The first atomic bomb in the USSR was a landmark event that completely changed the geopolitical situation on the planet.

All the key players on the world stage in the 40s of the 20th century tried to get their hands on a nuclear bomb in order to establish absolute power, make their influence on other countries decisive and, if necessary, easily destroy enemy cities and hit millions of people with the deadly impact of high-energy radiation.

The atomic project in the country of the Soviets got its start in 1943, which became a necessity to quickly catch up with the leading countries, Germany and the USA, in this matter, and prevent them from gaining decisive superiority. The exact launch date is February 11, 1943.

At that time, scientists and developers could not yet fully realize what a terrible weapon they offer to politicians, who are often very odious personalities. Nuclear weapons can instantly destroy millions of people around the world and cause irreparable harm to nature in all its manifestations.

Today, the political situation is still tense, which is a common thing for eternally warring people, and nuclear weapons continue to play an important role in establishing parity - an equality of forces, thanks to which neither side of the new global conflict does not dare to attack the enemy.

Creation of the atomic bomb in the USSR

Molotov became the main politician who was supposed to oversee the nuclear program.

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (1890 - 1986) - Russian revolutionary, Soviet political and statesman. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in 1930-1941, People's Commissar, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in 1939-1949, 1953-1956.

He, in turn, decided that such a serious work of scientists should be headed by Kurchatov, an experienced physicist, under whose leadership the domestic science made many outstanding breakthroughs.

This inventor and leader became famous for many things, in particular, for the fact that the first nuclear power plant was launched under him, that is, the peaceful use of atomic energy became possible.

The first bomb was named RDS-1. This abbreviation meant the following phrase - "jet engine special". This cipher was developed in order to keep developments as secret as possible.

Explosions of the projectile were carried out on the territory of Kazakhstan at a specially constructed for this training ground.

There are many rumors that the Russian side could not catch up with the Americans in any way, because they did not know some of the nuances of the development. The invention was allegedly hastened by the fact that American anonymous scientists "leaked" secrets to the councils, which greatly accelerated the matter.

But critics say that even if this is so, it is worth understanding that the domestic bomb would not have taken place without the general high level of development of science and industry, as well as the presence of highly qualified personnel who could quickly understand and apply the clues, even if they were.

Julius Rosenberg and his wife Ethel are American communists accused of spying for the Soviet Union (primarily in transferring American nuclear secrets to the USSR) and executed for this in 1953.

As for the one who passed on the secret to speed things up, then the blueprints for the bomb were sent to the USSR by a scientist named Julius Rosenberg, although he was supervised by other personalities, for example, Klaus Fuchs.

For his act, Rosenberg was executed in the early 50s in the United States. There are other names in the case as well.

The "father" of the Soviet nuclear project is rightfully considered the outstanding Russian nuclear physicist Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov. The creator of the deadly weapon took up this project in 1942 and oversaw it until his death.

Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov (1903 - 1960) - Soviet physicist, "father" of the Soviet atomic bomb. Three times Hero of Socialist Labor (1949, 1951, 1954). Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1943) and Uzbek Academy of Sciences. SSR (1959), doctor of physical and mathematical sciences (1933), professor (1935). Founder and first director of the Institute of Atomic Energy (1943-1960).

The development of weapons did not prevent the scientist from acting in other areas, for example, it was he who made a decisive contribution to the launch of the first nuclear reactors in the country and around the world for energy production.

Kurchatov was born in 1903 in the family of a landowner, he studied exceptionally well, and at the age of 21 he completed his first scientific work. It was he who became one of the leaders in the study of nuclear physics and all its many secrets.

Kurchatov is the owner of many honorary awards and titles of the highest level. Whole Soviet Union knew and admired this man who died at just 57 years old.

The work went on at an accelerated pace, therefore, after the launch of the project in 42, already On August 29, 1949, the first successful test was made.

The bomb was tested by a scientist and a military team under the organization of Khariton. Responsibility for any mistakes was the toughest, so all participants in the work treated their work with the utmost care.

The nuclear test site where it happened historical event, is called the Semipalatinsk test site, and it is located on the expanses of the territory of present-day Kazakhstan, and at that time - the Kazakh SSR. In the future, other places for such tests appeared.

The power of the RDS-1 was 22 kilotons, with its explosion, a huge amount of destruction took place. Their chronology is still of great interest today.

Here are some nuances of preparing the explosion:

1. To test the strength of the impact on the landfill, civilian houses were built from wood and concrete panels. About 1,500 animals were also housed there, on which it was planned to test the effects of the bomb.
2. Also, during the experiment, sectors with various types of weapons, fortified objects and protected structures were used.
3. The bomb itself was mounted on a metal tower almost 40 meters high.

When the explosion was made, the metal tower where the bomb was standing simply disappeared, and in its place a hole was formed in the ground by 1.5 meters. Of the 1500 animals, about 400 died.

Many concrete structures, houses, bridges, civilian and military vehicles were hopelessly damaged. The work was supervised by highest level, that's why there were no unplanned problems.

The consequences of the creation of the atomic bomb for the USSR

When the coveted form of weapons nevertheless appeared in the hands Soviet leaders, it caused a lot of different reactions. Already after the first successful test of the RDS-1, the Americans learned about this with the help of their reconnaissance aircraft.

US President Truman issued a statement about the event about a month after the tests.

Officially, the USSR recognized the presence of the bomb only in 1950.

What are the consequences of all this? History relates to the events of those times ambiguously. Of course, the creation of nuclear weapons had its own important reasons which were perhaps even a matter of the country's survival. The developer of such a project also did not understand the fullness of the consequences, and this applies not only to the USSR, but also to the Germans and Americans.

In general, in short, the consequences are as follows:

• the establishment of nuclear parity, when none of the parties to the global confrontation would risk starting an open war;
• significant technological breakthrough of the Soviet Union;
• the formation of our country as a world leader, the opportunity to speak from a position of strength.

Also, the bomb brought an increase in tension in relations between the USSR and the USA, today this is no less evident. The consequences of the production of nuclear weapons was that the world at any moment could slide into a catastrophe and suddenly be able to nuclear winter, after all, you never know what will come to the mind of the next politician who has seized power.

In general, curation and creation nuclear bomb RDS-1 was a complex event that opened literally new era world history, and the year of the creation of this weapon of the USSR became a landmark.

Truth in the penultimate instance

There are not many things in the world that are considered indisputable. Well, the sun rises in the east and sets in the west, I think you know. And that the Moon revolves around the Earth, too. And about the fact that the Americans were the first to create an atomic bomb, ahead of both the Germans and the Russians.

So did I, until four years ago an old magazine fell into my hands. He left my beliefs about the sun and the moon alone, but faith in American leadership was shaken quite seriously. It was a plump volume in German, a 1938 binder of Theoretical Physics. I don’t remember why I got there, but quite unexpectedly I came across an article by Professor Otto Hahn.

The name was familiar to me. It was Gan, the famous German physicist and radiochemist, who in 1938, together with another prominent scientist, Fritz Straussmann, discovered the fission of the uranium nucleus, in fact, starting work on the creation of nuclear weapons. At first, I just skimmed through the article diagonally, but then completely unexpected phrases made me become more attentive. And, ultimately, even forget about why I originally picked up this magazine.

Gan's article was devoted to an overview of nuclear developments in different countries of the world. As a matter of fact, there was nothing special to review: everywhere except Germany, nuclear research was in the pen. They didn't see much point. " This abstract matter has nothing to do with state needs., said British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain around the same time when he was asked to support British atomic research with public money.

« Let these bespectacled scientists look for money themselves, the state has a lot of other problems!" — this was the opinion of most world leaders in the 1930s. Except, of course, the Nazis, who just financed the nuclear program.
But it was not Chamberlain's passage, carefully quoted by Hahn, that caught my attention. England does not interest the author of these lines much at all. Much more interesting was what Hahn wrote about the state of nuclear research in the United States of America. And he literally wrote the following:

If we talk about the country in which the processes of nuclear fission are given the least attention, then the United States should undoubtedly be called. Of course, now I am not considering Brazil or the Vatican. However among developed countries, even Italy and communist Russia are far ahead of the United States. Little attention is paid to the problems of theoretical physics on the other side of the ocean, priority is given to applied developments that can give immediate profit. Therefore, I can state with confidence that during the next decade the North Americans will not be able to do anything significant for the development of atomic physics.

At first I just laughed. Wow, how wrong my compatriot! And only then I thought: whatever one may say, Otto Hahn was not a simpleton or an amateur. He was well informed about the state of atomic research, especially since before the outbreak of World War II, this topic was freely discussed in scientific circles.

Maybe the Americans misinformed the whole world? But for what purpose? No one even thought about nuclear weapons in the 1930s. Moreover, most scientists considered its creation impossible in principle. That is why, until 1939, the whole world instantly learned about all new achievements in atomic physics - they were completely openly published in scientific journals. No one hid the fruits of their labor, on the contrary, there was an open rivalry between different groups of scientists (almost exclusively Germans) - who will move forward faster?

Maybe scientists in the States were ahead of the whole world and therefore kept their achievements a secret? Nonsense assumption. To confirm or refute it, we will have to consider the history of the creation of the American atomic bomb - at least as it appears in official publications. We are all accustomed to take it on faith as a matter of course. However, upon closer examination, there are so many oddities and inconsistencies in it that you simply wonder.

With the world on a string - US bomb

1942 began well for the British. The German invasion of their little island, which seemed imminent, now, as if by magic, receded into a misty distance. Last summer, Hitler made the biggest mistake of his life - he attacked Russia. This was the beginning of the end. The Russians not only held out against the hopes of the Berlin strategists and the pessimistic forecasts of many observers, but also gave the Wehrmacht a good punch in the teeth in a frosty winter. And in December, the big and powerful United States came to the aid of the British and was now an official ally. In general, there were more than enough reasons for joy.

Only a few high-ranking officials who owned the information that British intelligence had received were not happy. At the end of 1941, the British became aware that the Germans were developing their atomic research at a frantic pace.. The ultimate goal of this process became clear - a nuclear bomb. The British atomic scientists were competent enough to imagine the threat posed by the new weapon.

At the same time, the British had no illusions about their capabilities. All the resources of the country were directed to elementary survival. Although the Germans and Japanese were up to their necks in the war with the Russians and the Americans, from time to time they found an opportunity to poke their fist into the decrepit building of the British Empire. From each such poke, the rotten building staggered and creaked, threatening to collapse.

Rommel's three divisions fettered almost the entire combat-ready British army in North Africa. Admiral Dönitz's submarines, like predatory sharks, darted across the Atlantic, threatening to interrupt the vital supply chain from across the ocean. Britain simply did not have the resources to enter into a nuclear race with the Germans.. The backlog was already large, and in the very near future it threatened to become hopeless.

I must say that the Americans were initially skeptical about such a gift. The military department point-blank did not understand why it should spend money on some obscure project. What other new weapons are there? Here are aircraft carrier groups and armadas of heavy bombers - yes, this is strength. And the nuclear bomb, which scientists themselves imagine very vaguely, is just an abstraction, grandmother's tales.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had to directly turn to American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt with a request, literally a plea, not to reject the British gift. Roosevelt called the scientists to him, figured out the issue and gave the go-ahead.

Usually the creators of the canonical legend of the American bomb use this episode to emphasize the wisdom of Roosevelt. Look, what a shrewd president! We will look at it a little differently: in what pen were the Yankees in atomic research, if they so long and stubbornly refused to cooperate with the British! So Gan was absolutely right in his assessment of the American nuclear scientists - they were nothing solid.

Only in September 1942 was it decided to start work on the atomic bomb. The organizational period took some more time, and things really got off the ground only with the advent of the new year, 1943. From the army, General Leslie Groves headed the work (later he would write memoirs in which he would detail official version taking place), the real leader was Professor Robert Oppenheimer. I will talk about it in detail a little later, but for now let's admire another curious detail - how the team of scientists who began work on the bomb was formed.

In fact, when Oppenheimer was asked to recruit specialists, he had very little choice. Good nuclear physicists in the States could be counted on the fingers of a crippled hand. Therefore, the professor made a wise decision - to recruit people whom he knows personally and whom he can trust, regardless of what area of ​​\u200b\u200bphysics they were engaged in before. And so it turned out that the lion's share of the seats was occupied by employees of Columbia University from Manhattan County (by the way, that is why the project was called Manhattan).

But even these forces were not enough. British scientists had to be involved in the work, literally devastating the English scientific centers, and even specialists from Canada. In general, the Manhattan Project has become a kind of Tower of Babel, with the only difference being that all of its participants spoke more or less the same language. However, this did not save us from the usual quarrels and squabbles in the scientific community, which arose due to the rivalry of different scientific groups. Echoes of these frictions can be found on the pages of Groves' book, and they look very funny: the general, on the one hand, wants to convince the reader that everything was decorous and decent, and on the other hand, to boast how deftly he managed to reconcile completely quarreling scientific luminaries.

And now they are trying to convince us that in this friendly atmosphere of a large terrarium, the Americans managed to create an atomic bomb in two and a half years. And the Germans, who pored over their nuclear project merrily and amicably for five years, did not succeed. Miracles, and nothing more.

However, even if there were no squabbles, such record terms would still arouse suspicion. The fact is that in the process of research it is necessary to go through certain stages, which are almost impossible to reduce. The Americans themselves attribute their success to gigantic funding - in the end, More than two billion dollars were spent on the Manhattan Project! However, no matter how you feed a pregnant woman, she still will not be able to give birth to a full-term baby before nine months. It is the same with the nuclear project: it is impossible to significantly speed up, for example, the process of uranium enrichment.

The Germans worked for five years with full effort. Of course, they also had mistakes and miscalculations that took up precious time. But who said that the Americans had no mistakes and miscalculations? There were, and many. One of these mistakes was the involvement of the famous physicist Niels Bohr.

Skorzeny's unknown operation

British intelligence services are very fond of boasting about one of their operations. We are talking about the salvation of the great Danish scientist Niels Bohr from Nazi Germany. The official legend says that after the outbreak of World War II, the outstanding physicist lived quietly and calmly in Denmark, leading a rather secluded lifestyle. The Nazis offered him cooperation many times, but Bohr invariably refused.

By 1943, the Germans nevertheless decided to arrest him. But, warned in time, Niels Bohr managed to escape to Sweden, from where the British took him out in the bomb bay of a heavy bomber. By the end of the year, the physicist was in America and began to work zealously for the benefit of the Manhattan Project.

The legend is beautiful and romantic, only it is sewn with white thread and does not withstand any tests.. There is no more credibility in it than in the fairy tales of Charles Perrault. Firstly, because the Nazis look like complete idiots in it, and they never were like that. Think well! In 1940 the Germans occupied Denmark. They know that a Nobel laureate lives on the territory of the country, who can be of great help to them in their work on the atomic bomb. The same atomic bomb, which is vital for the victory of Germany.

And what do they do? They occasionally visit the scientist for three years, politely knock on the door and quietly ask: “ Herr Bohr, do you want to work for the benefit of the Fuhrer and the Reich? You do not want? Okay, we'll come back later.". No, this was not the way the German secret services worked! Logically, they should have arrested Bohr not in 1943, but in 1940. If possible, force (namely force, not beg!) to work for them, if not, at least make sure that he cannot work for the enemy: put him in a concentration camp or destroy him. And they leave him to roam free, under the noses of the British.

Three years later, the legend goes, the Germans finally realize that they are supposed to arrest the scientist. But then someone (namely someone, because I have not found any indication of who did it) warns Bohr of the imminent danger. Who could it be? It was not the habit of the Gestapo to shout at every corner about impending arrests. People were taken quietly, unexpectedly, at night. So, the mysterious patron of Bor is one of the rather high-ranking officials.

Let's leave this mysterious angel-savior alone for now and continue to analyze the wanderings of Niels Bohr. So the scientist fled to Sweden. How do you think, how? On a fishing boat, avoiding German Coast Guard boats in the fog? On a raft made of boards? No matter how! Bor, with the greatest possible comfort, sailed to Sweden on the most ordinary private steamer, which officially entered the port of Copenhagen.

Let's not puzzle over the question of how the Germans released the scientist if they were going to arrest him. Let's think about this better. The flight of a world-famous physicist is an emergency on a very serious scale. On this occasion, an investigation was inevitably to be carried out - the heads of those who screwed up the physicist, as well as the mysterious patron, would have flown. However, no traces of such an investigation could be found. Maybe because it didn't exist.

Indeed, how valuable was Niels Bohr for the development of the atomic bomb? Born in 1885 and becoming a Nobel laureate in 1922, Bohr turned to the problems of nuclear physics only in the 1930s. At that time, he was already a major, accomplished scientist with well-formed views. Such people rarely succeed in areas that require an innovative approach and out-of-the-box thinking - and nuclear physics was such a field. For several years, Bohr failed to make any significant contribution to atomic research.

However, as the ancients said, the first half of life a person works for the name, the second - the name for the person. With Niels Bohr, this second half has already begun. Having taken up nuclear physics, he automatically began to be considered a major specialist in this field, regardless of his real achievements.

But in Germany, where such world-wide well-known nuclear scientists, like Hahn and Heisenberg, they knew the real value of the Danish scientist. That is why they did not actively try to involve him in the work. It will turn out - good, we will trumpet to the whole world that Niels Bohr himself is working for us. If it doesn’t work out, it’s also not bad, it won’t get underfoot with its authority.

By the way, in the United States, Niels Bohr to a large extent got in the way. The fact is that an outstanding physicist did not believe at all in the possibility of creating a nuclear bomb. At the same time, his authority forced to reckon with his opinion. According to Groves' memoirs, the scientists working on the Manhattan Project treated Bohr like an elder. Now imagine that you are doing some difficult work without any confidence in the final success. And then someone whom you consider a great specialist comes up to you and says that it’s not even worth spending time on your lesson. Will the job get easier? I don't think.

In addition, Bohr was a staunch pacifist. In 1945, when the US already had an atomic bomb, he vehemently protested its use. Accordingly, he treated his work with coolness. Therefore, I urge you to think again: what did Bohr bring more - movement or stagnation in the development of the issue?

It's a strange picture, isn't it? It began to clear up a little after I learned one interesting detail, which seemed to have nothing to do with either Niels Bohr or the atomic bomb. We are talking about the "main saboteur of the Third Reich" Otto Skorzeny.

It is believed that Skorzeny's rise began after he released Italian dictator Benito Mussolini from prison in 1943. Imprisoned in a mountain prison by his former associates, Mussolini could not, it would seem, hope for release. But Skorzeny, on the direct instructions of Hitler, developed a daring plan: to land troops in gliders and then fly away in a small airplane. Everything turned out perfectly: Mussolini is free, Skorzeny is held in high esteem.

At least that's what most people think. Only a few well-informed historians know that cause and effect are confused here. Skorzeny was entrusted with an extremely difficult and responsible task precisely because Hitler trusted him. That is, the rise of the "king of special operations" began before the story of Mussolini's rescue. However, very soon - a couple of months. Skorzeny was promoted in rank and position exactly when Niels Bohr fled to England. I couldn't find any reason to upgrade.

So we have three facts:
— firstly, the Germans did not prevent Niels Bohr from leaving for Britain;
— Secondly, Boron did more harm than good to Americans;
— third, immediately after the scientist ended up in England, Skorzeny gets a promotion.

But what if these are the details of one mosaic? I decided to try to reconstruct the events. Having captured Denmark, the Germans were well aware that Niels Bohr was unlikely to assist in the creation of an atomic bomb. Moreover, it will rather interfere. Therefore, he was left to live in peace in Denmark, under the very nose of the British. Maybe even then the Germans expected that the British would kidnap the scientist. However, for three years the British did not dare to do anything.

At the end of 1942, vague rumors began to reach the Germans about the start of a large-scale project to create an American atomic bomb. Even given the secrecy of the project, it was absolutely impossible to keep the awl in the bag: the instant disappearance of hundreds of scientists from different countries, one way or another connected with nuclear research, should have prompted any mentally normal person to such conclusions.

The Nazis were sure that they were far ahead of the Yankees (and this was true), but this did not prevent the enemy from doing something nasty. And at the beginning of 1943, one of the most secret operations of the German special services was carried out. On the threshold of Niels Bohr's house, a certain well-wisher appears who tells him that they want to arrest him and throw him into a concentration camp, and offers his help. The scientist agrees - he has no other choice, being behind barbed wire is not the best prospect.

At the same time, apparently, the British are being lied to about the complete indispensability and uniqueness of Bohr in the field of nuclear research. The British are pecking - and what can they do if the prey itself goes into their hands, that is, to Sweden? And for complete heroism, Bora is taken out of there in the belly of a bomber, although they could comfortably send him on a ship.

And then the Nobel laureate appears at the epicenter of the Manhattan Project, producing the effect of an exploding bomb. That is, if the Germans managed to bomb the research center at Los Alamos, the effect would be about the same. Work has slowed down, moreover, very significantly. Apparently, the Americans did not immediately realize how they were cheated, and when they realized, it was already too late.
Do you still believe that the Yankees built the atomic bomb themselves?

Mission "Alsos"

Personally, I finally refused to believe in these tales after I studied in detail the activities of the Alsos group. This operation of the American intelligence services was kept secret for many years - until they went into better world its main members. And only then did information come to light - albeit fragmentary and scattered - about how the Americans hunted for German atomic secrets.

True, if you thoroughly work on this information and compare it with some well-known facts, the picture turned out to be very convincing. But I won't get ahead of myself. So, the Alsos group was formed in 1944, on the eve of the landing of the Anglo-Americans in Normandy. Half of the members of the group are professional intelligence officers, half are nuclear scientists.

At the same time, in order to form Alsos, the Manhattan Project was mercilessly robbed - in fact, the best specialists were taken from there. The task of the mission was to collect information about the German atomic program. The question is, how desperate were the Americans in the success of their undertaking, if they made the main bet on stealing the atomic bomb from the Germans?
It was great to despair, if we recall a little-known letter from one of the atomic scientists to his colleague. It was written on February 4, 1944 and read:

« It looks like we're in a hopeless case. The project is not moving forward one iota. Our leaders, in my opinion, do not believe in the success of the whole undertaking at all. Yes, and we do not believe. If it were not for the huge money that we are paid here, I think many would have been doing something more useful long ago.».

This letter was cited at one time as proof of American talents: look, they say, what good fellows we are, in a little over a year we pulled out a hopeless project! Then in the USA they realized that not only fools live around, and they hurried to forget about the piece of paper. With great difficulty I managed to dig up this document in an old scientific journal.

They spared no money and effort to ensure the actions of the Alsos group. She was well equipped with everything you need. The head of the mission, Colonel Pash, had a document from US Secretary of Defense Henry Stimson, which obligated everyone to provide the group with all possible assistance. Even Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces Dwight Eisenhower did not have such powers.. By the way, about the commander-in-chief - he was obliged to take into account the interests of the Alsos mission in planning military operations, that is, to capture in the first place those areas where German atomic weapons could be.

At the beginning of August 1944, to be precise - on the 9th, the Alsos group landed in Europe. One of the leading US nuclear scientists, Dr. Samuel Goudsmit, was appointed scientific director of the mission. Before the war, he maintained close ties with his German colleagues, and the Americans hoped that the "international solidarity" of scientists would be stronger than political interests.

Alsos managed to achieve the first results after the Americans occupied Paris in the fall of 1944.. Here Goudsmit met with the famous French scientist Professor Joliot-Curie. Curie seemed sincerely happy about the defeats of the Germans; however, as soon as it came to the German atomic program, he went into a deaf "unconscious". The Frenchman insisted that he did not know anything, had not heard anything, the Germans did not even come close to developing an atomic bomb, and in general their nuclear project was of an exclusively peaceful nature.

It was clear that the professor was missing something. But there was no way to put pressure on him - for cooperation with the Germans in what was then France, they were shot, regardless of scientific merits, and Curie was clearly afraid of death most of all. Therefore, Goudsmit had to leave without salty slurping.

Throughout his stay in Paris, vague but threatening rumors constantly reached him: uranium bomb exploded in Leipzig, in the mountainous regions of Bavaria, strange outbreaks are noted at night. Everything indicated that the Germans were either very close to creating atomic weapons or had already created them.

What happened next is still shrouded in mystery. They say that Pasha and Goudsmit still managed to find some valuable information in Paris. Since November at least, Eisenhower has received constant demands to move forward into German territory at any cost. The initiators of these demands - now it's clear! - in the end, it turned out to be people associated with the atomic project and who received information directly from the Alsos group. Eisenhower did not have a real opportunity to carry out the orders received, but the demands from Washington became more and more stringent. It is not known how all this would have ended if the Germans had not made another unexpected move.

Ardennes riddle

In fact, by the end of 1944, everyone believed that Germany had lost the war. The only question is how long the Nazis will be defeated. It seems that only Hitler and his closest associates adhered to a different point of view. They tried to delay the moment of the catastrophe until the last moment.

This desire is quite understandable. Hitler was sure that after the war he would be declared a criminal and would be tried. And if you play for time, you can get a quarrel between the Russians and the Americans and, ultimately, get out of the water, that is, out of the war. Not without losses, of course, but without losing power.

Let's think: what was needed for this in conditions when Germany had nothing left of forces? Naturally, spend them as sparingly as possible, keep a flexible defense. And Hitler, at the very end of the 44th, throws his army into a very wasteful Ardennes offensive. What for?

The troops are given completely unrealistic tasks - to break through to Amsterdam and throw the Anglo-Americans into the sea. Before Amsterdam, German tanks were at that time like walking to the moon, especially since fuel splashed in their tanks for less than half the way. Scare allies? But what could frighten well-fed and armed armies, behind which was the industrial power of the United States?

All in all, Until now, not a single historian has been able to clearly explain why Hitler needed this offensive. Usually everyone ends with the argument that the Fuhrer was an idiot. But in fact, Hitler was not an idiot, moreover, he thought quite sensibly and realistically until the very end. Idiots can rather be called those historians who make hasty judgments without even trying to figure something out.

But let's look at the other side of the front. There are even more amazing things going on! And it's not even that the Germans managed to achieve initial, albeit rather limited, successes. The fact is that the British and Americans were really scared! Moreover, the fear was completely inadequate to the threat. After all, from the very beginning it was clear that the Germans had few forces, that the offensive was local in nature ...

So no, and Eisenhower, and Churchill, and Roosevelt simply fall into a panic! In 1945, on January 6, when the Germans were already stopped and even driven back, British Prime Minister writes panic letter to Russian leader Stalin which requires immediate assistance. Here is the text of this letter:

« There is very heavy fighting going on in the West, and at any time big decisions may be required from the High Command. You yourselves know from your own experience how troubling the situation is when one has to defend a very wide front after a temporary loss of initiative.

It is highly desirable and necessary for General Eisenhower to know in general terms what you intend to do, since this, of course, will affect all of his and our most important decisions. According to the message received, our emissary Air Chief Marshal Tedder was in Cairo last night, weather-bound. His trip was greatly delayed through no fault of yours.

If he has not yet arrived to you, I shall be grateful if you can let me know if we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or somewhere else during January and at any other points that you may you wish to mention. I will not pass on this highly classified information to anyone, with the exception of Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only on condition that it is kept in the strictest confidence. I consider the matter urgent».

If you translate from diplomatic language into ordinary: save us, Stalin, they will beat us! Therein lies another mystery. What kind of "beat" if the Germans have already been thrown back to the starting lines? Yes, of course, the American offensive, planned for January, had to be postponed to the spring. So what? We must rejoice that the Nazis squandered their strength in senseless attacks!

And further. Churchill slept and saw how to keep the Russians out of Germany. And now he is literally begging them to start moving west without delay! To what extent should Sir Winston Churchill be frightened?! It seems that the slowdown in the advance of the Allies deep into Germany was interpreted by him as a mortal threat. I wonder why? After all, Churchill was neither a fool nor an alarmist.

And yet, the Anglo-Americans spend the next two months in terrible nervous tension. Subsequently, they will carefully hide it, but the truth will still break through to the surface in their memoirs. For example, Eisenhower after the war will call the last war winter "the most disturbing time."

What worried the marshal so much if the war was actually won? Only in March 1945 did the Ruhr operation begin, during which the Allies occupied West Germany, surrounding 300,000 Germans. The commander of the German troops in the area, Field Marshal Model, shot himself (the only one of the entire German generals, by the way). Only after this did Churchill and Roosevelt more or less calm down.

But back to the Alsos group. In the spring of 1945, it noticeably intensified. During the Ruhr operation, scientists and intelligence officers moved forward almost after the vanguard of the advancing troops, collecting a valuable harvest. In March-April, many scientists involved in German nuclear research fall into their hands. The decisive find was made in mid-April - on the 12th, members of the mission write that they stumbled upon "a real gold mine" and now they "learn about the project in the main." By May, Heisenberg, and Hahn, and Osenberg, and Diebner, and many other outstanding German physicists were in the hands of the Americans. Nevertheless, the Alsos group continued active searches in the already defeated Germany ... until the end of May.

But at the end of May, something strange happens. The search is almost over. Rather, they continue, but with much less intensity. If earlier they were engaged in by prominent world-famous scientists, now they are beardless laboratory assistants. And the big scientists pack their things in droves and leave for America. Why?

To answer this question, let's see how events developed further.

At the end of June, the Americans conduct tests of an atomic bomb - allegedly the first in the world.
And in early August, they drop two on Japanese cities.
After that, the Yankees run out of ready-made atomic bombs, and for quite a long time.

Strange situation, isn't it? Let's start with the fact that only a month passes between testing and combat use of a new superweapon. Dear readers, this is not the case. Making an atomic bomb is much more difficult than a conventional projectile or rocket. For a month it is simply impossible. Then, probably, the Americans made three prototypes at once? Also incredible.

Making a nuclear bomb is a very expensive procedure. There is no point in doing three if you are not sure that you are doing everything right. Otherwise, it would be possible to create three nuclear projects, build three research centers, and so on. Even the US is not rich enough to be so extravagant.

However, well, let's assume that the Americans really built three prototypes at once. Why didn't they immediately start mass production of nuclear bombs after successful tests? After all, immediately after the defeat of Germany, the Americans found themselves in the face of a much more powerful and formidable enemy - the Russians. The Russians, of course, did not threaten the United States with war, but they prevented the Americans from becoming masters of the entire planet. And this, from the point of view of the Yankees, is a completely unacceptable crime.

Nevertheless, the United States has new atomic bombs ... When do you think? In the autumn of 1945? In the summer of 1946? Not! Only in 1947 did the first nuclear weapons begin to enter the American arsenals! You will not find this date anywhere, but no one will undertake to refute it either. The data that I managed to get is absolutely secret. However, they are fully confirmed by the facts known to us about the subsequent buildup of the nuclear arsenal. And most importantly - the results of tests in the deserts of Texas, which took place at the end of 1946.

Yes, yes, dear reader, exactly at the end of 1946, and not a month earlier. Data on this was obtained by Russian intelligence and came to me in a very complicated way, which, probably, does not make sense to disclose on these pages, so as not to substitute the people who helped me. On the eve of the new year, 1947, a very curious report lay on the table of the Soviet leader Stalin, which I will quote here verbatim.

According to Agent Felix, in November-December of this year, a series of nuclear explosions were carried out in the El Paso, Texas area. At the same time, prototypes of nuclear bombs were tested, similar to those dropped on the Japanese islands last year.

Within a month and a half, at least four bombs were tested, the tests of three ended unsuccessfully. This series of bombs was created in preparation for large-scale industrial production. nuclear weapons. Most likely, the beginning of such a release should be expected no earlier than mid-1947.

The Russian agent fully confirmed the data I had. But maybe all this is disinformation on the part of the American intelligence services? Hardly. In those years, the Yankees tried to convince their opponents that they were the strongest in the world, and would not underestimate their military potential. Most likely, we are dealing with a carefully hidden truth.

What happens? In 1945, the Americans drop three bombs - and all are successful. The next test - the same bombs! - pass a year and a half later, and not too successfully. Serial production begins in another six months, and we do not know - and will never know - to what extent the atomic bombs that appeared in the American army warehouses corresponded to their terrible purpose, that is, how high-quality they were.

Such a picture can be drawn only in one case, namely: if the first three atomic bombs - the same ones from 1945 - were not built by the Americans on their own, but received from someone. To put it bluntly - from the Germans. Indirectly, this hypothesis is confirmed by the reaction of German scientists to the bombing of Japanese cities, which we know about thanks to the book by David Irving.

"Poor Professor Gan!"

In August 1945, ten leading German nuclear physicists, ten chief actors"atomic project" of the Nazis, were held captive in the United States. All possible information was pulled out of them (I wonder why, if you believe the American version that the Yankees were far ahead of the Germans in atomic research). Accordingly, scientists were kept in a kind of comfortable prison. There was also a radio in this prison.

On August 6, at seven o'clock in the evening, Otto Hahn and Karl Wirtz were at the radio. It was then that in the next news release they heard that the first atomic bomb had been dropped on Japan. The first reaction of the colleagues to whom they brought this information was unequivocal: this cannot be true. Heisenberg believed that the Americans could not create their own nuclear weapons (and, as we now know, he was right).

« Did the Americans mention the word "uranium" in connection with their new bomb? he asked Han. The latter replied in the negative. “Then it has nothing to do with the atom,” Heisenberg snapped. An eminent physicist believed that the Yankees simply used some kind of high-powered explosive.

However, the nine o'clock newscast dispelled all doubts. Obviously, until then the Germans simply did not assume that the Americans managed to capture several German atomic bombs. However, now the situation has cleared up, and scientists began to torment the pangs of conscience. Yes Yes exactly! Dr. Erich Bagge wrote in his diary: Now this bomb has been used against Japan. They report that even after a few hours the bombed city is hidden by a cloud of smoke and dust. We are talking about the death of 300 thousand people. Poor professor Gan!»

Moreover, that evening, scientists were very worried about how "poor Gang" would not commit suicide. Two physicists were on duty at his bedside until late to prevent him from killing himself, and went to their rooms only after they found that their colleague had finally fallen asleep soundly. Gan himself later described his impressions as follows:

For a while I was occupied with the idea of ​​dumping all the uranium into the sea in order to avoid a similar catastrophe in the future. Although I felt personally responsible for what happened, I wondered if I or anyone else had the right to deprive humanity of all the fruits that a new discovery could bring? And now this terrible bomb has worked!

Interestingly, if the Americans are telling the truth, and the bomb that fell on Hiroshima was really created by them, why should the Germans feel "personally responsible" for what happened? Of course, each of them contributed to nuclear research, but on the same basis, one could place some of the blame on thousands of scientists, including Newton and Archimedes! After all, their discoveries eventually led to the creation of nuclear weapons!

The mental anguish of German scientists acquires meaning only in one case. Namely, if they themselves created the bomb that destroyed hundreds of thousands of Japanese. Otherwise, why should they worry about what the Americans have done?

However, so far all my conclusions have been nothing more than a hypothesis, confirmed only by circumstantial evidence. What if I'm wrong and the Americans really managed the impossible? To answer this question, it was necessary to closely study the German atomic program. And it's not as easy as it seems.

/Hans-Ulrich von Krantz, "The Secret Weapon of the Third Reich", topwar.ru/

The "father" of the Soviet atomic bomb, Academician Igor Kurchatov, was born on January 12, 1903 in the Simsky Plant of the Ufa province (today it is the city of Sim in Chelyabinsk region). He is called one of the founders of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

After graduating with honors from the Simferopol men's gymnasium and an evening trade school, in September 1920 Kurchatov entered the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of the Taurida University. Three years later, he successfully graduated from high school ahead of schedule. In 1930, Kurchatov headed the physics department of the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology.

"RG" tells about the stages of creating the first Soviet atomic bomb, which was successfully tested in August 1949.

Pre-Kurchatov era

Work in the field of the atomic nucleus in the USSR began in the 1930s. All-Union conferences of the USSR Academy of Sciences of that time were attended by physicists and chemists not only from Soviet scientific centers, but also foreign specialists.

In 1932 samples of radium were obtained, and in 1939 a chain reaction of fission of heavy atoms was calculated. The year 1940 became a landmark in the development of the nuclear program: employees of the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology applied for a breakthrough invention at that time: the design of an atomic bomb and methods for producing uranium-235. For the first time, conventional explosives were proposed to be used as a fuse to create a critical mass and initiate a chain reaction. In the future, nuclear bombs were blown up in this way, and the centrifugal method proposed by UPTI scientists is still the basis for the industrial separation of uranium isotopes to this day.

There were significant flaws in the proposals of Kharkovites. As noted in his article for scientific and technical journal"Engine" candidate of technical sciences Alexander Medved, "the scheme of the uranium charge proposed by the authors was in principle not workable .... However, the value of the proposal of the authors was great, since this particular scheme can be considered the first official proposal in our country on the design of a nuclear bomb itself" .

The application went through the authorities for a long time, but was never accepted, and ended up on the shelf labeled "top secret."

By the way, in the same fortieth year, at the All-Union Conference, Kurchatov presented a report on the fission of heavy nuclei, which was a breakthrough in solving the practical issue of implementing a nuclear chain reaction in uranium.

What is more important - tanks or a bomb

After Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, nuclear research was suspended. The main Moscow and Leningrad institutes involved in the problems of nuclear physics were evacuated.

Beria, as head of strategic intelligence, knew that major Western physicists considered atomic weapons an achievable reality. According to historians, back in September 1939, Robert Oppenheimer, the future scientific leader of the work on the creation of the American atomic bomb, came to the USSR incognito. From him, the Soviet leadership for the first time could hear about the possibility of obtaining a superweapon. Everyone - both politicians and scientists - understood that the creation of a nuclear bomb is possible, and its appearance in the enemy's hands will bring irreparable troubles.

In 1941, the USSR began to receive intelligence from the United States and Great Britain about the deployment of intensive work on the creation of nuclear weapons.

Academician Pyotr Kapitsa, speaking on October 12, 1941 at an anti-fascist rally of scientists, said: "... an atomic bomb of even a small size, if feasible, could easily destroy a large metropolitan city with several million people ...".

On September 28, 1942, a resolution "On the organization of work on uranium" was adopted - this date is considered the start of the Soviet nuclear project. In the spring of the following year, Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was created specifically for the production of the first Soviet bomb. The question arose: to whom to entrust the leadership of the newly created structure.

“It is necessary to find a talented and relatively young physicist so that the solution of the atomic problem becomes the only thing in his life. And we will give him power, make him an academician and, of course, we will vigilantly control him,” Stalin ordered.

Initially, the list of candidates consisted of about fifty names. Beria offered to stop the choice on Kurchatov, and in October 1943 he was summoned to Moscow for the bride. Now the scientific center, into which the laboratory has been transformed over the years, bears the name of its first head - "Kurchatov Institute".

"Stalin's jet engine"

On April 9, 1946, a decision was made to establish a design bureau at Laboratory No. 2. The first production buildings in the zone of the Mordovian Reserve were completed only at the beginning of 1947. Some of the laboratories were located in monastic buildings.

The Soviet prototype was named RDS-1, which, according to one version, meant "special jet engine." Later, the abbreviation began to be deciphered as "Stalin's jet engine" or "Russia makes itself." The bomb was also known under the names "product 501", atomic charge "1-200". By the way, in order to ensure secrecy, the bomb was referred to in the documents as a "rocket engine".

The RDS-1 was a 22 kiloton device. Yes, the USSR carried out its own development of atomic weapons, but the need to catch up with the States, which had gone ahead during the war, prompted domestic science to actively use intelligence data. So, the American "Fat Man" was taken as the basis. A bomb under this code name was dropped by the United States on August 9, 1945 on the Japanese Nagasaki. "Fat Man" worked on the basis of the decay of plutonium-239 and had an implosive detonation scheme: conventional explosive charges explode along the perimeter of the fissile material, which create an explosive wave that "compresses" the substance in the center and initiates a chain reaction. By the way, in the future, this scheme was recognized as ineffective.

RDS-1 was made in the form of a free-falling bomb of large diameter and mass. The charge of an atomic explosive device is made of plutonium. The ballistic body of the bomb and electrical equipment were of domestic design. Structurally, the RDS-1 included a nuclear charge, a large-diameter ballistic bomb body, an explosive device, and equipment for automatic charge detonation systems with safety systems.

Uranium deficit

Taking the American plutonium bomb as a basis, Soviet physics faced a problem that had to be solved in a short time: at the time of development, the production of plutonium in the USSR had not yet begun.

At the initial stage, captured uranium was used. But a large industrial reactor required at least 150 tons of the substance. At the end of 1945, mines in Czechoslovakia and East Germany resumed work. In 1946, uranium deposits were found in Kolyma, in the Chita region, in Central Asia, in Kazakhstan, in Ukraine and the North Caucasus, near Pyatigorsk.

The first industrial reactor and radiochemical plant "Mayak" began to be built in the Urals, near the town of Kyshtym, 100 km north of Chelyabinsk. Kurchatov personally supervised the loading of uranium into the reactor. In 1947, the construction of three more atomic cities was launched: two in the Middle Urals (Sverdlovsk-44 and Sverdlovsk-45) and one in the Gorky region (Arzamas-16).

Construction work proceeded at a rapid pace, but there was not enough uranium. Even at the beginning of 1948, the first industrial reactor could not be started. Uranium was loaded by June 7, 1948.

Kurchatov took over the functions of the chief operator of the reactor control panel. Between eleven and twelve o'clock at night, he began an experiment on the physical start-up of the reactor. At zero thirty minutes on June 8, 1948, the reactor reached a power of one hundred kilowatts, after which Kurchatov drowned out the chain reaction. The next stage of reactor preparation lasted two days. After the supply of cooling water, it became clear that there was not enough uranium in the reactor to carry out the chain reaction. Only after loading the fifth portion did the reactor reach a critical state, and the chain reaction became possible again. It happened on the tenth of June at eight o'clock in the morning.

On June 17, in the operational log of shift supervisors, Kurchatov made an entry: “I warn you that if the water supply is stopped, there will be an explosion, therefore, under no circumstances should the water supply be stopped ... It is necessary to monitor the water level in emergency tanks and the operation of pumping stations ".

On June 19, 1948, at 12:45 pm, the industrial launch of the first nuclear reactor in Eurasia took place.

Successful tests

The amount put into the American bomb was accumulated in the USSR in June 1949.

The head of the experiment, Kurchatov, in accordance with Beria's instructions, gave the order to test the RDS-1 on August 29.

A section of the waterless Irtysh steppe in Kazakhstan, 170 kilometers west of Semipalatinsk, was allocated for the test site. In the center of the experimental field with a diameter of about 20 kilometers, a metal lattice tower 37.5 meters high was mounted. RDS-1 was installed on it.

The charge was a multilayer structure, in which the transfer of the active substance to the critical state was carried out by compressing it by means of a converging spherical detonation wave in the explosive.

After the explosion, the tower was completely destroyed, a funnel formed in its place. But the main damage was from the shock wave. Eyewitnesses described that when the next day - August 30 - a trip to the experimental field took place, the test participants saw a terrible picture: the railway and highway bridges were mangled and thrown back by 20-30 meters, cars and cars were scattered across the steppe at a distance of 50-80 meters from the installation site, residential buildings were completely destroyed. The tanks, on which the impact force was tested, lay on their sides with downed towers, the guns turned into a pile of mangled metal, ten "experimental" Pobeda vehicles burned down.

A total of 5 RDS-1 bombs were manufactured. They were not transferred to the Air Force, but were stored in Arzamas-16. At present, the mock-up of the bomb is on display at the Nuclear Weapons Museum in Sarov (former Arzamas-16).

The fathers of the atomic bomb are usually called the American Robert Oppenheimer and the Soviet scientist Igor Kurchatov. But considering that work on the deadly was carried out in parallel in four countries and, in addition to the scientists of these countries, people from Italy, Hungary, Denmark, etc., took part in them, the bomb that was born as a result can rightly be called the brainchild of different peoples.

The Germans took over first. In December 1938, their physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann, for the first time in the world, carried out artificial fission of the uranium atom nucleus. In April 1939, the military leadership of Germany received a letter from professors of the University of Hamburg P. Harteck and V. Groth, which indicated the fundamental possibility of creating a new type of highly effective explosive. The scientists wrote: "The country that is the first to be able to practically master the achievements of nuclear physics will gain absolute superiority over others." And now, in the Imperial Ministry of Science and Education, a meeting is being held on the topic "On a self-propagating (that is, a chain) nuclear reaction." Among the participants is Professor E. Schumann, head of the research department of the Third Reich Arms Administration. Without delay, we moved from words to deeds. Already in June 1939, the construction of Germany's first reactor plant began at the Kummersdorf test site near Berlin. A law was passed to ban the export of uranium outside Germany, and a large amount of uranium ore was urgently purchased in the Belgian Congo.

Germany starts and… loses

On September 26, 1939, when war was already raging in Europe, it was decided to classify all work related to the uranium problem and the implementation of the program, called the "Uranium Project". The scientists involved in the project were initially very optimistic: they considered it possible to create nuclear weapons within a year. Wrong, as life has shown.

22 organizations were involved in the project, including such well-known scientific centers as the Physical Institute of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, the Institute of Physical Chemistry of the University of Hamburg, the Physical Institute of the Higher Technical School in Berlin, the Physical and Chemical Institute of the University of Leipzig and many others. The project was personally supervised by the Imperial Minister of Armaments Albert Speer. The IG Farbenindustry concern was entrusted with the production of uranium hexafluoride, from which it is possible to extract the uranium-235 isotope capable of maintaining a chain reaction. The same company was entrusted with the construction of an isotope separation facility. Such venerable scientists as Heisenberg, Weizsacker, von Ardenne, Riehl, Pose, Nobel laureate Gustav Hertz and others directly participated in the work.

Within two years, the Heisenberg group carried out the research needed to create an atomic reactor using uranium and heavy water. It was confirmed that only one of the isotopes, namely uranium-235, contained in a very small concentration in ordinary uranium ore, can serve as an explosive. The first problem was how to isolate it from there. The starting point of the bombing program was an atomic reactor, which required either graphite or heavy water as a reaction moderator. German physicists chose water, thereby creating for themselves serious problem. After the occupation of Norway, the only heavy water plant in the world at that time passed into the hands of the Nazis. But there, the stock of the product needed by physicists by the beginning of the war was only tens of kilograms, and the Germans did not get them either - the French stole valuable products literally from under the noses of the Nazis. And in February 1943, the British commandos abandoned in Norway, with the help of local resistance fighters, disabled the plant. The implementation of Germany's nuclear program was in jeopardy. The misadventures of the Germans did not end there: an experimental nuclear reactor exploded in Leipzig. The uranium project was supported by Hitler only as long as there was hope of obtaining a super-powerful weapon before the end of the war unleashed by him. Heisenberg was invited by Speer and asked bluntly: "When can we expect the creation of a bomb capable of being suspended from a bomber?" The scientist was honest: "I think it will take several years of hard work, in any case, the bomb will not be able to affect the outcome of the current war." The German leadership rationally considered that there was no point in forcing events. Let the scientists work quietly - by the next war, you see, they will have time. As a result, Hitler decided to concentrate scientific, industrial and financial resources only on projects that would give the fastest return in the creation of new types of weapons. State funding for the uranium project was curtailed. Nevertheless, the work of scientists continued.

In 1944, Heisenberg received cast uranium plates for a large reactor plant, under which a special bunker was already being built in Berlin. The last experiment to achieve a chain reaction was scheduled for January 1945, but on January 31, all equipment was hastily dismantled and sent from Berlin to the village of Haigerloch near the Swiss border, where it was deployed only at the end of February. The reactor contained 664 cubes of uranium with a total weight of 1525 kg, surrounded by a graphite neutron moderator-reflector weighing 10 tons. In March 1945, an additional 1.5 tons of heavy water was poured into the core. On March 23, it was reported to Berlin that the reactor had started working. But the joy was premature - the reactor did not reach a critical point, the chain reaction did not start. After recalculations, it turned out that the amount of uranium must be increased by at least 750 kg, proportionally increasing the mass of heavy water. But there were no reserves left. The end of the Third Reich was inexorably approaching. On April 23, American troops entered Haigerloch. The reactor was dismantled and taken to the USA.

Meanwhile across the ocean

In parallel with the Germans (with only a slight lag), the development of atomic weapons was taken up in England and the USA. They began with a letter sent in September 1939 by Albert Einstein to US President Franklin Roosevelt. The initiators of the letter and the authors of most of the text were émigré physicists from Hungary Leo Szilard, Eugene Wigner and Edward Teller. The letter drew the president's attention to the fact that Nazi Germany was conducting active research, as a result of which it could soon acquire an atomic bomb.

In the USSR, the first information about the work carried out by both the allies and the enemy was reported to Stalin by intelligence as early as 1943. It was immediately decided to deploy similar work in the Union. Thus began the Soviet atomic project. Tasks were received not only by scientists, but also by intelligence officers, for whom the extraction of nuclear secrets has become a super task.

The most valuable information about the work on the atomic bomb in the United States, obtained by intelligence, greatly helped the promotion of the Soviet nuclear project. The scientists participating in it managed to avoid dead-end search paths, thereby significantly accelerating the achievement of the final goal.

Experience of Recent Enemies and Allies

Naturally, the Soviet leadership could not remain indifferent to German nuclear developments. At the end of the war, a group of Soviet physicists was sent to Germany, among whom were the future academicians Artsimovich, Kikoin, Khariton, Shchelkin. All were camouflaged in the uniform of colonels of the Red Army. The operation was led by First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Ivan Serov, which opened any door. In addition to the necessary German scientists, the "colonels" found tons of metallic uranium, which, according to Kurchatov, reduced the work on the Soviet bomb by at least a year. The Americans also took out a lot of uranium from Germany, taking the specialists who worked on the project with them. And in the USSR, in addition to physicists and chemists, they sent mechanics, electrical engineers, glassblowers. Some were found in POW camps. For example, Max Steinbeck, the future Soviet academician and the vice-president of the Academy of Sciences of the GDR, were taken away when, at the whim of the head of the camp, he made a sundial. In total, at least 1000 German specialists worked on the atomic project in the USSR. From Berlin, the von Ardenne laboratory with a uranium centrifuge, equipment of the Kaiser Institute of Physics, documentation, reagents were completely taken out. Within the framework of the atomic project, laboratories "A", "B", "C" and "G" were created, the scientific supervisors of which were scientists who arrived from Germany.

Laboratory "A" was headed by Baron Manfred von Ardenne, a talented physicist who developed a method for gaseous diffusion purification and separation of uranium isotopes in a centrifuge. At first, his laboratory was located on the Oktyabrsky field in Moscow. Five or six Soviet engineers were assigned to each German specialist. Later, the laboratory moved to Sukhumi, and over time, the famous Kurchatov Institute grew up on the Oktyabrsky field. In Sukhumi, on the basis of the von Ardenne laboratory, the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology. In 1947, the Ardenne was awarded Stalin Prize for the development of a centrifuge for the purification of uranium isotopes on an industrial scale. Six years later, Ardenne became twice a Stalin laureate. He lived with his wife in a comfortable mansion, his wife played music on a piano brought from Germany. Other German specialists were not offended either: they came with their families, brought with them furniture, books, paintings, were provided with good salaries and food. Were they prisoners? Academician A.P. Alexandrov, himself an active participant in the atomic project, remarked: "Of course, the German specialists were prisoners, but we ourselves were prisoners."

Nikolaus Riehl, a native of St. Petersburg who moved to Germany in the 1920s, became the head of Laboratory B, which conducted research in the field of radiation chemistry and biology in the Urals (now the city of Snezhinsk). Here Riehl worked with his old acquaintance from Germany, the outstanding Russian biologist-geneticist Timofeev-Resovsky (“Zubr” based on the novel by D. Granin).

Recognized in the USSR as a researcher and talented organizer, able to find effective solutions to the most complex problems, Dr. Riehl became one of the key figures in the Soviet atomic project. After the successful testing of the Soviet bomb, he became a Hero of Socialist Labor and a laureate of the Stalin Prize.

The work of laboratory "B", organized in Obninsk, was headed by Professor Rudolf Pose, one of the pioneers in the field of nuclear research. Under his leadership, fast neutron reactors were created, the first nuclear power plant in the Union, and the design of reactors for submarines began. The object in Obninsk became the basis for the organization of the A.I. Leipunsky. Pose worked until 1957 in Sukhumi, then at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna.

Gustav Hertz, the nephew of the famous physicist of the 19th century, himself a famous scientist, became the head of the laboratory "G", located in the Sukhumi sanatorium "Agudzery". He received recognition for a series of experiments that confirmed Niels Bohr's theory of the atom and quantum mechanics. Its results are very successful activity in Sukhumi were later used at an industrial plant built in Novouralsk, where in 1949 the filling for the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 was developed. For his achievements in the framework of the atomic project, Gustav Hertz was awarded the Stalin Prize in 1951.

German specialists who received permission to return to their homeland (of course, to the GDR) signed a non-disclosure agreement for 25 years about their participation in the Soviet atomic project. In Germany, they continued to work in their specialty. Thus, Manfred von Ardenne, twice awarded the National Prize of the GDR, served as director of the Physics Institute in Dresden, created under the auspices of the Scientific Council for the Peaceful Applications of Atomic Energy, led by Gustav Hertz. Hertz also received a national award - as the author of a three-volume work-textbook on nuclear physics. There, in Dresden, Technical University, Rudolf Pose also worked.

The participation of German scientists in the atomic project, as well as the successes of intelligence officers, in no way detract from the merits of Soviet scientists, who ensured the creation of domestic atomic weapons with their selfless work. However, it must be admitted that without the contribution of both, the creation of the atomic industry and atomic weapons in the USSR would have dragged on for many years.

little boy
The American uranium bomb that destroyed Hiroshima was of a cannon design. Soviet nuclear scientists, creating RDS-1, were guided by the "Nagasaki bomb" - Fat Boy, made of plutonium according to the implosion scheme.

Manfred von Ardenne, who developed a method for gas diffusion purification and separation of uranium isotopes in a centrifuge.

Operation Crossroads was a series of atomic bomb tests conducted by the United States on Bikini Atoll in the summer of 1946. The goal was to test the effect of atomic weapons on ships.

Help from overseas

In 1933, the German communist Klaus Fuchs fled to England. After receiving a degree in physics from the University of Bristol, he continued to work. In 1941, Fuchs reported his involvement in atomic research to Soviet intelligence agent Jurgen Kuchinsky, who informed Soviet ambassador Ivan Maisky. He instructed the military attache to urgently establish contact with Fuchs, who, as part of a group of scientists, was going to be transported to the United States. Fuchs agreed to work for Soviet intelligence. Many illegal Soviet spies were involved in working with him: the Zarubins, Eitingon, Vasilevsky, Semyonov and others. As a result of their active work, already in January 1945, the USSR had a description of the design of the first atomic bomb. At the same time, the Soviet residency in the United States reported that it would take the Americans at least one year, but no more than five years, to create a significant arsenal of atomic weapons. The report also said that the explosion of the first two bombs might be carried out in a few months.

Nuclear fission pioneers

K. A. Petrzhak and G. N. Flerov
In 1940, in the laboratory of Igor Kurchatov, two young physicists discovered a new, very peculiar type of radioactive decay atomic nuclei- spontaneous division.

Otto Hahn
In December 1938, German physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann for the first time in the world carried out artificial fission of the uranium atom nucleus.

One of the first practical steps taken by the Special Committee and PGU was the decision to create a production base for the nuclear weapons complex. In 1946, a number of important decisions were made in connection with these plans. One of them concerned the creation of a specialized design bureau for the development of nuclear weapons at Laboratory No. 2.

On April 9, 1946, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a closed resolution No. 806-327 on the creation of KB-11. That was the name of the organization designed to create a "product", that is, an atomic bomb. P.M. was appointed head of KB-11. Zernov, chief designer - Yu.B. Khariton.

By the time the resolution was adopted, the issue of creating KB-11 had been worked out in detail. Its location has already been determined, taking into account the specifics of future work. On the one hand especially high degree the secrecy of the planned work, the need for explosive experiments predetermined the choice of a sparsely populated area, hidden from visual observations. On the other hand, one should not move too far away from the enterprises and organizations co-executing the atomic project, a significant part of which were located in the central regions of the country. An important factor was the presence of a production base and transport arteries on the territory of the future design bureau.

KB-11 was tasked with creating two variants of atomic bombs - plutonium using spherical compression and uranium with cannon rapprochement. Upon completion of the development, it was planned to conduct state tests of charges at a special range. A ground explosion of a charge of a plutonium bomb was supposed to be carried out before January 1, 1948, a uranium bomb - before June 1, 1948.

The official starting point for the development of the RDS-1 should be the date of issuance of the “Tactical and Technical Assignment for the Atomic Bomb” (TTZ), signed by Chief Designer Yu.B. Khariton on July 1, 1946 and sent to the head of the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR B.L. Vannikov. The terms of reference consisted of 9 points and specified the type of nuclear fuel, the method of its transfer through a critical state, the overall mass characteristics of the atomic bomb, the timing of the operation of electric detonators, the requirements for a high-altitude fuse and self-destruction of the product in the event of failure of the equipment that ensures the operation of this fuse.

In accordance with the TTZ, it was planned to develop two versions of atomic bombs - an implosion type on plutonium and uranium with cannon rapprochement. The length of the bomb was not to exceed 5 meters, diameter - 1.5 meters, and weight - 5 tons.

At the same time, it was planned to build a test site, an airfield, a pilot plant, as well as the organization of a medical service, the creation of a library, etc.

The creation of an atomic bomb required the solution of an exceptionally wide range of physical and technical issues associated with an extensive program of computational and theoretical research, design and experimental work. First of all, it was necessary to study the physicochemical properties of fissile materials, to develop and test methods for their casting and machining. It was necessary to create radiochemical methods for extracting various fission products, organize the production of polonium, and develop a technology for manufacturing neutron sources. It required methods for determining the critical mass, the development of a theory of efficiency or efficiency, as well as the theory of a nuclear explosion in general, and much more.

The above brief enumeration of the directions in which the work has been developed, far from exhausts the entire content of the activities that required implementation for the successful completion of the atomic project.

By the February 1948 resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which corrected the deadlines for fulfilling the main task of the atomic project, Yu.B. Khariton and P.M. Zernov was instructed to ensure the manufacture and presentation by March 1, 1949 for state tests of one set of the RDS-1 atomic bomb with full equipment.

In order to complete the task in a timely manner, the resolution stipulated the scope and timing of the completion of research work and the manufacture of materiel for flight design tests, as well as the resolution of certain organizational and personnel issues.

From the research works, the following stood out:

• completion by May 1948 of the development of a spherical charge of explosives;
• study until July of the same year of the problem of compression of metals during the explosion of an explosive charge;
• development of the neutron fuse design by January 1949;
• determination of critical mass and assembly of plutonium and uranium charges for RDS-1 and RDS-2. Ensuring the assembly of a plutonium charge for the RDS-1 until February 1, 1949.

The development of the design of the actual atomic charge - "RD-1" - (later, in the second half of 1946, called "RDS-1") was started at NII-6 at the end of 1945. Development began with a 1/5 scale model of the charge. The work was carried out without technical specifications, but exclusively according to the oral instructions of Yu.B. Khariton. The first drawings were made by N.A. Terletsky, who worked at NII-6 in a separate room, where only Yu.B. Khariton and E.M. Adaskin - deputy. director of NII-6, who carried out general coordination of work with other groups that began the development of high-speed detonators to ensure synchronous detonation of a group of electric detonators and work on an electric activation system. A separate group began to deal with the selection of explosives and technologies for manufacturing unusual shapes of parts from the aircraft.

At the beginning of 1946, the model was developed, and by the summer it was made in 2 copies. The model was tested at the NII-6 test site in Sofrino.

By the end of 1946, the development of documentation for a full-scale charge began, the development of which began to be carried out already in KB-11, where at the beginning of 1947 in Sarov, initially, the minimum conditions for the manufacture of blocks and blasting were created (details from explosives, before being launched into operation of plant No. 2 in KB-11, supplied from NII-6).

If by the beginning of the development of atomic charges, domestic physicists were to some extent ready for the topic of creating an atomic bomb (according to their previous work), then for designers this topic was completely new. They did not know the physical foundations of the charge, new materials used in the design, their physical and mechanical properties, the admissibility of joint storage, etc.

Large sizes parts from explosives and their complex geometric shapes, tight tolerances required the solution of many technological problems. So, specialized enterprises of the country did not undertake to manufacture a large-sized charge case, and Pilot Plant No. 1 (KB-11) had to make a sample case, after which these cases began to be manufactured at the Kirov Plant in Leningrad. Large-sized parts from explosives were also originally made in KB-11.

During the initial organization of the development of the constituent elements of the charge, when institutes and enterprises of various ministries were involved in the work, a problem arose due to the fact that the documentation was developed according to various departmental guidance materials (instructions, specifications, normals, construction of a drawing designation, etc. .). This provision made production very difficult due to the large differences in the requirements for manufactured charge elements. The situation was corrected in 1948-1949. with the appointment of N.L. Dukhov. He brought with him from OKB-700 (from Chelyabinsk) the “Drawing Economy System” adopted there and organized the processing of previously developed documentation, bringing it to a single system. The new system best suited the conditions of our specific development, which provides for a multi-variant design study (due to the novelty of the designs).

As for the radio and electrical charge elements (“RDS-1”), they are entirely domestically developed. Moreover, they were developed with duplication of the most critical elements (to ensure the necessary reliability) and possible miniaturization.

Strict requirements for the reliability of the operation of the charge, the safety of work with the charge, the preservation of the quality of the charge during the warranty period of its shelf life determined the thoroughness of the development of the design.

Information provided by intelligence about the contours of the bombs and their sizes were few and often contradictory. So, about the caliber of the uranium bomb, i.e. "Kid", it was reported that he was either 3 "(inches), then 51/2" (in fact, the caliber turned out to be noticeably larger). About the plutonium bomb, i.e. "Fat Man" - that it looks "like a pear-shaped body", and about the diameter - it is 1.27 m, then 1.5 m. So the developers of the bombs had to start everything almost from scratch.

TsAGI was involved in working out the contours of the body of the KB-11 aerial bomb. Purges in its wind tunnels of an unprecedented number of contour options (more than 100, under the guidance of Academician S.A. Khristianovich) began to bring success.

The need to use complex system automation - this is another fundamental difference from the development of conventional bombs. The automation system consisted of safety stages and long-range cocking sensors; starting, "critical" and contact sensors; energy sources (batteries) and an initiation system (including a set of detonator capsules), which ensures the synchronous operation of the latter, with a difference in time from the microsecond range.

Thus, at the first stage of the project implementation:

• the carrier aircraft was determined: TU-4 (on the orders of I.V. Stalin, the American “flying fortress” B-29 was reproduced);
• several options for the designs of aerial bombs have been developed; their flight tests were carried out and the contours and structures that meet the requirements of atomic weapons were selected;
• the automation of the bomb and the instrument panel of the aircraft was developed, which guaranteed the safety of the suspension, flight and release of the battery, the implementation of an air blast at a given height and, at the same time, the safety of the aircraft after an atomic explosion.

Structurally, the first atomic bomb consisted of the following fundamental components:

• nuclear charge;
• an explosive device and an automatic charge detonation system with safety systems;
• ballistic case of an air bomb, which housed a nuclear charge and automatic detonation.

The atomic charge of the RDS-1 bomb was a multilayer structure in which the transition of the active substance - plutonium to the supercritical state was carried out due to its compression by means of a converging spherical detonation wave in the explosive.

Great success was achieved not only by technologists, but also by metallurgists and radiochemists. Thanks to their efforts, even the first plutonium parts contained a small amount of impurities and highly active isotopes. The last point was especially significant, since short-lived isotopes, being the main source of neutrons, could have a negative effect on the probability of a premature explosion.

A neutron fuse (NC) was installed in the cavity of the plutonium core in a composite shell of natural uranium. During 1947-1948, about 20 different offers concerning the principles of operation, design and improvement of NC.

One of the most complex components of the first RDS-1 atomic bomb was an explosive charge made from an alloy of TNT and RDX.

The choice of the outer radius of the explosive was determined, on the one hand, by the need to obtain a satisfactory energy release, and, on the other hand, by the permissible external dimensions of the product and the technological capabilities of production.

The first atomic bomb was developed in relation to its suspension in the TU-4 aircraft, the bomb bay of which provided the possibility of placing a product with a diameter of up to 1500 mm. Based on this dimension, the midsection of the ballistic body of the RDS-1 bomb was determined. The explosive charge was structurally a hollow ball and consisted of two layers.

The inner layer was formed from two hemispherical bases made from a domestic alloy of TNT and RDX.

The outer layer of the RDS-1 explosive charge was assembled from separate elements. This layer, designed to form a spherical converging detonation wave at the base of the explosive and called the focusing system, was one of the main functional units of the charge, which largely determined its performance characteristics.

Already at the very initial stage of the development of nuclear weapons, it became obvious that the study of the processes occurring in the charge should follow the computational and experimental path, which made it possible to correct the theoretical analysis based on the experimental results of experimental data on the gas-dynamic characteristics of nuclear charges.

It should be especially noted that the chief designer of the RDS-1, Yu.B. Khariton and the main developers, theoretical physicists, were aware of the high probability of a 2.5% incomplete explosion (decrease in explosion power by ~ 10%) and the consequences that await them if it occurs. They knew and… they worked.

The site for the test site was chosen near the city of Semipalatinsk, Kazakh SSR, in a waterless steppe with rare abandoned and dry wells, salt lakes, partially covered by low mountains. The site intended for the construction of the test complex was a plain with a diameter of about 20 km, surrounded from the south, west and north by low mountains.

The construction of the landfill began in 1947, and by July 1949 it was completed. In just two years, a colossal amount of work was completed, with excellent quality and at a high technical level. All materials were delivered to construction sites by car on dirt roads for 100-200 km. Traffic was around the clock in both winter and summer.

On the experimental field there were numerous structures with measuring equipment, military, civil and industrial facilities for studying the impact of damaging factors of a nuclear explosion. In the center of the experimental field there was a metal tower 37.5 m high for the RDS-1 installation.

The experimental field was divided into 14 test sectors: two fortification sectors; sector of civil constructions; physical sector; military sectors to accommodate samples of military equipment; biological sector. Along the radii in the northeast and southeast directions at various distances from the center, instrument buildings were erected to accommodate photochronographic, film and oscillographic equipment that recorded the processes of a nuclear explosion.

At a distance of 1000 m from the center, an underground building was built for equipment that registers light, neutron and gamma fluxes of a nuclear explosion. The optical and oscilloscope equipment was controlled via cables from a programmable machine.

To study the impact of a nuclear explosion on the experimental field, sections of metro tunnels, fragments of airfield runways were built, samples of aircraft, tanks, artillery rocket launchers, ship superstructures were placed various types. It took 90 railway wagons to transport this military equipment.

The government commission for testing the RDS-1, chaired by M.G. Pervukhina began work on July 27, 1949. On August 5, the commission concluded that the test site was fully ready and proposed to carry out detailed testing of operations for assembling and undermining the product within 15 days. The time of the test was determined - the last days of August.

I.V. was appointed scientific supervisor of the test. Kurchatov, from the Ministry of Defense, Major General V.A. led the preparation of the test site for testing. Bolyatko, the scientific management of the test site was carried out by M.A. Sadovsky.

In the period from August 10 to 26, 10 rehearsals were held to control the test field and equipment for detonating the charge, as well as three training exercises with the launch of all equipment and 4 detonations of full-scale explosives with an aluminum ball from automatic detonation.

On August 21, a plutonium charge and four neutron fuses were delivered to the test site by a special train, one of which was to be used to detonate a military product.

Scientific supervisor of the experiment I.V. Kurchatov, in accordance with the instructions of L.P. Beria, gave the order to test the RDS-1 on August 29 at 8 am local time.

On the night of 08/29/49, the final assembly of the charge was carried out. The assembly of the central part with the installation of parts made of plutonium and a neutron fuse was carried out by a group consisting of N.L. Dukhova, N.A. Terletsky, D.A. Fishman and V.A. Davidenko (installation "NZ"). The final installation of the charge was completed by 3 o'clock in the morning on August 29 under the direction of A.Ya. Malsky and V.I. Alferova. Members of the special committee L.P. Beria, M.G. Pervukhin and V.A. Makhnev controlled the course of the final operations.

On the day of the test, at the command post of the test site, located 10 km from the center of the test field, the majority of the top management of the test gathered: L.P. Beria, M.G. Pervukhin, I.V. Kurchatov, Yu.B. Khariton, K.I. Shchelkin, employees of KB-11, who participated in the final installation of the charge on the tower.

By 6 o'clock in the morning, the charge was raised to the test tower, its equipment with fuses and connection to the subversive circuit were completed.

Due to the deterioration of the weather with a shift one hour earlier (from 7.00 instead of 8.00 according to the plan), all the work provided for under the approved regulations began to be carried out.

At 06:35, the operators turned on the power of the automation system, and at 06:48 the test field automatic machine was turned on.

Exactly at 7 am on August 29, 1949, the whole area was lit up with a blinding light, which marked that the USSR had successfully completed the development and testing of the first atomic bomb.

According to the memoirs of the test participant D.A. Fishman, the events in the command post unfolded as follows:

In the last seconds before the explosion, the doors located on the back side of the command post building (from the center of the field) were ajar so that the moment of the explosion could be observed from the burst of illumination of the area. At the moments of "zero" everyone saw a very bright illumination of the earth and clouds. The brightness exceeded the solar one several times. It was clear that the explosion had been successful!

Everyone ran out of the room and ran up to the parapet, protecting the command post from the direct impact of the explosion. Before them, a picture of the formation of a huge cloud of dust and smoke, enchanting in its scale, was opened, in the center of which a flame was blazing!

But Malsky's words were heard from the loudspeaker: “Everyone immediately enter the command post building! Approaching shock wave”(according to calculations, she should have approached the command post in 30 seconds).

Upon entering the premises, L.P. Beria warmly congratulated everyone on a successful test, and I.V. Kurchatov and Yu.B. Khariton kissed. But inside, apparently, he still had some doubts about the completeness of the explosion, since he did not immediately call and report to I.V. Stalin about a successful test, but went to the second observation post, where the nuclear physicist M.G. Meshcheryakov, who in 1946 attended demonstration tests of US atomic charges on the Bikini Atoll.

At the second observation post, Beria also warmly congratulated M.G. Meshcheryakova, Ya.B. Zeldovich, N.L. Dukhov and other comrades. After that, he meticulously questioned Meshcheryakov about the external effect of the American explosions. Meshcheryakov assured that our explosion was superior to the American one in terms of external picture.

Having received confirmation from an eyewitness, Beria went to the headquarters of the test site in order to inform Stalin about the successful test.

Stalin, having learned about the successful test, immediately called B.L. Vannikov (who was at home and due to illness could not attend the test) and congratulated him on a successful test.

According to the memoirs of Boris Lvovich, in response to congratulations, he began to say that this was the merit of the party and the government ... Here Stalin interrupted him, saying: “Come on, Comrade Vannikov, these formalities. You better think about how we can start manufacturing these products in the shortest possible time.

20 minutes after the explosion, two tanks equipped with lead shielding were sent to the center of the field to conduct radiation reconnaissance and inspect the center of the field.

The reconnaissance found that all structures in the center of the field had been demolished. A funnel formed in place of the tower, the soil in the center of the field melted and a continuous crust of slag formed. Civilian buildings and industrial structures were completely or partially destroyed. Eyewitnesses presented a terrible picture of the great massacre.

The energy release of the first Soviet atomic bomb was 22 kilotons of TNT equivalent.