fascist popular uprisings. M., 1965. S. 70.
Nazarevich R. Warsaw uprising. 1944 M., 1989. S. 91.
April 28, 1945, Moscow Handwritten testimony of the commandant of Warsaw, Lieutenant-General of the Luftwaffe R. Shtagel “Uprising in Warsaw” // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 590.
Garmatny V.L. Decree. op. S. 38.
See: August 5, 1944. Message from the commander of Army Group Center to the commander of the 9th Wehrmacht Army about the transfer of reinforcements to Warsaw // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 70.
Bach-Zelewski Erich von dem (born von Zelewski, in the late 1930s - changed his surname to von dem Bach-Zelewski, and in November 1941 to von dem Bach; 1899-1972). Member of the First World War, after which he was left to serve in the Reichswehr. At the end of 1924, he was dismissed from the army for conducting Nazi propaganda. In February 1930 he joined the NSDAP, in 1931 he joined the SA and the SS. In 1932 he was elected to the Reichstag from Breslau. In 1938 he became Higher SS and Police Fuhrer in the southeast (Breslau). From 1941 to June 1944, the Higher Fuhrer of the SS and Police in Central Russia. From October 1942 to June 1943 he was authorized by the Reichsführer SS to combat bandit formations in the East. For the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising in September 1944 he was awarded the Knight's Cross. Since November 1944, the commander of the 14th, in February 1945 - the 10th SS Army Corps. In February-April 1945 he commanded the Oder corps. After the end of the war, he was arrested and acted as a witness at the Nuremberg trials. Until 1950 he was imprisoned. In 1958 he was again arrested. In 1962 he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He died in the prison hospital. Cm.: Zalessky K.A. Security detachments of Nazism ... S. 29-30.
Semenov K.K. SS troops. Soldiers like everyone else. M., 2004. S. 175.
Padfield P. Reichsfuehrer SS. Smolensk, 2002, p. 469.
The tragedy of the Jews of Belarus during the German occupation (1941–1944). Collection of materials and documents. Minsk, 1995. S. 79.
Davies N. Rising 44. The Battle for Warsaw. London-Oxford, 2004, pp. 252, 666; MacLean F.L. Or. cit. R. 187; Pishenkov A.A."Penalty" SS. Sonderkommando Dirlewanger. M., 2009. S. 169; Romanko O.V. Muslim Legions in World War II. M., 2004. S. 219; Krikunov P. Cossacks. Between Hitler and Stalin. M., 2005. S. 445–446; Drobyazko S.I. Under the banner of the enemy ... S. 531-532, 543, 584; Zalessky K. Luftwaffe. Air Force of the Third Reich. M., 2005. S. 132; Hanns von Krankhals. Der Warschauer Aufstand. Frankfurt/Main, 1964, pp. 381–383.
Semenov K.K. SS troops ... S. 175.
July 25, 1945, camp No. 284. From the protocol of interrogation of an officer of the combined regiment of the RONA brigade P.R. Mayorova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 600-602; June 10, 1946, camp No. 256. From the protocol of interrogation of the commander of the combined regiment of the RONA brigade I.D. Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 630; See also: September 1, 1946 Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 662. In the testimony of I.D. Frolov and officer of the RONA brigade A.A. Perkhurov events are presented somewhat differently. They claim that Kaminsky held a meeting on August 7 near the city of Petrokau. Here the composition of the consolidated regiment was determined. Perhaps we are talking about another meeting with the participation of Kaminsky. In our opinion, Frolov's regiment was formed before the start of the march, on the territory of Upper Silesia.
Gribkov I. The owner of the Bryansk forests ... S. 43; Kliettann G.K.. Die Waffen-SS. Eine Documentation. Osnabruck, 1965. S. 265; July 16, 1946 Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 646; July 25, 1945, camp No. 284. From the protocol of interrogation of an officer of the combined regiment of the RONA brigade P.R. Mayorova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 602. Researcher Norman Davis names another figure - 2000 people. Cm.: Davies N. Or. cit. R. 252.
After September 2, 1944 From the diary of a soldier of the RON brigade I.I. Vashenki // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 1074. Note that Vashenka's diary, despite the interesting factual material, is subjective and far from fully reflects how the Kaminites acted in Warsaw. See also: August 5, 1944 Message from the Commander of Army Group Center to the Commander of the 9th Wehrmacht Army about the transfer of reinforcements to Warsaw // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... P. 70; June 10, 1946, camp No. 256. From the protocol of interrogation of the commander of the combined regiment of the RONA brigade I.D. Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 632.
Reinefarth Heinrich (Heinz) (1903–1979), SS Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the SS and police forces. After the end of the First World War, an active participant in the Volunteer Corps. In 1924 he entered the Reichswehr. From 1927 he worked in the judiciary. In 1931–1932 prosecutor in First and Cottbus, then - until 1939 notary. In 1932 he joined the NSDAP and the SS. in 1939 he joined the Wehrmacht as a sergeant major. For distinction in battles in France in June 1940 he was awarded the Knight's Cross. In 1942, he was recalled from the Wehrmacht and appointed Inspector General of the Administration of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Since June 1943 he was the head of the department in the Main Directorate of the Order Police. December 1943 to December 1944 Higher Fuhrer of the SS and Warta district police. For participation in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, he was awarded oak leaves to the Knight's Cross. From December 1944 commander of the XVIII SS Army Corps. In January - March 1945, the commandant of the fortress Kustrin. Since March, commander of the XIV SS Army Corps. After the war he was arrested, until 1948 he was imprisoned. After that, he was mayor of Westerland on Sylt, a member of the Landtag from the Union deprived of their homeland and rights. Cm.: Zalessky K.A. Security detachments of Nazism ... S. 191-192.
Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 40-42. On how the operation to suppress the uprising in Warsaw was going, Reinefart constantly reported to von dem Bach and the commander of the 9th Army, von Forman. It must also be said that Shpilker's Sonderkommando was not formally part of the "von dem Bach" grouping of forces and means.
Hanns von Krankhals. Or. cit. S. 381.
July 8, 1946 Perkhurova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 642.
July 16, 1946 Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 662 - 64.
July 16, 1946 Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 666.
July 16, 1946 Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 664.
September 19, 1946 Protocol of interrogation of Police Lieutenant General H. Reinefart // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 678. The fact that some "Kamins" opened fire on the Germans was reported to Frolov by the Waffen-Obersturmführer Baburov. The shooting, according to Baburov, began when there was an exchange of fire with the rebels. Frolov ordered Baburov to make sure that there were more of these cases! What prompted Frolov to give such an order is hard to say. His post-war testimony, especially his own, raises many questions. Frolov is trying to present himself as the organizer of some kind of sabotage within the consolidated regiment. In addition to the unspoken order to shoot at the Germans, he advised the officers to tell the fighters to render their weapons unusable. Frolov also cites an episode when a skirmish took place between the Kaminians and the Germans, as a result of which there were mutual casualties, and Kaminsky had to deal with a Wehrmacht colonel. But the matter was hushed up, since the very next day the divisional commander allegedly said that "It's all nonsense." In his own handwritten testimony, Frolov tries to show himself as an overly passive commander who cannot take a step without Kaminsky's order, which leads to a constant downtime of the regiment. Without completely rejecting this possibility, one should not trust Frolov's words in everything. Moreover, in his testimony, he did not say how he fired from a howitzer at houses. And such a case, if it really was, shows Frolov from a completely different side. Finally, going to sabotage, Frolov could not help but know what this could turn out to be for Kaminsky and for himself. As for the shooting at the Germans, there may be several versions here. Shooting at the Germans, perhaps, was those fighters who did not want to participate in the suppression of the uprising, but were included in the combined regiment. "Kamintsy" could also open fire because the Germans from neighboring assault units let them go forward, while they themselves followed them when the firing points of the militants were suppressed. Other options are also possible. Kaminsky, according to Frolov, had a conflict with a German security police officer, whose subordinates were holed up in the same house. Kaminsky ordered the officer to raise the police on the attack and go into battle along with the "Kaminsky". The officer refused, saying that he would not lead his men into battle without the order of the senior commander. Kaminsky reported this to Ror, but there was no answer.
July 16, 1946 From the protocol of interrogation of the commander of the combined regiment of the RONA ID brigade. Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 648.
December 1944. The final report of the Governor of the Warsaw District L. Fischer to the Governor-General of the Reich Minister Dr. Frank // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 1136.
After September 2, 1944 From the diary of a soldier of the RON brigade I.I. Vashenki // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 1080, 1082-1084; July 25, 1945, camp No. 284. From the protocol of interrogation of an officer of the combined regiment of the RONA brigade P.R. Mayorova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 602.
June 10, 1946, camp No. 256. From the protocol of interrogation of the commander of the combined regiment of the RONA brigade I.D. Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 632; September 1, 1946 From the handwritten testimony of the commander of the combined regiment of the RON IL brigade. Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... from 668. See also: After September 2, 1944 From the diary of a soldier of the RONA brigade I.I. Vashenki // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 1088.
After September 2, 1944 From the diary of a soldier of the RON brigade I.I. Vashenki // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 1086, 1090; June 10, 1946, camp No. 256. From the protocol of interrogation of the commander of the combined regiment of the RONA brigade, ID. Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 632.
July 8, 1946 Perkhurova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 642; July 25, 1945, camp No. 284. From the protocol of interrogation of an officer of the combined regiment of the RONA P.R. Mayorova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 602; After September 2, 1944 From the diary of a soldier of the RON brigade I.I. Vashenki // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 1080. In the testimony of N.M. Vasyukova can also find a mention of the robberies organized by the Kaminians in Warsaw. Moreover, Vasyukova said that Frolov's subordinates brought with them to Ratibor several cars and trucks, bicycles and carts. See: August 8, 1946, Moscow. From the protocol of interrogation of N. Vasyukova, an employee of the RONA brigade, // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 656.
Zalessky K . BUT.
Littlejohn D. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich. Vol. 4 San Jose 1994. R. 311; Glaube G . The mysterious death of Brigadeführer Kaminsky // "Echo of War". 2007. no. 1. S. 31.
Drobyazko S.I. World War II 1939–1945: The Russian Liberation Army. M., 2000. S. 31; Ulyanov V., Shishkin I . Traitors. Appearance. M., 2008. S. 310.
Sokolov B.V. Occupation ... S. 184.
Zalessky K.A. Commanders of national formations of the SS. S. 46.
Redlikh R.N. In the Kaminsky brigade // Materials on the history of the Russian Liberation Movement ... S. 434.
Historian A.V. Okorokov with reference to an interview with V.D. Poremsky writes: “When the “Vlasov movement” began to develop, and Kaminsky refused to become subordinate to the ROA, the council of the NTS decided to liquidate it ... The execution of the action was entrusted to the members of the NTS who served in the RONA. managed". See: Fascism and Russian emigration (1920–1945). M., 2002. S. 481.
It is known that Kaminsky twice refused to recognize Vlasov as the head of " freedom movement and sign the Smolensk Declaration. As I. Gribkov writes: “Kaminsky believed that Vlasov was a careerist, a hypocrite and a traitor who, having betrayed Stalin once, could betray later” (The owner of the Bryansk forests ... P. 41).
Glaube G . Decree. op. S. 31.
September 1, 1946 From the handwritten testimony of the commander of the consolidated regiment of the RONA brigade, I.D. Frolova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... 668.
Gribkov I . The owner of the Bryansk forests ... S. 45.
Zasukhin V.A. Decree. op. pp. 118, 126.
The state security organs of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T. V. Book. 1. Forward to the West (January 1 - June 30, 1944). M. 2007. S. 576–581.
For example, at the trial in Nuremberg, von dem Bach stated that in January 1941, during a meeting in Wewelsburg, the SS chief told him that in order to implement the plans of the Black Order in the East, 30 million Slavs had to be eliminated. It has not yet been possible to document whether Himmler said something similar.
Diem Christoph (1892–1960). Member of the First World War. In 1918 he joined Volunteer Corps. Since 1929 adjutant of the command of the assault detachments (SA) in Würtenberg. Since 1931, he was the head of the SA "South-West" group. In 1932 he was transferred to the SS. From November 1933 he was a member of the Reichstag. In March 1939 he was appointed police president of Gotenhafen. From January 1944 he was the head of the SS and police in Zhitomir, and from February 25, 1944 - in the Lemberg district. On August 20, 1944 he was transferred to the 29th division of the SS troops. From August 30 to September 27, 1944 - division commander, after which he acted as the High Fuhrer of the SS and Police in Belgium - Northern France (until January 18, 1945). In October 1944 he also became the head of the SS and police in Istria. Cm.: Zalessky K.A. Security detachments of Nazism ... S. 107.
Jürs Heinrich (1897-?). Member of the First World War. From March 1935 to December 1936 he was the commander of the 14th abshnit of the General SS (Bremen), from November 1938 to January 1943 - the 32nd abshnit of the General SS (Augsburg). From October 1940 to January 1941, he was the head of the 2nd Directorate of the Main Directorate of the SS (maturing issues). From May 1943 to April 1945 he headed the management group B (manning) of the SS Main Directorate. From September 27 to October 11, he served as commander of the 29th Waffen-SS division. On January 18, 1945, he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general of the SS troops. Cm.: Zalessky K.A. Security detachments of Nazism ... S. 262.
Glaube G. Decree. op. S. 31.
See: July 25, 1945, Camp No. 284 Mayorova // Warsaw Uprising of 1944 ... S. 602.
Gribkov I . Combat use ... P.14.
Drobyazko S.I. Lokot Autonomous Okrug… S. 211–212.
It was not possible to place this topic in the sections about the Second World War.
Didn't want to mess up sections.
Russian division of the SS RONA. Lokot "republic"
It is well known about the Latvian, Estonian and Ukrainian SS divisions. About Belarusian - only to historians. But few have heard of the Russian SS division. But it was and left its cruel mark in the history of the Great Patriotic War.
The history of the 29th SS division began in the Bryansk region, when in October 1941 the troops of the German 2nd Panzer Army entered the city of Lokot.
Elbow – small city in the Orel (now Bryansk) region, the former estate of Prince Mikhail Romanov. The rapidly advancing German troops urgently demanded order and security in the occupied territory. There were also those who wanted to do it.
In Lokta, there were enough sent here by the authorities NKVD in the 30s. The vast majority of them were, to put it mildly, not enthusiastic about Stalin's management methods. It was on their initiative and with the warm support of the command of the 2nd Panzer Army that the autonomous Lokotsky region was created. It was headed by a physics teacher at the local technical school, Konstantin Pavlovich Voskoboinik.
K.P. Voskoboynik
He was appointed chief burgomaster of Lokt and launched a vigorous activity in the formation of power structures, not forgetting about the armed forces. The troops were given the name Russian Liberation People's Army, i.e. RONA. It had its own intelligence, a newspaper and even a theater.
Command 2 TA, making sure that local government able to secure the rear areas on its own, transformed the Lokotsky district first into a county, and then into a district, and included in it 8 districts of the Kursk and Oryol regions with a population of 581,000 people. So the town with a funny name became the fascist capital of the Bryansk region.
In Lokta, the main state institutions, canteens worked, newspapers were published, taxes were regularly collected. On January 8, 1942, Konstantin Voskoboinik dies in a battle with partisans. He was replaced by Bronislav Kaminsky. He managed to create a very effective management structure in Lokte.
The militarized militia, which at first numbered about 200 people, began to actively fight the partisans. Kaminsky launched a vigorous activity and soon cleared a large territory of them. It was he who was called the "Master of the Bryansk Forest." By the spring of 1942, the number of militia increased to 1,700 people.
Moscow, of course, understood the danger of spreading this positive experience for the Germans to most of the occupied territory. Reconnaissance and sabotage groups were thrown into the Lokt area. They were given the task of physically eliminating Kaminsky, but without much success. Moreover, the Kamenites quickly fine-tuned their intelligence and counterintelligence, already practicing throwing their agents to the partisans.
Under the harsh hand of Kaminsky, life gradually improved. It should be noted that the Lokot Autonomous Okrug was not only an experiment of the military, but rather the leaders of the Third Reich. Even Adolf Hitler knew about its existence, not to mention the Rosenberg Ministry and the SS Headquarters. The militia of the republic was transformed into an assault brigade RONA. It should not be confused with the Vlasov army, which had the name ROA. If the Germans did not really trust the Vlasovites, then the Kamenites had a completely different attitude.
What rights did Kaminsky, says such an episode. Summer 1943 2 German soldiers robbed a mill standing on the outskirts, killed its owner and were caught by the Lokot policemen. The court of the Lokot Republic sentenced them to death. The sentence was carried out on the square in front of a huge crowd, despite the objections of the German high command.
Inspired by success and with the support of the German command, Kaminsky sought to expand its activities as much as possible. In a small town, he became crowded. Kaminsky announced mobilization. Captured officers of the Red Army were involved as commanders.
Assault brigade RONA has become significant military force and was handed over to the SS. By the end of the forty-second year, it included fourteen rifle battalions, an anti-aircraft battery, an armored division, a commandant platoon and a fighter company. The total number is up to 10,000 people. All these forces were used to fight the partisans, which began from the very beginning of the existence of the new government and continued until the evacuation of RONA units from Lokt.
Kaminsky's party also received its development. Its program was practically written off from the program of the German Nazis. In fact, the National Socialist order was established in the Lokot Republic. For example, marriages between non-Jews and Jews were forbidden. Jews were subjected to various restrictions, additional requisitions and forced labor.
In Lokta, only marriages consecrated by the church were recognized, divorces were prohibited. Abortions were banned, a struggle was waged to preserve the family, and fertility was encouraged. Personal ownership of land was restored, private trade was stimulated in the cities. Free trade and the division of land among local peasants caused a flourishing in areas of the district that were not attacked by partisans.
There were many exiles in Lokotsky and neighboring areas who were forbidden to live in major cities Soviet Union, so initially Kaminsky had enough supporters. However, the majority gradually became disillusioned with him and with Hitler. And on the fronts, the situation began to change. At the beginning of March forty-three, Soviet troops approached the outskirts of the district, and the 3rd and 5th regiments of the RONA took part in the hostilities against the Red Army, suffering heavy losses. Many, not accepting the battle, deserted, about 700 people went to the partisans. But, in general, the actions of the Kaminians were successful.
RONA spent the whole spring and summer of 1943 fighting partisans. In fact, this brigade was responsible for the rear German armies on the Orel-Kursk line. The largest and most successful operation was the "Gypsy Baron", during which more than 1,500 partisans were killed and the same number captured. In addition, more than 200 partisan bases were destroyed. By participating in these battles, the assault brigade attracted the attention of the Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler. The brigade began not only to obey, but also to be structurally part of the SS troops. Kaminsky was awarded a medal, and he was given the rank of SS Brigadeführer, which corresponded to Major General.
In the spring of 1944 in NKVD the so-called "Liter case" was opened, in which documents were filed on the planning of the assassination attempt on Kaminsky. This case was supervised by the captain of state security Frolov, who then had the pseudonym "comrade Altai". Initially, they wanted to put in the house where the head autonomous region, bomb. The explosives were supposed to be carried by the recruited chief of the economic unit RONA.
To accomplish the task of destroying Bronislav Kaminsky, several operational groups were deployed to the brigade's area of operations. They included both trained saboteurs and experienced operative agents. If it was impossible to carry out a terrorist attack directly against Kaminsky, it was planned to recruit people from his immediate circle and persuade them either to kill the Brigadeführer or to transfer him alive into the hands of the partisans.
But plans are plans, but sometimes the most banal things can change everything. Agent Sophia,
who was sent with the Sokol sabotage group, did not complete the task and instead got married and left with the child for the location of the group. Despite the failed task, "Sophia" was not punished. Subsequently, after checking and retraining, she was again transferred to the front line.
In addition to the Chekists, partisans also acted against Kaminsky, they have RONA had their accounts.
In the summer of 1943, the situation in the district became threatening, and Kaminsky in agreement with the Nazi command, he ordered the evacuation of the RONA and the civilian population to the city Lepel Vitebsk region. Having loaded tanks, artillery and other equipment, RONA units, together with the civil administration of the district and their families total number up to 30,000 people left for Belarus.
The Lepel Special District was already formed, and Kaminsky was appointed its mayor. All power in this territory was concentrated in his hands. The rigidity of the executive power was combined with elements of democracy like rural gatherings. The orders established in Lepel were similar to the Lokot ones.
The positive experience for the Germans of creating a Russian quasi-state was transferred to Belarus. In practice, the RONA brigade was considered as an exemplary model for managing the occupied territories. The main task assigned to the settlers was to fight the partisans.
Kaminsky carried out a number of major operations to clear his zone of partisans. With the changed situation on the fronts, the backwater Lepelsky district became a strategically important rear zone of Army Group Center. And at the same time, the offensive of the Red Army and the efforts of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement caused the intensification of the actions of the patriots in the German rear. These operations caused even greater hatred for the invaders.
In such a situation, the transfer of the solution of such problems to the hands of Kaminsky suited everyone. The Germans practically did not interfere in what was happening in the district. They were quite satisfied that a sufficiently large territory practically did not cause them any trouble. Police formations from local residents were transferred under the command of the Brigadeführer. Needless to say, they were quite numerous. The local peasantry, as well as throughout the Soviet Union, was dissatisfied with collectivization, and many residents saw the Germans as liberators from the Bolsheviks.
However, the relationship between the settlers and the local population was not easy. Moreover, most of the arrivals were settled in the homes of local residents, to put it mildly, without their consent. There was a difference in language and customs, and simply a factor of strangers who arrived from nowhere and put things in order. The locals called them either Orlovtsy or Narodniks.
In fact, the Kaminians behaved in Belarus, like occupiers, and failed to include the locals in the life of their republic. The partisans of the Lepel zone also did not sit idly by. And besides purely military operations, one of the most effective ways the fight against punishers was propaganda. True, things were not so simple with the Kamenites, although serious efforts were made. The scale of the resources used was impressive, right down to the planes that delivered letters from relatives to potential defectors. In Moscow, this activity was given great importance and in this work there have been very great successes.
Here is one of those stories. Through their intelligence channels, a group of Kaminians came to the partisans, they wanted to go over to their side. The main one in this group was a certain Kostya. But at the same time they wanted some guarantees that they would simply not be shot as traitors to the Motherland. We agreed to meet at the crossing.
The partisans made it a condition that the defectors bring their commander, dead or alive, with them. He was the chief of police of the Lepel district, right hand Kaminsky, Pakhomov. The Kaminites complied with the condition and arrived at the appointed place with Pakhomov, in uniform, with weapons, on several carts. The carts were loaded with mines and shells. They also carried 2 cannons with them.
The guerrillas and Kaminians, not being able to destroy each other in direct combat, directed considerable efforts towards propaganda. Everything was used: newspapers, leaflets, and cartoons. But the advance of the Red Army had the greatest influence on the minds. Many began to think about their future fate, looking for their salvation in the transition to the partisans.
There were transitions of Kaminians to the side of the partisans, but earlier this phenomenon was not of a mass nature. On the one hand, a significant part of them were enemies of the Soviet regime by conviction, on the other hand, everyone understood that their struggle on the side of Hitler was unlikely to be forgiven. Yes, and Kaminsky's propaganda also worked.
War is not done with white gloves, and cruelty was shown not only by the punishers, but also by the partisans, giving food for the Brigadeführer's propaganda. The brigade commander tried to maintain iron discipline in the RONA, not stopping at any measures. By this time, his brigade had become a fairly organized and experienced SS unit.
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The successes of Kaminsky in the fight against the partisans did not go unnoticed. In the winter-spring of 1944, the brigade RONA fought constant battles in the rear of Army Group Center. Kaminsky for participation in these battles he was awarded the Iron Cross of the 1st class, and Heinrich Himmler drew attention to the assault brigade.
In the summer of 1944, Kaminsky was called to the headquarters of the Reichsfuehrer, located in East Prussia. The Reichsfuehrer personally thanked him for the actions of the Ronovites, and the brigade itself RONA By order of Himmler, they were transformed into the 29th SS Grenadier Division.
In Lepel, all Kaminsky's ideas about creating "Russia without Jews and Bolsheviks" gradually faded away. He never managed to find support from the local population. Neither repression nor propaganda helped. The dense anti-Semitism of Kaminsky in Lepel, which was a Jewish town before the war, looked wild at all. The local Jewish population, which is several thousand people, was completely destroyed by the Germans and local police even before they arrived. RONA. Therefore, in the eyes of a significant part of the local residents, Kaminsky's anti-Semitic propaganda looked like wild dances on the graves of innocent fellow countrymen.
However, in the context of the intensification of the partisan struggle and the punitive measures of the Germans, questions of ideology began to fade into the background. Mutual hatred flared up, where the watershed passed already by the name of Hitler, and not by the name of Stalin.
The Red Army, which had already begun to liberate Belarus, left no doubt about the end result of the entire war. Therefore, in an effort to hasten the already inevitable fall of the Germans, the partisans stepped up their actions.
On the eve of the summer campaign of 1944, the Nazi command, for its part, sought to secure its rear. Therefore, in the winter of the 44th, all the forces of the punishers were thrown against the partisans. To support their actions, infantry units were allocated, aviation and armored vehicles were actively used.
To a large extent, this zone was cleared of partisans, all this was accompanied by huge casualties among the civilian population. In an effort not only to drive the partisans out of their bases, but also to deprive them of the possibility of returning, the punishers ruthlessly burned the villages so that henceforth no one could help the partisans either voluntarily or without it.
The first successes appeared among the operatives who worked against RONA. The reaction to the military successes of the Soviet Union was different. Someone even more embittered, someone was looking for ways of salvation. According to archival documents interdistrict residency NKVD Belarus had agents, both among ordinary fighters and among some leaders.
However, despite the good position in the collection of information, the solution of the main issue - the physical destruction of Kaminsky - still remained unrealized. It should be noted that the counterintelligence regime in the occupied territories has sharply increased. M
numerous security agencies of the occupiers, together with the formations of collaborators, launched a large-scale hunt for scouts and partisans. Both undercover work and widespread raids were intensified.
This was caused both by the increased activity of Soviet reconnaissance and sabotage groups, and by a simple increase in the concentration of various traitors and provocateurs who had gathered in Belarus from all the previously occupied territory. But for many of them, the fear of impending retribution became more important. Some of them, even conscious of their crimes, still went over to the partisans.
In the summer of 1944, the Lepel special district became front-line. Due to the lack of trains, it was not possible to carry out a planned evacuation to Czechoslovakia. Fighter family members RONA ended up in Germany, where they became ordinary eastern workers without any privileges.
August 2 in Warsaw, the Poles raised an uprising, and the Germans called on the Kaminians to suppress it.
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The actions of the Ronovites were accompanied by mass robberies and murders. And, to a large extent, those residents of Warsaw who did not take part in the uprising. Some of them were actually Germans. Polish historians claim that soldiers of the 29th SS division killed more than 15,000 people during the fighting.
To the demand of the Germans to reassure their soldiers, Kaminsky, wounded in these battles, replied that de his people lost all their acquired property during the struggle against the Bolsheviks, and there is nothing wrong if they want to improve their financial condition at the expense of the Poles, who are hostile to the Germans.
The death of Kaminsky
Still doing atrocities, Kaminsky's soldiers continued to fight in Warsaw. Since RONA left Soviet territory and was left almost without a livelihood, the brigade commander was powerless to tame his fighters. In other words, then few people could have known that the 29th SS division would soon be disbanded. Kaminsky has a few weeks left to live.
The 4th direction of the Belarusian NKVD finally managed to find a way to deal with the commander RONA. According to official German data, in the midst of the fighting in Warsaw, Kaminsky was summoned to the commander. He did not return from this trip. On a forest road, bandits attacked his car with the aim of robbery. All escorts and the brigadeführer himself were killed. Allegedly, the bandits took away all the valuables and documents, and then set fire to the car.
All this happened in late September or early October 1944. The Germans showed the RONA officers the burnt car of the Brigadeführer, overturned into a ditch and riddled with bullets.
But all this was a staging staged under the direction of Birkampf, chief of the Krakow SD. In fact, Bronislav Kaminsky was killed by the Germans themselves. But what really happened then in Poland?
Field Marshal Guderian wrote in his materials that Kaminsky was destroyed by the decision of the SS court. But for what? To this day, this has remained a mystery to almost all researchers.
There were 2 versions of this. First: for special cruelty to the inhabitants of Warsaw. Sentence to the Brigadeführer SS for particular cruelty in Nazi Germany?! This is complete nonsense. Another version boiled down to the fact that Kaminsky was removed in order to clear the way for Vlasov. But at the end of the war, the Germans were unlikely to sacrifice such an important figure as the RONA commander. After all, he began to fight on the side of the Nazis even when the general Vlasov successfully fought in the Red Army.
When Vlasov sat in a German concentration camp and when he began to create a school of propagandists, all this time Kaminsky with his fighters participated in real battles, and not without success. In addition, according to German law, he was German because he had a German mother. If we compare Vlasov and Kaminsky in the opinion of the Germans, then Bronislav was clearly preferable. But why Vlasov stayed alive and Kaminsky shot? The answer to this mystery lay under the heading "Top Secret" in the archives of the special services.
So, after an unsuccessful attempt to kill or kidnap Kaminsky, the NKVD managed to destroy him with the hands of the Germans. Here is another secret of the special services. It turns out that back in 1937, the NKVD forced Kaminsky to become their informant. He then received the pseudonym "Ultramarine". He was recruited by an employee of the Orel Department of the NKVD. The task of "Ultramarine" was to denounce exiles like him. It turns out that RONA commanded by an NKVD agent!
A form has been preserved, approved by the People's Commissar for Security of Belarus, Tsanava, which says, neither more nor less, about an attempt to recruit Kaminsky again. The recruiting agent was supposed to be his sister, who was specially transferred across the front line. It was to be provided with photocopies of Kaminsky's signature and his own handwritten reports.
However, this whole story hardly says anything new about Bronislav's personality. Then the time was such that refusal to cooperate with the authorities meant treason, and such subscriptions were forced to give almost everyone who fell into the hands of the NKVD. During the years of repressions of the 30s, the NKVD intelligence apparatus grew thousands of times. Although the vast majority of these people were practically not used, many had a hook.
As it turned out, he was also on Kaminsky. Why they waited so long before launching it remains a mystery. It can be assumed that the documents of the Orel Department for the recruitment of "Ultramarine" were simply lost in the military turmoil and were found much later.
Since the brigadeführer refused to cooperate, the original documents about his recruitment in the 37th slipped to the Germans. Having discovered that the SS general was a Russian agent, they had no choice but to quietly remove him. It was an undoubted success of the NKVD, although somewhat belated.
The Kaminsky brigade was practically disbanded, and the personnel were transferred to the unit of General Vlasov. Thus ended perhaps the most daring experiment of the Nazis in Russia.
RON B. Kaminsky is a gang of punishers, traitors and Nazi accomplices. And not fighters against Bolshevism.
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Introduction
Among the collaborationist formations created on the territory of the USSR occupied by the Nazis, a special place is occupied by the Kaminsky Brigade, also known as the Russian Liberation People's Army (RONA) and the 29th Waffen– grenadier division SS troops.
B.V. Kaminsky
Unlike the Russian Liberation Army, better known to the domestic reader, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, the armed units organized in the southern regions of the Bryansk region in October 1941 were not a propaganda action of the invaders, but a real fighting force, sometimes inflicting quite sensitive blows on Soviet patriots - partisans and underground workers. This allowed the German military authorities to hand over the brigade commander - B.V. Kaminsky - significant powers, expressed, in particular, in granting the latter broad autonomy, which occupied the territory of six districts of the Oryol and two - Kursk regions, with a population of up to 1.7 million people (the so-called Lokotsky administrative district).
Despite the fact that the RONA units were unable to withstand the onslaught of the advancing Red Army (in the spring and summer of 1943), the German command evacuated the brigade and part of the civilian residents of the district to the territory of Belarus, where the Kaminians had to confirm their status as one of the most combat-ready anti-partisan collaborationist formations.
The successful activity of the subordinate Kaminsky formation became a guarantee that the brigade was included in the SS troops and became the first Russian division of the Black Order.
In the course of writing this book, the authors took into account two points. First, a lot has already been written about the Kaminsky Brigade. Secondly, little of what has been written can claim completeness, scientific objectivity, and a conscientious analysis of currently available sources. We have to admit that the best studies devoted to the problem focus mainly on the civil and political aspects of B.V. Kaminsky.
In fairness, it should be noted that a number of special works devoted to the Kaminsky Brigade have been published in the West, but practically all of them look sparingly and archaic in factual terms today: researchers make little use of Soviet and Russian sources (not to mention literature), uncritically approach some established myths.
The authors of some foreign studies demonstrate depressing incompetence. So, in the book of F. MacLean, dedicated to the formation of O. Dirlewanger, it is noted that the RONA assault brigade consisted of ... "Ukrainian renegades" , and the British historian K. Heaton "pleased" the public with an unimaginable cocktail of errors, confusion and delirium. He writes that « the formation of Kaminsky became the 29th SS Panzer-Grenadier Division (Russian No. 2) under the command of Gruppenführer Seidling ". We flatter ourselves with the hope that any trained domestic reader understands perfectly well that the 29th division (Russian No. 1) was a waffen grenadier. By "Seidling", obviously, is meant SS Obersturmbannführer (and not Gruppenführer) Hans Siegling, commander of the 30th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS troops (Russian No. 2).
Finally, many Western authors call Bronislav Kaminsky either "Bratislava" or "Mecheslav". However, why blame the mirror if there are publicists in Russia who stubbornly continue to write the name of the RONA commander as “Kaminsky” (and the autonomy headed by the latter in 1942-1943 is called “Lokotskaya”) ...
We were faced with the task of presenting the history of the formation and combat activities of the RONA as objectively as possible - starting from the creation of the "people's militia" units of the Lokotsky volost, and ending with the participation of the combined regiment of the 29th division of the SS troops in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. The result of the study was that, in fact, for the first time in the historiography of the issue in the book offered to the reader, the specific combat operations of the "Kamintsy" against Soviet and Polish patriots, the activities of employees and agents of the NKVD - NKGB, aimed at eliminating brigade commanders and decomposing the personnel of the formation, as well as retaliatory countermeasures of intelligence and counterintelligence RONA. The issue of the crimes of the "Kaminians" against the civilian population is not ignored. Finally, various versions of Kaminsky's death are analyzed.
It should be noted that in our recently published book “Russian SS men in battle. Soldiers or punishers? (Unfortunately, as is often the case, the publishers found it necessary to give "their own" - alas, incorrect - version of the name) a separate chapter was devoted to the Kaminsky Brigade. However, the purpose of this publication was, first of all, to consider the genesis of the attitude of the top of the Third Reich and the SS to the "Slavic question", summarizing all the facts known to us today of the service of the Slavs (and not just Russians) in the bodies, divisions and parts of Himmler's department.
Therefore, this book is not an "extended presentation" of the corresponding chapter. The material has been fundamentally revised, some inaccuracies have been corrected, a new array of sources has been connected.
The authors consider it their duty to sincerely thank Candidate of Historical Sciences S.G. . Drobyazko, historians K.K. Semenova, I.V. Gribkova, M.V. Kozhemyakin, as well as S.N. Nepodkosova, A.Yu. Belkova and A.V. Shestakova.
Chapter first. The occupation of the Bryansk region and the formation of the "People's Militia" of the Lokot Volost (October 1941 - January 1942)
The village of Lokot, the administrative center of the Brasovsky district of the Oryol (now Bryansk) region, was occupied by units of the 17th Panzer Division of Lieutenant General Hans Jurgen von Arnim on October 4, 1941. The division was at the forefront of the 47th motorized army corps, which is part of the 2nd tank group of the Wehrmacht (from October 6 - the 2nd tank army), and participated in the encirclement and defeat of the Soviet 3rd and 13th armies of the Bryansk Front that fell into the cauldron near Trubchevsk. By the beginning of October, units of the 280th, 137th, 148th, 7th, 148th, 7th units of the 280th, 137th, 148th, 7th, 148th, 7 -th, 148th, 282nd, 269th rifle and 42nd cavalry divisions of the 3rd Soviet army, General Ya.M. Cruiser. Only a few units and individual soldiers of the 3rd and 13th armies managed to break out of the encirclement. Most of the Red Army soldiers who remained in the cauldron were forced to surrender by October 20.
On the territory of the Brasovsky district, formations and units of the Red Army did not actually conduct defensive battles. Local residents did not show resistance to the invaders either, who, due to specific historical traditions, have never been distinguished by loyalty towards Soviet power. At first, the attempt to organize the partisan movement and the underground actually failed in the region. First Secretary of the Oryol Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) AL. Matveev in a memorandum to the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement P.K. Ponomarenko stated: “Compared to the neighboring regions, the Brasovsky region produced a relatively smaller percentage of partisans and a relatively large percentage of traitors from among the party-Soviet activists. The evacuated families of the party and Soviet activists were escorted to the whistle and unequivocal threats of the anti-Soviet, and some of the employees of the institutions stubbornly avoided evacuation under various pretexts..
Settlement Lokot, Brasovsky district. From a post-war map
Those party and Soviet workers who did not have time to evacuate were either handed over to the German military authorities, or even killed. It was this fate that befell E.F. Sedakov, who, on the eve of the war, acted as head of the Brasov police department. When the German units entered Lokot, Sedakov tried to escape into the forest and take part in organizing the Brasov partisan detachment"For the Motherland". After the death of Sedakov, V.A. became the head of the detachment. Kapralov, later shot by the Chekists for the murder of his commissar and numerous facts of desertion, drunkenness and looting that took place in the detachment.
The situation that developed in the Brasovsky district on the eve and at the time of the occupation is vividly characterized by the words of M.G. Vasyukov, said by him during the post-war interrogation (before the war, Vasyukov worked as the chairman of the planning department of the Brasovsky district executive committee, during the occupation he was the head of the planning and economic department of the Lokot self-government): “At the beginning ... of the war, by the decision of the Bureau of the Republic of Kazakhstan of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I was appointed a member of the commission for conscription into the Red Army, at the same time to the commission for the evacuation of the area to the deep rear of the country. In July 1941, an order was issued by the Republic of Kazakhstan of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to include in the partisan detachment the entire asset of the district, party members, including me. All members of the party went into the forest. I, on the instructions of the RK VKP (b), until the last moment, was engaged in the evacuation of livestock, grain and other valuables. On October 3, I sent the last echelon. The Germans have already come close to the village. Elbow. On October 4, they occupied the city, and on the 3rd, I broke into the forest to the agreed partisan base. There I found 8 people led by the second secretary of the RK VKP(b) Razumov. We gathered about 20 people. The whole group failed to get into the main headquarters of the partisan detachment, and therefore intelligence was sent. It was around October 18th. The reconnaissance united with the main headquarters and there she was ordered to tell us to immediately leave the encirclement and connect with the main headquarters. Led by the second secretary of the Republic of Kazakhstan of the CPSU (b) Razumov, we arrived in the forest, where our main partisan headquarters was located. The headquarters was not in place. Since we had neither weapons nor food ... Razumov gave the order ... to disperse wherever they can. On October 22, some of the comrades dispersed. I lived for two more days, and then I was forced to return to Lokot, the place of residence of my family. I was arrested, but then released.".
The emblem of the division is a stylized St. George's Cross
29th Grenadier Waffen Division SS "RONA" (1st Russian) (German 29. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS "RONA" (russische Nr. 1)), also known as the "Kaminsky Brigade" - Russian collaborationist paramilitary formations created as the "Russian Liberation People's Army" on the territory of the Lokot self-government during the Second World War
Initially, on the territory controlled by the Lokot self-government, "national police" (about 200 people) and self-defense units (about 20 people) were formed, but this was not enough. Deserters and criminals robbed the roads. In the forests around Lokt, a large number of encircled and special groups formed by the NKVD and the GRU were hiding, which later became the backbone of the partisan detachments. All this human mass was fed by night robberies of villages, warehouses, raids on single German cars. In order to defend the Lokotsky district, the RONA was created, the number of which was rapidly increasing and by the summer of 1943 amounted to 8 - 8.5 thousand people. Initially, the RONA units acted against the partisans of the Bryansk region. In the period from June 19 to June 27, 1942, 427 partisans crossed over to the side of the RONA; 65 of them joined RONA. In the summer of 1943, during the turning point in the war, the partisan movement recovered from its initial defeats, and the RONA began to suffer heavy losses, despite German help. Several partisan attempts were made on Kaminsky. P. Sutulin cites the following facts about the activities of the RONA punishers:
"In order to fight against the same partisans, the villages of Krasnaya Svoboda, Trebushka, Cherp, Gavrilova Guta, Kokorevka, Konushino, Chukhra, Smilichi, Igritskoye, Dobrovolsky, Altukhovo, Shushuyevo were completely burned down, and their residents were forcibly evicted to other areas. According to the State Extraordinary Commission, which conducted investigations into the activities of the RONA, during the period of the existence of the republic, its punishers executed 10,000 people, and more than two hundred were burned alive.
In 1942, in the Bryansk region, as part of the Gilza II combat group, the Kaminsky brigade took part in the anti-partisan operation Vogelsang (Vogelsang, the name of the large Nazi elite training complex in the Eifel. Sometimes the name of the operation is indicated as "Bird Trill" or "Singing birds", which is a literal translation of a proper name from German), under the command of Lieutenant General Baron Werner von und zu Giles. The battle group included a tank regiment of the 5th division, units of the 216th infantry division, Kaminsky policemen, units of the 102nd and 108th Hungarian light divisions - about 6.5 thousand people in total. During the operation, 1,193 partisans were killed, 1,400 were wounded, 498 were captured, and more than 12,000 people were evacuated; the punishers lost 58 people killed and 130 wounded, which indicates the nature of the operation: against the civilian population.
March 21, 1944, Belarus. Anti-partisan operation. Bronislav Kaminsky with a group of members of his headquarters and officers of the order police. Also, the Kaminsky police, together with other eastern volunteers, took part in the following operations:
* "Neighborly Help" (German: Nachbarhilfe) - mainly the 98th division and the 108th Hungarian light division, Kaminsky's police performed auxiliary functions;
* "Gypsy Baron" (German: Zigeunerbaron) - the largest operation involving the XLVII Panzer Corps, the 4th, 7th, 292nd Infantry Divisions, the 18th Panzer, 10th Motorized and 102nd Hungarian Light Divisions and during which 207 partisan camps were destroyed, 1584 partisans were killed and 1568 were taken prisoner;
* "Free shooter" (German: Freischütz) - in addition to the Kaminsky police, the 5th tank division, 6th Infantry and 707th Division;
* “Tannenhäuser” (German: Tannenhäuser. Translated means “Spruce Houses”, but perhaps the name of some settlement was used) - RONA and eastern volunteers took part in the operation;
* "Easter Egg" (German: Osterei) - operation of the RONA and parts of the Eastern Volunteers.
Parts of the RONA took part in the unsuccessful operation "Citadel" for the German army on the Kursk Bulge. During the retreat, about 30 thousand RONA fighters and their families left the Lokot self-government.
Commanding Officer - Major Ivan Frolov (center) with RONA officers during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. The officer to the right of Ivan Frolov is Lieutenant Mikhalchevsky. The soldier on the right, apparently, belongs to the ROA (judging by the patch). Ivan Frolov will die on August 21 at the corner of Srebrna and Towarowa streets; SU-76 and 2 x 122-mm howitzers.
The Kaminsky division took an active part in suppressing the uprising in the Okhota and Vistula regions. On August 4, 1944, the RONA consolidated regiment was thrown to storm the Poles' stronghold in the building of the Tobacco Monopoly Reduta Kaliski, which was defended by about 300 people. In this battle, RONA suffered its first losses - 22 killed. From the very first day, the units were drawn into mass robberies and drunkenness - they smashed and robbed warehouses and shops, shot local residents who simply found themselves in the area. Other formations involved in the suppression of the uprising were also engaged in this with the approval of the commander of the 9th Army and Heinrich Himmler. According to Polish researchers, between 15,000 and 30,000 people became victims. Executions in the courtyards of Warsaw streets continued for several weeks. Numerous facts of looting, rape and pogroms took place. Members of the RONA brigade also raped two German girls from the KDF organization (German: Kraft durch Freude / Strength through joy).
The actions of the Kaminsky brigade aroused the indignation of the Wehrmacht and veterans of the First World War. The commander of the 9th Army of the Panzer Forces, Nikolaus von Hofmann, in whose area of responsibility Warsaw was, sent a protest against the actions of the RONA brigade to Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zalewski, who tried to resolve the issue in working order. However, Kaminsky's subordinates refused to follow the orders of anyone other than Kaminsky. Kaminsky said that his subordinates have the right to loot, as they have lost all their property in Russia.
The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Heinz Guderian (who had previously supported the idea of creating the Lokot autonomy) wrote in his memoirs:
“… von dem Bach… informed me about the atrocities of his subordinates, which he is not able to stop. His messages made my hair stand on end, so I was forced to report everything to Hitler that evening and demand the removal of both brigades (note by Kaminsky and Dirlewanger) from Eastern Front. »
The looting of the brigade was reported upstairs. According to the testimony of Alfred Jodl, head of the operations department of the OKW, given at the Nuremberg trials, he made a report to Hitler, who personally ordered the dissolution of the brigade. Kaminsky was recalled from the location of the brigade.
A few days later, on August 28, Kaminsky was shot by members of the Sonderkommando SS operating in the Litzmannstadt (Lodz) ghetto under the command of Hans Botman. At the Nuremberg trials, his murder was confirmed by Erich von dem Bach-Zalewski, according to him, his “measures consisted in the execution, according to the laws of wartime, of the brigade commander Kaminsky and his associates, because they authorized the further advancement of robberies and requisitions.” Kaminsky's subordinates were informed that he was killed by Polish partisans. According to some reports, the murder was preceded by a formal court-martial. sources
