(July - September 1936)

The revolt of July 17–20 destroyed the Spanish state, in the form in which it existed not only during the republican five-year period. In the first months of the republican zone there was no real power at all. In addition to the army and security forces, the republic lost almost its entire state apparatus, since most officials (especially senior officials) did not return to duty or defected to the rebels. 90% of Spain's diplomatic representatives abroad did the same, and the diplomats took with them many secret documents.

The integrity of the republican zone was actually violated. Along with the central government in Madrid, there were autonomous governments in Catalonia and the Basque Country. However, the power of the Catalan Generalidad became purely formal after the Central Committee of the Anti-Fascist Militia was formed in Barcelona on July 23, 1936 under the control of the CNT, which took over all administrative functions. When anarchist columns liberated part of Aragon, the Aragonese Council was created there - an absolutely illegitimate government body that did not pay attention to the decrees and laws of the Madrid government. The Republic was not even on the verge of collapse. She's already crossed that line.

As noted above, Premier Quiroga resigned on the night of July 18-19, unwilling to authorize the release of weapons to parties and trade unions. President Azaña entrusted the formation of a new cabinet to Cortes President Martinez Barrio, who brought into the government a representative of the right-wing Republicans, Sánchez Roman, whose party did not even join the Popular Front. This composition of the government was supposed to signal to the rebels Madrid's readiness to compromise. Martínez Barrio called Mola and offered him and his supporters two seats in the future cabinet of national unity. The general replied that there was no turning back. “You have your masses, and I have mine, and we both cannot betray them.”

In Madrid, the workers' parties understood the formation of the Martinez Barrio cabinet as an open capitulation to the putschists. The capital was overwhelmed by mass demonstrations, whose participants shouted: “Treason!” Martinez Barrio was forced to resign after serving only 9 hours in office.

On July 19, Azaña entrusted the formation of a new government to José Giral (1879–1962). Giral was born in Cuba. For his political activities (he was a staunch republican), he was imprisoned in 1917, twice under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and once under Berenguer in 1930. Giral was a close friend of Azaña and together with him founded the Republican Action Party, which later changed its name to the Republican Left Party. In the governments of 1931–1933, Giral was Minister of the Navy.

Hiral's cabinet included only representatives of the Republican parties of the Popular Front. Communists and socialists declared their support.

Hiral's first measure was to authorize the issuance of weapons to the parties and trade unions that were part of the Popular Front. This has already happened all over the country in a violent and disorderly manner. Each party sought to obtain as many weapons as possible “just in case.” It often accumulated in warehouses, while it was sorely lacking at the fronts. So in Catalonia, the anarchists captured about 100 thousand rifles, and in the first months of the war the CNT sent no more than 20 thousand people into battle. During the storming of the La Montaña barracks in Madrid, a mass of modern Mauser rifles were dismantled by young girls who showed off the weapons as if they were just buying a necklace. As a result of inept handling, tens of thousands of rifles became unusable, and the Communists had to launch a special propaganda campaign in favor of surrendering the rifles. Party agitators argued that the modern army needs not only riflemen, but also sappers, orderlies, and scouts, who can easily do without rifles. But the gun became a symbol of the new status, and people parted with it extremely reluctantly.

Having somehow solved the problem with weapons, Hiral tried to streamline the local authorities. Instead of them or in parallel with them, Popular Front committees were created. Initially, they only wanted to monitor the loyalty of local authorities to the republic, but in conditions of paralysis of the administrative apparatus, they spontaneously took on the functions of local government bodies.

From the very beginning of the rebellion, disagreements arose in the camp of the left forces. The anarchists and left socialists of Largo Caballero demanded the immediate destruction of the entire old state machine, vaguely imagining what should replace it. The CNT even put forward the slogan: “Organize disorganization!” The communists, the centrists of the PSOE under the leadership of Prieto and the Republicans convinced the masses, inspired by the first successes, that victory had not yet been achieved and the main thing now was iron discipline and the organization of all forces to eliminate the rebellion. Even then, anarchists began to reproach the Communist Party for betraying the revolution and moving into the “camp of the bourgeoisie.” The PSOE continued to prohibit its members from joining the government, and Prieto was forced to organize affairs in the navy without permission.

In that initial period of the war, it was the CPI that increasingly began to be considered by the population of the republican zone as the most “serious” party, capable of ensuring the normal functioning of the state apparatus. Immediately after the mutiny, several tens of thousands of people joined the Communist Party. The United Socialist Youth (USY), an organization created by merging the youth organizations of the CPI and the PSOE, actually stood on the positions of the communists. The same can be said about the United Socialist Party of Catalonia, founded on July 24, 1936 (it included local organizations of the PCI, PSOE and two small independent workers' parties). President Azaña publicly told foreign correspondents that if they wanted to correctly understand the situation in Spain, they should read the newspaper Mundo Obrero (Workers' World, the central organ of the PCI).

On July 22, 1936, Giral issued a decree dismissing all civil servants involved in the rebellion or who were “open enemies” of the republic. Persons recommended by the Popular Front parties were invited to the civil service, who, unfortunately, sometimes did not have any administrative experience. On August 21, the old diplomatic service was dissolved and a new one was created.

On August 23, a special court was established to try cases of state crimes (three days later, the same courts were established in all provinces). Along with three professional judges, the new courts included fourteen lay judges (two each from the PCI, PSOE, Republican Left Party, Republican Union, CNT-FAI and OSM). In the case of a death sentence, the court, by a majority vote in a secret ballot, determined whether the defendant could apply for clemency.

But, of course, the matter of life or death for the republic was, first of all, the accelerated formation of its own armed forces. On August 10, the dissolution of the Civil Guard was announced and the National Republican Guard was created in its place on August 30. On August 3, a decree was issued on the formation of the so-called “volunteer army,” which was intended to replace the people’s militia that fought the enemy in the first days of the rebellion.

The People's Militia is the collective name for the armed formations created by the Popular Front parties. They formed without any plan and fought wherever they wanted. There was often no coordination of any kind between individual units. There were no uniforms, logistics or sanitary services. The police included, of course, former officers and soldiers of the army and security forces. But they were clearly not trusted. Special commissions checked their political reliability. The officers were classified either as republicans, so-called "indifferents", or as "fascists". There were no clear criteria for these assessments. In the first days of the rebellion, about 300 thousand people signed up for the militia of different parties (for comparison, it can be noted that Mola had no more than 25 thousand fighters at the end of July), but only 60 thousand participated in the fighting to one degree or another.

Later, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PCI, José Diaz, called the summer of 1936 a period of “romantic war” (although for him this definition was hardly suitable, since in the first days of the rebellion he lost his Komsomol daughter, killed by the rebels, in his native Seville). Young people, mostly members of the OSM and CNT, dressed in blue overalls (something like a revolutionary uniform, like leather jackets in Russia during the civil war) and armed with anything, loaded into requisitioned buses and trucks and went to fight the rebels. The losses were enormous, since combat experience and basic tactical techniques of combat were completely absent. But the greater the rejoicing in case of success. Having liberated a locality, the police often went home, and young people spent the night discussing their successes in cafes. And who remained at the front? Often no one. It was believed that each city or village had to stand on its own.

The people's militia was the only possible means of preventing the victory of the rebellion in its early days, but it, of course, could not resist the regular armed forces in a real war.

Giral's decree on the creation of a volunteer army was immediately supported by the communists and those members of the Socialist Party and the UGT who followed Prieto. However, anarchists and the Largo Caballero faction waged a massive campaign against this move. “The barracks and discipline are finished,” exclaimed one of the leading representatives of Spanish anarchism, Federica Montseny. “The army is slavery,” echoed the CNT newspaper Frente Libertario. Largo Caballero's comrade Arakistein wrote that Spain is the cradle of guerrillas, not soldiers. Anarchists and left-wing socialists were against unity of command in police units and against central military command in general.

In organizational terms, the militia, as a rule, consisted of hundreds (“centuries”), each of which elected one delegate to the battalion committee. Delegates from the battalions constituted the command of the “column” (the numerical composition of the column was completely arbitrary). All decisions of a military nature were made at general meetings. Needless to say, such military formations were simply, by definition, incapable of waging even some semblance of war.

The influence of the Communist Party, the Prieto group and the Giral government itself in the first months of the war was insufficient for the decree on the creation of a volunteer army to be implemented. He was simply ignored by the bulk of the police.

Under these conditions, the communists decided to show a real example and created the prototype of a new type of army - the legendary Fifth Regiment. This name was born in the following way. When the Communists informed the Minister of War that they had formed a battalion, it was assigned the serial number “5”, since the first four battalions were formed by the government itself. The Fifth Battalion later became a regiment.

In fact, it was not a regiment at all, but a kind of military school of the Communist Party, training officers and non-commissioned officers, training police officers, instilling in them discipline and basic combat skills (advancing in a chain, digging in the ground, etc.). Not only communists were accepted into the regiment, but everyone who wanted to fight the putschists competently and skillfully. Quartermaster and sanitary services were organized in the Fifth Regiment. Military textbooks and short instructions were published. It published its own newspaper, Milisia Popular (People's Militia). The Communists actively recruited officers from the old army to the Fifth Regiment, entrusting them with leadership positions.

In the Fifth Regiment, for the first time, the people's militia had a communications service and its own weapon repair workshops. The commanders of the Fifth Regiment were the only ones who had maps produced by the regiment's specially created cartographic service.

It must be said that supporters of the republic had a careless attitude towards weapons throughout almost the entire war. If a rifle jammed, it was often abandoned. The machine guns did not fire because they were not cleaned. The Fifth Regiment, and then the regular units of the Republican Army, where the influence of the Communists was strong, were distinguished in this sense by much greater order.

The Fifth Regiment first introduced the institution of political commissars, clearly borrowed from the experience of the Russian revolution. But the commissars sought not to replace commanders (the latter were often former officers), but to maintain the morale of the soldiers. This was very important, since the police were easily inspired by successes and just as quickly became despondent by failures. The regiment also had its own anthem, “Song of the Fifth Regiment,” which became very popular at the front:

My mother, oh dear mother,

Come closer here!

This is our glorious Fifth Regiment

He goes into battle singing, look.

The Fifth Regiment was the first to organize propaganda against enemy troops by radio and loudspeakers, as well as by leaflets, which were scattered using primitive rockets.

By the time of its formation in the Francos Rodriguez barracks (former Capuchin monastery) on August 5, 1936, the Fifth Regiment consisted of no more than 600 people, after 10 days there were 10 times more, and when the regiment was merged into the regular army of the republic in December 1936 , 70 thousand soldiers passed through it. The combat training course was designed for seventeen days, but in the fall of 1936, due to the difficult situation at the fronts, the regiment's students went to the front line within two or three days.

But in July-August 1936, the Fifth Regiment was still too weak to have a decisive influence on the course of military operations. So far, only unorganized motley detachments that did not submit to a single command, who, as a rule, had formidable names (“Eagles”, “Red Lions”, etc.) fought on the side of the republic. That is why the Republicans not only failed to realize their significant numerical superiority over the enemy, but also to stop their rapid advance towards Madrid. July-August 1936 was the time of the Republicans' greatest military failures.

What happened in the rebel camp? Of course, there was no such disorder there as in the republican zone. But with the death of Sanjurjo, the question arose about who would be the leader of the uprising, which was turning into a civil war with unclear prospects. Even the optimist Mola believed that victory could only be achieved in two or three weeks, and even then only if Madrid were captured. With what political program to win? While the generals were saying different things. Queipo de Llano still defended the republic. Mola, although not so firm in this point of view, still did not want Alfonso XIII to return. The only thing on which all the military conspirators were united was that there was no need to involve civilians in the administration of the part of Spain they occupied. That is why Mola’s consultations with Goikoechea, who demanded the creation of a broad right-wing government, failed.

Instead, on July 23, 1936, the Junta of National Defense was formed in Burgos as the highest body of the rebel forces. It included 5 generals and 2 colonels under the formal leadership of the most senior of them, General Miguel Cabanellas. The “strong man” in the junta was Mola. He made Cabanellas a nominal leader largely to get rid of him in Zaragoza, where Cabanellas, in Mola's opinion, was too liberal with the opposition. General Franco was not included in the junta, but on July 24 he was declared commander-in-chief of the rebel forces in southern Spain. On August 1, 1936, Admiral Francisco Moreno Fernandez became the commander of the scanty Navy. On August 3, when Franco's troops crossed Gibraltar, the general was brought into the junta along with his ill-wisher Queipo de Llano, who continued to rule in Seville, regardless of anyone's orders. In addition, the two generals shared different views on the future course of the war in the south. Queipo de Llano wanted to concentrate on “cleansing” Andalusia of Republicans, while Franco was eager to get to Madrid by the shortest route through the province of Extremadura adjacent to Portugal.

But we got ahead of ourselves a little. At the end of July 1936, the main threat to the republic was not yet Franco, locked in Morocco, but “director” Mola, whose troops were stationed just 60 kilometers north of Madrid, on the approach to the Sierra Guadarrama and Somosierra mountain ranges framing the capital. The fate of the republic in those days depended on who would take possession of the passes through these ridges.

Immediately after the start of the rebellion, small groups of military rebels and Phalangists settled in the Somosierra Pass, trying to hold these most important strategic points until the main forces of General Mola arrived. On July 20, two columns of rebels, consisting of 4 army battalions, 4 companies of Carlists, 3 companies of Phalangists and cavalry (totaling about 4 thousand people), with 24 guns, approached Somosierra and on July 25 attacked the pass. It was defended by policemen, carabinieri and a motorized detachment of the well-known captain Condes (the leader of the murder of Calvo Sotelo), who arrived from Madrid and who had previously occupied the pass and kept it from attacks by the initially not very strong rebel units. On the same day, July 25, the putschists broke through the republican positions and the police retreated, clearing the Somosierra Pass. But subsequent rebel attacks were unsuccessful and the front in the Somosierra region stabilized until the end of the war. These early battles demonstrated the tenacity of even untrained militia in defense when supported by strong natural (as in this case) or artificial (as later in Madrid) fortifications. The fighting in Somosierra promoted Major Vicente Rojo, who later became one of the leading military leaders of the Republicans (he then served as chief of staff of the front, which meant the totality of all militia units defending Somosierra).

In the Sierra Guadarrama mountains, from the first days of the rebellion, poorly armed detachments of lumberjacks, workers, shepherds and peasants arose, preventing groups of Falangists from entering the capital (the latter calmly moved by car to Madrid, thinking that it was already in the hands of the rebels).

On July 21, a militia detachment arrived from Madrid led by Juan Modesto (1906–1969), who also later became one of the most prominent commanders of the republic. "Modesto" means "humble" in Spanish. This was the party pseudonym of Juan Guillote, a simple worker who worked at a sawmill and later headed the general workers' union. Since 1931, Modesto was a member of the CPI, and after the outbreak of the rebellion he became one of the organizers of the Fifth Regiment. He took part in the assault on the La Montagna barracks, where he already proved himself to be a good organizer. Hundreds of Sierra workers and peasants joined Modesto's detachment. This is how the battalion named after Ernst Thälmann arose, which became the most combat-ready part of the republic on this section of the front.

When the rebel units of Mola approached the Sierra Guadarrama (they were supported by machine gun platoons and two batteries of light artillery), they immediately encountered stubborn resistance. Some of the soldiers of the Madrid infantry regiment “Vad Ras”, who were personally brought by Dolores Ibarruri, came to the aid of the Republicans. She and Jose Diaz went to the barracks, where the soldiers greeted the leaders of the Communist Party very warily. They were not particularly eager to fight for the republic, but when it was explained to them that the new government would give land (most of the soldiers were peasants), their mood changed and the soldiers went to the front. Together with Dolores Ibarruri, they were led by another prominent communist, Enrique Lister, who later became one of the best generals of the republic. The Frankists tried to explain his military talent in their own way, spreading rumors that Lister was a career German officer sent to Spain by the Comintern. In fact, Lister (1907–1994) was born in Galicia, the son of a stonemason and a peasant woman. Poverty forced him to emigrate to Cuba at the age of eleven. Upon returning, he was imprisoned for trade union activities and lived briefly in exile in the USSR (1932–1935), where he worked as a tunneler on the construction of the Moscow Metro. On July 20, Lister participated in the assault on the La Montagna barracks and, along with Modesto, became one of the organizers of the Fifth Regiment.

On July 25, the Steel Company of 150 communists and socialists entered the battle, which seriously pushed back the rebels, paying for it with the lives of 63 soldiers. On August 5, 1936, Mola made his last attempt to break through to Madrid across the Alto de Leon plateau. It was then that he declared that the Spanish capital would be taken by his four columns, supported by a fifth, which would strike from the rear. This is how the term “fifth column” was born, which later became widely known. But the “Director’s” plans to occupy Madrid by August 15 failed and already on August 10 the rebels went on the defensive in this section of the front.

After this, the putschists decided to outflank the Republican positions through the Sierra Gredos. There, the defense was held by a detachment of Madrid police under the command of a career officer Mangada, who advanced to the position on July 26. One day in July, members of the detachment stopped two cars. A man emerged from one of them and proudly declared that he was the leader of the Valladolid phalanx. During the civil war, both sides often wore the same uniform of the Spanish army and often mistook the enemy for one of their own. Fate played a cruel joke on Onesimo Redondo, the founder of the phalanx (and it was he). The police immediately shot him.

On August 19, the rebels launched an attack, but it quickly choked as a result of the work of the Republican artillery and 7 aircraft sent by the commander-in-chief of the Republic Air Force, a hereditary nobleman and communist Hidalgo de Cisneros. On August 20, the putschists brought into action the Moroccans, who by that time could already have been transferred to the northern front from Andalusia. But here, too, Republican aviation did a good job. With her support, the police launched a powerful counterattack and drove the rebels back almost to the city of Avila, which was already prepared for evacuation. But the Republicans did not build on their success and quickly went on the defensive. Such caution in offensive operations would become the real “Achilles heel” of the Republican army during the civil war.

On August 29, the rebels suddenly captured the poorly guarded Boqueron Pass and broke into the village of Pegerinos. The Moroccans, advancing in the vanguard, cut off the heads of peasants and raped women. The left flank of the Guadarrama Front was in danger of breaking through. But Modesto's forces arrived in time, and together with a company of the assault guards surrounded the Moroccan battalion in Pegerinos and destroyed it.

By the end of August, the front had stabilized and it became finally clear to Mole that he could not take Madrid. This failure also buried the “Director’s” hopes for leadership in the rebel camp. By that time, it was not he, but Francisco Franco, who was basking in the rays of victory.

But until Franco's troops landed on the Iberian Peninsula, the struggle in southern Spain was of a special nature. There was no front line here and both warring parties, relying on the cities in their hands, carried out raids against each other, trying to bring under control as much of Andalusia as possible. Residents of rural areas for the most part sympathized with the Republicans. They organized several partisan detachments, which were even worse armed than the people's militia of the cities. In addition to flintlocks and shotguns, scythes, knives and even slings were used.

The features of the Andalusian war of July-early August 1936 can be traced through the example of the town of Baena. In the first days of the rebellion, the Civil Guard seized power there and unleashed brutal terror. Popular Front activists who fled from Baena, with the assistance of peasants from surrounding villages armed with scythes and hunting rifles, recaptured the town. On July 28, the Moroccans and Phalangists, with the support of several aircraft, after a stubborn battle, again took Baena, but on August 5, a detachment of the assault guard, again with the help of peasants, liberated the city. The Republicans left him only on the orders of one of the commanders who were “straightening” the front line.

Having settled in Seville and physically eliminated all opposition there, Queipo de Llano, like a medieval robber knight, made punitive forays into neighboring areas. When attempting to resist, the rebels carried out mass executions of civilians. For example, in the town of Carmona near Seville, 1,500 people were killed. Queipo de Llano sought to ensure land communications between Seville, Cordoba and Granada (the latter's garrison fought virtually surrounded). But near these cities, more or less tightly knit detachments of the people's militia were already operating, and not peasants with scythes. Granada was squeezed from the south (from Malaga) and the east by militia units, in which there were many soldiers and sailors. The police also had machine guns. The rebels in Granada held out with all their might.

In early August, the Republicans decided to carry out their first major offensive operation since the beginning of the war and liberate the city of Cordoba. By the time of the offensive, local police detachments, in which miners armed with dynamite were the striking force, had already reached the outskirts of the city. But Cordova was a tough nut to crack. There, the rebels had a heavy artillery regiment, a cavalry regiment, almost the entire civil guard and phalangist detachments that had come over to their side. However, this was only enough to keep the city from the onslaught of the police.

In early August, three columns of Republicans began an attack on Cordoba in converging directions. The government troops were commanded by General José Miaja (1878–1958), who later became widely known. Like his colleagues, the general moved to Morocco. In the early 1930s, he was a member of the Spanish Military Union, but Gil Robles, having taken the post of Minister of War in 1935, sent Miaja away to the provinces. The putsch found the general in the position of commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade in Madrid. Overweight, bald and owl-like with his thick glasses, Miaha did not enjoy authority among his fellow generals. He was considered a pathological loser, which even his last name seemed to support (miaja means “little” in Spanish).

On July 28, Miaja was entrusted with command of the Republican forces of the south (they numbered a total of 5,000 people) and on August 5 these forces were already in the vicinity of Cordoba.

At first, the Republican general offensive developed promisingly. Several settlements were liberated. The head of the rebels in Cordoba, Colonel Cascajo, was already ready to begin a retreat from the city and sent desperate calls for help to Queipo de Llano. They were heard and the African units of General Varela moved to Cordoba in a forced march, clearing some areas of Andalusia of the “reds”. And here Miaha unexpectedly ordered a retreat, without even waiting for Varela’s forces to approach, fearing the use of aviation by the rebels. The front in the Cordoba area has stabilized. The Republicans' first offensive anticipated their major mistake in the war. Having learned to break through the enemy's front, they could not build on their success and retain the liberated territory. The rebels, on the contrary, were guided by Franco’s clear instructions to cling to every piece of land, and if it was lost, try to return the ceded territory at any cost.

But let's return to Franco himself, whom we left immediately after his arrival in Morocco on July 19. Upon learning of the failure of the mutiny in the fleet, the general instantly realized that without foreign help it would be unlikely to transfer the African army to Spain. Immediately after landing in Morocco, he sent ABC's London correspondent Louis Bolin on the same plane to Rome via Lisbon, where Bolin was to meet Sanjurjo. The journalist carried with him a letter from Franco, which authorized him to conduct negotiations in England, Germany and Italy on the urgent purchase of aircraft and aviation weapons for the “Spanish non-Marxist army.” The general wanted to get at least 12 bombers, 3 fighters and bombs. Franco intended to use air power to suppress the Republican fleet patrolling the Strait of Gibraltar.

True, Franco had several transport aircraft (from among those damaged by his executed cousin, later repaired), including those transferred from Seville. Three three-engine Fokker VII aircraft made four flights a day, delivering Moroccan troops to Seville (16–20 soldiers with full equipment were transported per flight). Franco understood that such a pace of transfer was insufficient compared to the people's militia units constantly arriving in Andalusia. In addition, Franco feared that Mola would enter Madrid first and become the leader of the new state. At the end of July, the rebels restored several flying boats, 8 old Breguet 19 light bombers and two Newport 52 fighters. These works were led by perhaps the only major rebel aviation specialist, General Alfredo Kindelan (1879–1962). He graduated from the engineering academy and became a pilot. Military service in Morocco earned him the rank of general in 1929. As Alfonso XIII's personal aide-de-camp, Kindelan did not accept the republic and resigned, taking advantage of Azaña's military reform. After the putsch, Kindelan immediately placed himself at Franco's disposal and was appointed commander of the Air Force on August 18, a post he would retain throughout the war.

While the envoy Franco Bolin was heading by train from Marseille to Rome, the general talked with the Italian military attaché in Tangier, Major Luccardi, begging him to urgently send transport planes. Luccardi reported this to the leadership of Italian military intelligence. But Mussolini hesitated. He remembered how in 1934 he had already sent weapons to the Spanish right (Carlists), but little good came of it. Even now, the Duce was not sure that the rebellion would not be suppressed in a few days. Therefore, when Mussolini received a telegram from the Italian envoy in Tangier de Rossi (Luccardi had arranged for him to meet Franco on July 22), outlining Franco's request to send 12 bombers or civilian transport aircraft, the Duce wrote “no” on it in blue pencil. At this time, Bolin, who arrived in Rome, secured a meeting with the Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano (Mussolini's son-in-law). He seemed to initially take a favorable position, but after consulting with his father-in-law, he also refused.

On July 25, a delegation from Mola (who knew nothing about the contacts of Franco's emissary in Italy) led by Goicoechea arrived in Rome. Unlike Franco, Mola did not ask for planes, but for ammunition (there were 26 thousand left for his entire army). At this point, Mussolini learned that France had decided to send military aircraft to the Republican government and the first of them (in total there were 30 reconnaissance and bomber aircraft, 15 fighters and 10 transport aircraft) landed in Barcelona on July 25. True, the French removed all weapons from them, and for a certain time these aircraft could not be used in combat. But Mussolini was infuriated by the very fact of French intervention and, to spite Paris, sent Franco on July 28 12 Savoia-Marchetti (SM-81) bombers, which were called “Pipistrello” (i.e. “bat” in Italian). At that time, it was one of the best bombers in the world, already tested by the Italians during the war with Ethiopia (however, the Ethiopians did not have modern fighters). The plane reached speeds of up to 340 km per hour, and was thereby 20% faster than the German Ju-52. Armed with five machine guns (versus two for the Junkers), the Bat could carry twice as many bombs as the Yu-52 and had a flight range of 2,000 km (also twice as long as the Junkers).

The planes took off from Sardinia on July 30. One of them fell into the sea, and two, having used up their fuel, landed in Algeria and French Morocco. But even the 9 planes that reached Franco could not fly until a tanker with high-octane gasoline arrived from Italy. The rebels themselves could not fly planes, so their Italian pilots were formally enrolled in the Spanish Foreign Legion. Thus began the intervention of fascist Italy in the Iberian Peninsula.

Having learned that the first sounding in Rome was unsuccessful, Franco did not put everything on one card and decided to turn to Germany for help. Its “Führer” Adolf Hitler had little interest in Spain. If Mussolini rushed around with plans to turn the Mediterranean Sea into an “Italian lake” and tried to bring Spain under his control, then Hitler only remembered that Spain was neutral during the First World War (a fact in the eyes of the front-line soldier Hitler was very shameful). True, already being a politician at the national level, the leader of the NSDAP reflected in the 1920s on the possibility of using Spain as a counterweight to France (exactly the same role was assigned to Spain by Bismarck in his time), but this was rather a secondary stake in the big geopolitical game of the Nazis.

Franco admired National Socialist Germany and, as Chief of the General Staff of the Spanish Army, led negotiations on the purchase of German weapons in 1935, which were interrupted after the victory of the Popular Front.

On July 22, Franco asked the German consulate in Tetouan to send a telegram to the military attache of the “Third Reich” in France and Spain (with residence in Paris), General Erich Kühlenthal, asking him to send 10 transport aircraft with German crews. Kühlenthal forwarded the request to Berlin, where it was shelved. Franco had no choice but to look for a direct route to Hitler. Back on July 21, he met with a German whom the general knew as a supplier of cookstoves for the Spanish army in Morocco. It was the bankrupt sugar trader Johannes Bernhardt who fled from Germany from his creditors. But the ambitious Bernhardt was also an expert on economic issues of the NSDAP party organization in Spanish Morocco, which was headed by businessman Adolf Langenheim. Bernhardt had difficulty persuading Langenheim to fly with him and Franco’s representative, Captain Francisco Arranz (who served as chief of staff of the tiny Francoist Air Force) to Berlin. On a Lufthansa Junkers 52 m mail plane requisitioned from the Canary Islands, Franco's three emissaries arrived in the German capital on July 24, 1936. The German Foreign Ministry rejected Franco’s request, since diplomats of the old school did not want to involve their country in an incomprehensible conflict, and ideological considerations (“the fight against communism”) were alien to them. But Langenheim organized a meeting with his boss, the head of the foreign policy department of the NSDAP (all Nazi party organizations abroad were subordinate to him), Gauleiter Ernst Bohle. He had long been competing with the Foreign Ministry for influence on Hitler and did not miss an opportunity to do something contrary to the prim diplomats. At this time, Hitler was in Bavaria, at the Wagner music festival in Bayreuth. Bole sent Franco's envoys to the minister without portfolio Rudolf Hess (“Deputy Fuhrer for the Party”), who was also there, and he already arranged a personal meeting with Hitler for the rebel emissaries. On July 25, the “Führer” was in a good mood (he had just listened to his favorite opera “Siegfried”) and read a letter from Franco in which he asked for planes, small arms and anti-aircraft guns. At first, Hitler was skeptical and clearly expressed doubts about the success of the rebellion (“that’s not how you start a war”). To make a final decision, he convened a meeting and, fortunately for the rebels, in addition to the Minister of Aviation Goering and the Minister of War Werner von Blomberg, one person took part in it, who turned out to be the largest expert on Spain in Germany. His name was Wilhelm Canaris, and since 1935, with the rank of admiral, he headed Germany's military intelligence service, the Abwehr.

Even during the First World War, Canaris arrived in Madrid with a Chilean passport to organize communications with German submarines located in the Mediterranean Sea. The active German created a dense network of agents in the country's ports. In Spain, Canaris made useful connections, including with the wealthy industrialist and newspaper magnate, liberal and friend of King Alfonso XIII, Horacio Echevarieta (his secretary was Indalecio Prieto). Canaris tried to organize sabotage against Entente ships in Spain, but French counterintelligence was “on his tail” and the German was forced to hastily leave the country he loved aboard a submarine. Some sources claim that Major Francisco Franco was among Canaris' agents in Spain, but there is no clear evidence of this.

In 1925, Canaris was again sent on a secret mission to Madrid. He had to negotiate the participation of German pilots in the fighting of the Spanish army in Morocco (under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, Germany was prohibited from having an air force and therefore the Germans were forced to train combat pilots in other countries, including the USSR). Canaris completed the task with the help of his new acquaintance, Lieutenant Colonel Alfredo Kindelan of the Spanish Air Force. On February 17, 1928, Canaris secured a secret agreement between German and Spanish security forces, which provided for the exchange of information and cooperation in the fight against subversive elements. Canaris's partner was the executioner of Catalonia, General Martinez Anido, who then held the post of Minister of the Interior (he later became Franco's first Minister of Security).

Thus, Canaris knew almost all the leaders of the rebellion in Spain, and was personally acquainted with many (he met Franco during Spanish-German negotiations on arms supplies in 1935).

During a meeting on Spain on July 25, 1936, Hitler wanted to know the opinion of all three present on whether to help Franco. To the Fuhrer himself, the rebellion seemed, as already mentioned, amateurishly prepared. Blomberg was vague. Goering supported the request of Franco’s envoys to “stop world communism” and test the young Air Force of the “Third Reich” created in 1935. But the most detailed argument was presented by Canaris, who was outraged by the murder of many officers in the Spanish fleet (he experienced the same thing in October 1918 in Germany, when the sailors’ uprising began in Kiel). Stalin, Canaris said, wants to create a Bolshevik state in Spain, and if this succeeds, France with its Popular Front government, similar to the Spanish one, will slide into the quagmire of communism. And then the Reich will be squeezed into the “red pincers” from the West and the East. Finally, he, Canaris, personally knows General Franco as a brilliant soldier who deserves the trust of Germany.

When Hitler closed the meeting at 4 a.m. on July 26, he had already decided to help Franco, although two days earlier he was afraid that participation in the Spanish Civil War could drag Germany into major foreign policy complications ahead of schedule.

Now Hitler was in a hurry. He wanted to forestall Mussolini and prevent the Duce from placing Spain under sole Italian control. Already on the morning of July 26, in the building of the German Ministry of Aviation, the “Special Headquarters W” (after the first letter of the surname of its leader, General Helmut Wilberg), which was supposed to coordinate assistance to the rebels, gathered for its first meeting. Bernhardt was appointed by Goering on July 31, 1936 as the head of a specially created front “transport” company HISMA, through which Franco’s weapons were secretly to be supplied. These supplies were to be paid for by barter with supplies of raw materials from Spain, for which another company, ROWAK, was established on October 7, 1936. The entire operation was codenamed “Magic Fire.”

On July 28, at 4:30 a.m., the first of the 20 Junkers 52 transport aircraft promised by Hitler took off from Stuttgart. The vehicles were equipped with additional gas tanks (a total of 3800 liters of gasoline). Without landing, the Junkers flew over Switzerland, along the French-Italian border and across Spain straight to Morocco. Already on July 29, these planes, piloted by Lufthansa pilots, began to transfer units of the African army to Spain. On the same day, Franco sends a telegram to Molé, ending with the words: “We are the masters of the situation. Long live Spain!" By August 9, all the Junkers arrived.

While waiting for the Moroccans, Queipo de Llano resorted to the following military trick in Seville. Some of the most tanned Spanish soldiers were dressed in Moroccan national clothes and drove around the city in trucks, shouting meaningless “Arab” phrases. This was to convince the recalcitrant workers that the African army had already arrived and further resistance was futile.

By July 27, at the largest Luftwaffe base, Deberitz, near Berlin, about 80 pilots and technicians were collected from various garrisons and agreed to voluntarily go to Spain. General Wilberg read Hitler’s telegram before the formation: “The Fuhrer decided to support the (Spanish) people now living in unbearable conditions and save them from Bolshevism. Hence the German help. For international reasons, open assistance is excluded, so a secret action of assistance is necessary.” Even relatives were forbidden to talk about the trip to Spain, who believed that their husbands and sons were performing a “special assignment” in Germany. All letters from Spain arrived in Berlin at the postal address “Max Winkler, Berlin SV 68”. There, envelopes were exchanged that received a postmark from one of the Berlin post offices. After this, the letters were sent to the recipients.

On the night of July 31 to August 1, the German merchant steamer Usaramo with a displacement of 22,000 tons left Hamburg for Cadiz, carrying 6 Xe-51 fighters, 20 anti-aircraft guns and 86 Luftwaffe pilots and technicians. The young people on board the ship introduced themselves to the crew as tourists. However, military bearing and identical civilian suits could not deceive the sailors. Some sailors even thought that a special operation was being prepared to capture the German colonies lost in the First World War in Africa.

Arriving in Seville by train from the port of Cadiz on August 6, the “German tourists” turned into several military units. Transport (11 Yu-52), bomber (9 Yu-52) and fighter (6 Xe-51), as well as anti-aircraft and ground groups were created. The Germans had to train the Spaniards to fly fighters and bombers as quickly as possible.

Problems immediately arose. Thus, during assembly it turned out that some parts of the Heinkels were missing, and with great difficulty the Germans managed to “put five cars on the wing.” But the Spanish pilots immediately ruined two of them during the first landing, which turned out to be on the belly. After this, the Germans decided to fly on their own for now.

Hitler's Germany was entering its first war.

Until mid-October 1936, German Junkers transferred 13,000 soldiers and 270 tons of military cargo to Andalusia from Morocco. To save time during the day, maintenance of the Junkers was carried out by German technicians at night with the car headlights on. In 1942, Hitler exclaimed that Franco should erect a monument to the glory of the Junkers and that the “Spanish Revolution” (the Führer meant the rebellion) should thank them for its victory.

The air bridge almost collapsed due to lack of gasoline. The rebels quickly used up army reserves and began purchasing fuel from private individuals. But the quality of this gasoline was insufficient for aircraft engines, and the Germans added benzene mixtures to the barrels. After this, the barrels were rolled on the ground until their contents became more or less homogeneous. In addition, the rebels managed to purchase aviation gasoline in French Morocco. And yet, when the long-awaited Cameroon tanker arrived from Germany on August 13, 1936, there was only one day’s worth of fuel left for the Junkers.

On August 5, the rebel air force raided Republican ships to divert their attention and lead a sea convoy with troops to Spain. But at first the fog got in the way. The convoy was able to put to sea again only in the evening.

At the same time, Franco tried to put pressure on the Republican fleet through diplomatic methods. After his protests, the authorities of the international zone of Tangier (the British played the first fiddle in the administration there) sent the Republican destroyer Lepanto out of this port. The authorities of the English colony of Gibraltar refused to refuel Republican ships. On August 2, a German squadron appeared in the Strait of Gibraltar, led by the most powerful ship of the Nazi Navy, the “pocket” battleship Deutschland (it is noteworthy that Franco initially set the date for the first sea convoy from Morocco to Spain on August 2). The formal reason for the appearance of the German squadron off the Spanish coast was the evacuation of citizens of the “Reich” from a country engulfed in civil war. In fact, German ships helped the rebels in every possible way. The Deutschland stood in the Ceuta roadstead and already on August 3 prevented the Republican ships from effectively bombing this coup stronghold.

And so, on August 5, Italian bombers attacked the Republican fleet. The inexperienced crews of the ships, not accustomed to operating under an air attack, set up a smoke screen and retreated, which allowed the rebels to transport 2,500 soldiers by sea that same day (Franco would later call this convoy the “victory convoy”). Starting from that day, the rebels freely transported their contingents by sea to Spain, and on August 6, Franco himself finally arrived on the peninsula, choosing Seville as his headquarters.

It should be recognized that Franco showed persistence and ingenuity in achieving his main goal - the transfer of the most combat-ready rebel troops to Spain. For the first time in the history of wars, an air bridge was organized for this purpose. Some historians believe that Franco would have transported troops by sea anyway, since the Republican fleet was of little combat capability. But the passivity of the Republic's Navy was explained not so much by the lack of experienced commanders as by the effective raids of Italian aircraft: many sailors were terrified of the threat from the air. Thus, we can conclude that without the help of Hitler and Mussolini, Franco in any case would not have been able to quickly deploy his troops in Andalusia and launch an attack on Madrid.

And yet the republic’s fleet did not lay down its arms. On August 5, a large naval force consisting of a battleship, two cruisers and several destroyers heavily shelled the southern Spanish port of Algeciras, sinking the gunboat Dato (it was she who transported the first soldiers from Africa) and damaging several transports. In addition, Republican ships periodically bombarded Ceuta, Tarifa and Cadiz. But under the cover of aviation, the rebels transported 7 thousand people by sea through the strait in August, and 10 thousand in September, not counting a significant amount of military cargo.

At the end of July, the Republic's navy planned to seize the port of Algeciras by amphibious assault, but the entire plan was abandoned when information arrived about strengthening the port with new artillery batteries.

On September 29, a battle between the Republican destroyers Gravina and Fernandez and the rebel cruisers Admiral Cervera and Canarias took place in the Strait of Gibraltar, during which one of the destroyers was sunk and the other was forced to take refuge in Casablanca (French Morocco). After this, control of the Strait of Gibraltar finally passed into the hands of the rebels.

Having transferred troops across the strait, Franco began to implement the main task of the war - the capture of Madrid. The shortest route to the capital lay through Cordoba, which misled the Republican command, which concentrated the most combat-ready forces near the city and tried to counterattack. Franco, with his usual caution, decided to first unite with Mola’s troops and only after that jointly capture Madrid.

Therefore, the African army launched an offensive from Seville through Extremadura - a poor, sparsely populated, rural province without large cities north of Andalusia, bordering Portugal. In this country, since 1926, there was a military dictatorial regime of Salazar, who from the very beginning of the rebellion did not hide his sympathy for the putschists. For example, Mola and Franco maintained telephone communications in the early weeks of the war using the Portuguese telephone network. When Mola's troops were in dire straits in the Guadarrama area, the African army sent them desperately needed ammunition via Portugal. German and Italian planes accompanying the rush to the north of the Moroccans and legionnaires were often based at Portuguese airfields. Portuguese banks provided the rebels with preferential loans, and the putschists conducted their propaganda through the country's radio stations. The neighboring country's military factories were used to produce weapons and ammunition, and Portugal later sent 20,000 "volunteers" to Franco. In August 1936, German ships unloaded machine guns and ammunition in Portuguese ports, which were extremely necessary for the African army, and were transported to the front via the shortest route via Portuguese railways.

So, the left (Portuguese) flank of the advancing southern rebel army could be considered quite secure. On August 1, Franco ordered a column under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Asensio to march north, link up with Mola and hand over seven million rounds of ammunition to him. Queipo de Llano requisitioned vehicles, threatening to shoot the arrested leaders of the taxi drivers' union if the latter did not drive their cars to the general's residence. On August 3, the column of Major Castejon moved behind Asensio, and on August 7, the column of Lieutenant Colonel de Tella. Each column consisted of one “bandera” of the Foreign Legion, a “tabor” (battalion) of Moroccans, engineering and sanitary services, as well as 1–2 batteries of artillery. From the air, the columns were covered by German and Italian aircraft, although the Republican aviation did not provide serious opposition. In total, there were about 8,000 people in the three columns under the overall command of Yagüe.

The tactics of the African army were as follows. Two columns were in the vanguard, and the third formed a reserve, and the columns periodically changed places. Legionnaires were moving along the highway in cars, and the Moroccans were walking on both sides of the road, covering their flanks. The terrain in steppe Extremadura, with low vegetation and no natural obstacles, was very reminiscent of the war zone in Morocco.

Initially, the advancing columns encountered virtually no organized resistance. Approaching any populated area, the rebels through loudspeakers invited residents to hang white flags and open windows and doors wide. If the ultimatum was not accepted, the village was subjected to artillery fire and, if necessary, air strikes, after which the assault began. The Republicans, barricaded in houses (all Spanish villages consist of stone buildings with thick walls and narrow windows), shot back to the last bullet (and there were few), after which the rebels shot them themselves. Each Moroccan had in his backpack, in addition to 200 rounds of ammunition, a long curved knife, with which they cut the throats of the prisoners. After this, looting began, encouraged by the officers.

The tactics of the Republican police were very monotonous. The militiamen did not know how and were afraid to fight in open areas, so the unprotected flanks of Yagüe's three columns were safe. As a rule, resistance was offered only in populated areas, but as soon as the rebels began to surround them (or spread rumors about their outflanking maneuvers), the police began to gradually retreat and this retreat often turned into a disorderly flight. The rebels mowed down the retreating ranks with machine guns mounted on cars.

The morale of the battle-hardened African army was very high, which was facilitated by the close and democratic relations between officers and soldiers, which were completely atypical for the Spanish armed forces. Officers wrote letters to illiterate soldiers and, when going on leave, took them to their relatives (in addition to letters, gold teeth knocked out from captured policemen and civilians, rings and watches taken from victims were handed over). In the barracks of the Foreign Legion hung portraits of comrades who died in Madrid at the La Montagna barracks. They swore to take revenge for them and took revenge cruelly, killing all the wounded and captured policemen. To justify such an inhumane way of waging war, the following “legal” explanation was invented: the police did not wear military uniforms, therefore they were, they say, not soldiers, but “rebels” and “partisans” who were not subject to the laws of war.

The first serious resistance of Yagüe's column was met in the town of Almendralejo, where about 100 policemen took up a foothold in the local church. Despite the lack of water and shelling, they held out for a week. On the eighth day, 41 survivors left the church. They were lined up and immediately shot. But Yagüe did not delay combat troops for such operations. As a rule, a platoon remained in populated areas, carrying out “cleansing” operations and ensuring extended communications. Extremadura and Andalusia were hostile lands for the rebels, whose people were treated much worse than the native inhabitants of Morocco.

In 7 days, having traveled 200 kilometers, Yagüe's troops captured the city of Merida and came into contact with Mola's army, transferring ammunition to it. This was the first modern blitzkrieg in European history. It was this tactic that the Nazis would later adopt, having learned from their Spanish charges. After all, blitzkrieg is nothing more than quick raids of motorized infantry columns with the support of tanks (the rebels still had few of them), aviation and artillery.

Yagüe wanted to immediately continue his advance towards Madrid, but the cautious Franco ordered him to turn southwest and take the city of Badajoz that remained in the rear (which had 41 thousand inhabitants and was located 10 kilometers from the Portuguese border).

Yagüe considered this order meaningless, since the 3,000 poorly armed policemen and 800 army and security forces gathered in Badajoz did not think about attacking and did not pose any threat to the rear of the African army. In addition, the Republican command had previously transferred the most combat-ready units from Badajoz to Madrid.

The inhabitants of Badajoz and its environs were devoted to the republic, since it was here, in the area of ​​​​large latifundias, that agrarian reform and irrigation of farmland were most actively carried out.

On August 13, the rebels cut the Badajoz-Madrid road and surrounded the city, making it impossible to transfer reinforcements to help the defenders of the capital of Extremadura. The police column sent to Badajoz on August 12 was almost completely destroyed on the march by German aircraft and Moroccans.

The defenders of Badajoz took refuge behind the city's fairly strong medieval walls, blocking the gates with sandbags. They had only 2 old howitzers at their disposal, and most of the 3,000 policemen did not have any weapons. Throughout the first half of the day on August 13, the rebels subjected the city to massive shelling, and in the evening of the same day they launched an assault. At the same time, the civil guard rebelled in the city. It was only possible to suppress it at the cost of heavy losses. And yet all the attacks of the African army that day were repulsed. The next day, rebel sappers blew up the gates of Trinidad (“Trinity” in Spanish) and, with the support of five light tanks, launched an assault in thick chains. Machine-gun fire from the defenders killed 127 attackers in the first 20 seconds. Only at 4 o'clock in the afternoon did the rebels break into the city, where fierce street fighting broke out. The last center of resistance was the cathedral, where fifty Republicans held out for another whole day. Some of them were later shot right in front of the altar.

After the capture of Badajoz, a wild massacre began, unseen in Europe since the Middle Ages. It became known only thanks to the presence of French, American and Portuguese correspondents in the city. For two days the pavement of the square in front of the commandant's office was covered with the blood of the executed. Massacres also took place in the bullring. American journalist Joe Allen wrote that after night executions from a machine gun, the arena looked like a deep bloody puddle. The genitals of those killed were cut off and crosses were carved into their chests. Killing a peasant in rebel jargon meant “giving agrarian reform.” In total, according to various sources, the massacre in Badajoz claimed the lives of 2,000–4,000 people. And this despite the fact that the rebels released 380 arrested enemies of the republic unharmed from the city’s prisons.

The coup propaganda initially generally denied any “excesses” in Badajoz. But the presence of foreign correspondents made denial impossible. Then Yagüe publicly stated that he did not want to take thousands of “reds” with him to Madrid, who still needed to be fed, and could not simply leave them in Badajoz, since they would make the city “red” again. In Badajoz, the putschists cut down an entire hospital for the first time. Later, all this would be repeated more than once, but “Badajoz” became a household name, denoting brutal reprisals against innocent civilians.

The Badajoz massacre was not an accident at all. From the very beginning of the rebellion, Franco set himself the goal of not only taking power in Spain, but also exterminating as many political opponents as possible in order to more easily retain power. When one of the correspondents told the general on July 25, 1936 that to pacify Spain he would have to shoot half of its population, Franco replied that he would achieve his goal by any means.

In addition, massacres and violence against women had a strong demoralizing effect on the defenders of the republic. Queipo de Llano, in his radio appearances, took sadistic delight in describing the (partly fictitious) sexual adventures of Moroccans with the wives and sisters of killed or arrested supporters of the republic.

In general, it should be noted that the system of terror of the rebels (and it was precisely an invented and proven system) had its own characteristics in different regions of Spain. The putschists were especially atrocious in “red” Andalusia, which was considered as enemy territory captured during military operations.

Queipo de Llano introduced the death penalty for participation in strikes on July 23, 1936, and from July 24 the same punishment was applied to all “Marxists.” On July 28, they announced the introduction of capital punishment for anyone who hid weapons. On August 19, the “social general” Queipo de Llano extended the death penalty to those who exported capital from Spain. Meanwhile, the owner of Andalusia himself discovered remarkable commercial talent, establishing the export of olives, citrus fruits and wine. Part of the currency received in this way went to the rebel treasury, and the general kept part for himself.

For a long time, members of workers' organizations were practically game in Seville. At any moment they could be arrested and shot without trial or investigation. Queipo de Llano advised workers to join the phalanx, mockingly calling the blue uniform shirts of the Falangists “life jackets.” Seville's prisons were overcrowded and many of those arrested were kept under guard in schools or simply in the courtyards of houses. Interestingly, membership in the Masonic lodge was considered almost the biggest crime. It’s strange, considering that many of the putsch officers were themselves Freemasons.

The head of the repressive apparatus at Queipo de Llano was the sadistic and alcoholic Colonel Diaz Criado. He sometimes gave life to prisoners if their wives, sisters or fiancees satisfied his violent sexual fantasies.

In some villages neighboring Seville, immediately after the coup, priests were taken hostage by supporters of the republic, some of them were shot. After capturing such villages, Queipo de Llano typically executed all members of the municipality, even if the freed priests asked him not to do so, citing good treatment by the Republicans.

In Castile, with its conservative population, the terror was more “targeted”. Typically, a committee consisting of the local priest, the landowner and the commander of the civil guard met in each locality. If all three believed someone was guilty, it meant the death penalty. In case of disagreement, the punishment was imposed in the form of imprisonment. These committees could even “forgive”, but at the same time the “forgiven” had to demonstrate his loyalty to the new government by volunteering to join the rebel troops or giving his son there. But along with this “orderly terror” there was also a “wild” one. Detachments of Falangists and Carlists killed their political opponents at night, leaving corpses on the roadsides for public viewing. The “signature mark” of the phalanx was a shot between the eyes. General Mola (more “soft” than Franco) was even forced to issue an order to the authorities of Valladolid to carry out executions in places hidden from prying eyes and quickly bury the corpses.

The atrocities of the rebels gave pause to even those conservative politicians and thinkers who disliked either the left or the Popular Front. One of these was Miguel de Unamuno, a representative of the “generation of 1898”, who was disillusioned with the republic. The putsch found him in the post of rector of the university in Salamanca, captured by the rebels. On October 12, the university solemnly celebrated the so-called Race Day (the date of Columbus's discovery of America, which marked the beginning of the spread of the Spanish language and culture in the New World). Franco's wife Dona Carmen was also present. One of the speakers was the founder of the Foreign Legion, General Miljan Astray, whose supporters constantly interrupted the speech of their idol, shouting the legion's motto “Long live death!” Unamuno could not restrain himself and said that the military must not only win, but also convince. In response, Astray attacked the rector with his fists, shouting: “Death to the intelligentsia!” Only the intervention of Franco's wife prevented lynching. But the very next day Unamuno was not allowed into his favorite cafe, and then removed from his post as rector. In December 1936, he passed away, abandoned by all his friends and acquaintances.

In principle, it should be emphasized that all world-famous cultural figures in Spain were on the side of the republic.

Galicia turned out to be practically the only territory with a republican-minded population captured in the very first days of the rebellion (in Andalusia the struggle lasted for about a month). Resistance still continued there, taking the form of local strikes. A peculiarity of Galicia was cruelty towards teachers and doctors, who were universally considered leftists, while lawyers and humanities professors were considered to be persons of conservative beliefs. In some localities, as in Andalusia, everyone who was suspected of sympathizing with the Popular Front was massacred. Mothers, wives and sisters of those executed were forbidden to mourn.

In Navarre, the Carlists, who played the main role there at the first stage of the rebellion, dealt with the Basque nationalists with particular hatred, although the latter were as zealous Catholics as the Carlists themselves. On August 15, 1936, a solemn religious procession in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary took place in the capital of Navarre, Pamplona. The Falangists and Carlists decided to mark the day in their own way, organizing the execution of 50–60 political prisoners, many of whom were baptized before execution. After killing defenseless people, among whom were several priests, the Carlists calmly joined the solemn procession, which had just reached the main cathedral of the city.

In general, during the massive and well-organized terror in the part of Spain captured by the rebels, according to various estimates, from 180 to 250 thousand people were killed (including the executions of Republicans immediately after the end of the civil war).

What was the situation in the republican zone? The main and fundamental difference was that physical reprisals against the “enemies of the republic” were carried out, as a rule, contrary to the laws and decrees of the central government by various “uncontrolled” elements (primarily anarchists) in the first months after the rebellion. After the government managed to more or less bring numerous military formations, columns and committees under control at the beginning of 1937, revolutionary terror practically disappeared. However, it never acquired such a massive character as in the rebel zone.

After the failure of the rebellion in Madrid and Barcelona, ​​almost all captured putschist officers, including General Fanjul, were shot without trial. The government, however, later sanctioned capital punishment, since in this case it was fully consistent with the criminal code.

Local Popular Front committees took over the functions of courts, where, naturally, there were no lawyers. The accused, as a rule, himself had to look for witnesses confirming his innocence. And the accusations were very different. Those who listened too loudly to Seville's radio could be accused of undermining the fighting morale of the republic. Anyone who was looking for matches with a flashlight at night could be suspected of giving signals to fascist planes.

The anarchists, socialists and communists who were members of the committees kept their own lists of suspects. They were compared, and if someone had the misfortune of being on three lists at once, then guilt was considered proven. If the suspect was on only one list, they, as a rule, talked to him (and, mostly, quite favorably) and if the person was found innocent, the committee members sometimes drank a glass of wine with him and released him on all four sides (sometimes even under an honorary escort that accompanied the liberated person to the gates of the house). The committees fought against false denunciations: sometimes they were shot for them.

The situation was worse in those regions where power immediately after the rebellion was in the hands of anarchists (Catalonia, Aragon, some settlements in Andalusia and the Levant). There, the CNT-FAI militants settled scores not only with the “reactionaries,” but also with competitors from the CPI and PSOE. Some prominent socialists and communists were killed from behind the corner because they wanted to restore basic order.

Often, captured rebels or their supporters were dealt with after particularly brutal rebel aircraft bombed residential areas of peaceful cities. For example, after the raid on Madrid on August 23, 1936, 50 people were shot. When the rebel navy announced a naval attack on San Sebastian, the city authorities threatened to shoot two prisoners for every victim of this attack. This promise was fulfilled: 8 hostages paid with their lives for the four dead.

On August 23, 1936, after a mysterious fire in the Modelo prison in Madrid (at the direction of the “fifth column,” prisoners began to burn mattresses in an attempt to break free), 14 prominent representatives of right-wing parties were shot, including the brother of the phalanx leader Fernando Primo de Rivera.

After the rebellion, all churches in the republic were closed, since the highest clergy for the most part supported the coup (priests called at masses to “kill the red dogs”). Many temples were burned. Anarchists and other ultra-revolutionary elements killed thousands of clergy in the first months of the war (in total, about 2,000 church representatives died in the republican zone). Communists and most socialists condemned these actions, but often simply did not want to spoil relations with the anarchists, whose influence reached its apogee in the first months of the war. There is, however, a known case when Dolores Ibarruri took a nun into her car and took her to a safe place, where she remained until the very end of the war. In September 1936, the Communists organized a speech on their radio station by the Catholic priest Ossorio y Gallando, which caused a softening of the general policy towards the Church. However, until the beginning of 1938, all public church services on the territory of the republic were prohibited, although services in private homes were not prosecuted.

The situation in the republican zone was further aggravated by the fact that on February 22, 1936, not only political prisoners, but also ordinary criminals left the prison under an amnesty. After the rebellion, many of them joined the anarchists and were engaged in ordinary robbery or settling scores with the judges who put them behind bars. In the Valencia area, a whole so-called “iron” column of bandit elements operated, robbing banks and “requisitioning” the property of citizens. The column was only disarmed with the help of communist troops after real street fighting in Valencia.

The Hiral government tried to put an end to the excesses of criminals masquerading as police. Citizens were advised not to open their doors at night and to immediately call the Republican Guard at the first suspicion. The arrival of the guards (and often only the threat to call them) was usually enough for the self-proclaimed policemen (they were mostly teenagers) to leave.

Prieto and prominent figures of the Communist Party repeatedly spoke on the radio demanding an immediate end to acts of lynching. When, after the rebellion, thousands of supporters of the putschists, members of right-wing parties and simply wealthy people took refuge in foreign embassies (mostly Latin American), the Popular Front government not only did not insist on their extradition, but also allowed the diplomatic missions to rent additional premises, although in the fall of 1936 the staff of all embassies left the capital. In Madrid, more than 20,000 enemies of the republic were quietly holed up in embassies. From there, Republican patrols were periodically fired upon and light signals were given to rebel aircraft. The reactionary doyen of the diplomatic corps, the Chilean ambassador, even tried to involve the Soviet embassy in the “humanitarian action,” but to no avail. The British and Americans also refused to accept “refugees” into the territory of their embassies. They referred to international law, which prohibited the use of the territory of diplomatic missions for such purposes.

On December 4, 1936, the Spanish security service, with the assistance of seconded Soviet advisers from the NKVD, carried out a surprise raid on one of the buildings of the Finnish embassy in Madrid (from there they often fired on patrols) and found 2,000 people there, including 450 women, as well as a lot of weapons and a workshop for the production of hand grenades. Naturally, there was not a single Finn in the building. All diplomats were in Valencia, and each “guest” was charged from 150 to 1500 pesetas per month. By order of then Prime Minister Largo Caballero, all “refugees” from the Finnish embassy were deported to France, from where most returned to the rebel-controlled zone.

In one of the buildings under the care of the Turkish embassy, ​​100 boxes of rifles were discovered, and from the Peruvian embassy the Falangists generally broadcast radio broadcasts, informing the rebels of the situation of the Republican units near Madrid.

Despite these irrefutable facts, the government of the republic did not dare to stop the embassy “lawlessness”, fearing to spoil relations with Western countries.

Many Phalangists were able to escape from the embassies to the rebel zone, others quietly sat in diplomatic missions until the very end of the war. It should be noted that already in the first months of the war, the Republicans proposed to establish an exchange of prisoners through the Red Cross, as well as to allow free passage of women and children through the front line. The rebels refused this. They considered the Red Cross a Masonic (and therefore subversive) organization. Only captured Soviet, German and Italian pilots, as well as high-ranking officers and politicians of both sides, were exchanged on the French border.

Concluding the comparative analysis of political repressions in the “two Spains” after July 18, 1936, we can only state that they cannot be compared. And the point is not even that in the republican zone, 10 times fewer people became victims of purges (about 20 thousand people). Every innocent life lost deserves compassion. But the rebels deliberately used mass terror as a weapon of war, anticipating the behavior of the Nazis in Eastern Europe and the USSR, while the Republic tried as much as possible to contain the righteous anger that filled the masses, faced with treason and betrayal of their own army.

But let’s return to the situation at the fronts in this dark August for the republic, 1936. Despite the rapid pace of advance of the African army, the capture of Badajoz and the joining of two parts of the rebellious territory into a single whole, the republic did not yet feel the mortal danger looming over it and madly scattered its already not very powerful forces.

Operations on the Aragonese front began promisingly for the Republicans, where the rebels had neither aviation, nor artillery, nor a sufficient number of troops. In the first days of the war, a column of anarchists led by Durruti left Barcelona, ​​inspired by the victory over the putschists in the city. Instead of the 20 thousand fighters announced to the seeing-off population, the column barely had 3,000, but on the way it was overtaken by the columns of the PSUC (United Socialist Party of Catalonia) and the Trotskyist POUM party. In early August, the Republicans surrounded the Aragonese city of Huesca on three sides, where the front was already held by the regular army soldiers from the garrison of the town of Barbastro who remained loyal to the Republic. Despite the advantageous positions and overwhelming superiority in forces, a real assault on Huesca never happened. In the area of ​​the city cemetery, the positions of the parties were so close that the anarchists and rebels exchanged mostly curses rather than shots. Huesca, which the rebels called their Madrid, remained in their hands, although the only road connecting the city with the rear was under fire from the Republicans.

The anarchists justified their inaction at Huesca by the fact that their main forces were dedicated to the liberation of Zaragoza. After the capture of the capital of Aragon, the CNT-FAI planned to launch a revolution in its understanding throughout Spain. What such a revolution looked like was demonstrated by the Durruti column itself, proclaiming “libertarian communism” without money and private property in the liberated Aragonese villages. Resisting “reactionary” peasants were sometimes shot, although Durruti himself often stood up for them.

Finally 6,000 Durruti fighters approached Zaragoza. And here, on the advice of the commander of the military garrison of Barbastro, Colonel Villalba, the column suddenly retreated back, as the colonel feared encirclement. And this, despite the fact that the rebels in Zaragoza had half as many soldiers and they were much weaker in artillery. The fact that the anarchists did not have a clear command system also played a role. Colonel Villalba formally had no authority, and Durruti either listened to his advice or ignored it. Durruti himself, despite his seemingly unquestionable authority, had to speak to his soldiers twenty times a day, convincing them to go on the offensive. The column of anarchists quickly melted and soon there were 1,500 people left in it.

There was no communication or coordination of actions with the government in Madrid or even with the neighboring sectors of the front occupied by the “Marxist columns”. Thus, the real opportunity to take Zaragoza and connect with the north of the country, cut off from the main part of the republic, was missed. Until mid-1937, the Aragonese Front was a front only in name: the rebels kept a minimal number of troops here (30 thousand on the side of the putschists in the spring of 1937 were opposed by 86 thousand Republicans), and the anarchists who set the tone on the Republican side did not really bother them with combat activities.

In the last days of July, in Catalonia and Valencia, the idea arose to recapture the main island of the Balearic archipelago, Mallorca, from the rebels. The autonomous government of Catalonia did not consult with Madrid, but decided to carry out the operation at its own peril and risk. The landing plan was developed by two captains - Alberto Bayo (Air Force) and Manuel Uribarri (Valencia Civil Guard). The expeditionary force, totaling 8,000 men, included detachments from all major parties. The landing was carried out with the support of two destroyers, a gunboat, a torpedo boat and three submarines. There was even a floating hospital. The landing itself was placed on the same longboats that the army used in 1926 during the famous landing in Alusemas Bay, which decided the outcome of the Moroccan war.

On August 5 and 6, almost without a fight, the Republican landing occupied two small islands of Ibiza and Formentera. On August 16, the paratroopers landed on the eastern coast of Mallorca and, using the element of surprise, occupied the city of Porto Cristo. A bridgehead was formed in the shape of an arc 14 kilometers long and 7 kilometers deep. But instead of building on their success, the Republicans remained inactive all day and thereby gave the enemy the opportunity to come to their senses. Mussolini was especially afraid of losing the Balearic Islands. He had already agreed with the rebels that for the duration of the war (and perhaps for a longer period) the islands would become an Italian naval and air base. Therefore, already 10 days after the successful landing of the Republicans, Italian planes began to iron their positions. The Fiat fighters gave the Republican bombers no opportunity to do the same. Franco sent units of the Foreign Legion to help Mallorca.

The general leadership of the rebels was carried out by the Italian Arconvaldo Bonaccorsi, known as Count Rossi. The "Count" appeared in Mallorca immediately after the mutiny and removed the Spanish military governor appointed by General Goded. The Italian drove around in his own car in a black shirt with a white cross and proudly told society ladies that he needed a new woman every day. The “Count” and his henchmen killed more than 2,000 people in just a few weeks of ruling the island. Rossi organized the defense of the island, relying on aviation sent by Mussolini.

But in the meantime, Madrid realized that the main danger to the republic was threatening from the south, and demanded that the landing force be recalled from Mallorca and sent to the capital’s front. On September 3, 1936, the battleship Jaime I and the cruiser Libertad of the Republic Navy approached the island. The landing commander, Captain Bayo, was ordered to evacuate the troops within 12 hours. Otherwise, the fleet threatened to abandon the landing force to the mercy of fate. On September 4, the expeditionary force, having suffered virtually no losses, returned to Barcelona and Valencia. The hospital with the wounded left in Mallorca was cut down by Count Rossi. It is noteworthy that the Republicans located the hospital in a nunnery and did not harm a single nun during their stay on the island.

Thus, the Republican landing operation, which was very spectacular from a military point of view, did not lead to tangible results and did not ease the situation on other fronts.

By early August, Mola realized the futility of his attempts to break through to Madrid through the Sierra Guadarrama. Then he decided to strike the Basque Country in order to cut it off from the French border, the approaches to which were covered by the city of Irun. The Republicans still did not have a unified command. True, on paper there was a Defense Junta of Gipuzkoa (that was the name of the province of the Basque Country adjacent to France), but in reality every city and every village defended itself at its own peril and risk.

On August 5, about 2,000 rebels, led by one of the Carlist leaders, Colonel Beorleghi, launched an attack on Irun. Mola transferred all his artillery to this group, and Franco sent 700 legionnaires. However, the Basques bravely resisted and Beorleghi’s soldiers could not take the San Marcial fortress dominating the city until August 25. Franco had to use Junkers to transport additional reinforcements to the colonel. A repeated offensive on August 25 was again repulsed by competent machine-gun fire, and the rebels suffered serious losses.

The defenders of Irun received reinforcements in the form of several hundred militiamen from Catalonia, who reached the Basque Country through the south of France. But on August 8, the French government closed the border with Spain (the first step of the notorious “policy of non-intervention”, which will be discussed below) and several trucks with ammunition sent from Catalonia were no longer able to reach Irún. Although the population of southern France still did not hide their sympathies. French peasants from the border hills used light signals to inform the Republicans about the positions of the rebels and the movements of troops in their camp. Militiamen from Irun often crossed into France to eat and rest, returning loaded with rifles, machine guns and ammunition. The French border guards turned a blind eye to this.

And yet, thanks to a more organized use of troops, the rebels captured the fortress of San Marcial on September 2, which sealed the fate of Irun. On September 4, with the support of Italian aviation, the mortally wounded Beorleghi nevertheless entered the city, which was set on fire by the retreating anarchists. By the way, the colonel himself was shot at by French communists from the other side of the border.

On September 13, after being bombed by a rebel fleet, the Basques abandoned the resort capital of what was then Spain, the city of San Sebastian. As a result of the northern campaign, Mola captured an area of ​​1,600 square kilometers with solid industrial potential, but unlike the “lucky” Franco, this victory came at a high price. Of the 45 companies brought into battle by the rebels (mostly Carlists), the Basques, who numbered only about 1,000 people with one artillery battery (75 mm guns), put one third out of action.

What was happening at that time on the southern, main front of the civil war? After the capture of Badajoz, Yagüe's columns turned to the northeast and began to quickly advance along the Tagus River valley towards Madrid. In the week leading up to August 23, the rebels had covered half the distance from Badajoz to the capital. In the Tagus Valley, as in Extremadura, there were practically no natural obstacles. Only in one place in the hills of Montes de Guadalupe did the people's militia resist, but after threatening to be encircled they were forced to withdraw.

On August 27, three columns of rebels united and launched an offensive towards the important transport hub of the city of Talavera de la Reina, from which Madrid was 114 kilometers away. In the Talavera region, mountain ranges narrowed the Tagus valley and the city was a convenient line of defense. In two weeks after Badajoz, 6,000 legionnaires and Moroccans from Yagüe marched 300 kilometers.

Republican troops in the Talavera area were commanded by a career officer, General Riquelme. The most combat-ready units of the republic, which had driven Mola back from Madrid a month ago, urgently approached the city: companies of the Fifth Communist Regiment and OSM youth battalions under the command of Modesto and Lister. But, having arrived at the front, they learned that Riquelme had surrendered Talavera without a fight, and the policemen fled in panic from the city on buses, like football fans from a stadium.

German-Italian aviation played a key role in the rebel victory at Talavera. The low-level flights of Junkers, Fiats and Heinkels were enough - and most of the policemen rushed to their heels.

The surrender of Talavera on September 4, 1936, struck the Republic like a bolt from the blue. The Hiral government was forced to resign. It became obvious that the new cabinet must include all the main forces of the Popular Front.

At first, President Azaña simply wanted to supplement the government with several prominent socialists and, above all, Largo Caballero, who often made militant speeches, including to the militia in Talavera. He said that the government was helpless and did not know how to properly conduct a war. Relying on his popularity, Largo Caballero refused to join the government as an ordinary minister, and demanded for himself the post of prime minister, which he eventually received, also becoming minister of war. To bolster Caballero's claims to power, 2,000–3,000 UGT militia fighters were concentrated in Madrid. Prieto headed the ministries of the Air Force and Navy. In general, PSOE members took the majority of portfolios, but Largo Caballero insisted that communists must be included in the government. The leaders of the CPI refused, citing international considerations. They say that the rebels already call Spain a “red” communist country, and in order not to give additional ground for these statements in the world, the Communist Party should not yet participate in the government. However, Largo Caballero did not lag behind, reproaching the communists for their reluctance in difficult times to share responsibility for the fate of the country. After consulting with the leadership of the Comintern, José Diaz eventually gave the go-ahead and the two communists became ministers of agriculture (Vicente Uribe, a former bricklayer) and public education (Jesus Fernandez). Thus, for the first time in the history of Western Europe, communists entered the government of a capitalist country. The anarchists still flatly refused to cooperate with the state power that they wanted to abolish.

The appointment of Largo Caballero as prime minister was not easy for Azaña. This step was suggested to him by Prieto, who always believed that his main rival in the PSOE was not capable of any serious administrative work (as we will see, Prieto was right). The communists were unpleasantly struck by the peremptory nature with which Caballero demanded for himself the post of prime minister and minister of war at the same time. And yet, at the moment of crisis, the head of the executive branch had to become a person who was trusted by the masses, and such a person in early September 1936 was only the “Spanish Lenin” - Largo Caballero. Prieto thought that Caballero would become the banner under which other people and, above all, himself, would begin the painstaking and grunt work of creating a regular army

But these hopes were not realized. True, Largo Caballero loudly declared that his cabinet was a “government of victory.” Dressed in a blue “mono” jumpsuit of the people’s militia with a rifle at the ready, Caballero met with the fighters and convinced them that a turning point would soon come. At first, the new prime minister streamlined the work of the War Ministry and the General Staff. Previously, different people were constantly milling around there, waving mandates from various committees and demanding weapons and food. Caballero established security and a clear daily routine. His direct telephone number was known to few, and he was very scrupulous about every visitor, so it became difficult to get an appointment with the Minister of War. 65-year-old Caballero appeared at his workplace exactly at 8 am, and at 8 pm he went to rest. He strictly forbade waking himself up at night, even for important matters. Soon, the ministry employees felt that the restoration of order (undoubtedly long overdue) began to result in some kind of too clumsy bureaucratic mechanism, making it difficult to make operational decisions precisely at a time when the fate of the war was decided by days and hours. Largo Caballero began to strive to resolve many minor issues single-handedly. For example, on his orders, unaccounted for pistols, of which there were 25 thousand, were confiscated from the population. Largo Caballero stated that he would distribute these pistols himself and only on the basis of an order written by him personally.

The new prime minister had another bad trait. Having headed the government of the Popular Front, he remained essentially a trade union leader, trying to strengthen the positions of “his” trade union center UGT at the expense of other parties and trade unions. Caballero was especially envious of the communists, whose ranks, despite heavy losses during the days of the rebellion and in the first battles of the war, grew by leaps and bounds.

From a purely military point of view, Caballero had one “point” that almost led to the surrender of Madrid. For some reason, the prime minister resisted with all his might the construction of fortified defense lines around the capital. He believed that trenches and pillboxes dampened the morale of the police. For this man, it was as if the bitter lessons of the “black” August in the south of Spain, when legionnaires and Moroccans staged real massacres in an open field for the people’s militia, did not exist. In addition, Caballero opposed sending members of the construction trade union to build fortifications, since they were from “their”, “native” UGT!

We remember that Caballero and his supporters were at first generally against the regular army, considering guerrilla warfare to be the real element of the Spaniard. But when the communists and Soviet military advisers proposed creating partisan detachments to operate behind rebel lines (given the sympathy of the population of almost all of Spain for the republic, this suggested itself), Caballero resisted this for a long time. He believed that partisans should fight at the front.

And yet, the “blitzkrieg” of the African army and the successes of the communist Fifth Regiment forced Largo Caballero to agree to the creation of six mixed brigades of the regular People’s Army on the basis of the people’s militia, which was called for by the Soviet military attaché, brigade commander V.E., who appeared in Madrid in early September. Gorev (previously Vladimir Efimovich Gorev was a military adviser in China, and arrived in Spain from the post of commander of a tank brigade). Each brigade was to have four infantry battalions with machine guns, a mortar platoon, twelve guns, a cavalry squadron, a communications platoon, an engineer company, a motor transport company, a medical unit and a supply platoon. Such a brigade, which had a staff of 4,000 soldiers, was an autonomous unit capable of independently performing any combat missions. It was precisely these brigades (although they were called columns) that the legionnaires and Moroccans rushed to Madrid. But, having agreed with the creation of mixed brigades in principle, Caballero delayed their formation in practice. Each commander of the future brigade received 30,000 pesetas and the order to form brigades by November 15. If this deadline had been met, Madrid would not have been able to be defended. Brigades had to be thrown into battle “on wheels”, sacrificing time and people. But this led to the fact that during the decisive battle for Madrid, the Republicans did not have any more or less trained reserves.

Yet Talavera shook up the Republic. The "romantic war" is over. A life and death struggle began. It took Yagüe's troops two weeks to march from Talavera to the city of Santa Olalla, i.e. 38 kilometers (remember that before that, in less than a month, the African army covered 600 kilometers).

In addition to the communist and youth shock companies mentioned above, other units also approached Talavera. The command of all the forces of the republic near Talavera (about 5 battalions) was entrusted to one of the few “African” career officers in the camp of the republic, Colonel Asencio Torrado (1892–1961), who was favored by Largo Caballero “himself”.

Asencio attacked Talavera the military "right" way, but was unable to reorganize his forces to repel the rebel counter-offensive and withdrew, fearing encirclement. Asensio did not bother to concentrate his forces on a fairly narrow front (4–5 km) on both sides of the Madrid highway and did not throw his battalions into battle immediately, but one after another. They were met by heavy fire from machine guns and artillery, and attacks from the Junkers from the air. The African army then pressed on the flanks of the exhausted Republicans and forced them to withdraw. Of course, the rebels no longer had a rapid pace of advancement, but this gain in time was given to the Republicans at the cost of colossal losses and was used terribly slowly by Madrid to build up trained reserves.

At Santa Olalla, the African army had to fight, perhaps for the first time, with a battle-hardened people's militia. The Libertad (Freedom) column, which arrived from Catalonia on September 15, launched a counter-offensive and, skillfully using machine-gun fire, liberated the village of Pelaustan, throwing the rebels back 15 kilometers. But here, too, the Republicans were unable to consolidate their success: as a result of a counterattack by Yagüe’s forces, some parts of the Catalan militia were surrounded and were forced to fight their way to their own with losses. On September 20, the African army nevertheless took Santa Olalla, despite the heroic resistance of the Republicans, whose losses reached 80% of the personnel. In the town itself, 600 police officers who were captured were shot in cold blood.

On September 21, Yagüe captured the city of Maqueda, from which two roads led: one to the north - to Madrid, the other to the east - to the city of Toledo, the medieval capital of Spain. There, behind the thick fortress walls of the ancient Alcazar fortress, since the suppression of the rebellion in Madrid, a motley putschist garrison consisting of 150 officers, 160 soldiers, 600 civil guards, 60 Falangists, 18 members of the right-wing Popular Action party, 5 Carlists, 8 Toledo cadets held out infantry school and 15 other supporters of the rebellion. In total, the commander of this detachment, Colonel Miguel Moscardo, had 1024 fighters, but behind the walls of the Alcazar there were also 400 women and children, some of whom were members of the families of the rebels, and some taken hostage by relatives of prominent figures of left-wing organizations. The militia besieging the Alcazar at first had no artillery, and the rebels felt quite confident behind walls several meters thick. They had a sufficient amount of water and a lot of horse meat. There was no shortage of ammunition either. The Alcazar even published a newspaper and hosted football matches.

The police in Toledo were also not particularly active. Its fighters sat in the square in front of the Alcazar, exchanging various barbs with the besieged. Then improvised barricades arose from all sorts of rubbish, but still the rebels wounded and killed in shootouts much more policemen than they themselves lost in killed and wounded.

The siege continued unsteadily for about a month. During this time, rebel propaganda made the “heroes of the Alcazar” a symbol of devotion to the high ideals of the “new Spain.” Mola and Franco began to compete in the liberation of the Alcazar, realizing that the one who would first reach the fortress would become the undisputed leader of the rebel camp. Already on August 23, with the help of a communications plane, Franco promised Moscardo that the African army would come to the rescue in time. On July 30, Mola signaled the same thing, adding that his troops were closer to Toledo.

The rapid advance of the putschists from the south forced the Republican command to become more active in Toledo. At the end of August, a weak, but still artillery shelling of the fortress began: one 155 mm and several 75 mm shells were fired. Sappers dug a tunnel under the walls to plant explosives there. But the Republicans were kept from a decisive assault by the presence of women and children in the fortress, whom the “heroes of the Alcazar” used as human shields.

On September 9, Vicente Rojo, who had already become a lieutenant colonel, had previously served as a teacher at the Toledo Infantry School and personally knew many of the besieged, on the orders of Largo Caballero, he entered the Alcazar under a white flag, trying to achieve the release of women and children and the surrender of the garrison. Rojo was led blindfolded to Moscardo, but attempts to appeal to the colonel's military honor, which prohibited the forcible detention of women and children, led to nothing. On September 11, the Madrid priest Father Vázquez Camaraza arrived at the fortress with the same mission. “Good Christian” Moscardo ordered to bring one of the women, who naturally assured that she was in the Alcazar of her own free will and was ready to share its fate with the garrison. Two days later, the dean of the diplomatic corps, the Chilean ambassador, approached the walls of the fortress and again asked Moscardo to release the hostages. The colonel sent his adjutant to the wall, who informed the diplomat through a loudspeaker that all requests should be transmitted through the military junta in Burgos.

On September 18, police detonated three mines near the Alcazar, which did not cause much harm to the besieged.

Another touching episode also appeared in the heroic legend of the Francoists about the Alcazar. All newspapers in the world reported that on July 23, 1936, the commander of the police besieging the fortress brought the son of Colonel Moscardo Luis to the telephone so that he could persuade his father to surrender, threatening otherwise to shoot his son. Moscardo wished his son a courageous death, after which Luis was allegedly immediately shot. In fact, Luis Moscardo was later shot along with others arrested as retaliation for a brutal rebel air raid on Toledo. Of course, Louis was not to blame for anything, but such was the terrible logic of that civil war. In addition, Moscardo’s son has already reached military age.

So, when Yagüe took Maqueda, Franco faced a painful choice: either go to Toledo, distracted from the main goal - Madrid, or rush to the capital with a forced march.

From a purely military point of view, of course, a rush to Madrid suggested itself, and Franco was well aware of this. The capital was absolutely not fortified, and the police were demoralized by a long retreat, fruitless counterattacks and terrible losses. But the general decides to stop the attack on Madrid and liberate the Alcazar. Naturally, this was publicly explained by Franco’s honest word given to Moscardo that the African army would come to his aid. They also talked about the sentimental feelings of Franco, who studied at the Toledo Infantry School. But this was not the main thing in the general’s motives. He needed the theatrical capture of the Alcazar to consolidate his claims to sole power in the rebel camp.

The Germans helped him take the first and decisive step on this path when, at the insistence of Canaris, they decided that any military assistance to the rebels would be provided only through Franco. On August 11, Mola, who had never achieved recognition abroad, agreed that Franco should be considered the main representative of the rebels. Germany continued to insist on the appointment of a sole leader and commander-in-chief of the “nationalists” (this is how the putschists began to officially call themselves, as opposed to the “Reds” - the Republicans; in turn, the Republicans called themselves “government forces”, and the rebels - fascists). In this case, of course, Franco was implied: Canaris again took on the main role in lobbying him.

Even before the first rebel delegation left Germany in July 1936, Canaris asked Langenheim (already an Abwehr agent by that time) to remain close to Franco and report on all the general’s moves. But Mola Canaris did not lose sight of him either, using his long-standing contacts with the “director’s” chief of staff, Colonel Juan Vigon. Vigon's information was supplemented by information received from Mola's headquarters through Abwehr agent Seidel. The German military attaché in Paris maintained contact with other prominent putschist generals. Sometimes even Franco communicated with Mola through Berlin, until both rebel armies established direct contact with each other. Canaris established agents in the republican zone and shared information with Franco. Soon the Abwehr suffered its first losses: its agent Eberhard Funk was detained while trying to collect information about the ammunition depots of the Republican army, and paid for his excessive curiosity with his life.

Canaris put aside all his affairs for a while and dealt only with Spain. A portrait of Franco, whom Canaris considered one of the most outstanding statesmen of the time, appeared on his desk. At the end of August, Canaris sent his employee and naval officer Messerschmidt (sometimes confused with the famous aircraft designer) to Franco via Portugal to find out the rebels' weapons needs. The condition for providing assistance was its concentration in the hands of Franco. In September, Johannes Bernhardt, already familiar to us, for his part, told Franco that Berlin sees only him as the head of the Spanish state.

On 24 August 1936, on the recommendation of Canaris, Hitler issued a special directive which stated: “Support General Franco as far as possible, materially and militarily. At the same time, active participation [of the Germans] in hostilities is ruled out for now.” It was after this directive that new batches of aircraft (disassembled and packed in boxes labeled “Furniture”), ammunition and volunteers went from Germany to Cadiz.

However, the military intelligence of Canaris made a serious mistake with the first steamship Usaramo. Docker workers in Hamburg, among whom communists were traditionally strong, became interested in the mysterious boxes and they deliberately “dropped” one of them, which contained aerial bombs. Herbert Wehrlin, a counterintelligence officer of the German Communist Party (Abwehrapparat) in Hamburg, reported this to his superiors in Paris. As a result, the flagship of the Republican fleet, the battleship Jaime I, was already waiting for Usaramo in the Strait of Gibraltar. The German ship did not respond to the order to stop and headed towards Cadiz at full speed. The battleship opened fire, but there were no competent artillery officers on it, and the shells did not cause any harm to the Usaramo. Still, it was a wake-up call for Canaris. If Jaime I had captured a German steamer, there would have been such a scandal in the world that Hitler might have stopped interfering in Spanish affairs.

On August 27, 1936, Canaris was sent to Italy to agree with the head of Italian military intelligence, Roatta, on forms of assistance from both states to the rebels. It was decided that Berlin and Rome would help in the same amount - and only Franco. The participation of Germans and Italians in hostilities was not envisaged unless the top leadership of the two countries decided otherwise. The meeting between Canaris and Roatta was the first step towards the formation of the Berlin-Rome military axis, born on the battlefields of Spain. During negotiations between Canaris and Italian Foreign Minister Ciano, the latter began to insist on the direct participation of German and Italian pilots in hostilities. Canaris did not object and, by telephone from Rome, persuaded the German Minister of War Blomberg to give the appropriate order. A few days later, the German fleet sent to Spanish waters was also given the green light to use weapons to protect German transport ships heading to Spain.

Soon, Lieutenant Colonel of the German General Staff Walter Warlimont (appointed coordinator of military assistance to Spain), together with Roatta, arrived at Franco’s headquarters via Morocco (it had been moved from Seville north to Caceres) and explained to the general the essence of the German-Italian agreements reached.

Having received the blessing of Germany and Italy directly from the lips of high-ranking representatives of the fascist states, Franco felt that the moment had finally come to declare his claims to power. On his initiative, a meeting of the military junta was scheduled for September 21, 1936, with the invitation of other prominent generals. Lobbying work with them was launched by Yagüe, who was specially recalled from the front (he was promoted to general) and longtime friend of Canaris Kindelan.

The meeting of the generals took place in a wooden house at the Salamanca airfield. The nominal head of the junta, Cabanellas, spoke out against the establishment of the post of sole commander-in-chief and refused to take part in the vote. The rest chose Franco as “Generalissimo,” although Queipo de Llano was already dissatisfied with this decision. True, he recognized that no one else (especially Mola) could win the war. It should be emphasized that the title “Generalissimo” in this case did not mean that Franco was given this title. They just decided to call him the chief among generals, that is, the first among equals.

Despite the formal support, Franco understood that his new position was still very fragile. The powers of the “Generalissimo” were not defined, and Queipo de Llano, as soon as he left the meeting, began to intrigue against the new leader. Therefore, on the same day, September 21, 1936, Franco decided to take Toledo and, on the wave of this success, finally consolidate his leadership.

The Republicans were also aware of the important symbolic significance of the Alcazar. In September, they began to bomb the fortress, although at that critical time every plane was worth its weight in gold, and air support was so lacking for the militia soldiers who were bleeding in battles with the African army. Franco used German Junkers to deliver food to the besieged in the Alcazar. On September 25, 1936, French-made Republican Devoitin fighters shot down one Yu-52 over Toledo. Three pilots left the bomber by parachute, but one was killed by machine gun fire from the fighter while still in the air. The second, having landed, managed to shoot three policemen before the same thing happened to him. The third pilot was most unlucky. He was given to women outraged by the barbaric bombing of Toledo, who literally tore the pilot into pieces.

On the same day, September 25, three columns of the African army under the command of the Carlist adherent General Varela moved towards Toledo. The very next day, fighting took place in the outskirts of the city. On September 27, foreign journalists were ordered to leave the rebel lines. It was clear that another terrible massacre was coming. And so it happened. The police did not put up strong resistance in Toledo, only the police held out for several hours at the city cemetery. The anarchists failed again, declaring that if the enemy artillery fire did not stop, they would refuse to fight.

However, the Moroccans and legionnaires took no prisoners. The streets were littered with corpses, and streams of blood flowed along the pavements. As always, the hospital was cut out, and grenades were thrown at the wounded Republicans. On September 28, Moscardo, emaciated and having grown a beard, leaving the gates of the fortress, reported to Varela: “There is no change in the Alcazar, my general.” Two days later, the “capture” of Alcazar was specially repeated for film and photojournalists (during this time Toledo was somehow cleared of corpses), but this time Moscardo’s report was accepted by Franco himself.

The legend about the “lions of the Alcazar” and their “courageous liberators” was replicated by the world's leading media. This move in the first propaganda war in modern European history was left to the rebels.

In front of Franco's palace in Caceres, cheering crowds gathered, chanting "Franco, Franco, Franco!" and raising their hands in a fascist salute. On the wave of “popular enthusiasm,” the general took a decisive step in the struggle for primacy in the rebel camp.

On September 28, a new and final meeting of the military junta took place in Salamanca. Franco became not only the commander-in-chief, but also the head of the government of Spain for the duration of the war. The Burgos junta was abolished, and in its place the so-called state-administrative junta was created, which was simply an apparatus under the new leader (it consisted of committees that practically repeated the structure of the regular government: committees of justice, finance, labor, industry, trade, etc.)

Franco was made precisely the head of the government, and not the state, since the monarchical majority among the generals considered the king to be the head of Spain. Franco himself has not yet clearly defined his preferences. On August 10, 1936, he declared that Spain remained republican, and after 5 days he approved the red and yellow monarchist flag as the official standard of his troops.

After his election as leader, Franco suddenly began to call himself not the head of government, but the head of state (for this, Queipo de Llano called him a “pig”). It immediately became clear to smart people that Franco did not need any monarch: as long as the general was alive, he would not give up supreme power into anyone’s hands.

Having become the leader, Franco immediately notified Hitler and Mussolini about this. To the first he expressed his admiration for the new Germany. In addition to these feelings, Franco tried to copy the cult of personality that had already developed around the “Führer” by that time. The general introduced the address “caudillo” in relation to himself, i.e. “leader”, and one of the first slogans of the newly-minted dictator was the slogan - “One fatherland, one state, one caudillo” (in Germany it sounded like “One people, one Reich, one Fuhrer"). Franco's authority was strengthened in every possible way by the Catholic Church, whose highest hierarchs were hostile to the republic from the moment of its birth in April 1931. On September 30, 1936, Bishop Pla y Deniel of Salamanca delivered the pastoral message “Two Cities.” “The earthly city (i.e., the republic), where hatred, anarchy and communism reign, was contrasted with the “heavenly city” (i.e., the rebel zone), where love, heroism and martyrdom reign. For the first time in the message, the Spanish Civil War was called a “crusade.” Franco was not a particularly religious person, but after he was elevated to the rank of leader of the “crusade,” he began to emphasize almost the entire ritual side of Catalystism and even had a personal confessor.

At this point, it is perhaps worth taking a closer look at the biography of the man who was destined to rule Spain from 1939 to 1975.

Francisco Franco Bahamonde was born on December 4, 1892 in the Galician city of El Ferrol. In Spain, as in other countries, residents of different historical provinces are endowed with certain special character traits that give them their own unique flavor. If Andalusians are considered straightforward (if not simple-minded), and Catalans are practical, then Galicians are considered cunning and resourceful. They say that when a Galician walks up the stairs, you cannot tell whether he is going up or down. In the case of Franco, popular rumor hit the mark. This man was cunning and cautious, and it was these two qualities that brought him to the pinnacle of power.

Franco's father was a man of very free (or, simply put, dissolute) morals. The mother, on the contrary, was a woman of strict rules, although gentle and kind in character and very pious. When the parents separated, the mother raised the children (there were five of them) alone. At first, Francisco wanted to become a sailor (for the residents of the largest Spanish naval base, El Ferrol, this was natural), but defeat in the war of 1898 led to a reduction in the fleet, and in 1907 he entered the Toledo Infantry School (it was officially called the Academy). There he was taught horse riding, shooting and fencing, just like 100 years ago. Equipment was not held in high esteem in the Spanish army. In 1910, after graduating from college (Franco was in 251st place out of 312 graduates in terms of academic performance), Franco was awarded the rank of lieutenant and sent to serve in his hometown. But a real military career could only be made in Morocco, where, after filing the appropriate petition, Franco arrived in February 1913.

The young officer demonstrated courage (albeit calculating) in battle and a year later received the rank of captain. He was not interested in women and devoted all his time to service. He was nominated for the rank of major, but the command considered the officer's career growth too rapid and canceled the nomination. And here Franco for the first time showed his hypertrophied ambition, filing a complaint in the name of the king (!) Persistence brought him major's shoulder straps in February 1917.

There were not enough major positions in Morocco, and Franco returned to Spain, where he began to command a battalion in the Asturian capital Oviedo. When labor unrest began there, the military governor, General Anido, called for the strikers to be killed as “wild animals.” Battalion commander Franco carried out this order without any remorse. Like most officers, he hated leftists, freemasons and pacifists.

In November 1918, Franco met Major Milian Astray, who was toying with the idea of ​​creating a Foreign Legion in Spain based on the French model. After these plans came to fruition on August 31, 1920, Franco took command of the first battalion ("bandera") of the legion and again arrived in Morocco in the fall. He was lucky: his unit did not take part in the offensive that ended in disaster at Annual in 1921. When the Moroccans began to be pushed back, Franco showed unprecedented cruelty. After one of the battles, he and his soldiers brought twelve severed heads as trophies.

But the officer was again passed over without being awarded the rank of colonel, and Franco left the legion, which had shaped in him such qualities as determination, cruelty and disregard for the rules of war. Thanks to the press, which relished the heroism of the young officer, Franco became widely known in Spain. The king awarded him the honorary title of chamberlain. Franco returned to Oviedo, but already in June 1923 he was promoted to colonel and made commander of the legion. Postponing his planned marriage, Franco returned to Morocco. After fighting a little, he finally married in October 1923 to a representative of an old but impoverished family, Maria del Carmen Polo, whom he met 6 years ago. The whole country was already watching the wedding of the hero of Morocco. And even then one of the Madrid magazines called him “caudillo”.

In 1923–1926, Franco again distinguished himself in operations in Morocco and was promoted to brigadier general, becoming the youngest general in Europe. Newspapers were already calling him a “national treasure” of Spain. And again his high rank forced him to leave Morocco. Franco was appointed commander of the army's most elite unit, the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division in Madrid. In September 1926, Franco gave birth to his first and only child, daughter Maria del Carmen. In the capital, the general makes many useful connections, primarily in political circles.

In 1927, King Alfonso XIII and the dictator of Spain Primo de Rivera decided that the army needed a higher educational institution that would train officers of all branches of the military (before that, military schools in Spain were sectoral). In 1928, the Military Academy in Zaragoza was established and Franco became its first and last head. We remember that Azaña abolished the academy during the military reform. Franco's further path until July 1936, already described on the pages of this book, was the path of a conspirator against the republic, but a calculating conspirator, ready to act only for sure. Many considered Franco to be mediocre, which was undoubtedly fueled by his unassuming appearance - a puffy face, an early visible belly, short legs (the Republicans teased the general as “Shorty Franco”). But the general was anything but gray. Yes, he was ready to go into the shadows, to temporarily retreat, but only in order from new positions to achieve the goal of his life - supreme power in Spain. Perhaps it was this fantastic determination that made Francisco Franco the leader of Spain on October 1, 1936 (on this day his new titles were officially announced), which, however, had yet to be conquered.

To do this, Francisco Franco had to defeat another Francisco, Largo Caballero, who, having finally realized the mortal danger threatening the republic, began to act feverishly.

On September 28 and 29, decrees were issued on the transfer of soldiers, sergeants and police officers to military service. Police officers had their military ranks (received, as a rule, by decision of the soldiers themselves) confirmed by a special certification commission. Anyone who did not want to become a regular army soldier could leave the ranks of the police. Thus, the army of the republic was created not on the basis of the old professional armed units, but on the basis of motley and poorly trained detachments of civilians. This made it difficult to form a real army, but in those conditions it was at least some step forward. The anarchists, naturally, ignored the government decrees, maintaining the previous “free” order.

Largo Caballero ordered the acceleration of the formation of 6 mixed regular brigades on the Central Front (i.e. around Madrid). The 1st Brigade was headed by the former commander of the Fifth Regiment, Enrique Lister. Many commanders and commissars of this regiment joined the other 5 brigades.

The order to create brigades, already very late, was brought to their commanders only on October 14. As mentioned above, it was prescribed that their formation should be completed by November 15, and even then the War Ministry considered this deadline unrealistic. But the situation at the front was dictated not by the orders of Largo Caballero, but by the slowed, but still steady advance of the rebels towards the capital.

On October 15, 1936, Largo Caballero issued a decree establishing the General Military Commissariat, which in fact only legalized the political commissars operating in the militia, especially those under communist control. Caballero resisted this urgent measure for a long time. But the successes of the cadres of the Fifth Regiment sometimes contrasted very sharply with the combat effectiveness of the socialist militia (besides, the latter was very inferior to the communist troops in numbers). Caballero was unpleasantly surprised when, back in July, units of the socialist militia that arrived in Sierra Guadarrama could not withstand the first combat contact with the enemy and fled in panic. The commander of the republican forces on this mountain front, Colonel Mangada, angrily said: “I asked you to send me fighters, not hares.” The courage of the communist battalions was largely explained by the serious political work carried out there. One of the career officers even said that all recruits should be made members of the Communist Party for three months, and this would more than replace the course of a young fighter.

And finally, the positions of military delegates were established (as commissars were officially called, although it was the name “commissar” that stuck, which was explained by the popularity of the USSR among the broad masses), whom the War Ministry appointed to all military units and military institutions. It was determined that the commissar should be the assistant and “right hand” of the commander, and his main concern was to explain the need for iron discipline, raise morale and fight the “intrigues of the enemy” in the ranks of the army. Thus, the commissar did not replace the commander, but was, in military language close to the Russian reader, a kind of political officer. The head of the General Military Commissariat (GMC) was the left socialist Alvarez del Vayo (who retained the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs), his deputies were representatives of all parties and trade unions of the Popular Front. Largo Caballero addressed all Popular Front organizations with a proposal to nominate candidates for the positions of military delegates. The Communists submitted the most candidates - 200 by November 3, 1936.

Caballero did his best to prevent the predominance of PCI members among the commissars and even mobilized 600 people from the UGT trade union, which he himself headed, for this work.

Initially, the GVK held daily meetings at which directives for the day were approved. But events developed faster, and often the GVK simply could not keep up with them. Soon the practice of commissars arriving from the front to report was also abolished. In order not to disturb them, representatives of the GVK themselves went to the front line. The adviser to the Main Military Commissariat was Pravda’s special correspondent in Spain, Mikhail Koltsov (“Miguel Martinez”).

After the surrender of Talavera, Largo Caballero no longer opposed the proposals of the communists and General Staff officers to build several fortified defense lines around Madrid. However, the prime minister did not show ebullient energy on this issue. And in general, terrible confusion reigned in the organization of the defense of the capital until the beginning of November. The Communist Party had to, as in the case of the Fifth Regiment, act by its own example. The Madrid party organization mobilized thousands of its members to build fortifications (“fortifs,” as the Madrid residents called them). Only after this did the government create a special commission of specialists for the systematic construction of fortified areas. But it was too late. Instead of the three planned lines of defense, only one sector was built (and even then not completely), covering the western outskirts of the capital. At that time, the rebels struck the main blow from the south, but it was the western line of fortifications that saved Madrid in November 1936.

It can be concluded that Largo Caballero had learned a lot by October 1936. Now he not only spoke the right words, but also made the right decisions. There was only one thing missing - strict implementation of these decisions.

Before we begin to describe the key battle of the first stage of the Spanish Civil War, we should dwell on the international situation of the republic in August-September 1936.

With Germany and Italy everything was clear. While formally maintaining diplomatic relations with the republic, Berlin and Rome actively, although it seemed to them secretly, supported the rebels. Madrid knew this, but at first they could not prove the interference with any facts. Soon they appeared. On August 9, 1936, one of the Junkers flying from Germany to the rebels mistakenly landed in Madrid. The Lufthansa representative managed to warn the pilots, and they took their plane into the air before the airfield officials arrived. However, the crew got lost again and landed near Badajoz, which was still in Republican hands. This time the plane was seized and flown back to Madrid, where the crew and a Lufthansa representative were interned. The German government protested against the “illegal detention of a civilian aircraft” and its crew, which supposedly was only supposed to evacuate citizens of the “Reich” from war-torn Spain.

The Spanish government initially refused to hand over the plane and crew to Berlin, but then Azaña’s adjutant, Colonel Luis Riano, was detained in Germany. After this, the Spaniards agreed to release the pilots if Germany declared neutrality in the Spanish conflict. Hitler never had any problems with assurances and declarations of this kind. “The Fuhrer” considered international treaties to be “scraps of paper.” The Junkers pilots returned home, but the Republicans refused to hand over the plane, sealed it and parked it at one of the Madrid airfields. Subsequently, it was accidentally destroyed when the airfield was bombed by German planes.

On August 30, an Italian plane was shot down near Talavera, and its pilot, Italian Air Force Captain Ermete Monico, was captured.

But if the republic did not have to doubt the position of Germany, Italy and Portugal due to the ideological kinship of the local fascist regimes with the rebels, then it was precisely due to the same ideological kinship that the Spanish Popular Front hoped for help from France.

The fact is that in Paris, since May 1936, the Popular Front was also in power, whose government was headed by the socialist Leon Blum. Spanish socialists and republicans traditionally oriented themselves towards their French comrades, among whom they had many friends. During the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, the center of Spanish Republican emigration was in Paris. Even the militant anticlericalism of the Spanish Republicans was largely inspired by the example of France.

The ideological kinship of the two governments was also reinforced by the trade agreement of 1935, which, at the insistence of the French, included a secret article obliging Spain to purchase French weapons and, above all, aviation equipment.

On July 20, the Spanish ambassador in Paris Cardenas, on behalf of his government, met with Blum and the Minister of Aviation Pierre Cote and asked for an urgent supply of weapons, mainly aircraft. To the ambassador’s surprise... the interlocutors agreed. Then the ambassador and military attache, who sympathized with the rebels, resigned and made public the essence of the negotiations, which only spurred Hitler and Mussolini.

Right-wing French newspapers created an incredible fuss. The British government (where the Conservatives were in power) at the Franco-English-Belgian summit in London on July 22–23 put pressure on the French, demanding that they refuse to supply weapons to the republic. British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin threatened Bloom that if France came into conflict with Germany over Spain, it would have to fight alone. This position of the English conservatives was explained simply: they hated the “red” Spanish Republic much more than the Nazis or Italian fascists.

Yielding to pressure, Blum backed down. After all, quite recently - in February 1936 - a matured Germany occupied the demilitarized Rhineland, thereby finally breaking the Treaty of Versailles. The war with Hitler was already clearly looming on the horizon, and alone, without England, the French did not hope to win it. And yet, socialist convictions prevented Blum from simply abandoning his Spanish like-minded people in trouble, and in this he was supported by the majority of the government. On July 26, 1936, Blum instructed the Minister of Aviation to supply aircraft to the Spaniards using fictitious contracts with third countries (for example, Mexico, Lithuania and the Arab state of Hejaz). However, first, on July 30, 1936, the French forced the Republicans to send part of Spain's gold reserves to France.

The aircraft were supplied through the private company Office General del Er, which had been selling transport and military aircraft to Spain since 1923. An active role in the entire operation was played by the pilot (who flew over the Atlantic) and member of the French parliament from the radical socialist party, Lucien Busutreau.

On August 1, 1936, news was received of the forced landing of Italian planes heading to Franco on the territory of Algeria and French Morocco. Blum convened a new cabinet meeting, at which it was decided to allow the sale of aircraft directly to Spain. On August 5, the first six Devoitin 372 fighters flew from France to Madrid (26 of them were sent in total). To these were added 20 bombers "Potez 54" (more correctly "Pote", but in Russian-language literature the name "Potez" has already been established), three modern fighters "Devoitin 510", four bombers "Bloche 200" and two "Bloche 210". It was these aircraft that formed the backbone of the Republican Air Force until November 1936.

It is generally accepted to consider French aircraft sold to the republic to be obsolete. However, this was not entirely true. In principle, French aircraft were not very inferior to the German Heinkel 51 and Junkers 52. Thus, the Devoitin 372 fighter was the newest representative of this class in the French Air Force. It reached speeds of up to 320 km per hour (“Heinkel 51” - 330 km per hour) and could rise to a height of 9000 meters (the same figure for “Heinkel” - 7700 meters).

The French Bloche bomber could carry 1,600 kg of bombs (“Junkers 52” - 1,500 kg) and had automatically retractable landing gear, which was a rarity for that time. The Blosch was let down by its low speed - 240 km per hour, although even here the Junkers did not particularly stand out (260 km per hour). The flight altitude (7000 meters) made the Bloch within reach of German and Italian fighters, but for the Yu-52 this figure was even lower - 5500 meters.

The Potez 543 bomber was much better than the Blosch, and therefore the Junkers. It reached speeds of up to 300 km per hour, carrying a 1000 kg bomb load. The flight altitude - 10,000 meters - was unsurpassed and the "potez" was equipped with oxygen masks for the pilots. The bomber defended itself with three machine guns, but did not have any armor protection.

But if the French planes were not inferior to their German opponents in class, then the young Republican pilots could not compete on equal terms with the Luftwaffe pilots and Italians (both Berlin and Rome sent the best to Spain). Therefore, the republic was in dire need of foreign aviators. In France, the famous writer and member of the International Anti-Fascist Committee Andre Malraux took up the matter. Through a network of recruiting centers, he recruited several dozen former civil airline pilots and participants in various regional conflicts in different countries (France, USA, Great Britain, Italy, Canada, Poland, etc.). There were also 6 Russian White emigrants in the squadron. Most were attracted by the crazy salary paid by the Spanish government by the standards of that time - 50,000 francs per month and 500,000 pesetas of insurance (paid to relatives in the event of the death of the pilot).

Malraux's international squadron was named "España" and was based near Madrid. A lot of time was spent on the redeployment of French aircraft from Catalonia to the capital. The situation with finishing and repairs was poor. Accidents on the ground and in the air often occurred. Therefore, España made full use of the standard Newport 52 fighters of the Republican Air Force of that time and the Breguet 19 light bombers.

The Breguet was developed in France as a light bomber and reconnaissance aircraft back in 1921 and was later produced in Spain under license. By the mid-1930s it was already obsolete. The plane's speed (240 km per hour) was clearly insufficient. Moreover, in reality, in combat the plane barely reached 120 km per hour. The Brega had 8 locks for hanging 10-kilogram bombs, but there weren’t any in the arsenals, and we had to make do with four- and five-kilogram bombs. The bomb-throwing mechanism itself was extremely primitive: in order to drop all eight bombs, the pilot had to simultaneously pull four cables. The aim was also bad. After the mutiny, the Republicans were left with about 60 Breguets, and the rebels - 45-50. Many aircraft on both sides failed due to technical reasons.

The main fighter of the Spanish Air Force in July 1936 was also the French Neuport 52 aircraft, produced under license. Developed in 1927, the wooden triplane theoretically reached speeds of up to 250 km per hour and was armed with one 7.62 mm machine gun. But in practice, the old Newports rarely reached more than 150–160 km per hour and could not catch up with even the slowest of the German aircraft, the Junkers 52. Machine guns often failed in combat and their rate of fire was low. 50 Newports went to the Republicans and 10 to the Rebels. Of course, this fighter could not compete on equal terms with Italian and German aircraft.

The commander-in-chief of the aviation of the Republic, Hidalgo de Cisneros, often complained about the indiscipline of Malraux’s “legionnaires”. The pilots lived in the capital's fashionable Florida Hotel, where they noisily discussed plans for military operations in the presence of women of easy virtue. When the alarm sounded, half-dressed pilots, accompanied by equally lightly dressed companions, jumped out of their hotel rooms.

Hidalgo de Cisneros several times proposed disbanding the squadron (especially since the Spanish pilots were confused by the exorbitantly high salaries of the “internationalists”), but the Republican government refrained from this step, fearing the loss of its prestige in the international arena. But in November 1936, when Soviet pilots were already setting the tone in the Spanish skies, Malraux’s squadron was disbanded, and its pilots were offered to transfer to Republican aviation on normal terms. The vast majority refused and left Spain.

In addition to the Malraux squadron, another international unit of the Republican Air Force was formed under the command of the Spaniard Captain Antonio Martin-Luna Lersundi. Soviet pilots appeared there for the first time, flying until the end of October on Potheses, Newports and Breguets.

However, in August-September 1936, Malraux's squadron was the most combat-ready unit of the Republican Air Force. However, the Germans and Italians were superior to the French in their tactics. Republican pilots operated in small groups (two or three bombers accompanied by the same number of fighters), while the Germans and Italians intercepted them in large groups (up to 12 fighters) and quickly achieved success in an unequal duel. In addition, all Italian-German aviation was concentrated near Madrid, and the Republicans scattered their already modest forces on all fronts. Finally, the rebels actively used aviation to support their ground troops, attacking the positions of the defending Republicans, and the Republicans bombed airfields and other objects behind enemy lines in the old fashioned way, which did not affect the speed of the African army’s advance towards Madrid.

On August 13, 1936, the Italian steamship Nereida brought to Melilla the first 12 Fiat CR 32 Chirri (cricket) fighters, which became the most massive fighter of the Spanish Civil War on the side of the rebels (in total in 1936–1939 in the Iberian 348 “crickets” arrived on the peninsula). The Fiat was a very maneuverable and nimble biplane. In 1934, this fighter set the speed record of that time - 370 km per hour. He also had the largest-caliber weapons of the Spanish war - two 12.7 mm "delirium" machine guns (there were practically no aircraft armed with cannons in Spain, except for the 14 newest German Heinkel 112 fighters), so often the first stage of the "cricket" became fatal for the enemy.

Based at the Seville Tablada airfield, the Fiats shot down the first Republican Newport 52 fighter plane on August 20. But on August 31, when three Crickets and three Devoitin 372 met, the outcome of the battle was completely different: two Italian aircraft were shot down and one damaged. The Republicans had no losses. By mid-October 1936, despite the replenishment, one of the two Fiat fighter squadrons had to be disbanded due to losses.

The Germans came to the aid of the Allies, having received the go-ahead from Berlin at the end of August to take part in hostilities (this applied to fighters; bomber pilots had fought before). German pilots were only forbidden to go deeper into the territory occupied by the Republicans. On August 25, Luftwaffe pilots shot down two Republican Breguet 19 bombers (these were the first victories of the young Nazi Air Force), and on August 26–30, four Potez, two Breguet, and one Newport bombers fell victim to the Germans. On August 30, the Republican “Devoitin” shot down the first “Heinkel 51”, the pilot of which managed to jump out with a parachute and make his way to his own.

Republican pilots bravely resisted an enemy outnumbering them. So on September 13, 1936, Lieutenant of the Republic Air Force Felix Urtubi, in his New Port, accompanied three Breguet bombers that flew out to bomb rebel positions in the Talavera area. Nine Fiats rose to intercept, and quickly shot down two slow-moving Breguets. Urtubi knocked out one Fiat, and, bleeding from his wound, rammed the second. This was the first ram of the Spanish Civil War. The brave pilot died in the hands of the Republican soldiers who arrived in time, and the Italian who jumped out with a parachute was captured.

But even such heroism could not reverse the numerical superiority of the Germans and Italians. Retreating to Madrid, Malraux's squadron alone lost 65 of its 72 aircraft. The Junkers became bolder and on August 23 launched their first attack on the Madrid Getafe air base, destroying several aircraft on the ground. And on August 27 and 28, rebel planes bombed peaceful areas of Madrid for the first time.

It is interesting that the first Junkers delivered by Hitler were transport aircraft, absolutely not suitable for bombing. Therefore, first, a gondola was suspended from below, in which a man sat, who received bombs (some of them weighed 50 kg) from other crew members through a hole specially made in the body of the vehicle and dropped them by eye. Moreover, in order to aim, the “bomb thrower” had to hang his legs over the side of the gondola.

However, the Germans quickly got the hang of it and first of all decided to get even with the Republican battleship Jaime 1, which almost sent them to the bottom. On August 13, 1936, a Yu-52 planted two bombs into the battleship and took the flagship of the Republican fleet out of action for several months.

Thus, the modest French assistance could not be compared with the scale of intervention in Spain by Hitler and Mussolini. But this help soon stopped.

On August 8, 1936, the French government suddenly decided to suspend supplies “in favor of the legitimate government of a friendly nation.” What happened? In the face of increasing British pressure, Blum decided that he would best help the republic if he cut off the channels of aid to the rebels from Germany, Italy and Portugal. On August 4, 1936, in agreement with Great Britain, France sent the governments of Germany, Italy, Portugal and England a draft agreement on non-interference in Spanish affairs. Since then, the term “non-intervention” has been a symbol of betrayal of the Spanish Republic, since the ban on the supply of weapons to both sides of the conflict (which is what the French proposed) equated the legitimate government of Spain with the putschists who rose up against it and are not recognized by the world community.

At a meeting on August 5, 1936, the French cabinet practically split (10 ministers were in favor of continuing arms supplies to Republican Spain, and 8 were against) and Blum wanted to resign. But Spanish Prime Minister Giral, fearing that a more right-wing government might come to power in France instead of Blum, persuaded him to stay, essentially agreeing to a policy of “non-intervention” (although Blum himself considered such a policy “meanness”).

On August 8, 1936, when the African army had already begun its assault on Madrid, France closed its southern border to the supply and transit of all military supplies to Spain.

Now the betrayal had to be formalized. An International Committee on Non-Interference in Spanish Affairs was created in London, which included ambassadors accredited to Great Britain from 27 states that agreed with the French proposal. Among them were Germany and Italy (later Portugal joined), who did not seriously intend to adhere to “non-intervention”.

The Soviet Union also joined the London committee. Moscow did not have any illusions about this body, but at that time the USSR sought to create, together with England and France, a collective security system in Europe aimed against Hitler and therefore did not want to quarrel with the Western powers. In addition, the Soviet Union did not want to hand over the committee to the fascist states, hoping through it to counteract the German-Italian intervention in Spain.

The first meeting of the committee opened in the Locarno State Hall of the British Foreign Office on September 9, 1936. The Spanish Republic was not invited to the committee. In general, this body was conceived by the British largely in order to prevent the question of German and Italian intervention in the Spanish conflict from being raised in the League of Nations. Like the modern UN, the League of Nations could impose sanctions against aggressive states and has just demonstrated this. After Italy's attack on Ethiopia in 1935, sanctions were imposed against Mussolini, which greatly affected Italy, which did not have its own raw materials (especially oil). But England in 1936 did not want this scenario to repeat itself. On the contrary, she courted Mussolini in every possible way, trying to prevent him from getting closer to Hitler. The “Führer” was a “bad” dictator in the eyes of the British, since he questioned the borders in Europe, while Mussolini still supported the status quo. Many English conservatives, including Winston Churchill, admired the Duce, whom the Italians themselves “loved” so much.

The very first meeting of the committee, chaired by the richest landowner and member of the Conservative Party, Lord Plymouth, boiled down to a skirmish over procedural issues. Lord was interested in such problems as whether gas masks could be considered weapons, and whether raising funds for the benefit of the republic could be considered “indirect intervention” in the war. In general, the problem of so-called “indirect intervention” was raised by fascist states who wanted to shift the focus to the USSR, where trade unions were launching a campaign to help Spain with clothing and food. Apart from this, there was nothing to blame the “Bolsheviks” for, but it was necessary to divert the discussion away from their own “help”, which in the form of bombs and shells was already destroying residential areas of Spanish cities. And in this shameful farce, the Germans and Italians could well count on the assistance of the “impartial” British.

In general, the work of the committee was clearly not going well. Then, for more thorough preparation of the meetings, they decided to create a permanent subcommittee consisting of France, Great Britain, the USSR, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Sweden and Czechoslovakia, with the first five states playing the main role in the discussions.

From September to December 1936, the standing subcommittee met 17 times, and the non-intervention committee itself 14. Volumes of stenographic protocols were produced, filled with diplomatic tricks and successful remarks from masters of sophisticated discussions. But all attempts by the Soviet Union to draw attention to the glaring facts of Italian, German and Portuguese intervention in the Spanish Civil War were torpedoed by the British, who often coordinated their tactics in advance with Berlin and Rome.

The Spanish Republic understood perfectly well that the London committee was just a fig leaf to cover up the German-Italian intervention in favor of Franco. Already on September 25, 1936, Spanish Foreign Minister Alvarez del Vayo demanded at a meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations to consider violations of the non-intervention regime and recognize the right of the legitimate government of the republic to purchase the weapons it needs. But, despite the support of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. M. Litvinov, the League of Nations recommended that Spain transfer all the facts confirming the participation of foreigners in the civil war... to the London Committee. The diplomatic trap prepared by the British slammed shut.

The United States of America did not subscribe to the policy of non-intervention. True, back in 1935, Congress passed a neutrality law that prohibited American companies from selling weapons to warring countries. But this law did not apply to intrastate conflicts. The government of the Spanish Republic tried to use this to its advantage and purchase aircraft from the United States. But when the aircraft manufacturing company Glenn L. Martin turned to the US government for clarification, it was told on August 10, 1936 that the sale of aircraft to Spain was not in the spirit of US policy.

However, the desire of American entrepreneurs to do profitable business was stronger, and in December 1936, businessman Robert Cuse entered into a contract to sell aircraft engines to the republic. To prevent this, Congress passed an embargo law at record speed on January 8, 1937, which directly prohibited the supply of weapons and other strategic materials to Spain. But by that time the aircraft engines had already been loaded onto the Spanish ship Mar Cantabrica, which was able to leave US territorial waters before the embargo law came into force (although an American Navy ship was on duty nearby, ready to detain the Republican steamer at the first order). But the motors, paid for in gold, were never destined to reach their destination. The Mar Cantabric's route was reported to the Francoists, who seized the ship off the Spanish coast and shot part of the crew.

In December 1936, Mexico, friendly to the Republicans, purchased aircraft from the United States with the aim of resell them to Spain, however, as a result of brutal pressure from Washington, it was forced to abandon the deal. The Republic lost a large amount of valuable currency (the planes had already been paid for). On the other hand, the air bombs sold by the United States to Germany were then transferred by Hitler to Franco and used by the rebels to bomb peaceful cities, including Barcelona (Roosevelt was forced to admit this in March 1938). For example, in January-April 1937, only one plant in the city of Carneys Point (New Jersey) loaded 60 thousand tons of aircraft bombs onto German ships.

Throughout the war, American companies supplied the rebel troops with fuel (which Germany and Italy, suffering from oil shortages, could not do themselves). In 1936, the Texaco company alone sold 344 thousand tons of gasoline to the rebels on credit, in 1937 - 420 thousand, in 1938 - 478 and in 1939 - 624 thousand tons. Without American gasoline, Franco would not have been able to win the first large-scale engine war in world history and fully exploit his advantage in aviation.

Finally, during the war, the rebels received 12 thousand trucks from the United States, including the famous Studebakers, while the Germans were only able to supply 1,800 units, and the Italians - 1,700. Moreover, American trucks were cheaper.

Franco once remarked that Roosevelt acted toward him “like a true caballero.” A very dubious praise.

The American ambassador to Spain, Bowers, being an honest and far-sighted man, repeatedly asked Roosevelt to provide assistance to the republic. Bowers argued that this was in the interests of the United States, since Spain was holding back Hitler and Mussolini, America's likely future opponents. But they didn’t want to listen to the ambassador. It was only after the defeat of the Republic, when Hitler occupied Czechoslovakia, that Roosevelt told Bowers: “We made a mistake. And you were always right...” But it was already too late. Thousands of American boys on the battlefields of World War II, stretching from hot Tunisia to the snowy Ardennes, will pay for this myopia with their lives.

But already during the Spanish Civil War, the overwhelming majority of American public opinion was on the side of the Republicans. Several hundred thousand dollars were collected in support of the republic (in today's dollars this would be tens of times more). A lot of food, medicine, clothing and cigarettes were sent to Spain. For comparison, it can be noted that the pro-Franco American Committee for Relief of Spain, having declared that it would collect 500 thousand dollars for the rebels, in fact was able to scrape together only 17,526.

Together with the Spanish people during the war years were the best American writers and journalists, such as Ernest Hemingway, Upton Sinclair, Joseph North and others. Inspired by personal impressions, Hemingway's novel For Whom the Bell Tolls became perhaps the best work of fiction about the Spanish Civil War.

In January 1937, an American medical detachment arrived in Spain. For two years, 117 doctors and nurses with their equipment (including vehicles) selflessly provided assistance to the soldiers of the People's Army. In March 1938, during heavy defensive battles of the Republicans on the Aragonese front, the head of the American hospital, Edward Barsky, was appointed head of the medical service of all international brigades.

In September 1936, the first American volunteer pilots appeared in Spain, and in total about 30 US citizens fought in the Republican Air Force. The Spanish government had strict requirements for volunteers: the total flight time had to be at least 2,500 hours, and the biography implied the absence of any dark spots. American Fred Tinker became one of the best aces of the republic's Air Force, having shot down eight enemy aircraft (including 5 Fiats and one Me-109) using Soviet I-15 and I-16 fighters. It is characteristic that after returning to the United States, Tinker had problems with the authorities, who filed claims against him regarding illegal travel to Spain. The pilot was refused admission into the US Air Force (which then had no pilots capable of even remotely matching Tinker), and the hunted ace committed suicide.

About 3,000 Americans fought in Spain in the ranks of the international brigades. The Abraham Lincoln and Washington battalions fought heroically in the battles of Jarama, Brunete, Zaragoza and Teruel. During the war, Lincoln's battalion had 13 commanders, seven of whom were killed and the rest were wounded. To the surprise of the visiting Americans, one of the battalion commanders was a black man, Oliver Lowe. In the then American army this was simply unthinkable.

More than 600 Lincoln veterans served in the U.S. military during World War II, many of whom were highly decorated.

But let's return to the alarming October 1936. Both the external and internal situation in Spain seemed to completely play into the hands of the rebels. Many thought that only a miracle would help defend Madrid. And this miracle happened.

In Europe, a large-scale armed conflict occurred in Spain. Then not only the indigenous inhabitants of the country were involved in the conflict, but also external forces in the form of such powerful states as the USSR, Germany, and Italy. The Spanish Civil War of 1936−1939 broke out based on conflicting views on the future of the country between the left-wing socialist (republican) government, supported by the Communist Party, and the rebel right-wing monarchist forces led by Generalissimo Francisco Franco.

In contact with

Preconditions for war

Until 1931 Spain was a monarchical state with a backward economy and a deep crisis, where there was inter-class hostility. The army had a special status in it. However, it did not develop in any way due to the conservatism of management structures.

In the spring of 1931, Spain was proclaimed a republic, and power in the country passed to the liberal socialist government, which immediately began to carry out reforms. However, stagnant Italy stalled them on all fronts. The established monarchical society was not ready for radical changes. As a result, all segments of the population were disappointed. Several times there were attempts to change government power.

The clergy were especially unhappy new government. Previously, under monarchism, it participated in all state processes, having enormous influence. With the establishment of the republic, the church was separated from the state, and power passed into the hands of professors and scientists.

In 1933, reforms were suspended. The far-right party, the Spanish Falange, won the elections. Riots and unrest began.

In 1936, leftist forces won the general elections in the country - Popular Front party, which included Republicans and Communists. They:

• resumed agrarian reform,
• amnestied political prisoners
• encouraged the demands of the strikers,
• reduced taxes.

Their opponents began to cooperate around the pro-fascist nationalist organization the Spanish Phalanx, which was already struggling to power. Her support came from the military, financiers, landowners, and the church.

A party opposed to the established government staged an uprising in 1936. It was supported by troops of the Spanish colony - Morocco . At that time they were commanded by General Franco, supported by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

Soon the rebels began to rule the Spanish colonies: the Canary Islands, Western Sahara, Equatorial Guinea.

Causes of the Spanish Civil War

The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War was influenced by several reasons:

Course of events during the war

Fascist rebellion and Spanish Civil War- simultaneous events. The revolution in Spain began in the summer of 1936. The mutiny of the fascist army led by Franco was supported by ground forces and the clergy. They are also supported by Italy and Germany, helping with the supply of weapons and military personnel. The Frankists immediately occupy most of the country and introduce their regime there.

State power created the Popular Front. He was helped by the USSR, the French and American governments, and international brigades.

From spring 1937 to autumn 1938. Military operations took place in the industrial areas of Northern Spain. The rebels managed to break through to the Mediterranean Sea and cut off Catalonia from the Republic. The Frankists had a clear advantage by the fall of 1938. As a result, they occupied the entire territory of the state and established an authoritarian fascist dictatorship there.

England and France officially recognized Franco's government with its fascist regime. The war turned out to be long with a huge number of casualties and destruction. These events were reflected in films about the revolution in Spain 1936−1939, shot by many directors. For example, the film “Hey, Carmela!”, directed by Carlos Saura.

The revolution in Spain ended with the establishment of fascism in the country for reasons:

The civil war, which engulfed the southern European state of Spain in 1936-1939, is commonly understood as an armed conflict provoked by social, economic and political contradictions. This chronological period is a phase of intensifying confrontations between supporters of the monarchy and democracy. The prerequisites began to take shape long before 1936, which was associated with the peculiarities of the development of Spain in the 20th century. The war officially ended in 1939, but the consequences were felt until the end of World War II, influencing the subsequent history of the country.

Participants in the Civil War

The struggle in Spain took place between several opposing forces, the main ones being:

• Representatives of left-wing social forces who stood at the head of the state and advocated a republican system;
• Communists supporting left-wing socialists;
• Right-wing forces that supported the monarchy and the ruling dynasty;
• The Spanish army with Francisco Franco, who sided with the monarchy;
• Franco and his supporters were supported by Germany and A. Hitler, Italy and B. Mussolini;
• The Republicans enjoyed support from the Soviet Union and the countries of the anti-fascist bloc; people from many countries joined the ranks of the rebels to fight against fascism.

Stages of conflict

Scientists identify several periods in the Spanish Civil War, which differed from each other in the intensification of hostilities. Thus, three stages can be distinguished:

• Summer 1936 - spring 1937: for the initial period of confrontation, they moved from the territory of the colonies to the mainland of Spain. During these months, Franco received serious support from the ground forces, declaring himself the leader of the rebels. He emphasized to his supporters and rebels that he had unlimited powers and capabilities. Therefore, he was able to suppress the uprising in a number of cities without any problems, in particular in Barcelona and Madrid. As a result, more than half of the territory of Spain passed into the hands of the Francoists, who were strongly supported by Germany and Italy. The Popular Front at this time began to receive various types of assistance from the United States, France, the USSR, and international brigades;
• The spring of 1937 until the autumn of 1938, which was distinguished by the intensification of military operations in the northern regions of the country. The population of the Basque country offered the greatest resistance, but German aviation was stronger. Franco requested air support from Germany, so the rebels and their positions were bombed en masse by German planes. At the same time, the Republicans managed to reach the Mediterranean coast in the spring of 1938, thanks to which Catalonia was cut off from the rest of Spain. But by the end of August – beginning of September there was a radical change in favor of Franco’s supporters. The Popular Front asked for help from Stalin and the Soviet Union, whose government sent weapons to the Republicans. But it was confiscated at the border and did not reach the rebels. So Franco managed to capture most of the country and take control of the population of Spain;
• From the autumn of 1938 to the spring of 1939, the Republican forces gradually began to lose popularity among the Spaniards, who no longer believed in their victory. This belief arose after the Franco regime strengthened its position in the country to the maximum. By 1939, the Francoists captured Catalonia, which allowed their leader to establish control over all of Spain by the beginning of April of that year and proclaim an authoritarian regime and dictatorship. Despite the fact that the USSR, Great Britain and France did not like this state of affairs very much, they had to come to terms with it. Therefore, the British and French governments recognized the fascist regime of Franco, which was to the advantage of Germany and its allies.

Prerequisites and causes of the war: chronology of events of the 1920s - mid-1930s.

• Spain found itself in a whirlpool of complex socio-economic processes caused by the First World War. First of all, this was manifested in the constant change of government offices. Such leapfrog in the leadership of Spain prevented the solution of the priority problems of the population and the country;
• In 1923, General Miguel Primo de Rivera overthrew the government, resulting in the establishment of a dictatorial regime. His reign lasted a long seven years and ended in the early 1930s;
• The global economic crisis, which caused a deterioration in the social situation of the Spaniards and a drop in living standards;
• The authorities began to lose authority, and were no longer able to control the population, negative trends in society;
• Democracy was restored (1931, after municipal elections were held) and the establishment of the power of leftist forces, which caused the abolition of the monarchy and the emigration of King Alfonso XIII. Spain was proclaimed a republic. But the apparent stabilization of the political situation did not contribute to the long stay of political forces alone in power. The majority of the population continued to live below the poverty line, so left and right political forces made the most of socio-economic issues as a platform for coming to power. Therefore, until 1936 there was a constant alternation of governments of the right and left, which resulted in the polarization of parties in Spain;
• During 1931-1933 Attempts were made to carry out a number of reforms in the country, which increased the degree of social tension and the activation of radical political forces. In particular, the government tried to pass new labor legislation, but it was never adopted due to protests and resistance from entrepreneurs. At the same time, the number of officers in the Spanish army was reduced by 40%, which turned the military personnel against the current government. The Catholic Church went into opposition to the authorities after the secularization of society was carried out. The agrarian reform, which provided for the transfer of land to small owners, also ended in failure. This caused opposition from the latifundists, so the reform of the agricultural sector failed. All innovations were stopped when right-wing forces won the elections in 1933. As a result, miners in the Asturias region rebelled;
• In 1936, general elections were held, in order to win which different political forces, forced to cooperate, united into the “Popular Front” coalition. Its members included moderate socialists, anarchists and communists. They were opposed by right-wing radicals - the Catholic Orientation Party and the Phalanx Party. They were supported by supporters of the Catholic Church, priests, monarchists, the army, and the highest command of the army. The activities of the Phalangists and other right-wing elements were prohibited from the first days of the Popular Front's stay in power. Supporters of the right-wing forces and the Phalanx party did not like this very much, which resulted in massive street clashes between the right and left blocs. The population began to fear that strikes and popular unrest would bring the Communist Party to power.

An open confrontation began after an officer who was a member of the Republican Party was killed on July 12. In response, a deputy from conservative political forces was shot dead. A few days later, the military in the Canaries and Morocco, which at that time were under Spanish rule, opposed the Republicans. By July 18, uprisings and revolts began in all military garrisons, which became the main driving force of the civil war and the Franco regime. In particular, he was supported by officers (almost 14 thousand), as well as ordinary soldiers (150 thousand people).

Main military actions 1936-1939

Cities such as:

• Cadiz, Cordoba, Seville (southern regions);
• Galicia;
• A huge part of Aragon and Castile;
• Northern part of Extremadura.

The authorities were concerned about this turn of events, since almost 70% of Spain's agricultural sector and 20% of industrial resources were concentrated in the occupied territories. The rebels were led in the first months of the war by José Sanjurjo, who had returned to Spain from Portuguese exile. But in 1936 he died tragically in a plane crash, and the putschists chose a new leader. He became Generalissimo Francisco Franco, who received the title of leader (in Spanish “caudillo”)

The uprising was suppressed in large cities, because The navy, army garrisons, and air force remained loyal to the republican government. The military advantage was precisely on the side of the Republicans, who regularly received weapons and shells from factories. All specialized enterprises in the military sector and industry remained under the control of the country's leadership.

Chronology of events of the civil war during 1936-1939. as follows:

• August 1936 - the rebels capture the city of Badajoz, which made it possible to connect different centers of confrontation by land and begin an offensive northward towards Madrid;
• By October 1936, Great Britain, the United States and France had declared non-intervention in the war and therefore banned all arms supplies to Spain. In response, Italy and Germany began to regularly send Franco weapons and provide other types of assistance. In particular, the Condor air legion and the volunteer infantry corps were sent to the Pyrenees. The Soviet Union could not maintain neutrality for long, so it began to support the Republicans. The government of the country received ammunition and weapons from Stalin, soldiers and officers were sent - tank crews, pilots, military advisers, volunteers who wanted to fight for Spain. The Communist International called for the formation of international brigades to help fight fascism. A total of seven such units were created, the first of which was sent to the country in October 1936. The support of the USSR and the International Brigades thwarted Franco's attack on Madrid;
• February 1937 Caudillo supporters burst into Malaga, beginning a rapid advance northward. Their path passed along the Harama River, which led to the capital from the south. The first attacks on Madrid took place in March, but the Italians who had helped Franco were defeated;
• The Frankists returned to the northern provinces, and only by the fall of 1937 did the rebels manage to gain a foothold here completely. At the same time, the conquest of the sea coast took place. Franco's army was able to break through to the sea near the city of Vinaris, as a result of which Catalonia was cut off from the rest of the country;
• March 1938 – January 1939 the conquest of Catalonia by the Francoists took place. The conquest of this region was difficult and complex, accompanied by atrocities, huge losses on both sides, and the death of civilians and soldiers. huge losses on both sides, deaths of civilians and soldiers. Franco established his capital in the city of Burgos, where at the end of February 1939 a dictatorial regime was proclaimed. After this, Franco's victories and successes were forced to be officially recognized by the British and French governments;
• During March 1939, Madrid, Cartagena and Valencia were conquered in succession;
• On April 1 of the same year, Franco spoke on the radio, addressing the Spaniards. In his speech, he emphasized that the civil war was over. A few hours later, the American government recognized the new Spanish state and the Franco regime.

Francisco Franco decided to make himself the ruler of the country for life, choosing as his successor the grandson of the former king Alfonso the Thirteenth, Prince Juan Carlos (Bourbon dynasty). The return of the rightful monarch to the throne was supposed to turn Spain back into a monarchy and a kingdom. This is what happened after the caudillo died on November 20, 1975. Juan Carlos was crowned and began to rule the country.

Results and consequences of the civil war

Among the main results of the bloody conflict it is worth noting:

• The hostilities provoked the death of 500 thousand people (according to other sources, the death toll reached one million people), most of whom were Republican supporters. One in five Spaniards died from the political repression carried out by Franco and the Republican government;
• More than 600 thousand residents of the country became refugees, and 34 thousand “children of war” were taken to different countries (for example, three thousand of them ended up in the Soviet Union). Children were taken mainly from the Basque Country, Cantabria and other regions of Spain;
• During the war, new types of weapons and weapons were tested, propaganda techniques and methods of manipulating society were developed, which became excellent preparation for the Second World War;
• A huge number of military personnel and volunteers from the USSR, Italy, Germany and other countries fought on the territory of the country;
• The war in Spain united international forces and communist parties around the world. About 60 thousand people passed through the international brigades;
• All settlements of the country, industry, production lay in ruins;
• A dictatorship of fascism was proclaimed in Spain, which provoked the beginning of brutal terror and repression. Therefore, prisons for opponents of Frank were opened in large numbers in the state, and a system of concentration camps was created. People were not only arrested on suspicion of opposing local authorities, but also executed without charges. 40 thousand Spaniards became victims of executions;
• The country's economy required serious reform and the injection of colossal funds, since money depleted not only Spain's budget, but also its gold and foreign exchange reserves.

Historians believe that the Republicans lost the war because... failed to eliminate contradictions between various political forces. For example, the Popular Front was constantly seething with confrontations between communists, socialists, Trotskyists, and anarchists. Other reasons for the defeat of the republican government include:

• The transition to Franco's side of the Catholic Church, which enjoyed enormous support from Spanish society;
• Military assistance to the rebels from Italy and Germany;
• Massive cases of desertion from the Republican army, which was not distinguished by discipline, the soldiers were poorly trained;
• There was no unified leadership between the fronts.

Thus, the civil war that engulfed Spain in 1936 and lasted for three years was a disaster for the common people. As a result of the overthrow of the republican government, Franco's dictatorship was established. In addition, the internal conflict in Spain showed a sharp polarization of forces in the international arena.

The rebellion against the Republican government began on the evening of July 17, 1936 in Spanish Morocco. Quite quickly, other Spanish colonies came under the control of the rebels: the Canary Islands, the Spanish Sahara (now Western Sahara), and Spanish Guinea.

Cloudless skies over all of Spain

On July 18, 1936, the Ceuta radio station transmitted to Spain a conditional phrase-signal for the beginning of a nationwide rebellion: “There is a cloudless sky over all of Spain.” And after 2 days, 35 of the 50 provinces of Spain were under the control of the rebels. Soon the war began. The Spanish nationalists (that is what the rebel forces called themselves) were supported in the struggle for power by the Nazis of Germany and the fascists of Italy. The Republican government received assistance from the Soviet Union, Mexico and France.

Republican militia fighter Marina Ginesta. (wikipedia.org)

Women's unit of the republican police. (wikipedia.org)

The surrendered Spanish rebel is led to a military trial. (wikipedia.org)

Street fighting. (wikipedia.org)

Barricades of dead horses, Barcelona. (wikipedia.org)

At a meeting of the generals, Francisco Franco, one of the youngest and most ambitious generals, who also distinguished himself in the war, was elected leader of the nationalists to lead the army. Franco's army freely passed through the territory of his native country, recapturing region after region from the Republicans.

The Republic has fallen

By 1939, the Republic in Spain had fallen - a dictatorial regime was established in the country, and unlike the dictatorships of allied countries like Germany or Italy, it lasted quite a long time. Franco became the country's dictator for life.

Civil War in Spain. (historicaldis.ru)

Boy. (photochronograph.ru)

Republican militia, 1936. (photochronograph.ru)

Street protests. (photochronograph.ru)

By the beginning of the war, 80% of the army was on the side of the rebels, the fight against the rebels was carried out by the People's Militia - army units that remained loyal to the government and formations created by the Popular Front parties, in which there was no military discipline, a strict command system, or individual leadership.

The leader of Nazi Germany, Adolf Hitler, helping the rebels with weapons and volunteers, viewed the Spanish War primarily as a testing ground for testing German weapons and training young German pilots. Benito Mussolini seriously considered the idea of ​​Spain joining the Kingdom of Italy.

Civil War in Spain. (lifeonphoto.com)

Since September 1936, the leadership of the USSR decided to provide military assistance to the Republicans. In mid-October, the first batches of I-15 fighters, ANT-40 bombers and T-26 tanks with Soviet crews arrived in Spain.

According to nationalists, one of the reasons for the uprising was to protect the Catholic Church from the persecution of atheist Republicans. Someone sarcastically remarked that it is a little strange to see Moroccan Muslims as defenders of the Christian faith.

In total, during the civil war in Spain, about 30 thousand foreigners (mostly citizens of France, Poland, Italy, Germany, and the USA) served in the ranks of the international brigades. Almost 5 thousand of them died or went missing.

One of the commanders of the Russian detachment of Franco’s army, former white general A.V. Fok, wrote: “Those of us who will fight for national Spain, against the Third International, and also, in other words, against the Bolsheviks, will thereby fulfill their duty before white Russia."

According to some reports, 74 former Russian officers fought in the ranks of the nationalists, 34 of them died.

On March 28, the nationalists entered Madrid without a fight. On April 1, General Franco's regime controlled all of Spain.

At the end of the war, more than 600 thousand people left Spain. During three years of civil war, the country lost about 450 thousand dead.

Spain did not take part in First World War 1914 - 1918, but, like many European countries, at its end it suffered from a leapfrog of weak government cabinets. In 1923 General Miguel Primo de Rivera overthrew another government and declared himself a dictator. He was in power for seven years, and his reign came to an end when the great economic crisis at the turn of the 1920s and 30s affected Spain. The sharp decline in the living standards of the Spaniards led to their final loss of authority among the people. Democracy was restored in Spain, and a left-wing government came to power. The monarchy was abolished, King Alfonso XIII of Spain emigrated, and the country became a republic. Left and right-wing cabinets began to take turns replacing each other, and the country experienced a polarization of political forces. At the general election in February 1936, the left - from moderate socialists to anarchists and communists - created a coalition: Popular Front. They managed to defeat the right bloc, which consisted of parties of Catholic orientation and radical Phalanx, founded by the son of Miguel Primo de Rivera, Jose Antonio. The advantage of the Popular Front in the elections was very small, but when it came to power, it almost immediately banned the Phalangists. This led to street clashes between left and right. The outbreak of strikes and land seizures alerted the right, fearing the establishment of a communist dictatorship.

The activities of the left caused particular concern among the Spanish military. It seemed to them that only an armed uprising could prevent the emergence of Red Spain. Therefore, on July 17, 1936, the Spanish units located in Morocco, under the command of General Francisco Franco seized power in the Spanish-owned part of this colony and declared non-recognition of the Madrid government. Within a week, the rebellious garrisons in Spain itself captured Oviedo, Seville, Zaragoza and a number of other cities. However, the uprisings in Madrid and Barcelona were quickly suppressed. As a result, the north-west of the country remained under nationalist control, with the exception of part of the coast near Bilbao and the area around Seville. The Republicans controlled the eastern half of Spain, including the capital, Madrid. The country found itself in the midst of a civil war, replete with horrors and atrocities.

To get his troops across Gibraltar, Franco turned to Hitler for help. Even before the end of July, Junkers 52 transport aircraft began arriving in Morocco, creating an air bridge. Mussolini, who ruled Italy, also sent his planes. Germany and Italy began to intensively supply the nationalists with weapons. The Moscow Comintern, for its part, decided to send volunteers to Spain and provide financial assistance to the Republicans.

Great Britain and France were very afraid that a new European war could break out from this internal conflict. They proclaimed a policy of non-intervention, although the then left-wing French government was extremely reluctant to do so. They made contact with Italy, Germany and Portugal and obtained a promise from them not to interfere in the conflict. An international Committee on Non-Intervention was founded and its first meeting took place in London in early September. However, Hitler and Mussolini, despite their assurances of non-participation, continued to supply the nationalists with weapons and people, and in ever increasing quantities. The Soviet Union then stated that it would implement non-intervention agreements only to the extent that Germany and Italy did.

The Spanish right opened two fronts. General Mola began to clear the north of the country of Republicans, and General Franco moved towards Madrid from the south. By the end of the year, with the help of Mola, he managed to surround Madrid on three sides. The Republican government left the besieged capital, moving to Valencia, and Italy officially recognized Franco's government.

The motives of the powers that provided active support to the warring parties in Spain were very different. Hitler saw the conflict as something of a testing ground where he could test new weapons, primarily tanks and airplanes. Germany sent no more than 15,000 people to Spain during the entire conflict, but its main contribution was associated with the participation of aviation - the Condor Legion. It was in the skies of Spain that the Messerschmitt-109 fighter and the Junkers-87 dive bomber received their baptism of fire. German bombers inflicted the greatest damage on the enemy. The world remembered their raids on Madrid, and most importantly, on a small town Guernica near Bilbao on April 26, 1937, when 6,000 civilians died.

Gradually, the position of the Republicans began to deteriorate. One of the reasons for the failures was internal squabbles in their camp - between socialists, pro-Stalinist communists, Trotskyists and anarcho-syndicalists. Although incendiary speeches Dolores Ibarruri, nicknamed Passionaria (“Fiery”) excited the defenders of Madrid, the contradictions between members of the coalition became so great that in May 1937, clashes took place in Barcelona between communists and anarchists.

The second reason for the Nationalists' advantage was that they were better armed than the Republicans. The Non-Intervention Committee decided to blockade the coast of Spain. Germany and Italy were assigned to control the eastern coast, Great Britain - the southern, and together with France - the northern. The blockade, however, had little effect. The nationalists managed to get everything they needed through friendly Portugal, and no one controlled the airspace. By November 1937, Franco had strengthened his position so much that he could organize the blockade himself. Therefore, by the end of 1938, the Republicans held only one small enclave in the extreme northeast and a second on the east coast opposite Madrid. By that time, foreign volunteers, including members of the International Brigade, were forced to leave Spain according to the plan put forward by the Committee on Non-Intervention. More and more states recognized the Franco regime, and finally in February 1939 the republican government emigrated through the Pyrenees to France. At the end of March, Madrid also fell, and a month later Franco announced a cessation of hostilities.