HISTORY OF THE KALMYK KHANS

The Kalmyks, now sitting on the Volga, have the same origin with the Mongols, one religion and one language.

When the Zungar (Altai) Oirats killed each other during unrest, the Torgut taishi Kho Orlek 1, not wanting to upset his subjects, migrated further to the peoples of alien origin (Turkic tribes), whom he conquered. Thinking to move even further, in the year of Shoroy Morin (i.e., 1618 A.D.), he sent good people to look out for the shores of the Caspian Sea. Having truly learned that the lands there were not occupied by anyone, he took his subject Torghuts, also Khoshuts and Derbets - a total of 50,000 smokes or wagons, and, accompanied by his six sons, in the year of Shora Lu (i.e., 1628 according to R. X. ) left his nutuk (place of nomadism) in Zyungaria and moved west. Not reaching the Ural River ("Zai" from the Tatar "Chzhayak", we have "Yaik"), he conquered the Embuluk (Tzimbuluk) Tatars, who roamed the river. Embe; having crossed the river Ural, subjugated the Tatar generations to its power: nagai, hatai-khabchik (Kipchak), zhitesen (Edisan) and in the year Temur Morin (1630) arrived on the banks of the river. Volga 2.

Then no one could prevent him from establishing himself there, because, except for the weak Tatars, there was no one. There were also few Russian cities. Meanwhile, this distant country (uchzhim tala?), abundant in grass, was the most convenient for the Oirats for nomadism.

Thus, Kho Orlek from the Urals to the Volga, from Astrakhan to Samara (Samur) placed his subjects on permanent nomad camps. Although this country belonged to Tsagan Khan (White Tsar), but Kho Orlek, despite friendly relations, took possession of this country, which he liked, without bringing this to the attention of the king and not obeying him.

In the year of Temur Lu (1640 A.D.), the dechins (Mongols) and the derbens (Oirats) put an end to the old enmity (which had lasted since the 14th century) and reconciled. In the presence of Inzen Rinboche, Akshobiya Manchzhushiri, Amoghasidd Manchzhushiri and Khutuktuin Gegen, (Khalkha) Erdeni Zasaktu Khan, Tushetu Khan, (Oirat) Gushi Nomyn Khan, Erdeni Batur hun taizhi and other khans and noyons gathered at the Seim and approved the Laws (Yeke Tsazhi) 3 .

The Torgut Kho Orlek (with his sons Shukur Daichin and Yelden) went to this Seim, concluded friendly and kindred alliances 4 , brought the approved laws to his Nutuk and began to be guided by them in governing his subjects. Shortly after Ho Orlek returned, he attacked the city of Astrakhan, the inhabitants of which defeated him and pursued him. In this battle Ho Orlek was killed. 5

II. Torgut taishi Shukur Daichin and his son Puntsuk

When the Torguts came from Zungaria, the sons of Kho Orlek, Yelden and Louzan, conquered the Tatars. Kho Orlek 6 gave these two sons all the Tatars they conquered, excluding his subject Torguts.

After the death of Kho Orlek, his eldest son, Shukur Daichin 7, having become the leading taishi (akhalakchi taishi), cunningly subjugated the Nogai Tatars, subject to his brothers Louzan and Yelden, who, during the troubles, gradually lost all their subjects. Lowzan (probably Yelden) with a few the best people left for Tibet. (Khoshutsky) Gushi Khan foresaw and predicted even earlier that Yelden would lose his subjects. eight

After that, Shukur Daichin became extremely proud 9, began to attack the Russian land 10 and cause great harm, which is why the Russians were forced to send an army from Astrakhan, which overcame (the Kalmyks) and cut down many. Daichin, wishing to make peace with the Russians, in the year Modon Khonin (1655) sent ambassadors Dural Darkhan, Tseren and Chikhul to the Russian tsar in Moscow. These ambassadors, having arrived in Moscow, made a vow and an oath that "the Kalmyk taishi Shukur Daichin, all the noyons and the entire Kalmyk ulus will be loyal subjects (itegelt albat) of the Russian Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, that they will neither attack Astrakhan, nor rob, nor ruin".

The Russian tsar, having started a war with the Crimea (Haram), asked Shukur Daichin for 12 troops (omok tserek). In the year Temur Uker (i.e. 1661) Daichin with his son Puntsuk went on a campaign and together with the Russian troops fought the Crimean Tatars. He promised to send the prey (olzo) taken in this campaign to Tsagan Khan (White Khan or Tsar), in which, under the Astrakhan governor Prince Bekosich, Puntsuk gave wool, who, at the same time, prayed to Borkhan, kissed Shuten (holy image), sutras (holy books) and rosary, licked his knife and applied it to his throat 13.

After the death of Shukur Daichin, his son Puntsuk 14 took over the reins of government. During his lifetime, the Khoshut taishi Kundulen Ubashi arrived from Zyungaria with 3,000 wagons of subordinates, settled down as a nomad at the river. Volga and joined the Kalmyks 15 .

III. Torgut Ayuki Khan

Ayuki taiji took over the reins of government upon the death of his father Puntsuk.

During his reign, Dorji Rabtan 16, his own aunt, arrived from Zyungaria with 1,000 subjects and, joining her nephew, increased the Kalmyk ulus.

Ayuki taiji then went to war in the Kuban; he fought for two months against the Nagai Tatars, who had fled from Russian rule (see note 10), and brought them back to the Volga 17 . So the glory of Ayuki taiji spread among the southern peoples.

Ayuki taiji, wishing to be, like his father Puntsuk, a tributary of the Russian Tsar, in the year Usun Uker (1673) took an oath (shakhan) at the river Shara Tseke that the Kalmyks 18 would not attack Russian cities, that they would not make friendship With Turkish sultan, neither with the Crimean Khan, nor with the Persian Shah, that they will protect the Russian country from enemies, etc.

The Derbet owner Solom Tseren taishi on 19 in the year Modon Bars (1674) arrived on the Volga with 4,000 wagons of subjects and, having submitted to Ayuka tayji, increased his strength.

Although Ayuki Taiji, under Prince Shcherbatov, repeated the oath of allegiance (Albat) to the Russian Tsar 20 , but when hostile relations between the Bashkirs and the Russians began, he, along with the Bashkirs, in the year of Temur Taka (1681) in the provinces of Kazan and Orenburg robbed and ruined the people, burned a lot small towns and took many prisoners, which brought great fear to the Russians. This prompted the Russian tsars (John and Peter Alekseevich) to send their dignitary and Prince Alexei Ivanovich Golitsyn for new negotiations with Ayuki taiji 21, with whom he had negotiations at the river. Sharachin. With these negotiations, the Russians managed to stop the Kalmyk raids and keep them from friendly relations with alien khans (Turkish, Persian and Crimean).

Ayuki tayji, having stopped the attacks on the Russian kingdom, went to the East and, capturing the Khasaks (Kyrgyz) and Turkmens, made them his tributaries (Albats), which made him famous in those countries.

The holy hierarch the Dalai Lama granted Ayuka the title of khan (khan tsolo) and a seal (tamga). Even before, when the Kalmyk leaders (terun - head) wore the title "taishi", the saint Bogdo Lama granted Shukur Daichin (Ayuka's grandfather) the title and seal of the khan, but he returned it back, saying: "There are many noyons like me, how can I khan?" 22 Although Ayuki was a tributary (albat) of the Russian tsar, but without informing him, he accepted this high khan's title with his power.

Ayuki Khan, not proud of the Zungar Oirats, but entered into family relations with them: so he gave his daughter to Tsevan Rabtan (son of the Zungar owner Senge) 23 . In addition, he traveled to Zyungaria and brought to the Volga those Torguts who remained in Zyungaria.

The incessant wars and turmoil that took place in Zungaria were the reason that the Oirats, called Khara Halimak (Black Kalmyks, Telengits), with Tsagan Batur taizhiy migrated from Zungaria to Russia in the year of Gal Bars (1686) and were settled near the river. Akhtuba 24 .

Russian Great Khan Peter went to foreign western states in order, having studied the arts and sciences there, to teach them later to their subjects. He instructed Ayuki Khan to protect, when he was abroad, (where he stayed in 1697 and 1698) Russian state from southern external enemies; as a result of which the book Boris Matveyevich Golitsyn in the year Gal Uker (1697) had a meeting with Ayuki Khan at the river. Shara Tseke 25, They decided in the treaty articles: "If Ayuki Khan fights Bukhara, Kharakalpaks, Khasaks (Kirghiz), then the Russians must give him cannons; also give him 20 pounds of gunpowder and 10 pounds of lead annually. Without consent (zarlik) Khan, not to baptize Kalmyks who fled to the Russians; if they baptize, then collect a fine for those baptized. Ayuki Khan, if he wants, can send his subjects to the Crimea and the Kuban for booty and robbery; if they, being beaten by the enemy, run away to the Russians cities, then they (Kalmyks) should not be persecuted, but provided with possible benefits. So the Russians won over Ayuki Khan to their side.

Although in this way Ayuki Khan strengthened and brought peace and contentment to his subjects, but in the year of Temur Mogoy (1701) between Ayuki Khan and his son Chakdarchzhab there were strife over the wife (khatun) of the latter 26 . Gunchjab, the beloved son of Ayuka, having given his word to kill his older brother, on a dark night sent a malicious person to his brother, who shot at Chakdarchzhab from a gun loaded with two bullets (charges) and wounded him. This caused strife and confusion: Gunchzhab fled to the mountains. Saratov (Sharatu); Ayuki Khan took refuge in a small Russian town, and Chakdarchzhab, taking some relatives with him, migrated across the river. Zya (Ural) and there settled down as a nomad camp. Prince Boris Golitsyn, sent from the Russian Khan, arrived and reconciled father and son.

Sanchjab, the son of Ayuka, who left with Chakdarchjab, took 15,000 wagons of his subjects and went to the Zyungar Nutuk, where Tsevan Rabtan took away his subjects, and Sanchjab sent one back. 27

The Kalmyk ulus from the time of arrival from Zyungaria (1628) gradually increased, but from that time (1701) began to decrease.

When in the year Gal Gakhai (1707) the Chechens, Kumyks and Nagais attacked the Russians, Ayuki Khan did not give the Russians the required troops. Then, when the Bashkirs rebelled against Russia, (Derbet) Munke Temur, subject to (Hariat) Ayuka, burned more than a hundred villages in the provinces of Penza and Tambov, captured a lot of Russian farmers and sold them to Persia, the Kuban, Khiva and Bukharia . Therefore, in the year of Shoroy Khulugun (1708), Petr Matveyevich Apraksin 28 came to learn from Ayuki Khan about the reason for these unjust acts; Ayuki replied that the (Derbet) Munke Temur was guilty of this, and that he did not know about his intentions. Ayuki Khan promised not to allow his taishis to cross to the southern bank of the river. Volga and not send them to robberies and robberies, he also promised to help the heads of neighboring Russian cities in the event of an attack by enemies; in the event of an attack by the Bashkirs, Crimeans, and other enemies on the Kalmyks, he asked for permission to take refuge in nearby Russian cities.

In the year of Temur Hulu guna (1720), when Tsar Peter was preparing for a war with Turkey, the Bashkirs again raided the Russians. The tsar, hoping to pacify them through Ayuki Khan, sent a decree 29, why Ayuki Khan sent 5,000 troops against them, and sent 10,000 troops to the Don, most of which were Derbetovites, who pacified the Cossacks, who carried out theft and robbery on the Don. thirty

Comments

1 . Torgut means Torgut, i.e. causing an obstacle (see Gaban Sharaba). When the Torguts joined the Oirats, they had an owner, Mergeni Erketu (see Batur Ubashi Tyumen), who lived at the end of the 14th and at the beginning of the 15th century. Sanan Setsen (History of the Eastern Mongols, pp. 162 and 211) first mentions the name Torgut when he speaks of the Torgut Tsalak Turgen, a contemporary of the Zungarian Yesen taishi, who lived in the 15th century. A hundred years later, precisely in 1562, the Ordos Khutuktai Secen hong taizhi, having undertaken a campaign against the Oirats, attacks the Torghut generation, who roamed near the river. Irtyshe, kills Khara Butur and hoists his black banner in the hearth (golomta, the meaning of which Dorji Banzarov speaks in the work Black Faith or Shamanism). This Torgut Khara Butura was named by Gaban Sharab and Batur Ubashi Tyumen Bura, the son of Buygo Orlek, and in 101 notebooks of the History of the Mongolian and Turkestan Vans and Huns he was named Bura Akhalahu. The cousin of this Bur, the Torgut Temene batur (the son of Yezene taishi, who is mentioned in the History of Siberia by Miller) was a glorious knight, had 8,000 troops (see the Legend of the campaign of the Mongolian Ubashi hun taizhi in 1587 against the Oirats; in the Biography of Neizhi Toin, son Temene Batura, it is said that he had 10,000 troops); he is also remarkable as a zealot of Buddhism (see the Legend of the Oirats Gaban Sharaba and Batur Ubashi Tyumen). The second cousin of this Temene batura, Kho Orlek, son of Zulzagan Orlek, was the leading taishi of the Torgut generation; in his time, the Torguts did not take part in the Oirat strife. When the Zungarian Batur hong taizhi, who roamed the Altai, began to oppress the Oirats, subordinating them to his influence, the Torgut Ho Orlek, threatened by this, took his Torguts, went to the borders of the Russian kingdom and stopped at the Volga near the Caspian Sea (see East. mong. Vans and Huns, 101 notebooks). It can be seen from this that Kho Orlek migrated from his former places of nomadism in Zyungaria solely because he did not want to subordinate his Torguts and himself to the influence of the Zyungar rulers Khara Khula and his son Batur hun taychzhiya.

2 . About the migration of the Oirats from the countries of the Altai region, Gaban Sharab says: “In the year of Shoroi Lu (1628) the Derben of the Oirat noyons were informed (torguts) of their intention to part with them, and in the year of Shoroi Mogoi (1629) they parted. In the year of Temur Morin (1630) Louzan (son of Kho Orlek) crossed the Ural and Volga rivers and conquered the Mangats (Tatars), at that time the headquarters of Kho Orlek and (his eldest son) Daichin were on the other side of the Ural River. the Volga river".

3 . Inzen (Inza) Rinboche, a Tibetan by birth, was the first viceroy of the Dalai Lama between the Mongols and the Oirats. Isn't he called in other places Tsagaan Nomyn Khan, Ochiro Darayn Khutuktu? (See Batur Ubashi Tyumen). Khutuktuin gegen is Zaya Pandita, a natural Oirat of the Khoshut generation, who was sent to the Oirats by the Dalai Lama and the Bogdo Lama to replace Inzen Rinboche, who was supposed to go to the Mongols. Zaya Pandita arrived from Tibet in the Altai countries in the autumn of the year Tulai (1639) and spent the winter at Tarbagatai with the named brother of his Khoshut Ochirtu taychzhiya (Tsetsen Khan, son of Baibagas Khan). Inzen Rinboche and Zaya Pandita met for the first time during the consecration of the suburgan at Bulnain Usun Khochjir (for this suburgan, see Spassky's Notes on Baykov's travels); then they were present at the Seimas at the approval of the laws proposed by Batur hong taizhiy, which took place on the third day of the middle autumn month of the year Temur Lu (1640). At this Diet, from the Khalkha owners, Zasaktu Khan, a direct descendant of Genghis Khan, excelled; from the Oirat - khoyur taizhi (that is, two taizhi: the Khoshut Ochirtu taizhi and the Zungarian Batur hun taizhi) (see the Biography of Zaya Pandita and the Laws of 1640). The laws of 1640, proposed by the Zungar Batur hong taizhiy, and the Decrees issued during Dondok Dashi, the Volga Oirats were guided until the second quarter of this century, and even now they often turn to them. (Not later than two years, they, like the Biography of Zaya Pandita, will be published by me in the original and Russian translation.)

4 . At this time, Puntsuk (Bunchuk, Monchak), the son of Shukur Daichin, married the daughter of the Zungarian Batur hun taychzhiya. From this marriage was born the later famous Ayuka Khan, who lived with Batur hun taichjiya until his death, which happened in the year of Modon Morin, i.e. in 1654 (cf. on the way back from Tibet to the Volga, Shukur Daichin stopped by Zyungaria and took his grandson Ayuka. Probably, in 1640, the following family unions were also concluded: the elder aunt of Ayuki, the daughter of Shukur Daichin, was married off to the Khalkha Mergen khan Yerinkey, and the younger aunt (Dorchzhi Rabtan) was married off to the Khoshut Ochirta taychzhiya, whose daughter later married Chakdorchzhab, the eldest son of Ayuki Khan (see 101 notebooks of the History of the Mongolian Vans and Guns).

5 . In the spring of the year Modon Taka (1645) the Torguts invited Zai Pandita, who preached the doctrine on the occasion of the infirmity of Dayu Erke taijiya, the son of Daichin. Also, the owners: Gombo Yelden, Louzan, Sanjin, Kirsa and others alternately invited Zai Pandita to their place and offered gifts, 20,000 horses alone were presented as a gift (in favor of the spiritual treasury 10,000). Gombo Yelden, who accompanied Zaya Pandita, said: "Before, when Inza Khutuktu was with us, there were no such gifts." (See Biography of Zaya Pandita). Daichin had four sons: 1. Kuru, who, having no sons of his own, took to himself Zhalbo, the son of his brother Dayu; 2. I give (Dashi); 3. Puntsuk and 4. Nama Seren. Kho Orlek had six sons: 1. Shukur Daichin, 2. Gombo Yelden, 3. Kirsa, 4. Sanjin, 5. Louzan, and 6. Syunke (see the Tale of the Oirats Emchi Gaban Sharaba). In 1645 Ho Orlek is no longer mentioned; hence he was killed between 1641-1645.

6 . Ho Orlek, having taken most of his subjects, to his six sons (Daichin, Yelden, Louzan, Kirs, Sanjin and Syunke) gave 1,000 wagons (hence, 166 wagons to each) and said: "Who is good, he does not need - how many, how many of his subordinates: you know that the Oirat Seim, waiting for my arrival, used to never disperse. Children, you yourself know how to be the best "(see Gaban Sharaba and Batur Ubashi Tyumen). We read about the deeds of Kho Orlek and his children in Gaban Sharab (continuation of our 2nd note): "Fourteen years later (after arriving in the Urals and the Volga, i.e. 1644), they, thinking about the oath mutually given in 1640 Derben by the Oirats, disposed to return to their Oirats. At this time, the wife of the Derbet Daichin khoshuchiya (son of Dalai taisha) came to her Torgut relatives, followed by Daichin khoshuchi (probably, who lived at odds with his wife).Kho Orlek and son his Yelden, together with all the Torguts, attacked Daichin khoshuchiya, who fell in the battle." This was in 1643 before the death of Kho Orlek and before the departure of his son Daichin to Zungaria and Tibet. Gaban Sharab says that the Torguts (from the Volga and Ural countries) at that time disposed to return to the Oirats, and Fischer in the History of Siberia (pp. 419 and 420), on the contrary, says that Kho Orlek, leaving his former dwelling in the upper reaches of the river. Tobol, in 1643 moved to the neighborhood of the city of Astrakhan and tried to persuade the Nogai Murzas to fall away from Russia; however, the Astrakhans went out into the field to suppress all his treachery, all his army was beaten to the ground and several of his sons and grandchildren were found killed.

7 . In the spring of the year Modon Taka (1645), when Zaya Pandita was with the Torghuts, Kho Orlek was no longer alive, but his son Daichin is mentioned as the eldest of the brothers and as the leading noyon. Daichin at that time wandered in the Ural countries, but in the spring of the next year, Gal Nokhoi (1646), going to Tibet, was in Zungaria during the battle of Ukharlik, where the khoyur taizhi (i.e., the Zungarian Batur hun taizhi and the Khoshut Ochirtu taizhi) defeated Khoshut Kundulen Ubashi (see Biography of Zaya Pandita). We learn about the reason for the Battle of Ukharlik from Fisher's story in the History of Siberia (pp. 444-446): "The Zungarian Batur hong taizhi was at war with Ishim Khan (married to the daughter of Kho Orlek; another daughter of Kho Orlek named Dara-Uba-Zalcha was 317 and 442), whose son Yangir Sultan commanded the Kirghiz-Kaisaks and, unfortunately, the Kalmyks (Oirats) was captured. Freed from captivity, Yangir disturbed the Kalmyks with frequent raids. hong taizhi), wanting to get rid of the painful enemy, in 1643 with the help of his friends he gathered 50,000 troops and captured the uluses of Alat Kirghiz and Tokmak, which numbered up to 10,000 people. Kontaisha attacked the trenches, from which they bravely defended themselves, and Yangir Sultan from the rear with rifles attacked and laid down up to 10,000 Kalmyks, while another prince Yalantush came to the rescue with 20,000 troops. prisoners with them. Khoshut owners Uchirtu (Ochirtu taizhi) and Ablai taizhi (sons of Baibagas Khan), whose father (uncle) Guzi Khan (Gushi Khan) had previously lived in Kokonor land, helped Kontaisha in this war. Baibagas Khan's younger brother Gushi Khan really lived in Koko Nor, but then, in the year of Temur Mogoi, that is, in 1641, as Vaidurya Karpo says, or in 1643, as the History of the Mongolian and Turkestan Vans and Guns says, he owned Tibet. As for Ochirtu taiji and Ablai, they first lived near the Alashan mountains, in the east and west of the river. Toli. See 79 notebook East. mong. and Turkest. vans and goons. Upon leaving from there, Ochirtu accepted Kontaishin's daughter as a wife (his other wife was the daughter of Shukur Daichin, Ayuki Khan's aunt) and settled near the lake. Zaisan, between the lake. Zaisan and r. Ayagus, oz. Balkhash, r. Chui to the river. Or the borders of the Yuldus country, and Ablai lived on this side of the river. Irtysh, where the remains of Ablaikit built by him are now visible (near Semipalatinsk). Kontaisha willingly wanted to attract another taisha, the Khoshutian Kundulen Ubashi, to his side, and asked him to go against the Kirghiz-Kaisaks together, but Kundulen taisha refused, declaring that he was friends with Yangir Sultan, that he called himself his son. Kontaisha was embittered by this and wanted to take revenge on Kundulen. Since the next spring of 1644 he still intended to go against Yangir Sultan, on his return from the first campaign Kontaisha sent a messenger to his father-in-law taisha Urlyuk (Kho Orlek) with a letter in which he asked Urlyuk to attack Kundulen when he, Kontaisha, attacked to Yangir. The messenger had to pass by the dwellings of Kundulen, the letter was intercepted, the intention was open and the danger. "Kundulen could not help but take measures to avert the claims and revenge on the part of Batur hong taizhi, who throughout his life strove for the goal of subordinating all Oirat owners to his influence However, Kundulen Ubashi's attempt to overthrow the yoke of Batur hun taychjiya was unsuccessful: the Ukharlik battle cost him dearly. to see or not to know the plans of Batur hun taijiya, and therefore, probably, he had to leave his former desire to return to the Oirats, so as not to fall under the influence of Batur hun taizhiya. year of death Batur hun taichjiya, i.e. in the winter of 1654, lived in the summer of 1655 in Bulnain Usun Khuchzhir, in the camps of the Khoshut Ablai taichzhiya. 655 Ablai taizhi started building the Ablayn sume or Ablayn kit (see fig. Biography of Zaya Pandita). Baikov says about this Ablain whale, he was there in May 1655: “The Beshka River (Beske, Beshke, Bishike) flows from the stone of the mountains to the Irtysh; on that Beshke River, Ablai taisha makes a city, but it’s just unknown whether it’s made of stone or wood. A lot has been planted in the forest; the pine forest is thin, as in our Russia in cities near cities it sets up strongholds, that city is between stone mountains, and craftsmen were sent to it from the Chinese kingdom ... "(see Ancient Bethliofika, ed. Novikov). The Torgut Daichin wintered in the winter of 1655 in the nomad camps of Ablai Taijiya. In the summer of 1656, when Daichin was with Ablai, Galdam (the son of the Khoshut Tsetsen Khan) and Sonom Sotai (?) came to visit him from Koko Usun Kharatala. At the same time, in the presence of Khutuktuin Gegen (Zaya Pandita), Ablai had a great celebration. The Torgut Daichin, having invited the priest to his place, returned to his nomad camps. (See Biography of Zaya Pandita.) From the above facts, we see that the wanderings of the Torghut Daichin continued from 1646 to 1656. At that time, he could well know the state of Tibet, China, the Mongols and the Altai Oirats, could learn the intentions and plans of the best representatives of Tibet and the Oirats, and had to finally establish himself in the idea that it was much better and more profitable for him to roam in the Ural and Volga countries.

8 . The Khoshut Gushi Khan said to the Torgut Yelden: "If someone weakens you and causes harm, then this is your elder brother (Daichin), and you will be left with four or five wagons." These words came true when Daichin took possession of his ulus and abandoned him at the place of nomadism. (See Gaban Sharaba and Batur Ubashi Tyumen.) This incident probably happened at the end of 1645 or at the beginning of 1646 before Daichin left for Tibet. In Tibet at that time Gushi Khan ruled, to whom Yelden probably retired, which I conclude from the following words of Gaban Sharaba: "Gushi Khan told Yelden that he would seize Daichin (hence, it was during Daichin's stay in Tibet, where he went , except for a pious purpose, probably, and about his brother’s flight there) and give it to him, Yelden, to which Yelden answered with a heart: “You, cutting a piece of meat from the thigh, will not put it on it again.” As for Lauzan, we we find him managing his subjects during the wanderings of Daichin from 1646 to 1656, as we will see below. "Lousan, having 70 wagons (after receiving inheritance from his father?), At nine years old increased the number of subject to 8,000 wagons" (see Gaban Sharaba, Batur Ubashi Tyumen has up to 10,000 wagons.) When Daichin, probably upon arrival from Tibet, pursued his younger brother Louzan, (the sons of the latter) Dorji and Goldama wanted to join Daichin (their uncle) in battle, but Louzan said with heart: "Don't attack my senior his brother; you are not in a position to keep the Torgut Nutuk intact." (See Gaban Sharaba.) Louzan is aware that only Daichin is able to manage the still immature Torgut Nutuk, whose benefit for Louzan was higher than his own private interests.

9 . The Dalai Lama, the master of Buddhism, had a great influence on his spiritual children; the Oirat and Mongolian owners cherished his attention and blessing, as in the old days in Europe secular lords cherished the attention of the pope and patriarch; religion, through this representative, with its recognition and blessing, gave a moral support to their right. The spiritual lord of Tibet, knowing his influence, cautiously, in extreme cases only, distributed to the secular lords his blessing, favors and titles, which the Oirat and Mongol owners so strongly sought. For the sake of his political views, the Dalai Lama granted the Torgut Daichin the title of khan and the seal: this shows that Daichin had a great political significance and strength. Gaban Sharab says: “Bogdoin gegen (Dalai Lama) granted Daichin the khan’s title and tamga, but he, returning it back, said: “There are many noyons like me, how can I be a khan?” Many of the Oirat noyons praised this deed and, - adds Batur Ubashi Tyumen, - urged him to ask him back for the khan's title (tsolo) and tamga (seal)." As you can see, it was not without calculation that Daichin did not accept the title of khan; It is not for nothing that the Oirats still repeat his famous saying "the highest of the deceivers is the one who knows how to pretend those who love the truth"(See Gaban Sharaba and Batur Ubashi Tyumen). The rules that Daichin kept when managing his subordinates, choosing his assistants and allocating his sons with destinies, can be seen from his following sayings. "Daichin told his grandson Ayuka: "Do you want to know, how should a noyon (lord, lord, leader) govern the people? "I want to," Ayuka answered. - "If you want to be a noyon, you must know the time: 1. when to be equal with those under your control, 2. when to command them, and 3. when to look after them like a mother to your child. If you learn these three rules, then you can be a noyon (ruler) ". He said to Ayuka: “You say that you alone wish to acquire nine heterogeneous knowledge (what? Necessary for a noyon?), but know that your life is short-lived. You show favor to nine people, of whom each has learned one of these nine knowledge: if you have nine such people with you, then you can become like one person who has mastered nine knowledge. (See Gaban Sharaba and Batur Ubashi Tyumen). Daichin gave his sons Dai, Puntsuk and Nama Serena to all three one part, and took the rest for himself. He said that he "does not understand why other owners distribute the majority of their subjects to their children." To this, the Khoshut Kundulen Ubashi said: “In your wisdom, you have taken for yourself most of the subjects and completely dominate, like a noyon; I, without taking my inheritance, divided everything between my sons (of whom there were 16!) And thus brought myself to misery” . Torgut Daichin, managing 160 wagons, subsequently increased the number of subject to one hundred thousand (100,000) wagons. (See Gaban Sharaba and Batur Ubashi Tyumen.)

10 . The Yedisans (zhitesan) and the Tatars (mangat) withdrew from the power of Russia and submitted to the Kalmyks in 1643, and in 1654 and 1655 Murza Bolshoi Nogai and the Shterekovs (?) went to the Kalmyks. See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. T. III. pp. 320-22.

11 . See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. T. IV. P. 40. In the shert entry on February 4, 7163 (1655), according to which the Kalmyk ambassadors Durkhan Tarkhan, Seren taisha and Chokula swore allegiance to the sovereign for Daichin taisha (he was then in Zungaria on the way back from Tibet), Louzan taishu, Sanjin taishu (Daichin brothers), for Monchak (Puntsuk) and Mameren (Nama Serena) taisha (Daichin’s sons) and for all ulus people according to their Daichinov and Monchakov (hence, Puntsuk ruled the ulus on behalf of his father) by command, we find more detailed information about this event." 1. Daichin, Louzan, Sanzhin, Puntsuk and Narma Seren with children, brothers, nephews and all ulus people to be with the Great Sovereign in eternal obedience, good to him, the sovereign, and the sovereign's people to want in everything without any cunning; 2 . about sovereign disobedient and traitors, do not refer to anything with anyone and do not stand for them; 3. sovereign Russian people and eternal lackeys of the Nagai, Edisan and Yurt Tatars in uluses and on passages, and in trades, do not beat anywhere and in full of not having, and n e to rob; 4. to lag behind all your previous untruths; 5. the sovereign's fatherland to Astrakhan and other sovereign Ukrainian cities and counties, to state people who are in parcels and in trades and in passages, and to Nogai and Yurt uluses, and to horse and animal herds do not come to war; brothers, children, nephews, ulus people and sovereigns, traitors murzas and Tatars (war) do not send; 6. do not burn sovereign cities, villages, villages and uchugs, do not beat people and do not have in full, and do not rob and do not do or think any evil; 7. where the sovereign instructs, to be taishas and ulus people in the sovereign's service, together with the sovereign's military people, with the sovereign's traitors and disobedients, fight to the death, not sparing their heads; not to change the sovereign and not to repair any tricks on the sovereign's people; 8. sovereign people of Russian, Tatar and Cherkasy are full and their bellies, which in the past and this year 7269 (1661) were taken by us, the Kalmyk people, and the traitors of the Nagai and Edisan and Enbuluk (zhinbuluk) Tatars near Astrakhan and under Temnik and under others sovereign cities, gather everyone and send them to Astrakhan; 9. traitors to the sovereign of the Nagai and Edisan and Enbulutsk murzas and Tatars, who in past years, betraying the sovereign, from under the sovereign's fatherland, from near Astrakhan, went to our taishas in the Kalmyk uluses, which of them would like to go to Astrakhan, taishami and ulus people in captivity should not keep or rob them, but let them go to Astrakhan without any detention at all; ten. henceforth, the sovereign's eternal lackeys of the Nogai and Edisan and Yurt Murzas and Tatars from the sovereign's homeland from Astrakhan and from other cities should not be called to their uluses; if someone comes by himself, they will not be accepted and sent to Astrakhan; 11. to send all the sovereign people of Russians and Tatars and Cherkasy polonians to taishas from their uluses to Astrakhan; 12. if the boyars and governors from Astrakhan and other cities learn to send messengers for all sorts of sovereign affairs to the Kalmyk uluses to them (Daichin, Louzan, Sanzhin and Puntsuk and their children, brothers, nephews and ulus people), then those messengers should not do any dishonor , do not beat them, do not rob them, and do not repair crampedness at home, but let them go without any detention ... If our taishas and we, ulus people, will not learn to do it, as it is written in this shert record, and our wool and approval than we will break: and on our taishas and on us, Dural Tarkhan and on Seren taisha and on Chokulai, and on all ulus people, awaken God's wrath and a fiery sword, and we will be cursed in this world and in the future. "(See Complete collection Laws of the Russian Empire, Vol. 1, No. 145.)

12 . Shert record on June 8, 1769 (1661): "Se yaz Daichin taisha. Urlyuk taishi (son of Daichin taishi, son of Ho Orlek taishi), yes yaz Monchak taishi Daichin taishina son (Puntsuk taishi son of Daichin taishi), making a true contract, we give wool (an oath) to the great sovereign... they cursed for us, at our command and for the children... and for all our ulus people, our neighbors zarguchi Tarkhan and Dazan Kashka, according to our Kalmyk faith, worshiped and kissed the borkhan in the current 7169 (1661) year on June 8, in a tent in front of deacon Ivan Gorokhov, on the fact that, by decree of the great sovereign, we made an agreement: to be, but it is not a mistake to repair a great sovereign with people in eternal peace and unity and help them everywhere. great sovereign to Moscow, and full to Rymsky uluses and transhumance horses and all booty should not be given back for ransom, but that booty of all ranks should be sold to Russian people in the cities of the great sovereign. 3. Russian pilgrims, whom we get in the Crimean uluses, declare and give to Astrakhan or other nearby cities. 4. And the great sovereign’s salary to us for our service, which will also be 5. The people of the great sovereign will not repair us dashingly, and in that, according to an agreement with the clerk Ivan Gorokhov, Kazbulat Murza Cherkassky believed in us ... His former coat 7164 and 7165 (1657 and 1658) years, we backed up this record and statement ... in case of violation of this record, we called upon ourselves the wrath of God, a fiery sword and curses in this world and in the future. "Probably, both this and the previous sherti were written in common in at that time in the Tatar language, because it is further said that Monchak (Puntsuk) taishi in the original handily attributed the Kalmyk letter: “And with the Don Cossacks with Fyodor Budan, according to our Daichin and Monchakov’s command, our kindred man Dazan Kashka believed that to hunt over the Crimean people and over their uluses to our Kalmyk people fighting with the Don Cossacks at the same time and do not repair any tricks between themselves. "(See Complete collection of laws of the Russian Empire. Vol. I. No. 300). si are no longer mentioned, although they were alive. In the "Biography of Zaya Pandita" there are indications that they wandered beyond the river. Zai (Ural) and between 1656-1660 they hosted curates and honored Zai pandita. In 1660, Louzan, offended by the retreat of the Mangat (Tatars), crossed over in the upper reaches of the river. Zay and joined the (Khoshut) Oktsotbo and Tutul, the three of them (Torgut?) Mergen taychzhiy forced to take refuge in the trenches at Fr. Aksakhal. "The curate, returning from Daichin to Zyungaria, who roamed along the Zai River, arranged for them a date and peace." Not having the necessary sources at hand, they are currently unable to follow the further fate of these individuals.

13 . The shert record dated December 9, 7170 (1661), given by Puntsuk, says: "I, the Kalmyk taisha Bunchuk, for myself and for my father Daichin taisha Urlyukov, and for my nephew Monchzhik Yalba (Manchzhik Chzhalbo, son of Dayu, grandson of Daichin) taisha and for other taishas and ulus of their Kalmyk kindred possessing people who roam with us, and for the Nagai and for the Edisan and Enbulut and Malisbash and Kelechen murzas and for their children and brothers and nephews and grandchildren and for their ulus people I shert and I give wool to my Kalmyk faith and bowed and kissed the god of my borkhan, the prayer book of the whip and the rosary, and I lick my knife and put it to my throat. At congresses at the Berekete tract (near Astrakhan), Puntsuk agreed with the boyar and voivode Prince Grigory Supchalevich Cherkassky Bekovich as follows: "1. Be in eternal allegiance and obedience to the great sovereign; 2. do not refer to traitors and do not stand for them; 3. See 11 above, paragraphs 5-7, 4. with the Turkish (Turkish) Sultan, with the Kizilbash Shah (Shah of Perenets), with the Crimean Khan, with the Bey of Azov and with the Temryukovites, with the Tamanians, with the Beleneis, with the Kumyks in exile not to be in union and in the world; do not lend them a gun and horses, do not give people to help; also with foreigners of different faiths who are not obedient to the great sovereign, do not refer, do not be in a union, do not lend a gun and horses and people in not to give help, as it was in previous years under the former boyars and governors: under Prince Dmitry Petrovich Lvov and his comrades, they gave people to help the Crimean Khan and lent horses 5. See above note 11, paragraphs 8-9 and 10; 6. the great sovereign of the Russian people and Tatar followers (about Cherkasy not mentioned) to send us all of our uluses to Astrakhan. (See Complete collection of laws of the Russian Empire. T. I. No. 316.)

14 . About the time of Shukur Daichin's death, as far as I can remember, none of our scientists speak definitively. In the "Biography of Zaya Pandita" we find the following information about him: "In the year of Temur Gahay (1671) Khoshut Ablai united (with his uncle Khoshut) Kundulen Ubashiy and conquered (actually "ate") Dayan taishia (son of Derbet Dalai taishia), then started a war with the Torgut Daichin, conquered Daichin and wintered in the Urals.The sons of Kundulen Ubashiya, deprived of booty, looked unfavorably at Ablai and moved away from him.When Ablai wintered on the river Zay (Ural), the Torgut Ayuka (son of Puntsuk, grandson of Shukur Daichin, born in 1641 or 1642) during Tsagan Sara (1672) from the Volga River he arrived with an army, fought with Ablai, defeated his army and took Ablai himself. Since 1660, in Zungaria between the Oirat owners, unrest and discord began, which then penetrated to the Volga and Ural Oirats; a quarrel between the Torghut Shukur Daichin and his brother Louzan dates back to this time (see above: addition to note 12). In 1670 and earlier, Daichin roamed the river. Ural. At that time in Zyungaria the state of mind was in great fermentation; the unrest and strife of the Oirat owners intensified, especially with the death of the Zungar Senge, the son of Batur hun taychzhiy. Tsetsen taizhi and Batur killed their younger brother Senge, who got half of his father's ulus and all his rights in the Oirat Diet. Galdan hong taizhi, who was at the court of the Dalai Lama, learned about the murder of his elder brother Senge, left the clergy with the permission of the Dalai Lama, appeared in Zungaria, punished the brothers and appropriated the ulus. In the "Biography of Zaya Pandita" it is noted that in the winter of the year Gakhai (1671) Aldar taishi (son of the Derbet Tsoin, grandson of Dalai taishi) went up the Irtysh and (the first of the Oirat owners) joined Boshokt Khan (Galdan khun taichzhiyu), and in the spring of the year Uker (1673) joined him and the (Khoshutian) Daichin hong taizhi. In these troubled times(1671), the Torgut Daichin, in his old age, experienced displeasure to be defeated by the Khoshut Ablai, who at the same time (in early 1672) was taken by Ayukoyu, the grandson of Daichin. About Daichin, likewise about Puntsuk, there is no more information in the sources known to me so far.

15 . In the "Biography of Zaya Pandita" we read: "Derbet Kundulen Ubashi", that is, the Derbet Kundulen Ubashi, but in other sources known to me, there is no owner with this name among the Derbet owners. Judging by the time and circumstances, one must think that this derbet Kundulen Ubashi is the Khoshut Kundulen Ubashi, the brother of Baibagas Khan and Gushi Khan, the uncle of Tsetsen Khan (Ochirtu taychzhiya, grandfather of Ablay). It seems to me that where the Derbet Kundulen Ubashi is found in the Oirat original, one should read: "Derbet owners and (Khoshut) Kundulen Ubashi". After the death of their father, the famous Dalai taiji, the Derbet owners considered Kundulen Ubashiya their patron, friend and protector against the claims of Batur hun taiji and his supporters. Above, in notes 7, 9, 14, we have already met with this person; here I will give a few more information about him, gleaned from the "Biography of Zaya Pandita". "In the year of Usun Khonin (1643), Zaya Pandita wintered in Khusuluk at the (headquarters) of Kundulen Ubashiya. In the spring of the year Gal Nokhoy (1646), Kundulen Ubashi went to war against the Zungarian Batur hun taichjiya and the Khoshut Ochirtu taichzhiya, was defeated at Ukharlik and returned through Talki, moreover, many people and livestock died from the infection.Zaya Pandita, returning to Zungaria from the Torghuts, saw Kundulen Ubashiy and promised to reconcile him; taiji and Ochirtu taizhi)". When the Khoshut Ochirtu taizhi and Ablai taizhi (brothers from the same father but different mothers) quarreled and started a war (in the summer of Temur Uker, i.e. 1661), the Derbetovites and the children of Kundulen Ubashi supported Ablai. (As you can see, Kundulen Ubashi wandered west from Ablai, on the way from Zyungaria to the Torguts). In the year of Temur Gahai (1671), Ablai, in conjunction with the Derbets and Kundulen Ubashiy, conquered the Derbet Dayan taichzhiy, then the Torgut Daichin; at the beginning of 1672, Ablai was taken by the Torgut Ayuka (see note 14). Was it not at this time that Kundulen Ubashi joined the Kalmyks?

16 . Although the Volga Oirats say that Ude Agas, i.e. Dorji Rabtan, was the daughter of Kho Orlek, but it is likely that she, as noted above, in note 4, was the daughter of his son Shukur Daichin. Tradition says that she, being married to the Khoshut Tsetsen Khan, poisoned her stepson Galdama (born in 1635 from the daughter of the Zungarian Batur hun taychzhiy), not wanting Galdama, who accidentally found out about her love affairs with Gelun Gakemchiy, would reveal her secret. In 1667 Ude Aghas poisons Galdama; in 1671, the Khoshut Ablai taizhi went to war against the Torgut Shukur Daichin, whom in the same year the Khoshut Tsetsen Khan sent to Barun Tala, i.e., to Tibet, and in 1673 Dorchzhi Rabtan (Ude Agas) returned to Zyungaria from Zu, t i.e. Tibet, where she traveled, probably in order to atone for her sins with prayers and rich gifts to Buddhist shrines. The Zyungarian Galdan hong taizhi (Boshoktu khan), as noted in note 14, arrived in Zyungaria from Tibet and appropriated to himself the ulus and all the rights of his father Batur hong taizhiy. The Oirat owners, being dissatisfied with the leading member of the Oirat Seim, the Khoshut Tsetsen Khan, began to take the side of Boshoktu Khan. Here is what the "Biography of Zaya Pandita" says: "In the winter of the year Temur Gahai, i.e. 1671, Aldar taishi (son of the Derbet Tsoin, grandson of Dalai taishi) went up the Irtysh and joined Boshokt Khan ... In the spring of the year, Usun Uker , i.e. 1673, Danjin hong taizhi, son of Mahai Dalai Ubashiya, grandson of the Khoshut Kundulen Ubashiya, betrayed (Tsetsen Khan) and joined Boshokt Khan ... In the summer of Modon Tula, i.e. 1675, Tsetsen Khan sent army against Boshoktu Khan... In the autumn of the same year, Dorji Rabtan arrived from Zu. In the year of Gal Lu, i.e., 1676, the troops of Boshoktu Khan came to the Ili River... Dorji Rabtan then fled with the Ayuki ambassador, reached the source Bem and expressed a desire to go to the Torguts, who roamed between the Volga and the Urals.Achitu Tsorchzhi, Arana Durishu (grandson of Khoshut Kundulen Ubashiya), Uyzan Nanso, Padma and others advised to go down, others advised to go to Barun Tala, others advised to stay here. Since Achitu Tsorzhi wished to go down the river Bem, Dorzhi Rabtan went down... In that winter, Tse Tsen Khan gathered up to 10,000 troops in Zuldus. Some advised him to go to Barun Tala, others to Khoton, others advised him to take possession of the (Kyrgyz) Khasaks, others to make peace (with Boshoktu Khan); some advised to follow Dorji Rabtan and join the Torghuts; There were also those who advised to spend the winter here. Tsetsen Khan asked everyone to spend the winter here, promising fodder for livestock and food for people. .. Lobzan Gombo, the son of Galdama, fled alone to Barun Tala, that is, to Tangut ... In the middle winter month of the year Gal Lu, that is, 1676, Boshoktu Khan captured Tsetsen Khan, coming from Shara Bel ... In the middle autumn month of the year Gal Mogo, i.e. 1677, Boshoktu Khan migrated from the Khabtsaga tract, located by the Ili River, to the Tsagan Khochzhir tract; from here for the winter migrated to the river. Irtysh ... In the summer of the year Shoro Morin, that is, 1678, Boshoktu Khan roamed the Gurban Tulga tract; the Mongol Shene Khan came to see him here; in the autumn of the same year, Torgut Zamso (Ayuki's brother) and Dorchzhi Rabtan came to him; in winter, Zarbunai, the ambassador of the Dalai Lama, arrived (probably, for this they came to Boshoktu Khan to ask for the freedom of Tsetsen Khan) ... In the winter of Shoro Khonin, that is, 1679, Boshoktu Khan wintered at the river. Irtysh... In the spring of the year, Temur Bechin, that is, 1680, Boshoktu Khan passed through Zaire, spent the summer in Coco Goya, then went to war on Yarkand, took it. In winter, the khan's headquarters was in Boro Tala. In the winter of the year Temur Bechin, i.e., 1680, the Khoshut Tsetsen Khan died (burkhan bolbo) in Boro Tala. Dorji Rabtan, the wife of the Khoshut Tsetsen Khan, returned from Tibet to Zyungaria in 1675, and left Zyungaria for the Volga in 1676 to Ayuki Taijiya, in 1678 with Zamsoyu, brother of Ayuki Taijiya, came to Zungaria in order to ask Boshoktu Khan for freedom to her husband Tsetsen Khan.The further fate of Dorji Rabtan or Ude Aghas is unknown.

17 . "You, the Don chieftains and Cossacks, and Ayuki taishi with his Kalmyk ulus people, on October 1 of this year, 7181 (1672), went near Azov, killed many of your people and drove away the animal herds, and took the brother of the Azov pasha, who is now sitting at We, the Azov people, will pay back 200 rubles, and 500 Azov people. See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. Vol. I. No. 533; ibid, No. 565. Prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkasskoy wrote to the sovereign that the Kalmyk Ayuki taishi da Solom Serenya taishi and his son sent their people 10,000 people to the Crimean uluses, they fought Tatars near Perekop, beat many thousands, stole every animal and uluses and villages smashed and that the Crimean Khan himself was kept in the Crimea to help the Turkish Sultan. See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. T. I. No. 556.

18 . Ayuki taishi with a written record given by him on February 27, 7181, i.e. 1673, on the Solyanaya River, a few versts from Astrakhan, under the boyar and voivode Yakov Nikitich, Prince Odoevsky, steward Ivan Mikhailovich, Prince Korkodinov, Vasily Lavrentievich Pushechnikov and clerk Petr Samoilov, reinforced the coats of his grandfather and father and pledged: 1. to go to war against the enemies of the great sovereign, where there is a command; 2. do not come to war on the cities of the great sovereign; 3. no evil and no zeal to repair; 4. live in peace and harmony with the sovereign's people; 5. to be in eternal allegiance and obedience; 6. to want good for the great sovereign and his people in everything in truth, without any unsteadiness and cunning; 7. see note. 13, item 2; 8. see note. 11, pp. 5-7; 9. see note. 13, item 4; 10. if the Yedisan, Nagai and Enbulutsky murzas, who roam with me, secretly leaving, learn to steal, beat the sovereign's people and have them in full, then restrain them from theft and ruin without any excuse; 11. see note. 11, pp. 9.10; 12. if Russian people, Georgians, Belarusians, Volokhi and Multians of the Orthodox Christian faith will leave for the cities of the great sovereign from the uluses, then I will order my ulus people according to the murals to have a payback by decree of the great sovereign; 13. if not baptized Kalmyks and Tatars of my ulus will leave for the cities, then such fugitives will be given back to me who were not baptized; 14. followers of the royal majesty of the cities of the Orthodox Christian faith and non-believers who will leave Bukhara, from Yurgench, from Khiva and other possessions to the Kalmyk uluses in order to go to the cities of the great sovereign, then, without detaining them in the uluses, let them go to the cities, oh than in uluses to make an order; 15. if in the Kalmyk uluses there are still admirers of the great sovereign, then they should be sent to the cities; 16. There are no Bashkirs in our uluses, but if they appear, then let them go to the cities of the great sovereign; 17. see note. 11, item 12; 18. send to the great sovereign about the affairs of a few people; 19. to Astrakhan to send to the boyars and governors about all their affairs; 20. trade near Astrakhan to repair against the previous decree of the great sovereign without any quarrels and zeal with the Russian people; 21. with our ulus people, send us horses to Moscow for sale in the villages of Ardabazar on the former road to Tambov, Kasimov, Volodymyr; 22. to release the Ayukayevs from Moscow and Astrakhan without detention; 23. if the great sovereign instructs me and the ulus people and murzas to go to the Crimea and the Crimean uluses, or where there is a command, then we will go without any rushing off; 24. if the sovereign sends us a salary in order for our services, in addition to annual salaries, then accept what will be sent; to have a salary according to the decree of the great sovereign; 25. when I arrive in my uluses from this congress, then according to the current agreement, I will go to war against the Kumyk owners with the Kalmyks and Tatars in order to reveal many of their lies before the great sovereign; 26. doing a fishery over them this spring (1673), we will go to war in the Crimea and the Crimean uluses with many congregations without any reeling; 27. I, Ayukai taishi Monchakov, swear to the great sovereign for myself, for brothers, nephews, relatives, for all ulus people, for Nagai, Edisan, Enbulut, Maliybash, Kelechin murzas, their children, nephews and ulus people who roam with us , on that everything, as it is written in this shert entry; 28. if we do not serve and please the great sovereign, we will refer to the Turkish sultan and others and break our wool in some way, then may God's wrath and the fiery sword be on us, and that saber, which I, having taken out of the scabbard, on I put my head and to my throat, from my enemy, may I be stabbed in the throat, and in the next century, may we be cursed according to our Kalmyk faith; 29. in the past years, the Kalmyk Oblay and Duar and their ulus people committed many lies before the great sovereign; serving the great sovereign, I, Ayuka taishi, for those their iniquities, perpetrated a fishery on them, beat many of their ulus people and took Oblay and Duar; Oblai is now in the uluses, and Duar taishi is on the Terek: I must give them both to the Russians under this treaty ... At the congress there were people related to Ayukai taishi. or Ablai taishi was a Khoshut owner, a nephew of Kundulen Ubashiya, who was mentioned above in notes 7, 14 and 15. Tradition says that Ayuki taychi, having captured Ablai, held him first in his ulus, then handed him over to the Russians, who held he was under guard in Tsaritsyn, later Ayuki begged Ablai to come to his ulus, who ended his troubled life at Mogoytu Ulan ravine near the Sala River Duar or Dugar taizhi was the son of the Torgut owner Syunke, about whom we refer to notes 5 and 6; therefore, Dugar will be the cousin of Ayuki Taijiyu, whom Ablai helped to defeat in 1672. I hope to provide some more information about Dugar and Ablai later.

19 . Solom Tseren taizhi was the son of Manchzhushiri, the grandson of the famous Dalai taishi, whom Fischer mentions on pages 318, 329, 330, 415 and 416 in his History of Siberia. Louzan, the son of Kho Orlek, and Nazar, the son of Nam Seren, helped Ayuka tayzhiy in 1672 to take away the ulus of his grandfather Shukur Daichin from the Khoshut Ablai and capture Ablai himself. Compare notes 14 and 18. In note 17, it is noted that in 1672 Solom Tseren, together with Ayuki taichzhiy, went to the Crimean uluses during the war; consequently, the news given in our original must be taken in such a way that, in 1674, having finally established himself as a nomad on the upland side of the Volga, he fell under the influence of Ayuki taychzhiya. We have interesting information about the kind of assistance Ayuki taizhi and Solom Tseren taizhi provided us with in fisheries and searches for the Crimea. In 7182 (in July 1674), by decree of the sovereign, the Kalmyk Ayukai taisha and many other Kalmyk, Edisan and Nogai murzas with their ulus people were ordered to go fishing over Azov and over the enemy Crimean yurts. See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. T.1. No. 581. On October 9, 7184 (1675), Prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkasskoy wrote that Ayuka taisha did not go to the Crimean fishery, and he did not send taisha (Derbet) Solom Serenya; that, although Ayuki sent his younger brother Big Zamsu (Yeke Zamso) and his ulus Kalmyks of small people with him, but he did not go to the sovereign service and returned with the Don back to his uluses, only Mazan Batur (a descendant of the Torgut owner Bur , about which see note 1), with which there were 1,000 people of different ulus Kalmyks; although he was in his infancy, however, while serving the great sovereign, he climbed over the Don and, together with Prince Kaspulat Cherkassky, with Ataman Serk Ivan and with the Zaporizhzhya army, went for fishing to the Crimean yurts across the Rotten Sea beyond Perekop (Zaisangi of the Erketenevsky ulus lead their own family from this Mazan Batur, whom descendants still sing in their songs). In this campaign, they were at the Stone Bridge, knocked down the outposts that were set up by the Crimean saltans, beat many Crimean people, burned villages and villages and took tents and bunchuks, and on the way back, at Perekop, they had a battle with three saltans who wanted cut off their path; then they captured the hero Murza Mansurov and other Tatars. See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. T. I. No. 3. On the service of the Kalmyks of this time, the charter dated December 27, 7184 (1675) says: before the commission of the service, they had never been." At the same time, it was instructed to send decrees to the Bashkirs and the Kalmyk Ayuka taisha and Sol Seren taisha, so that they would go to the Crimea next spring (1676). See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. Vol. I. No. 614.

20 . Shertnoy record, given on January 15, 7185 (1677) at the same place beyond the river. Volga near Astrakhan under the okolnichi and governor Prince Konstantin Osipovich Shcherbatov, Duma nobleman Kirill Osipovich Khlopov, clerks Semyon Rumyantsev and Alexei Simonov, Ayuki taizhi, his brother Monchak Zamsa (Yeke Zamso) for himself and for his brother, his own smaller Zamsa (Norbo Zamso), Solo Seren for himself and all of them for Batyr taisha (son of Syunke, cousin uncle of Ayuki) and new arrivals Dayan Serenya (sons of Derbet Dalai taishia?), Dol (?), Babsha (Babushi, son of Derbet Bu Yelden, younger brother of Dalai taishia?), Ayukaya Sharapova (?), who again came to roam after the treaty of 7181 (1673), for brothers, children, nephews, grandchildren and for the Nagai, Edisan, Enbulut, Maliybash and Kelechi murzas and others pledged to be under the sovereign's high hand in eternal citizenship, forever unrelenting. Having reinforced the coat of 7181, they decided: 1. see note 18, paragraphs. 1-7; 2. if from the Crimea or other states ambassadors, envoys, sent, or sheets through some people for any business are sent to us, then we will write about those sent to the great sovereign to Moscow or to Astrakhan to the boyars and governors without any ranting; the very same ambassadors, envoys and those sent without a decree of the great sovereign to their states should not be released and not written against those sheets sent; let go of id and write sheets from the state command, as he indicates; if they are commanded to be sent to Moscow or Astrakhan, then the order is to be executed and sent with their envoys; 3. see note 11, paras. 3, 5 and 6; 4. And what about in the past 7183 and 7184 and in the current 7185 years (i.e. 1674, 1675 and 1676) our Kalmyk ulus people, Nagai, Edisan, Enbulut Tatars violated the former wool, committed murders and robberies to people of different ranks, in full imali and uchugs ruined - about all that we, taishas, ​​in our uluses to find by painting, which we, taishis, now on the contracts, the painting of that ruin; find followers and send robbery to Astrakhan, and punish the thieves for that; 5. see note 11, paragraph 7; note 13, item 4 (no mention of the Shah of Persia and theses); note 18, paragraph 10; 6. speaks of the Nogai, Edisan, Enbulutsk Tatars, who betrayed the tsars Mikhail Fedorovich and Alexei Mikhailovich. See note 10 and note 11, paragraphs 9 and 10; 7. see note 18, paragraph 12 (added: and those who are captive according to the murals are not found and we do not ask for repayment for those), 8. do not ask those Kalmyks who, according to their desires, are baptized into the Orthodox Christian faith for the Orthodox Christian faith ( back) to us taishas and our ulus people; 9. see note 18, paragraph 13; 10. see note 18, paras. 14-16; 11. which messengers, by decree of the great sovereign, will be sent from Moscow to me, Ayuka taisha, with letters from him of the great sovereign and to me, Ayukayu taishe, those of his great sovereign, to receive letters, standing up and taking off my hat, with great honor; 12. see note 11, paragraph 12; 13. see note 18, paras. 18-21, 23; 14. We, taishas, ​​have an annual monetary salary from the sovereign, against the former great sovereign of the decree, 590 rubles each. for a year; if they come to serve the great sovereign, and to us, taishas, ​​in the uluses from where again the taishis with the ulus people roam, then they will be in the same salary, in the sovereign's salary, in 590 rubles; 15. See note 18, p. 28. At the congress with the taishas, ​​relatives and possessors of the best ulus people were and shert all of them taishas, ​​and that the taishi put their hands in Kalmyk to the shert record of Ayukai and Solom Seren in Kalmyk and that Kalmyk letter in Astrakhan in the Order Chamber it was translated, and the Kalmyks translated into the Tatar language so that there is no Kalmyk translator in Astrakhan, and the Tatar language translated into Russian is written: no tax and robbery should be repaired, Ayukai and Solom Seren taishi both for the murz and for their kindred and close people had a hand." See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. T. II. No. 672.

21 . January 24, 7191 (1683) under the boyar and voivode Prince Andrei Ivanovich Golitsyn, okolnichi Prince Nikita Ivanovich Primkov-Rostovsky, Duma nobleman and voivode Stepan Bogdanovich Lovchikov near Astrakhan beyond the river. Volga in the same place was sherted for eternal and faithful allegiance to Ayukai taizhi for themselves, for their brother Big Zamsu and for their children Shabdar (Chakdorchzhab), Raptan, Sanchzhan (Sanchzhab), Konchzhap (Gunchzhab), Solom Seren taisha for themselves and for their son Munke Temur, Lesser Zamsa (Norbo Zamso) for himself, and all of us: Ayukai, Solom Seren and Zamso for Nazar Mamemut taisha (Nazar Mamut, son of Nam Seren, cousin of Ayuka), Molesh taishu (? Moloshi), Dorchzhi taishu, son Nazar Mamutova, Baibu taishu (son of Torgut Ayusha, grandson of Temene batur or son of Louzan, cousin uncle of Ayuki taichzhiya or son of Derbet Toin?), Circassian taishu (?), Ayukaya taishu of the son of Daijin (?), Echi taishu (?), Danchzhik taishu (?), Tsetsen taishu (son of the Derbet Daichin khoshuchiya?), for his brothers, children, and so on (Batur is also mentioned. See note 20). The content of this shert entry: 1) See note 18, paragraphs 5 and 6; 2) and what about in the past years to 7190 (1681) and in 7190 (1681, 1682) and in 7191 (1682, 1683) years I, Ayukai, and we, Zamsy taishi, with military people, with Kalmyks and Tatars, the old wool violated and went with the traitorous Bashkirs to the Caucasian and Ufa districts, as well as under other Ukrainian cities, ravaged villages, cities, villages and under those cities and along the Volga and in the fields and on the passages they took Russian people, Bashkirs and Cheremis with their wives and children, horse and animal herds were driven away, robberies were repaired and uchugs were ruined; and those taken Russian people, all of us, taishas, ​​gathering in our uluses, send to Astrakhan; let the Bashkirs and Cheremis go back to their former places, where someone lived; to the thieves who took the Russian people along the Volga for a treaty, to inflict execution and ruin without any reproach, and henceforth we ourselves should not do this at all and inflict an order under the death penalty, so that our ulus people, Kalmyks and Tatars would not go to war under the cities of the great they didn’t ruin the sovereign, villages and villages, they didn’t beat people, they didn’t have them in full, they didn’t drive away horse and animal herds and didn’t do any harm; 3) if the Bashkirs, having stolen, betray the great sovereign and come to us, taishas, ​​then, having accepted them, do not join them in stealing, but send them to the great sovereign, to Moscow and to the cities of royal majesty; 4) Compare note 11, item 7; note 13, item 4; note 18, paragraph 10; note 11, paragraphs 9 and 10 (added: "to return the princes and murzas of the Yurt with the ulus people of the Astrakhan nomad camp, who in the past 7190 (1681, 1682) departed from Astrakhan from the Cossack devastation and landed in our uluses"); note 18, paras. 12 and 13 (added: "bring the followers taken under the cities of the great sovereign to the cities, where they are closer and more taxable, with escorts without a trace"), 14 and 15; note 20, paras. 7 and 10; note 11, item 12; note 18, paras. 18-21, 25 and 28 (added: “if we find the captured Russian people, we don’t give them all up, we won’t let the Ufimians and the Cheremis go, or we will continue to accept the traitors of the Bashkirs and, uniting with them, we will commit some insolence, and not send them to the cities to the great sovereigns "). See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. T. II. No. 990.

22 . See note 9.

23 . Above, in notes 4 and 16, it was erroneously said that Dorji Rabtan or Ude Atas was the daughter of Shukur Daichin, she was the daughter of his son Puntsuk. Shukur Daichin (in 1640) married his son Puntsuk to the daughter of the Zungarian Batur hun taychjiya; from this marriage Ayuki was born, who was brought up in Zyungaria by his grandfather Batur hong taychzhiya. Shukur Daichin, on his way back from Tangut, called in (in 1655) to Zungaria, took Ayuki and returned to his uluses ... The elder sister (yegechi) Ayuki was married to the Khalkha Mergen khan Yerinkei, and the younger (Dorchzhi Rabtan) was to the Khoshut Ochirtu Tsetsen Khan, whose daughter subsequently married Chakdorchzhab, the eldest son of Ayuki... The wife of Ochirtu Tsetsen Khan (Dorji Rabtan) went to the Torguts and lived there with her brother (akha) Ayuki... Tsevan Rabtan wanted to marry Anu, granddaughter Ochirtu Tsetsen Khan (whose daughter?), but Galdan Boshoktu Khan kidnapped her and took her for himself. Tsevan Rabtan, offended by his uncle's act, migrated to Boro Tala and, wishing to be related to Ayuki taichzhiy, married his uncle's daughter. Sanchjab, the third son of Ayuki taychzhiya, accompanied his sister to Zyungaria to her fiancé, having with him more than 15,000 families. Tyavka, Khan of the Khasaks (Kyrgyz), was about to block the way to Zyungaria, but Sanchzhab bravely made his way, defeated Tyavka and arrived in Boro Tala ... All Ayuka's relatives were hated by Galdan Boshoktu Khan ... In 1697, when Galdan was defeated by the Chinese army and fled, Ayuki sent zaisang Dorchzhichzhab with 1,000 troops to the Altai country in order to follow Galdan. Tsevan Rabtan sent Sanchjab with 20,000 troops to join him, but Diba the Tangut, being on friendly terms with Galdan, prevented this: Sanchjab returned back. In 1698 Galdan died in flight. Noyons Khoshuchi, Sebten and Munko, who obeyed Ayuka, accompanied Tsevan Rabtan to Beijing to worship the Bogd Khan with congratulations on the joyful victory over Galdan and tribute. In 1700, Ayuki again sent ambassadors with tribute to the Bogd Khan, but the ambassadors were oppressed while passing through Zyungaria. After the complete defeat of Galdan, Tsevan Rabtan tried to unite the numerous clans of the Oirats under his rule, for which he kept Sanchjab with him. When Ayuki demanded his son, Tsevan Rabtan drove Sanchjab home to the Volga, and kept the subordinates who came with him and divided them among the Zungar otoks. See "History of the Mongolian and Turkestan Vans and Guns", notebook 101, sheets 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13. Zoriktu hun taizhi (Tsevan Rabtan) on the 11th day of Tsagan Sara year Modon Mechin (1704) arrested Sanchjab , took 15,000 wagons of his subordinates (torguts). See "The Legend of the Oirats" by Gaban Sharaba.

24 . On May 19 of this year, 7195 (1687), in our great sovereigns, a letter was written to you, our neighbor boyar and saver and court voivode, Prince Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, that the Kalmyk Tsagan Batyr taisha and the children sent their envoys to us, the great sovereigns, beating their foreheads, us, the great sovereign, under our royal majesty, the autocratic high hand into eternal citizenship, and so that we grant the taisha, his children and all their ulus people, order them to roam between the Volga and the Don along the rivers Khopra, Medveditsa and Ilavle. We, the great sovereigns, granted Tsagan Batyr, his children and all the ulus people to eternal citizenship, and ordered us to roam in those places where they now roam until our decree. How will this letter of ours come to you (Golitsyn), you would henceforth, where he, taisha, and his children with ulus people, would roam in summer and winter according to your consideration and write to him, taisha, from yourself about it, but it would be proper for him , taisha, roam beyond the Volga on the meadow side along the Akhtuba river. See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. T. II. No. 1245.

25 . On July 13, 7205 (1697), the boyar Prince Boris Alekseevich Golitsyn was to inspect the lower towns and build a new line and a sluice business on the Kamyshenka River. Through many transfers, the Kalmyk Ayuki came to the same river Kamyshenka with many neighbors and the best ulus people; not reaching, in advance of himself he sent his neighbors Unitey and Ezhu to the train to Golitsyn at the mouth of the river. Kamyshenki talk about the place where he should be; according to the dressing, he became from the mouth of the river. Kamyshenki in 5 versts. On July 15, Ayuki sent his close people to see Golitsyn somewhere; Golitsyn sent to him against that and relied on his reasoning, where it was more convenient for him to see each other. According to many transfers, Ayuki ordered to put his headquarters close to Golitsyn's convoy and from himself from the headquarters went on a date with all his neighbors, about which he sent a message in advance. Prince Golitsyn rode half way to Ayuka and, as usual, they congratulated him on horseback; then we went together to the tents. Were in tents. Prince Golitsyn called Ayuki to dine with him, but he, after talking with his foreman, said that it was impossible for him to go in a wagon train for slingshots, cannons and crowds. Prince Golitsyn ordered to throw back all the slingshots and bring people together, leaving a small number on guard; testifying to this, Ayuki rode in a wagon train with all his owners and close people in a large crowd and dined at Golitsyn; after dinner, after sitting enough, he went to his camps. There was no contract that day. On July 16, Ayuki came to Prince Golitsyn and asked him to come to him; Golitsyn, seeing his loyalty to the great sovereign, went with only one court to the smallest people and without servants. Ayuka's son (Gunchzhab) met many people away from headquarters. Arriving, Golitsyn and Ayuki sat, had fun and between themselves made a brotherhood with great spiritual reinforcement. With fraternal reinforcements, Ayuki took his son Genzhep (Gunchzhab), handed him over to Prince Boris Alekseevich with his hands, giving him all observance and teaching of the policy of Moscow and other politicians. Golitsyn stayed at Ayuka's quite until night. Ayuki ordered his son Genzhep and his nephew Zamsin (Yeke Zamso or Norb Zamso?) with close people, not in big people, to see Golitsyn to his camp and spend the night there; they spent the night. (The next day) On July 17, after sending Prince Golitsyn, Ayuki, with all his owners and close people, came to dine with Golitsyn in not many people; after dinner they went to special tents and talked about the affairs proper to the great sovereign: 1) if a military case calls for the Bukharians, Karakalpaks and Kirghiz-Kaisaks, then give Ayuka 2 semi-golanki and 3 mazhers and to them cannonballs and bombs, gunners and grenade launchers, and gunpowder 20 pounds; also give him annually 20 pounds of gunpowder and 10 pounds of lead; 2) it is safe for him, Ayuka, to roam freely under all the cities of the great sovereign, and not to inflict insults, crowding and theft in the nomad, both Ayukin and other ulus people; 3) for the sake of the sovereign’s service, as well as for his prey, Ayuki send his people to the Crimea, the Kuban and the mountains with ease, if they are attacked by enemy strong people and if they run away to the sovereign’s cities, then do not beat them off from the cities, but how can help be repaired while enemy people lie under them; if Ayuki will send letters about this with people from himself behind his own hand and seal, then the letters will be announced to the governors in the cities, but without a letter they will not be sent anywhere; 4) Kalmyks, ulus people of Ayuka, who, having stolen, will run away to the sovereign cities alone or with their wives or children, do not accept or baptize them, but detain them in the cities and write about them to Moscow and Ayuka, if the governors are for by decree, then to rule on the governors of money at 30 rubles per person and give them to Ayuka; if this is done by city people, then the money should be ruled for the same at the governors, and they should be written to the service; 5) to transport Ayuka with his house to the sovereign's people across the Volga from Cherny Yar to Saratov, where ships will arrive; other uluses to the same sovereign people and in courts under previous agreements (? ) to transport from hire without any detention and insults, what to look for the governors to order with reinforcements; 6) send sovereign decrees to Ufa, Yaik and to the Don towns, so that there are no quarrels and quarrels from the Cossacks and Bashkirs and that they live peacefully, about which to make an order under the death penalty. Prince Boris Alekseevich Golitsyn secured the treaty clauses with his own hand and gave it to his brother Ayuka, and against that he took from Ayuka a nasty letter for his brother's hand. Such handwritten white letters were exchanged on July 20. See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. T. III. No. 1591. Bakta-Girey recaptured this authentic treaty letter from Ayuki. See in the archive of the Astrakhan Chamber of State Property Cases of the Kalmyk Administration of 1721 No. 16.

26 . Ayuki had four wives: a) Akhala, daughter of Khoshut Kundulen Ubashiya; there was a learned, intelligent woman, Chakdorchzhab was born from her; b) Wangjil, also from the house of Khoshut owners (who?), Gunchzhab was born from her; when Ayuki was at war, the Nutuk drove her to her family; c) Taichzhi Abga, the daughter of the Zungarian Tsevan Rabtan, from her were born: Tseren Dondok, Galdan Danjin, Arabtan, Baran Tseren; d) neither her name nor her gender is known. Chakdorchzhab had wives: a) the niece of the Zyungar lama noyon Kambo (name unknown), from her were born: Dasan (Datsan), Baksada and Nimter; b) Gabala, daughter of the Derbet Solom Tseren; from her were born: Dondok Rashi, Dobchi Rashi (Solom Dobchi), Busurman, Yandak, Bodon and Dorji Rashi. (Reported by the elder Bebe Gaban Tsoyzhy). So far, I do not know the name of that Chakdorchzhabov's wife, because of which there were strife between father and son.

27 . See note 23.

28 . On September 30, 1708, the close minister and Kazan and Astrakhan governor Pyotr Matveyevich Apraksin, going from Astrakhan to Kazan on a floating voyage and departing 200 versts from Astrakhan, saw the Kalmyk Ayukoyu Khan (Ayuki was first named khan at the tract of the Danilovka River on Akhtuba, three versts from the Volga River) and said the following about the affairs of the great sovereign:

I. Apraksin praised the service of Ayuki Khan, henceforth encouraged him with the mercy of the great sovereign and said that Ayuki served the great sovereign more than others in all fidelity and repaired all care for the Russian people and that he most faithfully served, for which the mercy and salary of the great sovereign never will be taken away from him, and that from his enemies he will be guarded with all care. Ayuki Khan promised the great sovereign to serve until his death in all fidelity without fail and not leave the nomadic uluses from the river. Volga.

II. Apraksin said: “By the gracious decree of the great sovereign, Kazan, Astrakhan, Terek, Ufa and all the lower cities were handed over to me with any government in all matters; when the enemies come under the cities and counties, and I will write to Ayuki Khan from Kazan or Astrakhan, so that he sends against the enemies of military people, then his people would faithfully serve and protect each other with the Russian people for one thing: if the khan's people prove their service, then they will be given a large, contented, state salary. come to Astrakhan, Terek, Kazan or other lower cities, Apraksin will write to Ayuki, then he, Ayuki Khan, will send his military people with children, grandchildren and others there and will serve faithfully, along with the Russians and will never leave his faithful services.

III. Apraksin demanded that Ayuki Khan have taishas, ​​Kalmyk owners and their ulus people in all obedience and fear, so that taishas and owners (noyons) themselves would not go to the upland side, where there are cities, villages and villages, and would not send their people to ruin ; if someone appears in the Russian districts as self-will and causes ruin, those thieves will be executed, and the ruin will be ordered to pay and rule on their owners. Ayuki Khan told about this to all the locals and the owners who were with him, ordered firmly and wanted to immediately send decrees to all distant uluses to (Torgut) Chimet (son of Batur, Dugar's younger brother) and (Derbet) Munk Temur (son of Solom Tseren) under mortal fear, so that the owners themselves did not go to the upland side of the river. The Volga and their people did not send.

IV. Apraksin said that this year the people of Chimet and other owners have caused a lot of ruin in Penza, Kozlovsky, Tambov and other districts, burned more than a hundred villages and villages and took many men and women, and horse and cattle herds. Previously, it was written from Moscow and from me from Astrakhan about the return of that yasyr from to this day to the investigation of a small number, defense and payment were not made, Russian yasyrs were sold to Kizilbashia (Persia), the Kuban, Khiva and Bukharia, and many more are in Kalmyk in the uluses of Russian yasyrs, except for the Don ones, to find, in all uluses to make a strong order, so that those yasyrs would be found and brought to the khan, and he would order them to be given to those cities, to which ulus is closer. Ayuki Khan replied that this theft was committed without his knowledge by the Kalmyks of Chimet, Munke Timur and others, that he never wanted this and had a great shame in that and feared the wrath of the sovereign. Although Chimet and Munke Timur are distant from him, Ayuki, by their nomads, and he cannot know what they will do and keep, however, he will immediately send decrees to them with great fear so that they do not do this in the future, they appease their people, the captured Russian people they would immediately find everyone and send them to the sovereign cities; if they do not do this, they disobey, then he, Ayuki Khan, will write against them to the great sovereign and governor in Kazan and go to war with military people. The great sovereign, for a faithful inspection of those Russian yasyrs in the khanovs of the Kalmyk, Edisan and Enbulut uluses, would have left a good man from his own governor; who will appear, all of them should be immediately collected and sent to Astrakhan. For this, the Astrakhan nobleman Mikhail o Bereitov was left.

V. Apraksin said that Chimet taisha was in every obedience to Ayuka Khan, like others; if he continues to be disobedient, then the b-khan will deal with him and take him to the fortress; the khan will not be abandoned either by the grace of the great sovereign, or by the protection of military people. Ayuki Khan answered that he would appease Chimet, punish him with fear and petition, so that he faithfully served the great sovereign and did not cause ruin to the residents of Russian cities, did not send his people to Russian cities and did nothing without his knowledge, otherwise the khan will protect him in order to catch Chimet and go to war with him.

VI. Apraksin said that he, through letters and sendings, informed the khan about what the ruin of the city of Terek had been in the past (1707) year from the thief of the self-proclaimed Saltan (Murat, whose interesting response speeches are in the Archives of the Astrakhan Chamber of State Property in the files of 1703, according to alphabet No. 1), Chechens, Kumyks and Terek Nagais, that when the Terek was under siege, the khan promised to send 3,000 Kalmyks with his grandchildren Dasan (son of Chakdorchzhab) and Dondok (son of Gunchzhab), but did not fulfill: Dasan came to Astrakhan without people, and Dondok came with small people and was rewarded with a salary, but after leaving Astrakhan, he turned his back on the road. Now Chechens, Nagais and other local owners are doing all sorts of dirty tricks to the Terek and boasting of ruin; and Ayuki Khan would have sent 4,000 or 5,000 of his people against them and ordered them to be ruined because they had done a great offense and ruin to the Terek to the tsarist majesty, our common sovereign, with that thieves' Saltan, took many Russian people and sold them to different lands, and others are still kept in their captivity on great paybacks. With this, Ayuki Khan would have shown faithful service to the great sovereign, along with the Khan's people, military men from the Terek and Cossacks from Grebensk would be sent against the Chechens. Ayuki Khan said to this that he would send 5,000 people or more with his son Chakdorchzhap (Chakdorchzhab) or with his grandchildren and ordered those Chechens and Terek Nagais to be ruined for the Terek ruin, when they still did not calm down, and that the war against the Chechens, probably and Chimet will go with joy and deserve the guilt of his great sovereign.

VII. Ayuki Khan asked Apraksin to send decrees to all cities from Astrakhan to Saratov, so that the cities where the Khan would send would be protected and given him military men and guns, when he, the Khan, from which enemies there would be violence. Apraksin replied that everything would be done, and what could not be done to the governors, then write to Kazan or Astrakhan, where he, the governor, would be; if people are sent from the khan to him, then it will be ordered to the governors to give them carts and escorts in the cities with every pleasure and without any delay. If there will be some enemy offensive and violence in these cities, and the governors will write and send to Ayuki Khan about sending military people to defend themselves, then the khan, according to his promised word and faithful service to the great sovereign, should send his military Kalmyks to any great sovereign enemies and protect those cities.

VIII. Ayuki Khan said that he also wanted to have a faithful and truthful friendship and a named brotherhood with Peter Matveyevich, what a strong brotherhood he had with the boyar Prince Boris Alekseevich (see note 25), that Peter Matveyevich, by decree of the great sovereign, was appointed by the ruling governor over Kazan, Astrakhan and all the cities of the Lower Land, and all sorts of things were handed over to him by a full decree of his great sovereign, as it had never happened to anyone before. Apraksin replied that he wanted a true named brotherhood and strong friendship with Ayuki Khan, for all the best royal majesty, their common sovereign, deeds. See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. T. IV. No. 2207.

29 . Pyotr Matveevich Apraksin on September 5, 1710 saw again at the river. Danilovka, in the same place, with Ayuki Khan, who was with other taishas in a crowd, and spoke the following about the affairs of the great sovereign:

I. Apraksin said the same thing as in Article 1 28 of the note with the following addition: the faithful service of the khan is known to the great sovereign, who, for that, at the denunciation of him (Apraksin), granted the khan with an excessive salary with an increase, indicating to give the khan 1,000 rubles a year, also made an increase in gunpowder and lead for the services of his people. Ayuki Khan answered, as before, promising that he would order all taishas not to wander anywhere from the river. Volga.

II. Apraksin said the same thing as in the 2nd article 28 notes. Ayuki Khan and taishi (Torgut) Chimet, (Derbet) Chiter, son of Munke Temur, and (Torgut) Dondok Ombo (son of Gunchzhab) promised not to leave their service.

III. August this year, 1710, His Royal Majesty, with a courier sent on purpose, personally wrote to the governor, so that now, next autumn, all the khan's people, taishas and their ulus people, would migrate to the Don and spend the winter on the Don, which is necessary to prevent the raids of the Kuban thieves' Don Cossacks Nekrasov and others : Ayuki would show his service with this. Ayuki Khan answered that although it was not without difficulty for him, however, he would fulfill that will of the sovereign for the will of the sovereign and for brotherly friendship and love with the governor, and now, next autumn (1710), he would send to the Don against the Manatsky town, not far from Cherkasy, 10,000 Kalmyks with taishas (Torgut) Chimet Baturov and (Derbet) Chiter Munke Temurov, who are ordered to roam until spring on the river. Salu and Manyche, at the bottom of the river. Don; Chimet and Chiter themselves also promised. The khan and the taishi said: how can they go to the Don from when, so that they would be sent from the governor on purpose from the Astrakhan nobles, who would have to be there with them for all sorts of reports.

IV. Apraksin said that the khan should have taishas and others in every obedience, that taishas and owners themselves should not go and let people go to the Nagorny side, where there are cities, villages and villages; if anyone appears, those thieves will be executed, and the ruin will be paid and ruled by the owners. Ayuki Khan told Chimet and Chiter, Dondok Ombo, who were with him, under fear and wanted to send decrees to distant uluses so that the Kalmyks would by no means cross to the Upland side of the river without his decree. Volga; but if someone appears to be obedient, they will repair the final ruin and send them with their heads to Russian cities. Taishi confirmed all this.

V. Apraksin said that in the current 1710 year, the sovereign instructed him, the governor, in agreement with the khan, to manage the war with the Bashkirs for their great theft and many treason, about which the khan was notified in writing and verbally with Dmitry Gorocharev and others, who himself with Dundey, his man, wrote on purpose and ordered to be sent to the Bashkirs. The governor sent from Kazan with the stolnik Ivan Bakhmetev many military people who are already in the indicated place, but the khan still did not send his military Kalmyks to the Bashkirs, who fix all sorts of dirty tricks, still do not pay tribute and boast of ruin and Karakalpaks. Now the khan sent his military men and ordered them to ruin, beat and capture the Bashkirs because they committed treason on the sovereign, Kazan and many counties, a great ruin, beat and took more than 11,000 people and ruined and burned many hundreds of villages and villages. Ayuki Khan replied that he sent 5,000 Kalmyks to the Bashkirs with (Torgut) Dorji taisha, the son of (Nazar) Mamut, and other owners who went on a campaign about three weeks ago, and was waiting for information from there; now it has become too late to send big people to the Bashkirs, but he, the khan, will urgently send big people in the spring (1711) with (Torgut Nazar) Mamut taisha, if there is no other great need.

VI. Ayuki Khan said the same thing as in Article 28 of the note, adding: when he, the Khan, will be subjected to violence from the Bashkirs, Crimeans or other enemies. Apraksin replied that everything would be done, adding: if there are letters from the khanov at his hand, he, Apraksin, orders to give the khan help from Astrakhan and go to the defense without describing himself to Kazan, and orders the commandants of other cities to write about it to Kazan or where the governor will be. Further, the same as in Article 28, Notes. These articles were approved by Ayuki Khan, governor P. M. Apraksin and other taishis and owners with their signatures and seals. See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. T. IV. No. 2291.

30 . The Turks not only took the Don Cossacks Nekrasov and his comrades, who rebelled in 1708, into their region and defended themselves, but gave them help from the Crimean and Kuban Tatars to attack our regions and wreak havoc. See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. T. IV. No. 2322. The Don Cossacks, remaining faithful to the kiss of the cross, helped the tsarist troops in pacifying the Astrakhan rebellion in 1705. See Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. T. IV. No. 2092 (Appendix).

About five years ago, the project of publishing the Astrakhan Encyclopedia was actively discussed. Volume "Nature" managed to be released. Volume "History" vanished into oblivion. I was called there and I prepared the material. Now lies in the archive. Publish on the web

nomadic state formation that existed on the territory of the Astrakhan region since the 50s. XVII in. to 1771 Otkochevka uluses Torgout taishi Ho-Urlyuk from the territory of Dzungaria to the Lower Volga in the 30s. XVII in. laid the foundation for a new public education. In the process of development of the territory of the Lower Volga region by the Kalmyks, foreign policy interaction with the Dzungar Khanate and Russia, the political and administrative-territorial system of the Kalmyk Khanate is being formed. The relations of the khanate with Russia were built on the basis of sherty agreements concluded with the Astrakhan governors, later with governors, and were of a vassal nature - the khan's troops participated in Russian military operations for the provision of nomads and the right to trade in Russian cities. The process of voluntary entry of the Kalmyks into the Russian state was secured by sherts of February 4 and March 30, 1657 - from this period, the military service of the Kalmyks and the regular issuance of salaries to the Kalmyk aristocracy by the Russian government began. The formation of the all-Kalmyk statehood and the formation of the khan's power begins in the 50-60s XVII century, ending by the 70-80s. XVII in. during the reign of Khan Ayuki. The final vassalage of the Kalmyk Khanate in relation to Russia is formed in the first quarter XVIII in. The territory of the khanate was determined by the boundaries of the Kalmyk nomad camps: in the north - along the Big Irgis - to Saratov; in the south - along the river. Kumy, along the Caspian coast; in the east - to the Yaitsky Cossack and Guryev towns; in the west - to the interfluve of the Don and Manych. The earliest evidence of the population of the khanate dates back to 1733. According to Russian officials, there were up to 300-320 thousand people (65 thousand wagons) in the khanate. The head of state was a khan from the Torgout clan, who had sole hereditary power. Judicial branch in the khanate was represented by the court Zargo The khan had at his disposal a large staff of court and general ulus officials: dargi (tax collectors, managing the financial affairs of the khan), demchei (tax collector, managing the affairs of uluses), bichachi (scribes), elchi (messengers), bodogchei (judges). The army of the khanate, formed by the militia of the subject population of the uluses, was divided into horse regiments - hundreds - fifty.

Administratively, the khanate was divided into uluses, aimags and khotons, having their own administration. The uluses of the Kalmyk Khanate were divided into large (destinies) and small (hereditary), which had ethnic names (Tsokhorovsky). In the first quarter XVIII in. there were three destinies, divided according to the traditional military-administrative principle for the Mongols: the left (Zyunovsky), central (Khansky) and right (Barunovsky). The largest inheritance was the Khan's inheritance - the possession of the ruler, which included Erketenevsky, Bagutovsky, Tsohorovsky, Koben-Noyunovsky, Khabuchinevsky, Barunovsky uluses, uluses of the Big and Small Zyungars. The Zyunovsky inheritance included the Kereitsky, Tsaatanovsky, Nogaisky uluses. The Barunovsky inheritance included the uluses of Khabuchins, Baruns and Khoshouts.

The social structure of Kalmyk society included a privileged class ( noyons, zaisangs, clergy) and commoners ( albatu, abganers ketochiners, shabineri).

The basis of the economic life of the population of the Kalmyk Khanate was extensive cattle breeding, an auxiliary function was performed by fishing and domestic handicraft production.

The result of the XVIII in. political, administrative-territorial, religious contradictions between the elite of the Kalmyk Khanate and the Russian government becomes the migration in January 1771 of a significant part of the uluses of the Khanate (30,909 wagons - 70% of the population) led by the governor of Ubushi to the territory of the Xinjiang province of the Chinese Empire. Catherine's decree II dated October 19, 1771, the Kalmyk Khanate was liquidated.

Lit.:

Batmaev M.M. Kalmyks in XVII - XVIII centuries. Events, people, life. Elista: Dzhangar, 1993.

Tsyuryumov A.V. Kalmyk Khanate within Russia: problems of political relations. Elista, Jangar, 2007

Western Mongols (Oirats)

Western Mongols (Oirats) were divided into several large tribes: Choros, Torgouts, Khoshouts and Derbets. The first Oirat khanate, headed by rulers from the Choros tribe, arose in the 1st half of the 15th century, but after the death of Khan Esen in 1455/6

it fell apart. Separate tribes were now ruled by taishis, who from time to time gathered at the chulgan, convened by the chulgan-dargi. The inner problems of the Oirats, the conflicts of individual taishas, ​​were sorted out at the stockrooms.

A new Oirat khanate, and again with the Choros ruling house at the head, arose at the end of the 16th century. The then Choros ruler of Khara-Khul defeated other contenders for power in a long-term struggle, especially his main rival, Baibagas, the ruler of the Khoshouts, and created his own khanate in Dzungaria. Shortly after this event, most of the Hoshouts moved to the southeast in the region of Lake Kukunor, and the Torgouts, Derbets and a certain number of Hoshouts moved to the west, to the lower reaches of the Volga, where they became known as the Kalmyks.

Khoshouts from Kokunor seized political power in Tibet in the middle of the 17th century.

Dzungar Khanate

Togon 1418-1440

Esen 1440-1455/56

After the death of Esen, the early khanate disintegrated.

Khara-Hula 1580s - 1634

Hoto-Khotsin-Batur 1634-1653

Senge-taisha 1653-1670

Galdan Boshoktu Khan 1670-1697

Tsevan-Rabdan 1697-1727

Galdan-Tseren 1727-1746

Tsevan-Dorji-Adzha-Namzhil 1746-1749

Lama Dorji 1749-1753

Davatsi Khan 1753-1755

Nemehu-Jirgal 1755

Amursana (of the Khoyt tribe) 1755-1757

The khanate was destroyed by the troops of Qing China. Its population was slaughtered almost without exception. Amursana fled to Russia. He was settled in the vicinity of Tobolsk, where he soon fell ill and died.

Kalmyk Khanate

In 1627-1628. part of the Oirat tribes of Torgouts, Khoshouts and Derbets, each led by their leaders, taishas, ​​moved from Dzungaria to the lower reaches of the Volga. There they became known as the Kalmyks. The first group of settlers was headed by the leader of the Torgouts Ho-Urlyuk.

The Kalmyk Khanate arose in a new place of residence in the second half of the 17th century. The first khan of the Kalmyks was the son of Ho-Urlyuk Daichin. Very soon the khanate became dependent on the Russian state.

Daichin 1650s - 1664

Monchak 1664-1669

Ayuka 1) 1669-1724

Tseren-Donduk 2) 1724-1735

Donduk-Ombo 3) 1735-1741

Donduk-Dashi 4) 1741-1761

Ubashi 5) 1761-1771

In 1771, the governor of the Khanate, Ubashi, took most of the Kalmyks back to Dzungaria and passed into the citizenship of Qing China. Together with him, almost all the nobility of the Torgouts and Hoshouts left. From the Manchu emperor, Ubashi received the title of Zoriktu-khan and Unensudzuktuk man to govern. Other rulers also received high-profile titles and land for settlement.

A smaller (small) part of the Kalmyks remained under the citizenship of Russia. Therefore, in 1771, by decree of Empress Catherine II, the Kalmyk Khanate was abolished.

In 1800, Emperor Paul I granted the "Most Merciful Letter to the Kalmyk People", in which the Derbet owner of Chucha Taishi Tundutov was appointed governor of the Kalmyk people. He died in 1803 and bequeathed the position of viceroy to his son. But other noyons began to challenge the will. As a result, the khan's power in Kalmykia was completely eliminated.

Notes

1) From 1669 - the leading taisha, from 1690 - khan.

2) In 1724 - 1731. - governor of the khanate, from 1731 - khan.

3) In 1735 - 1737. - governor of the khanate, from 1737 - khan.

4) In 1741-1757. - governor of the khanate, from 1757 - khan.

5) Viceroy of the Khanate.

Used materials of the book: Sychev N.V. Book of dynasties. M., 2008. p. 692-694.

The Dzungar Khanate (otherwise the Oirat Khanate, or Kalmykia) is a state located north of the Tien Shan mountains. In the 1st floor. 18th century its boundaries were determined by a line running from the lake. Balkhash at the mouth of the river. Lyaguz to the north to the river. Irtysh, along the Irtysh to its sources, further south to the east. the tip of the Tien Shan ridge, to the west along this ridge to the river. Alai, further along the Ferghana Range to its north-west. end, then to modern. Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan, crossing the environment. the course of the river. Chu and going up it to the south. shores of the lake Balkhash. In the beginning. 14th century among the nomadic tribes inhabiting the sowing. lands of the former Dzhagataev ulus, a desire for independence began to appear, which so far manifested itself in a fierce struggle with its neighbors - the Chinese and Oirats. The latter, pressed from the east by the Mongols, after an unsuccessful attempt to seize the south. the region of Dzungaria, moved down the valley of the river. Black Irtysh and south to Kuku-nor. In the 1st floor. 17th century The Oirats, united in the hands of Khara-Khul and his son Batur Khuntaishi (1634-1653) in D. Kh., extended their power in the west to the river. Chu. In 1660, the khanate, under the rule of Senge, expanded its possessions in the north to the Russian. Krasnoyarsk. After the death of Senge, who was killed by his brothers (1671), his brother Galdan Boshoktu took revenge on the killers, then expelled his uncles from the borders of Dzungaria and captured Vost. Turkestan (1679) and Ala-Shan (1676-1678). In 1686, Galdan conquered the Tien Shan Kara-Kyrgyz and penetrated into Fergana to Sarykol, and in 1688 moved to Khalkha, where, unable to fight on his own, he asked for help from China, deciding to surrender to the citizenship of the whale. emperor. The latter took the blows of the Dzhungars, and in the battle in the Ulan-butun tract, Galdan was defeated by the troops of the bogdykhan Kan-si and fled to the north. The 2nd campaign of Galdan was more successful, but when at the head of the whale. Kan-si himself appeared in the army, Galdan was again defeated, fled and soon died (1697). After the defeat of Galdan in Khalkha, all the lands up to the Irtysh passed into the hands of his rebellious nephew Tseven-Ravdan, who, having first recognized the citizenship of China, after that started a war against him, defeated the Chinese and took the city of Hami, tried to capture Tibet, but, after unsuccessful attempts, had to again recognize himself as a vassal of Kang-si.

The advance of the Kalmyks from the South and Western Siberia, where they originally settled, into the depths of Eastern Europe continued until the middle of the 17th century. In a little more than half a century, they traveled from the upper reaches of the Irtysh to the Emba, Yaik (Ural) and Volga basins. By the beginning of the 1660s. Kalmyks finally settled on the Lower Volga and the vast steppes adjacent to it in the west. This was mainly due to the assignment of nomad camps to them on the terms of carrying military service in favor of Russia.

The official date of the voluntary annexation of the Kalmyks to Russia is August 20, 1609, when the conditions for their citizenship were formulated in the letter of the Russian government addressed to the governor of the city of Tara I.V. Mosalsky. However, the process of their incorporation into the Russian state was far from being a one-time act. The formation of the Kalmyk Khanate in the Lower Volga region was accompanied by close contacts with the Russian state. In 1655-1656. the practical head of the Kalmyk uluses, Daichin, expressed his readiness to accept Russian citizenship. His message said that the taishi subject to him "will do something that never happened from them for a century - one evo Monchak and the grandson of his native Manzhik taishi, themselves ... will become a great sovereign" 72

In 1664, the Kalmyk Khanate was officially recognized by Russia, and Supreme ruler Volga Kalmyks Monchak was awarded the symbols of state power - "a silver with gilding mace decorated with jaspers and a white imperial banner with a red border." At that time, as is known, the mace was also given to the rulers of other peoples as a sign of power; it had the hetman of the Zaporizhzhya army and the ataman of the Don army. The Kalmyks occupied the empty steppe spaces of the southeastern part of Eurasian Russia, where some Turkic ethnic groups (Nogais, Crimean Tatars, etc.) visited only occasionally. The newcomers found here largely familiar natural and climatic conditions, which to a large extent ensured the preservation of their former economic activities based on nomadic cattle breeding. The acquisition of a new territory, consolidation on it, long-term settlement and development of the Volga steppes had a positive effect on the formation of the Kalmyk ethnos.

According to researchers, in early XVII 1st century about 280,000 Kalmyks from Dzungaria 73 migrated to the borders of Russia. At the same time, they did not break ties with their former compatriots, which finally broke off only with the defeat of the Qing Empire of Dzungaria in the middle of the 18th century. However, there is also evidence that the number of resettled reached half a million people 74

The socio-economic structure of the Kalmyks at the time of their migration from Dzungaria is usually called "nomadic feudalism", although the interpretation of this concept is still largely debatable 75 .

The Kalmyks who migrated to Russia had certain social features characteristic of them, customs and traditions of the nomadic way of life of the Oirats. The entire population was divided into large groups that were part of different specific possessions - uluses. The most noble and influential noyons were at the head of the uluses. Uluses, in turn, were subdivided into aimags, the leaders of which were zaisangs. Aimaks consisted of khotons, and khotons - from tents of individual families of nomads.

The distribution of Kalmyks in uluses has its roots in the distant past and is associated with tribal division and the ulus system of the early Mongols. Under the ulus-aimak system, all Kalmyk uluses and aimaks had their own ethnonymic names. This sometimes misled researchers who believed that an ulus is a tribe, and an aimak is a clan. Thus, Kalmyk society seemed to them to be still in a tribal state 76 . But the preservation of ethnonyms of Oirat, and sometimes even more ancient origin, is more logically explained by the fact that "for all Kalmyk uluses and aimaks, the transfer of old ethnic names to new social and other groups that arose already under the feudal system" 77 is typical. That is why the concept of "tribal society" is in no way acceptable to the Kalmyk society within Russia 78 .

The ulus-aimak system of Kalmyk organization received its further development in the second half of the 17th century. with the formation of the Kalmyk Khanate. The territory of the Khanate included camps on both sides of the Volga from Astrakhan to Tsaritsyn and Samara, including the steppes of the Don and the Urals. Within the framework of the khanate, which existed until 1771, the formation of the Kalmyk ethnos took place. At the same time, there was a sub-ethnic division into Derbets, Torguts, Khoshuts and Don Kalmyks (Buzavs). Their appearance is associated with various stages of the ethnic history of the Kalmyk people. Torguts, Khoshuts and Derbets are components of Oirat origin, from which then, in fact, the Kalmyks, a new Mongolian-speaking ethnic group in Russia, formed. The Don Kalmyks (Buzavs) were the product of ethnic mixing and assimilation, and groups of Derbets, Torguts and Khoshuts participated in their formation. At present, the Derbets, Torguts and Don Kalmyks are the main intra-ethnic divisions of the Kalmyk people. The few Khoshuts are increasingly assimilated by the ethnically close Torghuts, although they retain their sub-ethnic self-consciousness.

The existing ulus-aimach administrative system subsequently underwent a significant evolution.

The Kalmyk Khanate consisted of the Torgoutovskiy, Derbetovskiy and Khosshoutovskiy uluses, from which new Torgut and Derbet uluses were then separated. Due to the almost complete departure of the Khoshuts in 1771 from Russia back to Dzungaria, the Khoshoutovsky ulus remained undivided and was subsequently largely populated by the Torguts. However, then the role of the Derbets intensifies, since most of the Torguts have already gone to China.

Following the abolition of the Kalmyk Khanate in 1771, its territory was included in the Astrakhan province as a separate administrative unit called the Kalmyk steppe. The traditional structure of the Kalmyk society, divided into uluses, aimaks and khotons, was preserved. The management of the Kalmyk people began to be carried out through officials from Russian officials. Gradually, their own self-government was replaced by a system of guardianship, and thus the inclusion of the Kalmyks into the system of Russian statehood 79 was completed.

The departure of the vast majority of the Volga Kalmyks back to Dzungaria was caused by the policy of the Russian authorities to limit the autonomy of the Kalmyk Khanate. The Christianization of the Kalmyks and the expansion of the economic colonization of the lands they occupied also played a significant role here.

Most of the Kalmyks who left Russia died on the way, and those who reached their ancestral home were dispersed within the boundaries of the Xinjiang administrative region artificially created by the Qing authorities of China. It is believed that more than 30 thousand Kalmyk families migrated from Russia - wagons 80 . According to other sources, a much larger number of Kalmyks left with Ubushi Khan 81 .

The insignificant part of the Kalmyks (13-15 thousand wagons) who remained in Russia lost the opportunity to use the territory of the liquidated khanate. The main residence of the Kalmyks after 1771 became the right (upland) side of the Volga River - the Kalmyk steppe. This name firmly established itself behind the formed territorial-administrative region of the settlement of the Kalmyks after 1771 and has been preserved to this day as an ethno-geographical concept.

Part of the Kalmyks ended up outside the Kalmyk steppe: in the Urals, on the Don, along the Terek River in the Caucasus, in the Orenburg Territory and in other territories. In the new ethnic environment, some groups of Kalmyks assimilated (as, for example, it happened with the Chuguev Kalmyks), while others eventually turned into separate sub-ethnic formations, which received their name from the territory of the new settlement. These include Don (Buzavs), Ural, Orenburg and Terek (Kuma) Kalmyk-Cossacks.

Settled in Kalmykia to early XIX in. the division into 9 uluses existed with some changes until 1917. Historically, the Kalmyk uluses on the Volga were formed as fiefs of individual Noyon dynasties, some of which were still in Dzungaria, while others were elevated in the Kalmyk Khanate. The most significant part of the uluses arose gradually as the uluses of the most numerous Torgut noyons, descendants of Khan Ayuki. So, the main feudal domain of the Kalmyk Khan Donduk-Ombo and his brother Bokshirga in the 30-40s. was Tsokhurovsky ulus. The name of the ulus comes from the ethnonym "tsoohor-torgut" (literally - "motley torguts"), which is widespread in Xinjiang and Tibet.

Tsokhurovsky ulus was then divided into Bagatsokhurovsky and Ikitsokhurovsky uluses; this was due to the fact that Khan Donduk-Ombo began to rule the Bagatsokhurovsky ulus (from the Kalmyk "bag-tsoohor-torgut", which means "small tsoohor-torguts"). Iki-tsoohurovsky ulus (from "ik-tsoohor-torgut" - "large tsoohor-torguts") went to Bokshirga, the son of Gunjep - the youngest son of Ayuki Khan. There was also the Erketenevsky ulus, the population of which was called "Erketen-Torgut", or "Onchkh-Erketen-Torgut". The name of this ulus, possibly, is related to the real historical person Onch Khan, who, according to legend, was in charge of the Erketenevsky ulus at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries. The word "erketen" itself is usually translated as "distinguished", or having earned the privilege of the taisha, or as "endowed with the power to dispose". As for the Derbetovsky ulus, inhabited by Derbet Kalmyks, after the death in 1784 of its owner, Tsendan Drodzhi, there were strife between his sons for the right to own the ulus. Then the Russians made a decision: to end the strife, divide the ulus into two parts - Maloderbetovsky and Bolshederbetovsky. Residents were given the right to freely choose one of the two sons of Tsendan Dorji as the owner and become a subject of one or another ulus, the boundary between which was the Manych River. At the beginning of the XX century. a separate Manychsky ulus emerged from Maloderbetovsky.

The division of the Kalmyk people into uluses was declared by the "Highly Approved Rules for Governing the Kalmyk People" dated March 10, 1825. 82 According to this decree, Kalmykia was divided into six uluses: Big and Small Derbetev, Torgoutovsky, Khoshoutovsky, Bagatsokhurovsky and Erketenevsky. On November 24, 1835, another decree followed, according to which the Kalmyk people were divided instead of 6 into 7 uluses: two new uluses were formed from the Torgoutovsky ulus: Yandykovsky and Khorakhusovsky 83 .

According to the "Highly Approved Regulations on the Governance of the Kalmyk People" on April 23, 1847, 84 Kalmyks were divided into nomads in the Astrakhan province and the Caucasus region; they still made up 7 uluses, but their names were somewhat modified compared to the situation in 1835. Kalmykia was divided into three state-owned (Bagatsokhurovsky, Erketenevsky, Yandyko-Ikitsokhurovsky) and four owner uluses (Bolshederbetevsky, Maloderbetevsky, Khosshoutovsky, Kharahuso-Erdenievsky). The regulation of 1847 provided that pastures and other lands should be divided into uluses, excluding mochagi and the Kalmyk bazaar, which were made available to residents of all uluses.

In 1861 total Kalmyk uluses amounted to nine, as can be seen from the "List settlements Astrakhan province"; of these, 6 were state-owned and 3 owner-owned, and in the list, instead of the Yandyko-Ikitsohurovsky ulus, two uluses were named: Yandykovsky and Ikitsohurovsky. Part of Maloderbetevsky and the entire Bolshederbetevsky ulus were already administratively part of the Stavropol province. the ulus of Enotaevsky district became known as Bagatsokhur-Muravyevsky - in memory of the Minister of State Property, General MN Muravyov.In 1878, the Khoshoutovsky ulus, located on the meadow side of the Enotaevsky district and the mountainous part of the Astrakhan district, was renamed Aleksandrovsky.

Kalmyk governorship

The management of the Kalmyks within Russia was initially concentrated in the Posolsky Prikaz, which was abolished in 1720 in connection with the transformation into the Collegium of Foreign Affairs. Somewhat earlier, in 1715, the tsarist government appointed a special plenipotentiary representative to the Kalmyk camps, who was subordinate to the Astrakhan governor. Communications with the Kalmyk Khanate were carried out by the Astrakhan chief commandant; the latter until 1719 performed his functions under the supervision of the Kazan governor, and then - with the knowledge of the Astrakhan governor. The commander, who was involved in Kalmyk affairs, stayed at the headquarters of the khan, then in Saratov (1717-1727). Tsaritsyn (1727-1742) and, finally, in the Enotaevskaya fortress (1742-1771).

480 rub. | 150 UAH | $7.5 ", MOUSEOFF, FGCOLOR, "#FFFFCC",BGCOLOR, "#393939");" onMouseOut="return nd();"> Thesis - 480 rubles, shipping 10 minutes 24 hours a day, seven days a week and holidays

Tsyuryumov Alexander Viktorovich. The Kalmyk Khanate within Russia: problems of political relations: dissertation... Doctor of Historical Sciences: 07.00.02 / Tsyuryumov Alexander Viktorovich; [Place of protection: Volgograd. state university]. - Volgograd, 2007. - 497 p. : ill. RSL OD, 60s: gg.: 19: c.): - -: Kalmyk: khanate

Introduction

CHAPTER 1. RUSSIAN-KALMYK AMBASSADOR RELATIONS IN THE FIRST HALF OF XVIIВ 44

1.1. The formation of Russian-Kalmyk relations in Western Siberia in the first quarter of the 17th century 46

1.2. Kalmyk-Nogai relations in the first third of the 17th century: the struggle for the Southern Urals 51

1.3. Russian-Kalmyk relations in the Urals (20-30s of the 17th century).58

1.4. Crisis of 1644 67

1.5. Russian-Kalmyk negotiations in the second half of the 1640s: overcoming the crisis 73

Chapter 2

2.1. Formation of the Kalmyk Khanate 86

2.2. Relations with Dzungaria 90

2.3. The policy of the first khans during the Russian-Polish war 99

2.4. The Kalmyk Khanate in Russian-Turkish relations in the last third of the 17th century in 109

2.5. Domestic policy of Russia and problems of social and political integration of Kalmyks 119

CHAPTER 3. THE KALMYK KHANATE DURING THE FORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE 143

3.1. The Kalmyk Khanate in Russian-Turkish relations in the years Northern war 146

3.2. Government control over the eastern policy of the Kalmyk Khanate 156

3.3. Mutiny of 1701 167

3.4. Provincial reform and the institute of khan power:. 174

3.5. Formation of the ulus system of the Khanate 1S5

3.6. Kalmyks and the socio-economic policy of Russia

in the Volga region 194

CHAPTER 4 XVIIIВ 205

4.1. Establishment of the Viceroyalty Institute 208

4.2. Centrifugal tendencies and foreign policy of the khanate 225

4.3. Migration of part of the Kalmyk uluses to the Kuban in the first half of the 30s. XVIII at 233

4.4. Russian policy and ending the strife 246

4.5. Restoration of the institute of khan power in the second half of the 1930s. XVIII at 255

CHAPTER 5

5.1. The institute of governorship in the system of provincial government.276

5.2. Changing the ulus system 290

5.3. Restriction of foreign policy relations of the khanate 399

5.4. Economic policy of Russia in the Lower Volga region and the problem of the Kalmyk nomads 313

CHAPTER 6. THE KALMYK KHANATE IN THE DOMESTIC POLICY OF RUSSIA (60s of the XVIII century) 327

6.1. The first years of Ubashi's governorship 330

6.2. Limitation of the power of the governor and the reform of Zargo 335

6.3. Government colonization and reduction of nomadic territory 350

CHAPTER 7

7.1. The participation of the Kalmyks in the Russian-Turkish war of 1768-1774 362

7.2. Reasons for migration 3 72

7.3. Care preparation.382

7.4. Migration to the East 390

Conclusion 409

Notes 414

List of sources and literature 471

Appendix 495

Introduction to work

Relevance of the topic. Beginning of the 21st century characterized by an active search for ways to establish new forms of Russian statehood. A deep study of the vast historical experience of the formation and evolution of the Russian multinational state has a paramount role in it. The study of the history of the Kalmyk people, at the beginning of the 17th century, can significantly supplement the study of the process of its formation and evolution in modern times. migrated from the steppes of Western Mongolia and appeared on the borders of Russia in Western Siberia. In the middle of the century, Kalmyk statehood was formed in the form of a khanate.

As is known, in Soviet historiography the theory of the voluntary entry of the Kalmyks into Russia at the beginning of the 17th century dominated. But the numerous Kalmyk shertis reflect the 50-year-long stage of difficult negotiations about the territory of the Kalmyk nomads and the conditions for subordinating the Kalmyks to Moscow. At the same time, peaceful contacts sometimes alternated with more or less significant military clashes. In our opinion, the true causes and stages of the entry of the Kalmyks into Russia have not yet been sufficiently studied. We believe that the entry of the Kalmyks into the Russian state was realized in the course of several successive stages. Obviously, 400 years after the beginning of the establishment of Russian-Kalmyk relations, there is a need for an objective analysis of their history from the standpoint of modern methodology and taking into account the entire range of available sources.

Further, in our opinion, it is necessary to pay attention to the process of formation of the Kalmyk statehood, which took place in the conditions of simultaneous integration of the Kalmyks into the Russian state. Here it is important to note a certain interest of Moscow in

5 strong Kalmyk power, since there is still no work in historiography in which the problem of the formation of the Kalmyk Khanate would be studied from the point of view of the influence of Russian policy.

In connection with this aspect, it is advisable to consider the issue of the role and place of the Kalmyk Khanate in the foreign policy system of Russia. As is known, the Kalmyks played the most important mediating role in the advancement of Russia in the North Caucasus. It is necessary to highlight the characteristic features of the relations between the Kalmyks and the peoples of the North Caucasus, which created a counterbalance to the Crimean aggression and strengthened the southern borders of Russia and its position in the Caucasus region. The relations of the Kalmyks with China and Dzungaria were also an independent sphere. This problem is of interest not only for the history of the Kalmyk people, but also for the history of Russian foreign policy as a whole.

The resulting state of the Kalmyks became, along with the Hetman's Ukraine, one of the largest national political formations within the Russian state of the 17th-18th centuries. In the problem of interest to us, it is relevant to clarify the evolution of the national-state position (status) of the Kalmyk Khanate within Russia in the context of the evolution of the state system of the latter from a class-representative monarchy to absolutism, a comparison of the status of the Khanate with the position of similar national and territorial entities of the Don and Left-bank Ukraine.

This block of problems is part of the history of Russia's internal (national) policy and belongs to the list of problems that have been relatively little studied not only in Kalmyk, but in general in Russian historiography. Special works on this problem have not been created, but some fragments of it are covered in the works of modern researchers. The time has come for a deeper analysis of the policy of the Russian government. In our opinion, its key problems were socio-political issues related to the inheritance of the khanate

power, the evolution of the ulus system, the Christianization of the Kalmyks. The study of these problems will highlight the evolution of the institution of khan power and determine the place of governorship in the system of provincial power.

No less important is a comprehensive analysis of the political and socio-economic development of the Kalmyk society in the 1760s, which will make it possible to show the reasons and nature of the migration in 177Ї of the majority of the Kalmyk people to China.

In general, the study of this set of issues reveals not only the place and role of the Kalmyks in the history of the formation of the multinational Russian state, but also important features of its national policy, which contributed to the political and economic integration of ethnic groups into the state system.

Historiography, Analysis of Kalmyk literature on the history of the XVII-XVIII centuries. testifies that the study of the history of the Kalmyk people began simultaneously with the solution of the problem of its national-state structure within Russia.

Already in the XVII century. Fragmentary information appeared in the works of European and Eastern travelers and diplomats about the appearance of Kalmyks in the Lower Volga region and their relations with Moscow 1 . The foundations of the scientific historiography of Kalmykia were laid in the next century in the works of G.F. Miller, I.E. Fisher, where information is given about the appearance of the Oirats on the borders of the Kuchum Khanate, their relations with the Nogais were first considered here. Significant information was contained in the works of P.I. Rychkova, S.G. Gmelina, P.S. Pallas, I.I. Lepekhina, I.G. Georgi and others, who collected information about the Kalmyks during academic expeditions 2 . Even then, for example, I.I. Lepekhin admitted that among the Kalmyks "we have, in addition to other military services, good and numerous savers of our borders from the raids of the Kirghiz-Kaisaks and Kubans" 3 .

A special place in historiography was occupied by the work of V.M. Bakunin, based on a wide range of documents and materials of the Collegium

7 foreign affairs. Working in the 20-30s. 18th century in the administration of the Astrakhan governor, the author played a significant role in regulating relations with the Kalmyk Khanate. After moving to the Collegium, he continued to deal with Kalmyk affairs. The author, not striving for theoretical generalizations, constructed the work as a chronological description of the history of the Kalmyks from the moment they became part of Russia until 1741. The work briefly describes the process of entry, provides the content of some sherts, describes in sufficient detail the history of relations between Russia and the rulers of the Khanate in the first half of the 18th century. in. 4 These works played a significant role in the process of collecting information on the history of the Khanate, its relations not only with Russia, but also with neighboring peoples and states.

In the historiography of the XIX century. the scope of research has expanded. The authors have developed two points of view in assessing the nature of Russian-Kalmyk relations. The concept of the Kalmyk invasion, close to the official-protective direction, prevailed. The well-known orientalist N.Ya. Bichurin (Iakinf). His works were based on rare Chinese sources (for example, the official Qing writings “The Highest Approved Description of Xinjiang”, “Description of what was seen and heard about the Western Territory”), as well as materials Complete collection laws. This allowed the author to give a systematic presentation of the history of the Oirats (Dzhungars) and Kalmyks of the XIV-XVIII centuries. But the sources involved by the researcher determined not only the merits, but also the shortcomings of his works, which are characterized by excessive confidence in the information of official Chinese and Russian sources.

N.Ya. Bichurin argued that at the beginning of the XVII century. the ruler of the Torgouts, Ho-Urlyuk, "made his way with weapons" to Russia, which at that time was occupied by "difficult circumstances from the West." The subsequent rulers of the Kalmyk Khanate, according to N.Ya. Bichurin,

8 continued this course. Therefore, the author placed all the blame for the negative moments in Russian-Kalmyk relations on the Kalmyks, describing their behavior as complete insubordination and constant violation of their obligations. Only towards the end of the 17th century. "fear of imminent and severe punishment", as well as government policy, weakened the aggressiveness of the Kalmyks. But at the same time, examining the military service of the Kalmyks in protecting the southern borders of Russia, the author was forced to admit that the Kalmyks justified the hopes and provided her with very strong help. For the first time in historiography, N.Ya. Bichurin studied the process of Christianization of the Kalmyks, believing that the main thing in Russian policy was not to attract nomads to a new religion, but to protect them after the adoption of Christianity 5 .

Close to the position of N.Ya. Bichurin was the point of view of a number of authors. N. Nefediev argued that the tsarist government tried to "keep this people in dependence by measures of meekness." Justifying the government's policy, he emphasized that the government "was always interested in the well-being of the Kalmyks and was engaged in improving the regulations for them." N. Nefediev saw the willfulness of the taishas “in private raids resulting from an innate inclination to this in this people.” The fact that they never joined the popular movements that were taking place at that time in the south of the state 6 is given special merit to the khans.

Another researcher, F.A. Buhler also believed that the Kalmyks "were rather bad allies than restless subjects." At the same time, the author acknowledged that most of the steppes of southern Russia were sparsely populated, so the Kalmyks played an important role in their protection 7 . F. Buhler believed that in the XVIII century. the government almost did not interfere in the internal administration of the Kalmyks, "which was presented either to the khan, or to the governor of the khanate, in a word, to their people's chief, and they already negotiated with him - relations rather diplomatic than sovereign" 8 .

9 The researcher noted the restrictive actions of the government, which infringed on the interests of the Kalmyk owners - the reorganization of Zargo, the increase in military settlements on the Volga and Yaik 9 .

A. Popov was close to him. In his opinion, all the treaties between the tsarist government and the taishas were valid only on paper, but in reality they were never implemented, because the Kalmyks “considered their allegiance to Russia nothing more than an alliance. Based on this view, the taishi did not consider breaking their sherts a crime. Beginning in 1683, the Kalmyks became more obedient to the court 1 .

K.I. Kostenkov also believed that the entire "period of the Kalmyks' stay under the auspices of Russia, from 1630 to 1771, represents a revelry of wild freedom, unbridled by the government." At the same time, the government could not subdue the Kalmyks by force of arms. However, according to the author, "the extent to which they benefited from the named service, they harmed by their robberies and robberies to the same extent." K.I. Kostenkov believed that the relations between the rulers of Russia and the khans were not of a vassal nature, the government did not interfere in the internal affairs of the Kalmyks 11 .

A.M. agreed with this. Pozdneev, who noted that the Kalmyks deliberately moved towards the Volga "with the general knowledge, approval and consent of all Oirat generations." At the same time, the author believed that the behavior of the Kalmyk owners was marked by abuse of the “good” attitude of the government. In his opinion, in the XVII century. the government did not develop and did not pursue any specific policy towards the Kalmyks. True, it concluded numerous sherti with the taish, but the nomads never attached importance to them, “because the content of these sherti remained unknown to them,” since they were written in flat or Tatar languages, equally incomprehensible to the Kalmyks” 12.

In the second half of the XIX century. CM. Solovyov introduced the materials of the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into scientific circulation. The historian attributed

10 Kalmyks to the last representatives of the "movement of the Central Asian nomadic hordes to the west, to European borders", but their movement was belated. The Kalmyks ran into a strong Russia and were forced, willy-nilly, to submit to its power. However, this subordination was rather shaky. The European state, the researcher continues, laid its hand on the Kalmyks. “The strong Kalmyk Horde,” he noted, “went to the Volga, was embraced by the state and fought in vain in its strong arms.” The Kalmyks did not want to put up with such a situation and tried to free themselves from guardianship. Therefore, the Kalmyk owners, according to the author, "rushed to their own or to the east, to the Kalmyks independent of Russia, or to the west, to the Crimea." According to V.O. Klyuchevsky, “the Kalmyks were not defeated by the power of Russian weapons, but voluntarily recognized the state power of the country where they settled over themselves.”

These authors, giving a political assessment of Russian-Kalmyk relations, were forced to acknowledge the active participation of the Kalmyks in the Russian wars. During this period, historiography accumulated significant material on the history of the participation of the Kalmyks in the Russian-Turkish wars (I.I. Golikov, P.G. Butkov, V.D. Smirnov), testifying to their significant contribution to Russia's advance into the Caucasus 15 . The relationship between the Kalmyks and the Don Cossacks was studied in sufficient detail in the works of V.B. Bronevsky, N.A. Maslokovets, I.F. Bogdanovich, E.P. Savelyeva 16 . In their works, the main attention was paid to the Kalmyk-Don clashes, but joint campaigns to the Crimea were practically not covered. In the same years, Academician P. Pekarsky and B.V. Dolbezhev first elucidated a number of important moments in the history of the migration of the Kalmyks in 1771, revealing only some of the reasons for this event 17 .

At the beginning of the XX century. researchers drew on new archival sources. Archimandrite Guriy, having studied the materials of the Holy Synod, in his fundamental work on the history of the Christianization of the Kalmyks proved that

that the Kalmyks “went to Russia not for the purpose of a peaceful life near the Russian borders, but with the aim of dominating and conquering the Russian cities there, perhaps in the hope of restoring their dominion where the descendants of Genghis Khan, his grandchildren, once sat in a yurt.” The researcher saw the political history of the khanate as "extremely rebellious and restless, in constant hostility and intrigues with the Russians." At the same time, he overestimated the ties between Kalmykia and Dzungaria, emphasizing the desire of the Kalmyks for independence. In the work of M.K. Lyubavsky, significant factual material is provided, testifying to the contradictory process of simultaneous counter development of the Lower Volga and North Caucasian steppes by the Kalmyks and the resettled peasantry, with the main attention being paid to land conflicts 1 . A number of works highlighted the role of the Kalmyks in Russian-Nogai and Russian-Turkmen relations 20 .

The appearance of these studies somewhat changed the assessment of Russian-Kalmyk relations. But simultaneously with these studies, works appeared that differ in their assessments from the official-protective direction, and close to the liberal direction. They give a more objective picture of Russian-Kalmyk relations. So, M.G. Novoletov studied individual materials of the Astrakhan Kalmyk archive, divided the time of the Kalmyks' stay in Russia into several periods. The first of them occurred in the first half of the 17th century. (until 1655) and was characterized by complete freedom of the Kalmyks from the Russian government. In the second period (until 1725), Russian-Kalmyk relations were built on special contractual clauses, the only real duty of the Kalmyks was military service. In the third period (1725-1771) there was a gradual restriction of the power of the Kalmyk khans, and the government took the initiative in their appointment. M.G. Novoletov believed that the khan independently ruled the people, "repaired the court and reprisal", fought and communicated with foreign states and

12 nations. The actions of the Kalmyk rulers were not based on intrigues against Russia 21 .

G.N. Prozritelev, studying the military service of the Kalmyks, came to the conclusion that the Russian government, skillfully using the civil strife of the Kalmyk owners, actively interfered in the internal affairs of the khanate. It regularly used the military services of the Kalmyks, forgiving their petty duties, robberies and devastation. By the way, in Prozritelev's edited Proceedings of the Stavropol Scientific Archival Commission, for the first time an opinion appeared about the voluntary nature of the entry of the Kalmyk people into Russia 22 .

Thus, the historiography of the Kalmyk Khanate reached in the XVIII - early XX centuries. certain level. Several key issues were at the center of the study. Among them, a special place was occupied by the history of Russian-Kalmyk relations, through the prism of which the own history of the Khanate was studied. The authors of the official-protective direction emphasized the exclusively positive role of Russia in the political history of the khanate. The undoubted merit of pre-revolutionary authors is the accumulation of factual material and the introduction of new sources into scientific circulation, which created the basis for further more in-depth research. But at the same time, a huge mass archival sources, as well as a number of published materials, remained out of sight. For example, with the exception of a few published chronicles, the Kalmyk sources proper were not involved, and the documents of the "Collection of the Russian Historical Society" were little used.

The history of Soviet Kalmyk studies begins with the publication of the works of N.N. Palmova. The author for the first time studied a significant range of sources from the Astrakhan Kalmyk archive, which made it possible to highlight the main trends in the evolution of the Kalmyk statehood. In "Etudes on the history of the Volga Kalmyks" the researcher agrees

13 with the concept of the Kalmyk invasion, considering that at the beginning of the 17th century. taishi sought to speak with the Moscow government no longer in the language of "random wanderers in the Volga steppes", but in the language of the winners, "who had every chance to secure the most favorable conditions for themselves on the free steppe nomad camps next to the Russians." Until the middle of the century, the Kalmyk rulers considered themselves not so much subjects as allies of Russia. The author attributes the beginning of the tendency to subordination to the middle of the 17th century, when, according to shert charters of 1655 and 1657. the Russian government provided the Kalmyks with semi-empty steppe spaces of the Volga region. In 1657 the military service of the Kalmyks began.

Much attention in the "Etudes" is given to the place of the Kalmyk Khanate in the system of international relations. The connections of the Kalmyks with the Dzungar Khanate and Qing China are studied in most detail. According to the author, Ayuka established diplomatic relations with the Kuban and mountain owners, made peace and started a war solely at his own discretion, without asking permission from the Russian authorities 25 .

N.N. Palmov noted that for the XVIII century. characterized by the limitation of the opportunities for economic and political development of the Kalmyks by the tsarist government. The Petrine era put an end to the efforts of the Kalmyks to retain national rights in their entirety. In the 20s. 18th century the economic interests of the Kalmyks collided with the interests of Russia in the question of the right to free use of fishing along the Volga and Akhtuba 26 .

The next step in historiography was the work of Academician S.K. Bogoyavlensky, which was based on the archival materials of the Posolsky Prikaz. In it, for the first time, the concept of a deliberate and concerted "offensive" of the Kalmyks against Russia was subjected to scientific criticism. The author covered in detail the process of the Kalmyks' migration to the Urals, the defeat of the Nogais, and the negotiations with Russia in Moscow and Ufa 27 .

Due to the deportation of the people, studies on the history of Kalmykia in the 17th-18th centuries. resumed in the early 1960s. After the Great Patriotic War in Soviet historical science, in order to strengthen the friendship of peoples, to emphasize the outstanding progressive role of Russia in relation to the countries of the East, the thesis about the voluntary and peaceful nature of the entry of the Siberian peoples into the Muscovite kingdom 28 is spreading. He had a great influence on the historiography of Kalmykia. In studies of the 60-80s. the history of the Kalmyk Khanate received one-sided coverage. The issues of relations between the Kalmyks and the local population - Russians, Bashkirs and Nogais - were not studied at all. An analysis of them would make it possible to single out changes in the vector of movement of nomads: Western Siberia - the Urals - the Volga. For example, in the work of P.S. Preobrazhenskaya was the first to study in detail the process of sherting in the middle of the 17th century, and provides significant material on the history of Russian embassies to the Kalmyks. But the author's opinion about the desire of the Kalmyk taishas to reduce the content of sherts to the conclusion of an allied treaty turned out to be without proper argumentation. P.S. Preobrazhenskaya defines shert on June 8, 1661 by a military treaty, which really proves the vassal relations of the Kalmyk taishas to the Muscovite tsar. In September 1664, a Russian military banner was sent to the Kalmyk uluses in September 1664 as an expression of confidence in the Kalmyks and recognition of their merits in military service to the Russian state.

In 1964, a monograph by I.Ya. Zlatkin on the history of the Dzungar Khanate. Denying the great-power plans of creating a new Mongol nomadic empire by the Kalmyks, the author explains the process of Kalmyks joining Russia as a necessary measure. The movement to the Lik and the Volga was explained by the desire to get out of the economic and foreign policy crisis that engulfed the Oirat world at the turn of the 16th-17th centuries. At the same time, both sides - both Russia and the Kalmyks -

15 were interested in establishing economic and political ties. Describing the process of shredding, the researcher does not mention the Kalmyk-Nogai relations at all. Therefore, the beginning of Russian-Kalmyk contacts in Western Siberia and the appearance of Kalmyks in the Volga region was studied by him as a single process 30 .

Views of I.Ya. Zlatkin were developed in the work of M.L. Kichikov, in which, for the first time in Soviet historiography, the issue of the history of the Kalmyks' entry into Russia at the beginning of the 17th century, as well as the process of the formation of the khanate in the middle of the century, was covered in detail. The analysis by the author of the reasons for the migration of the Torgouts of Ho-Urlyuk in the Urals and the Volga region became new. According to the researcher, there was no place for the Torgout rulers in the Irtysh, Ishim and Tobolsk lands, by the 30s. 17th century inhabited by yasak people of the Moscow state and partly by Dzungarian, Khoshut and Derbet taishas. The relatively sparse population of the territory of the Urals and the Volga region, which arose as a result of the decline of the Great Nogai Horde, attracted the attention of the Kalmyks and determined their movement towards the Volga. The author notes that in the first half of the 1630s, Russia was against nomadic Kalmyks in the Urals. The international situation in the west and south of the Russian state was unfavorable at that time. Under these conditions, the aggravation of relations with the nomads of Siberia and the lands adjacent to it was undesirable for Russia. With this in mind, the Moscow government in most cases resorted to peaceful means to resolve disputes with the nomads. In 1636-1637, taking into account the willingness of the Kalmyks to fight against the enemies of Russia, the government allowed them to roam along the Volga and Yaik. Following this, the Russian authorities began to seek "direct servility" of the Kalmyks with the extradition of hostages, that is, complete submission. According to M.L. Kichikov, the inert charter of 1655 legally secured the state of “eternal obedience” of the Kalmyks and partially solved the territorial problem; in 1657, military service of the Kalmyks began 31 .

In general terms, the views of P. Preobrazhenskaya and M.L. Kichikov were reflected in the "Essays on the history of the Kalmyk ASSR". As a result, historiography established the opinion that the movement of the Kalmyks into Russia was a forced step 32 .

Works appeared in Soviet historiography that covered only certain aspects related to the role of the Kalmyk Khanate in Russia's foreign policy, the contribution of the Kalmyks to the implementation of its policy in the North Caucasus and Central Asia was not fully appreciated. In the works of T.I. Belikov, separate issues were considered military history Kalmyks, a significant range of sources about joint campaigns in the Crimea was revealed, and for the first time the significant role of the Kalmyks in relations between Russia and Crimea was recognized in the 17th century. It should be noted that the participation of the Kalmyks in the wars of Russia was directly connected by the author with the Sherts of the 50-80s. 17th century 33

K.P. Shovunov, studying the history of the participation of Kalmyks in the wars of Russia, considered military service as the main public service. In our opinion, the researcher argued insufficiently that from the middle of the 18th century. methods of directive instructions of the state and military departments of the empire in relation to the khan's power became predominant. The main link in the government policy towards the Kalmyks was the idea of ​​gradually transferring their military force into an integral part of the Russian army. The frequent involvement of Kalmyks in Russian wars contributed to the decision to leave in 1771. 34 In Kabardino-Balkaria during these years, significant research was carried out on the history of the joint service of Kalmyks and Kabardians in the Russian army of the 17th-18th centuries. In the monographs of L.B. Zasedateleva and I.L. Omelchenko appreciated the contribution of the Kalmyks to the implementation of Russia's policy in the North Caucasus 35 . Only in the study of G.A. Sanin, for the first time in historiography, the significant role of the Kalmyks in relations between Russia and the Crimea during the Russian-Polish war was recognized 3 .

In the works of B.P. Gurevich, B.C. Myasnikova, Sh.B. Chimitdorzhieva, A.I. Chernyshev, a general analysis of the situation in the Central Asian region is given, the role of the Oirats and Kalmyks in it is shown. The authors showed the forced nature of the migration of the Oirats to the Russian state and the voluntary nature of the shert 7 .

During these years, attention was also paid to the study of Russia's internal policy towards the Kalmyks. In a number of works, it passed through the coverage of the history of relations between the Kalmyk Khanate and neighboring peoples. We find separate plots that testify to the Kalmyk-Don ties, as well as to the rather contradictory attitude of the Kalmyks to social movements on the Don and in the Volga region. Researchers have identified a significant range of sources on land conflicts, but when studying the history of peasant-Cossack and urban movements, the main attention was paid to the participation of certain groups of Kalmyks in them. At the same time, the fact of Ayuka's speech on the government side 38 was completely hushed up.

Kalmyk-Bashkir relations received some coverage. For example, N.V. Ustyugov, then I.G. Akmanov and R.G. Bukanova paid considerable attention to the contacts of the Kalmyks with Kuchum's son Ishim, and also examined in detail their attitude to the Bashkir uprising of 1662-1664. 39

We find the study of individual problems of the relationship between Kalmyks and Kazakhs in the works of N.G. Apollova and V.Ya. Basin. The researchers paid special attention to the negotiation process with the Kalmyks in the second third of the 18th century, that is, during the entry of the Little Zhuz into Russia. Moreover, the authors showed mutual interest in reconciliation both on the part of the elite of both nomadic peoples, and from the Orenburg authorities. By the way, already in these years N.G. Apollo noted that in the XVIII century. The main economic task of the government in Kalmykia was economic development through the development of cattle breeding 41 . In historiography received

IS coverage also covers certain aspects of the relationship between the Kalmyks and the Turkmens and Karakalpaks 42 .

A significant influence on the development of historiography was exerted by the "round table" on the topic "The accession of peoples to Russia and its objective historical consequences" (Zvenigorod, 1989). The materials of the table demonstrated the beginning of historians' rejection of the former dominant interpretation of the annexation of peoples to Russia, as, of course, a voluntary and peaceful process, the participants of the table noted the complexity and ambiguity of the process of annexing one or another territory to Russia 43 .

In the latest literature published at the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st centuries, the work of M.M. Batmaev. The author is inclined to believe that the finale of the Kalmyk movement - coming to the Volga and settling in the Volga steppes - was predetermined by the logic of the development of events, and was not the logical conclusion of a preconceived plan. The formation of Kalmyk feudal statehood within Russia was facilitated by the following factors: the government's plans to enlist the military forces of the Kalmyks, a favorable solution to the territorial problem, stabilization of the population, and so on. In the second half of the XVII century. Russia was forced to wage a series of difficult wars, including with Turkey and its vassal, the Crimean Khanate. In such a situation, there was a significant need for the help of the Kalmyk cavalry.

MM. Batmaev notes the inconsistency of Russian policy in the 18th century. On the one hand, fearing an excessive strengthening of the power of the khans or governors, the tsarist government did not give them full will over other owners, and sometimes directly opposed them to some of the latter. On the other hand, not wanting excessive confusion and self-will of the noyons, in view of the need to carry out the necessary measures through the Kalmyk central government, tsarism at certain moments tried to strengthen it. After the Northern War and the intensification of Russian policy in

19 Central Asia and the Caucasus increased pressure on the autonomy of the Kalmyk Khanate. In the post-Petrine era, Russia did not wage large-scale wars, the need for cavalry decreased, a course of toughening began, the local Astrakhan authorities tried to exercise comprehensive control over the activities of the khan. This trend objectively met the interests of absolutism, within which there was no place for independent autonomous rulers. The main means was the use of disagreements among the nobility of the khanate, reducing the power and strength of the khan by supporting taishas, ​​who for one reason or another separated from the bulk of the uluses 4 .

The history of the formation of the national-state status of the Kalmyk Khanate is devoted to the work of K.N. Maksimov. According to the researcher, at the beginning of the second half of XVII in. The Khanate was recognized by the Russian authorities as an ethno-political entity with the status of political autonomy 45 . A significant range of sources of the XVIII century. was introduced into scientific circulation by A.G. Mitirov. Historian focus

devoted to the policy of the Russian government towards the Kalmyks. The religious policy of Russia towards the Kalmyks is considered in the works of G.Sh. Dordzhieva and E.P. Bakaeva 47 .

In the work dedicated to the history of the migration of 1771, E.V. Dordzhieva notes that caused by the Petrine reforms of the first quarter of the 18th century. serious socio-economic shifts in Russia had a significant impact on the Kalmyk society, which was expressed, in particular, in the reduction of nomads, the spread of agricultural work, the first attempts to move to settled life and the development of commodity-money relations. These changes undermined the foundations of society on which the power and privileges of the Kalmyk elite rested. It was she who conceived the migration in order to preserve the traditional forms of management, and with them her dominant position. It is clear that these changes were accompanied by a deterioration in the economic situation of the common people and

20 even the extinction of the poor. The situation was aggravated by the need to participate in the wars waged by Russia. All this aroused the discontent of the common people, which the nobility took advantage of, by deceit and coercion, forcing them to leave Russia. The tendencies indicated by the author were only part of the reasons for the migration 48 .

For the first time in the historiography of the history of Kalmykia in the XVII-XVIII centuries. in the work of V.I. Kolesnik entry of the beginning of the 17th century. and the migration of 1771 were elucidated as a single process, as stages in the development of the nomadic civilization of the Kalmyks, which can hardly be considered indisputable. The author believes that the tsarist government did not have in the XVII century. in the region with sufficient military and administrative potential in order to reliably defend it from external enemies and control its own subjects here. According to V.I. Kolesnik, the main content of the Kalmyk-Don relations is not joint campaigns against the Crimea and Kuban, but "constant, essentially predatory raids together on someone or on each other" 49 . The researcher believes that for the first half of XVIII in. it is expedient to speak not so much about the real limitation of the sovereignty of the Kalmyk rulers, but about a clear identification of the threat of such limitation in the future. Tseren-Donduk received and held power exclusively by conciliation. He became the last Kalmyk khan who managed to get formal recognition of his status from the Dalai Lama, but this circumstance only emphasized the precariousness of his position. For him, the slightest attempt to distance himself from Russia, not to mention migration, was tantamount to a loss of power. The strife of the first half of the 1730s showed that the Kalmyk Khanate, headed by a completely dependent and controlled khan, had lost its importance as a strong military partner. Moreover, Russia was faced with the need to keep its own large military forces here, not only to defend the southeastern borders, but also to protect the khan from his own subjects. According to the researcher,

21 Russia's state interest was, after all, to have on its borders with the Islamic world a reliable strategic plan and a truly strong ally, rather than a puppet regime in need of protection. Donduk-Ombo achieved power by fiercely defending his independence, but he also received it from the hands of the tsarist administration, which carried out a coup d'état in his interests, while trampling on the will of the Dalai Lama 50 .

A successful attempt to continue the discussion of the 1989 conference and summarize the historical experience of pursuing the national policy of Russia was a collective monograph devoted to the formation of a system for managing national outskirts, a significant part of one of the chapters of which is devoted to the Kalmyk Khanate. peoples that became part of Russia 52.

In the latest work of V.V. Trepavlov, relations with the Nogays of the Oirats and Kalmyks in the 16th - first half of the 17th centuries are considered. The author examines the historical fate of the Nogai Horde through the prism of the relationship between Kalmyks and Nogais. The mass departure of the Big Nogais to the Volga coast falls on the end of 1633 - the beginning of 1634. The researcher explains this fact not by a one-time catastrophic defeat, but by many years of blows from the east and violence from the Russian Astrakhans. The author convincingly proves that there is no reason to believe that the complete displacement of the Nogai was the goal of Ho-Orlyuk and other Kalmyk nobles. They needed roaming spaces and obedient subjects. They received the first, they dreamed of increasing the number of the second, attracting refugees back to the Nogai side with various promises and threats. The Russian authorities did not allow independent, behind their backs, reconciliation of the nomads 53 .

Complicated relationships between Kalmyks, Nogays, Bashkirs, Kazakhs and Yaik Cossacks in the 17th century. shown in the works of I.G. Akmanova, N.E.

22 Bekmakhanova, V.D. Puzanov. The authors believe that the main issue in these relations was the question of control over the South Ural steppes 54 . In the same years, in a number of monographs, B.K. Malbakhov and K.F. Dzamikhov began to pay much attention to the history of relations between Kalmyks and Kabardians 55 , in the work of A.S. Shmelev, numerous contacts of the Kalmyks with the Endireyevsky principality of the Kumyks were investigated 56 . In the latest collective monograph on the history of the Astrakhan region, where considerable attention is paid to the role of the Kalmyks in the process of socio-economic development of the region, the concept of the Kalmyk invasion 57 reappeared.

Some issues of relations between the Kalmyks and Dzungaria and Tibet are covered in the works of E.L. Nameless. I.V. Vishnyakova, using materials from the State Archives Omsk region, significantly supplemented the history of the movement of the Kalmyks in 1771 to China, special attention was paid to the actions of the Kazakhs of the Younger and Middle Zhuzes. So, the authors have identified a wide range of relationships: conflicts and clashes, embassy ties and military alliances.

In foreign historiography, the main attention is paid to the historical and ethnographic study of Kalmykia. In the work of the French historian M. Kuran, Russian-Kalmyk relations are defined as peaceful. The one and a half century stay of the Torgouts in a foreign environment seems to him forced, but tolerable until the strengthened Russian Empire began its systematic expansion to the south. Around the Torgouts, a ring of fortresses and fortified lines, German colonies on the Don and Volga, was shrinking, the people were being Christianized. The author explains this by the fact that, "organizing in a European way and moving south, Russia became more and more alien to its nomadic subjects and more and more suppressed them" 60 .

In the middle of the XX century. we note the increased interest in the history of the Khanate in American historiography. First in historiography

23 of the process of the entry of the Kalmyks into Russia was the work of G.V. Vernadsky. In it, the author notes that “if the Kalmyks had definitely set themselves the goal of conquering Western Siberia, if only in order to restore the Tatar kingdom of the Kuchumoviches under their rule, then it is possible that they would have succeeded, at least temporarily, in crushing the rule of the Russians in Western Siberia. He further writes that " big war"between the Russians and the Kalmyks did not happen due to a number of the following reasons: the Kalmyks at that time did not have a single leader due to civil strife; besides, being a steppe people, the Kalmyks were not inclined to undertake large campaigns deep into the forest belt of Siberia, where the main Russian settlements were located; they were also distracted by the international situation, that is, the danger from the Uryankhai Mongols (Altyn-khans), on the one hand, and the Kazakhs, on the other; Russians and Kalmyks were interested in developing trade between themselves. G.V. Vernadsky singled out another important circumstance that hampered Russian-Kalmyk relations in the first half of the 17th century, namely, the unpreparedness of Russians for relations with the Mongols in terms of language. The historian dwelled on the causes of long-term strife. In his opinion, the growth in the number of owners of uluses 61 directly led to increased fragmentation.

The history of the migration of 1771 was studied in detail in the work of K. Barkman, which became the first special work based on Chinese sources. The author rightly notes that "it is unlikely that the Torgouts previously (that is, during the visit of 1756) agreed on their return to China in 1771" 62 .

A notable event in Western historiography was the book by L. Kreder, dedicated to the social system of nomadic peoples. Although the political history of the khanate is given little space in it, the author clearly identified one of the prerequisites for fragmentation in the Kalmyk khanate: according to the principle of inheritance, the paternal (khan) domain

24 was divided among all heirs. At the same time, the younger ones obeyed the eldest son, to whom power passed.

P. Rabel's study "Kalmyk-Mongols" devotes much space to the history of Russian-Kalmyk relations. According to the author, the end of the reign of Khan Ayuki was marked by real independence and the beginning of political strife. By the middle of the XVIII century. Russia's interference in the internal affairs of the khanate increased significantly.

The modern American historian M. Khodarkovsky devoted his monograph to the history of the development of Russian-Kalmyk relations from 1600 to 1771. The work is based on Russian-language and Turkish published archival materials and literature. The most valuable are the Turkish chronicles attracted by the author, which contain the correspondence of the khans Ayuki and Tseren-Donduk with Istanbul and Bakhchisaray in the 1670-1720s. The work acknowledges that the movements of the Oirat tribes at the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th centuries occurred under the pressure of the Kazakhs in the south and the Mongols in the east. The arrival of the Kalmyks on the Volga and their large-scale raids disrupted the existing balance of power in the area and became a noticeable push in the defense of the southern Russian borders. After the Nogaev left here Russian border turned out to be unprotected from the Kalmyks.

The principal goal of the Russian government during the XVII-XVIII centuries. was the transfer of the Kalmyks to the status of "faithful Russian subjects who are in military service in return for government payments. Russian government tried to legitimize such allegiance through the traditional ritual of the oath of allegiance. To do this, the government decided that it would be most beneficial to support one strong leader. But the policy of supporting one strong leader cracked and led to a negative result. In the 1720s and 1730s, Russian policy towards the Kalmyks also began to change, with the government beginning a "divide and rule" policy. According to

25 According to the author, the government "achieved the goal of weakening the power of the khan, but as a result reduced the ability of the Kalmyks to defend the borders and provide people for the Russian army." M. Khodarkovsky believed that "the Kalmyks from the time of their arrival in the Caspian steppes perceived relations with Russia as a military-political alliance of two equal forces." The Kalmyks perceived the Russian emperor only as a military leader and protector, who did not have the right to extend his power to the administrative and economic affairs of the Kalmyks, as well as their relations with foreign authorities. The Kalmyks expected to be allowed to govern independently, although they counted on Russian payments and protection 65 .

The well-known European historian A. Kappeler paid much attention to the history of national policy in pre-revolutionary Russia. His works are devoted to a comparative analysis of the history of Russian policy in Kalmykia, Kazakhstan, on the Don, in Kabarda. The author mistakenly believes that in the XVII and XVIII centuries. Kalmyks, like the Crimean Tatars and other nomads, as well as Ukrainians, were perceived by the imperial center as unreliable peoples, were considered rebels and potential traitors. Their elite was guaranteed privileges and certain rights of self-government, but they were not recognized as full-fledged, equal in rights with the Russian nobles, and therefore, with the exception of some high-ranking nobles, they were not co-opted into the nobility of the empire 66 .

The works of Chinese historians, known to us from translations, contain a variety of information on the history of the Oirats, but much less about the Kalmyks. It should be pointed out that many foreign authors, as a rule, operate with a circle of news from Chinese writings that cannot be recognized as authentic, and have the rights of documentary evidence. A comparatively complete and detailed analysis of these works is given in the well-known book by J. Badley 67 . For example, Tsishy, ​​who wrote an essay on the transition of the Torgouts to Russia, notes that they did not

26 could resist the "great power of the Zungars" who "oppressed" them and "wanted to enslave". For this reason, the Torgouts left the borders of Dzungaria and retired to Russia, "joining the number of her subjects." The flight of the Kalmyk Khan Ubashi with most of his subjects is regarded by Tsishi as "a reckless escape from Russia to Zyungaria." According to the author, the Russian-Turkish war was the reason for the migration of most of the Kalmyk people to China. “After several years,” the author wrote, “a war broke out again, between Russia and the Turks, for which new donations were required from the Turguts, but the Turguts, considering them burdensome for themselves, decided to refuse it” 68 .

We find significant information in the well-known compilation work of the Chinese author of the 19th century. He Qiutao, known in China as the "Complete Chronicle of the Shofang of the Northern Region" and "The Collection of Documents on the Events on the Northern Frontier". The author used historical data on the settlement of the Kalmyk uluses in the lower reaches of the Volga, which testify that Kho-Orlyuk migrated to Russia and settled on the Volga River due to his unwillingness to submit to the Dzungarian Khuntaiji 69 . A well-known contribution to the study of the history of the Kalmyk Khanate was made by the monograph of Ma Dazheng and Ma Ruhan 70 .

Thus, in the XVIII - early XX century. The researchers paid the main attention to the analysis of personal relationships between the rulers of Russia and the Kalmyk Khanate. In Soviet and modern Russian historiography, the socio-economic and political system khanates. Preference is given to the study of individual periods and problems: Russian-Kalmyk relations at the beginning of the 17th century, the military history of the Kalmyks in the second half of this century, the history of the Khanate at the beginning of the 18th century, the migration of most of the Kalmyk people to China in 1771. with the conduct of Russia's domestic policy, are interpreted as factors that negatively influenced the traditional structure of a nomadic society. Meanwhile, wearing

Despite the contradictory nature of the socio-economic and political integration of the Kalmyks into the Russian statehood, it had a wide range of positive results associated with Russia's modernization breakthrough.

Basic purpose The purpose of this work is to elucidate the evolution of relations between Russia and the Kalmyks from the time of their entry into Russia until their migration to Dzungaria and the influence of these relations on the socio-political development of the Kalmyk Khanate.

To achieve this goal, the following tasks:

to study the formation of Russian-Kalmyk embassy relations in the system of Russia's foreign policy actions during the annexation of Siberia;

highlight the main stages of the entry of the Kalmyks into the Russian state;

Determine the place of the Kalmyk Khanate in foreign policy
Russia, after analyzing the role of the armed forces of the khanate in the Russian
Turkish wars and having studied the history of his ambassadorial relations with
neighboring peoples and states;

To reveal the processes of formation and evolution of the Kalmyk
statehood in terms of integration into the Russian
states;

consider Russia's influence on internal politics Kalmyk khans and reveal the essence of the contradictions between the various ruling groups of Kalmykia;

show the attitude of the population, including the ruling elite, to the process of assimilation into a single Russian state;

reveal the influence of the Kalmyk factor on the process of administrative and socio-economic development of the Urals and the Volga region by Russia;

Conduct a comprehensive analysis of the political and social
economic development of the Kalmyk society in the 1760s, show
reasons and character of migration in 1771;

To trace the formation and gradual change of the national
state status of the Kalmyk Khanate in the context of evolution
state system of Russia from a class-representative monarchy to
absolutism, compare the status of the khanate with the position of similar
national and territorial formations of the Don and the Left Bank
Ukraine.

Object of study is the process of folding the Russian multinational state in the XVH-XVIII centuries.

Subject of study - history of political relations between the Kalmyk Khanate and Russia. In the system of Russian-Kalmyk relations, it is necessary to single out foreign policy problems associated with the entry of Kalmyks into Russia, and domestic political problems aimed at integrating new subjects into the political, legal, social, economic and cultural system of the country.

Chronological framework of the study. The lower limit is due to the beginning of the formation of the Kalmyk Khanate in the middle of the 17th century. In our opinion, it was during the reign of Daichin and Monchak (mid-1640s - 1660s) that the formation of the Kalmyk state took place. We did not set ourselves the task of specifically considering the history of Russian-Kalmyk relations in the pre-Khan period, in the first half of the 17th century. But we consider it necessary to refer to this period, since it was at this time that the prerequisites for the separation of the uluses of Kho-Urlyuk appeared and the process of politogenesis was outlined.

The upper limit of the study is the migration of most of the Kalmyk people in 1771 to China, which became the actual self-liquidation of the khanate. Thus, the scope of the study covers the 17th - 18th centuries. (until 1771), which makes it possible to clearly identify the main trends and

29 patterns of Russian-Kalmyk relations during a very significant historical epoch.

Methodological basis works are the requirements of modern historical science and scientific methodology, including general philosophical principles (historicism, objectivity), involving the consideration of facts, events, phenomena in their development and interaction with other phenomena of the surrounding reality. General scientific (analysis, synthesis) and special historical research methods (historical-genetic, comparative-historical, problem-chronological) were also used, which made it possible to identify general patterns in the history of the national policy of Russia and features in the history of relations with it of the Kalmyk Khanate.

By objectivity, we mean the absence of bias in the selection of facts, their coverage and analysis, the desire to consider individual phenomena in the totality of all the factors that influenced their development, in interconnection and interdependence from each other. The principle of objectivity made it possible to avoid political and ideological bias, to consider historical events on the basis of the totality of reliable facts known to us.

We proceed from the fact that the judgments, assessments and conclusions contained in the study should be based only on the historical sources of the era under study. Historicism involves the consideration of each individual phenomenon, starting from the causes of its occurrence, the main stages of development, to the moment that this phenomenon became in the period under study. Of course, an essential feature of historicism as a principle historical research, constitutes the principle of a cautious, that is, very responsible, assessment of an era according to its internal laws, and not to the categories of another century. In particular, to assess Russian-Kalmyk relations, it is advisable to use such concepts of modern historical and historical-legal science as

"protectorate", "autonomy", which most accurately convey the content of the events described.

An integral part of the scientific-historical approach is the method of systematic consideration, which made it possible to establish cause-and-effect relationships of events, that is, to study the history of Russian-Kalmyk contacts in the system of international relations with the participation of the leading countries of that time and in the system of regional policy of the Russian state.

The applied comparative analysis makes it possible to determine the place of Kalmykia in a number of other autonomies of this period - the Don, Ukraine, to show the patterns and features of the all-Russian policy.

Source basis dissertations consist of both published and unpublished documents of the central and local authorities of Russia in the 17th-18th centuries introduced into scientific circulation for the first time. To date, the National Archives of the Republic of Kalmykia, the Russian State Archives of Ancient Acts and the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Empire of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remain the most significant for our research. Russian Federation.

In Soviet times, a deep study of archival materials was carried out by V.L. Kotvich. However, the content of these materials for the first half of the XVII century. became widely known only thanks to S.K. Bogoyavlensky, who created a collection of information on the history of the Kalmyks in the first half of this century 71 . An analysis of historiography shows that in the study of individual periods in the history of Kalmykia, we find obvious gaps and erroneous judgments. This is due not only to the level of professionalism or worldview of researchers, but also to the state of the source base.

Archival documents of the 17th century. contain the richest material that allows you to restore the historical picture of the movement of the Kalmyks to the West, the evolution of the system of Russian-Kalmyk relations and the process of formation of the Khanate within Russia. Royal administration

3I closely followed the actions of the nomads and actively developed various kinds of relations with them. The Kalmyks, when moving from Dzungaria to the northwest, came into direct contact with various administrative bodies of Siberia, and then the south of Russia. The wide development of clerical office work in Russian local and central institutions of the 17th century. gave rise to extensive correspondence between the voivodeship departments both among themselves and with Moscow, as well as with the rulers of various Kalmyk uluses. Therefore, official office work was concentrated both in Moscow and locally.

A wide range of sources can be divided into several types:

The first type of sources are legislative
materials: royal orders and letters of the 17th century, article lists of governors and
envoys, imperial decrees to the Astrakhan governors and
governors, letters to the Kalmyk khans and taishas, ​​shert records and
contracts. These materials allow you to consider the process of integration
Kalmyk Khanate into the Russian state, as well as
preparation and implementation of government events on

reforming the management system in Kalmykia.

Most of the RGADA archival material on the history of relations between Russia and the Kalmyk Khanate was published in the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire (1st edition). Here we find Kalmyk sherti of the second half of the 17th century, treaty articles from the beginning of the 18th century, imperial letters and decrees, more than 60 documents in all 72 . Documents and materials of the Complete Collection of Laws for a long time remained the main base of sources for pre-revolutionary historiography.

In the XX century. a significant range of act material was presented in the "Materials on the history of Russian-Mongolian relations in 1607 - 1636", prepared by L.M. Gataullina, M.I. Golman and G.I. Slesarchuk, edited by I.Ya. Zlatkina and N.V. Ustyugov. First book

32 of this collection contains a number of extremely important documents, which to a large extent reveal the picture of the movement of the Kalmyks to the west up to the Emba and Yaik (Urals), show the attitude of the Russian government to this.

Actual materials of the 17th century. on the political relations of the Kalmyks with Russia, represented by shert records, were deposited as a result of the activities of the Ambassadorial and Siberian orders and were preserved in the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts in the relevant funds, as well as in fund 119 "Kalmyk Affairs" 74 .

Since the 18th century in the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, materials were deposited that touched on the fundamental problems of Russia's relations with the Kalmyk Khanate (appointment of rulers, military service, Christianization of fugitive Kalmyks, their arrangement near Russian settled settlements, etc.). The imperial decrees to the governors of Astrakhan and Orenburg, as well as the correspondence of the rulers of the Russian Empire with the Kalmyk khans and governors, were of the greatest importance. Their content is important for a comparative analysis of letters to the Kalmyks, since they revealed the true goals and detailed plans of the government.

Separate materials of the Petrine period were published in Letters and Papers of Emperor Peter I and other collections 75 . A more extensive collection of documents from this century is presented in the "Collection of the Russian Historical Society", which published important documents of the imperial office and the Senate on relations with Kalmykia. Most of the indicated materials of the "Collection" were published at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century. As noted by A.B. Kamensky, for a number of reasons they were little used in the Soviet historiography of Kalmykia. Therefore, one of the tasks is to expand the source base of the problem by using materials from the "Collection" 76 . A number of volumes also published the minutes of the meetings of the Supreme Secret

33 councils, Cabinet of Ministers, Conferences at the highest court for the 30-60s. 18th century The most significant were publications on the course of clashes in the khanate in the first half of the 1720s, on the fate of the settlement of baptized Kalmyks 77 .

Of the documents of the Governing Senate, the most complete publications were “The Senate Archive. Journals and definitions of the Governing Senate ", which included materials of 1732, 1735, 1737, 1738 and 1739. about relations with Donduk-Ombo, and the work of A.N. Filippov "Journals of the Governing Senate for 1737" 79 . The latter contains rich material on the fate of the baptized Kalmyks of Princess A. Taishina and on the solution of the issue of allocating places for Kalmyks to fish. Analysis of published normative-actual sources of the 18th century. involves an appeal to the fund 119 "Kalmyk Affairs" of the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire. In this work, for the first time, imperial decrees and letters of 1725-1771 were introduced into scientific circulation. 80

The next type of source is office documentation central authorities and local administration. These include documents and materials of the 17th century. - reports and reports ("article lists") of almost all Russian embassies and service people who traveled to the Kalmyks; questioning speeches (various testimonies of prisoners, refugees and merchants); reports and reports ("replies") of the royal governors of various cities of Siberia, the Urals and the Volga region; records of the reception of Kalmyk ambassadors in various Russian cities and in Moscow; Correspondence of Kalmyk taishas and khans with government agencies of Russia. These materials make it possible to study the picture of Russian-Kalmyk relations, the course of negotiations on the problems of attracting Kalmyk troops to Russian wars.

A large number of documents from the Posolsky and Siberian orders of the 17th century. published in the collections "Historical Acts", "Additions to Historical Acts". In the 5-volume "Acts of Historical" materials of the Astrakhan command hut on the participation

34 Kalmyks in the Bashkir uprising of 1662-1664. and the Razin movement 81 . The 12-volume materials of the "Additions to the Historical Acts" are mainly represented by the sources of the Astrakhan provincial archive, as well as the archive of G. Miller. The first information about the Kalmyks in the Supplements refers to the mid-30s. 17th century and testify to the appearance of Kalmyks in the Lower Volga. Of particular importance is also the unsubscribe of the Astrakhan governors for 1648-1654. Numerous documents touch upon the history of the participation of the Kalmyk troops in the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people in the second half of the 17th century, provide information about the attitude of the Kalmyks to the uprising led by S. Razin, Kalmyk-Nogai relations, important materials on the crisis of 1682, as well as Russian diplomatic negotiations and Poland, during which the issue of involving the Kalmyks 82 was discussed. The same issues are covered in the materials published in the "Acts Concerning the History of South-Western Russia" 83 .

A number of documents were published in the "Russian Historical Library" and "Acts of the Archaeographic Expedition", containing information about the relationship with Dzungaria, about the movement of the Kalmyks to the Volga in the 20-30s. 17th century Information about the contacts of the Kalmyks with the Don Cossacks is placed in the collection "Don Affairs" 84 .

In the XX century. the most valuable publications of archival documents appeared in the second half of the century. Of undoubted interest is the second volume of “Materials on the history of Russian-Mongolian relations. Russian-Mongolian relations. 1636-1654". Published materials testify to the events associated with the movement of large masses of Oirats to the north-west, to the region of the Urals, which remained between the Torgouts and Dzungars in the 30-40s. 17th century vassal relations. During this period, the Torgouts were active in Western Siberia, and contradictions between the owners of uluses 85 intensified within the Oirat union.

“Materials on the history of Russian-Mongolian relations. 1654-1685" devoted to the relations of the Dzhungars and Khoshouts with Russia contain several important documents about their contacts with the Volga Kalmyks, about the appearance of taisha Ablai on Yaik 86 . In the last volume of “Materials on the history of Russian-Mongolian relations. 1685-1691" there are important documents about the arrival of the uluses of Tsagan Bator to the Volga in 1687 and the aggravation of relations between Ayuka and Galdan 87 .

Separate plots on the history of Kalmyk-Chinese contacts associated with the Tulishen embassy are reflected in the available publications of documents on the history of Russian-Chinese relations, as well as in collections of documents on the history of Russia's relations with China and the states of Central Asia 88 . It should be noted that important materials have been published on the history of relations between the Kalmyks and the Kazakhs and the role of Russia in their settlement 89 .

In Soviet historiography, significant work was carried out to collect and publish materials on the history of peasant wars XVII-XVIII centuries, in which we find extensive information about the attitude of the Kalmyks towards them 90 . Collections of documents devoted to the history of relations between a number of peoples and Russia were published in the North Caucasus. They contain significant material testifying to the role of the Kalmyks in Russian politics. Materials on the history of Russian-Kabardian relations contain significant correspondence between the Posolsky Prikaz and K.M. Cherkassky about the campaigns of the Kalmyks in the 1670s 91 .

Previously unpublished materials were found in a number of funds of the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts. According to V.V. Trepavlov, from the end of the first quarter of the 17th century. the Kalmyk factor is becoming more and more evident in the Nogai history. Under the blows of the Kalmyks, the Nogai retreated to the west, and, in the end, most of them moved to the right bank of the Volga. The change of steppe hegemons manifested itself, in particular, in the “retraining” of voivodeship replies (reports). If in the second

36 half of the XVI - the first third of the XVII century. reports of the Astrakhan governors were filed in the "Nogai columns" and then copied into the Nogai embassy books, then from the mid-1630s they began to be listed already in the Kalmyk affairs. Meanwhile, in the Nogai cases, materials were found on the relationship of the Kalmyks with the Astrakhan voivodship administration for the 40-50s. 17th century Of considerable interest are the extracts made in the archives from the Kalmyk cases on all the circumstances relating to the nomadism of the Kalmyks and a series of extracts about the Derbet ulus 93 , generalizing in nature. A large number of documents about the Kalmyks are found in Mongolian, Zungarian, especially Nogai, Kabardian and other cases 94 . Documents on the relationship between the Kalmyks and the Nogais, Bashkirs and Don Cossacks in the second half of the 17th century have been deposited in the Don Affairs fund. 95

The source base of the work includes office materials of the Astrakhan provincial administration on issues of relations with the Kalmyks. A certain number of documents of the provincial administration were deposited in the funds of the State Archive of the Astrakhan Region. In the fund of the Astrakhan Prikaznaya Hut, a letter of the Kazan Prikaz to Astrakhan has been preserved, indicating the reaction of Russia to the appearance of Kalmyks on the Volga in the 30s. 17th century The governor's funds contain a small number of decrees from the Collegium of Foreign Affairs on issues of relations with the Kalmyks, as well as the correspondence of the governor Ubasha with Astrakhan in the 60s. 18th century 96

Correspondence on Kalmyk affairs of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs with the Senate, the Military Collegium (about the preparation of the Kalmyk cavalry for campaigns in the Russian army, about the actions of the Kalmyks on the Don and Lika), as well as with the College of Commerce (about paying salaries to Kalmyks). These materials, which were, as a rule, of a reference nature, are close to those compiled by the Collegium of Foreign Affairs.

37 references, promemoria, extracts and reports for emperors, the Supreme Privy Council, the Cabinet of Ministers, etc.

The most significant information was preserved by the reports of the Astrakhan governor, as well as other representatives of the local administration. They included reports, reports from persons sent to the Kalmyk steppe with various assignments. The appeal to this source is explained by the fact that it is in the reports that the daily information that came from the steppe is reflected.

There are many files on the relationship of Kalmyks with neighboring peoples and states in other archive funds. In the fund 112 “The Cases of the Edissan, Embulut and Budjat Tatars” 98, “A detailed extract about the Edisan and Enbuluk Tatars from the reports of A.P. Volynsky, Field Marshal M.M. Golitsyn, lieutenant colonel Beklemishev and letters from the Supreme Privy Council and from the rescripts and from the reports of Mr. Neplyuev ”(1723-1728) 99 . Separate information about the Kalmyks was deposited in other funds of the archive 100 .

A significant place among the sources is occupied by documents of special representatives of the College of Foreign Affairs under the khans. They made up fund 36 "Consisting in Kalmyk affairs under the Astrakhan governor" of the National Archives of the Republic of Kalmykia (423 cases belong to the period of interest to us). The uniqueness of this fund lies in the fact that materials were deposited here that came from the authorities and administration of the Russian Empire and came from the steppe from Kalmyk rulers, noyons and ordinary Kalmyks. Here are copies of documents of a reporting nature from persons who performed various assignments of the Astrakhan administration in the uluses, correspondence with the authorities on the Don, Lika, and in neighboring provinces. In addition, the materials of fund 35 "Kalmyk expedition at the Astrakhan provincial office" are of interest, in which there is information on the history of the khanate in the late 60s and early 70s. 18th century 101 Analysis of NARC funds allows

38 highlight the most significant groups of documents and materials. First of all, these are the reports of the people of the Astrakhan administration who were in the uluses with various assignments and assignments. At the heart of these documents, deposited in the bulk in the NARC, are the testimonies of direct eyewitnesses of the events. On the basis of the materials listed above, reports of the Astrakhan governors, as well as persons who had special assignments from the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, were compiled to the court. It must be said that the value of these Russian-language documents is enormous, since they contained daily information, therefore, they allow us to show the most detailed picture of events. A significant drawback of the NARC materials is their incomplete preservation.

A large amount of information is contained in the letters of the Kalmyk khans, noyons and ordinary Kalmyks written in Zaya-Pandit script. In them we find explanations of those events that were rich in the history of the XVII-XVIII centuries. The most significant messages were addressed to the court and often duplicated in Astrakhan. The disadvantage of these documents was the bias of the authors, who sometimes belonged to the opposing camps and reported opposite information 102 . Cross-analysis of Kalmyk letters does not always make it possible to achieve a real picture. In this case, a group of Russian-language documents that were of a reporting nature acquires great importance.

In addition, in the Archive of Orientalists of the St. Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the A.M. Pozdneev preserved extracts from archival documents of the Astrakhan Kalmyk archive for 1708-1712, a description of the Chinese embassy Tulishen 103 .

Important information on the topic is contained in Kalmyk, Central Asian and Chinese annals. More V.L. Kotvich noted that “among the Oirats themselves we find very little information about their life in the 17th and 18th centuries. The vicissitudes of fate they experienced did not contribute to the preservation of the historical

39 literature, which, undoubtedly, they existed, and now about the degree

its development can only be judged by a few facts.

The nomadic way of life, the absence of cities as cultural centers, internecine wars, as well as clashes with the Kazakh, Nogai, Bashkir and other feudal lords, as well as the events associated with the migration of most of the Kalmyk people in 1771, led to the fact that on the territory of Russia practically no national written sources have been preserved. For example, in 1736 A.M. Cherkassky asked the former Khan Tseren-Donduk, who lived in St. Petersburg, about the existence of books on the history and religion of the Kalmyks. The former ruler of the khanate only promised to look at them among the belongings of Shakur Lama, who had died by that time 105 . Only 30 years later, I. Kishenskov found in the uluses a part of the “ancient Kalmyk history”, which he promised to send to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs 106 . In 1776 P.S. Pallas, making extensive use of Kalmyk sources, published historical information about the Volga Kalmyks. The author made a fair conclusion that the last Kalmyk governor-khan Ubashi and the higher clergy surrounding him, during the departure of most of their subjects to Dzungaria, took with them the chronicle “Ancient History” (“Chondschin taka”), which, as the researcher believes, died on the way.

The surviving Kalmyk sources have been preserved through recordings and translations G.S. Lytkin. The work used a more complete edition translated by A.V., Badmaev. One of the most interesting samples of national literature is the essay "Moonlight - the story of Rabjamba Zaya Pandita", better known as "Biography of Zaya Pandita" (short title; "Sarin Girl"). It was written around 1691 by Radnabadra, one of best students and followers of the famous Buddhist preacher Zaya Pandita (1599-1662). Biography contains summary the history of the spread of Lamaism among the Kalmyks and a number of other important

40 historical information. Radnabadra recounts the events in chronological order, year after year, reporting on the activities of Zaya Pandita, on his travels around the Oirat and Kalmyk nomad camps 1 .

The content of the anonymous "History of the Kalmyk Khans" is a brief history Volga Kalmyks from the moment they came to Russia until 1771. It contains important information about the activities of Ho-Urlyuk, Daichin, Monchak, Ayuka, Donduk-Ombo, Donduk-Dashi, Ubashi. The compiler of the "History of the Kalmyk Khans" knew Mongolian, Oirat and, most likely, Russian sources 11 . The chronicle of Gaban-Sharab "The Legend of the Oirats" (1737) describes the history of the arrival of the Kalmyks to the Volga "". The “Tale of the Derben Oirats” (1819) by Batur-Ubashi Tyumen gives a fairly complete genealogy of the Kalmyk rulers, which makes it possible to significantly supplement information about administrative unit khanate" 2.

Great importance have "Materials for the history of the Oirats" G.S. Lytkin, in which the author concentrated various information 17th and 18th centuries, gleaned from the above-mentioned Kalmyk writings, oral stories, and from the History of the Mongolian and Turkmen Vans and Guns" 3 .

Paying serious attention to the study of Kalmyk sources, one should not forget the sources of eastern origin. In the works of the famous Khiva khan and historian Abu-l-Gazi (1603-1664) "Shajara-yi Turk" (Genealogy of the Turks) and "Shajara-yi Tarakim" (Genealogy of the Turkmens), written in 1659-1664, there is brief information about Nogai-Kalmyk relations" 4 .

Thus, a significant layer of new archival sources allows us to present a more complete and consistent picture of events. The published materials in Russian contain extensive information on the history of the 17th-18th centuries. A characteristic feature of these documents was the predominance of information about Russian-Kalmyk

RUSSIANm

STATEBENNAd 4

relationships. The documents and materials found in the archives allow

clarify or change the picture of events. This range of sources is sufficient today to study the key problems of the socio-political history of the Khanate and the development of Russian-Kalmyk relations.

Scientific novelty of the research. The dissertation provides a theoretical generalization of the history of political relations between the Kalmyk Khanate and Russia. To achieve this goal, a wide range of both published and first introduced into scientific circulation sources, including archival documents and materials, was used. As a result of the study, for the first time:

the author's concept of the history of relations between the Kalmyk Khanate and Russia was created, including the establishment of Russian-Kalmyk embassy relations (the first half of the 17th century), joining Russia (the second half of the 17th century) and political and socio-economic integration into the Russian Empire ( 18th century);

it has been established that in the first half of the 17th century, when Russian-Kalmyk relations were associated with the search for nomadic territories by the Kalmyks in Western Siberia, a legal solution to the issue of Kalmyks joining Russia took place;

it is concluded that the actual entry of the Kalmyks occurred in the second half of the century, when the Kalmyks received nomad camps in the interfluve of the Don, Volga and Yaik, in the same years the process of entry was supplemented by the addition of Kalmyk nomad camps in the east of the Emba;

it is shown that an important factor in the Russian-Kalmyk rapprochement was, first of all, the external threat of the Crimean Khanate, in the course of a joint struggle against which a military-political alliance was first created, and then the direct military service of the Kalmyks of Russia began;

the concept of the formation of the Kalmyk Khanate was developed, according to which the formation of national statehood took place on

42 the basis for the development of traditional institutions of a nomadic society;

at the same time, the role of Russian policy as an external factor that accelerated the political genesis of the Kalmyk society in the 17th century was highlighted. and directly influenced the transition from the khan's power to the institution of governorship in the 18th century;

traced the extensive ties of the Kalmyk Khanate with the peoples of the North Caucasus, which testified to the most important mediating role of the Kalmyks in the advancement of Russia in this region, and with neighboring peoples and states in the east, primarily with China and the Dzungar Khanate, which did not contradict Russia's foreign policy strategy;

It is shown that the main socio-economic problems
relations between the Khanate and Russia, which arose during the period of economic
development of the Lower Volga region and the coast of Yaik, led to a reduction
territories of nomads and restriction of fishing of Kalmyks;

it is concluded that the Kalmyk society in the 1760s was in a state of socio-economic and political crisis, the way out of which the national elite mistakenly considered migration to the territory of the former Dzungar Khanate;

political and legal analysis of act sources made it possible to highlight the formation and change in the national-state status of the Kalmyk Khanate from patronage to political, and then to administrative autonomy. In general, this path corresponded to the history of the formation of the national and territorial formations of the Don and the Left-Bank Ukraine and marked a gradual but steady displacement of elements of a kind of federalism in favor of the unitarism of the emerging Russian Empire.

Practical significance The work consists in the possible application of the results of this scientific research in the development of a wide range of issues, both the history of Russia and the history of individual peoples. Its main provisions can be used in the preparation of new research on the history of Kalmykia. The results of the study formed the

43 the basis of the relevant sections of the "History of Kalmykia", "Kalmyk Encyclopedia", and also used in the preparation of general and special courses, staging seminars, popular science and local history publications.

An objective assessment of the events of the past is also extremely important for adjusting the geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation and pursuing its regional national policy on present stage. Conclusions and generalizations can contribute to the improvement of the process of nation-state building and harmonization of national relations in a certain historical perspective.

The formation of Russian-Kalmyk relations in Western Siberia in the first quarter of the 17th century

In the XVI-XVII centuries. in connection with the formation of states of a number of nomadic peoples, the geopolitical situation in the Central Asian region has changed. One of these peoples was the Oirats, who made the last great migration from Asia to Europe. Their possessions occupied the territory from the lake. Zaisan to the city of Karashar in the west, bounded in the east by the western slopes of the Khangai mountains; in the south, their nomad camps did not reach Turfan, Barkul and Khami. Per northern borders Oirat possessions were the southern borders of the possessions of the Kazakhs, Kirghiz and other nationalities, nomadic in the upper reaches of the Irtysh and Yenisei9.

The entry of Kalmyks into the Russian state was due to a number of political and socio-economic reasons. An analysis of the position of the Oirat society shows that, torn apart by civil strife, it turned out to be squeezed from all sides, moreover, it was isolated from foreign markets - Chinese (Eastern Mongols) and Central Asian (Mogulistan and Kazakhstan). All attempts by the Oirats to gain access to the markets of settled peoples ended in failure. The lack of pasture reserves within the Oirat possessions pushed their rulers onto the path of internecine struggle and external expansion towards the nomad camps of the Mongol, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Nogai and other rulers. Thus, the Oirat society experienced a deep socio-economic crisis associated with a lack of access to the markets of China and Central Asia. The crisis also manifested itself in the lack of pastures.

Land tightness, military failures in internal strife and during external clashes pushed individual groups of taishas to search for new pasture territories. The markets of the Siberian cities remained the only ones available.

The Oirats left the borders of Dzungaria and moved in two streams along the Irtysh to the northwest, to the Siberian regions of the Russian state. One group consisted of the uluses of Derbets and Torgouts, headed by the chief Derbet taisha Dalai-Batyr, it included the uluses of Izenei (Ichenei), Uzhen and Yurikty Konaevs; the other - the uluses of the main Torgout taisha Ho-Urlyuk and Korsugan, as well as Ulchechey, Togachey, Buyaran and Dubenei. From the letters of the Order of the Kazan Palace to the Tara governor I.V. Mosalsky (1608) is aware of the appearance of the first group along the Om and Irtysh to the city of Tara, the second - along Kamyshlov to Kolmak Lake11. The mixed composition of the groupings may indicate the presence of a common plan of action for the Torgout and Derbet taishas, ​​whose union was sealed by a dynastic marriage: the wife of Dalai-Batyr was the sister of Ho-Urlyuk12. It is also possible that at first the migration took place with the consent of other Oirat rulers. They were the first to sherto in 1606-1608. in Siberian cities, there are two groups of Oirats - Torgouts and Derbets, who are called Kalmyks in Russian documents. We believe that these events marked the beginning of the establishment of embassy relations. The contents of the sherts indicate that both parties accepted a number of obligations. First of all, an agreement was reached on military protection from the Kazakhs and the Eastern Mongolian Altyn Khan Sholoy-Ubashi (1567-1627). In turn, the Kalmyk rulers undertook to pay tribute and send hostages (amanats). At the same time, the Kalmyks received permission to roam along the Kamyshlov, Ishim, Irtysh and Om rivers and trade in Tara and Tomsk, and pledged to pay tribute in cattle. The issue of sherti as a form of oath of allegiance to the Muscovite tsar occupied a central place in the negotiations that arose with them. The concept of wool was quite broad. V.L. Kotvich noted that Affairs XVII in. there are frequent references to the fact that one or another Oirat owner, usually through his ambassadors, “gave the truth, made a shert”, but this was done exclusively verbally, and only sometimes the text of the sherti was prepared in advance for the one who brought the wool, and such shert records are only found in Oirat affairs." And then he added that “in relations with the Volga Kalmyks and with Altyn Khan, shert notes were used as written obligations, sealed with their signatures”13. P.S. Preobrazhenskaya believes that shert in all cases also meant an oath in compliance with religious ceremonial, which confirms to the “Orthodox” Russian state the strength and inviolability of the contract on the part of the non-Christian people or state14. B.P. Gurevich supplements this opinion, arguing that the Russian authorities meant the entry of one or another people into Russia by wool. The Oirat rulers saw in the sherti an opportunity to conclude a military alliance beneficial to them and did not want to bind themselves with any long-term obligations15.

Formation of the Kalmyk Khanate

In studying this issue, it is necessary to take into account that the Oirat society passed in the XIII-XVI centuries. the initial stage of politogenesis. In our opinion, the most important factor in the politogenesis of the Oirats of Central Asia was their very early entry into the sphere of direct or indirect influence of large centers of civilization. The Kalmyks came to Russia with well-established hierarchical and state traditions that originated in the Oirat period of history. Already in the middle of the XVII century. Kalmyk society revealed the main features of statehood4.

M.L. Kichikov argued that the Kalmyks came to the steppes of the Urals and the Volga region, having a long-established feudal social system, feudal-hierarchical and state traditions. The formation of the Kalmyk Khanate within Russia was determined by internal prerequisites: the class structure of society, the struggle for the centralization of political power, the aggravation of class contradictions, and the need to resolve the territorial problem. The author acknowledged that the process of the formation of the Kalmyk statehood was facilitated by the fact that it met with the support of the authorities of tsarist Russia, which was interested in using the Kalmyk army for defense needs. At the same time, the rulers of the Kalmyk Khanate retained complete independence in managing internal affairs and had some, controlled by Russia, freedom of external relations5.

In our opinion, it is important to identify the initial stage of political consolidation, the emergence of the main taisha. Already in the 30-40s. 17th century signs of political consolidation of the Torgout uluses were quite clearly identified: the nomination of Ho-Urlyuk, then Daichin (Shukur-Daichin) as the main rulers of the Volga Kalmyks, their recognition by Russia. Gaban-Sharab wrote that Ho-Urlyuk gave his sons Yelden and Lauzan all the Tatars they conquered, excluding his subject Torguts6. We believe that he passed the latter to his eldest son Daichin. The sources note the dominant role of Daichin among the Volga Kalmyks: “And he owns all the Kalmyk uluses and Altyul murza Daichin taisha”. Daichin told the Nogai murzas that “his father Urlyuk-taisha is glorious in all hordes, and his father de Urlyuk-taisha is the king in their lands, and he de, Daichin-taisha, will soon become king” 8. At the same time, the struggle for power did not stop among the heirs of Ho-Urlyuk. According to the Astrakhan governor, one of his sons, Dayan-Erke, was poisoned on the orders of Lauzan by a certain lama. In the anonymous "History of the Kalmyk Khans" and in the "Tale" of Batyr-Ubashi Tyumen, it is reported that Daichin took away the subject Nogai Tatars from the brothers Elden and Lauzan, then took possession of their ulus people. After the death of his father, he was given the title of "akhalakchi taishi", that is, the dominant taishi. Elden with the remnants of subject people retired to Kuku-nor10. The defeat of Yelden, according to G. Lytkin, took place in 1645 or 164611

Consolidation was associated not only with the name Daichin. In the absence of his elder brother, who was in Tibet, the role of the chief taisha was performed by Lauzan, that is, the supreme power was concentrated in the Ho-Urlyuk family. During these years, his possession, according to Batyr-Ubashi Tyumen, was 10 thousand wagons13. According to sources, Lauzan did not always obey his brother. For example, already in 1647, disobeying Daichin and seeking to free his arrested people, near Astrakhan he took “Russian and Nogai full”, which caused an aggravation in relations with the governor14.

Many taishas of the Daichin group did not have their former political independence. For example, the prince of Abul-Gazy fled to the uluses of Shunkei in 1641 and asked the taisha to provide him with military assistance in the struggle for power. But the taisha refused to help "without the order of his brother Daichin taishi"15.

In the second half of the 1650s, despite all the disagreements, the institution of fraternal co-government was preserved in the khanate. That is why the Russian authorities communicated equally with both Daichin and Lauzan and probably knew about the existence of contradictions that arose between the brothers on the basis of political disagreements16. The fact of the coming split is noted in the literature. The History of the Kalmyk Khans notes that Lauzan, after a long struggle with his brother, left for Tibet17. P.I. Rychkov confirms and completes this message: “Lauzan, having quarreled with him (Daichin. - A.Ts.), migrated beyond the Yaik to the Ora River and intended to go to Tibet, where the Dalai Lama has a residence. Then this Shokur, who were under the possession of the Lauzan Kalmyks, attracted everyone to his power.

The Kalmyk Khanate in Russian-Turkish Relations during the Northern War

Kalmyk formations took an active part in the Northern War. Kalmyk cavalry was used in almost all ground operations of this war, taking an active part in many clashes with the Swedes. According to K.P. Shovunov, in the first two years of the Northern War, up to 6,500 people were sent from the khanate to the active army. Already in 1701, a 3,000-strong Kalmyk-Tatar army arrived in Moscow, which Peter I himself examined. In 1703, the Kalmyks were also part of the troops of B.P. Sheremetev in Livonia9.

During these years, the Polish king August II showed his interest in the Kalmyk cavalry, who asked Peter I "to give the cavalry 8 regiments and 4000 Kalmyks"10, the Kalmyk cavalry attracted the attention of Hetman Mazepa. In 1707 Ayuka sent to Russian army 3 thousand people. In February 1709, at the direction of Peter I, 3 thousand Kalmyks were sent to Poltava, accompanied by the steward I. Efremov11.

At the beginning of the century, the Kalmyks were used to protect the southern and southeastern borders of the state. To ensure the security of this area, the Russian authorities sent Kalmyks in separate groups. So, in February 1703, a letter was sent from Moscow to the taish Baakhan and Batyr, who roamed the lands of the Don army, stating that “from now on they will be sent to the Crimean places, order their people to be kept on the side in a small number, and many people there to be and nomads to live is not ordered. The same task was assigned to the Kalmyks of the Derbet ulus Munko-Temir, who also roamed the Don. As the Derbet noyon Laban-Donduk wrote to Empress Elizabeth I in 1748, in 1702 the Derbets received an order from Peter I “to roam along the Volga, Don and Yaik rivers at their own will, wherever, whenever they want”12. The following year, the Derbets organized observation posts along the borders of the Donskoy army. In mid-June of this year, Munko-Temir reported to Moscow: “It was ordered against the Crimean and Zaporozhye thieves' Cossacks from their secret parishes to have all caution and guards and be ready to be any, and by that decree I sent my people from me to all four sides of the ulus and to this day they stand guard from their enemy arrivals. In total, up to 5-6 thousand people were involved in the security service on the southern borders13.

At the same time, the Kalmyks renewed contacts with Istanbul and Bakhchisaray. M.G. Novoletov noted that in 1704 a Kalmyk embassy was even sent to Istanbul. Probably, Ayuka later recalled this treaty: “We had a peace treaty with the Crimea and how we conquer, we will talk about it among ourselves when Russia starts a war with Turkey, and he (khan. 148 A. Ts.) does not will be in the world." Khan's words testify to the desire to carry out foreign policy compatible with the Russian exchange rate.

In 1704, Ish Mehmed Aga brought a short letter to Istanbul, which emphasized Ayuki's desire for good neighborly relations. Khan promised to carry out the orders of the padishah "as well as he can." The Ottoman response, transmitted in a letter from the grand vizier, was cautious and moderate. The vizier approved of Ayuki's obedience, noting that "the degree of reward and benefit from his patronage will be equal to the degree of Ayuki's obedience." Ayuka was called upon to confirm his sincerity by peaceful relations with the Crimean Khan Selim Giray. The letter ended on a cautious but promising note: "May Allah Almighty reward you with success in serving the Ottoman state." In the letter, Ayuka was first called "Khan"15.

The contacts of the Kalmyks with Istanbul became known in the Ambassadorial order. Therefore, it was no coincidence that detachments of Don Cossacks began to patrol the border in order to intercept the Kalmyk ambassadors heading to the Crimea. Already in 1705, according to the testimony of the Don ataman L. Martynov, an exchange of embassies took place between the Kalmyks and the Crimea16.

The issue of terminating embassy contacts with Turkey and involving the Kalmyks in the protection of the southern borders was further resolved in the treaty articles of 1708 and 1710. In form, they resembled short protocols of negotiations with an obligatory operative part. These acts continued a series of sherts of the second half of the 17th century, which stipulated the main points of the military service of the Kalmyks of Russia. The treaty articles, which had the subtitle "On the eternal and faithful citizenship of the Russian sovereign with all uluses", were clearly divided into parts related to external and internal politics Russia.