In Siberia, the creation of anti-Bolshevik armed formations began at the end of 1917. They were based on underground military organizations that arose in Irkutsk, Tomsk and other cities. Taking advantage of the performance of units of the Separate Czechoslovak Corps against the Bolsheviks, officer organizations in a number of Siberian cities in late May - early June 1918 raised uprisings and, with or without the help of the Czechoslovaks, began the formation of the first volunteer units of the future Siberian Army.

From companies and detachments of various sizes, after the announced mobilization of officers, by June 1, the Novo-Nikolaevsky regiment, one company, a cavalry detachment and an escort team with a total number of about 800 people were formed. The next day, the headquarters of the West Siberian Separate Army was formed (commanded by Colonel A.N. Grishin-Almazov). In the first half of June, the number of troops began to grow rapidly and reached 4 thousand people with 17 machine guns and 19 guns. This made it possible in mid-June to form the Central Siberian Corps under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A.N. Pepelyaev and the Stepnoy Siberian Corps under Colonel P.P. Ivanov-Rinov from the troops of the Provisional Siberian Government, which in August were renamed the 1st Central Siberian and 2nd th Stepnoy Siberian Army Corps. Later, the Ural Army Corps was formed under the command of Lieutenant General M.V. Khanzhin (later the 3rd Ural Mountain Rifle Corps). By mid-July, the size of the army had increased to 23.4 thousand people with 145 machine guns and 30 guns. On June 27, the West Siberian Separate Army was renamed the Siberian Separate Army.

In August, a call for recruits was announced, which, across the territory of Siberia from Baikal to the Urals, was supposed to give the army about 200 thousand reinforcements, and by September 1, the combat strength of the army reached 60.2 thousand people with 184 machine guns and 70 guns. In September, contact was established with the units of Captain G.M. Semenov and the formation of the 4th East Siberian and 5th Amur Army Corps began. By October 1, 1918, the Siberian Separate Army consisted of 10.7 thousand officers, 59.9 thousand armed and 113.9 thousand unarmed soldiers.

“Russian young units stood in the front line, simultaneously fighting and forming,” recalled General V.K. Sakharov, “the work that Russian officers carried out was beyond human strength. Without proper supplies, without sufficient funds, in the absence of equipped barracks, uniforms and shoes, it was necessary to gather people, form new regiments, teach, train, prepare them for combat work and at the same time carry out guard duty in the garrisons. It should also be added that all this happened in an area and among a population that had just experienced a stormy revolution and had not yet fermented; the work went on under the incessant screams of socialist propaganda.”

In December, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Admiral A.V. Kolchak was formed (partly at the expense of the headquarters of the disbanded Siberian Separate Army). The headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which dealt with issues of planning operations, directing military operations, training and using troops, was directly subordinate to him. Troop control was carried out through the commanders and headquarters of armies and groups, as well as commanders of individual formations. In the fall of 1919, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, due to its cumbersomeness, was abolished, and the management of military formations was carried out through the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front, Lieutenant General M.K. Dieterichs.

General V.K. Sakharov, characterizing the construction of the armies of Admiral A.V. Kolchak, wrote: “It was necessary to reconsider and rearrange all the states, many legal provisions, and establish a completely disorganized apparatus for supplying weapons and military supplies received from the allies from Vladivostok.

The path for work now lay like this: to take from the old all the best, sanctified by the successes of the Russian army, connected with it historically, arising from the natural conditions and characteristics of the Russian people; it was necessary, in addition to this, to introduce everything that was required by life itself and the new conditions caused by the war. For to deny this new, not to take it into account, to blindly adhere to old models would be as reckless as the other extreme - a complete denial of one’s historical norms and an attempt to acquire something new, which does not even resemble the previous one.”

In accordance with the order of Admiral Kolchak dated December 24, 1918, the Yekaterinburg group was deployed to the Siberian Army of the new formation. In June 1919, it included the Northern (1st Central Siberian and 5th and Siberian Army Corps) and Southern (3rd Siberian Steppe and 4th Siberian Army Corps) groups, the Free Shock Corps and the 8th Army attached Army Kama Corps and 1st Cavalry Division. In total, the army consisted of 56.6 thousand bayonets, 3.9 thousand sabers, 600 machine guns, 164 guns, 4 armored trains and 9 aircraft. June 22, 1919 The Siberian Army was divided into the 1st and 2nd Siberian Armies, which, together with the 3rd (former Western) Army, became part of the Eastern Front.

At the end of December 1918, the Ural Separate Army was formed from units of the Ural Cossack Army. Until November 1918, the Urals were nominally subordinate to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of all land and naval armed forces of Russia, Lieutenant General V.G. Boldyrev, then, operationally, to Admiral A.V. Kolchak, and in July 1919 - General A.I. Denikin. By this time, the army included the 1st Ural (1st, 2nd, 6th and temporarily attached 3rd Iletsk division, 1st Ural infantry, Nikolaevsky, Semenovsky and Tsarevsky regiments, partisan foot detachments, armored and aviation detachments), 2 1st Iletsk (5th Iletsk division and separate units)” and 3rd Ural-Astrakhan Corps. The army was provided with weapons, ammunition and uniforms through supplies from Great Britain (through the supply bodies of the Armed Forces of Southern Russia) and the seizure of trophies. In the fall of 1919, the size of the army decreased sharply due to a typhus epidemic. So, in December, only 230 soldiers and officers remained in the Ural Corps. At the beginning of 1920, the remnants of the army were captured by the Red Army at Fort Aleksandrovsky.

The Orenburg Cossack army was initially subordinate to Komuch, then to General V.G. Boldyrev, and from November 1918 it was under the operational subordination of Admiral A.V. Kolchak. In October 1918, the Southwestern Army was formed in the Orenburg region, renamed on December 28 into the Separate Orenburg Army under the command of Lieutenant General A.I. Dutov. The army included the 1st (1st and 2nd Orenburg Cossack divisions) and 2nd (4th and 5th Orenburg Cossack divisions) Orenburg Cossack corps. On May 23, the army was reorganized and renamed the Southern Independent Army. In June, it included troops of the former Southern Group of Major General G.A. Belov (4th Orenburg and 5th Sterlitamak Army Corps), 11th Yaitsky Army and 1st Orenburg Cossack Corps. In total, the army had 15.2 thousand bayonets, 12 thousand sabers, 7 thousand unarmed people, 247 machine guns and 27 guns.

In September 1919, the army was again renamed Orenburg, and in October, together with the 3rd Army and the Steppe Group of Forces, it became part of the Moscow Army Group under the command of Lieutenant General V.K. Sakharov. After the defeat suffered in battles with the Reds in the region of Orsk and Aktyubinsk, the remnants of the Orenburg army retreated to Semirechye, where they joined the Separate Semirechye Army. It was formed at the end of 1919 under the command of Major General B.V. Annenkov. The main backbone of the Separate Semirechinsk Army was the 2nd Separate Steppe Siberian Corps, which in July 1919 included: Ataman Annenkov's Partisan Division, the 5th Siberian Rifle Division, the Separate Semirechinsk Cossack and Steppe Rifle Brigades and the Kyrgyz Cavalry Brigade. In the spring of 1920, General Annenkov's army was defeated, and its remnants crossed the Chinese border, where they were interned.

In the Volga region, the Committee of Members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly (Komuch) on June 8, 1918 officially announced the creation of the People's Army. Initially it was built on a volunteer basis, with a 3-month service life. In total, they managed to recruit a little more than 10 thousand soldiers. Therefore, Komuch on June 30 announced the mobilization of men of 1897-1898. birth. The head of the Komuch Military Department, N.A. Galkin, recalled that “after the failure of the volunteer period, we moved on to mobilizing young people who were not infected with Bolshevism. But recruitment went well only in non-Russian areas. The peasants en masse did not support the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly.” As a result, by the fall it was possible to bring the army to 30 thousand people.

In the cities and towns of the Volga region, liberated by the Czechoslovaks and units of the People's Army of Komuch from the Bolsheviks, companies were first organized, which were then reduced into battalions. At the end of June 1918 they were deployed into 8 infantry regiments, which were renamed rifle regiments in July. In July, the detachment of the General Staff of Lieutenant Colonel V.O. Kappel began to develop into a Separate Rifle Brigade (Special Purpose Rifle Brigade). The remaining units became part of 3 rifle divisions in mid-August. Half a month later, 3 more rifle divisions were formed, and the number of cavalry regiments was increased to 5. In September 1918, the Kazan Rifle Brigade (3.6 thousand bayonets and sabers) was created from the remnants of the Northern Group of the People's Army.

Due to political tensions that arose between Komuch and the Ufa Directory, it was not possible to properly organize the logistics of the People's Army.

At the beginning of 1919, the army troops were reorganized. So, for example, by May the rifle brigades were deployed into the 1st Samara, 3rd Simbirsk and 13th Kazan rifle divisions, and the cavalry into the Volga Cavalry Brigade. All of them became part of the 1st Volga Army Corps, subordinate to the commander of the Western Army.

On January 1, 1919, the Western Army was formed from units and formations of the Kama and Samara groups of forces and the 3rd Ural Mountain Rifle Corps. In June, it included the Ufa (2nd Ufa Army Corps - 4th Ufa of General Kornilov, 8th Kama of Admiral Kolchak and 12th Ural Rifle and Siberian Cossack Brigades), Ural (6th and 7th Ural Mountain Riflemen and the 11th Ural Rifle and Ufa Cavalry Divisions, the 1st Separate Rifle Brigade) and the Volga (1st Samara, 3rd Simbirsk and 13th Kazan Rifle Divisions, Volga Cavalry and Orenburg Cossack Brigades) groups. The total strength of the army was 23.6 thousand bayonets, 6.5 thousand sabers, 1.7 thousand unarmed, 590 machine guns and 134 guns. In July, the Western Army was reorganized into the 3rd Army, the remnants of which, after the defeat on the Tobol and Ishim rivers, became part of the Moscow Army Group. At the beginning of 1920, the remnants of the 3rd Army, which had reached Transbaikalia, were consolidated into the 3rd “Kappel” corps.

On May 30, 1919, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the south of Russia, Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin, recognized Admiral A.V. Kolchak as the Supreme Ruler and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of all land and naval armed forces of Russia. Later, on July 25, Admiral Kolchak issued order No. 153 with the creation of a unified Russian army.

According to the “Report of the staff of the Russian Army according to its organizational SODS1ShSPIAM by July 1, 1919,” it was supposed to consist of 52.8 thousand combatant officers and military officials and 1 million 231.1 thousand combatant and non-combatant soldiers. By the end of 1919, it was planned to increase the available troops to 75% of the regular strength, i.e. 39.6 thousand officers and 923.3 thousand soldiers (not counting aircraft and armored units). In fact, by July 1, 1919, the combat strength of units in the active army and military districts did not exceed 19.6 thousand officers and officials, 416.6 thousand combatant and non-combatant soldiers and volunteers. Directly in the Siberian, Western and Southern armies there were 94.5 thousand bayonets, 22.5 thousand sabers, 8.8 thousand unarmed people with 1.4 thousand machine guns, 325 guns, 3 armored cars, about 10 armored trains and 15 aircraft .

Touring the troops at the front, General A. Budberg on August 22, 1919 characterized the state of the armies: “I was convinced that the information about the Homeric size of military convoys was not exaggerated; there are regiments with a convoy of over a thousand carts, and the army authorities are powerless to fight this evil; You can give any orders regarding reductions in this regard, but no one will carry them out.

All transport and rear positions are overcrowded, which has the most serious impact on the allowance and supply of combat personnel.

All this is the result of the activities of 25- and 28-year-old generals who know how to attack with a rifle in their hand, but who absolutely do not know how to manage their troops, give them proper organization and not allow them to turn into continuous convoys.

What I saw and learned during these three days fully confirmed the conclusions that I had reached back in Omsk regarding the impossibility of an offensive for us. You cannot advance without infantry, because in the so-called divisions there are 400-700-900 bayonets, and in the regiments there are 100-200 bayonets; We must not forget that we must occupy broad fronts; and our divisions are equal in number to battalions. You cannot advance with lost artillery, almost no machine guns, and with the remnants of technical communications equipment.

Here we must add a completely frustrated army rear, unable to properly supply the troops, even when they are withdrawing, with their reserves; How will we be content during the offensive, when we enter the area of ​​​​destroyed railways and depleted local resources both by us and by the Reds, i.e. We will find ourselves in a situation in which the correct and well-organized work of the rear becomes extremely important.”

The armies of A.V. Kolchak were supplied by Great Britain, France and the USA. British General A. Knox in a letter to Admiral A.V. Kolchak wrote in June 1919 that “after approximately mid-December 1918, every rifle cartridge was British-made, brought to Vladivostok on British ships and delivered to Omsk under British guard.” According to the report of the British Military Mission, from October 1918 to October 1919, 79 ships with 97 thousand tons of cargo arrived in the Far East. In total, 600 thousand rifles, 346 million cartridges, 6,831 machine guns, 192 field guns and uniforms and equipment were supplied for 200.5 thousand people, including 200 thousand greatcoats, 200 thousand hats, 200 thousand padded jackets, 400 thousand caps, 400 thousand pairs of shoes, 400 thousand blankets and other uniforms and equipment. Unlike the Armed Forces in southern Russia, Admiral Kolchak’s armies received 5 times less artillery and practically no planes and tanks were sent to them.

At the end of July - beginning of August 1919, a conference was held in Omsk with the participation of Admiral Kolchak, the High Commissioner of the Allies under him W. Elliot, the US Ambassador to Japan R. Morris, the French Commissioner in Vladivostok Martel, Generals Graves, Knox, Janin, Matsushima. During the conference, an agreement was reached on the supply of weapons, ammunition and equipment to the white armies of those regions of Russia that, by agreement between them, were within the sphere of interests of one or another of the Entente countries and the United States. At the same time, it was decided to make a representation to the governments of the United States and Great Britain about the allocation for the armies of Admiral Kolchak of 310 thousand rifles, 500 million rounds of ammunition, 3 thousand Colt machine guns, 40 heavy and 30 light tanks, 30 armored cars, 420 trucks and 10 cars, 60 aircraft. In addition, Great Britain provided Admiral A.V. Kolchak with more than 50 million pounds sterling in financial assistance.

However, in connection with what followed in the autumn of 1919 - winter of 1920. After the defeat of Kolchak’s army, all these weapons, ammunition and military equipment were never delivered to Russia. According to the American General Graves: “Kolchak would not have lasted even a month without the help of the allies.”

In a telegram dated December 1, 1918, No. 263, the Chairman of the Paris Russian Political Conference G.E. Lvov, through the Russian Ambassador in Washington Bakhmetyev, informed the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Omsk government P.V. Vologodsky: “On account of the property received from the liquidation, it was sent to the Czechs 100,000 rifles, 100 machine guns, 22 field guns, 4.5 million rifle cartridges, 150,000 shoes, 611 bales of sole leather. We are sending you 100,000 rifles, 200,000 shoes, railway equipment...” In the USA, Admiral Kolchak’s quartermasters were going to purchase 1 million overcoats, 1,200 thousand pairs of shoes, 1 million caps, 50 thousand blankets and other uniforms and property. In 1919, the US government transferred 392,994 rifles and 15,618 thousand cartridges to the army of Admiral Kolchak. In addition, 100 airplanes, several armored cars and tanks, 400 trucks and cars, steam locomotives, rails, steel, iron, tools, a large amount of sanitary supplies, medicines and many other weapons, equipment and equipment were sent. Ataman Semenov’s units were supported by Japan, which provided him with financial resources, weapons (rifles, guns) and ammunition.

The armed forces of Admiral Kolchak also included two special formations - the Izhevsk and Botkin rifle divisions, the basis of which were the workers of the Izhevsk and Botkin arms factories who rebelled against the Bolsheviks in August 1918. At the same time, the People's Armies of Izhevsk and Votkinsk were organized, including 120 companies. At the beginning of September 1918, both armies were united under the command of Colonel D.I. Fedichkin and became known as the armies of the Kama region. In the second half of November, the remnants of the rebels fought their way across the river. Kama, where they united with units of the People's Army of Komuch. On January 3, 1919, Admiral Kolchak ordered the formation of the Izhevsk separate rifle brigade (more than 2 thousand people) from parts of the Izhevsk region, which was included in the 2nd Ufa Army Corps. At the beginning of August it was reorganized into the Izhevsk Rifle Division. Units of the Botkin region were consolidated into the Consolidated Rifle Division of the Western Army, which was then renamed the 15th Rifle Division, which became part of the 8th Army Kama Corps.

After the defeat of the armies of Admiral Kolchak, the people of Izhevsk and Votkinsk at the beginning of 1920 retreated to Transbaikalia, where they united with the troops of Lieutenant General G.M. Semenov. He arrived in Transbaikalia as the commissioner of the Provisional Government for the formation of volunteer units from the Cossacks and Buryats. By April 1918, in Manchuria, in the exclusion zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway, he formed the Special Manchurian Detachment (SMD) consisting of the Mongol-Buryat cavalry regiment, 2 regiments of the Kharachen Mongols, the 1st Semenovsky and 2nd Manchurian infantry regiments, 2 officer and 2 Serbian companies, 14 guns, 4 armored trains and a battalion of Japanese volunteers. By the end of 1918, Semenov formed the 5th Amur Separate and Native Cavalry Corps, separate Cossack units. All of them became part of the Separate East Siberian Army. In May 1919, Admiral Kolchak ordered the formation of the 6th East Siberian Army Corps consisting of the Manchurian Ataman Semenov, Transbaikal Cossack and Native Cavalry (recruited from Buryats and Honghuz on a volunteer basis) divisions.

At the beginning of 1920, Ataman Semenov created the troops of the Russian Eastern Outskirts (Far Eastern Army) from the remnants of the armies of Admiral Kolchak and his units. It included three corps, which in November were driven out by Soviet troops from Transbakal region to southern Primorye.

Here, the troops of General Semenov (up to 30 thousand people) were renamed “police reserve” in May 1921. Since November, they began to be called the White Rebel Army, which numbered 6 thousand bayonets and sabers.

In June 1922, Lieutenant General M.K. Diterichs took command of the troops and fleet of the Provisional Amur Government. In August, government troops were renamed the Amur Zemstvo Army, and Diterichs became its Voivode. It included 4 armies (groups): Volga, Siberian, Siberian Cossack and Far Eastern, three of which were previously the 1st Cossack, 2nd Siberian Rifle and 3rd Rifle Corps, the 4th Far Eastern Army (group) was formed from parts of the 1st and 2nd corps. In total, by September 1, the Zemstvo army numbered up to 8 thousand people with 19 guns and 3 armored trains. After the defeat in Primorye, the bulk of the army crossed the Chinese border, where they were interned.

"Life Company", Moscow, 1994

As a result of the spring offensive of Kolchak's Russian army, the Whites broke through the red Eastern Front in the center and defeated the northern flank of the red front; occupied vast territories, including the Izhevsk-Votkinsk region, Ufa and Bugulma, and reached the approaches to Vyatka, Kazan, Samara, and Orenburg.

Advance of Kolchak's army

In February 1919, the Russian army under the command of Kolchak, through a series of private operations, was able to prepare an advantageous starting position for the transition to a general offensive. So, the White Guards attacked the 2nd Red Army and pushed its right flank towards the city of Sarapul. This resulted in the withdrawal of the 2nd Army to the Kama line. As a result, the left flank of the 5th Red Army in the Ufa region was exposed, and the right flank of the 3rd Red Army retreated to Okhansk.

Siberian army. On March 4, 1919, the Siberian Army under the command of General Gaida launched a decisive offensive, delivering the main blow between the cities of Okhansk and Osa, at the junction of the 3rd and 2nd Red Armies. Pepelyaev's 1st Central Siberian Corps crossed the Kama River along the ice between the towns of Osa and Okhansk, and Verzhbitsky's 3rd West Siberian Corps advanced to the south. On March 7–8, the Whites took the cities of Osa and Okhansk, and continued to move along the river line. Kama.

The Siberian army developed an offensive and occupied significant territories. However, its further movement was slowed down due to the enormity of the space, poorly developed communications of the theater of operations, the onset of the spring thaw and the increased resistance of the Red Army. The 2nd Red Army suffered heavy losses, but retained its combat capability; the breakthrough of the Red Front failed. After the work of the “Stalin-Dzerzhinsky commission”, which investigated the reasons for the so-called. The “Perm catastrophe”, the quantitative and qualitative strengthening of the Red armies, the Reds were no longer the same as in December 1918. While retreating, they fought and maintained the combat effectiveness and integrity of the front.

In April 1919, the Whites again established themselves in the Izhevsk-Votkinsk region: on April 8, the Votkinsk plant was captured, on April 9 - Sarapul, by April 13 - the Izhevsk plant. Kolchak’s troops broke through towards Yelabuga and Mamadysh. A white flotilla with a landing party was sent to the mouth of the Kama. Next, White developed an offensive in the direction of Vyatka and Kotlas. However, Kolchak’s troops were unable to break through the front of the Red armies. On April 15, the extreme right-flank units of Gaida’s army came into contact with small groups of the Northern White Front in the completely roadless and wild Pechora region. However, this event, as previously noted, did not have any serious strategic consequences. The weak Northern Front could not provide any significant assistance to Kolchak's Russian army. This was initially connected with the position of the Entente, which did not intend to fight Soviet Russia at full strength.

In the second half of April, the Siberian Army was still advancing. But its onslaught weakened due to the increased resistance of the 3rd Red Army. The left flank of Gaida's army threw back the right wing of the 2nd Red Army beyond the lower reaches of the river. Vyatka. A serious factor was the spring thaw, the lack of a developed road network, and the vast territory. The white corps became separated, lost contact with each other, and could not coordinate their actions. Communications were greatly stretched, the forward units were deprived of the supply of ammunition and food, and the artillery was stuck. The troops were overworked by the previous breakthrough; there were no operational and strategic reserves to develop the first successes. Personnel shortage manifested itself, officers were dying, and there was no one to replace them. Reinforcements, mainly from peasants, had low combat effectiveness and did not want to fight for their masters.

Western Army. On March 6, 1919, the Western Army under the command of Khanzhin launched an offensive in the general direction of Ufa, Samara and Kazan. Mikhail Khanzhin was a participant in the war with Japan, during the First World War he commanded an artillery brigade, an infantry division, and was an artillery inspector in the 8th Army. He played a prominent role in the Lutsk (Brusilov) breakthrough and was promoted to lieutenant general. Then inspector of artillery of the Romanian Front, inspector general of artillery under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Khanzhin showed himself to be a talented artillery chief and combined arms commander.

The offensive of Khanzhin's army was distinguished by a more active pace and serious results than the movement of the Siberian Army. The White strike group (2nd Ufa Corps of Voitsekhovsky and 3rd Ural Corps of Golitsyn) attacked the junction between the inner flanks of the 5th and 2nd Red armies, where there was an almost empty gap of 50 - 60 kilometers. This largely predetermined the further success of Kolchak’s army in the Spring Offensive.

Commander of the Western Army Mikhail Vasilyevich Khanzhin

The Whites attacked the left flank of the 5th Red Army (the left-flank brigade of the 27th Infantry Division), defeated and drove back the Reds. The White Guards, turning sharply to the south, moving along the Birsk-Ufa highway, almost with impunity, began to cut the rear of the stretched out divisions of both divisions of the 5th Red Army (27th and 26th). The commander of the 5th Army, Blumberg, tried to throw his divisions into a counterattack, but they were defeated by superior enemy forces. As a result of 4-day battles, the 5th Army was defeated, the interaction of its troops was disrupted, the remnants of the army, divided into two groups, tried to cover two important directions - Menzelinsky and Bugulminsky.

On March 10, Voitsekhovsky’s 2nd Ufa Corps, which broke through the front of the Red Army, took Birsk on the move. Kolchak’s troops moved in a southerly direction, bypassing Ufa from the west. For several days they moved with impunity along the rear of the 5th Red Army and destroyed them. At the same time, the 6th Ural Corps of General Sukin began a frontal offensive in the Ufa direction. On March 13, General Golitsyn’s corps took Ufa, the Reds fled to the west, south of the Ufa-Samara railway. The Whites were unable to surround them, but captured rich trophies, many supplies and military equipment. The 5th Army retreated, suffering heavy losses in prisoners and those who fled. Many themselves surrendered and went over to the side of the whites. On March 22, the Whites took Menzelinsk, but then abandoned it and reoccupied it on April 5.

During the period from March 13 to the end of March, the Red Command tried to rectify the situation by introducing reserves and individual units in the 5th Army sector, as well as by concentrating and active actions of the group on the left flank of the 1st Army in the Sterlitamak area. This group launched an attack on Ufa from the south. However, it was not possible to restore the situation. On March 18, units of the Southern Group of the Western Army and troops of Dutov’s Separate Orenburg Army began an offensive on the left flank. The fight 35 kilometers south of Ufa was stubborn: settlements changed hands several times. The outcome of the battle predetermined the transition of the Red Bashkir Cavalry Regiment to the White side and the arrival of the Izhevsk Brigade to this sector. By April 2, the Reds retreated; on April 5, the Whites took Sterlitamak and began an attack on Orenburg.

The offensive in the central direction continued to develop successfully. On April 7, Kolchak’s troops took Belebey, on April 13, Bugulma, and on April 15, Buguruslan. On April 21, units of Khanzhin reached the Kama, creating a threat to Chistopol. Soon they took it and created a threat to Kazan.

In the southern direction, the Orenburg Cossacks took Orsk on April 10, and the Ural Cossacks of General Tolstov occupied Lbischensk on April 17 and besieged Uralsk. Dutov's Cossacks went to Orenburg, but got stuck here. The Cossacks and Bashkirs, mostly cavalry, failed to take the well-fortified city. And the Ural Cossacks got stuck near their capital - Uralsk. As a result, the selected Cossack cavalry, instead of going into the opened gap in the center, in a raid along the Red rear, got stuck near Uralsk and Orenburg.

Thus, Khanzhin's Western Army carried out a strategic breakthrough in the center of the Red Eastern Front. And if this event did not cause the collapse of the entire Eastern Front of the Red Army and, accordingly, a catastrophic situation in the eastern direction, then this was primarily due to the peculiarities of waging the civil war. The vast expanses of Russia absorbed troops and both sides conducted maneuverable combat operations in small detachments. The Western army, as it moved forward, stretched its front more and more. Having occupied Buguruslan on April 15, Khanzhin’s army stretched along a front of 250–300 km, with its right flank at the mouth of the river. Vyatka, and the left one is southeast of Buguruslan. Five infantry divisions were moving fan-shaped on this front. Their striking power was constantly falling, and there were very few second-echelon troops and strategic reserves. The Whites made a deep breakthrough, but this had no or almost no effect on neighboring groups of troops. The Whites had to put their troops in order, regroup them, pull up the rear, which gave the Reds time to gain time, bring up new forces and reserves, and begin a counter-maneuver.

In addition, the white command never abandoned the idea of ​​connecting with the Northern Front. At the moment of the breakthrough of the Western Army in the center, it would be reasonable to strengthen Khanzhin at the expense of the Siberian Army. But they didn’t do this. And the Cossack armies - Orenburg and Ural - were stuck in the south.

White propaganda poster “For Rus'!” with the image of a Ural Cossack. White Eastern Front. 1919

Actions of the Reds

The Supreme Red Command took extraordinary measures to rectify the situation in the east of the country. A wave of recruits from politically active, conscientious fighters, trade union members and volunteer workers was sent to the Eastern Front. The strategic reserve of the main command was also thrown there - the 2nd Infantry Division, two rifle brigades (10th Infantry Division from Vyatka and 4th Infantry Division from Bryansk) and 22 thousand reinforcements. Also at the disposal of the Eastern Front was the 35th Infantry Division, which was formed in Kazan. The 5th division was also brought up here from the Vyatka direction.

This made it possible by mid-April 1919 to begin changing the balance of forces on the Eastern Front in favor of the Red Army. Thus, in the Perm and Sarapul directions, 33 thousand whites acted against 37 thousand Red Army soldiers. In the central direction, in the area where the front was broken through, the Whites still had a significant advantage - 40 thousand soldiers against 24 thousand Red troops. That is, the numerical disparity in forces was significantly reduced, instead of fourfold (more than 40 thousand versus 10 thousand), which was at the beginning of the operation, it decreased to almost twofold.

During the same period, the commander of the Southern Group of the Red Armies (1st, Turkestan and 4th) Frunze carried out a series of troop regroupings in order to strengthen his own position, create a reserve, strengthen the center of the Eastern Front, where the situation was developing according to a catastrophic scenario, and prepare a counterattack from the Southern Group . As a result, Frunze’s active actions became the prerequisites for the future successful counter-offensive of the Red Army. The 4th Army was weakened by the withdrawal of the 25th Infantry Division (first to the army group reserve), but was given only a defensive mission. The Turkestan army had to hold the Orenburg region and maintain contact with Turkestan, so it was reinforced by one brigade of the 25th division. The remaining two brigades of the 25th division were transferred to Samara, a junction of routes to Ufa and Orenburg, strengthening the Ufa-Samara direction. In the future, the 4th and Turkestan armies were supposed to hold back the attacks of the enemy’s Orenburg and Ural armies.

The situation was difficult in the sector of the 1st Red Army. Its right wing (24th Infantry Division) in early April developed a successful attack on Trinity. And the left wing sent three regiments to the Sterlitamak area and a brigade to Belebey to help the 5th Army. However, the enemy defeated a group of Red troops in the Sterlitamak area, took it, and also forestalled the brigade moved to Belebey, capturing it. The left flank of the 1st Army was weakened, and the fall of Belebey created a threat to the rear of the 1st Red Army. It was necessary to stop the successfully developing offensive of the right flank of the 1st Army and quickly withdraw the 24th Division back. While the remnants of the defeated 20th Infantry Division held back the enemy in the Belebey direction, the 24th Division was transferred to this area by a forced march. The withdrawal of the 1st Army forced the Turkestan Army to also carry out a partial regrouping back, and by April 18–20 its new front ran along the line Aktyubinsk - Ilyinskaya - Vozdvizhenskaya. And Frunze strengthened the position of his two armies by moving the strategic reserve to the Orenburg-Buzuluk region.

Thus, Frunze began preparing and accumulating reserves for the future counter-offensive of the Red Army on the Eastern Front. On April 7, the command of the Eastern Front planned the concentration of the 1st Army in the Buzuluk, Sharlyk area to launch a flank counterattack against the enemy advancing on Buguruslan and Samara. On April 9, the RVS of the Eastern Front expanded the operational capabilities of the Southern Group, including the 5th Army in its composition and giving Frunze complete freedom of action. The commander of the Southern Group had to regroup the troops and deliver a decisive blow to Kolchak’s army before the end of the spring thaw or after it. On April 10, a directive was issued by the RVS of the Eastern Front, according to which the Southern Group was to strike to the north and defeat the enemy, who continued to push back the 5th Red Army. At the same time, the Northern Group of Forces was formed consisting of the 2nd and 3rd armies under the command of the commander of the 2nd Army Shorin. She was given the task of defeating the Siberian army of Gaida. The dividing line between the Northern and Southern groups passed through Birsk and Chistopol, the mouth of the Kama.

Results

As a result of the spring offensive of Kolchak's Russian Army, the Whites broke through the red Eastern Front in the center (positions of the 5th Army), defeated the northern flank of the red Eastern Front (heavy losses of the 2nd Red Army); occupied vast territories, including the Izhevsk-Votkinsk region, Ufa and Bugulma, and reached the approaches to Vyatka, Kazan, Samara, and Orenburg. The Kolchakites captured a vast region with a population of more than 5 million people.

The Soviet high command had to take emergency measures to stabilize the situation in the east of the country and organize a counteroffensive. “Flight to the Volga” (“Run to the Volga”) of Kolchak’s Russian army eased the position of Denikin’s army in the South of Russia (VSYUR). The strategic reserves of the Red Army were transferred to the Eastern Front, as well as the main reinforcements, which helped Denikin's troops win in the South of Russia and begin the campaign against Moscow.

From a military-strategic point of view, it is worth noting the successful choice of the strike site - the junction of the 2nd and 5th Red armies, which was practically bare. White also took advantage of the weakness of the 5th Army - creating a quadruple superiority in forces in the direction of the main attack. However, the white command made a strategic mistake by delivering two main attacks - the Perm-Vyatka and Ufa-Samara directions. In addition, in the future, the two strike fists dispersed their forces even more, attacking in several directions at once. The corps and divisions lost contact and could no longer establish interaction. As it moved forward, the vast expanses of Russia simply swallowed up the white army; it lost its striking power. The personnel backbone of the army was melting, Kolchak’s army was struck by a personnel shortage, and new peasant recruits constantly worsened the fighting qualities of the Russian army. At the same time, the strength and resistance of the Reds grew. In its ranks there was a talented, tough and intelligent commander, the brilliant commander Frunze, he was able to regroup the forces of the Southern Army Group and began preparing a counterattack. In addition, we should not forget the natural conditions - the period of spring thaw, which significantly worsened the possibilities of movement.

In January 1919, the 17,000-strong 4th Army, created from peasant partisan detachments, having defeated the Cossacks and captured Uralsk, quickly began to disintegrate. No one wanted to go into the winter steppe and storm the bristling villages. The troops responded to attempts to curb them with “communist discipline” with riots. 2 regiments of the Nikolaev division rebelled and killed the commissars. They were joined by the team of the armored train and supported by the peasants of Novo-Uzensky district. Members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Lindov army and members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Republic Mayorov and Myagi, who came to restore order, were shot. In such a situation, Frunze took command. He assessed the situation and forgave the rebels. He left the murder of representatives of the central government and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the army without consequences! He didn’t even order an investigation, reporting to the top that the main culprits had already escaped! I simply weighed two possibilities - that in the event of repression, the rebel units would rush to the White Cossacks and pull the rest with them, and on the other hand, the stunned regiments, suspended in uncertainty, would happily seize the opportunity for amnesty. And he sent an order to the Nikolaev division: “Wash away the crime against Soviet power with your blood.” The division remained in service. In a few days, Frunze toured the combat areas huddled close to housing and showed off his skills as an agitator at rallies - he had plenty of experience. He took part in minor skirmishes, appeared with a rifle in chains - and popularity was won. And then he began to take control of the freemen. He mixed parts of different divisions, molding them into two groups, the Ural and Aleksandrov-Gai. And in February, as soon as the frosts had subsided, he began his offensive. Chapaev's Aleksandrov-Gai group took the large village of Slomikhinskaya, the Ural group took Lbischensk.

The path to Turkestan was again open. The troops aimed at Guryev in order to press the Cossacks to the Caspian Sea, to the deserted sands, and finish them off. In connection with the party’s program for “decossackization,” Frunze was given every possible support. New units for the 4th Army were formed in Samara, sent from his “patrimony” of Ivanovo-Voznesensk (under the pretext that the weavers who were left without work should pave the way to Turkestan cotton themselves). The 25th shock division was re-formed under the command of Chapaev, which was planned to move to Orenburg in order to finally defeat Dutov. Frunze also drew attention to several ownerless regiments that had broken through from Turkestan during the previous offensive. He did not distribute them among his formations, but decided to create a new Turkestan army on their basis. And he achieved appointment as commander of the Southern Group of two armies.

While this group, building up its strength, launched an offensive to the south, and Bloomberg’s 5th Army was preparing for another strike to the east, the day of Kolchak’s general offensive was approaching. In the literature you can find different numbers of his troops - 300, 400, and even 700 thousand. All these numbers are not true. Sometimes they were deliberately inflated by white propaganda. Even if we take into account the roster of rear garrisons, headquarters, training teams, police, and Cossack atamans who do not want to obey anyone, these figures will still remain overestimated. And at the front, by the beginning of March, Kolchak had 137.5 thousand people, 352 guns, 1361 machine guns. The 6 armies of the Eastern Front opposing him totaled 125 thousand people, 422 guns, 2085 machine guns, i.e. the advantage in manpower was negligible, and in armament the White Guards were inferior to the enemy.

One more tragic feature of the Eastern Front should be noted. Unlike the South of Russia, Kolchak did not have an advantage over the Reds in the quality of the army. In 1917 - 1918 all the best officers rushed south, to Kornilov and Alekseev. And from the moment of the Czechoslovak revolt until November 18, it was easier to get from the center of Russia to the Don to the Kuban through neutral Ukraine than to Siberia through the front. In the east, people gathered largely randomly, spontaneously joining the liberation uprising or falling under mobilization. Of the 17 thousand officers in Kolchak’s army, only about 1 thousand were regular officers. The rest are, at best, storerooms and ensigns of wartime production, at worst, dubious production of “constituent offices,” directories and regional governments. The acute shortage of officers was made up for by untrained youths who put on their shoulder straps after a six-week course - pure in soul, but not having anything behind this soul and not being able to do anything at all.

In the photo: A.V. Kolchak awards soldiers of his army

A galaxy of prominent commanders gathered in the south. There was an abundance of military leaders there; for example, such major military figures as Lukomsky and Dragomirov were in civilian positions. Kutepov, Wrangel, Erdeli, Pokrovsky and many others held administrative positions for a long time or were in the reserve command. In the east there was a shortage of not only talented, but simply competent military leaders. Kolchak himself could only be a banner; he had little understanding of land strategy and tactics. And around him, the commanding heights were occupied by those who were promoted or accidentally brought to the top by the White rebel movement. Let's say that Kolchak's chief of staff (in fact, the first person under the sailor-commander-in-chief) turned out to be Captain Lebedev, just a Kornilov courier to Siberia, who rose to the rank of general under changing governments. And many corps and divisions were commanded by lieutenant generals who, at best, proved themselves to be good commanders of semi-partisan detachments during the liberation of Siberia and the Urals. This was at a time when a staff of General Staff military experts was installed in command and staff positions in each Bolshevik army.

In the south, the strong backbone of the army was made up of “registered” officer units - Markov’s, Drozdov’s, Kornilov’s, Alekseev’s, welded together by common traditions, victories and losses. There were no such things in the east. The newly created regiments and divisions had neither a common past nor a strong bond. The strongest and most combat-ready units of Kolchak were the Izhevsk and Botkin regiments from the rebel workers of these cities. The striking force of the south was the Cossacks. But the Cossack troops were too different. Don - 2.5 million Cossacks, Kuban - 1.4 million, Terek - 250 thousand. The Eastern Cossack troops were small in number, did not have such deep traditions as their older brothers, and each pulled in its own direction. Amur (40 thousand) and Ussuri (34 thousand) were bogged down in the internal war of Primorye. The leader there was Ataman Kalmykov, who ignored the Supreme Power. The larger Transbaikal (250 thousand) sat under the hand of Semenov, who openly did not recognize Kolchak. Again, there was a war going on there - some of the Cossacks recoiled from the self-proclaimed chieftain and created red detachments. More or less supported by the Siberian Cossacks (170 thousand). Semirechenskoe (45 thousand) was entirely occupied with the war for its own bearish corner. The largest was the Orenburg army (500 thousand), but there the Cossack class also included the Bashkirs, looking askance first in the direction of Dutov, then in the direction of the traitor Validov. The Ural Cossacks (170 thousand) fought bravely, but they fought on their own, the connection with them was weak.

It was under such conditions that the two forces were preparing for confrontation. In December, Kolchak had every chance to defeat the loose red front, as happened in Perm, but then he did not yet have a sufficient army. By February, the draconian measures of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky had strengthened the northern flank. The decayed southern flank, no doubt, could still easily be crushed. But the betrayal of Validov’s corps and the loss of Ufa, Orenburg, and Uralsk forced the offensive to be postponed for a month. By March, when the offensive began, Frunze’s 40,000-strong group was already hanging on Kolchak’s southern flank and was getting stronger and stronger. By the beginning of spring, the Siberian Army of Gaida, about 50 thousand people, was deployed in the Perm region, with the attack directed towards Izhevsk - Glazov - Vyatka. To the south is the Western Army of M.V. Khanzhin in 43 thousand with the direction Ufa - Samara. It was given operational subordination to the 14,000-strong Cossack Southern Group of Gen. Belov, and Dutov’s Separate Cossack Army, 15 thousand people, was targeting the Orenburg direction. Kappel's Volga Corps remained in Kolchak's reserve.

In literature, not only red, but also white, there is a very slippery legend about the wrong choice of the direction of the main attack. They say that the northern direction was mistakenly chosen out of rivalry with Denikin in order to get ahead of him in the capture of Moscow. It is even argued that the direction of the main attack was chosen based on the rivalry between the British and the French. The British, they say, pulled Kolchak to the north, to unite with their Arkhangelsk group, and the French to the south - to their protege Denikin. This version is pure nonsense. It was generated in the white camp by Kolchak’s political opponents, and the reds picked it up and developed it in order to make more caricatures of the white generals, who were even ready to rip each other’s throats out.

It is very easy to refute this version. Firstly, both directions were considered equivalent, and the main one was not the north, but the south. Secondly, the zones of British “interests” were closer to the south, in Petrovsk (Makhachkala) and Baku, while the north was not included in the British state “interests”; they simply did not know how best to get rid of it. And Denikin by this time was in disgusting relations with the French because of their policy in Odessa, unwillingness to help the Don and flirting with Petlyura. Thirdly, the version of rivalry deliberately confuses different periods of the war. In March, Denikin did not have to think about any Moscow; with an army of 60,000, he barely held his flanks from the more than 200,000-strong Bolshevik group that poured in from Ukraine and Tsaritsyn. Therefore, the only form of mutual assistance was possible on Denikin’s part - to draw more red forces to himself, and on Kolchak’s part - to take advantage of this.

And finally, studying the experience of the civil war, we can come to the conclusion that the even distribution of forces in several directions was... correct. Maybe by accident, but right. The strategy of the civil war is very different from the classical one, and success was determined not only by the arithmetic ratio of troops, but also by a host of other factors - moral, political, economic, etc., which were impossible to take into account in advance. Kolchak’s original plan of attack in several directions can be considered correct. If only the command had realized to act correctly as it developed!

The Siberian Army began the operation. On March 4, Pepelyaev’s corps crossed the Kama River across the ice between the cities of Osa and Okhansk. To the south, Verzhbitsky’s corps began an offensive. They penetrated the defenses of the 2nd Red Army, and on 8.03 both cities were taken. In 7 days of stubborn fighting, the Bolsheviks retreated 90-100 km, but the breakthrough was unsuccessful. After the work of the “Stalin-Dzerzhinsky commission”, the quantitative and qualitative strengthening of the front, the Reds here were no longer the same as in December. While retreating, they maintained the integrity of the front and combat effectiveness.

Almost simultaneously, on March 5, Bloomberg’s 5th Red Army tried to go on the offensive near Ufa. I ran into two divisions at random, the 26th and 27th (about 10 thousand people in both), which were also disorganized in a big city, and ran into the entire army of Khanzhin, who was preparing to strike. And, of course, I received it in such a way that only dust came out. The Reds ran. And the next day Khanzhin went on the offensive. This was one of Kolchak’s best military leaders, at least a real, not fake lieutenant general who advanced during the World War. True, he was not a combat commander, but a staff commander - he previously headed the main artillery department. But still, Khanzhin stood out favorably against the general background of Siberian precocious commanders.

His strike group under the command of Gen. Golitsyn from the 2nd Ufa Corps (17 thousand) and the 3rd Ural Corps, General. Boytsekhovsky (9 thousand) attacked the Reds north of Ufa and broke through the front, completing the defeat of the 5th Army. The 6th Ural Corps, General, moved head-on to Ufa. Sukina (10 thousand). The Bolsheviks fled. Communication between the army headquarters and the troops was disrupted. On March 10, the Whites occupied Birsk, followed by Menzelinsk, reaching the Kama River and cutting the Red Eastern Front in two.

The breakthrough also began south of Ufa. An encirclement was emerging that threatened the destruction of the entire 5th Army. Gene group Belova occupied Sterlitamak, cutting off railway communication with Ufa from the south. The 4th Ural Mountain Rifle Division reached the station. Chishmy, cutting off the city from the east. Fleeing from the ring, the headquarters of the 5th Army, led by Bloomberg, abandoned Ufa on March 12 and fled, giving the order to the troops to retreat to the river line. Chermasan, 100 km to the east. We tried to get hold of the station. Chishma, but it was clogged with a traffic jam of trains and convoys, and panic reigned. Throwing everything they could, the Red Army soldiers rolled into the countryside. The front command canceled Bloomberg's order to withdraw and gave instructions to return and defend Ufa to the last drop of blood. However, there was no longer any communication between the units. The remnants of the 5th Army scattered, fleeing the steppes, without roads, to the south and east.

This loss of control helped the Reds avoid complete destruction. When the encirclement ring closed, it contained only a mass of property, weapons and supplies. In exactly the same way, the second ring near the village of Repyevki slammed shut in vain. The Bolsheviks fled so quickly that no maneuvers or forced marches could capture them in a pincer movement. On March 14, white troops occupied Ufa without a fight, losing only about 100 people during the operation. The Red 4th Army was defeated on the southern flank. Once again, the Ural Cossacks took up checkers together and rebelled against the “Antichrists.” The victorious march to Guryev fizzled out. 2 presumptuous regiments were defeated. Cossacks under the command of Gen. Tolstova moved to Uralsk.

Meanwhile, among these victories, inconsistencies quickly began to accumulate. A separate Cossack army of Dutov approached Orenburg and got stuck under it. The Cossacks and Bashkirs, mainly cavalry, were unsuitable for siege and assault on fortified positions. But the command was unable to tear them away from their own “capital” and send them to a more promising direction, agreeing with their desire to first liberate “their” land. Dutov's direction was automatically attached to Khanzhin's army: Sterlitamak - Beloretsky Plant. Belov's southern Cossack group pulled back to cover the gap between the units of Khanzhin, Dutov and Tolstov. As a result, at the very beginning of the offensive, the Whites' enormous advantage in cavalry was lost. Instead of entering the breakthrough and moving in raids along the Red rear, all the White cavalry forces found themselves tied up in a task that was completely beyond their strength and unusual for cavalry - the siege of Orenburg and Uralsk. And Khanzhin’s corps, pursuing the Reds, began to fan out across the endless steppes, losing contact with each other.

In the photo: Sitting in the first row (from left to right): the first is the commander of the 1st Volga Corps, General V.O. Kappel, the third - commander of the Western Army, General M.V. Khanzhin, fourth - Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief General D.A. Lebedev.

The success was complete, the front was destroyed. This is where we could strengthen the Western Army at the expense of the Siberian Army. But the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, led by Lebedev, missed even this opportunity. The Bolshevik command was already considering plans and sending out directives to the armies about a general withdrawal beyond the Volga... And again the month-long delay in the offensive had an effect. The spring thaw struck, and the planned push to Samara got stuck in seas of liquid mud. The muddy steppe slowed down both the victorious march of the whites and the panicked flight of the reds.

They continued to beat the Bolsheviks. As soon as they tried to remove part of the forces from the northern flank to plug the holes, the Siberian Army launched a new blow. 10.04 she took Sarapul, 13.04 - Izhevsk. A white flotilla with a landing force entered the mouth of the Kama. And Khanzhin’s army still won one victory after another. In early April, Bugulma and Belebey fell. The city of Chistopol at the mouth of the Kama was occupied - the whole river became white. The Kolchakites reached the Volga. Kazan was under threat. The Whites approached Samara on two directions. From the northeast, Voitsekhovsky’s corps occupied the city of Sergiopol, 100 km away. From the east, Sukin's corps and the cavalry corps of General. Bakich (17 thousand sabers) began heavy battles near the city of Buguruslan with the forces of the 1st and Turkestan Red Armies. They were defeated, thrown back to the south. One of the best at the front, the 24th Iron Division, lost half of its artillery, was demoralized and retreated in complete panic... But Frunze’s group remained aloof from the main attack and now threatened Khanzhin’s army’s stretched communications from the flank.

Based on materials from the book by V. E. Shambarov - “White Guard”.

On May 17, 1918, the uprising of the Czechoslovak Corps began in Russia, from which many historians count the beginning of the Civil War. Thanks to the rebellion of the Czechoslovak Corps, which covered a significant part of the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East, Soviet authorities were liquidated in vast territories and anti-Soviet governments were created. It was the performance of the Czechoslovaks that became the starting point for the start of large-scale military operations of the “whites” against the Soviet regime.

The history of the Czechoslovak Corps is inextricably linked with the First World War. In the fall of 1917, the command of the Russian army decided to create a special corps of Czech and Slovak prisoners of war, who had previously served in the Austro-Hungarian army, were captured by Russia, and now, given their Slavic affiliation, expressed a desire to fight against Germany and Austria-Hungary as part of Russian troops.

By the way, Czech and Slovak volunteer formations, which were staffed by Czechs and Slovaks living on the territory of the Russian Empire, appeared back in 1914, when the Czech squad was created in Kyiv, but they acted under the command of Russian officers. In March 1915, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, allowed the admission of Czechs and Slovaks from among prisoners of war and defectors of the Austro-Hungarian army into the ranks of the Czechoslovak formations. At the end of 1915, the First Czechoslovak Rifle Regiment named after Jan Hus was created with a strength of 2,100 troops, and by the end of 1916 the regiment was transformed into a brigade of 3,500 troops. Colonel Vyacheslav Platonovich Troyanov was appointed brigade commander, who was awarded the rank of major general in June 1917.

After the February Revolution of 1917, a branch of the Czechoslovak National Council, founded back in 1916 in Paris, appeared in Russia. The Czechoslovak National Council assumed the authority to lead all Czechoslovak military formations on both the Eastern and Western fronts. The Provisional Government treated the Czechoslovak movement favorably, recognizing the Czechoslovak National Council as the only legitimate representative of the Czechs and Slovaks in Russia. Meanwhile, the CHNS was entirely under the control of Great Britain and France; Russia’s influence on it was minimal, since the leadership of the CHNS was located in Paris. The Czechoslovak brigade, which fought on the Eastern Front, was transformed into the 1st Hussite Division, and on July 4, 1917, with the permission of the new Supreme Commander, General Lavr Kornilov, the formation of the 2nd Czechoslovak Division began.

On September 26, 1917, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General Nikolai Dukhonin, signed an order to form a separate Czechoslovak Corps, which included both Czechoslovak divisions with a total number of 39 thousand soldiers and officers. Although the bulk of the corps' military personnel were Czechs and Slovaks, as well as Yugoslavs, Russian became the command language of the corps. Major General Vyacheslav Nikolaevich Shokorov was appointed commander of the Czechoslovak Corps, and Major General Mikhail Konstantinovich Diterichs was appointed chief of staff.

By the time of the October Revolution in Russia, units and divisions of the Czechoslovak Corps were located on the territory of the Volyn and Poltava provinces. When the corps command received news of the Bolshevik victory and the overthrow of the Provisional Government, it expressed support for the Provisional Government and advocated further continuation of hostilities against Germany and Austria-Hungary. This position met the interests of the Entente, which controlled the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. From the very first days of the October Revolution, the Czechoslovak Corps took an unequivocal position against the Bolsheviks. Already on October 28 (November 10), units of the Czechoslovak Corps took part in street battles in Kyiv, where military school cadets confronted local Red Guard units.

After the October Revolution, the leaders of the Czechoslovak National Council began to seek recognition of the Czechoslovak military formations located on Russian territory as a foreign allied force subordinate to the French military mission. Professor Tomas Masaryk, representing the Czechoslovak National Council, insisted on the inclusion of Czechoslovak troops in the French army. On December 19, 1917, the French government decided to subordinate the Czechoslovak Corps in Russia to the command of the French army, after which the corps received an order to be sent to France. Since the Czechoslovaks had to go to France through the territory of Soviet Russia, the leadership of the Czechoslovak National Council did not intend to spoil relations with the Soviet government.

Tomas Masaryk even went so far as to allow Bolshevik agitation in Czechoslovak units, as a result of which about 200 Czechoslovak soldiers and officers joined the Bolsheviks. At the same time, Masaryk refused offers of cooperation from generals Lavr Kornilov and Mikhail Alekseev. Gradually, Russian officers were removed from the main command posts in the Czechoslovak Corps, and their places were taken by Czechoslovak officers, including those who sympathized with left-wing political ideas.

On March 26, 1918, in Penza, an agreement was signed between Soviet Russia, which was represented on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR by Joseph Stalin, and representatives of the Czechoslovak National Council and the Czechoslovak Corps on the unhindered movement of units of the Czechoslovak Corps through Russian territory to Vladivostok. However, this situation displeased the German military command, which put pressure on the Soviet leadership. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR Georgy Chicherin demanded that the Krasnoyarsk Council of Workers' Deputies stop the further advance of Czechoslovak units to the east. By this time, there were about 8 thousand Czechoslovak military personnel in the area of ​​Penza, Syzran and Samara, another 8.8 thousand military personnel were in the area of ​​Chelyabinsk and Miass, 4.5 thousand military personnel in Novonikolaevsk and the surrounding area, 14 thousand military personnel in Vladivostok. Naturally, such a large number of armed and organized people with military training and combat experience represented a solid force, which the Bolshevik leadership did not think about. When Czechoslovak military personnel learned that Chicherin had ordered that Czechoslovak units should not be allowed to enter the east, they perceived this decision as a hidden attempt by the Soviet authorities to hand them over to Germany and Austria-Hungary as traitors.

On May 16, 1918, a congress of Czechoslovak military personnel began in Chelyabinsk, which lasted four days. At the congress, it was decided to break with the Bolsheviks, stop handing over weapons to Soviet authorities and follow their own order to Vladivostok. Meanwhile, on May 21, the Soviet government decided to completely disarm the Czechoslovak units, and on May 25, the corresponding order was issued by the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs Leon Trotsky. However, in Maryanovka, Irkutsk and Zlatoust, where the Red Guards tried to disarm the Czechoslovak units, the latter put up decisive resistance. The Czechoslovak corps took control of the entire Siberian road.

At the congress, the Provisional Executive Committee of the Congress of the Czechoslovak Army was formed. It included the heads of three echelons. Lieutenant Stanislav Chechek (1886-1930), an accountant by profession, was working at the Skoda representative office in Moscow at the start of the First World War. He volunteered to join the Czech squad, took part in the war, commanding a company and then a battalion. On September 6, 1917, Chechek was appointed deputy commander of the 4th Infantry Regiment named after Prokop Goly. In May 1918, he led the largest group of troops of the Czechoslovak Corps - the Penza.

Captain Radola Gaida (1892-1948), a pharmacist by profession, served in the mountain rifle regiment of the Austro-Hungarian army, then married an Albanian woman and settled in the city of Shkoder. When the First World War began, he was again drafted into the Austro-Hungarian army, but in 1915 Gaida surrendered and went to serve in the Montenegrin army, and in 1916 he arrived in Russia and served as a doctor in the Serbian regiment, then in the Czechoslovak brigade. On March 26, 1917, Gaida was appointed company commander of the 2nd Czechoslovak Rifle Regiment. In the spring of 1918, he led all Czechoslovak troops stationed east of Omsk.

Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Voitsekhovsky, a native of the Vitebsk province nobles, served in the Russian army since 1902, graduated from the Konstantinovsky Artillery School and the Nikolaev Military Academy of the General Staff. In January 1917, he was appointed chief of staff of the 176th Infantry Division, in February - chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 3rd Caucasian Grenadier Division, then served as chief of staff of the 126th Infantry Division, and from August 1917, actually served as chief of staff 1st Czechoslovak division of the Russian army. In February 1918, he became the commander of the 3rd Czechoslovak Jan Žižka Infantry Regiment, and in May 1918 he was appointed senior military commander of the Czechoslovak troops in the Chelyabinsk region. Under his command, on the night of May 26-27, 1918, units of the 2nd and 3rd Czechoslovak Rifle Regiments established control over Chelyabinsk without losses. In June 1918, Wojciechowski was promoted to colonel and led the Western Group of Forces, which included the 2nd and 3rd Czechoslovak Rifle Regiments and the Kurgan Marching Battalion. Czechoslovak troops under the command of Colonel Voitsekhovsky occupied Troitsk, Zlatoust, and then Yekaterinburg.

Since the beginning of the uprising of the Czechoslovak Corps, its units were no longer subordinate to the Czechoslovak National Council in Moscow and did not comply with Tomas Masaryk’s order to surrender their weapons. By this time, the Czechoslovaks already considered the Bolshevik government as potential allies of Germany and were going to continue the war with Germany and Austria-Hungary in alliance with anti-Bolshevik Russian formations. It was under the control of the Czechoslovak troops that the formation of alternative authorities to the Soviets began in those cities that were controlled by units of the Czechoslovak Corps. Thus, in Samara on June 8, the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly (Komuch) was organized, and on June 23 in Omsk, the Provisional Siberian Government was created. The People's Army of Komuch was created, and Colonel Nikolai Galkin became the chief of the General Staff. The most reliable part of the People's Army of Komuch became the Separate Rifle Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Kappel.

In July 1918, Czechoslovak units in alliance with Kappel's troops took Syzran, then Kuznetsk, Tyumen, Yekaterinburg, Irkutsk and Chita were taken by Czechoslovak troops. However, the command of the Red Army managed to quickly mobilize impressive forces of the Red Army to suppress the uprising of the Czechoslovak Corps. Soon the Czechoslovaks were driven out of Kazan, Simbirsk, Syzran, and Samara. By the fall of 1918, heavy losses of Czechoslovak troops led the command of the Czechoslovak Corps to the decision to withdraw Czechoslovak units to the rear. Czechoslovak units dispersed along the Trans-Siberian Railway and no longer took part in hostilities against the Red Army. Individual Czechoslovak units continued to serve in protecting facilities and even in eliminating partisans in Siberia, but the activity of the Czechoslovak Corps in 1919 became less and less. During the retreat of Kolchak's troops, the Czechoslovak Corps largely prevented the movement of Kolchak's troops to the east. Along the way, the Czechoslovaks removed part of Russia’s gold reserves, which were under their control during the retreat. They also handed over Admiral Kolchak as a Red.

In December 1919, the first units of the Czechoslovak Corps began to depart by ship from Vladivostok to Europe. In total, 72,644 military personnel of the Czechoslovak Corps were evacuated from Russia on 42 ships. Corps losses in Russia amounted to about 4 thousand people killed and missing.

Many veterans of the Czechoslovak Corps subsequently went on to serious military and political careers in independent Czechoslovakia. Thus, the former commander of the Czechoslovak Corps, General Jan Syrovy, served as chief of the general staff, then as minister of national defense and prime minister. Sergei Voitsekhovsky rose to the rank of army general in Czechoslovakia; by the time the country was captured by the Nazis, he commanded the 1st Czechoslovak Army. Lieutenant General Radola Gaida served as deputy chief of the general staff of the Czechoslovak army, then was actively involved in political activities. Stanislav Čeček rose to the rank of general and commanded the 5th Infantry Division of the Czechoslovak Army.

Given the complexity of the situation at that time, it is not possible to clearly evaluate the actions of the Czechoslovaks. But it must be recognized that the uprising of the Czechoslovak Corps played a very important role in the history of revolutionary Russia, becoming one of the key impetuses for the outbreak of the Civil War in the country.

Who hasn't heard how he fought with his enemies?
Izhevsk regiment near bloody Ufa,
How he rushed to attack with an accordion player,
Izhevets is a simple Russian worker.

Izhevsk fighters in Kolchak’s Russian army

In Soviet times, we enthusiastically sang a song about “the assault nights of Spassk, the Volochaev days.” And no one asked the question: why were those Far Eastern hills so hard for the red heroes? The reality turned out to be not entirely heroic, rather tragic. In fact, in the winter of 1922, at the Volochaev line, the Reds were fiercely resisted by a division of Ural workers who fought for the Whites.

In August 1918, the Izhevsk-Votkinsk anti-Bolshevik rebellion took place - an armed uprising led by the organization "Union of Front-line Soldiers" under the slogan "For Soviets without Bolsheviks." The workers rebelled, outraged by the Russophobic lawlessness of the Red Terror and the numerous cruel and extrajudicial reprisals against their fellow countrymen. The center of the uprising was two cities where large state-owned defense factories were located. At the moment of its highest rise, the rebellion engulfed a territory with a population of more than a million people (most of modern Udmurtia), and the size of the rebel army reached 25 thousand bayonets. The most active participants in the uprising were the workers of Izhevsk and Votkinsk. It was from them that two divisions were formed. The workers went into battle against the Bolsheviks, first under a red banner on which was written “In the fight you will find your right.”

Strategically, the Izhevsk-Votkinsk uprising had a significant impact on the position of the Red Army, mainly on the actions of the 2nd and 3rd armies. The 2nd Army was actually defeated by the rebels, after which it had to be created again and until the very end of the uprising it was confined to the Izhevsk-Votkinsk region, unable to assist the front. In turn, the 3rd Army was forced to allocate part of its forces for action against the rebel Votkinsk, in addition, significant forces were diverted to protect the Vyatka-Perm railway, which was in danger of being cut by the rebels. All this became an important factor that allowed the Russian army to concentrate forces in the Perm direction and subsequently capture Perm on December 25, 1918. The defeat, flight and complete collapse of the 2nd Army of the Red Army, the obvious sympathy and help of the peasants to the rebel workers made the uprising extremely dangerous for the red government. The unreliability of those mobilized from the local population forced troops to be sent from the center of the country. Perseverance in military clashes required the sending of especially persistent units made up of communists, Latvians and Chinese. The detachments of mercenary foreigners were no different in their cruelty from home-grown communists, and the struggle took on a ferocious, bloody character with heavy losses on both sides. As a result of the defeat of the uprising, the White movement lost the opportunity to use the potential of the Izhevsk arms factories, which produced up to one third of all small arms produced in Russia, in the Civil War. These factories passed into the hands of the Reds. Due to the departure of a significant part of the workers to the whites, the production of rifles at the Izhevsk plant sharply decreased. Only by January 1919 it was possible to increase it to 1000 pieces per day, which, nevertheless, was half the production volume before the uprising. Together with the rebels, their families also left their homes, not counting on the mercy of the Bolsheviks.

During the Civil War, the Izhevsk and Votkinsk divisions suffered losses and merged into one division. It was headed by Colonel Victorin Molchanov. This formation became part of the troops of Admiral Kolchak. The civil war for Molchanov began with the fact that he led a detachment of peasant self-defense that resisted the Bolshevik food detachments in the Kama region. Then Molchanov led an uprising in Yelabuga district. At the same time, having broken through the front, a unit of Izhevsk workers withdrew from the encirclement near Yelabuga and became part of the 2nd White Guard Ufa Army Corps.

The division of Ural workers was the most combat-ready unit of Kolchak’s troops. She was the last to retreat, holding back the onslaught of the Reds. She suffered especially in Krasnoyarsk, where the Reds rebelled, cutting off their escape routes. Then the Izhevsk/Votkin residents fought into Krasnoyarsk, defeated the rebels and moved to Irkutsk.

Battle banner of the Ural workers division

As we know, in the Baikal region, Kolchak’s army ended its existence, and the Supreme Ruler himself was shot. Only the Ural division and the regiment of Kappel officers were able to cross the ice of Lake Baikal in full force. In Chita, General Molchanov received the post of deputy commander of the Far Eastern (White) Army and headed the Siberian Corps, created on the basis of the remaining troops of Kappel and Kolchak. In Primorye, Molchanov rearmed his soldiers, replenished the regiments with volunteers from the local population, after which the corps became known as the Insurgent White Army. From Ussuriysk, Molchanov's army launched an offensive to the north and inflicted a number of significant defeats on the Red Far Eastern Army. On December 22, 1921, the Whites captured Khabarovsk and liberated almost all of the central Amur region and northern Primorye. The Molchanovites suffered their first defeat on February 12, 1922 from the superior forces of the Red Army near Volochaevka.

During the years of Soviet power, a museum was created on the June-Koran hill on the left bank of the Amur, near Khabarovsk. One of the most interesting exhibitions recreates the events of February 1922: the army of the red hero of the Civil War Vasily Blucher, having numerous superiority in manpower, with the support of artillery, tanks and armored trains, breaks through the white defenses. The June-Koran hill and adjacent territories were occupied by the Izhevsk-Votkinsk division. It gave the rest of the White Guards, burdened with convoys and families, a chance to retreat beyond the Amur and then, from Primorye, by sea or by land, emigrate from Russia.

The division itself lost many soldiers in those battles, but also laid down a lot of enemy manpower on the approaches to Volochaevka. Suffice it to say that the first regiment of Red Army soldiers that stormed the hill was completely destroyed. Commander Blucher had to urgently throw reserves into battle so that the Whites would not have time to transport ammunition from Khabarovsk. Since there was not enough ammunition, the Izhevsk residents poured water on the slopes of the hill, creating an ice crust, and entangled everything with barbed wire. They rose from the trenches only in furious bayonet attacks. When Blucher's cavalry began to surround Volochaevka and the hill, Molchanov gave the order to retreat to Khabarovsk. From there, its units fought their way south with heavy fighting. The most violent clashes occurred at Rozengartovka and Bikin stations. By the way, all Blucher regiments participating in them were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

In October 1922 Fierce fighting began in Spassk. And again, the evacuation of the remnants of the White Army was covered by the Izhevsk-Votkinsk division under the command of General Molchanov. Of course, the Ural workers also protected their families, who were in a hurry to get out of Russia to China. On the morning of October 9, the Red troops went on the offensive along the entire front. After a short artillery barrage, they occupied the northern part of the city. By noon, four more forts were captured and the Whites retreated to the last fortified line in the area of ​​the cement plant. However, then, finding themselves under the threat of being captured from the flanks, they were forced to leave Spassk...

So the division of Ural workers practically ceased to exist. She took on only one more battle - on the border with China. In order for the convoy with women and children to cross the border, the Urals launched a bayonet attack against the Red Army soldiers, commanded by Uborevich. Only a small number of surviving soldiers and officers, preserving St. Andrew's Banner, left Russia...

Victorin Mikhailovich Molchanov

Permanent commander of the Izhevsk-Votkinsk division. He graduated from the Elabuga Real and Moscow Infantry Junker (later Alekseevskoye Military) schools. He served in the Siberian engineer battalions in the Baikal region and in the village of Razdolnoye near Vladivostok. He did a lot of geodetic work in Primorye and Lake Baikal. Member of the First World War. The end of the war found him on the Riga front as an engineer in the army corps with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was wounded in both legs and was taken prisoner by the Germans. He ran. Returning to Yelabuga, he joined the White movement. At the end of the Civil War, together with several officers and the commander of the Zemstvo Army, General Diterichs, he left Vladivostok for the Korean border in Posiet. Here they were picked up by a squadron of ships of the Siberian Flotilla of Rear Admiral George Stark. Victorin Molchanov emigrated to Korea, from there he moved to Manchuria. After some time, he left for the USA and settled near San Francisco. There he organized a chicken farm. During the Great Patriotic War, Molchanov supported fundraising in the United States to help the Red Army and the Soviet people fighting fascism. Victorin Mikhailovich died in 1975.

Sources:

"The white commander walked under the red banner"