Analysis and comparison. The Afghan war awaits an objective historical assessment “My company was like a toy”































1 of 30

Presentation on the topic: Afghan and Chechen wars

Slide no. 1

Slide description:

Slide no. 2

Slide description:

Slide no. 3

Slide description:

In 1973, the Daud (Saur) revolution took place, overthrowing the monarchy in Afghanistan. The first president of Afghanistan was Mohammed Daoud Khan (cousin of the deposed king), who relied on the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan - PDPA. This party was formed in 1965 and adhered to a pro-communist orientation. In 1967, due to tactical differences, two wings took shape in it: “Khalys” (“People”), led by N.M. Taraki and "Parchan" ("Banner") led by B. Karmal, who received their names from the factional newspapers of the same name. The Afghan war lasted from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989, that is, 2,238 days. On December 25, 1979, at 7 o’clock in the morning, near the city of Termez, two pontoon-bridge regiments began to build a pontoon bridge

Slide no. 4

Slide description:

At 15.00, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began in accordance with the order of the USSR Minister of Defense. The scouts were the first to cross, and then, under the leadership of General K. Kuzmin, the 108th Motorized Rifle Division. At the same time, military transport aviation began airlifting the main forces of the airborne division of a separate parachute regiment to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram. Until the last minute, the paratroopers were not privy to the plans of senior leadership. It took forty-seven hours to transfer personnel, during which 343 flights were made. 7,700 paratroopers and 894 units of military equipment were delivered to Kabul and Bagram. On December 27, the 103rd Airborne Division took control of the building of the PDPA Central Committee, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Communications and other important objects in the capital of Afghanistan. By the morning of December 28, units of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division concentrated northeast of Kabul.

Slide no. 5

Slide description:

The military operation to introduce Soviet troops into Afghanistan can be divided into two stages: 1) December 27-28, 2) December 29-31, 1979. At the first stage, on December 27, the Dar-ul-Aman palace, Kabul radio and other important objects were stormed. The second stage was to cross the state border and march along the routes Termez - Kabul - Ghazni and Kushka - Herat - Kandahar, to encircle the most important administrative centers of the country. Carrying out this task, the first motorized rifle division (12 thousand people) moved in the direction of Kushka - Kandahar, and other forces through Termez, the Salang pass - to Bagram and Kabul. Part of the Soviet troops from Kabul headed to Gardes.

Slide no. 6

Slide description:

Before January 1, 1980, 50 thousand military personnel were introduced, including two airborne and two motorized rifle divisions. In January 1980, two more motorized rifle divisions entered Afghanistan, and the total number of Soviet troops reached 80 thousand people. During the first half of 1980, the Soviet military contingent continued to strengthen, especially with four combat aviation regiments, three helicopter regiments, and various independent brigades and regiments.

Slide no. 7

Slide description:

Starting from the winter of 1980/81, the opposition intensified sabotage and terrorist activities. Instead of large formations of 500-1000 people, small detachments of 30-40 people and even smaller groups consisting of 2-3 terrorists began to operate. The objects of sabotage were industrial enterprises, transport, irrigation and energy structures. During these opposition actions, the Soviet military contingent, which was primarily used to carry out tasks to protect state and other DRA facilities, began to suffer noticeable losses. If in 1979 personnel losses amounted to 86 people, then in 1980 - 1484, in 1981 - 1298, in 1982 - 1948, in 1983 - 1446, in 1984 - 2343, in 1985 - 1868, in 1986 -1333, 1987 -1215, 1988 - 759, 1989 - 53 people

Slide no. 8

Slide description:

Almost immediately after the introduction of Soviet troops, attempts were made to solve the “Afghan problem” politically. However, it was only in 1986 that the DRA leadership put forward a policy program for national reconciliation. This new course was directly influenced by the perestroika that began in the USSR and the new political thinking of the Soviet leadership led by M.S. Gorbachev in the field of foreign policy. The policy of national reconciliation included: negotiations with the armed opposition; creating conditions for the return of all refugees to their homeland; political and military amnesty for all Afghans who stopped fighting against the existing government, and even the formation of a coalition government. As a result of this new policy, new forces came to the leadership of the PDPA, and M. Najibullah became the General Secretary of the Central Committee in May 1986. On November 30, 1987, in accordance with the new constitution of Afghanistan, at a meeting of representatives of all segments of the population, Najibullah was elected president of the country.

Slide no. 9

Slide description:

After this, the DRA government allowed the unhindered return to their homeland of all refugees, guaranteed the rights and freedoms of all DRA citizens who stopped the armed struggle, and by October 1989 signed agreements on the cessation of hostilities with 2/3 of all field commanders of the Afghan opposition. At the end of 1988 - beginning of 1989, meetings were held between representatives of the USSR and the Afghan opposition, as well as with representatives of the Pakistani and Iranian leadership and the former king of Afghanistan M. Zahir Shah about ending the war, restoring peace in the country and forming a coalition government. As part of these negotiations, the USSR confirmed that it would fully fulfill the obligations assumed in Geneva on April 14, 1988 for a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. By February 15, 1989, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was completed, which was monitored by UN observers

Slide no. 10

Slide description:

Slide no. 11

Slide description:

Slide no. 12

Slide description:

Slide no. 13

Slide description:

Slide no. 14

Slide description:

Slide no. 15

Slide description:

The First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996. First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Republic of Chechnya) - military operations in Chechnya and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus in order to keep Chechnya within Russia. Often called the “first Chechen war,” although the conflict was officially called “measures to maintain constitutional order.” The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, facts of genocide of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted. Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the defeat and withdrawal of federal troops, mass destruction and casualties, de -de facto independence of Chechnya before the second Chechen conflict and the wave of terror that swept across Russia

Slide no. 16

Slide description:

Chechen conflict In September 1991, Dudayev’s people defeated the Supreme Council of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in Grozny. Deputies were beaten and thrown out of windows, resulting in the death of City Council Chairman Vitaly Kutsenko. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram “I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation and the creation of the Republic of Ichkeria

Slide no. 17

Slide description:

Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between government troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. For example, troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used. In Urus-Martan alone in October 1994, the Dudayevites lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was personally planned by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI A. Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, B. Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, the detachment of the opposition field commander R. Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but retreated each time without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses. On November 26, the opposition unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time.

The Americans and their allies have been in Afghanistan longer than the Soviet troops.
November 26, 2010 marked 9 years and 50 days since the soldiers
The NATO coalition invaded the mountains of Afghanistan. Exactly that much
The military operation that the USSR carried out in Afghanistan lasted. Rubicon,
as they say, it has been passed and it is already possible to sum up some results, carry out
comparison and parallels, make predictions.

When Washington sent its troops into the “nest of world peace” in 2001
terrorism" in Afghanistan, in the post-Soviet space only the lazy
did not practice wit on this matter, skeptically assessing the chances
NATO. The Western world, on the contrary, arrived in the enviable confidence that
they certainly will not repeat the mistakes of the totalitarian Land of the Soviets and in
will achieve the desired goal in the foreseeable future. In Europe and America it was believed
that all sorts of comparisons between the Afghan wars of the USA and the USSR in this case
inappropriate. However, it has now become obvious that comparing the situation in the 1980s and
2000s is not only possible, but also necessary: ​​9-year history of the Afghan
war has provided a huge layer of material that needs analysis, comparison and
forecasting the situation.

What do the aggressor countries of the USSR and the USA have in common regarding Afghanistan?

Experts from the academy and exchange trading have identified a number of patterns:
1. both the USSR and the USA at the time of the introduction of their troops
Afghanistan were superpowers. Their military potential was enormous
which, in turn, made it possible to count on quick and unambiguous
success;
2. both states were empires of sorts,
that is, carriers of supranational ideology. The USSR fought for triumph
communism throughout the world, the USA - for the victory of democracy. The armies of these countries
were international, that is, theoretically they could not
be guided in your actions by nationalistic motives;
3. both in 1979-80 and in 2001 the invasion was carried out with lightning speed and almost without bloodshed;
4. US and USSR military personnel had a high fighting spirit;
5. command of both armies declared control over the entire territory of Afghanistan;
6. number of OKSVA in different years
ranged from 80 to 104 thousand military personnel (this does not include employees
intelligence services, instructors and civilian specialists). As part of the troops
ISAF currently has about 130 thousand soldiers and officers (this does not include
allegedly civilian employees of various security structures);
7. Both the USA and the USSR established a puppet government in Afghanistan, which they supported financially, unsuccessfully trying to place many of the burdens of the war on his shoulders.
As we can see, the initial data of the two states participating in the war in
Afghanistan are roughly comparable. During the same
activities, there were both certain similarities and significant
differences.

How are the Afghan wars of the USSR and the USA different?

The analytical service of the Masterforex-V Academy explained that:
against Soviet troops many fought
scattered detachments of Mujahideen of various political views,
religious preferences (Tajiks and Uzbeks - moderate Sunnis, Pashtuns -
Orthodox Sunnis, residents of Herat province - Shiites, among the population
Ismailism is widespread in Badakhshan), ethnicity. General
the number of armed opposition during the Soviet occupation is estimated
from 300 to 500 thousand people;
against NATO in Afghanistan is currently at war
only one Taliban movement plus a small organization
Al-Qaeda. The Taliban unites mainly Pashtuns who profess
radical forms of Sunni Islam. The number of Taliban is unlikely
exceeds 100 thousand fighters;
in the 1980s, the Afghan mujahideen were supported by the United States, Pakistan, China, Iran, all Arab countries;
Now the Taliban provide hidden
patronage only by Pakistani intelligence services, a little Iran and some
Arab organizations. In essence, the Taliban are forced to rely only on
the people of Afghanistan and then only to certain tribes and ethnic groups.
This is clearly not enough to conduct large-scale military operations;
USSR, which was the leader of the Warsaw bloc,
still did not drag allies into Afghanistan: Poles, Czechs,
Gederaites, Bulgarians. This allowed us to rely solely on our own
strength, ensure unity of command and not share responsibility. Even with
from a human point of view, such a step looks more noble
(the Eastern European allies, however, did not appreciate this, but now
got the opportunity to taste all the “delights” of the Afghan war);
The United States initiated the deployment of NATO troops to Afghanistan,
fortunately, all member countries of the Alliance fully supported this decision.
Now Afghan warriors will appear in more than 20 countries, including not even
NATO Australia and New Zealand.

The results of the operation can be called twofold:
On the one side, neither the USSR nor the USA
were able to achieve their goals in Afghanistan. Socialism is not
built, Bin Laden was not caught, al-Qaeda was not destroyed, democracy was not
spread it, it turns out they only lost people in vain.
On the other side, loss figures are largely
are not comparable, which gives many experts reason to talk about obvious
NATO's successes and advantages. During the 1980s, the number of deaths in Afghanistan
or more than 15 thousand Soviet military personnel died, more than 53 thousand were
wounded and 417 missing. At the same time, the troops of the international
The coalition has lost 6,900 troops to date and more than 12,500 have been
wounded.
In this case, NATO functionaries and analysts, in the absence of real
successes have to be content with little: they are not proud of what
brought peace to Afghanistan, but because they lost fewer soldiers than the USSR.
Allegedly, this clearly proves the effectiveness of the North Atlantic
Alliance. But the difference in losses naturally has an explanation.

How can one explain the difference in troop losses in the “Afghan wars” of the USSR and the USA?

As explained by Rasul Zhalalov, representative of the community of traders and investors in the USA and Canada, Masterforex-V Academy:
Soviet troops regularly or on your own
carried out large military operations, or entrusted them to local allies,
strictly controlling execution. In any case, military activity in
The 1980s was much higher than in the 2000s. Limited contingent up to
in recent days I have been trying to carry out important strategic tasks, for example,
close the border with Pakistan, clear the Afghan rebels
Pandshir Gorge.
NATO soldiers for the most part
profess defensive tactics, they control only the capital of the country,
conditionally some large cities and communication routes (only about 10-11%
territory of Afghanistan, while the Soviet army actually held
own hands 30-35%).
Soviet soldiers often performed
tasks unusual for them: built, helped in economic activities
etc. There were a lot of restrictions on the use of weapons.
Twenty years later, the Americans and their allies,
professing the priority of the lives of our own military personnel, massively
they shoot to kill at the slightest danger, almost never go beyond
limits of their well-fortified bases and try to avoid combat
clashes until significant reinforcements arrive. In fact, now in
Afghanistan is fought only by aviation and reconnaissance, under such conditions there are losses
coalitions could be reduced to a minimum.
Soviet soldiers used local water,
As a result, the number of gastrointestinal diseases has steadily increased.
A significant part of the losses is explained precisely by this reason.
Americans and their allies They consume only products delivered by plane from their home countries. Even water is brought to them in plastic bottles.

Thus, it is quite difficult to judge whose actions in Afghanistan are more effective. It is, of course, possible to make forecasts, but they are also quite elusive. It is now quite obvious that
* coalition losses in Afghanistan will only increase (even today the average annual figure is comparable to the Soviet one);
* discontent in NATO countries will also increase significantly, then the troops
will be withdrawn, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will again be engulfed by civil
war, and it will finally plunge into the Middle Ages.

Question: Will the US collapse “after Afghanistan” like the Soviet Union?. Of course not.
* The USSR did not collapse because of the Afghan war;
* Americans will think that they won in Afghanistan. US Residents
never forget the main thing: to look at the world exclusively in
in a positive way.

The editors of the Exchange Leader magazine and experts from the Academy of Forex and exchange trading Masterforex-V conduct : Why is the US still in Afghanistan? Possible answers:
* fight against terrorism
* drug trafficking control
* spreading its influence in Central Asia, limiting access there for China and Russia.

Source "Exchange Leader"

Ruslan Sultanovich, many years have passed since the end of the “Soviet-Afghan” war. Are there any “blank spots” left in its history?

– The biggest “blank spot” is the 273 prisoners of war who did not return home and missing persons, whose search and return to their homeland our committee is currently very actively engaged in.

– How do you look for them and what are the results?

– We work both in Afghanistan and in neighboring countries, in particular in Pakistan. In this case, we resort to the help of domestic and foreign intelligence services. Over the past year, we have been able to learn in detail about the uprising of 15 Soviet prisoners of war in Badaber (Pakistan) in April 1985, reconstruct the course of events, and find out the names of almost all participants.

– How many prisoners of war and missing persons have you found over the years?

“With the help of our committee, we found and returned 12 people to their homeland. Mostly from Afghanistan. But former Soviet soldiers also live in the USA, Canada, Germany... One, who lived in Afghanistan and was found by us, returned to his family and friends, after spending a little time in Russia, returned again “across the river,” as they said then: he already has long ago he had family, children, he converted to Islam...

Let me remind you that a total of 417 people were missing and captured, of which 119 were released, 97 returned home. We recently brought more remains of soldiers. We currently have a group working in Afghanistan, where two more burials have been discovered.

– What is the main lesson of that war for you personally?

– There is no need to impose your model of socio-economic and other structure on a foreign country, or introduce “your own” system of power. At that time, we transferred everything that was negative in the USSR to Afghan soil, even began to abolish religion... Therefore, we could not help but lose.

– There are American troops in Afghanistan now. To what extent do they take into account the experience of the battles of Soviet troops?

“In any case, they don’t conduct military operations there like we do.” They are huddled there in their camps, bases, conducting targeted special operations, nothing more.

– But to some extent they are trying to build democracy there in their own image and likeness...

– You need to know Afghanistan. As long as Washington gives money to Kabul, the Afghan government will tolerate the presence of Americans in the country. You know what our employees say when they come from business trips to Afghanistan. Former Mujahideen say: we are fools for fighting with you! The Americans deceived us, promised a bright future, but for several years now they have been solving only their own “narrow” problems, while speculating on the fight against international terrorism. And the Soviet Union at one time built roads, schools, hospitals in this impoverished country...

– How has the attitude towards internationalist soldiers in Russia and other CIS countries changed over the years?

- Yes, in general, no way. “Afghans” are honored and valued. In recent years, we have established close cooperation with public “Afghan” organizations in the Baltic countries. Except maybe Turkmenistan... The “Afghans” there, and there are more than 12 thousand of them, have withdrawn into themselves. We correspond with them, provide them with some assistance, I personally invite them to our events, but alas...

– What is the help you provide?

– Once a year we approve a program of medical and social rehabilitation. Currently, our committee has registered 2,000 internationalist soldiers with the absence of upper and lower limbs, 1,600 of them are missing both legs, 15 are missing both arms, 30 are missing legs and one arm, 430 live with one arm. The number of disabled people is growing. If in 1991 there were 15 thousand of them, then in 2003 their number already exceeded 20 thousand people. Every year, up to 12% of children who participated in combat operations are recognized as disabled for the first time. The war is catching up with them.

Through the Interparliamentary Assembly we are trying to synchronize some things. For example, there used to be benefits for “Afghans”, but now in many countries they have been abolished. But in other countries, say, in Russia, free travel for “Afghans” remains. And we want an “Afghan”, for example, from Ukraine, to be able to travel around Russia for free. Therefore, we are seeking the introduction of some kind of unified identification.

– How many internationalist soldiers are there now who fought in Afghanistan?

– According to official data provided to us by the republics, 673,846 people. These are those who were called up from the territories of the CIS countries. Most of them are in Russia (306,600), Ukraine (160,375) and Uzbekistan (72,102), the least in Moldova (7,412), Armenia (5,371) and Azerbaijan and Georgia are the same - 3,369 people each. In addition, there are still 5,400 “Afghans” living in Lithuania, 2,350 in Latvia, and 1,652 in Estonia.

At the moment, in a country like Russia, which is not emerging from wars, conflicts, or counter-terrorism operations, there is still no government body that would deal with “Afghans”, “Algerians”, “Spaniards”, “Chechens” "and other internationalist warriors. Let's say that in the USA there is a Department of War Veterans Affairs. This ministry is allocated $36 billion annually, which is almost a third of the budget of the Russian Federation. But our law on veterans, a good law that was adopted a long time ago and in the development of which we participated, practically does not work in its financial part. Its articles are suspended when the budget is adopted.

– The Afghan and Chechen wars, are they similar in your opinion?

“Both wars are similar in that in both we fight partisans of the same kind. Therefore, in combat and moral-psychological terms, the Afghan and Chechen wars are one and the same. But in the political and legal sense, these are, of course, completely different things.

But there is another aspect. Our state does not realize that when soldiers return from war, be it “Afghan” or “Chechen”, they need to be dealt with - in many areas. Our first return from Afghanistan was in 1980–1981, and the “Afghans” of the 80s still managed to somehow grasp onto a peaceful life. They introduced benefits to us, gave us jobs, gave us apartments, treated us, used our examples to educate young people... Later, when perestroika came, and then democracy and the market, all this was much more difficult to do. What can we say about “Chechens” today?! They are doing absolutely nothing for them now. Take the same “combat” ones. They will introduce increased salaries and will not pay the due money for months, or even years.

I understand this matter this way: a corresponding program is created, and funds are allocated for it, an official responsible for its implementation is appointed, etc. But here they say: why create a program or - especially - some kind of special body when we have the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Social Protection, the Pension Fund? So they each pull their own, but if there’s a problem: it’s not mine, it’s not mine... And then, don’t confuse the problems of the common man and the problems of those who went through combat operations, these are completely different things.

That's one thing. But we also made a mistake during the Chechen campaigns - we began sending police units to Chechnya, designed to protect public order. There he, a policeman, shot at people, killed, they shot at him, and now he has returned with his psyche turned upside down and must continue to protect public order! The “Chechen syndrome” is already at work in the police environment today; it is transmitted from “Chechen” police officers to those who did not participate in this counter-terrorism operation; an example of this are numerous cases of abuse of citizens by people in police uniforms.

– What is your forecast for the situation in Chechnya?

– As it goes, so everything will go. No war, no peace. Both for the near future and for the longer term. In addition, it is clear that the situation there is fueled by external forces. The same United States openly declared the Caucasus a zone of its interests.

– They say that the problem is that if the separatist leaders Basayev and Maskhadov are caught, the situation will change for the better and even turn around.

- Nonsense! Dudayev was killed - and what has changed? Money went from one to another or to others. The problem is that during the war years, even worse militants appeared there than Basayev, or Gelayev, or anyone like them. There, since 1992, when the events began, young people have grown up who neither studied at school nor were in the Komsomol (by the way, unlike Basayev), who are generally illiterate, learned only to play with military weapons and see the enemy in everyone Russian soldier. Those who were 7–10 years old in 1994, when the war began, are 17–20 today, these are real wolves. For ten years they only saw that they wanted to beautifully destroy them (“with two regiments”), and were brought up in the spirit that their enemy was Russia.

– Have you finally left politics? Do you have any plans for the future?

– I don’t have any plans yet. I do committee work and I love it. At one time, I came into politics forcedly. And if I wanted to become, say, a deputy, I wouldn’t have any problems. But I do not want. I can’t imagine what I would do in the current State Duma... Is this the State Duma?!

The last war of the Soviet Army was started and ended in the very center of Asia - on the land of ancient Afghanistan. Herat, Bagram, Khost, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar...
Until relatively recently, these names were very distant and at the same time close geographical points for us, who lived in the then Soviet Union.
Distant because these cities were in Afghanistan, close because our peers, friends, and relatives were there. Every time we heard these names, we worried about the fate of our guys who were there, across the “river” (Amu Darya - a river on the border between the USSR and Afghanistan).
They are remembered on February 15, when on this cold, windy day in 1989, the last Soviet soldier of a limited contingent of Soviet troops left Afghan soil.
It was a strange and drawn-out war, the victories and defeats of which the Soviet people knew little about. This war had its own characteristics.

I would like to remember the guys called up from the Chechen Republic to fulfill their international duty in Afghanistan. Events in Chechnya and the two wars that followed for a long time made the topic of participation of natives of the Chechen Republic in the Afghan war closed and almost forgotten.

According to available data from the chairman of the Chechen regional branch of the all-Russian public organization “Russian Union of Afghanistan Veterans”, Salamu Asuev, during the period of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, 2,441 natives of the then Chechen-Ingushetia completed military service. Of this number, 69 people died, having fulfilled their military duty to the end. Of these, 44 were Chechens, 24 Russians and one Ukrainian. Three more dead Chechens were drafted outside the republic.

Currently, in the database of the Chechen branch of the Union of Afghanistan Veterans, 670 people are members of the organization. It should be noted that during the entire ten-year Afghan war, not a single one of our fellow countrymen was captured, became a deserter, or went missing.

The military events in Chechnya made their own sad adjustments. Since Afghanistan, 170 people have died or died. Ten people are still listed as missing not in that distant country, but in their homeland, at home, during the period of hostilities.

Heroes of the Soviet Union from Chechnya

Until now, the only Hero of the Soviet Union from among the natives of the Chechen Republic was Georgy Demchenko, who was awarded this highest award posthumously. I didn’t know him, although we were both the same age and lived in Grozny just a few blocks from each other.

While fulfilling his international duty in Afghanistan, Senior Lieutenant Demchenko died in 1983. While carrying out a combat mission, he found himself surrounded by superior enemy forces and, covering the retreat of his comrades, so as not to be captured, Demchenko blew himself up with a grenade. He was 23 years old then. He was buried in the central city cemetery of Grozny.

24 years after his death, in April 2007, I was present at the exhumation of his remains. During military operations in Grozny, one of the artillery shells hit Demchenko’s grave directly, splitting the marble monument in two. The city administration brought the grave into proper shape and glued the monument together.

The exhumation occurred at the request of the Hero’s parents, who moved to Volgograd with the beginning of the Chechen war. The parents were elderly and for health reasons could not visit their son’s grave in Grozny.

They made a request to the President of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, who complied with the wishes of Demchenko’s parents. On his instructions, all necessary measures were taken to exhume and transport the remains to the new burial site.

I especially remember that after so many years, on top of the zinc coffin, the cockade and flag from the paratrooper’s beret were completely untouched by corrosion.

Salamu Asuev, who was present at the funeral ceremony, said then that “the youth of the Chechen Republic was brought up by such a fellow countryman as Georgy Demchenko.”

Chechen veterans of Afghanistan expressed regret that one of their comrades, many years after death, is leaving his homeland. However, according to them, "the wishes of his parents for his former brothers in arms are sacred." Hero of the Soviet Union Georgy Demchenko was given military honors. After this, the funeral escort went to Volgograd.

Friends and fellow soldiers say that Suleiman Khachukaev should have become another Hero. He also saved an entire reconnaissance company at the cost of his life. Not allowed. He was posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin, which was usually awarded along with the Golden Star.

A year after Hero of the Soviet Union Demchenko found his final resting place on Volgograd soil, it suddenly became known that among the natives of our republic there was another Hero of the Soviet Union. It turned out to be the living Ruslan Zaipulaev.

Zaipulaev was awarded the highest award of military glory back in 1990 for the courage and heroism shown in the performance of military duty during the military operations in Afghanistan. As you know, a year later the USSR as a great country ceased to exist, and the award was lost. Perhaps it was deliberately lost due to the well-known political events that began in the Chechen Republic in 1991. Only 18 years later, the award found the hero. In 2008, Ruslan was awarded the Golden Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union - one of the last Soviet military awards.

The Brotherhood of War

Afghanistan became a place where the concept of nationality was completely absent. When a soldier donated his blood to a seriously wounded man, he did not ask what nationality or religion he was.

There were other values: brotherhood, friendship, mutual assistance, providing assistance from a seemingly hopeless situation.
I clearly remember the story of my relative Khusein Tsamaraev, who went through Afghanistan. He was a tanker, and his fellow countryman named Imran served in the air assault brigade. In one of the few meetings he told Hussein a story that I cannot forget.

By order of the command, Imran and a group of paratroopers went deep into the rear of the territory controlled by the Afghan Mujahideen. The goal of the dangerous mission was to destroy a large enemy transshipment base with a huge amount of ammunition.

At first everything went well. We reached the base location without any special incidents, set off a grandiose “fireworks display” and began to retreat without losses. Having woken up from such a daring attack, the “shuravi” (as the soldiers of the Soviet Army were called), the Mujahideen organized pursuit, regularly coming into combat contact with the paratroopers.

Despite their losses, the dushmans continued to stubbornly press. To independently retreat to their own and disperse their pursuers, the paratroopers decided to disperse in groups of five. Imran was appointed commander of the squad. His group made its way along the most difficult mountain route. Soon the first wounded appeared. Leaving became even more difficult. In a moment of despair, Imran decided to stay and cover the retreat of his comrades.

In a moment of respite, he announced his decision. In the ensuing silence, which seemed to last an eternity, but in fact some seconds, the voice of one of the fighters was heard. Everyone called him Sanka, probably because he looked too boyish. This was his first baptism of fire.

“Commander,” he said, “let me stay,” said Sanka. Imran was taken aback by such a request, as if it was something ordinary. “New guy, didn’t you hear the order? - It was said that everyone should leave!” - "Guys! You all have parents. But I don’t have anyone, I’m an orphanage. So, there’s no one to cry for me,” he said with a sad, somewhat apologetic smile. Despite the order, and then persuasion, Sanka remained there. Forever...Thanks to him, the remaining soldiers safely reached the location of their troops. I didn’t know this guy, but I remembered him, nineteen years old, forever.

Resident of the village Gekhi Ruslan Saraliev, at the age of eighteen, went straight to Afghanistan, having served as an anti-aircraft gunner for exactly two years of military service. He recalls how, after typhus, he ended up in the hospital and was offered a commission. When meeting with his fellow countrymen, he told them about this proposal. Along with him in his unit were six Chechens and four Ingush. His final decision was this: “I came here with you and, Allah willing, I will go home with you.”

There, in the hospital, he met another of his fellow countrymen, a resident of the village of Chishki, Said-Selim Eskiev. This was their first and last meeting. Eskiev served at a remote post near the village of Surabi near the Afghan-Pakistani border. When he had two months left until the end of his service, his squad went on a combat mission. When one of those walking in front heard a click under his feet, Eskiev, without hesitation, pushed him away and lay down on the mine himself, saving his comrades with his life.

Bilal Tatashov recalls how, after his service in Afghanistan, his younger brother Khalil was called up for military service there. Once, while accompanying a convoy, he ended up in the unit in which Bilal served and met his colleague Yusup-Khadzhi from the Gudermes region.

“We had a rule that when a Chechen resigned, he signed his name and handed over his belt to the Chechen who remained to serve. When I handed over my belt to Yusup-Hadji, there were already five names on it. After communicating with my brother, Yusup-Khadzhi gave him the same belt that I had given him at one time,” recalls Bilal Tatashov.

It should be noted that just five years later, already during the fighting in the Chechen Republic, the military brotherhood turned out to be stronger than political prejudices. It is known that some of the Chechen “Afghans” were part of illegal armed groups during the fighting on the territory of the Chechen Republic. However, this did not prevent them from maintaining contacts with “Afghans” from Russian regions, who made requests to search for missing soldiers, as well as military personnel who were in captivity.

Military brotherhood turned out to be stronger than political prejudices. It is known that some of the Chechen “Afghans” were part of illegal armed groups during the fighting on the territory of the Chechen Republic. However, this did not prevent them from entering into contacts with “Afghans” from regions of Russia, who made requests to search for missing soldiers, as well as military personnel who were in captivity.

For example, veterans of the war in Afghanistan, with the help of their Chechen combat friends, assisted in the release of Major Morozov and his group of 50 people from captivity.

And here is how Major Morozov, commander of the 22nd Brigade Special Forces detachment of the GRU, captured by militants on January 8, 1995 in the mountains near the village of Komsomolskoye, recalls his meeting with the Chechen “Afghans” in the magazine “Brother” - January 2010: “In the first days of me interrogated by the chief of intelligence and the chief of counterintelligence of the Shali region. Both are former military men and served in Afghanistan.

It's getting dark. We are sitting in a cell. They come in: “Morozov, let’s go.” Well, I think it's starting. We leave the building of the State Security Department of the Shalinsky district, there used to be police there. They told me so quietly: “Just behave calmly, don’t twitch.” And we look almost the same. Everyone is wearing camouflage and black knitted hats. In just a few days I've already grown up.

We leave, cross the square and go into a cafe. We sit down at the table. They said something, and soon a bottle of vodka, pickles and some other snacks appeared on the table. They pour it and say: “Well, bro, let’s get to the meeting.” Like, “Afghan” brothers, etc. Then they say: “You know, we haven’t decided yet what to do with your detachment. But if it comes down to killing you, then you know that no hand will be raised against you. There’s a Zhiguli car standing there, let’s take you to Khasavyurt now, and everything will be fine with you. And then we’ll decide with the squad. I refused such an offer." As you know, the entire detachment returned home safely. This is the story about former brothers in arms who, by the will of fate, found themselves on opposite sides of the “barricades”.

With the help of Chechen "Afghans" in the summer of 1998, two more conscripts were released.
We must pay tribute to the young people of that time - our fellow countrymen, who walked the roads and gorges of Afghanistan with honor.

In total, 293 Chechens were awarded state awards. Military awards of our fellow countrymen, of which 1 person was awarded the Order of Lenin (posthumously), the Battle Red Banner 2 people (1 posthumously), two Orders of the Red Star - 2 people, the Order of the Red Star - 77 people (38 posthumously), the medal "For Courage" " - 109 and the medal "For Military Merit" - 84 people.

Document-certificate about losses in Afghanistan

A total of 13,833 people were killed or died from wounds and illnesses, including 1,979 officers.
A total of 49,985 people were wounded, including 7,132 officers.
6,669 people became disabled.
There are 330 people on the wanted list.
200 thousand people were awarded orders and medals of the USSR, of which 76 became Heroes of the Soviet Union. A total of 5,462,555 people passed through Afghanistan.
(Data from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, 1989)
Publicity. - 1991. - N 29.
* * *
According to updated data, the following people died in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989:
Russians - 6888
Ukrainians - 2378
Belarusians - 613
Uzbeks - 1086
Tatars - 442
Kazakhs - 362
Turkmens - 263
Tajiks - 236
Azerbaijanis - 195
Moldovans - 194
Kyrgyz - 102
Bashkirs - 98
Armenians – 95
Georgians - 81
Mordovians - 66
Lithuanians - 57
Mari - 49
Chechens - 47
Ossetians - 30
Kabardians - 25
Latvians - 23
Kalmyks - 22
Udmurts – 22
Komi - 16
Estonians - 15
Ingush - 12
Balkars - 9
Jews - 7
Abkhazians - 6
Karelians - 6
Karakalpaks - 5
Tuvans - 4
Buryats - 4
Yakuts - 1
other peoples and nationalities - 168
people of Dagestan - 101

Chechens occupy 18th place in the martyrology among representatives of 67 nationalities of the Soviet Union who took part in the Afghan war. Most of them were under twenty years old. War is a matter for the young, a medicine against wrinkles.

1

By February 15, 1989, Afghanistan was completely gone. A veteran of that war, Hero of Russia, Vyacheslav Bocharov recalls the feelings with which he left Afghanistan, and compares his Afghan experience with what he later had to endure in Chechnya.

“My mouth was like a toy”

“I didn’t want to leave. I was in business. I liked my job. My company was like a toy,” says Colonel Bocharov, a short, modestly dressed man with scars on the left side of his face - a trace of a terrible wound received during the storming of a school in Beslan - I submitted a report to stay. Then, already in the Union, I submitted a report to return ( Bocharov left Afghanistan back in 1983 - RIA Novosti). But here it is - you assume, but the command has it. The commanders decided that I was more needed in the Union."

Vyacheslav Bocharov arrived in Afghanistan in 1981 as deputy commander of the airborne reconnaissance company of the 213th Parachute Regiment. Bocharov still remembers how he flew to Kabul from Tashkent. It was like a scene from the Soviet movie "Platoon".

“A whole planeload of replacements like me arrived, and those who won theirs left for Tashkent on the same board. How different we were from each other! This difference was not so much that their faces were dark from the rays of the Afghan sun , as much as the internal state that is a consequence of being in conditions that involve risk to life. War leaves its mark on everyone,” he says.

© Photo: from the personal archive of Vyacheslav Bocharov

“Today it’s hard to understand, but then we were rushing to Afghanistan,” recalls Bocharov. “I was an officer, and I knew why my Motherland raised and fed me. I grew up following the examples of Spain ( Spanish Civil War 1936-1939). For me, Afghanistan was a kind of Spain."

Back in 1980, the first of Bocharov’s classmates at the Ryazan Airborne Forces School, Ivan Prokhor, died in Afghanistan: “They were already returning from a mission in two infantry fighting vehicles when they were ambushed. They were fired upon. One vehicle caught fire. Prokhor covered the first one, which had been hit, in his vehicle "so that all the fighters could be safely evacuated from it. And I myself fell under shrapnel."


© Photo: from the personal archive of Vyacheslav Bocharov

“What are you, fascists, or what?”

At the end of February 1982, Bocharov’s regiment moved to the area of ​​​​the city of Tagab - this is 50 km northeast of Kabul. Bocharov’s own company was ordered to occupy a commanding height from which the dushmans could fire at the Soviet column.

“Shuravi” (Soviet soldiers) came across an ambush of “spirits”: “a machine-gun burst rang out. I didn’t feel any pain, but I fell - as if someone had hit my legs with a club.” Bocharov noticed holes in the trousers. He put his hand in - there was blood. Three bullets hit him in the legs.

“I injected a painkiller. But I didn’t tell the soldiers about the wound. There would have been unnecessary panic, unnecessary thinking,” says the officer. “It was very difficult to shoot at people for the first time. To shoot at a person, even the one who just shot at you, It’s very difficult. We had to overcome this moment. And then things got easier.”

Bocharov's company managed to repel the attack of the dushmans. “We checked all the doors for bandits. We broke down the doors. We found one guy. And the soldiers were so furious: two of ours were wounded. They wanted to put him against the wall, although they were not sure that he also shot. I shouted to the soldiers: “Leave him alone!” What are you doing, fascists, or what?"

For that battle, Bocharov received the Order of the Red Star. After the hospital, he fought in Afghanistan for another year.

© Photo: from the personal archive of Vyacheslav Bocharov

© Photo: from the personal archive of Vyacheslav Bocharov

"Everything was done perfectly"

Bocharov has no doubt about the need for the USSR to participate in that war.

“I understood perfectly well: Afghanistan borders on our territory. If we are not on it, then the United States will come. And they will shoot right through, to the Urals, with their missile systems into the territory of the USSR.

We didn't come there on our own. We were invited by the Afghan government. The army was not tasked with destroying everyone and taking control of the entire territory. The task was to help the national army restore order. Afghan units acted together with us. We approach the village and tell the Afghans: act, you are the masters here. True, it often happened that the Afghans fled, and then we had to solve the assigned task.

Now our military personnel come to Afghanistan and are greeted as friends. I have a friend, Alexey Posokhov - we studied together, fought together - he told me how he recently went to Afghanistan. I met with one Afghan, he lifted his shirt and showed a scar: this scar is from a shuravi! And he smiles happily at the same time. Because we fought honestly. This was a war of equals.

Afghanistan, especially when compared with the Chechen company, is a strict fulfillment of all the requirements of the combat regulations. There was no laxity there. No disorganization in actions. Clearly, using the experience of both wars and exercises. Everything was done perfectly. A soldier must wash once a week - he did. Yes, there were linen lice. But we fried the laundry. In the evening before going to bed, you brush your teeth, look for lice in the seams and crush them - if you want to sleep peacefully.”

Odessa, who died in Grozny

In Chechen companies everything was completely different. In the first half of the 90s, Vyacheslav Bocharov already served in Moscow, at the General Staff of the Airborne Forces. He transferred here from Lithuania - after all, Russia began to withdraw its troops from the Baltic states. I transferred, but were not provided with housing, and my salary was delayed for months. To feed himself, Bocharov, like many headquarters officers, worked at night as a security guard in a convenience store. For the sake of a dorm room, I got a job as a janitor. “At five in the morning, I, a colonel, holder of orders, took a broom. You sweep, the broom goes to the pantry, and I go to the Airborne Forces headquarters. I didn’t leave the army: I hoped that this mess would end sooner or later.”

These were the realities of the country that started the war in Chechnya.

"The terrible first Chechnya. This is the result of the fact that there was no army. The union collapsed - the army was destroyed. There were some separate military formations, units. But they were practically demoralized. Troops were withdrawn from Eastern Europe, thrown into an open field. Where to put the family It’s not clear where to live. Everyone lives in tents. And suddenly they say: the war has begun. Let’s go to the Caucasus. There isn’t even a solid military unit. The commanders didn’t know their soldiers. Combined battalions, combined companies... They were pulled from everywhere. Sailors were even brought in! The sailors fought there, in the Caucasus! What kind of interaction could there be, what kind of training? There was no home front, everything was stolen. When you look at the photographs of that time, your heart bleeds. Poor soldiers, where your homeland threw you and forgot you there," Bocharov recalls.

And again, as in the days of Afghanistan, strings of “cargo-200” stretched out from the hot spot. Bocharov takes out a photograph of the New Bogorodskoye Cemetery (Novinsky district of the Moscow region) - it is lined with monuments to unknown soldiers who died in Chechnya. The remains have not yet been attributed. “Every year parents come here and go to the grave to which their heart leads them,” testifies Bocharov, who has seen this many times.

“My college classmate Volodya Selivanov died in the first Chechen war. At school his name was “Odessa” - he came from those places, and he was such a dashing guy, he loved to laugh. In Afghanistan he was the head of an intelligence regiment. We walk with him from the metro to headquarters, he says: “I’m going on a business trip in two days.” I didn’t attach any importance to it - not the first and not the last business trip of airborne headquarters officers. It’s a common phenomenon. I say: “Well, good luck!” Luck has turned away.”

After some time, Bocharov learned how Odessa died. He became one of one and a half thousand Russian soldiers and officers who died in the “New Year’s assault” on the capital of Chechnya on December 31, 1994. Colonel Selivanov's column entered Grozny from the eastern side and came under heavy fire from militants. He was not injured during the shelling, but the next day, while helping to drag the wounded, he received a sniper bullet in the back.

© Photo: from the personal archive of Vyacheslav Bocharov


© Photo: from the personal archive of Vyacheslav Bocharov

Chechnya, a meeting place for old friends

A few years after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the experience of the “Afghans” was in demand in Chechnya. Bocharov was invited to the FSB Special Purpose Center, to the famous Vympel. He became deputy detachment commander.

Soon Bocharov received another injury: the helicopter on which he and a special forces group were returning from a mission was shot down by Chechens in the Vedeno Gorge. The helicopter miraculously did not explode, but only fell into pieces. The Vympelovites found themselves in territory occupied by militants and surrounded by minefields. All with serious injuries, except for Bocharov himself and Major Andrei Chirikhin. While firing back, Bocharov and Chirikhin carried 16 wounded soldiers away from the helicopter. Then they had to fight their way to their own. Many of the fighters were later awarded for this battle - except for Bocharov himself, "since the operation did not take place without heavy losses."

And just three months later, his assistant Andrei Chirikhin died tragically - special forces captured a particularly dangerous criminal in the village of Tsentoroi. The militant surrounded himself with his own children so that the special forces could not shoot. And he himself shot Major Chirikhin. “We caught the bandit, but not in front of the children. Children have nothing to do with it...” - as if Bocharov is still making excuses for the death of his colleague.

“Many Afghans fought in Chechnya. By the way, not only on our side, but also on the Chechen side,” recalls the colonel.

Bocharov did not have the opportunity to meet his former colleagues in Afghanistan on the opposite side, but he remembered one local policeman, a senior police lieutenant in the village of Dachu-Borzoi. “He was not for us and not for the Chechens. He was for order. He was a good man, correct. The locals respected him.” In Afghanistan, a Chechen fought in the infantry. And soon he was killed by separatist militants.

There was another unexpected meeting. “We arrived in Khattuni (a village in the Vedeno region). I came to the location of the Airborne Forces group to see the commander. I introduce myself: Colonel Bocharov.

— Comrade Bocharov, have you been to Afghanistan?

- Don’t you remember me?

I look at him and say: no, I didn’t have such fat ones. And he is so dense and bald.

“I’m your medical instructor who bandaged your legs in Afghanistan!”

I remembered. It turned out that since then he had long become a Hero of Russia and a colonel.

Afghanistan and Chechnya, fighters and their opponents

“In Chechnya, it was the same Russian soldier, with all his traditions of mutual assistance. I can remember a lot of examples of heroism in Chechnya - how officers covered young soldiers with themselves or fell on grenades to save the rest. But the army itself was not the same - disorganized, demoralized . Many did not understand what they were doing there at all. Like, why should I risk my life in this turmoil? For whom? Ideals were blurred. There were simply a lot of young, unfired soldiers.

Or the story of the 6th company: a company of 90 people opposed a detachment of two thousand militants (February 29 - March 1, 2000 near Argun). No one came to her aid, and the Chechen militants confessed on air that they paid “500 pieces of greenery” to escape the encirclement.

There were more professionals in Chechnya than in Afghanistan. We fought not only against bandits - ours, Russian citizens. There were bastards of all stripes there, they came from all over the world. The intelligence services of all states worked. There is only one task - to begin the process of tearing Russia apart into smaller parts. And if it weren’t for the army with all its shortcomings, this would have happened. In Afghanistan they fought like peasants. There was more of the local population, ordinary dekhans (peasants). But they were good at using small arms, like all nomadic peoples.

I wanted to go to Chechnya.


© Photo: from the personal archive of Vyacheslav Bocharov