The defeat of the Russian army near Narva. The beginning of the Northern War. Defeat at Narva. Strengthening the Swedish army

11/19/1700 (2.12). - Battle of Narva; defeat of Russian troops from the Swedish army of King Charles XII

Russia took part in the restoration of access to the Baltic Sea, lost in 1617, by seizing the original Russian lands from Ivangorod to Lake Ladoga. Sweden was the dominant power in northern Europe at the time and began the war with a series of victories over the Saxons and Danes. Russia was part of the anti-Swedish coalition and was obliged to begin military action. He decided first of all to recapture Narva and Ivangorod from the Swedes.

The first major battle between the Russians and the Swedes was the Battle of Narva on November 19, 1700. In September, a 35,000-strong Russian army under the command of the Tsar besieged Narva, a strong Swedish fortress on the shores of the Gulf of Finland. At first, the fortress had a garrison of about 2 thousand people, and it could have been taken, but in November a Swedish army of 10 thousand, led by King Charles XII, was sent to help them. The Swedes landed in the area of ​​Revel and Pernov (Pärnu). But even after this, the Russians outnumbered the Swedes almost three times. However, the Russian units were only recently formed and were not sufficiently prepared for battle. The besiegers were stretched out in a thin line almost 7 km long without reserves.

Russian intelligence sent to meet the Swedes underestimated the number of the enemy. Not expecting an imminent Swedish offensive, Peter on November 18 left the Duke of Croix at the head of the Russian troops and left for Novgorod to speed up the delivery of reinforcements. Early the next morning, the Swedish army, under the cover of a snowstorm and fog, unexpectedly attacked Russian positions. Karl created two strike groups, one of which managed to break through in the center. The absence of the Tsar weakened discipline. Many foreign officers of the Russian army, led by Commander de Croix, went over to the side of the Swedes. Treason in command and poor training led to panic in Russian units. They began a disorderly retreat to their right flank, where there was a bridge over the Narva River. Under the weight of the human masses, the bridge collapsed. On the left flank, the cavalry under the command of Governor Sheremetev, seeing the flight of other units, succumbed to general panic and rushed to swim across the river.

Nevertheless, there were persistent Russian units, thanks to which the Battle of Narva did not turn into a massacre. At a critical moment, when it seemed that everything was lost, the guards regiments - Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky - entered the battle for the bridge. They repelled the onslaught of the Swedes and stopped the panic. Gradually, the remnants of the defeated units joined the Semyonovtsy and Preobrazhentsy. The battle at the bridge lasted several hours. Charles XII himself led troops in an attack against the Russian guards, but to no avail. On the Russian left flank, A.A.’s division also steadfastly fought back. Weide. As a result of the courageous resistance of these units, the Russians held out until night, and in the darkness the battle died down.

Negotiations began. The Russian army lost the battle, was in a difficult situation, but was not defeated. Karl, who personally experienced the fortitude of the Russian guard, apparently was not entirely confident in the success of the new battle and agreed to a truce. The parties entered into an agreement under which Russian troops received the right of free passage home. However, the Swedes violated the agreement: after the Guarean regiments and the division of A.I. Golovin crossed Narva, the Swedes disarmed the divisions of Weide and I. Yu. Trubetskoy, capturing the officers. The Russians lost up to 8 thousand people in the Battle of Narva, including almost the entire senior officer corps. Swedes' losses amounted to about 3 thousand people.

After Narva, Charles XII did not begin a winter campaign against Russia. He considered that the Russians were already practically defeated. The Swedish army opposed the Polish king Augustus II, in whom Charles XII saw a more dangerous opponent. Strategically, Charles XII acted quite reasonably. However, he did not take into account one thing - the enormous energy of Peter I. The defeat at Narva did not discourage him, but, on the contrary, prompted him to take revenge. “When we received this misfortune,” he wrote, “then captivity drove away laziness, and forced us to hard work and art day and night.”

The "Grand Embassy" showed the impossibility of creating an anti-Turkish coalition and the struggle for the Black Sea. But in the course of it it became clear that there was a possibility of creating an anti-Swedish coalition and fighting for access to the Baltic Sea. In 1699, treaties of alliance were concluded with Denmark and Saxony (the Saxon Elector Augustus II was also the Polish king). Having concluded a 30-year truce with Turkey, Russia entered the Northern War in August 1700.

In October 1700, a 40,000-strong Russian army besieged the Narva fortress. The siege dragged on due to the inept actions of the artillerymen and the lack of cannonballs and gunpowder. Meanwhile, the Swedish king Charles XII with a sudden attack took Denmark out of the fight, and then landed in Estland. On November 18 he approached Narva. In the battle that took place, the Russian army was defeated, despite significant numerical superiority: 35-40 thousand Russians against 12 thousand Swedes. The reasons for the defeat were the unfortunate location of the Russian troops, their poor training and the betrayal of most of the foreign command staff led by Duke von Krui. Only the Guards (formerly amusing) regiments offered real resistance. The Swedes captured all Russian artillery and captured most of the officers.

Rebuilding the Army

Having won a victory near Narva, the Swedes, however, moved not to Russia, but to Poland. This decision of Charles XII gave Peter I time to restore the army. Peter subsequently wrote about Narva: “When we received this misfortune (or better said, great happiness), then captivity drove away laziness and forced us to work hard day and night.”

A new recruitment into the army was announced. By the spring of 1701, 10 dragoon regiments of 1 thousand people each were formed. Gradually, the transition to recruiting recruits took place - 1 person from 50 - 200 peasant households. Since 1705, recruitment became regular. The Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments turned into unique officer schools. The Navigation School was organized for the training of naval officers.

In the Urals, the construction of metallurgical plants began in the shortest possible time, and the casting of cast iron cannons and cannonballs began. Some of the bells taken from churches were cast onto copper cannons.



First victories in the Baltics. Founding of St. Petersburg

Soon after Narva, Peter sent boyar B.P. Sheremetev with cavalry detachments to the Baltic states. Sheremetev actually waged a guerrilla war, attacking Swedish patrols and convoys. He won his first serious victory in 1701 at the Erestfer manor over the detachment of General Schlippenbach, for which he was awarded the rank of field marshal.

In 1702, Sheremetev's troops took the Marienburg fortress in Estland. In the autumn of the same year, the Swedish fortress of Noteburg fell at the source of the Neva (ancient Russian Oreshek). Peter gave the fortress a new name - Shlisselburg (Key City), believing that it opens the way to the conquest of the entire territory along the banks of the Neva - Ingria. In 1703, the Russians took the Nyenschanz fortress at the confluence of the Okhta and the Neva.

In the same year, St. Petersburg was founded on Hare Island on the Neva. After 10 years, Peter actually moved the capital of Russia here. To cover the city from the sea, the Kronshlot fortress was founded on the island. Kotlin.

The construction of the fleet began: in 1703, the Olonets shipyard began work, and in 1705, the Admiralty shipyard in St. Petersburg.

In 1704, Russian troops captured the important Swedish fortresses of Dorpat and Narva. Access to the sea was secured.

Collapse of the Northern Alliance

Having invaded Poland, Charles XII was never able to force a general battle on Augustus II, since he stubbornly avoided confrontation. However, Charles XII deprived him of the throne and proclaimed Stanislav Leszczynski, his puppet, king of Poland.

The Russian army, sent by Peter to help Augustus, concentrated in August 1705 in Grodno. However, in March 1706, having received news of the defeat of the Saxon army and fearing to be cut off from their borders, the Russians left Grodno and retreated to Lvov.

In the fall of 1706, Augustus II signed the Peace of Altranstadt with Charles XII, renounced the Polish throne, recognized Stanislav Leszczynski as the Polish king and broke all allied obligations directed against Sweden. The Northern Alliance finally collapsed. The Swedish invasion of Russia was becoming inevitable.

Swedish invasion

The Swedish army invaded Russia in the summer of 1708, with 33 thousand people. The Russians, despite their numerical superiority, adopted the tactic of “languishing” the enemy: avoiding a general battle, destroying food supplies on the way of the Swedes, harassing them with attacks from mobile Cossack forces.

Charles XII did not dare to immediately march on Moscow. Instead, he moved to Ukraine, hoping to replenish food supplies and link up with the Cossack troops of Hetman Mazepa, who secretly promised him help. True, these hopes were not justified. Ivan Mazepa managed to bring only 10 thousand Cossacks to Charles, and the rich reserves of the hetman's headquarters were burned by the tsarist troops.

On September 28, 1708, the Russians won an important victory: they defeated the XII Corps of General Levengaupt, which was coming to the aid of Charles, near the village of Lesnoy. The Swedes also lost their entire huge convoy. The royal army was left without provisions and almost without ammunition. Peter called the battle of Lesnaya “the mother of the Poltava battle.”

Battle of Poltava

In the spring of 1709, the Swedes besieged the Poltava fortress. After seven weeks of siege, the king was told that the garrison would not be able to hold out for long. Peter decided to give a general battle. It took place on June 27, 1709.

The Poltava position was advantageous for defense. The Russian left flank was covered by a forest, the right by a ravine. The Swedes could attack only through the field, which the Russians blocked with redoubts placed in a T-shape.

Charles XII decided to attack the Russian position head-on. Experiencing a shortage of gunpowder, he relied on a bayonet attack. While attacking, the Swedes suffered losses from Russian artillery fire. Having broken through the redoubts, they met the main Russian forces, lined up in two lines. They managed to break through the first line. Hand-to-hand combat ensued. After two hours, the tired and exhausted Swedes could not stand it and retreated. Soon the retreat turned into flight. On June 30, the Russian cavalry under the command of M.M. Golitsyna overtook the fleeing Swedes near the village of Perevolochny. 16 thousand Swedes surrendered to a 9 thousand-strong Russian detachment. Charles XII with a few close associates and Mazepa fled to Turkey.

The Battle of Poltava dramatically changed the course of the war. In October 1709, the Northern Alliance was restored. In 1710, Russian troops captured Riga and Revel. The initiative in the Northern War finally passed to Russia.

Prut campaign

Charles XII, once in Turkey, convinced the Sultan that Russian successes threatened Turkish power on the shores of the Black Sea. In 1710, Türkiye declared war on Russia. In an effort to get ahead of the enemy, Peter I moved the army into Turkish possessions - to the banks of the Prut. However, the Prut campaign was unsuccessful. The 140,000-strong Turkish army surrounded the 38,000-strong Russian army. The situation seemed hopeless. Peter was ready to return to the Swedes all the lands taken from them, except Ingria, and give them Pskov. However, the Turks were afraid to attack the regular Russian army. This made it possible to conclude peace on tolerable terms. The Russians only pledged to return Azov, destroy Taganrog and allow Charles XII to return to his homeland. This meant the failure of plans to consolidate in the Azov region, but made it possible to continue the fight with Sweden from the positions already achieved.

Gangut battle

In 1713, Russian troops invaded Finland, which belonged to Sweden. In 1714, the Russian galley fleet, moving along the coast, met a Swedish squadron at Cape Gangut. Knowing that the Gangut Peninsula has a narrow isthmus, the Russians decided to drag the galleys, bypassing the Swedes. However, they found out about this and sent part of the squadron to the place where the galleys were launched. The remaining ships remained at the cape. Meanwhile, the sea was completely calm. The Russians rowed around the stationary Swedish ships. Part of the Swedish squadron that entered the narrow fiord was blocked and boarded by Russian galleys. Russia won the first major naval victory in its history. Under Gangut a new naval power was born.

Beginning of the Northern War

In $1697-1698$. Peter I held Grand Embassy across European countries. As a result, a coalition was created against Sweden, which was then the strongest northern country. The coalition was named Northern Union. Russia intended to gain access to the Baltic through war and return the Baltic lands, and also hoped to gain Swedish Ingria. The largest fortress in this region was Narva. According to the agreement in the Northern Alliance, Russia declared war on Sweden immediately after the conclusion of a truce with Turkey at the end of August $1700. In the outbreak of the Northern War, Ingermanland became the main target.

Preparations for the Battle of Narva

The Russian army had sufficient strength, but the reforms begun by Peter I required continuation.

Example 1

So, in particular, the army lacked discipline and the necessary military knowledge, as well as support.

However, young Peter I believed that the army was ready for war; he planned to bring $40,000 infantry, $10,000 noble cavalry and $10,000 Cossacks to Narva. The Swedish army was better organized.

The march to Narva of the Russian troops was quite long, because... The movement was slowed down by the convoy with equipment, ammunition, etc., as well as by rains. The advanced regiments approached the fortress $2$ weeks after the start of the war - by September $10, $1700. And the latter did not have time for the battle at all: for example, $10$ thousand Cossacks were in Pskov, the Pskov-Pechora Monastery and Gdov, and $10$ thousand soldiers led Repnin A.I., were still in Novgorod.

Siege

The garrison of Narva was about $2,000 people. Narva was located on the western bank of the Narva (Narova) River, and Ivangorod was on the eastern bank. There was a bridge between these fortresses, which made a siege very difficult. The siege was led personally by Peter I. In the second half of October, Russian artillery began shelling Narva, but the guns only lasted for a couple of weeks and did not achieve any effect at all (the guns were small-caliber). Thus, the shelling failed.

In this situation, the Northern Alliance showed its inconsistency: Denmark capitulated, the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth August II retreated from Riga. But Charles XII, King of Sweden, sent additional forces to Ingria and arrived himself.

At the beginning of November, a Russian detachment Sheremetev was defeated at the Purtz fortress (in a marshy area on the coast of the Gulf of Finland between Narva and Revel, i.e. Tallinn). Sheremetev managed to capture two officers who, following instructions, greatly exaggerated the real information about the number of Swedish troops.

Main battle

Fearing the possible actions of Augustus II, as well as the Cossacks who were in Pskov and Repnin’s soldiers in Novgorod, Charles II did not equalize the number of troops with the Russians. Soon the Swedes defeated Sheremetev at Pihayogi, because. he dispersed the detachment to search for forage.

$10$ November captain of the Preobrazhensky regiment Jacob Gummert went over to the side of the Swedes. This greatly undermined the attitude towards foreign officers.

Having learned from Sheremetev about the approach of the Swedes, Peter I left for Novgorod. The king transferred command to the duke de Croix. As a result, the general battle of November 30 took place without the king. The Swedes attacked unexpectedly thanks to heavy snowfall and a headwind for the Russians. In the Russian army, panic began from surprise: someone tried to escape, many drowned, some beat foreign Germans, blaming them. De Croix surrendered to the Swedes. But the $3$ regiment of the new formation fought desperately. By nightfall the unrest intensified. The next morning the prince A. Imeretinsky, A. Golovin, Prince Y. Dolgorukov and I. Buturlin Negotiations for surrender began.

Note 1

The Russian army left Narva without banners and weapons.

Results

It was a heavy defeat for the Russian army: they lost many soldiers, including command staff, artillery, and the reputation of the army collapsed. But Charles XII recklessly decided that he had defeated Peter I for a long time, while the Russian Tsar began to actively carry out military reform, now seeking to rely on his compatriots in leadership positions.

Peter I's attempts to make peace with Charles XII were unsuccessful, so Russia became closer to Augustus II.

The capture of Narva by Peter took place in $1704 in the second battle.

[…] Hello for many years! And please remember about me. God gave this scripture in the service of the great sovereign near Rugodiv, stay healthy, and henceforth I trust in the all-generous God. And we have been standing near Rugodiv for the fourth week and are dying a cold and hungry death: bread has become expensive, we buy penny bread for two altyns. And you, Father Stepan Prokofievich, will be able to visit it yourself, and you will bring me some kind of fur coat, a shirt and trousers, and good clothes or booties, soon, without delay. And if it’s impossible on your own, and you come with someone, you really need it, and even a hryvnia’s worth of bread, and I’ll pay all the money here. Yes, write to me about your health, so that I may rejoice over your health in Christ. Therefore, I write to you little, but hit you with my forehead a lot.

SIEGE OF NARVA

[…] There was news that Narva was poorly fortified and there were few troops in it. On September 23, Peter stood near Narva and immediately began preparations for the siege together with the Saxon engineer general Gallart, who was sent by King Augustus. Difficulties emerged immediately: much less military supplies had been prepared than was needed, according to Gallart. Another problem: the troops, due to the bad autumn road and lack of supplies, moved very slowly, and valuable time was running out. In total, the troops gathered near Narva ranged from 35 to 40,000, exhausted by the difficult campaign and lack of food supplies: the guns turned out to be unusable. Finally, on October 20, fire opened on the city from all Russian batteries; They hoped that the city, with its small means, would not last long, when suddenly news came that Charles XII had landed in Pernau with what was said to be a large army. After a council of war, the Russians fortified their camp. The shooting at the city continued until finally a shortage of cannonballs, bombs and gunpowder forced a ceasefire. It was necessary to wait for their delivery.

Soloviev S.M. History of Russia from ancient times. M., 1962. Book. 14. Ch. 4. http://magister.msk.ru/library/history/solov/solv14p4.htm

DISPOSITION NEAR NARVA

It was a strong fortress at that time. It was located on the left bank of the river. Narova, 12 km from its mouth. On the right bank of the river there was a bridgehead - the ancient Ivangorod castle, built at the beginning of the 17th century. The area around Narva was swampy. After the autumn rains it became impassable for troops. The fortress had solid fortifications and walls that required strong artillery to break through gaps. Its garrison, led by Colonel Horn, numbered 2 thousand people.

Russian troops numbering 34 thousand people were camped on the left bank of the Narova in one line, which in the form of a semicircle covered Narva and adjoined the flanks to the river. The front of the camp, about 7 km long, faced not the fortress, but to the west and consisted of fortifications in the form of an embankment with a moat (aproshi), behind which the troops were located. To ensure siege operations and conduct reconnaissance, irregular cavalry under the command of B.P. Sheremetev was advanced to the Revel road.

Rostunov I. I., Avdeev V. A., Osipova M. N., Sokolov Yu. F. History of the Northern War 1700-1721 http://militera.lib.ru/h/rostunov_ii2/02.html

BOMBING THE FORTRESS

On November 1, following the attack at Ivan-Gorod, a new line was drawn, and during the attack at Shlos, 2 people were killed and 5 were wounded. Today they fired heavily at the city from cannons and also threw bombs, which started a small fire in the city, but was soon extinguished. Our guns had more defense against the city; Moreover, it was noticed that some of the guns exploded, even though several charges were not discharged.

2. G. Allart ordered to make one lodgement on the false attack on the right side; Then they fired heavily, where 3 were killed and 20 people were wounded. Then one line on the left side of the batteries for 16 guns was drawn for 70 steps. Likewise, during an attack, one line was drawn for 100 steps; with 2 killed and 6 wounded.

3. The aforementioned cradle was repaired, and the line and batteries were added 60 steps; Also, during the shloss attack, they retreated 36 steps. 5 people were injured and no one was killed. Also, strong cannon fire and bomb throwing was restrained, as the regimental cannons and bombs became scarce.

"THE GREATEST VICTORY" OF KARL

The quick victory over Denmark won by the eighteen-year-old Charles XII freed his hands for immediate action against the Russians who had besieged Narva, and with extraordinary speed he transported his army by sea to Pernov (Pernau) and from there moved towards Narva. At this time, the entire ruling noble class in Sweden supported the king with particular enthusiasm. On November 18, 1700, Charles attacked the Russian army besieging Narva and inflicted a heavy defeat on it. The Russian command was in the hands of a Frenchman in the Austrian service, Duke de Croy, who happened to turn up, although he received excellent recommendations (Russian sources call him de Croy or von Croy). This adventurer, invited to Russian service in 1700, brought with him eighty officers from Vienna. Half of this “officer” recruited by De Croix, I note by the way, surrendered near Narva along with their commander, who later, already in Swedish captivity, begged Peter for efimka for a whole year, for “42 people were forced to eat with the great food.” and feed these "poor captives".

The officers, hastily recruited and untrained, commanded the majority of recruits taken straight from the plow, who had never been in battle. This de Croix turned out to be below all criticism as a strategist. He stretched out his army in a long thin strip and was content with that. During the battle, almost no orders came from him at all, and if he gave any, they were understood only by Germans who were hastily taken as officers, but not by Russian officers and certainly not by soldiers. The Russians' weapons were very bad; the guns exploded and killed the servants. Finally, the delivery of provisions was so organized that the soldiers of some regiments did not eat for a day just before Charles attacked them. The soldiers considered their unknown commander-in-chief de Croix and the German officers entirely to be traitors who would hand them over to “their” king. Under such conditions, the strange thing is not that the Russians suffered losses, but that the battle lasted so long: from morning until dark at night. This is explained by the courage and stamina of several detachments and, above all, two guards regiments (Semyonovsky and Preobrazhensky), and in fact, Charles XII learned that the Swedes had won only when the Russians offered the following conditions: they receive free access with weapons, across the river, on all four sides. In captivity, despite the conditions, insidiously violated, Charles detained generals, colonels and officers of noble birth.

This “greatest victory” of Charles was trumpeted for years by the Swedes, Germans, and the French and English who sympathized with him. If we compare Narva with Poltava, where the Swedes rushed in all directions, in a stampede after just two hours of a general battle, and where (counting the capitulation at Perevolochnaya) the entire army that still survived the battle surrendered without any conditions, then it may seem strange that the Narva the defeat of the Russians was considered such an unheard of military feat by the Swedish king.

The army moved to Narva, numbering about 35 thousand, consisted mostly of recruits under the command of bad officers and foreign generals who did not enjoy trust. There were no strategic paths; they could not bring enough shells or food along the muddy autumn roads. They began to shell the fortress, but the cannons turned out to be unusable, and they soon stopped firing due to lack of gunpowder. The besiegers, according to an eyewitness, walked around the fortress like cats around hot porridge; no measures were taken against the offensive of Charles XII. In a fierce November blizzard, the king crept up to the Russian camp, and the Swedish 8,000-strong brigade destroyed the Russian corps. However, victory was every minute within a hair's breadth of disaster. The king was most afraid that Sheremetev's noble and Cossack cavalry would strike him in the rear; but she, according to Karl, was so kind that she rushed to run and swim across the Narova River, drowning a thousand horses. The winner was so afraid of his vanquished that during the night he hastened to build a new bridge in place of the one that had collapsed under the pressure of the fugitives, in order to help them quickly get to their side of the river. Peter left the camp on the eve of the battle so as not to embarrass the commander-in-chief, a foreigner, and he really was not embarrassed, he was the first to surrender himself into captivity and carried along other foreign commanders, frightened by the bitterness of his Russian command.

Klyuchevsky V.O. Russian history. Full course of lectures. M., 2004. http://magister.msk.ru/library/history/kluchev/kllec61.htm

CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT

Narva was besieged by a strong Russian army (35–40 thousand people). But Peter began the campaign in the fall, the weather interfered with military operations, and the lack of roads left the army without bread and fodder. The shortcomings of the military organization made themselves felt: although the troops stationed near Narva were regular, of a new system, Peter himself admitted that they were “not trained,” that is, bad. In addition, the majority of the officers were foreigners who were not loved by the soldiers, who did not know Russian well, and there was no one authority over the entire army. Peter entrusted the command to the Russian general Golovin and the Frenchman recommended by the Germans, the Duke of Croix. And Peter himself did not refuse orders for military actions. There was thus a plurality of commands. Under all these conditions, among the Russian troops there naturally arose a fear of a clash with Charles’s army, covered with the laurels of recent victories in Denmark.

And after the defeat of Denmark, Charles went against Peter. The Russians near Narva learned about the approach of the Swedes already when Karl was only 20–25 versts away. Peter immediately left the army, leaving de Croix's command. Knowing the courage and personal bravery of Peter, we cannot explain his departure by cowardice; it would be more accurate to think that Peter considered the case at Narva lost and left to prepare the state for defense against the Swedish invasion. On November 20, 1700, Charles actually defeated the Russian army, took away the artillery and captured the generals. Peter hurried to strengthen Novgorod and Pskov, instructed Repnin to collect the remnants of the returning defeated army and waited for Charles on the borders of the Moscow state.

But Karl's mistake saved Peter from further troubles. Karl did not take advantage of his victory and did not march on Moscow. Some of the votes in his military council were in favor of a campaign in Russia, but Charles looked myopically at Peter’s forces, considered him a weak enemy - and went against Augustus. Peter could breathe more freely. But the situation was still difficult: the army was upset, there was no artillery, the defeat had a bad effect on the mood within the state and destroyed the prestige of Russia abroad. […] Under the fresh impression of defeat, Peter flashed the thought of seeking peace, but Peter did not find anyone abroad willing to help Russia […].

At the time of the entry of Russian troops into Ingria and Estland, there were few Swedish troops in the region. In addition to the 2 thousand garrison defending Narva, there was a Swedish corps - up to 8 thousand soldiers, under the command of the Governor-General of Ingria, Count Otto Welling, which was located southeast of Pernov (Pärnu). In addition, there were small garrisons in cities and fortresses. These forces could not engage in direct battle with the Russian army.

Charles XII sent additional forces (about 10 thousand soldiers) to Estonia and Ingeria, which landed in Revel and Pernov. The Swedish king himself also arrived in Pernov along with his troops on October 5 (16). He gave his forces quite a long rest. On October 12 (23), Karl arrived in Revel and gave the order to Otto Welling with the main forces of his corps to move north to Wesenberg. On October 25 (November 5), Charles XII arrived in Revel, where he held a meeting with the local population, he promised people additional privileges as part of the Swedish Empire.


Clash at Purtz (Purtz)

Peter I, having received news of the landing of Swedish troops in Pernov, sent a 5,000-strong cavalry detachment of Boris Sheremetyev along the Revel road on September 26 (October 7). The distance from Narva to Revel was about 200 versts, the road went through a marshy area along the coast of the Gulf of Finland, and on the way were the village of Pyhayogi, the fortification of Purz and Wesenberg. Small formations of Swedes retreated to Revel. Sheremetyev's detachment, without encountering resistance, by October 3 (14) covered 100 miles and took up the positions of Wesenberg.

On October 25 (November 5), General Welling’s detachment approached Wesenberg from the south. Having learned about the approach of Swedish troops, Sheremetyev decided to retreat 36 versts back to the Purts fortification and dispersed his detachment across several settlements in the swampy area east of Purts in order to block all roads leading to Narva. And the count himself with the main forces stopped in the village of Povanda.

The Swedes, taking advantage of the carelessness of the Russian soldiers who did not set up a guard, recaptured Purts on October 25 (November 5), and the village of Variel on October 26 (November 6). Sheremetyev, having learned about this, sent a large detachment; the Swedes in Variel were surrounded, but fought their way out and retreated. The captured Swedes reported false information about the approach of a large Swedish army (30-50 thousand people).

Count Boris Petrovich Sheremetev would become one of the best commanders of the Northern War, but one of his traits was great caution. He decides not to hold the Purtsa line and retreat another 33 miles back to the village of Pyhayogi. Sheremetev quite reasonably believed that it would be difficult for his cavalry to hold off the onslaught of Swedish forces in swampy and wooded areas.

The outskirts of Wesenberg and the retreat route of Boris Sheremetev.


Fortification of Purtz.

Further actions of the parties

Initially, Karl did not concentrate all his forces to fight the Russian army near Narva, because he saw danger in the south of Estland. In the Novgorod land there was a division under the command of Anikita Repnin and a detachment of Cossacks of Ivan Obidovsky. In addition, there remained the possibility of new actions on the part of the Saxon Elector Augustus II, who, although he lifted the siege of Riga, could join the Russian forces at Pskov and strike in the Dorpat direction. Charles XII left several thousand regular soldiers and militia for the defense of Revel, and for actions in the southern direction he allocated a thousandth Reitar regiment under the command of General Wolmar Anton von Schlippenbach. On October 26 (November 6), Schlippenbach's Reiters defeated a 1.5 thousand detachment of Pskov militias near Lake Ilmen. In this battle, more than eight hundred Russian militia were killed, and Schlippenbach’s soldiers captured a dozen Russian ships and the banner of the Pskov province.

Karl, having learned about the results of the clashes at Purz, decides to move with a relatively small detachment of 4-5 thousand soldiers to Wesenberg. There his detachment linked up with the forces of General Welling. On November 12 (24), the Swedish king, contrary to the advice of part of his generals, decided to march to Narva.

Sheremetyev did not take into account his previous mistakes - the reconnaissance was poorly organized and the approach of the Swedish forces was actually missed. In addition, most of his forces were busy searching for provisions and fodder. At the key point of his defense there were only 600 people. Karl did not neglect reconnaissance and knew about the position of Russian forces. The Swedish army marched along two parallel roads, knocking down small Russian cavalry detachments due to surprise and organization. As a result, on November 16 (27), Sheremetyev was unable to organize resistance at the border of the village of Pyuhayogi and retreated, provoking the wrath of Peter.

Peter's departure, plans of the Russian and Swedish command

Peter, having assessed the situation, left for Novgorod on November 18 (29), leaving command to Field Marshal de Croix (although he refused such an honor). After their victory in the Battle of Narva, the Swedes spread the version that the Russian Tsar fled due to cowardice. In Sweden they even issued a medal with the image of a crying Peter running from the fortress, the inscription on it was a quote from the Bible: “He went out, weeping bitterly.” This same hypothesis was then repeated by some Russian historians. But, apparently, this is a mistaken opinion. More serious historical research does not support it. Peter's biography speaks of his personal courage; this man was not afraid of difficulties, more than once he found himself in the thick of battle, putting his life on the line. Apparently, we can talk about Peter’s underestimation of Charles’s determination and the capabilities of the Swedish army. The Tsar, having received information about the small number of the Swedish army, did not imagine that Charles would decide to attack the Russian fortified camp, where the larger Russian army was located, before reinforcements arrived. Therefore, the king decided to use this time, accelerating the arrival of additional forces, the delivery of ammunition and food, for negotiations with the Polish king about the interaction of forces to strike the Swedish army.

The generals, having received a message from Sheremetyev about the approach of the Swedish army, did not know what to decide. At the military council, Sheremetyev proposed leaving the fortifications and attacking the Swedes themselves, but most generals decided to stick to defensive tactics, taking advantage of the presence of fortified positions.

The bold determination of the Swedish king upset Peter’s calculations: “Should the Swedes be afraid of the Moscow peasants?” Karl said and on November 19 he led the troops into the attack. The security service of the Russian camp was so poorly organized that the Swedes easily reconnoitered the positions. Karl chose the traditional tactics for the Swedish army: strike the center of Russian positions with the main forces, break through them, and then destroy both wings separately.

The implementation of the plan was facilitated by the fact that the Russian positions were poorly prepared for defense. The Russian troops were very poorly positioned; it was difficult to defend the fortifications, because there was no formation depth (all forces were located in one line) and reserves that could be easily transferred to the threatened area. There was no opportunity to maneuver with our superior forces or provide mutual support to each other. In addition, there was an enemy fortress in the rear, which had to be looked after. Communication with the other bank could only be achieved through one floating bridge on the right flank of the defense.

The left flank was defended by Weide's division and Sheremetyev's cavalry, in the center, occupying part of the Hermannsberg heights, Prince Trubetskoy's formations, on the right flank Golovin's division, including the Semenovsky, Preobrazhensky, and Lefortovo regiments. The headquarters of the Russian army was located on the extreme right flank, on the island of Kamperholm. The total number of Russian forces is estimated at 34-40 thousand people, including irregular troops. 22 cannons and 17 mortars were placed along the ramparts, the rest of the artillery was located near Ivangorod.

The Swedish army numbered up to 12 thousand bayonets and sabers (21 infantry battalions, 46 cavalry squadrons and 37 guns).

Battle

On the night of November 19 (30), 1700, the Swedish army secretly, along forest paths, approached the center of the Russian army, and from where they were not expected. After resting, at about 13:00 the Swedes went on the offensive. They attacked in two groups: Welling's column (11 battalions and 22 squadrons) went to the right of the Hermannsberg heights, the other, Renschild (10 battalions, 12 squadrons, 21 guns), to the left of this hill. In front of the columns were shock troops of five hundred grenadiers with fascines (a bunch of twigs, a bunch of brushwood) in order to fill the ditch. A battery of 16 guns under the command of Baron Sjöblad was installed on the crest of the height, and it opened fire on the center of the Russian positions. There are 12 squadrons left in reserve.

The weather was favorable for the Swedish king, a strong wind with thick snow hit the Russian soldiers in the eyes (visibility was no more than 20 meters). The Russian formations managed to get into position, but the ramparts were protected only by a sparse chain of riflemen who defended a front of 6 miles. The fight started at 2 o'clock. The Swedes were able to use the factor of surprise, threw fascines into the ditch, climbed the rampart, and within half an hour the defense in the center was broken through in two places. First, Trubetskoy’s units retreated, followed by Weide’s left flank and Golovin’s right. The army was cut into two parts, the artillery was lost, one began to be pushed to the south, the other to the north. Confusion began, many felt that the foreign officers had betrayed them, the soldiers, shouting: “The Germans have betrayed us!”, tried to kill them. Foreign generals and officers, saving their lives, surrendered to the Swedes in full force. Sheremetyev's local cavalry tried to retreat across the Narova River by ford. Sheremetyev himself successfully crossed to the other side, but about 1 thousand people drowned in the icy river.

But the battle was not lost yet. The Swedish army captured Hermansberg, the center and key of the Russian defense, and began to press both wings of the Russian army into the flanks. The Swedish command concentrated its main efforts against the “northern group”, a divided Russian army. Initially, the overthrown forces of Trubetskoy and Golovin ran in disarray towards the bridge; it could not withstand the crush and collapsed. There was nowhere to retreat, Golovin’s frustrated forces began to line up together with the Preobrazhensky, Lefortovo and Semenovsky regiments, which did not succumb to general panic and occupied the bridgehead fortification - “Wagenburg” (or Walk-Gorod, a mobile field fortification in the 15th-18th centuries). Peter's guards and Golovin's formation repulsed all attacks by Rehnschild's forces. The Swedish king ordered Welling to allocate several battalions to reinforce Renschild, and he himself advanced with selected troops to help. Karl personally led the Swedish troops into the attack, but the former “amusing” ones withstood the blow and did not yield a single step to the Swedes. Karl said in admiration: “What men!” The Swedes suffered significant losses here.

The commander of the “southern group” Weide was able to gather the units that were upset at the beginning of the battle, stopped the advance of Welling’s column and even pushed back the Swedes. But since the local cavalry fled and could not support his counterattack, he could not do more. Night stopped the battle.

There was a stalemate. Karl cut up the Russian army, destroyed its center, the Russians lost artillery, all foreign officers and the high command in the person of de Croix went over to the side of the Swedes. But not a single Russian regiment folded; each of the two Russian groups was equal in number to the Swedish army. The impossibility of retreat could give rise to a desperate determination among the Russians to attack the enemy, and a simultaneous attack by Russian forces from both sides could lead to victory for the Russian army. Some of the Swedish infantrymen, having captured a convoy in the Russian camp, plundered it and got drunk. An incident of “friendly fire”, typical of Western armies, also occurred - two Swedish battalions in the dark mistook each other for Russians and began a battle with each other.

The main problem of the Russian forces was the lack of clear command and communication between themselves. The remaining Russian commanders, having accurate information about the situation, could well have turned the outcome of the battle in their favor.


Painting by A. E. Kotzebue “The Battle of Narva”.

Negotiation

Russian generals - Prince Yakov Dolgorukov, Automon Golovin, Ivan Buturlin, General-Fieldmaster Tsarevich Alexander Imeretinsky, Adam Weide, without accurate information about the situation, decided to start negotiations. Karl, realizing the precariousness of his position, willingly met their initiative.

During the negotiations that began, an agreement was reached according to which the Russian troops could honorably retreat to the other side of the river, keeping their weapons and banners, the Swedes received artillery and convoys. The night of November 19 to 20 (December 1 to 2), 1700, Russian and Swedish sappers restored the crossing. On the morning of December 2, parts of the “northern group” began to cross to the other side. Units of Golovin's division with the Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky, and Lefortovo regiments crossed the river without hindrance. But then Karl violated the agreement: the Swedes demanded that the units of the Weide division lay down their arms and banners, in addition, the Russian command and officers were taken prisoner. The soldiers of Weide's division were forced to give up their weapons and banners and with “great abuse,” blaspheming the Swedes and the command, walked across the bridge.

Causes of defeat

Poor organization of reconnaissance and actions of the local cavalry. More successful actions of Sheremetyev's cavalry against General Welling could delay Charles's campaign until the spring-summer of 1701, a more convenient time for military operations.

The pre-war reorganization of the Russian army temporarily weakened it, new standards had not yet taken hold, and old mechanisms were broken. Ideally, Peter and his commanders needed several years of combat with a weak enemy in order to consolidate the positive principles and discard the erroneous ones. And the Russian army almost immediately collided with the first-class, “invincible” army of the Swedish Empire. The exam was very tough. It must be said that, despite the general defeat, the Russian soldiers and some of the commanders showed their best side, withstanding the blows of Charles’s seasoned soldiers.

Poor organization of defense. The location for the battle was extremely unfortunate: the troops were sandwiched between two lines of ramparts, they could not maneuver, build a deeper defense, assist each other, transfer reserves; there was a strong enemy fortress in the rear.

Skillful use by the Swedish command of the weak points of the Russian defense - the Swedes managed to strike at the junction of the Russian divisions, dividing the Russian army into two parts.

Results

The Russian army lost 7 thousand killed, drowned, and deserted. The Swedes, violating the agreements, captured 700 people, including 10 generals, 56 officers (including A. Weide, A. Imeretinsky, I. Buturlin, Y. Dolgoruky - they were held captive until 1710, I. Trubetskoy, A. Golovin - exchanged for Count Renschild only at the end of 1718, etc.). The Swedes captured 195 guns, 20 thousand muskets, 210 banners, and the royal treasury of 32 thousand rubles.

Swedish losses amounted to 2 thousand people killed and wounded.

This was a severe defeat for the Russian army: heavy casualties were suffered, the army was virtually beheaded by the surrender of foreign officers and the treacherous capture of the most talented Russian commanders, and a significant amount of artillery was lost. In Western Europe, after the Battle of Narva, the Russian army was no longer perceived as a serious force for several years. The European press warmly supported this idea, foreign diplomats laughed at the Russian envoys. There were even rumors about new heavy defeats for Russia and the seizure of power by Princess Sophia. The Narva defeat was considered in Europe an irreparable disaster.

The Swedish king received the glory of a great commander. But, on the other hand, this victory sowed the seeds of the future defeat of the Swedish Empire - Karl believed that he had defeated the Russian armed forces for a long time and did not develop his success, deciding to focus on the Saxons. Such a personal factor as Charles’s hatred of the Saxon ruler also played a role; the Swedish king considered him the initiator of the anti-Swedish alliance, the main conspirator who must be severely punished. “His behavior is so shameful and vile,” Charles spoke of Augustus, “that it deserves vengeance from God and the contempt of all right-thinking people.” He greatly underestimated the Russian army until the Battle of Poltava. Karl did not agree to peace, although Peter, through the mediation of Austrian and French diplomats, was ready for negotiations. The Russian Tsar, on the contrary, after a crushing defeat, developed vigorous activity, worked on mistakes, and focused on training Russian officers.

There was a serious danger of an invasion by the Swedish army into the interior of Russia in 1701. The Russian Tsar had to hastily strengthen the northwestern borders of the state; the troops remaining at his disposal, under pain of death, were forbidden to retreat from the Pskov-Novgorod-Arkhangelsk defense line. The construction of new fortifications and the repair of old ones, and the mobilization of the population for work begins.

The 1700 campaign ended with the Battle of Narva. It was unsuccessful for the Allies. Swedish troops achieved major strategic successes: Denmark was withdrawn from the war, the Saxons lifted the siege of Riga and retreated, the Russian army was defeated at Narva.


Monument to Russian soldiers. In 1900, on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the first battle of Narva, on the initiative of the Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky regiments and the 1st battery of the Life Guards of the 1st Artillery Brigade, a monument to the fallen Russian soldiers was built near the village of Vepsküll.

Application. Peter's assessment of the battle.

“The Swedes near Narva received a victory (victory) over our army, which is indisputable; but one must understand over which army they received it: there was only one old Lefortovo regiment, and two regiments of the guard (Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky) were only in two attacks near Azov, and they had never seen field battles, and especially with regular troops. The other regiments, both officers and privates, were recruits; and besides, late in the day there was a great famine, because of the great mud it was impossible to bring food. In one word we can say: the whole thing was like an infant’s play, and art was below the surface. What surprise is it for an old, trained, practiced army to find victory over such inexperienced ones? True, this victory at that time was extremely sad and sensitive, as if all hopes were desperate in the future. But when you think about it, then... if we had then gotten victory over the Swedes, who were so unskillful in all matters, both military and political, then what kind of trouble could happiness have plunged us into later, like the Swedes, already long ago trained and glorious in Europe (whom the French called the German scourge), near Poltava they so cruelly overthrew that all their maxim (greatness) was turned upside down. But when we received this misfortune (or, better to say, great happiness) near Narva, then captivity drove away laziness and forced us to work day and night to work hard and to art, and ordered us to wage war with fear and skill.”

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