The results of the Franco-Prussian War were summed up by the Frankfurt Peace of 1871. France lost Alsace and a significant part of Lorraine with a population of one and a half million, two-thirds German, one-third French, undertook to pay 5 billion francs (i.e. 1875 million rubles at the current rate) and had to undergo German occupation east of Paris before payment of the indemnity. Germany released the prisoners captured in the Franco-Prussian War immediately, and at that moment there were more than 400 thousand of them.

France became a republic and lost two provinces. The North German Confederation and the South German states united to form the German Empire, the territory of which was increased by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine.
Austria, still not losing hope of taking revenge on Prussia for its defeat in the war of 1866, finally abandoned the idea of ​​regaining its former dominance in Germany. Italy took possession of Rome, and the centuries-old secular power of the Roman high priest (the pope) thereby ceased.

The Franco-Prussian War had important results for the Russians as well. Emperor Alexander II took advantage of the defeat of France in order to announce to the other powers in the fall of 1870 that Russia no longer recognized itself as bound by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, which prohibited it from having a navy in the Black Sea.
England and Austria protested, but Bismarck proposed to settle the matter at a conference, which met in London at the beginning of 1871. Russia here had to agree in principle that international treaties should be respected by everyone, but the new treaty drawn up at the conference, however, satisfied Russian requirement.
The Sultan was forced to come to terms with this, and Turkey, having lost its defender and patron in the person of Napoleon III, temporarily fell under the influence of Russia.

After the Franco-Prussian War, political dominance in Europe, which belonged to France under Napoleon III, passed to the new empire, just as France itself, as a result of its victories in the Crimea, took away this dominance from Russia at the end of the reign of Nicholas I.
The role in international politics played by the “Tuileries Sphinx” Louis Napoleon, as a result of the Franco-Prussian War, passed to the “Iron Chancellor” of the German Empire, and Bismarck became the scarecrow of Europe for a long time. It was expected that after a war on three fronts (with Denmark, Austria and France), he would start a war on the fourth front, with Russia.
It was expected that Germany would want to take possession of all the lands where there were Germans, that is, the German parts of Austria and Switzerland and the Baltic provinces of Russia, and, in addition, Holland with its rich colonies; Finally, they expected a new war with France, which did not put up with the loss of two provinces, and in which the idea of ​​“revenge” was very strong, that is, revenge for the defeat and return of the lost regions.
After the Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck declared at every opportunity that Germany was “completely saturated” and would only protect the common peace, but they did not believe him.

The peace, however, was not broken, but it was an armed peace. After the Franco-Prussian War, there was an increase in militarism: the introduction of universal conscription on the Prussian model in various states, an increase in the size of armies, the improvement of weapons, the reconstruction of fortresses, the strengthening of military fleets, etc., etc.
Something like a race began between the great powers, which was accompanied, of course, by a constant increase in military budgets, and with them taxes and especially public debts.
Entire industries associated with military orders received extraordinary development after the Franco-Prussian War. One “cannon king” Krupp in Germany, in the second half of the eighties, could boast that his factory produced more than 200,000 guns at the request of 34 states.

The fact is that secondary states also began to arm themselves, reform their troops, introduce universal conscription, etc., fearing for their independence or, as was the case in Belgium and Switzerland, for their neutrality in the event of a new major clash like this Franco-Prussian war.
The peace between the Great Powers was as unbroken after 1871 as it was between 1815 and 1859; only Russia waged a new war with Turkey in the late seventies.

Eyewitness testimony: I.S. Turgenev "LETTERS ABOUT THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR" http://rvb.ru/turgenev/01text/vol_10/05correspondence/0317.htm

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, the war between France, on the one hand, and Prussia and other states of the North German Union and Southern Germany, on the other.

Caused by deep contradictions between Prussia and France. Prussia sought to complete the unification of Germany under its auspices and weaken France and its influence in Europe. France - to inflict a decisive defeat on Prussia, eliminate the possibility of creating a united and strong Germany, and maintain its predominant influence on Europe. continent, stop the growth of the revolutionary movement and prevent the political crisis of the Second Empire. (For the map, see the inset to page 320.) On the eve of F.-p. V. Prussian army, recruited on the basis of universal conscription, was the strongest and most combat-ready in the West. Europe. Number troops of North Germany, the union (including contingents of the South German state) in the military. time could be over 1 million people. (including over 690 thousand in the active army). In the military At that time, the corps united into an army. German art-I was armed with steel rifled guns from the Krupna plant, valid. the fire reached 3.5 km. Prus, a plan developed back in the winter of 1868/69 by the chief general. General headquarters X. Moltke (senior), envisaged an offensive against Alsace and Lorraine, the defeat of the main. strength in the gene. battle, then push their remnants to the white border and capture Paris. The plan took into account the possibility of military operations against Austria-Hungary if it entered the war on the side of France.

The total number of French army military time could not exceed 570 thousand people, including 330-340 thousand in the active army. In service with the French. The infantry had a needle gun of the A. Chaspo system, which had an effective range. fire 1500 m (1.5 times more than the German needle gun I. Dreyse), as well as 25-barrel mitrailleuses (rate of fire up to 250 rounds per minute, fire range up to 1500 m). However, the French bronze rifled guns were loaded from the muzzle and were significantly inferior to German ones in firing range. A major miscalculation by the French. military There was a lack of leadership in the organization. structure of the peacetime army of divisions and corps (with the exception of the Guards), their formation immediately on the eve of the war could not ensure proper coherence of units and subunits. France did not have a carefully developed war plan. Hastily compiled, it contained a number of errors (the timing of the mobilization and concentration of troops, calculations for the split of the German coalition, etc. were unrealistic). Due to the superiority of the Prussian troops in numbers, art. Armament and combat training, the French sought to launch the offensive first, forestalling the enemy in the mobilization and deployment of forces. Franz. the command planned to inflict ch. blow in the Bavarian Palatinate, to separate the troops of North Germany. Union and South Germany. state, etc. to keep the latter from entering the war on the side of Prussia.

The reason for the war for both sides was diplomatic. conflict between Prussia and France over the candidacy for Spanish. throne. On July 2, 1870, the government of Spain invited a relative of Prussia, King William I, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, to occupy the vacant royal throne. Napoleon III, provoked by Bismarck, declared war on Prussia on July 19, 1870. From the Prussian side, it began as history, progressive, because its chapter. the goal was to remove obstacles to the final unification of Germany posed by France. At the same time, aggression. Prussia's plans created the preconditions for the subsequent transformation of the war on its part into an aggressive one.

Franz. The troops were consolidated into one Army of the Rhine (commander-in-chief Napoleon III), concentrated in Alsace and Lorraine. German the army (commander-in-chief Wilhelm I, in fact Moltke) was concentrated by August 1. on the Middle Rhine between Metz and Strasbourg and by 6 August. totaled approx. 500 thousand people at 1584 or. Franz. The troops did not take decisive action, limiting themselves to minor skirmishes with the vanguards of the pr-ka. Aug 4 advanced units of the German armies were defeated near Weissenburg by the French. division general A. Douet. Aug 6 German troops defeated the 1st Corps of Marshal M.E. McMahon at Werth and the 2nd Corps of General. S. O. Frossard at Spichern, and as a result of the battles of August 16 and 18. on the left bank of the Moselle at Vionville - Mars-la-Touré and at Saint-Privat-Gravelotte French. The troops retreated to Metz, where they were blocked by 7 corps and 3 cavalry. German divisions (160 thousand people). Aug 22 At the request of the government, the new (so-called Chalons) army of MacMahon (over 120 thousand people, 393 op., 76 mitrailleuses) set out from Reims with the goal of releasing the French. troops besieged in Metz. They spoke out against McMahon. 3rd and newly created. The Meuse army, which surrounded the French in the Sedan region. After crushing, defeat on September 2. French The Chalon army capitulated along with Napoleon III, who was with it, and surrendered. The Sedan disaster accelerated the fall of Napoleon III's empire. 4 Sep. 1870 France was declared a republic. The bourgeois government came to power. Republicans led by Gen. L. Zh. Trochu (“Production of National Defense”). Obstacles to completing the national German unifications were eliminated: in November. 1870 South German states joined the North-Germany. union. However, the ruling and militaristic circles of Prussia sought to continue the war with the goal of annexing Alsace and Lorraine and receiving predatory indemnity. For France, the war in its second stage became progressive, national liberation. The people demanded universal armament, and under their pressure “the government of the national. Defense", which sought to make a deal with the enemy in order to prevent the further development of the revolution, and had already entered into secret negotiations with Bismarck, was forced to take measures for the defense of Paris very late. German The troops advanced towards the capital of France, meeting almost no resistance, and on September 19. Paris was besieged. 23 Sep. they occupied Tul, September 27. The garrison of Strasbourg capitulated. Thanks to the patriotic thanks to the efforts of the French people managed to create a new huge army in France (together with the National Guard, franc-tireurs, garrisons of Paris and other fortresses, it numbered approx. 1 million people). This significantly complicated the position of the Prussian command. Everything is mute. The troops were confined to the fortresses and continued the blockade of Metz and Paris. Franz. The Loire army, concentrated in Tours and Bourges, was preparing for the liberation of Paris. At this time, the commands dealt a treacherous blow to Republican France. Rhine French army Marshal A. Bazin, who entered into secret negotiations with the enemy. As a result, 27 Oct. after 72 days of blockade in Metz, the best 173 thousand capitulated without a fight. French army. “...This is a fact unheard of in the history of wars,” wrote F. Engels (Marx K., Engels F. Soch. Ed. 2nd. T. 17, p. 158). Released mute. troops (two armies) were sent against the French. armies (Loire and Northern), which in battles began to suffer defeats from German personnel; troops.

Bazin's betrayal, the reluctance of the French. government to organize defense, secret negotiations with the enemy on a truce, famine and deprivation caused October 31. in Paris, a workers' uprising was suppressed. 7 Nov The Loire army launched an offensive and on November 9. completely defeated the 2nd Bavarian Corps at Kulm and occupied Orleans, but on December 4. was knocked out of it by those who went on the offensive. troops.

In Jan. 1871 North The French army was defeated at Saint-Quentin, and the East. army at Belfort. Military France's position deteriorated sharply.

From 27 Dec. 1870 the Germans began art. shelling of Paris with 502 heavy guns. Its garrison withstood a siege for more than 4 months. Communication with the field armies was carried out through balloons (during the siege, 65 balloons with 164 people took off from Paris) and carrier pigeons.

22 Jan 1871 the population of Paris rebelled again. Having suppressed the uprising, the French. The government has completed negotiations with him. command,

26 Jan signed the agreement on the surrender of Paris, and on January 28. - truce. German Most of the forts of the Parisian fortress with artillery and ammunition were transferred to the troops.

26 Feb. A preliminary peace treaty was signed at Versailles. Before the ratification of the peace treaty, Nat. At the meeting, the Germans received the right to send their troops into Paris, which on March 3, after ratification, left Paris. On March 18, a popular uprising won in Paris and the Paris Commune of 1871 was created, which lasted until May 28. On May 10, the Frankfurt Peace of 1871 was signed between France and Germany, confirming the basic principles. terms of the Versailles preliminary treaty.

Ch. consequence of F.-p. V. was the completion of the unification of Germany under the hegemony of Prussia, the German Empire arose. Although the unification of Germany was a historically progressive event, it was achieved not in a revolutionary democratic way, but in a reactionary way, from above, with “iron and blood” (Bismarck). At the head of Herm, an empire that included within its borders in addition to him. land part of Poland and French ter., became aggressive. Prussian, Junkerism. A dangerous military has formed in the center of Europe. hearth The difficult conditions of the Frankfurt Peace gave rise to deep contradictions between France and Germany, which were one of the causes of the First World War of 1914-18.

Experience of F.-p. V. showed the enormous importance of universal conscription for the creation of a mass bourgeoisie. army, its advance and thorough preparation for war, the increased role of the general. headquarters in the preparation and conduct of combat operations. The mobilization plan and railway planning acquired exceptional importance. transportation, the use of telegraph in the military. purposes, thanks to which it The troops managed to complete mobilization and strategist, deployment earlier, and seize the strategist and initiative. There have been changes in the command and control of troops.

Moltke led the armies not with centralized orders, but with individual directives to the commanders of the armies, who acted within the framework of the received directive independently, in accordance with the situation developing in the army zone. It became possible to operate on a wider front, to maneuver to cover the flanks of the aircraft. In coordinating the efforts of a large number of troops operating on a wide front, the features of the operation began to appear more clearly. During the period of F.-p. V. This means influence on the development of the military. art was influenced by the use of the new military. technology, more advanced weapons - German. art and french Chaspo guns. The improvement of infantry combat formations continued. The rifle chain was increasingly used. The increasing role of fire gave the troops greater stability, made it difficult for the enemy to break through the defense front, and increased the importance of tact and maneuver. After F.-p. V. Many states have introduced universal conscription.

V.P. Glukhov.

Materials from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia were used.

Literature:

Marx K. Civil War in France. - Marx K., Engels F. Op. Ed. 2nd. T. 17;

Engels F. Notes on the war. - Ibid. T. 17;

Obolenskaya S.V. The Franco-Prussian War and public opinion in Germany and Russia. M., 1977;

Shneerson L.M. The Franco-Prussian War and Russia. From the history of Russian-Prussian and Russian-French. relations in 1867-1871. Minsk, 1976;

Mikhnevich N.P. The war between Germany and France 1870-71. Part 1. St. Petersburg, 1897;

Moltke G. History of the German-French War of 1870-1871. Per. with him. M., 1937.

Franco-Prussian or Franco-German war 1870-1871 - Origin of the war. Since 1866, Napoleon III had great fear of Prussia and was irritated that Bismarck, after the Austro-Prussian War, did not give France the “compensation” that the emperor had greatly counted on. For its part, Prussia was actively preparing for war; whole clouds of its agents scoured the eastern provinces of France. Under such conditions, all that was missing was a pretext for an armed conflict, and the pretext was not slow to present itself. On July 2, 1870, the Council of Spanish Ministers decided to offer the Spanish crown to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, with whom negotiations had previously been held about this by Spanish commissioners, who came to Sigmaringen specifically for this purpose. On July 3, news of this was published in newspaper telegrams, and immediately great excitement arose in Parisian official circles. On July 4, a representative of the French envoy Benedetti, who had left Berlin, appeared at the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and stated that the French government was dissatisfied with the acceptance of the Spanish crown by Prince Leopold, a relative of the Prussian king. Thiele, who received the French commissioner, replied that Prussia had nothing to do with this matter. As soon as Thiele's answer was telegraphed to Paris, (on the same July 4th) the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Duke of Grammont, urgently summoned Baron Werther, the Prussian envoy, and demanded that the Prussian king order Leopold to renounce the Spanish crown and not leave Germany; otherwise, Grammon said, disaster threatens. Werther asked whether “catastrophe” should not be understood as war? He was given an affirmative answer, and the next day he left for Ems, where King William was then located. On July 4, 5 and 6, a number of the most passionate and threatening articles addressed to Prussia, which had a rather clearly expressed official character, appeared in Parisian newspapers. On July 6, Ollivier, the head of the cabinet, made a speech in the legislative body in which he said, among other things: “We cannot allow a foreign power to place one of its princes on the throne of Charles V. We hope that this plan will not be carried out.” ; We rely on the wisdom of the German people and on the friendship of the Spanish people towards us. Otherwise, we, strong by your support and the support of the entire French people, will fulfill our duty without the slightest hesitation and with due firmness.” The official press praised to the skies the wisdom and firmness of Ollivier and Grammont, who did not want to give “the southern border of France to the eastern enemy.” In vain did the Spanish ministers make a categorical statement to all courts that King William had absolutely nothing to do with the whole story of the candidacy of the Prince of Hohenzollern. The Parisian press, with the exception of a few and uninfluential organs, continued, under obvious official pressure, to prepare the public for a foregone war. The fact is that although Napoleon III at the beginning was still somewhat opposed to a break with Prussia, the empress and ministers, firmly convinced of the need for war and completely unfamiliar with the balance of the real forces of both countries, already identified the war with victory and demanded it. “War is needed for this child to reign,” said Evgenia, pointing to her son. Officials were already talking about the demands that defeated Prussia, driven into the “Kavdinsky Gorge” (Cassanyac’s words), would have to submit to. On July 8, the Duke of Grammont sent a circular to the French envoys at foreign courts, informing them of France's firm intention to oppose Hohenzollern's candidacy. The left of the legislative body directly stated several times (through the mouths of Jules Favre and Arago) that the government was only looking for a pretext for war, artificially inflating an empty political incident; but the ministry, with the full approval of the majority, even avoided answering the opposition. Demonstratively hasty military preparations began in France. The English ambassador in Paris, Lord Lyons, tried to calm Grammont, but he announced that one must be prepared for anything until there is a definite answer from the Prussian government. Extremely harsh and irritated articles also began to appear in many organs of the German press. Bismarck, Moltke, Roon wanted war, because they were confident in the superiority of Prussia's military forces; but the king was comparatively peaceful. On July 7, the French envoy to the Prussian court, Benedetti, received orders by telegraph from the Duke of Grammont to go to Ems and demand personal negotiations with King William there. On July 9, Benedetti was received by the king. Wilhelm treated him very cordially and said: “We will not quarrel over the Hohenzollern candidacy.” Benedetti expressed the French government's desire that the king order Prince Leopold to renounce his candidacy for the Spanish throne. Wilhelm replied that he could not do this, because this whole matter did not concern him at all. On July 11, Benedetti was received by the king for the second time and again received the answer that everything depended on the decision of Prince Hohenzollern himself, whose whereabouts were currently unknown to William. At the same time, Baron Werther, the Prussian envoy, was ordered to return to Paris. On July 12, Werther arrived in Paris and was immediately invited to the Duke of Grammont. It was during this visit that the Spanish envoy (Olozaga) came to Grammon and presented him with a copy of the telegram sent to Madrid, which he had received from the father of the Prince of Hohenzollern; In this telegram, the father, on behalf of his son, refused the latter's candidacy for the Spanish throne. For those not privy to the secrets of French (and partly Bismarckian) diplomacy, it seemed certain that the incident was over. At first, the French government was, indeed, somewhat embarrassed, for it kept repeating that it only wanted to achieve the prince’s renunciation of the Spanish crown. Ollivier even declared (July 12) that the matter had been settled. The official newspaper Constitutionnel spoke in the same spirit. Grammont, however, almost immediately expressed his dissatisfaction with the outcome of the matter. He told Baron Werther that Emperor Napoleon would be pleased if the Prussian king would now write him a letter in which he would explain that he approved of the prince’s abdication and hoped that the cause of the quarrel between France and Prussia would be eliminated. Werther sent reports to Berlin about this new demand, but Grammon did not expect an answer. On July 13, he stated in the legislative body that the incident was still ongoing, and when they noticed that the day before Ollivier had called the incident settled, Grammon dryly noted that he did not care about the gossip on the sidelines (Ollivier did not make his statement from the podium). Having received news of Grammont's new demand, Bismarck categorically told the English ambassador, Lord Loftus (July 13), that further concessions from Prussia were impossible, and that the French were clearly inventing pretexts for war. On the evening of July 12, Benedetti received instructions from Paris to demand from William the public approval of the Prince of Hohenzollern’s refusal of the candidacy, as well as a promise that the prince would not accept this candidacy in the future. On July 13, Benedetti, during the king’s walk at the Ems springs, approached him and conveyed the Parisian demands. The king, referring to the prince's refusal, said that he had stopped the whole matter; As for guarantees for the future, the king noticed that the prince was not under his command at all, and he could not vouch for him. The king ended with a recommendation to contact the Prussian Foreign Ministry. Benedetti insisted that the king personally announce his final decision to him; the king refused and, finally, irritated, said to Count Lendorff, who was walking next to him: “Tell this gentleman that I have nothing more to convey to him.” On the same day, the king sent his adjutant (Prince Radziwill) to Benedetti three times, repeating in a softened form the words spoken to him in the morning; but Benedetti kept seeking a new audience, which was denied to him. When the king telegraphed Bismarck about what had happened, the latter was in Berlin. As he himself later said, he, Moltke and Roon, having read the dispatch, became somewhat despondent, because the king’s course of action was viewed as a concession to French claims. But Bismarck was not lost; he remade the dispatch in such a way that the meaning of the morning meeting was offensive to the French envoy (“His Majesty,” stood at the end of Bismarck’s alteration, “refused to receive the French envoy for the second time and ordered him to be informed through his adjutant on duty that he had nothing more to tell him.” ). What was not mentioned at all was what changed the nature of the event: the king’s words that negotiations would continue in Berlin, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It turned out as if the king not only found it inconvenient to continue negotiations in Ems, where he had come to rest and receive treatment, but the French envoy was “shown the door.” The altered dispatch was reported to the press, and on the 14th the French government received not only Benedetti's reports, but also telegrams about the document drawn up and published by Bismarck. As Bismarck, Moltke and Roon expected, this falsification turned out to be, indeed, a “beautiful scarf for a Gallic bull” and made a stunning impression in Paris. The war was finally decided. The French ministers knew nothing about the complete unpreparedness of the army for the fight; the Minister of War (Marshal Leboeuf) declared that everything was ready, right down to the buttons. Huge crowds walked around Paris shouting: “à Berlin!” At one o'clock in the afternoon on July 15, the Senate and the legislative body convened. In the legislative body, Ollivier outlined the progress of negotiations with Prussia, expressed “amazement” at the king’s reluctance to receive Benedetti, and declared that measures would be taken without delay to protect France and her honor. Ollivier also pressed the fact that Baron Werther suddenly went on vacation. The opposition (especially Thiers) objected, calling the war unreasonable and all pretexts for it empty and artificial; Favre, Arago, Grevy, Gambetta demanded at least the production of original documents relating to the “insult”, but were refused. The war loan was voted by a majority of 245 votes to 10, and other government proposals by a majority everyone against one (Glais-Bizouin). In the Senate the matter passed unanimously, with the most flattering greetings addressed to Grammont. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon a telegram was sent to Berlin announcing the declaration of war on Prussia by France. Mobilization proceeded feverishly and hastily in both countries. On July 19, a meeting of the North German Reichstag took place, at which Bismarck announced the receipt of a formal declaration of war. The Reichstag burst into thunderous shouts in honor of the king.

As for the attitude of the South German states to the war, Napoleon was mistaken in his calculations for the neutrality and even the union of the South German states. These calculations were based on the fact that after the war of 1866 the latter were subjected to various restrictions from Prussia. Meanwhile, shortly before the war, documents were made public, from which it was clear that Napoleon offered an alliance to Prussia, to the detriment of Belgium and the South German states; the former was to become the prey of France, and the latter to come into the possession of Prussia. In addition, Napoleon III sought to round off his possessions from the Rhine. When the South German population was imbued with the conviction that it was not a matter of Hohenzollern, but of the seizure of German soil, that war was declared not because of dynastic considerations, but because the French emperor opposed the unification of Germany and sought to turn the Rhine into a French river, then they there was general excitement. In Bavaria, only the Ultramontane party tried to convince their compatriots that the dispute between France and Prussia was not a German question at all. Irritation against the Ultramontanes among the people reached such a point that the main representative of this party in journalism, Siegl, was forced to flee to Austria. The parliamentary leader of the Ultramontanes, Jerg, insisted that Bavaria declare armed neutrality, arguing that the war between France and Prussia arose due to violations of court etiquette. The first minister, Count Bray, pointed out that the treaty with the North German Union obliges Bavaria to go along with the North Germans whenever the enemy enters German soil, that is, when the war is fought for the interests of all of Germany. The ministry's proposal was accepted by a majority of 101 votes to 47. The decision of Bavaria had an impact on Württemberg, where hostility against the Prussians also prevailed. Here, the representative of the democratic “International Society” Becher proposed to transfer the emergency military budget of the ministry to a special commission, but, yielding to the insistence of the head of government Varnbühler and the then famous publicist Karl Mayer, editor of the democratic newspaper “Beobachter”, Becher withdrew his proposal and the project ministry was approved unanimously. Hesse-Darmstadt, also hostile to Prussia, could not help but proceed to general armament after all of Germany declared itself against France. The Saxon government immediately recalled its ambassador from Paris and asked that Saxon troops be allowed into the vanguard of the allied army (the Saxons actually formed the vanguard of Prince Frederick Charles's corps). It was precisely where the French government expected to find supporters - in Hanover and Holstein - that the student youth turned out to be inspired by patriotism: students from the universities of Kiel and Göttingen became one and all volunteers. Students from the University of Erlangen in Bavaria and the University of Giessen in Hesse-Darmstadt did the same.

The attitude of the European powers towards the Franco-Prussian conflict remained completely neutral from the very beginning. The French ambassador in St. Petersburg, General Fleury, enjoyed the favor of Emperor Alexander II, but this could not influence Russian policy in the sense of intervention in the conflict favorable to France. Firstly, the course of action of France and Prussia in the critical year of 1863 determined for a long time the attitude of Alexander II towards both powers; secondly, family ties between the Russian and Prussian courts were of great importance; thirdly, Emperor Alexander II was irritated by the defiant behavior of French diplomacy regarding Prussia. “You think that only you have self-esteem,” he told Fleury, meeting him after receiving a telegram about Benedetti’s conversation with Wilhelm in Ems. Russia's benevolent neutrality towards Prussia was also important because Russia conditioned it on complete non-interference in the war of other powers; otherwise Russia threatened to side with Prussia. The Austrian government, which had been dreaming since 1866 of revenge and the return of influence over Germany, was completely paralyzed by this statement; The Prussian reserve army, stationed at Glogau in the first months of the war, also made a very strong impression on Austria, and it retained complete neutrality. Italy at the beginning of the conflict somewhat worried Bismarck with the sudden increase in its army and other preparations, but after the first victories of Prussia it was discovered that the Italian government would take advantage of the recall of the French detachment from Rome to occupy Rome. English policy, with some ambivalence in the critical July days, very soon turned out to be unfriendly towards France. On July 18, in the House of Lords and the House of Commons, the ministry declared that England would adhere to the strictest neutrality. The Times called the war "criminal"; The Daily News spoke of a "blood-stained" French emperor. This mood intensified even more when (July 24) Bismarck showed Lord Loftus the draft of the F.-Prussian Treaty (drafted by Benedetti in 1867), according to which Prussia pledged to help Napoleon “acquire” Luxembourg and Belgium. Benedetti frivolously left this project, which never received force, in the hands of Bismarck, who now introduced it to foreign ambassadors in the original. Not only Benedetti, but also Napoleon III was placed in an extremely disadvantageous position by this revelation. Prussia was, as it were, the protector of Europe from the encroachments and greed of France. Ollivier and Benedetti tried to refute the direct meaning and authenticity of the document, but they failed. Nevertheless, the British government was, in general, more sympathetic to France than public opinion. Already in mid-August, Prussia complained to the English cabinet that English ships were transporting weapons, coal, and food supplies to France, that is, they were engaged in military smuggling; but the English cabinet at first hesitated to ban this smuggling, and then, after issuing the ban (at the end of November), turned a blind eye to its violations. The United States treated Germany with complete sympathy, because after the Mexican expedition, Napoleon III was not liked there (and even during the internecine war, he tried to fan and maintain discord between the Northern States and the Southern States, which he patronized). As the Prussian victories progressed, the mood, however, began to double, and when the French Republic was proclaimed, many who sympathized with Prussia only out of hatred for Napoleon went over to the side of France. The government of the union maintained complete neutrality from the beginning to the end of the war. The secondary powers, like the first-class ones, all remained neutral. Most of all, fears were expressed in Prussia about Denmark, which could make an attempt to return the provinces taken from it, but it did not dare to do so. So, without having secured a single ally, with an unprepared, much smaller and worse armed army, without decent military maps of his own country, Napoleon III began this fatal war for his dynasty and for France.

Progress of military operations. By August 1, five French corps (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and Guards) concentrated in Lorraine, on the Saar River; behind them in Chalons, Soissons and Paris were the troops of the 6th Corps; The 1st and 7th corps were stationed in Alsace, near Strasbourg and Belfort, and three reserve cavalry divisions were in Pont-à-Mousson and Luneville. The total number of French troops reached 200 thousand. The emperor himself took charge of them, with Leboeuf as chief of staff. By the same time, the advanced German troops (about 330 thousand), divided into 3 armies, deployed on the Trier-Landau line. Already on July 28, at the military council in Metz, it became clear that the French army was completely unprepared; but public opinion demanded offensive action, and the 2nd Corps (of General Frossard) was moved to Saarbrücken, where the first, inconclusive battle with the German detachment occupying this city followed (August 2). Meanwhile, on August 3, the transportation of German troops to the border was completed, and the next day the 3rd Army (of the Crown Prince of Prussia) invaded Alsace and defeated the French division of General Douai, located near Weissenburg. Following this, Napoleon, abandoning overall command of the troops and leaving at his disposal only the guard and the 6th corps, entrusted the defense of Alsace to three corps (1st, 5th and 7th), under the command of MacMahon, and the troops , who were at Metz, subordinated to Marshal Bazin. 2 days after the Battle of Weissenburg, MacMahon's corps, located at Werth, was again attacked by the Prussian Crown Prince, completely defeated and retreated to Chalons. At the same time (August 6), the French suffered another setback: the 2nd Corps (Frossard), which occupied a strong position on the heights of Schiechern-Forbach, south of Saarbrücken, was attacked by units of the 1st and 2nd German armies (Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles) and after a stubborn battle was forced to retreat. The Germans, however, could not immediately take advantage of this latest success, since the strategic deployment of their 2nd Army on the Saar River was not yet completed; Only the patrols of their cavalry already appeared on the left bank of the Moselle on August 9th. Marshal Bazaine, meanwhile, pulled his troops to Metz, where units of the 6th Corps from near Chalon began to approach. On August 11, the Germans moved forward; On the 13th, their 1st Army came across French troops located around Metz; On the 14th there was a battle at Colombe-Noully, and on the night of the 15th the French left for the Moselle. Bazaine decided to retreat westward, to Verdun, but at the same time fell into a major mistake, leading his entire army (up to 170 thousand). ) along one road, whereas he had five of them at his disposal. Meanwhile, the 2nd German Army, which had captured the crossings on the Moselle, above Metz, was already moving to the left bank of the river; Reinbaben's cavalry division, marching ahead of this army, came across French troops moving towards Verdun and started a battle with them. On the morning of August 16, Emperor Napoleon, who was with Bazin’s army, left for Chalons; on the same day, French troops were attacked at Mars-la-Tour and Vionville by two corps of the 2nd German Army. This battle, indecisive in a tactical sense, was an important victory for the Germans in a strategic sense: they intercepted Bazaine’s direct route of retreat to Verdun and further to Paris and threatened the northern road to Doncourt. Instead of taking advantage of the temporary superiority of his forces to attack the enemy the next day, on August 17 Bazaine withdrew his troops to an impregnable, in his opinion, position near Metz. Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd German armies (over 250 thousand) quickly converged on Mars-la-Tour; A special corps was sent to act against Tul. The location of Bazaine's troops became clear to the Germans only around noon on August 18th. On this day, in the morning they moved in a northerly direction; a stubborn battle took place at Saint-Privat and Gravelotte; the French right wing was shot down, their last route of retreat intercepted. The next day, a reorganization of the German military forces was carried out: from the Guard, 12 and 4 corps of the 2nd Army, with the 5th and 6th cavalry divisions, the 4th Army was formed - the Maas Army, entrusted to the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony. This army, together with the 3rd (up to 245 thousand in total), was ordered to advance towards Paris. On the French side, meanwhile, a new army (about 140 thousand) was formed at Chalons, under the command of MacMahon. The emperor himself arrived to this army. At first it was decided to take her to Paris, but public opinion rebelled against this, demanding Bazin’s revenue, and, at the insistence of the new Minister of War, Cousin de Montauban (Count Palicao), MacMahon decided to carry out such a risky operation. On August 23, his army moved to the Meuse River. This movement was delayed by food difficulties, and meanwhile, already on August 25, positive information about it was received at the German headquarters. The 3rd and 4th German armies moved in a northerly direction, across MacMahon, and managed to warn the French at the Dane and Stene crossings. Repeated clashes with the German troops overtaking him (battles at Buzancy, Noir, Beaumont) pointed out to McMahon the danger that threatened him; he still had the opportunity to withdraw his army to Maizières, but instead led it to the fortress of Sedan, which did not at all represent a reliable stronghold and was surrounded on all sides by the commanders of the heights. The result was the Sedan disaster that followed on September 1, which resulted in the capture of the entire French army of MacMahon, along with Emperor Napoleon. Of the entire active French army, only the 13th corps of General Vinois remained free, which was sent by the Minister of War to reinforce MacMahon and had already reached Mezières, but, having learned on the evening of September 1 about what had happened at Sedan, it immediately began to retreat to Paris, pursued by the 6th German Corps. Official news of the latest events was received in the capital of France on September 3, and the next day a coup took place there: Napoleon was declared deposed, a government of national defense was organized under the chairmanship of General Trochu, and General Le Flo was appointed Minister of War. The Government of National Defense offered peace to Germany, but due to the excessive demands of the victorious enemy, the agreement did not take place. Meanwhile, it was impossible to count on a happy turn of military operations for the French. The Germans, during September and October, brought about 700 thousand people into France; The French, apart from Bazaine’s army locked in Metz, had comparatively only insignificant reliable forces left. Together with Vinoy’s corps, which made it to Paris, up to 150 thousand people could be counted in this city, a significant part of which were of very dubious dignity; about 50 thousand were in various depots and marching regiments; in addition, there were up to 500 thousand people aged 20-40 years, who served as material for the formation of new corps. This improvised army, in the fight against regular troops, inspired by the brilliant victories they had won, presented too little chance of success. Nevertheless, the Government of National Defense decided to continue the fight to the last extreme. Meanwhile, the German army was spreading across the northeast of France, taking possession of minor fortresses that were still in the power of the French. The 3rd and 4th armies, having separated two corps to escort Sedan prisoners, moved towards Paris and from September 17 to 19 completed the investment of this city (see Paris). Of the new French corps, the 15th was the first to be formed. He was immediately sent to Orleans to detain the Bavarians marching towards this city. Unsuccessful battles on October 10, 11 and 12 forced the 15th Corps to retreat across the Soldr River. In Blois, the French formed the 16th Corps, which, together with the 15th, constituted the 1st Loire Army, entrusted to the command of Orel de Paladin. He was instructed to drive the Bavarians out of Orleans. Due to various unfavorable circumstances (including the news of Bazaine's capitulation that followed on October 27), the advance towards Orleans slowed down until early November: the Bavarians were driven out of the city. The French government, encouraged by this success, decided to take advantage of it to advance towards Paris. However, Orel de Paladin, realizing that neither the size of his army nor its fighting qualities corresponded to such a daring enterprise, decided to take a wait-and-see attitude and took a position in front of Orleans, where he was joined by the newly formed 17th Corps. Soon after, thanks to the tireless, energetic activity of Gambetta, another 18th corps was formed in Gien, and the 20th in Nevers. These two corps were moved to Pithiviers in order to stop Prince Frederick Charles, who was approaching from Metz. On November 28, a stubborn battle took place at Bon-la-Rolande, after which Orel de Paladin returned to his previous positions. Following this, members of the Government of National Defense, who were in the city of Tours, having learned about the sortie being undertaken by the Parisian garrison towards Champigny, decided to launch a new offensive by the 16th and 17th Corps. On December 1 and 2, these corps had unsuccessful clashes (at Vilnoine and Loigny-Poupry) with the right wing of the army of Prince Frederick Charles and were thrown back to the west. After this, the prince decisively moved towards Orleans, captured the city on December 4 and cut the French army into two parts: the 16th and 17th corps remained on the right bank of the Loire, under the command of General Chanzy, and the 15th, 18th and 20th - on the left, under by the superiors of Aurel de Paladin, who was soon replaced by General Bourbaki. The loss of Orleans, due to the surrender of Metz and the unsuccessful outcome of the sortie from Paris, significantly reduced hopes for a happier turn of affairs; However, the government did not change its decision - to continue the defense until the forces were completely exhausted. The entire army of Prince Frederick Charles moved against the troops of Chanzy, called the 2nd Loire Army and reinforced by the newly formed 21st Corps. From December 7 to December 10 inclusive, a series of battles took place, and on the 11th, Frederick Charles launched a decisive attack on the French center. Convinced of the extreme fatigue of his troops and learning that the enemy had already penetrated to the Blois River, Chanzy began on the same day a retreat to Freteval and Vendôme. On December 14 and 15, the Germans attacked it, but did not achieve decisive success; however, Shanzi himself, fearing that a new battle would not completely undermine the strength of his young army, retreated on December 16, maintaining complete order and holding back those pursuing him. On December 19, the 2nd Loire Army stopped east of Le Mans. Meanwhile, the People's Defense Government was discussing a new plan of action to liberate Paris from the siege. Chanzy proposed a simultaneous offensive: from the north - the newly formed army there, led by General Federbe, from the south - the 1st and 2nd Loire armies. This proposal was not accepted, and on January 6, 1871, the order was given: Federb - to continue actions in the Somme River valley; Bourbaki - move east, liberate besieged Belfort and begin operations against the communications of the German army; Shanzi had to limit himself to defensive actions. On January 6, 1871, Friedrich-Karl's army resumed its offensive. On the 11th and 12th the battle of Le Mans took place, after which Chanzy had to retreat even further to the west; His army managed to recover and by the time the truce was concluded it counted up to 160 thousand in its ranks. The theater of war in the north extended from the Scheldt River to the sea, in the south reaching the Oise River. From a small number of free line troops, mobile national guards and free riflemen, two French corps were formed by the end of October: the 22nd (about 17 thousand people), concentrated near Lille, and the 23rd (about 20 thousand) - near Rouen ; in addition, up to 8 thousand people were in Amiens. General command in the north was entrusted to General Federb, but the troops subordinate to him had almost no proper training at all, or even the same weapons. Meanwhile, after the capitulation of Metz, a detachment under the command of General Manteuffel was separated from the German 1st Army for operations in the north; one corps was first left in Metz, and then began the siege of Thionville, Montmédy and other minor fortresses that remained in the rear. On November 20, 1870, the Germans opened operations in the northern theater of the war. On November 24, Manteuffel moved towards Amiens and, after a two-day battle (November 27 and 28), forced the French to retreat towards Arras. On November 30, the citadel of Amiens surrendered to Manteuffel, and the next day he moved to Rouen, leaving part of his troops on the Somme River; On December 5, Rouen was occupied, after which only minor skirmishes took place in this section of the northern theater of war. Meanwhile, General Federbe, who arrived at the northern French army on December 4, immediately began recruiting it and soon brought the strength of his two corps to 40 thousand. On December 8, one of the French divisions made a surprise attack on Fort Gam and captured it; Federbe marched towards Amiens and took up a position near that city on December 23rd. Manteuffel attacked him, but without decisive success; nevertheless, the very next day, Federbe, convinced of the extreme fatigue of his young troops, took them across the Scarpe River and settled down between Arras and Douai. On January 1, he again went on the offensive to rescue the besieged fortress of Peronne, but, after stubborn battles that took place on January 2 and 3 with the Prussian observation corps stationed at Bapaume (q.v.), he had to abandon his intention; On January 10, Peronne surrendered to the Germans. In order to divert the enemy's attention, Federbe headed for Saint-Quentin, near which, on January 19, he entered into battle with German troops led by General Goeben, but failed and retreated to Cambrai. However, the enemy troops were so tired that only on January 21 they moved after the French and soon retreated again across the Somme River. Taking advantage of the enemy's temporary inaction, the northern French army managed to recover and after a few days was ready for new operations; but the truce of January 28 suspended its further actions. In the east, things had an even more unfortunate outcome for the French. When General Douai's division left Belfort in August 1870 to join MacMahon's Chalon army, eastern France was left for some time without any means of defense. Then, from spare and marching units, the 20th Corps was gradually formed, assigned to protect the passages through the Vosges; several detachments of free shooters acted with him; in addition, Garibaldi, who arrived in France, formed a legion of 12 thousand people in Autun from several mobile battalions and volunteers of various nationalities; Finally, in the vicinity of the city of Bon, a division was formed under the command of General Kremer. All these militias did not pose a serious danger to the German line of operations, especially since the 20th Corps was soon drawn to Nevers to participate in attempts to relieve Paris. Meanwhile, after the capture of Strasbourg, General Werder's corps began the siege of other Alsatian fortresses. For the siege of Belfort, the Germans had a special building and, in addition, another observational one, in the city of Vesoul. The troops of this observation corps drove the Garibaldians out of Dijon, and on December 18 withstood a stubborn battle with Kremer's division near the city of Nuits. After the battles of December 3 and 4 at Orleans, the French government began to reorganize the three corps that retreated to Bourges and Nevers, and in mid-December brought their strength to 100 thousand. Their goal was to unblock Belfort. The command of all the troops intended for this purpose was entrusted to General Bourbaki, who was to be reinforced by another 24th corps, moved from Lyon to Besançon. Around December 20, the French 18th and 19th Corps began moving east. The transportation of troops proceeded very chaotically and with great delays; The young, unexposed soldiers had to suffer greatly from the onset of cold weather. Nevertheless, by December 29, the French were already in their assigned places. Having learned that Belfort was the real target of Bourbaki's actions, Werder decided to make a flanking movement in order to block the enemy's path at a position beyond the Lisen River; At the same time, he occupied the village of Vilereksel, near which he detained the advancing enemy throughout the entire day of January 9, and then unhinderedly retreated to his chosen position on the Lizen River. From January 15 to 17, the French tried in vain to dislodge the enemy from this position. When news arrived that German troops were approaching from the west, Bourbaki decided to retreat to Besançon, but this decision was late. Two German corps, entrusted to the command of General Manteuffel and rapidly advancing to the east, managed to reach the Dub River by January 22 and 23; at the same time, Werder began to threaten Clerval and Baume-les-Dames. Surrounded on almost all sides, Bourbaki, in a fit of despair, attempted suicide. General Clenchan, who took his place, retreated to Pontarlier, where he arrived on January 28. From here he intended to go along the Swiss border to Mut, but this last road was intercepted by the enemy. Pressed to the border, the French army (about 80 thousand) crossed from Verrieres to Switzerland on February 1, where they laid down their arms. The war in the provinces was in close connection with the events near Paris, which endured a siege for 4½ months (see Paris). During the truce, from January 28 to February 28, the terms of the Frankfurt Peace were worked out, which ended the war.

Literature: Ferdinand Lecomte, "Relation historique et critique de la guerre franco-allemande en 1870-71" (Geneva and Basel 1872-74); “Der deutsch-französische Krieg 1870-71, redigirt von der Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abtheilung des grossen Generalstabes” (B., from 1872); Borstädt, “Der deutsch-französische Krieg, 1870” (B., 1871); Menzel, "Geschichte des francösischen Krieges von 1870" (1871); Niemann, "Der francösische Feldzug 1870-71" (Hildburghausen, 1871-72); Rüstow, “Der Krieg am die Rheingrenze 1870” (Zurich, 1871); L. Hahn, “Der Krieg Deutschlands gegen Frakreich und die Gründung des deutschen Kaiserreichs” (B., 1871); Hiltl, "Der francösische Krieg von 1870 und 1871" (Bielefeld, 1876); Fontane, “Der Krieg gegen Frankreich 1870-71” (B., 1873); Junck, "Der deutsch-französischer Krieg 1870 und 1871" (Leipzig, 1876); Hirth und Gosen, “Tagebuch des deutsch-französischen Krieges 1870-71” (B., 1871-74); Fleury, " La France et la Russie en 1870, d'après les papiers du général comte Fleury, ambassadeur à Saint-Pétersbourg"(Paris, 1902; interesting for the diplomatic history of the war); "La guerre de 1870-71"; published in editions (6 of them were published until April 1902) par la section historique de l’état-major de l’armée (P.); Lehautcourt, “Histoire de la guerre de 1870-71” (vol. I: “Les origines”; vol. II: “Les deux adversaires”, P., 1901-02); Palat, “Répertoire alphabétique et raisonné des publications de toute nature concernant la guerre franco-allemande, parues en France et á l’étranger” (P., 1897); Lehautcourt, "Campagne de Loire" (1893); his, “Campagne de l’Est” (1896); his, “Campagne du Nord” (1897); his, “Siège de Paris” (1898; these three monographs are included in the second part of the above-mentioned general work of Lecourt); Amédée Brenet, “La France et l’Allemagne devant le droit international pendant les opérations militaires de la guerre 1870-71” (P., 1902); Berleux, " La caricature politique en France pendant la guerre, le siège de Paris et la commune"(Paris, 1872); diary of the heir Prince Frederick (later the German Emperor), translated into all major European languages ​​(latest edition - English, 1901); Eberstein, “Erlebtes aus den Kriegen 1864, 1866, 1870-71 mit Feldmarschall Graf Moltke” (Leipzig, 1899); Schmitz, "Aus dem Feldzuge 1870-1871" (Berlin, 1902); Veritas (pseudonym), “The German Empire of to day, outlines of its formation and development” (L., 1902); Annenkov, “The War of 1870. Notes and impressions of a Russian officer" (St. Petersburg, 1871); Wagner, History of the Siege of Strasbourg, 1870 (SPb., 1874); Leer, “Public lectures on the war of 1870 between France and Germany up to and including Sedan” (St. Petersburg, 1871); Muller, “Political history of modern times. 1870" (St. Petersburg, 1872); Sarcet, The Siege of Paris 1870-71. Memories and impressions" (St. Petersburg, 1871); Ch. Romagny, “Guerre franco-allemande de 1870-71” (2nd ed., P., 1902).

Losses Audio, photo, video on Wikimedia Commons

Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871- a military conflict between the empire of Napoleon III and the German states led by Prussia, which was seeking European hegemony. The war, provoked by the Prussian Chancellor O. Bismarck and formally started by Napoleon III, ended in the defeat and collapse of France, as a result of which Prussia was able to transform the North German Confederation into a unified German Empire.

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Background to the conflict

Cause of War (Ems Dispatch)

Already on July 28, at the military council in Metz, it became clear that the French army was completely unprepared; but public opinion demanded offensive action, and the 2nd Corps of General Frossard was moved to Saarbrücken, where the first, inconclusive battle with the German detachment occupying this city ensued (August 2).

Meanwhile, on August 3, the transportation of German troops to the border was completed, and the next day the 3rd Army of the Crown Prince of Prussia invaded Alsace and defeated the French division of General Douai, located near Weissenburg.

Following this, Napoleon, abandoning the overall command of the troops and leaving only the Guard and the 6th Corps at his disposal, entrusted the defense of Alsace to three corps (1st, 5th and 7th) under the command of MacMahon, and the troops those who were near Metz, subordinated them to Marshal Bazin.

2 days after the Battle of Weissenburg, MacMahon’s corps, located at Werth, was again attacked by the Prussian crown prince, completely defeated and retreated to Chalons. At the same time (August 6), the French suffered another setback: Frossard's 2nd Corps, which occupied a strong position on the heights of Spichern-Forbach, south of Saarbrücken, was attacked by units of the 1st and 2nd German armies of Steinmetz and Prince Friedrich. Karl and after a stubborn battle was forced to retreat.

The Germans, however, could not immediately take advantage of this success, since the strategic deployment of their 2nd Army on the Saar River was not yet completed; Only the patrols of their cavalry already appeared on the left bank of the Moselle on August 9. Marshal Bazaine, meanwhile, pulled his troops to Metz, where units of the 6th Corps from near Chalon began to approach. On August 11, the Germans moved forward; On August 13, their 1st Army came across French troops located around Metz; On August 14, a battle took place at Colombey-Noilly, and on the night of August 15, the French left for the Moselle. Bazaine decided to retreat westward, to Verdun, but at the same time made a major mistake by leading his entire army (up to 170 thousand) along one road, while he had five at his disposal. Meanwhile, the 2nd German Army, which had captured the crossings on the Moselle, above Metz, was already moving to the left bank of the river; the 5th Cavalry Division of General Reinbabena came across French troops moving towards Verdun and started a battle with them.

The defeat of the main forces of the French army

On the morning of August 16, Emperor Napoleon, who was with Bazaine's army, left for Chalons; on the same day, French troops were attacked at Mars-la-Touré and Vionville by two corps of the 2nd German Army. This battle, indecisive in a tactical sense, was an important victory for the Germans in a strategic sense: they intercepted Bazaine’s direct route of retreat to Verdun and further to Paris and threatened the northern road to Doncourt. Instead of taking advantage of the temporary superiority of his forces to attack the enemy the next day, on August 17 Bazaine withdrew his troops to an impregnable, in his opinion, position near Metz. Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd German armies (over 250 thousand) quickly converged on Mars-la-Tour; A special corps was sent to act against Tul. The location of Bazaine's troops became clear to the Germans only around noon on August 18th. On this day, in the morning they moved in a northerly direction; a stubborn battle took place at Saint-Privat and Gravelotte; the French right wing was shot down, their last route of retreat was intercepted.

The next day, a reorganization of the German military forces was carried out: from the Guard, the 12th and 4th corps of the 2nd Army, with the 5th and 6th cavalry divisions, the 4th Army was formed - the Meuse, entrusted to the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony. This army, together with the 3rd (total strength up to 245 thousand), was ordered to advance towards Paris.

On the French side, meanwhile, a new army (about 140 thousand) was formed at Chalons, under the command of MacMahon. The emperor himself arrived to this army. At first it was decided to take her to Paris, but public opinion rebelled against this, demanding Bazin’s revenue, and, at the insistence of the new Minister of War Cousin de Montauban (Count Palicao), MacMahon decided to carry out such a risky operation. On August 23, his army moved to the Meuse River. This movement was delayed by food difficulties, and yet on August 25, accurate information about it was received at the German headquarters. The 3rd and 4th German armies moved in a northerly direction, across MacMahon, and managed to warn the French at the crossings at Dena And Wall. Repeated clashes with German troops overtaking him (battles at Buzancy, Noir, Beaumont) pointed out to McMahon the danger that threatened him; he still had the opportunity to withdraw his army to Maizières, but instead led it to the fortress of Sedan, which did not at all represent a reliable stronghold and was surrounded on all sides by dominant heights. The result was the Sedan disaster that followed on September 1, which ended with the capture of the entire French army of MacMahon, along with Emperor Napoleon III.

Of the entire active French army, only the 13th Corps of General Vinois remained free, which was sent by the Minister of War to reinforce MacMahon and had already reached Mezières, but, having learned on the evening of September 1 about what had happened at Sedan, it immediately began to retreat to Paris, pursued by the 6th German Corps. Official news of the defeat at Sedan was received in the capital of France on September 3, and the next day there, as a result of a massive uprising of the Parisians, Napoleon was declared deposed, and a Government of National Defense under the chairmanship of General Trochu, General Le Flot was appointed Minister of War. The Government of National Defense offered peace to Germany, but due to the excessive demands of the victorious enemy, the agreement did not take place.

Siege of Paris and end of the war

The Germans brought about 700 thousand people into France during September and October; The French, apart from Bazin’s army locked in Metz, had only relatively insignificant reliable forces left. Together with Vinoy's corps, which managed to retreat to Paris, up to 150 thousand people could be counted in the city, a significant part of which were of very dubious dignity; about 50 thousand were in various depots and marching regiments; in addition, there were up to 500 thousand people aged 20-40 years, who served as a mobilization resource for the formation of new corps. This improvised army, in the fight against regular troops, inspired by the brilliant victories they had won, had little chance of success. However, the Government of National Defense decided to continue the fight to the end. The German army spread across the north-east of France, capturing secondary fortresses that were still in the power of the French. The 3rd and 4th armies, having separated two corps to escort Sedan prisoners, moved towards Paris and completed its encirclement from September 17 to 19.

Prussia

On January 18, 1871, at Versailles, Bismarck and Wilhelm I announced the reunification of Germany. Bismarck's dream came true - he created a unified German state. The Empire was quickly joined by states that were not part of the North German Confederation - Bavaria and other southern German states. Austria did not become part of the newly unified Germany. The five billion francs that the French paid to the Germans as indemnities became a solid foundation for the German economy. Bismarck became Germany's second man, but this is only formally. In fact, the prime minister was practically the sole ruler, and William I was not persistent and greedy for power.

Thus, a new powerful power appeared on the continent - the German Empire, whose territory was 540,857 km², population 41,058,000 people, and an army of almost 1 million soldiers.

War statistics

Countries	Population 1870	Number of troops	Killed (all reasons)	Wounded	Died from disease	Civilians killed
North German Confederation	32 914 800	1 451 992	32 634	89 732	12 147	200 000
Bavaria	4 863 000	55 500	5600
Württemberg	1 819 000	16 500	976
Baden	1 462 000	13 500	956
Total allies	41 058 800	1 451 992	40 166			200 000
France	36 870 000	2 067 366	78 000	143 000	61 000	590 000
Total participating troops	77 928 800	3 519 358	118 166			790 000

Information taken from the following books:

• Urlanis B. Ts. Wars and population of Europe. - Moscow., 1960.
• Bodart G. Loss of life in modern wars. Austria-Hungary; France. - London., 1916.

Diplomacy during war

Russia

Russia, after its defeat in the Crimean War and the signing of the unfavorable Paris Peace Treaty in 1856, lost its rights in the Black Sea. Under the terms of the treaty, it was prohibited from having and building a fleet in the Black Sea. Russia, left in complete diplomatic isolation, had no choice but to sign this treaty. France, Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire took the side hostile to Russia in the international arena. Austria was considered an ally of Russia, but after the Crimean War it became clear that Emperor Franz Joseph I was not going to support Russia.

Only Germany remained, which had long been looking for friendship with St. Petersburg. Otto von Bismarck understood perfectly well that without an alliance with Russia he would not be able to achieve his foreign policy goals. He sought to establish friendly relations with St. Petersburg, which, in turn, was also looking for new allies. Prussia, having secured the support of the Russian Empire, began war after war in Europe. In return, she promised Russia support for revising the Paris Peace of 1856. During the Danish War of 1864, the Prussian fleet strengthened in the Baltic Sea, but Russia did not react to this. During the German War of 1866, Russia also took a neutral position.

Russia did not intervene in the Franco-Prussian war either. Before the war, Napoleon III did not seek friendship and alliance with Russia. After the outbreak of hostilities, Adolphe Thiers was sent to St. Petersburg, who asked for Russian intervention in the war with Prussia.

Alignment of forces on the eve of the war. An important milestone in the history of Western Europe was the war between France and Germany. It is usually considered the beginning of the second stage of a new history. This war was generated by deep contradictions between Germany and France. For many years this war was called the Franco-Prussian war, although not only Prussia fought against France, but almost all German states, united by Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck into the North German Confederation. Only four German states - Baden, Bavaria, Württemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt - fought in alliance with France, since they were closely connected with it economically and religiously (belonging to Catholicism - a common confession).

Having created the North German Confederation of fourteen North German principalities, three free cities and the kingdom of Saxony, the “Iron Chancellor,” Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck sought to complete the process of unifying Germany “with iron and blood” under the leadership of the Prussian Junkers through a new dynastic war. The leaders of the North German Confederation believed that it was impossible to complete the unification of the German states without a military victory over France. In 1871, the military treaties concluded between the German states were expiring, so the war with France should have started as early as possible. The majority of the population of the North German Confederation supported the final unification of Germany and advocated a declaration of war on France. The Reichstag easily and quickly passed a law to increase the army (its strength was to be one percent of the total population). After the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, Bismarck considered war with France inevitable and was looking only for a favorable reason, a pretext for starting a war with France. In case of victory, he expected to achieve the main goal of the war: to capture Alsace and Lorraine from France. The army of the North German Confederation, under the leadership of Prussian generals, carefully prepared for the upcoming war. Already in 1868, the chief of the German general staff, Moltke, developed a plan for war against France. By 1870, Prussian troops were concentrated near the borders of France.

France wanted to go to war with Prussia as early as the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. But the quick end to hostilities played into the hands of Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck and delayed the inevitable outbreak of war between France and Prussia for several years. Beginning in 1866, Emperor Napoleon III was looking for an ally, conducting unsuccessful negotiations with Austria and trying to find ways to conclude an alliance with Russia. The French Emperor Napoleon III treated Prussia arrogantly; he considered the North German Confederation a weak opponent. The Second Empire in France was experiencing a deep systemic crisis; within the country, large sections of the population were dissatisfied with the regime of Napoleon III. The Emperor of France sought to strengthen his shaky prestige through foreign policy adventures. He sought to attack Prussia even before Bismarck had united all of Germany, to seize the left bank of the Rhine and prevent the unification of Germany.

The Junkers and major military industrialists of Prussia, for their part, also sought war. They hoped, by defeating France, to weaken it and capture the iron-rich and strategically important French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. Otto von Bismarck already since 1866 considered war with France inevitable and was looking only for a convenient reason to declare it. Bismarck wanted France, not Prussia, to be the aggressor and start the war first. In this case, the war would inevitably give rise to a nationwide movement in the German states to accelerate the complete unification of Germany. Then Bismarck could easily gain the support of the last German states not aligned with the North German Confederation (Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse and Baden). In this case, the war with France could be presented as an aggression against the North German Confederation and act as a defender of the German states from the aggressive French. Bismarck's next step would be to transform the North German Confederation into a more powerful, unified and centralized state - the German Empire under the leadership of Prussia.

War between Prussia and France became inevitable. Both Napoleon III and Bismarck - both leaders were looking only for a convenient reason to start it. The international situation continued to be favorable for Prussia. The competitive struggle between France and England for colonies forced the English government to consider Prussia as a counterweight to France. Russia wanted to use France's difficulties in Europe to achieve the elimination of the humiliating Treaty of Paris, which prohibited Russia from building fortresses and having a navy in the Black Sea. These conditions were imposed by France on Russia, which lost the Crimean War, under the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty (concluded on March 18, 1856). Italy wanted the weakening of France, since the policies of Napoleon III were now preventing the completion of the unification of Italy. Napoleon III always prevented the inclusion of the Papal States into the Italian state. The French Emperor Napoleon III patronized the Pope and did not allow the liquidation of the Papal States. The Austrian-Hungarian government was hostile towards Prussia. But it was afraid of the threat of war on two fronts: both against Prussia and against Italy. Austria-Hungary did not support the alliance against Prussia proposed to it by Napoleon III in 1867.

All European powers did not want to allow the unification of Germany; they did not want the emergence of a new, strong German state in Europe. Then they did not even imagine that the main result of the Franco-Prussian (Franco-German) war would be the creation of the German Empire. The governments of European countries hoped that in the course of a joint war, both Prussia and France would economically and politically exhaust and weaken each other. The European powers were inclined to favor a favorable outcome of the war for France; France's success seemed increasingly likely and predictable. Therefore, they treated Prussia more favorably in order to prevent France from strengthening at its expense.

France did not have to count on help from any other European powers. Great Britain could not forgive France for its penetration into China, Indochina, Syria, New Caledonia - zones of British colonial interests and considered France as a rival in the struggle for the redivision of the world. After the defeat in the Crimean War, Russia became closer to Prussia and could not be an ally of France. But French Minister of War Leboeuf assured that the country was completely ready for war, right down to the last button on the leggings of the last French soldier. Only a small group of Republicans, led by Louis Adolphe Thiers, did not support the declaration of war, while the entire French public was in favor of war. In fact, France turned out to be unprepared for war: the fortifications were not completed, the roads had not been repaired for a long time, mobilization was carried out in an unorganized manner, and supply trains were always late. There were not enough hospitals, doctors, and dressing materials. The soldiers and officers had a vague idea of ​​the goals of the war, and the General Staff did not take care to properly provide operational maps of military operations. There were no developed military action plans.

Soon Bismarck had a convenient occasion to declare war in connection with the question of the monarch's candidacy for the vacant royal throne in Spain. The Prussian prince Leopold of Hohenzollern was proposed by the Spanish government to fill the vacant throne, not without Bismarck's participation. This caused deep discontent and protest from Emperor Napoleon III, since the French could not allow the same Hohenzollern dynasty to rule in both Prussia and Spain. This created danger for France on both borders. In July 1870, the French government demanded from William that the German Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern refuse the Spanish crown offered to him. Under pressure from France, the prince's father, the Prussian King William, renounced the throne for his son Prince Leopold. Prince Leopold also abdicated the throne. But Napoleon III, through his ambassador Benedetti, presented to William, who was then vacationing in Ems, an impudent demand that the Prussian king, as the head of the Hohenzollern dynasty, officially approve such a refusal and, in addition, “for all future times” prohibit Leopold from occupying the Spanish crown. The French demanded a guarantee from the Prussian King William that such claims to the Spanish crown would never be repeated. The Prussian King Wilhelm was deeply humiliated and offended and did not make such a promise. At the same time, Leopold politely promised the French ambassador to continue negotiations on this. On July 14, 1870, from Ems, the king's close associate Abeken sent a telegram to Bismarck in Berlin, which reported on the negotiations in Ems. A master of provocations and fakes, Bismarck personally shortened the text of this “Ems dispatch” and deliberately distorted the information. Now it turned out that King William sharply refused to receive the French ambassador and thereby insulted him. Bismarck hoped that Napoleon would not tolerate the insult of the French ambassador and would be the first to start a war. The distorted text of Abeken's telegram was transmitted to representatives of the press. When the text of the telegram was forged, Generals Roon and Helmut Moltke were present and having lunch with Bismarck. Abeken's telegram upset them, they even interrupted lunch. But as soon as Bismarck showed them the fake, the generals cheered up. They welcomed Bismarck's idea and were happy about the war with France in advance.

Napoleon also knew how the negotiations between Ambassador Benedetti and the king actually proceeded, but he was not interested in the truth. He used the published text of the “Emes Dispatch” to declare France offended. It seemed to him that the favorable and plausible moment for an attack on Prussia had finally arrived. By falsifying the so-called “Ems dispatch,” Otto von Bismarck achieved his goal. On July 19, 1870, France, represented by the government of the Second Republic, was the first to officially declare war on Prussia. Napoleon III's favorite, the new Prime Minister Emile Olivier, and Empress Eugenie urged Napoleon III to declare war on Prussia. The French press launched a wide propaganda campaign in support of the war with Prussia. France thus acted as the attacking party.

The beginning of the war and the course of hostilities. In the upcoming victorious war, the Bonapartist clique saw a way out of the deepening political crisis, which was assuming threatening proportions. The conflict between France and Prussia over the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern for the Spanish throne was used by both sides to hasten the outbreak of war, the declaration of which Bismarck provocatively left to Napoleonic France.

In order to finally secure his rear from Great Britain, Bismarck published a written statement he had hidden of the secret demands of Napoleon III four years ago regarding negotiations with Prussia and the seizure of Belgium. As expected, the British royal court and the British government were outraged and finally believed in the aggressiveness of France.

During the declaration of war, four days after its outbreak, on July 23, the General Council of the International issued an appeal to the workers of all countries, written by Marx, in protest against the outbreak of the Franco-German war. However, the protest of the International turned into demagogic chatter: not a single one of the Landwehr soldiers (as the Prussian system of recruiting troops was called) heeded the advice of the MTR appeal and deserted from the war, did not dare to lay down their arms and leave the battlefield. The General Council of the International called on German soldiers to do this in its appeal. Marx predicted the imminent collapse of the Bonapartist empire of Napoleon III. The appeal said: “No matter how Louis Bonaparte’s war with Prussia ends, the death knell for the Second Empire has already sounded in Paris.” The appeal exposed the so-called “defensive” nature of the war for the German states and revealed the aggressive, reactionary nature of the war, and showed the provocative role of Prussia in starting the war.

The French command, led by Napoleon III (during his stay in the army as commander-in-chief, Empress Eugenie was declared regent) relied on a lightning war, dictated by military and political considerations. The French army was not prepared to conduct a protracted, regular campaign. The Prussian army was better trained, had high fighting qualities and was numerically superior to the French. The people of France did not want war and were afraid that Prussia's war against France would turn into a war with the French people. Further, an important argument was that France had no allies at the time of its entry into the war. True, France harbored empty hopes that the first victories of French arms would prompt Italy and Austria to enter the war with Prussia on the side of France. For these reasons, Napoleon III planned to quickly invade Germany and achieve military advantage even before the completion of mobilization in Prussia. The French cadre system allowed for earlier and faster mobilization of its troops than the Prussian Landwehr system. This gave a gain in time and disrupted the possibility of connecting North German and South German troops. Having isolated the North German Confederation from the South German states that had not joined it (Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse and Baden), Napoleon III achieved the neutrality of these states (anti-Prussian sentiments were strong in them).

However, to implement these plans, it was necessary to be fully prepared to wage a lightning-fast, offensive war. But from the very beginning, military operations developed extremely unsuccessfully for France. The French command's plans to wage a lightning war failed even before the first shot was fired. July 28, 1870, when the commander-in-chief of the French armed forces, Emperor Napoleon III, personally arrived at the border post of Metz (in Lorraine) to be present at the crossing of the Prussian border the next day. The Emperor found only one hundred thousand French soldiers on the border, and the remaining forty thousand were still in the Strasbourg area. This lagging contingent was not provided with any marching uniforms or equipment; there was no ammunition or provisions. The chaotic, belated mobilization of the French army proceeded somehow, very badly. Disorder and confusion also reigned on the railways; soldiers were transported under their own power over hundreds of kilometers. The favorable moment for the offensive was missed. The French army did not set out either on July 20 (according to the original plan) or on July 29, according to Napoleon III’s personal plan. Engels aptly remarked on this matter: “The army of the Second Empire was defeated by the Second Empire itself” (Works, 2nd ed., vol. 17, p. 21.). And at this time Prussia did not lose a single day. The Prussian Minister of War von Roon managed to complete the mobilization of North German and South German troops and concentrated them on the left bank of the Rhine. 4 August Prussian A They were the first to go on the offensive, forcing the French to take defensive positions from the very beginning of the war. Having missed the favorable moment and the initiative of the first strike, the French moved on to a long-term defensive war, for which they were not prepared. The French command was opposed by a first-class German army for that time. Its numbers were much, twice as large as the French army, organizational skills, military knowledge, experience of the command staff of the German army, the structure of the general staff, the combat training of soldiers, tactical training - according to all these indicators, the French were much weaker than the Germans. The Prussian command had a carefully developed military plan for the campaign, the author of which was Prussian Field Marshal Moltke. The German artillery was equipped with breech-loading guns: they were significantly superior to the French guns in terms of range and rate of fire. The superiority of the French concerned small arms (the Chassepot gun), but they did not use them properly. Finally, the Germans had an idea that inspired them, for which they gave their lives: the completion of the unification of the German fatherland. The German economy was ready for war: military warehouses were overflowing, railways and the transport system operated without interruption.

The troops of the German states were divided into three armies to facilitate administration. All three armies were located close to each other and, if necessary, they could easily be united together. At the beginning of August 1870, these three armies crossed the Rhine and settled along the Alsatian and Lorraine borders. The command of the French troops (eight corps) was taken over by the elderly and sick Napoleon III, and the chief of his general staff was Minister of War Leboeuf. French troops deployed on the North-Eastern border from Saarbrücken to Belfort.

On August 4, 1870, at Wissembourg or Weissenburg (in Alsace) and on August 6 at Werth (also in Alsace), the Prussian army defeated the southern group of French troops (the southern group of French troops was commanded by Marshal MacMahon). At Weissenburg, five thousand French held back a forty-thousand-strong German group all day and retreated to Strasbourg. French troops concentrated north of Strasbourg, numbering forty-six thousand soldiers, fought with a German group of one hundred and twenty thousand. Such a superiority of forces allowed the German troops to defeat the corps of Marshal MacMahon and cut him off from the rest of the French troops in the first days of the war.

On the same day, August 6, at Forbak (in Lorraine), the second corps of the Army of the Rhine under the command of the French general Frossard was defeated (the northern group of the French was commanded by Marshal Bazin). As a result of the first three defeats of the French army, the Germans occupied part of Alsace and Lorraine. The French fought valiantly and bravely, which was noted by the commander-in-chief of the Prussian army, Field Marshal Helmut Moltke. The courage and valor of the French soldiers alone was not enough to successfully wage the war. On August 12, the elderly Emperor Napoleon III handed over the command of the French troops to Marshal Bazaine and left for Chalons. Bazaine's troops (90 thousand soldiers) found themselves locked in Metz by two German armies in a narrow corridor between the Meuse (Meuse) river and the Belgian border. Bazaine's corps never entered the war until the surrender of the French troops on October 27.

The government of the Second Empire tried to hide the true state of affairs from the population, but rumors of defeat leaked to Paris and shocked the capital. The Parisian popular masses responded to the news of the defeat on August 4 and 6, 1870 with numerous anti-government demonstrations. Already on August 7, mass spontaneous demonstrations began and continued for three days in a row, until August 9. In different areas of Paris, spontaneous clashes occurred between demonstrators and the gendarmerie and government troops. There were demands for the deposition of Napoleon III. The demonstrators demanded the immediate proclamation of a republic and the arming of all citizens capable of bearing arms. Those gathered believed that only under a republican system would it be possible to achieve victory in the war with the German states. The demonstrators demanded that deputies of the left (republican) faction of the Legislative Corps come to power. Republican deputies, acting together with supporters of the constitutional monarchy - the Orléanists, believed that now, during an external threat to France, was not the time to stage a coup. “The breath of revolution was felt in Paris.” The popular uprisings were spontaneous; no one organized them, led them or directed them. The working class at that time was deprived of its leaders - they were in prison or hiding in exile. A favorable opportunity to overthrow the monarchy on August 7, when confusion and confusion reigned at the top and the capital remained without power for several hours, was missed. Ministers rushed about, crowds of people buzzed on the boulevards, the police and gendarmerie received no instructions. The government was very afraid of the action of the workers of Paris under the leadership of Republican deputies. But the fears turned out to be unfounded: the deputies of the left factions did not join the people, but preferred to send a delegation to the chairman of the legislative body Joseph Eugene Schneider (it included Republicans Jules Favre, Jules Francois Sim O n, K. Pelletan, etc.) with a request to transfer executive power to a committee of only Bonapartists. Joseph Schneider did not give his consent to the transfer of power, and this news encouraged the Bonapartists. They came to their senses and went on the offensive.

Already on August 7, the government took a number of emergency measures to suppress possible protests by the people. Paris was declared under siege and reinforced by a contingent of forty thousand soldiers transferred from various points. A number of departments were placed in a state of siege. The opening of an emergency session of the legislative body was scheduled for August 9. Deputies of the left faction entered into a conspiracy with the Orléanists to save the monarchy at the expense of the Bonaparte dynasty and create a temporary coalition government. Thus, in fear of revolution, the deputies of the left faction rushed to the camp of the monarchist reaction. They sought, through joint efforts with the bourgeois parties, to prevent the revolutionary overthrow of the empire and the establishment of a republic. This reassured the Bonapartists even more: they were now confident that the left-wing deputies were unable to risk a coup. The Bonapartists were ready to seize the political initiative from left-wing deputies and dismiss the liberal cabinet of ministers Emile Olivier. All the blame and responsibility for the failures in the war was placed on Olivier and his cabinet of ministers. The Bonapartists had a new cabinet at the ready, headed by the ardent Bonapartist Count Palicao.

In such conditions, on August 9, a meeting of the emergency session of the legislative corps opened in the Bourbon Palace under heavy security during the day. One hundred thousand Parisians, mostly workers, filled the square in front of the palace, slogans were heard: “Long live the Republic!” Attempts by demonstrators to enter the palace building were stopped by police and cavalry units. First, the head of the cabinet, Emile Olivier, spoke, trying to save his cabinet, followed by Republican deputy Jules Favre on behalf of the thirty-four deputies of the left faction. He made two proposals: on the general arming of the people and on the removal of Emperor Napoleon III from governing the state and the transfer of executive functions to a committee of fifteen deputies of the legislative corps. The first proposal passed almost immediately (it was supplemented with an amendment on arming the people in the provinces - the Bonapartists wanted to balance revolutionary Paris with reactionary peasant elements from the provinces). The second proposal to remove Napoleon III from power caused a storm of protest and was rejected by the Bonapartist majority. Even left-wing deputies were concerned about the prospect of a revolutionary seizure of power by the people. Left MP Jules Ferr And went out onto the terrace of the palace and appealed to the crowds of people to refuse to enter the premises of the legislative building. Another left-wing deputy, Ernest Picard, proposed postponing the question of the resignation of the cabinet of Emile Olivier. But Olivier’s cabinet could not resist and resigned. The formation of a new cabinet was entrusted to the ardent Bonapartist Count Charles Montauban de Palicao. The Bonapartists were triumphant: they had won a temporary victory.

So, thanks to the complicity of left-wing deputies, the events of August 7–9 extended the days of the Second Empire and brought to power in France a right-wing Bonapartist clique led by Count Charles Palikao (he received the portfolio of Minister of War). This clique sought at any cost to prolong the agony of the Bonapartist regime, which accelerated the military defeat of France. The new cabinet of ministers called itself the “Ministry of National Defense,” making it clear that it considered its main task to be the fight against German troops. The first measures of the new cabinet of ministers of Count Charles Palikao were aimed at suppressing anti-Bonapartist sentiments: already on August 10, the republican newspapers “Revey” and “Rappel” were closed. Instead of supporting the Army of the Rhine, part of the French troops from the border departments was withdrawn and transferred to Paris. British diplomats and the socialist press considered Palikao's ministry unviable: “The Empire is approaching its end...”. Republican deputies, including their leader Leon Gambetta, from the rostrum of the legislative body extolled the patriotism of the cabinet of Charles Palicao and loyally thanked the count and his ministers for their good intentions in the defense of the country. On the night of August 12, socialist leader Auguste Blanqui arrived in Paris from Brussels illegally. The socialists attempted to overthrow the empire on August 14, but were defeated: there was no support from the workers, time was lost. Blanca's calls to the people: “Long live the Republic!” To arms! Death of the Prussian A cam!” remained unnoticed. Leading people of France Louis Eugene Varlin, Jules Valles, Louise Michel) condemned the Blanquists for their recklessness. Bourgeois republicans called the coup attempt on August 14 “a vile affair of Prussian spies.” On August 17, Leon Gambetta poured out his gratitude to the Palicao government for “immediately following the trail of Bismarck’s spies” and demanded the most severe punishment for the participants in the speech - the socialists. Blanquists Emil Ed and Brid, arrested on August 14 O were sentenced to death by the tribunal. The government of Count Charles Palicao was supported by the Orléanists, led by Louis Adolphe Thiers. The Orléanists (supporters of the restoration of the Orléans dynasty) and Louis Thiers considered the military defeat of the Second Empire inevitable and prepared an Orléanist restoration. Both princes of Orleans petitioned the government of Count Charles Palicao to return to France “to participate in the defense of the fatherland,” but their request was not granted (to the delight of Louis Thiers, who considered their appearance in France premature). In addition to the Orléanist monarchist group, legitimists (supporters of the restoration of the legal, legitimate Bourbon dynasty) acted on the political field of France. Finally, the third monarchist group was the party of the current ruling dynasty of the Bonapartes - the Bonapartists.

Meanwhile, events at the front brought the Second Empire closer to complete military defeat. On August 14, Prussian troops forced a battle on the French near the village of Born And, to cut off their path to Verdun, where the French command was gathering troops, intending to create a new army there, the Chalons army. The Prussian command involved the French in two new bloody battles: on August 16 at Mars-la-Tour - Resonville and on August 18 at Gravlot - Saint-Privat. Despite the courage and heroism shown by ordinary French soldiers, the military defeat of the Army of the Rhine ended. The culprits of both defeats were Marshal Bazin, who shortly before (August 12) replaced Emperor Napoleon III as commander-in-chief. Bazin left the troops without reinforcements and leadership. The treacherous inaction of the French Marshal Bazin brought victory to the Prussians A Kam. After five days of fighting in the vicinity of Metz, Bazaine's army of one hundred and fifty thousand was cut off from Chalons and blocked in Metz by seven corps of the first and second armies of German troops (totaling 160 thousand people). The third German army moved unhindered towards Paris, and the fourth (reserve) German army and three cavalry divisions also rushed there.

On August 20, Engels wrote: “The military power of France has been destroyed.” Unbridled Bonapartist terror raged in Paris and the provinces. Distrust, suspicion, and spy mania led to lynchings and bloody massacres of the population against suspicious persons. The Bonapartist press in every possible way encouraged these reprisals, presenting them as “just revenge of the people against traitors to the motherland.”

As for the creation of an armed national guard, it was deliberately delayed and sabotaged by local authorities. The propertied people were enrolled in the National Guard, while the workers, formally included in the lists of guardsmen, were left unarmed. Fear of the coming republic stopped the authorities - arming the people was very, very dangerous. National Guardsmen were trained in military craft, holding sticks, umbrellas, canes and wooden models of guns in their hands. The same anti-national policy was pursued by the Bonapartist authorities in relation to the Mobile Guard. The government did not trust her and was afraid to arm her, because she was republican in her majority. The Bonapartist clique was dragging France into an irreversible crisis; the bourgeois republicans played the role of a buffer between the people and the empire. Engels rightly noted: “the national guard was formed from the bourgeoisie, small traders, and became a force organized to fight not so much the external enemy as the internal enemy.” (Works, 2nd ed., vol. 17, p. 121).

In August 1870, the political adventurer, reactionary and demagogue, Orléanist General Louis Jules Troche gained great popularity in France. Yu, who skillfully used the difficult situation in the country for his own purposes. Relying on the bourgeois republicans, with their help, Louis Jules Troche Yu managed to instill in himself the favor of the masses, who naively believed in the sincerity of his intentions and his ability to lead the country out of the deadlock. On August 16, Louis Trochu, by order of Count Charles Palicao, arrived in Chalon and took command of the 12th Army Corps. He aspired to become the military governor of Paris and commander of the Parisian garrison. But his ambitious plans were not limited to this: Louis Jules Troche Yu was sure that the war was lost, and the fate of Emperor Napoleon III was sealed. He was ready to transfer power into the hands of the Orléanists or Legitimists and thereby personally rise to the occasion.

Count Charles Palicao ordered Louis J. Troche Yu move the Chalon army to Metz to join the blocked army of Bazaine and, uniting them, defeat the Prussians A kov in the vicinity of Metz and stop the advance of the third and fourth German armies towards Paris. But the Orléanist Louis J. Trochu was not going to carry out the order of the Bonapartist Count Palicao. He decided to move one Chalon army to Paris in order to pacify the revolutionary Parisians and prevent revolution. The Orléanist Louis Jules Trochu did not believe in the plan of the Bonapartist Count Charles Palicao; for him it was more important to save the monarchy by removing the Bonaparte dynasty from power. Arriving in Chalon on August 17, on the night of August 18, General Louis Jules Trochu departed back to Paris, having in his hands a document signed by Napoleon III appointing L. J. Trochu as the military governor of Paris and commander-in-chief of the capital's troops. Eighteen battalions of the Paris Mobile Guard followed the general to Paris. The Chalon army was to immediately begin moving towards Paris. With the help of the army and eighteen battalions of mobiles, Louis J. Trochu hoped to wrest sanction for his new appointment from Count Charles Palikao. Upon arrival in Paris, a fierce struggle broke out between Count Charles Palikao and General Trochu, which became acute. Each of them ignored the orders of their opponent, and this extremely weakened the defense of Paris. The popularity of Orléanist Louis Jules Trochu grew every day; he became “the idol of the French bourgeoisie,” “the supreme arbiter of the fate of the government and defense of Paris.”

Meanwhile, in the vicinity of Metz, the final act of the military drama was being played out. On August 21, Marshal Marie Edme MacMahon, Duke of Magenta, transferred troops from Chalons to Reims, in order to march from there towards Paris on August 23. But on August 23, for an incomprehensible explanation, he moved troops not towards Paris, but towards Metz, which was associated with the loss of the last active French army. Apparently, this was insisted on by a dispatch received by Marie Edme MacMahon, Duke of Magenta, the day before from Count Charles Palicao, who insisted on connecting with Bazaine.

The movement of the ten thousand army of Marie Edme MacMahon, unsuitable for crossing the Ardennes, not provided with provisions or equipment, demoralized by the previous defeat, was extremely slow. The Germans blocked McMahon's path to Metz and came close to Metz on August 28. Charles Palikao, meanwhile, sent Marshal MacMahon a new dispatch demanding a connection with Bazin: “If you leave Bazin, a revolution will occur in Paris.” On the night of August 28, Marshal MacMahon began to retreat west to Maizières, otherwise he could have been locked in a narrow corridor between the Meuse (Meuse) river and the Belgian border. On August 28, Marshal Marie Edme MacMahon arrived in Mézières and resumed movement east to the Meuse River.

On August 30, 1870, the Germans, who advanced to the Meuse (Meuse) River and captured the crossing across it, attacked the troops of Marshal McMahon and defeated them. The French troops were driven back to the outskirts of Sedan, where the emperor's headquarters was located. At dawn on September 1, without allowing the French to come to their senses, the Prussian command launched a counteroffensive and fought the largest artillery battle of the 19th century near Sedan, well described in historical literature. The Germans had first-class artillery and major positional advantages, and inflicted a crushing defeat on the French. Their 100,000-strong group with powerful artillery attacked the French. Marshal MacMahon was wounded and was replaced by General Wimpfen, who ordered the troops to fight to the end. The French position became increasingly desperate and hopeless; ammunition ran out. The battle lasted twelve hours.

Surrounded and disorganized, French troops, together with Emperor Napoleon III, concentrated in the Sedan fortress. In the afternoon, a white flag was raised over the central fortress tower of Sedan, on the orders of Emperor Napoleon III, who was there. Despite the courage and dedication of the French soldiers, the outcome of the military defeat, the agony of the Second Empire, was as follows: three thousand killed, fourteen thousand wounded, three thousand disarmed on Belgian territory, over five hundred guns surrendered, eighty-three thousand captured soldiers, officers and generals together with Emperor Napoleon III. The Germans got large war trophies - this was the outcome of the French military disaster at Sedan. Emperor Napoleon III sent a shameful message to King William of Prussia: “My dear brother, since I was unable to die among my troops, it remains for me to hand over my sword to Your Majesty. I remain Your Majesty's good brother. Napoleon." Apparently, the elderly emperor still hoped to retain the throne.

The next day, September 2, by order of the emperor, the French General Wimpfen and the Prussian commander-in-chief General Moltke signed the act of surrender of the French army. The success of the Prussian army was ensured to a large extent by the numerical superiority of the Prussians in almost all battles (except for the only battle on August 16 at Mars-la-Tour). The war with France took place for the Prussians on one sector of the front.

Assessing the tragedy near Sedan, K. Marx exclaimed: “The French disaster of 1870 has no parallel in the history of modern times! It showed that Louis Bonaparte’s France is a rotting corpse.” (Works, vol. 17, p. 521).

Bourgeois-democratic revolution of September 4, 1870. Despite the signing of the act of surrender, hostilities continued. On September 2, the third and fourth German armies, setting out from Sedan, moved towards Paris. The government of the Second Empire did not dare to announce to Paris the fact of the defeat of the French army at Sedan and the signed act of surrender. The authorities cowardly concealed from the country the military catastrophe that had befallen it. On September 3, nothing was known in Paris about the situation at the front. The Minister of War spoke in the legislative body and did not say a word about the defeat at Sedan. The authorities wanted to gain time and take measures to prevent the revolution before the official announcement of surrender. Left deputies proposed the Orléanist Louis Adolphe Thiers to head a coalition government with the Orléanist General Louis Jules Trochu as Minister of War. Orléanist Louis Adolphe Thiers refused the offer to head the coalition government: he assumed that the new government would not last long and preferred to remain on the sidelines, waiting for its fall. At the next meeting, left-leaning legislators proposed the candidacy of Orléanist General Louis Jules Trochu for the post of military dictator of France. “Before this dear, beloved name, all other names must give way,” the bourgeois right-wing republican Jules Favre appealed to the deputies. The Bonapartist majority rejected the proposal of the deputies of the left faction. Then the left proposed the transfer of power to a triumvirate of two Bonapartists (Joseph Eugene Schneider, Charles Montauban de Palicao) and one Orléanist (Louis Jules Trochu). The next day Engels spoke about this as follows: “Such a bastard.” O This company has never seen the light of day.”

The course of events soon completely upset the intricacies and political intrigues of bourgeois politicians, who sought to prevent the revolution and the republic by any means. By the evening of September 3, a message about a military disaster near Sedan finally appeared. The report downplayed the actual losses of the French army by half. And then Paris rose! An eyewitness to the events, the bourgeois republican A. Rank, described what he saw as follows: “Workers are descending from everywhere in crowded columns. One cry resounds throughout Paris. Workers, bourgeois, students, national guards welcome the overthrow of Bonaparte. This is the voice of the people, the voice of the nation.” The demonstrators headed to the Bourbon Palace, the Louvre, the residence of the Orléanist General L. J. Trochu with the slogans: “Deposition! Long live the Republic!” Left-wing deputies, led by Republican Jules Favre, pleaded for a night meeting of the legislative body and an announcement of the transfer of power to the legislative body. “If there is delay, Paris will be at the mercy of demagogues!” – the bourgeois republican Jules Favre begged Schneider. The legislators had at their disposal no more than four thousand soldiers and officers, and they were ready to go over to the side of the people. There was only one way to prevent a popular revolution - to get ahead of the people and abolish the Second Empire through parliamentary means. Almost all the deputies were unanimous in this: the Orléanists, the Republicans, and even the majority of the Bonapartists (the only exception was a pathetic handful of “hard-headed” Bonapartists who did not want to make any concessions). At a night meeting on September 4, the left faction prepared and proposed a draft statement on the deposition of the emperor. It began with the words: “Louis Napoleon Bonaparte is declared deposed.” The Orleanists wanted to add the wording: “due to the vacancy of the throne” (the emperor was captured by the Germans). The Bonapartist Count Palicao was opposed to the transfer of power to the legislative corps. At a night meeting around one in the morning, the Minister of War briefly informed the deputies about the defeat at Sedan and the capture of Napoleon III. The meeting adjourned exactly twenty minutes later without adopting any resolution. The explanation for this was that the Parisian workers were already ahead of the deputies; they surrounded the Bourbon Palace and demanded the establishment of a republic. Only the eloquence of the deputy, the leader of the Republicans, Leon Gambetta, who stood on a dais behind the locked fence of the Bourbon Palace, calling on the rebellious people to “prudence,” prevented the people from spontaneously seizing the legislative body. At two o'clock in the morning, overwhelmed with horror and fear in the face of the impending revolution, the deputies left the palace. The bourgeois right-wing republican Jules Favre left the Bourbon Palace in the carriage of the Orléanist Louis Adolphe Thiers. An unprecedented excitement reigned on the streets of Paris from the night and throughout the morning of September 4th. The words “deposition” and “republic” passed from mouth to mouth. The Blanquists launched active propaganda, calling on the people to revolt.

A new meeting of legislators was scheduled at the Bourbon Palace for two o'clock in the afternoon. Republicans, Orleanists, Bonapartists, Legitimists, leftists frantically tried to agree with each other on the form of transfer of power to the legislative body. The demoralized government troops on the approaches to the Bourbon Palace at night were hastily replaced by bourgeois battalions of the National Guard and eighteen mobile battalions loyal to the Orléanist General Louis Jules Trochu, who returned to Paris from Chalons. But it was no longer possible to save the empire; the Second Empire was virtually dead. By twelve o'clock in the afternoon the square and its approaches were again filled with demonstrators. The meeting opened at one fifteen in the afternoon (13.15), it lasted exactly twenty-five minutes. The Bonapartists managed to submit their proposal to create a “government council of national defense” under the leadership of Count Palicao as a military dictator.

At that moment, demonstrators burst into the Bourbon Palace, and the Blanquists were the first among them. The crowd burst into the corridors of the palace, occupied the internal staircases and rushed to the stands shouting: “Long live the Republic!” Deposition! Long live France!” Right-wing Republican Leon Gambetta appeared at the podium, calling on the people to “maintain order” and vacate the legislative building. Next to Leon Gambetta was the Bonapartist Joseph Eugene Schneider. Left-wing deputies replaced each other on the podium. Leon Gambetta rose to the podium eight times in an attempt to calm the masses. The Blanquists left the hall, leading their supporters away. It was about three o'clock in the afternoon. Due to the unimaginable noise, the chairman was forced to close the meeting and left his chair. The Blanquists returned to his place and demanded the adoption of a resolution on the deposition of the emperor and the proclamation of a republic. Resistance to the crowd was becoming dangerous. Left deputies removed the Blanquists from the chair of the presidency with the help of the guards and proposed limiting themselves to the deposition of Emperor Napoleon III. The bourgeois republican Leon Gambetta read out the draft resolution prepared by the left. But the trick didn't work. Demands for the establishment of a republic sounded with renewed vigor.

Then the bourgeois republicans, tired of futile exhortations and intimidations, turned to the last resort: according to established tradition, a republic should have been proclaimed in R A touche. Right-wing Republicans Jules Favre and Leon Gambetta called for following them in R A carcass. Confused t O Crowds of people followed Jules Favre and Leon Gambetta in two streams along the embankments on both banks of the Seine River and headed to the Town Hall. Thus, the House of Legislators was cleverly freed from the people. On the way to the Town Hall, Favre met with General Trochu, who had been holed up in the Louvre since the evening of September 3, waiting for a favorable situation. Louis Jules Trochu approved the actions of the deputies. Both streams of demonstrators arrived at Grevskaya Square around four o'clock in the afternoon. A red banner, hoisted by the workers, was already waving on the pediment of the Town Hall. In the crowded hall of the Town Hall, the Blanquists and neo-Jacobins tried to announce the list of members of the revolutionary government they had planned. It included the names of Auguste Blanc And, Gustave Flour A nsa, Charles Delecle Yu for, Felix P A. To wrest the initiative from the hands of the Blanquists, the Republican Jules Favre was forced to personally proclaim a republic from the rostrum. The remaining deputies in the Bourbon Palace feverishly discussed their list of members of the provisional coalition government of Orléanists and bourgeois republicans. The neo-Jacobins and Blanquists missed the favorable moment for creating a revolutionary government. Some of the Blanquists at that moment were releasing political prisoners from prisons - among those released was the bourgeois republican Henri Rochefort, whose arrival the Blanquists were eagerly awaiting at the Town Hall. Belted with the red scarf of the mayor of Paris, Henri Rochefort triumphantly walked from prison through the streets of the capital. He was asked to announce the composition of the revolutionary government. The popular republican Henri Rochefort was offered participation in their government by the neo-Jacobins and Blanquists, but he chose to join the list of bourgeois republicans. Each faction wanted Henri Rochefort as mayor of Paris, but he joined the list of bourgeois republicans. By joining the bourgeois republicans, Henri Rochefort played into their hands: he prevented the neo-Jacobins and Blanquists from coming to power. As for the post of mayor of Paris, it did not go to Henri Rochefort: the post of mayor was given to the most moderate republican Emmanuel Arag O, an elderly figure in the revolution of 1848, who had long since left the political arena. Henri Rochefort supported his candidacy for the position of mayor. The question of the head of government remained unresolved. According to the original draft, this post was intended for the right-wing Republican Jules Favre. Orléanist Louis Jules Troche Yu the posts of Minister of War and Military Governor of Paris were intended. But General Louis Jules Troche Yu agreed to join the new government only as its head. This demand was satisfied, and the bourgeois right-wing republican Jules Favre became the deputy of the Orléanist Louis Jules Troche Yu. Henri Rochefort did not object to the participation of Louis Jules Troche Yu within the government.

Regent Eugenie stayed in the Tuileries Palace, the Senate met in the Luxembourg Palace - both palaces were not attacked by the people. On the evening of September 4, at the first meeting of the government, the Republican Jules Favre received the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs; Republican Leon Gumb e tta - became Minister of Internal Affairs; Republican Ernest Peake A r – became Minister of Finance; Republican Gaston Creme e- headed the Ministry of Justice; Republican Jules Francois Sim O n – Ministry of Education. Orleanist General Adolphe Charles Emmanuel Lefl O became Minister of War; Orléanist Admiral Martin Furisch O n - Minister of the Navy; Frederick Dory A n – Minister of Public Works; Joseph Magne e n - Minister of Agriculture and Trade. Henri Rochefort did not receive a ministerial portfolio, as did deputies Eugene Pelletan and Louis Antoine Garnier-Page e s, Alexandre Olivier Gleis-Bizou uh n. Orleanist Louis Adolphe Thiers also did not receive a ministerial portfolio; he himself refused to participate in the government, but in fact played a large role in the government.

So on September 4, 1870, a bourgeois provisional government was formed in France, which usurped the power in the country won by the people. The government pompously called itself a “government of national defense.” The Bonapartist empire was crushed by the Parisian workers and, despite the resistance of the bourgeois republicans, the republic was nevertheless proclaimed. Marx emphasized that “the republic was proclaimed on September 4 not by the pitiful lawyers installed in the Paris City Hall as a government of national defense, but by the Parisian people.” (Works, 2nd ed., vol. 17, p. 513).

The news of the fall of the Second Empire and the establishment of a republic was greeted with satisfaction in France. In Lyon, Marseille, and Toulouse, new republican authorities began to be created - revolutionary Communes. In their composition, in the nature of their first activities, they were much more radical than the central government in Paris. In the provinces, the opposition of the bourgeoisie was much weaker than in the capital.

The revolution of September 4, 1870 was the fourth bourgeois revolution in the history of France (first: in 1789–1794; second: in 1830; third: in 1848). It ended the Bonapartist regime of the Second Empire and led to the establishment of the regime of the Third Republic. The workers of Paris played a decisive role in the events of late August - early September 1870. The democratic transformations of France, begun by the Great French Bourgeois Revolution of 1789–1794, were continued by the revolution of September 4, 1870.

From the bourgeois-democratic revolution of September 4, 1870 to the proletarian revolution of March 18, 1871. From the first days in power, the government of the September republic stood up to defend its fatherland. Already on September 6, 1870, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republican Jules Favre, in a circular sent to French diplomatic representatives abroad, announced the government’s determination to “fulfill its duty to the end” and not to yield “not an inch of land or a stone of French fortresses” to the German aggressors. At the same time, the “government of national defense” was looking for ways out of the state of siege. On September 12, the French government sent Louis Adolphe Thiers on a diplomatic voyage to European capitals (Vienna, London and St. Petersburg), instructing him to ask the European governments of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and Tsarist Russia to facilitate the conclusion of peace on terms acceptable to France (less enslaving). All three European countries flatly refused mediation and military intervention in the conflict between France and the German states. On September 19–20, French Foreign Minister Jules Favre visited Otto von Bismarck's headquarters (in Ferrieres), but he also failed to negotiate an armistice with the Prussian chancellor. Only the second attempt by the Government of National Defense on October 30 was successful and the Parisians were told the “good news.”

The Government of National Defense scheduled elections for October 16, which were then postponed to October 2. The situation in Paris was extremely difficult due to the advance of the third and fourth armies of Prussian troops towards the capital. The other part of the German army was pinned down by the blockade of Metz and Marshal Bazaine's large army trapped there. In accordance with government decrees, a national guard was formed from all segments of the population, and weapons were issued to workers. There were not enough supplies of food and weapons to defend Paris. The Orléanist chairman of the government, General Trochu, took a capitulatory position and declared that “in the present state of affairs, an attempt by Paris to withstand the siege of the Prussian army would be madness.” Almost all ministers (with the exception of two or three) shared the capitulatory position of Louis Jules Troche Yu. The leaders of the new government were ready to make peace with the German aggressors on any terms. After the Battle of Sedan, the nature of the Franco-German war changed: the German aggressors sought to secede Alsace and Lorraine from France. The General Council of the International exposed the aggressive plans of the Prussian Junkers and the German bourgeoisie. On the French side, the war took on a defensive, patriotic character. In the occupied French lands, the German aggressors committed bloody crimes.

Without encountering resistance, in two weeks, by September 16, 1870, German troops approached Paris. On September 19, after an unsuccessful battle for the French at Chatillon, the Germans blocked Paris and began a siege. By the beginning of the blockade, an army of one hundred thousand soldiers and two hundred thousand national guards had already been formed in the capital. It became clear that the Prussian army would not be able to take Paris right away. In September Paris was surrounded. The headquarters of the German command was located in Versailles. The hundred-thirty-two-day (132-day) siege of Paris by the Germans began. Prussia became seriously concerned that other European powers would intervene in the conflict.

In France, there were patriotic calls to stand up for its defense, to defend the freedom and independence of their homeland. Great patriot of France, writer Victus O r Hug O wrote: “Let every house give a soldier, let every suburb become a regiment, let every city turn into an army!” Volunteers from other countries rushed to the aid of the French volunteers. The famous hero of the national revolutionary movement in Italy, Giuseppe Garibaldi, took an active part in the fight against the German invasion. His international detachment operated in a mountainous region southeast of Dijon. The number of fighters in partisan detachments (franc-tireurs) reached fifty thousand people. The operations of the French armies were carried out without sufficient preparation, were not coordinated with the actions of the Parisian garrison and among themselves, and did not lead to serious results.

On September 24, the Toul fortress capitulated; on September 28, after a seven-week defense and prolonged artillery shelling, Strasbourg surrendered. On October 29, after forty days of passive defense, Marshal Bazin surrendered the fortress of Metz along with one hundred and seventy-five thousand (175 thousand) French - the last regular French army - to German troops. An ardent reactionary, Bazin, even after the September 4 revolution, continued to consider the former Empress Eugenie the regent of France and conducted secret negotiations with her, seeking her consent to the peace conditions put forward by Bismarck. Marshal Bazin considered his army, which surrendered to the Germans, as a force capable of “restoring order” (i.e. the Bonapartist regime).

The tasks of ensuring the national independence of France and strengthening the republican system fell on the new government body - the Commune. Initially, the Commune was viewed by the population as a kind of city council, an intermediary between the government and the population. One of the documents of October 1870 emphasized that the Paris Commune should not consist of lawyers and bourgeois, but of revolutionary, advanced workers. The news of the treacherous surrender of the Metz fortress to the Germans caused great indignation in the capital. At the same time, the masses became aware of the defeat of the French troops at the village of Le Bourges e(in the vicinity of Paris). The National Guard first recaptured Le Bourges e from the Germans, but without waiting for reinforcements from General Louis Jules Troche Yu, was forced to surrender the village to the Germans again. Due to the inaction of General L.Zh. Trosh Yu the number of dead and captured French people reached two thousand people. Louis Adolphe Thiers arrived in the capital, who, on behalf of the government, took the initiative to conduct peace negotiations with Bismarck on concluding an armistice. Negotiations began in the main apartment in Versailles. On October 30, the government informed the population of Paris “good news” about the progress of negotiations with Otto von Bismarck on the issue of concluding an armistice between the German states and France.

On the morning of October 31, protests against the defeatist actions of the government began in Paris. Assessing the surrender of Metz as a betrayal, a crowd of demonstrators with the slogans “No need for a truce! War to the end! Long live the Commune!” broke into the Town Hall building. Members of the government were taken into custody, and a decision was made to immediately hold elections to the Commune. The creation of the Commune was assured. Prominent revolutionary Gust A to Flur A ns proclaimed the creation of the Committee of Public Safety, which, in addition to Gust A va Flur A nsa, Auguste Blanqui and Charles Delecluse were also included. The leading role in the events of October 31 was played by the vigilance committee created back in September, headed by the Central Committee of the twenty arrondissements of Paris. However, the rebels were unable to consolidate their victory. Active participants in the events of October 31 were Blanquists (supporters of Auguste Blanc And) and the neo-Jacobins (“new Jacobins”) differed sharply among themselves in their understanding of the tasks facing them. The neo-Jacobins Charles Delecluse and Felix Pyat, who joined the Committee of Public Safety, objected to the overthrow of the government and only sought the election of the Commune. A new Commune, following the example of the Commune of 1792–1794, would act alongside the government. Auguste Blanc And and the Blanquists believed that it was necessary to overthrow the government and establish a revolutionary dictatorship of the people, although they were powerless to carry out this plan. This news caused strong discontent among petty-bourgeois democrats. Troops loyal to the new bourgeois government, led by an ardent reactionary, General Auguste Alexandre Ducre, were recalled from the front. O, who was rushing to the Parisian Town Hall to “deal with the rebels.”

While the neo-Jacobins and Blanquists were discussing, the remaining members of the government, with the help of the National Guard battalions loyal to them, freed the arrested ministers and by 4 a.m. on November 1, they again took possession of the Town Hall. Having regained power, the government, contrary to its promise, did not resign and did not announce elections to the Commune. It scheduled elections for mayors alone for November 6, and hastily held a confidence plebiscite on November 3. Through manipulation, the government secured a majority of votes. Having consolidated its grip on power and regained its composure, the government immediately made arrests of everyone involved in the October 31 coup attempt. Blanqui and his supporters, neo-Jacobins and other participants in the failed coup of October 31, 1870, fled to avoid prison.

Disagreements among the leaders of the movement, tactical mistakes of the Blanquists, hesitations of petty-bourgeois democrats, unresolved illusions regarding the “government of national defense”, fear of the threat of civil war in besieged Paris - these are the reasons that determined the unsuccessful outcome of the uprising of October 31, 1870 .

Revolutionary uprisings also took place in other provincial cities. In Lyon, under the leadership of Mikhail Bakunin and his supporters, a performance took place, in which the workers of the “national workshops” took an active part. The crowd captured the Lyon R A carcass. The anarchist leaders of the movement urgently created the “Central Committee for the Salvation of France” and issued a number of decrees proclaiming “the destruction of the administrative and governmental state machine,” but did not take measures to consolidate the success. Soon the bourgeois battalions of the National Guard approached the Town Hall. The “Committee for the Salvation of France” liberated the Town Hall building without a fight. The uprising was suppressed. In Marseille, revolutionary-minded workers also seized the Town Hall on November 1 and hoisted a red banner over it. Power passed into the hands of the Revolutionary Commune, composed of anarchists and radicals. It was headed by Andr, a member of the International close to the Bakuninists. e Bastel And ka. The Committee of Public Safety was created, which began to carry out a series of democratic reforms. But already on November 4, battalions of the National Guard surrounded the Marseille Town Hall. The uprising in Marseille was also suppressed.

According to the same scenario, revolutionary uprisings broke out and ended tragically in Brest (October 2); in Grenoble (September 21 and October 30); in Toulouse (October 31); in Saint-Etienne (October 31). The garrison of the city of Chateaudun showed steadfast courage during the resistance to the troops on October 18. The unequal struggle lasted all day; the German troops fell into the smoking ruins of the city.

On October 7, one of the members of the government of national defense, the left-wing Republican Gambetta, flew from besieged Paris to neighboring Tours in a hot air balloon and developed vigorous activity there to form new armies. In a short time, the Turkish delegation formed eleven new corps with a total number of two hundred and twenty thousand people. The newly formed troops acted successfully: on November 9, the Loire Army entered Orleans and began to advance towards Paris. A month later, on December 4, under enemy pressure, French troops again left Orleans. Failures plagued the French not only near Paris, but also on other fronts. There was only one reason for the failures: the defeatist mood of the French generals, who did not believe in the success of the resistance and did not support the partisan movement of the common people. Strasbourg and Dijon were in the hands of the German occupiers.

The siege of Paris lasted over four months. The Paris garrison was commanded by General Louis Jules Troche Yu. Parisians suffered from unemployment: many businesses closed. The National Guard received a meager salary of thirty sous a day (a small copper coin). The food policy of the government of national defense in the besieged capital was also anti-people. In January 1871, bread standards were reduced to three hundred grams per person per day, and even this kind of bread could not be called bread; it was made from whatever was necessary. The cards also gave out a piece of horse meat, a handful of rice, and some vegetables - but even for these people had to stand in long lines from early morning. Cat and dog meat was sold at delicacy prices. The working population of Paris was starving, speculators were enriching themselves from the needs of the people. Cold, hunger and disease led to an unprecedentedly high mortality rate.

On December 27, one more thing added to all the misfortunes of the Parisians - artillery shelling. For a whole month, shells from German batteries exploded daily and methodically over the heads of Parisians, causing death and destruction everywhere; After each shelling, they left behind the ruins of residential buildings, museums, libraries, and hospitals; objects that had no military significance. Many Parisians were left homeless. But they bravely endured the disasters of the siege and still demanded that the fight against the enemy continue. The voices of those dissatisfied with the government of national defense, which brought France to a military catastrophe, were heard louder and louder. These sentiments of protest were reflected in numerous Blanquist literature, in the press, and in harsh speeches at meetings and in political clubs.

On January 6, 1871, the indignation of Parisians at the capitulatory tactics of the government found clear expression in the “Red Poster” published by the Central Republican Committee of the Twenty Arrondissement (it was created at the end of 1870 and united the district vigilance committees). The appeal put forward a demand for a general requisition of food products and the issuance of free rations. “The government did not call for a general militia, it left the Bonapartists in place and imprisoned the Republicans... With its slowness and indecisiveness it led us to the brink of the abyss. The people are dying from the cold and starving, .. the rulers of France do not know how to govern or fight. The place is the Commune!” – with these words the “Red Poster” ended. The slogan of replacing the bankrupt government of national defense and its replacement by the Commune elected by the people, with the entrustment of the functions of defense and administration of Paris to it, sounded with renewed vigor. It was in the Commune, endowed with government powers, that the masses of Paris saw the only force capable of saving France from destruction. Memories of the Paris Commune of 1792–1793 were combined with the ideas of creating self-governing communes and their federation promoted by socialists and Proudhonists. They talked about the Commune at meetings of the “red clubs”; they hatched plans to confiscate the property of fleeing owners, Bonapartists, churches, create workers’ associations, and transfer joint-stock companies into the hands of the workers. The Revolutionary Commune was often thought of as consisting of delegates from the socialist groups in Paris, and the government of France as consisting of delegates from the country's revolutionary communes and major workers' centres. Attempts were made to establish revolutionary communes in the provinces during popular uprisings in Lyon and Marseille.

Meanwhile, on January 18, 1871, the victors gathered in German-occupied Versailles - monarchs, kings, dukes, members of the governments of all German states that fought with France, and the entire diplomatic corps arrived. In a solemn ceremony in the Hall of Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles, the Grand Duke of Baden, on behalf of all German sovereigns, proclaimed William I of Hohenzollern Emperor of Germany. The Prussian king became the hereditary German emperor. As the Prussian Junkers and liberals wished, Wilhelm received the crown from the hands of the monarchs. Otto von Bismarck (reigned 1871–1890) became Chancellor of the German Empire. The unification of Germany was completed “from above”, through dynastic war, with the formation of the German Empire. From the first days of its existence, the German Empire, united under the leadership of the Prussian Junkers, showed its reactionary character from the very beginning. The monarchical system and the positions of the German reaction in Europe and their country were strengthened. The European powers watched with alarm the new dangerous competitor, who changed the balance and balance of power in Europe. Germany became one of the great powers of Europe.

On January 19–20, 1871, the Government of National Defense organized a major military raid at Businval (near Paris). As always, a poorly prepared operation led to the death of thousands of people's fighters who fought bravely and selflessly against a well-armed German enemy. By throwing the National Guardsmen into a trap set by the Germans, the government hoped to completely demoralize the population of Paris and break their resistance.

Outraged by such cynicism of the government of national “defense” (and in reality, treason), the working class of Paris raised a new uprising on January 22, 1871. The rebels again tried to capture R A carcass, but were fired upon and driven back by troops. But this time too, its initiators - the Blanquists - showed their inability to properly prepare it and ensure victory. As in the uprising of October 31, 1870, the leaders of the Paris organization of the International did not take part in the January uprising. The result was the same: the anti-government uprising on January 22, 1871 was defeated. The defeat was followed by massive