May 24, 1941 became a dark day for Great Britain: the battle cruiser Hood, the most famous and strongest ship of the Royal Navy at that time, was sunk in a short-lived battle in the Denmark Strait. His rival, the German battleship Bismarck, broke into the operational space of the Atlantic, accompanied by the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. The Bismarck's campaign, which ended with its death on May 27, its successful battle with the Hood became one of the central episodes of the Battle of the Atlantic, and its influence on the course of the war and the post-war development of the fleet turned out to be much greater than could be expected.

Dangerous situation

By the spring of 1941, a paradoxical situation had developed in the Atlantic theater of operations. The British Royal Navy, of course, had an overwhelming superiority over the Kriegsmarine of the Third Reich - including in the ships of the line class, which at that time were the basis of the main forces of the fleet. The British could formally oppose the two combat-ready German battleships - Scharnhorst and Gneisenau - and two more at the stage of commissioning, the more powerful Bismarck and Tirpitz, with a battle line of nine old battleships - four "mobilization" ships of the First World War II type "R" (the fifth ship of this type, "Royal Oak", was sunk by the submarine U-47 in the fall of 1939), five of their more advanced peers "Queen Elizabeth", three of which were radically modernized, two more modern - “Nelson” and “Rodney” built in the 1920s, two newest battleships of the “King George V” type and three high-speed battlecruisers - “Repulse”, “Rinaun” and “Hood”, also built at the end of the First World War.

Total - sixteen pennants in the battle line against four, while the British had three more battleships in construction, and the Germans had none (which, however, the British did not know about). However, this formal superiority instantly fades when analyzed in detail. Firstly, the geographical factor played a role. The original British war plan called for maintaining dominance in the Atlantic and Mediterranean and counterbalancing the Japanese deployment in the Far East. However, a key element in these calculations was the position of France, whose strong navy would support the Royal Navy in European waters. The defeat of France in 1940 deprived London of an ally, and a series of operations under the general name “Catapult”, which involved the capture and destruction of French ships in English and colonial ports in order to prevent them from passing under German control, turned the remnants of the French fleet into an enemy. Whether the actions of the British in the summer of 1940 were justified is debatable, but in any case, now they had to deal alone with both the Germans and the Italians who had joined them, without forgetting about the Far East.

Italy added to the naval forces of the Axis countries four battleships from the First World War that had undergone modernization, and four new ships of the Littorio class that were being completed. Potentially, this gave Berlin and Rome 12 battle-class ships, including 8 new and 4 old, against 19 (also taking into account the ships under construction) English ones, of which only 5 would have been new. Japan’s military preparations, which by 1941 had ten modernized battleships built in the 1910s-1920s and the construction of three battleships of a new type, finally reduced the former naval dominance of the British to nothing - an attempt to be strong everywhere threatened with defeat in any of the three key naval theaters of war for the empire.

The comparative characteristics of the ships in these conditions were of secondary importance, but they did not add optimism: economic problems allowed the empire to modernize only three battleships and one battle cruiser of the old construction, and also forced them to seriously reduce the characteristics of the new ships being built, which seriously reduced the chances in the event of probable military clashes of the main fleet forces.

However, the Royal Navy would be unworthy of its name if it did not seize chances even in these conditions: after the cold-blooded reprisal of the French ships in July 1940, the Italians began to suffer. On November 12, 1940, in an attack on the main base of the Italian Navy Taranto, 20 torpedo bombers and Swordfish bombers, rising from the deck of the British aircraft carrier Illustrious, achieved torpedo hits on three battleships - Conte di Cavour, Caio Duilio and the newest Littorio " Cavour was out of action for the rest of the war, Littorio and Duilio for several months each, making things much easier for British forces in the Mediterranean. Among other consequences of the attack, one can note a careful study of its results by the office of the Japanese naval attaché in Rome, but Tokyo representatives did not share their conclusions with anyone then.

In March 1941, the suffering of the Regia Marina - the Royal Italian Navy - continued: in the battle off Cape Matapan, the Italians lost three heavy cruisers sunk, and the newest battleship Vittorio Veneto was seriously damaged. This success of the British, which they themselves perceived as an offensive failure - the damaged enemy battleship managed to escape - firmly locked the Italian Navy in the bases, allowing the British to continue escorting convoys around the Mediterranean, despite heavy losses caused by attacks by aircraft and submarines. In general, despite all the “buts” and potential threats, this theater remained with the Royal Navy, and the material results were fairly reinforced by the self-confidence achieved in the battles - the Italians did not want to get involved in an open battle with British battleships - whether new or outdated.

This confidence also reigned in the Atlantic, even after the raid of the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in February 1941. Despite the relative success - a breakthrough through the British operational zone from the North Sea to the Bay of Biysk, arrival in Brest without losses and the destruction of 22 enemy merchant ships with a total tonnage of 115,600 tons - the same pattern was confirmed as in the Mediterranean. The Germans, fearing losses, avoided contact with British battleships, retreating first from convoy HX-106, which was escorting the outdated and not modernized battleship Ramillies, and then from SL-67, in whose escort the Germans discovered a slightly more advanced, but also outdated ship "Malaya". Under these conditions, the readiness for battle of the two newest German battleships - the Bismarck and the Tirpitz - was perceived by the British rather philosophically: the Huns' submarines in the Atlantic and their bombers in the Mediterranean posed a much more significant threat.

Operation Rhineland Exercise

The February breakthrough of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau convinced the Germans of the need to continue raider operations of large surface ships in the Atlantic: the commissioning of new battleships promised a qualitative advantage more significant than that of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the 280-mm main caliber of which is all it was considered insufficient to successfully confront British battleships carrying main battery guns from 356 to 406 millimeters. "Bismarck" and "Tirpitz" carried 380-mm main caliber artillery, eight of the latest guns with increased rate of fire and accuracy in four turrets, surpassing in firepower both the new British "King George" with their ten 356-mm barrels, and older ships with eight 381-mm guns from the First World War, which were inferior to the Bismarck in terms of firing range, speed and protection, and the Nelsons, whose 406-mm guns were not very successful. Moreover, the battlecruisers Repulse and Renown were inferior to the new German ships, whose 30-knot speed, prohibitive for battleships of the First World War and high even for the Second World War, was bought at the cost of weakening armor protection and reducing the number of main caliber barrels from eight to six.

Battleship Bismarck
Built by Blohm&Voss shipyard, Hamburg.
Laid down: 07/01/1936
Launched: 02/14/1939
Transferred to the Navy: 08/24/1940
Reached combat readiness: 02.1941

Displacement: 41,700 t standard; 50,900 tons total.
Length/width/draft, meters: 251/36/10.2
Reservations: main belt 320 mm, upper belt 145 mm, belt at the ends 60/80 mm, main deck 80-110 mm, steering gear 110-150 mm, main gun turrets 180-360 mm, main gun barbettes 340 mm, SK turrets 35- 100 mm, conning tower 200-350 mm, torpedo bulkhead 45 mm.

Energy: boiler-turbine power plant, 12 steam boilers, three shafts, total power 110 MW.
Full speed: 30.6 knots.

Weapons:
main caliber - 8 × 380 mm SKC34 (4 × 2),
medium caliber - 12 × 150 mm (6 × 2)
anti-aircraft artillery - 16 × 105 mm (8 × 2),
16 × 37 mm (8 × 2),
20 × 20 mm (20 × 1).
Aviation group: four reconnaissance seaplanes, one steam catapult.

Crew on the day of going to sea: 2220 people.

Only the larger than both of these ships, the Hood, could compete with the new Germans on equal terms - although it had not undergone modernization, it was in good technical condition, gave almost 30 knots of speed, had adequate (as it seemed) armor protection and eight 381 -millimeter main caliber guns. The most famous and popular ship of the Royal Navy at that time, named after the famous officer dynasty, the last representative of which was Rear Admiral Horace Hood, who died in the Battle of Jutland, was the first in its series - and the only one: the construction of three more ships was canceled after the First global for financial reasons. Combined with the excellent training of the crew, who had solid combat experience, the characteristics of the Hood made it the most valuable ship in the fleet. These qualities also determined its place in the structure of the Royal Navy: the ship was part of the Home Fleet, which was responsible for maintaining dominance in the North Atlantic, that is, in the “home” theater of war, the most important from the point of view of the empire.

On May 18, 1941, two ships left the German naval base of Gotenhafen - the battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen with 203 mm artillery. The second newest battleship, the Tirpitz, has not yet reached combat readiness, and Kriegsmarine commander Grand Admiral Erich Raeder refused the proposal of the commander of the surface fleet, Admiral Gunther Lütjens, to postpone the start date of the operation.

On May 21, the British Admiralty began to suspect that “something was going on”: the British attaché in Stockholm transmitted a radiogram that a detachment of two German heavy ships had been spotted in the Kattegat Strait the day before by the Swedish cruiser Gotland, and in the evening of the same day about Norwegian resistance fighters informed the same detachment on the radio: the Germans had anchored in the port of Bergen.

On May 22, the German detachment was photographed by a British aerial reconnaissance, and London accurately determined the enemy’s forces: the British knew that the Tirpitz was not ready to go to sea and that the Admiral Hipper was under repair.

On the same day, the commander of the Home Fleet, Admiral Sir John Tovey, sent a detachment consisting of the battle cruiser Hood, the newest battleship Prince of Wales and escort destroyers to the Denmark Strait between the islands of Greenland and Iceland, under the overall command of Rear Admiral Lancelot Holland, who was on aboard the Hood. In the strait itself, a screen of two heavy cruisers, the Suffolk and the Norfolk, unfolded, which were supposed to detect the Germans when they appeared. Another likely route for the German detachment - a wide passage between the Faroe Islands and Iceland - was provided by a screen of three light cruisers. On the night of May 23, John Tovey left the Scapa Flow base in the Orkney Islands aboard the battleship King George V at the head of a detachment that also included the aircraft carrier Victorious and escort ships. The British commander intended to take a position west of Scotland, which would allow him to intercept the German detachment along any route. There he waited for reinforcements to arrive in the form of the battle cruiser Repulse.

The battle

On the evening of May 23, British cruisers in the Denmark Strait noticed the Germans - and soon the leading Bismarck opened fire on the Norfolk. Not having the task of “stopping with their breasts” a clearly superior enemy, the British retreated, continuing to maintain radar and visual contact. The Germans also had radars, but due to shocks during firing, the Bismarck's bow radar failed, and Admiral Günther Lütjens placed the Prinz Eugen in command. The British did not notice this change of formation in the thickening cloudy darkness, believing that Bismarck was still leading the detachment. Admiral Holland, having received the radar contact data, led two of his linear units to intercept, obviously being confident of success: 18 barrels with a caliber of 356-381 millimeters against eight German ones gave a solid advantage, even despite the not very high reliability of the newest four-gun turrets of the recently commissioned "Prince of Wales".

Battlecruiser Hood
Built by John Brown & Company, Clydebank.
Laid down: 09/01/1916
Launched: 08/22/1918
Transferred to the Navy: 05/15/1920

Displacement: 41,125 t standard; 47,430 tons total.
Length/width/draft, meters: 267.5/31.7/9
Reservations: belt 305 mm, upper belt 127-178 mm, barbettes 305 mm, deck 25+38 mm, conning tower 76.2-280 mm, anti-torpedo bulkhead 38 mm.

Energy: boiler-turbine power plant, 24 steam boilers, four shafts, total power 106 MW.
Full speed according to the project is 31 knots, in 1941 - 29 knots.

Weapons:
main caliber - 8x381 mm Mk I (4x2)
anti-aircraft artillery - 14 x 102 mm Mk XVI (7x2)
3x8 40mm pom-pom mounts
5x4 12.7 mm Vickers machine guns
5x20 installations of anti-aircraft unguided rockets UP.
Torpedo armament - 2x2 533 mm torpedo tubes.
Aviation group: reconnaissance seaplane, one steam catapult.

Crew on the day of death: 1421 people.

At 05:35 on May 24, lookouts on the Prince of Wales discovered a German detachment at a distance of 17 nautical miles (28 kilometers), by which time the Germans had already established radar contact. The unnoticed restructuring of the German ships played a cruel joke on the British: the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen had silhouettes that were confusingly similar, and the large distance did not allow one to notice the difference in the sizes of the battleship and the heavy cruiser.

The British began to approach at full speed and at 05:52 began shooting at the lead ship, believing that it was the Bismarck. The Germans also did not immediately understand the tactical situation, mistaking the Hood for a light cruiser for some time, but soon identified both opponents. It is unknown how much this mistake of the Germans influenced subsequent events - it is possible that, having identified both opponents at once, Gunter Lütjens would have retreated, taking advantage of the advantage in speed, as the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had previously retreated even when meeting with a single old battleship.

Radiogram with a message about the death of "Hood"

British naval forces intercepted early this morning off the coast off Greenland German naval forces including battleship Bismarck. The enemy were attacked and during the ensuing action HMS Hood (Captain R. Kerr, CBE, RN) wearing the flag of Vice-Admiral L.E. Holland, CBE, receive an unlucky hit in magazine and blew up. The Bismarck has damage and the pursuite of the enemy continues.

It is feared there will be few survivors from HMS Hood.

A British formation near the coast of Greenland early in the morning intercepted a German one, which included the battleship Bismarck. The enemy was attacked, and in the ensuing affair His Majesty's ship Hood (Captain Kerr CBE, Royal Navy), under the flag of Vice-Admiral Holland CBE, was unsuccessfully hit in the magazines and exploded. The Bismarck is damaged and the pursuit of the enemy continues.

I fear that few will escape from His Majesty's ship Hood.

At 06:00, a German salvo from a distance of 8 to 9.5 miles (it is not possible to establish more precisely due to the death of the main participants in the events) covered the Hood, on which a large fire broke out, and a few moments later the battle cruiser exploded. Of the 1,421 people on board, the escorting destroyers were able to save only three. The Prince of Wales, sailing half a mile from Hood, was hit by a hail of debris, and a few minutes later the German detachment transferred fire to the surviving battleship. The Germans managed to damage one of the ship's four-gun turrets, the second failed due to mechanical failure, and the British were left with one main-caliber two-gun turret against the Germans' eight "big guns." Nevertheless, during this short time, the Prince of Wales scored three hits on the Bismarck, damaging the enemy’s bow group of fuel tanks with one of the shells. An oil trail followed the German.

The enemy's advantage, however, remained undeniable: having received seven hits, including three 380-mm shells from the Bismarck and four 203-mm shells from the Prinz Eugen, the commander of the Prince of Wales, Captain John Leach, laid a smoke screen and left from the battle. The battleship and two cruisers continued to maintain contact with the German detachment, transmitting a message about what was happening to Admiral John Tovey. The Germans, in turn, not knowing about the condition of the opponent, also considered it best to interrupt the battle and continued their journey to the south. The Bismarck, which had been hit by fuel tanks, slowly began to bury its nose in the water. A patch was placed under the hole, but this did not prevent significant volumes from flooding in the bow of the ship.

The consequences are greater than expected

The death of the Hood could not simply be left alone: ​​all available combat units nearby rushed into the North Atlantic. On the evening of the same May 24, the Bismarck again came into fire contact with the Prince of Wales and the accompanying cruisers, covering the departure of the Prinz Eugen for an independent raid. Having assessed the damage to the battleship, Admiral Lutyens decides not to risk the best German ship, and, having released the cruiser on a solo voyage, go with the Bismarck to Brest, where three months earlier he had safely brought the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. He failed to realize this plan - after three days of a dramatic chase and two attacks by torpedo bombers, the second of which, carried out by Swordfish from the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, deprived the Bismarck of steering control, the British caught up with the enemy. On May 27 at 10:39 the Bismarck was sunk. The British did not suffer any losses - the German battleship, almost devoid of speed, could not adequately maneuver and adjust artillery fire in the stormy sea; in addition, one of the first hits destroyed the main rangefinder post of the Bismarck. Nevertheless, the ship held out under fire from two British battleships for almost three hours and was finally sunk by torpedoes from cruisers that approached the minimum distance after the Bismarck’s guns stopped firing, having exhausted their ammunition. Along with the battleship, Admiral Lutyens, the commander of the ship Lindeman and another 2,104 people out of the 2,220 on board were killed.

The consequences of the battle, however, turned out to be much more significant than simply excluding two units of the main forces of the fleet from the enemy forces. First of all, the almost instantaneous sinking of the battlecruiser and the subsequent stubborn resistance of the Bismarck forced the British to reconsider their views on the combat capabilities of German ships and to constantly maintain in the Home Fleet a sufficient number of modern battleships and aircraft carriers to guarantee the neutralization of the Germans in the event of a new breakthrough into the Atlantic, so and did not take place.

This had a serious impact on the Royal Navy's capabilities in other theaters. Firstly, in the Mediterranean Sea, especially after German submarines sank the battleship Barham and the aircraft carrier Ark Royal in the fall of 1941, and Italian underwater saboteurs seriously damaged the battleships Valiant and Queen Elizabeth in the harbor of Alexandria. Secondly, in the Far East, where the Prince of Wales, a survivor of the battle with Bismarck, together with the battle cruiser Repulse, was sent to intercept Japanese convoys with troops without adequate escort and without air cover. "Repulse" and "Prince of Wales" died on December 10, 1941 in the South China Sea under the attack of torpedo bombers and coastal bombers of the Imperial Japanese Navy, as heroically as it was senseless, without causing any damage to the enemy, except for the four downed aircraft.

For the Soviet Union, this episode of the war at sea was important primarily due to the increased caution demonstrated by the British fleet when escorting polar convoys, the extreme expression of which was the defeat of convoy PQ-17 in July 1942, which was actually abandoned on orders from London in the face of a hypothetical threat from the Germans. large ships, which by that time had moved to Norway.

The distant echo of the battle between the Bismarck and the Hood, however, echoed over the Atlantic for another decade and a half after the war, when one of the main threats to the Western Allied Navy was considered the breakthrough into the ocean of Soviet heavy artillery ships - cruisers of Project 68, 68-bis and supposed battleships and battlecruisers, reports of the construction of which in the USSR have long excited the minds of Western naval analysts. To neutralize this hypothetical threat, the United States and Great Britain continued to maintain in service and in reserve the battleships remaining after the war - since aircraft carriers and aircraft of that period did not guarantee success in the difficult climatic conditions of the North Atlantic, and developed projects for new ships with powerful artillery weapons, united under the common name " Sverdlov-killers" - in honor of the lead cruiser of Project 68-bis "Sverdlov".

Finally, the ghost of a heavy artillery ship suddenly appearing from behind a horizon hidden by clouds among gloomy waves and creeping fog dissipated only towards the end of the 1950s - by that time it became clear that the Soviet Union in the naval war had relied on the development of naval missile-carrying aviation and nuclear power. submarine fleet, and large guns as weapons of naval warfare remained the property of history.

Battle in the Denmark Strait
The Battle of Denmark Strait, also known as the Battle of Iceland, was essentially a short engagement lasting just over a quarter of an hour. But this was a clash of titans - the largest battleships in the world at that time tested themselves and their strength, and it ended with the death of one of these giants.
Early in the morning of May 24, the weather cleared and visibility improved. The Germans followed a course of 220 degrees at a speed of 28 knots, and at 05.25 Prinz Eugen's sonars detected the noise of the propellers of two ships on the port side. At 05.37, the Germans visually spotted what they initially thought was a light cruiser at a distance of 19 miles (35 km) on the port side. At 05.43 they found another silhouette and sounded the combat alarm. On Bismarck they still haven’t decided what exactly they are observing, mistakenly believing that these are heavy cruisers. But the fact is that accurate identification of enemy ships was of great importance for the upcoming battle, since it was necessary to determine the type of shells to fire. The artillery commander of Prince Eugen, Captain-Lieutenant Pauls Jasper, decided by a strong-willed decision that they were observing the heavy cruisers of the British, and ordered the guns to be loaded with the appropriate shells. In fact, Hood and Prince of Wales were rapidly approaching the Germans, heading 280 degrees, with a speed of 28 knots. It is likely that Vice Admiral Holland, aware of the weakness of the battlecruiser Hood in long-range combat, wanted to get as close as possible in order to gain advantages or at least negate possible benefits for the enemy. So Lutyens had no choice whether to get involved or not. The fight was inevitable.
Two 381mm shells land next to Prinz Eugen

The British also made a mistake in recognizing the silhouettes, and deciding that Bismarck should have been the lead, Holland ordered Hood and the Prince of Wales to open fire on the lead. After which the British ships turned 20 degrees to the right, thereby taking a heading of 300 degrees. At 05.52 Holland finally figured out that it was not Bismarck who was leading and gave the appropriate commands, but for some reason Hood continued to track the lead, Prinz Eugen. The Prince of Wales correctly carried out the command and turned his sights on Bismarck, who was following in the wake of Prinz Eugen at a distance of about a mile. Suddenly, at 05.52.5, Hood opened fire, being at a distance of 12.5 miles. Following him, the Prince of Wales spat out the first salvos. Both ships fired salvos from the bow turrets; the stern ones could not be put into action due to the angle of approach being too acute. Admiral Lutyens informed the command by radiogram “Entered battle with two heavy enemy ships” - and surrendered to the elements of battle.
The first shells from Prince of Wales split up - some flew over Bismarck, others fell into the sea astern. Immediately after the opening of fire, the Prince of Wales began to experience technical problems, and to begin with, the first gun of the first bow turret failed. The next volleys of the Welsh also did not hit the target, whizzing over the Aryan heads and exploding in a safe distance. Hood's first salvos fell short, however, dousing the cruiser with water from explosions - let me remind you that Hood opened fire on Prinz Eugen.

Dora Tower is on fire! Bismarck comes into play.
Bismarck opens fire on Hood

The shells of the British scoundrels began to fall closer and closer, but the German guns were still silent. Bismarck's artillery commander, Lieutenant Commander Adalbert Schneider, asked for the go-ahead to fire without waiting for commands from the ship's command post. Adalbert was at the fire control post on the foremast. Finally, at 05.55, when the British turned 20 degrees and thereby helped the Germans understand that they were dealing with Hood and the King George V-class battleship, Bismarck opened fire, immediately followed by Prinz Eugen. At this time the distance was about 11 miles (20,300 meters). Both German ships concentrated their fire on the enemy's lead ship, the battlecruiser Hood. Bismarck's first salvo was an undershoot. At this time, the commander of Prinz Eugen orders the commander of the mine-torpedo warhead, Lieutenant Reimann, to load the port side torpedo tubes with torpedoes with a diameter of 53.3 cm and open fire, without waiting for commands from the bridge, as soon as the ship reaches the torpedo fire zone, at the discretion of the lieutenant. The 5th salvo of the Welsh again overshot, but the sixth, it is possible, hit the battleship, although the Prince of Wales did not record a hit. The Germans' return fire cannot be called anything other than sniper fire. At 05.57 Prinz Eugen recorded the first hit, his shells hitting Hood in the area of ​​the mainmast. The shell explosions caused a large fire, the flames spread to the second chimney.
Bismarck also suffered the famous hit that pierced the fuel tank, and now a trail in the form of a wide fuel oil stain remained behind the battleship. Lutyens ordered Prinz Eugen to shift fire to the Prince of Wales, and Bismarck's artillerymen to open fire with second-caliber guns on the Prince of Wales.

Destruction of Hood
Bismarck fires on Hood

At 06.00, Hood and the Prince of Wales began to turn left by 20 degrees, thereby giving the main caliber aft turrets the opportunity to take over. And just at this time, Bismarck’s fifth salvo covered Hood with direct hits. The distance at that time was already less than 9 miles (16,668 km). At least one 15-inch shell from the salvo pierced Hood's armor belt, flew into the powder magazine and exploded there. The explosion that followed horrified eyewitnesses with its force. Hood, the Great Hood, which for 20 years was the largest battleship in the world, the pride of the Royal Navy, split in two and sank in just three minutes. At a point with coordinates 63 degrees 22 minutes north latitude, 32 degrees 17 minutes west longitude. The stern section sank first, stern up, followed by the bow, stem up. No one had time to leave the ship, everything was so fast. Of the 1,418 people on board, only three were saved... Admiral Holland and his staff, ship commander Ralph Kerr and other officers were killed. The three survivors were picked up from the water by the destroyer Electra and later landed them in Reykjavik.
06.01 Hood takes off, view from Prinz Eugen

After Hood's explosion, Bismarck turned to the right and transferred fire to the still living Prince of Wales. The British battleship was also forced to turn to avoid crashing into the sinking remains of Hood, and thus found itself between the sinking Hood and the Germans, representing an excellent target. The Germans did not miss their goal. At 06.02 a Bismarck shell exploded in the conning tower of the Prince of Wales, killing everyone there except the battleship's commander, John Catterall, and one other man. The distance was reduced to 14,000 meters, now even the shells of the largest anti-aircraft caliber of Prinz Eugen could reach the poor fellow of Wales, and of course, the anti-aircraft guns also opened fire. If the English battleship did not want to share Hood’s fate, he had to get away. And quickly. The British put up a smoke screen and rushed to retreat at maximum speed. They got it hard - four hits from Bismarck and three from Prinz Eugen. Finally, burning with revenge, the British fired three volleys from the “Y” tower, which was controlled independently at the time of shooting, but to no avail; all the volleys missed. At 06.09 the Germans fired their final salvo and the Battle of the Denmark Strait ended. Many sailors from the Prince of Wales, probably, after this campaign, lit candles in the church in memory of their savior, Admiral Lutyens. The fact is that the British were amazed by the fact that the German raiders did not finish off the Prince of Wales. Most likely, there is only one reason - Lutyens was in a hurry to get away from the main forces of the British rushing to the battlefield, and decided not to waste time on the chase. There is no doubt that Lutyens and the raider sailors, inspired by victory, wanted nothing more at that moment than to catch up with Wales and send Hoodoo to the company, but the circumstances - due to the choice made by Lutyens - were stronger.
Between 02/06 and 09/06, Bismarck transfers fire to the battleship Prince of Wales after the sinking of Hood. The most famous photograph of Bismarck, recognized as one of the best photographs of the Second World War. Taken from Prinz Eugen. The battleship's stern turrets are firing. This is not twilight, the photo turned out to be darkened by the bright flashes of the salvo.

Prince Eugen did not suffer any damage from the British fire, except for the deck that became wet from nearby explosions and several fragments that clanked helplessly on the deck. But Bismarck got it hard. The English sailors were not the kind to die with impunity. Three heavy shells hit the left side of the battleship, most likely all three from the Prince of Wales. The first struck the battleship in the middle of the hull below the waterline, pierced the plating below the armor belt and exploded inside the hull, causing the flooding of power station No. 4 on the port side. Water began to flow into the neighboring boiler room No. 2, but emergency batches stopped the flow. The second shell pierced the hull above the armor belt and came out from the starboard side without exploding, but making a hole with a diameter of 1.5 meters. As a result, about 2,000 tons of water poured into the tank premises, the fuel tank was damaged, and the battleship lost 1,000 tons of fuel. Plus a trail of spreading fuel... The third shell pierced the boat without any other consequences.
Scheme of the battle in the Denmark Strait

The overall result of all these hits was that Bismarck's speed dropped to 28 knots. There was a trim of 3 degrees on the bow and a roll of 9 degrees on the port side, which is why the right propeller was exposed from time to time. We had to take water into the ballast tanks to eliminate the list.
Technically speaking, nothing serious happened to Bismarck. It did not lose its combat capability, its speed remained sufficient, and only 5 people from the crew received minor injuries - in other words, scratches. The most serious consequence was the loss of a considerable part of the fuel.

Raid and sinking of the battleship Bismarck

On May 27, 1941, a landmark event occurred in the history of World War II: the English fleet destroyed the most powerful warship of that time, the German battleship Bismarck. Destroyed after a long, adventurous chase, losing “the pride and symbol of the British Empire” - the heavy cruiser Hood.

Why iconic? The main thing is in the context of that time: Hitler sought to give Stalin a clear signal that he was seriously preparing for an invasion of the British Isles. So seriously that he is ready to throw his strongest, newly commissioned battleship into battle. There was a little more than a month left until D-Day, the date of the attack on the Soviet Union, and in a series of German diversionary maneuvers, the cruise of the battleship Bismarck became the most striking event. He died, but they people in the top Soviet leadership, who shared with Stalin the hope of a Wehrmacht attack on the British Isles, knew that Bismarck’s sister battleship Tirpitz, as well as the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser, were already preparing to go to sea “Prince Eugen”, who went on a raid with “Bismarck”, but managed to avoid his fate. So for these people, the voyage of the battleship Bismarck was supposed to symbolize the prologue to the imminent, deadly German attack on England.

The main thing is in the long-term historical perspective: the death of the battleship Bismarck marked another step in the change in the main active forces on the naval scene. In his memoirs, Churchill writes that the credit for the victory over Bismarck belongs to all types of naval forces, but “battleships played a decisive role at the beginning and end of the battle.” It seems that the preferences of the “former naval sailor” that he acquired during the era of World War I were reflected here. Because the main role was played by aviation, and primarily by the low-speed Swordfish biplanes (like our Po-2, but somewhat larger).

From the very beginning of World War II, aviation played an active role in armed conflicts at sea - British, mainly carrier-based, and German coastal aviation (Germany did not have aircraft carriers).

But aviation made its first serious bid for leadership in March 1941, when the same “Swordfish” marked the beginning of the defeat of the powerful Italian squadron.

A year later, in May 1942, the Battle of the Coral Sea occurred in the western Pacific Ocean. It was an unusual naval battle: the American and Japanese squadrons were separated by a distance of 350 kilometers. The opponents did not see each other even on radar screens. Here - for the first time in naval history - aviation became the main striking force on both sides. A new era has arrived - the era of aircraft carriers.

How it was

Laid down July 1, 1936
Launched 14 February 1939
Entered service - August 24, 1940
Total combat displacement 50,129 tons
Waterline length 241.5 meters
Weapons:
4 main caliber turrets (Anton, Bruno, Dora, Caesar) with 8 38 cm caliber guns. All shells - 800 kg, firing range 36,520 meters
12 15 cm caliber guns
16 - 10.5 cm
16 - 3.7 cm
18 - 2 cm
Speed ​​29 knots
Cruising range 8,525 miles (at 19 knots)
Armor protection of sides - 320 mm
Deck protection above gun magazines - 95 mm
4 Arado Ar 196 aircraft
Crew 2065 people

Raid of the battleship “Bismarck”

May 18-22, 1941
The battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, under the command of the commander of the German surface fleet, Admiral Lutyens, begin their raid. They enter Norway, where they wait for suitable weather, and then head north into the Denmark Strait.

May 21, 1941
An English reconnaissance plane discovers German ships in the Bergen Fjord.

May 22, 1941
New intelligence establishes that the ships have disappeared from there

May 23, 1941
The battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen were discovered in the Denmark Strait by the English heavy cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk. The British determine the course and speed of the German raiders. By order of the commander of the British fleet, a number of battleships and cruisers, as well as aircraft carriers, are sent to the north Atlantic. The first wave includes the battleship Prince of Wales and the cruiser Hood, accompanied by six destroyers. The Germans, in turn, established that they had been discovered, and despite the heavy oncoming wave, they increased their speed.

May 24, 1941
German raiders, accompanied by the cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk, are sailing in the North Atlantic, pressing against the ice fields off the coast of Greenland.
-03 40. The English unit is heading towards rapprochement with the German raiders.
-05 35. English ships establish contact with German ones. At this moment, two mistakes made by the British take their toll. Firstly, the commander of the English formation, Vice Admiral Holland, ordered to fire at the more powerful Bismarck, believing that he was leading the ranks. Meanwhile, the host was “Prince Eugen”. The second mistake was more serious. The British chose the wrong tactical position for the battle. Their ships are crossing the Germans on a course in which their main caliber stern turrets - eight out of 18 guns - cannot operate. The Germans initially gain an advantage in the power of a gun salvo.

-05 52. The British open fire at a distance of 22.7 km. The English shells travel over a long distance, but the Prince of Wales manages to hit the battleship Bismarck.
-05 55. The Germans open fire. With the second salvo, they cover the cruiser Hood ahead, on which a strong fire breaks out.

May 24, 1941 05.55 am The battleship Bismarck opens fire on the cruiser Hood

-06 00. Seeing the disadvantage of his position, Vice Admiral Holland orders a change of course 20 degrees to the left in order to bring the aft turrets into action and fight on parallel courses. The battleship Bismarck is again hit by a heavy shell.

-06 01 When starting to turn, the Hood is hit by a heavy Bismarck shell. A dazzlingly bright column of flame rises behind the bow superstructure of the cruiser. A huge ship, breaking in half, goes under the water. The destroyers arrive in time and pick up only three sailors from a crew of more than 1,500 people. At the same moment, “Prince of Wales” achieves a third hit on “Bismarck”.
(The reasons for such a quick death of the cruiser "Hood" were analyzed by Academician Krylov. See his "Memoirs" by Yu.M.)

The German ships transfer fire to the English battleship; it receives hits from five 381-mm shells from the battleship Bismarck and three 203-mm shells from the Prinz Eugen. The battleship “Prince of Wales” is covered with a smoke screen and leaves the battlefield, without however letting the German raiders out of sight of their radars.

May 24, 1941, day
The battleship “Prince of Wales” went to sea not yet “brought to condition.” (The main caliber towers, for example, had not yet been accepted from the builders. And one of them simply failed during the battle). Despite this and the damage received, he continues to follow the German raiders along with the Norfolk and Suffolk.

May 24, 1941, day
Admiral Lutyens decides to change the operation plan: to separate the ships and send the Prinz Eugen on a raid on an independent route. This later saved the ship from almost certain destruction.
This decision of Lutyens was due to a serious reason: one of the heavy shells from the battleship Prince of Wales damaged two bow fuel tanks of the Bismarck. The battleship Bismarck loses fuel, water floods the bow compartments, and the ship's speed drops noticeably. Lutyens rejects his officers' advice to return to Germany for repairs via the northern route. And he decides to make his way to Brest (France), where there is a dock capable of accommodating the battleship Bismarck.

May 24, 1941, day
The British are not aware of the serious damage to the battleship Bismarck and are gathering all their forces to intercept it in the north Atlantic, preventing it from reaching numerous convoys crossing the ocean.
Following the battleship Bismarck and almost next to it are the cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk under the command of Rear Admiral Wake-Walker. The battleship Prince of Wales is located right there.
From the northeast, under the command of the commander of the metropolitan fleet, Admiral Sir John Tovey, a flagship squadron consisting of the battleship King George V, the battle cruiser Repulse and the aircraft carrier Victorias is moving.
From the east are the battleship Rodney, the cruisers London, Edinburgh, Dorsetshire and several flotillas of destroyers.
The battleships “Rammiles” and “Rivend” are coming from the west.
Admiral Sommerville's squadron is moving from the south, consisting of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the battle cruiser Renown and the cruiser Sheffield.
The British leave all their convoys and transport routes unguarded and gather their ships into a huge ring in the northeastern Atlantic, hoping for a huge superiority in forces.
But fate almost laughed at them.

May 24, 1941
-18 00-19 00. The battleship Bismarck makes a turn and, unexpectedly for the British, comes straight towards them. The English ships are leaving. At this moment, the cruiser Prinz Eugen is hiding in the early evening haze, heading southwest. “Bismarck” turns around and continues its journey southeast to the shores of France.
May 24, 1941
22 00. The aircraft carrier "Vicories" is approaching the battleship "Bismarck" and, despite the late hour, lifts into the air its "Swordfish" torpedo bombers - a biplane torpedo bomber model, obsolete by the beginning of the Second World War, with a speed of 200 kilometers per hour. 9 planes find the battleship Bismarck in pitch darkness and throw torpedoes, only one hits the target, but does not cause serious damage.
(The warheads of English torpedoes were filled with dynamite, while the Germans were already using a composition containing hexogen for torpedoes. Yu.M.)

May 25, 1941
-03 06. The battleship Bismarck makes a turn again and goes on the attack against a detachment of Wake-Walker ships. The British retreat and lose contact with the German battleship. Continuing its journey to the southeast, the Bismarck slips through the cordon of English ships and finds a sure chance to escape pursuit.
But then the “radio war” begins.

May 25, 1941, day
The battleship Bismarck sends a radiogram, and the British take the direction of the ship. But when transmitting the data to the fleet, they make a mistake and some of the English ships turn on the opposite course - towards Iceland. The error is discovered, but several precious hours are lost.

May 26, 1941
7 00-8 00 “Bismarck” sends two radiograms, one of which can be deciphered. From it the British learn about Lutyens’ decision to break through to Brest. But the exact location of the Bismarck still remains unknown to them.

May 26, 1941
10-30 The flying boat Catalina of the British Coastal Aviation Command discovers the battleship Bismarck.

May 26, 1941, day
The British realize that the battleship Bismarck has a real chance of breaking through to Brest. To stop him, Admiral Tovey decides to throw torpedo bombers into battle from the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, located 130 kilometers from the battleship Bismarck.
The weather is terrible: continuous rain, large waves overwhelm the take-off deck, and the pitch of the aircraft carrier reaches 30 degrees. The clouds lie just above the sea. Visibility does not exceed hundreds of meters. In such a situation, ten Swordfish aircraft still take off and head for the enemy. But the first on their course is the English cruiser Sheffield, next in close proximity to the Bismarck. In conditions of disgusting visibility, torpedo bombers mistake the cruiser Sheffield for the battleship Bismarck and attack it. Fortunately, not a single torpedo hits the target.

May 26, 1941
19 00 - 20 00
The weather continues to worsen. The storm is getting stronger. Visibility drops. Evening is coming. But the aircraft carrier Ark Royal decides to repeat the raid. The last fresh 15 crews take off from the swinging deck and head for the Bismarck. As with the first two raids, the artillery of the battleship Bismarck meets the low-speed biplanes with powerful anti-aircraft fire. The air above the ship is surrounded by a dense ring of discontinuities. Breaking through it, the British attack on different courses and at different heights. Their persistence brings success. Two, maybe three torpedoes hit the target. The explosion of one of them, which hit the stern of the ship, turns out to be fatal for the Bismarck. This explosion disables the rudder control system and damages the battleship's propellers. The Bismarck is unable to maintain a constant course and describes irregular zigzags at sea. Shortly before midnight, Admiral Lutyens reports to the command: “The ship has lost the ability to be controlled. We will fight until the last bullet. Long live Fuhrer!”

By this time, the British were in a truly dramatic situation: they managed to stop the battleship Bismarck, but their heavy ships, capable of inflicting the final blow on the raider, had little fuel. They began to use up the emergency reserve. Prime Minister Churchill invited Admiral Tovey to pursue the battleship Bismarck to the end, even if the English squadron then had to be towed home. But after the second torpedo attack, reconnaissance aircraft from the aircraft carrier Ark Royal and the British cruisers at close range reported that the battleship Bismarck was going in circles and had noticeably lost speed. The British decide to give their last battle to the raider. At night, their destroyers attack the giant, but they fail to sink it. During the night, English battleships approach the battlefield.

May 27, 1941
08-47
The battleship Rodney opens fire with nine 406 mm guns. In a minute - “King George V”. The battleship Bismarck responds and hits Rodney with a third salvo. But the English battleship withstands this hit, and its shells destroy first the main and then the auxiliary fire control posts of the Bismarck. The raider is engulfed in fire, but continues to fire back. The British are increasing their fire.

10-15. The last guns on the battleship Bismarck fall silent, but its engines are working and it continues to slowly cut through the waves. Saving fuel and trying to speed up the outcome, Admiral Tovey orders the cruiser Dorsetshire to launch a torpedo attack. Dorsetshire fires 4 torpedoes at point-blank range at the battleship Bismarck. The Bismarck has been turned into a burning island, but remains afloat.
The following shells were fired at the battleship Bismarck:
380 -40.6 cm with “Rodney”
339 - 35.6 cm with “King George V”
527 - 20.3 cm with “Norfolk”
254 - 20.3 cm with “Dorsetshire”
716 - 15.2 cm with “Rodney”
660 - 13.3 cm with “King George V”

Realizing that it’s all over, the Germans open the seams, and the battleship Bismarck sinks stern first and lies on the port side.
More than 2,000 crew members die with him. 110 people were rescued, including only one officer.

In 1989, American oceanographer Robert Ballard found the site of the sinking of the battleship Bismarck.

Battleship Bismarck at the bottom

The first to discover the German formation consisting of the battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prince Eugen were observers from the English battleship Prince of Wales at a distance of approximately 38 km. This happened at 5.35 on May 24, 1941 - against the backdrop of a brightening horizon, the British noticed the masts of German battleships. The battleships Hood and Prince of Wales themselves remained in the shadow of the fading twilight. But the Germans also knew about the presence of the enemy thanks to hydrophone readings. And the cruisers Suffolk and Norfolk, which discovered the German formation the night before, monitored it using radar, periodically losing and regaining contact. But the main thing is that they reported the course of the German raiders, thanks to which it was possible to find them at the exit from the Denmark Strait. In the Atlantic, this would be much more difficult to do and would have to accompany every convoy from America and back, spending colossal resources that were already scattered across all oceans. There was less than a month left before the treacherous attack on the USSR, and in Europe England alone waged war against Nazi Germany. America helped a lot, with the help of convoys delivering the most necessary things, but Admiral Raeder’s submarines had already begun to form “wolf packs”, having felt the “taste of first blood”. And then there are two new, first-class raiders, capable of doing what a submarine cannot do - catching up and destroying. The convoy security forces were mostly destroyers capable of detecting and attacking a submarine with depth charges, but against a battleship their main caliber was like shot to an elephant! And “Bismarck” against a convoy is not even a bull in a china shop, it’s a natural “beating of babies”...

Admiral Holland, holding his pennant on the Hood, had a choice: fight or accompany the German squadron until the main line of His Majesty's fleet approached. Two by two - everything is fair and you can’t hesitate. The English formation “turned up” and the “Prince of Wales” took its position in the wake, 4 cables behind the flagship. The Hood was the first to open fire at 5:52 a.m. from a distance of 22 km on the leading German ship, mistaking it for the Bismarck. The Germans responded with a delay according to Hood, but extremely accurately - a 203-mm shell from the Prince Eugene hit the ammunition rack of the stern anti-aircraft gun, causing a noticeable fire. To confidently defeat the enemy from the main caliber guns, it was necessary to fire several sighting shots (three or more - this depended on the skill and training of the crew), taking the enemy into the “fork”. The Germans covered the Hood with a second salvo... The sixth salvo of the Prince of Wales hit the Bismarck's bow cheekbone and led to a fuel oil leak and the tank filling with sea water. The Bismarck was listed to starboard and trimmed to the bow, and a plume of leaking fuel followed it. The British tried to shorten the battle distance in order to avoid the overhead fire that the Hood was so afraid of due to its poorly armored deck. And as it turned out - not in vain...

At 6.00, from a distance of 15 km, the Hood was covered by the fifth salvo of the Bismarck and seconds later a huge column of fire appeared above the masts, followed by an explosion that broke the ship in half. The stern sank instantly, and the bow rose vertically and a salvo thundered from the bow turret. The ship disappeared under water in a matter of minutes, and only three were saved...

What were the battleships that took part in one of the last artillery battles of heavy ships in world history? The aircraft came to sea, becoming the main caliber of the fleet, surpassing all guns in range, accuracy and firepower.

The battlecruiser Hood was laid down after the Battle of Jutland by the main linear forces of the English and German fleets and took into account the lessons and mistakes of British shipbuilders, which cost the Crown dearly in that battle. Launched on August 22, 1918, immediately becoming the largest and most powerful ship in the world. Completed, equipped and prepared for testing on January 9, 1920. On March 29, she was transferred to the fleet, and on May 17, 1920, she became the flagship of the battlecruiser brigade.

Weapons:

• Main caliber: 8 guns – 381 mm in four two-gun turrets
• 12 – 140 mm rapid-fire guns
• 4 – 102 mm anti-aircraft guns

Maximum length – 262 meters

• Normal displacement is 42600 tons.
• Total displacement 45,200 tons.
• Speed ​​– 31 knots

Before the war, a number of small upgrades were carried out that did not affect the main and most time-consuming problems - the deterioration of the power plant and weak deck armor. When installing lighter boilers of the new generation, the freed weight could be used for additional armor.

The battleship Bismarck was launched on February 14, 1939, almost 20 years after Hood. On August 24, 1940, the first and only commander of the ship was appointed - captain first rank Lindemann, who was remembered for the words: “I will not allow people to shoot at my ship with impunity.”

Weapons:

• Main caliber: 8 guns – 380 mm in four two-gun turrets
• 12 150 mm guns
• 16 - 105 mm
• 16 - 37 mm
• 18 - 20 mm

Maximum length – 251 meters

• Total displacement 50,900 tons.
• speed – 30 knots

As part of Operation Rhineland Exercises, on May 18, 1941, it left the Polish port of Gdynia together with the heavy cruiser Prince Eugene and headed for English sea communications in the Atlantic, was met by a neutral - the Swedish cruiser Gotland, after which the squadron’s departure became known British intelligence. The British sent several formations to intercept, one of which discovered the German squadron...
The Bismarck did not survive its victim for long - the sinking of the Hood was a crushing blow to Britain's pride as a maritime power, and revenge was a matter of honor for all fleet personnel, from the cabin boy to the gray-haired retired admiral. Two days later, the Bismarck was found by the American flying boat Catalina (America was neutral at that time), a Swordfish torpedo from the aircraft carrier Ark Royal disrupted the control and the ship was not controlled and described circulation, and the next day it was finished off by the squadron battleships and cruisers point-blank without lowering the flag and opening the kingstons.

All the available forces of the British fleet from the Baltic to Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea (if he managed to get there) took part in the operation to bait the Bismarck. Several formations of warships left their convoys to participate in the operation to destroy the Bismarck, and its sister battleship Tirpitz, before its sinking in a Norwegian fiord, caused panic in the English fleet. However, Hitler was also terrified of losing his only trump card at sea.

Death

From March 21 to 23, 1941, in the southern waters of Iceland, the Hood, the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Nelson searched for the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which had left their bases with the goal of breaking into the Atlantic. The search ended in vain, since the German battleships had already arrived in Brest by that time. On March 23, Hood returned to the mouth of the Clyde River, and on March 25, sea trials were carried out.

On March 31, Hood, together with the cruisers Fiji and Naijiriya, patrolled the Allied transport communications. From April to May, the cruiser was based in Hvalfjord (Iceland). According to intelligence reports about the departure to sea of ​​the German battleship Bismarck, on April 19, Hood was sent to patrol the Denmark Strait, but it soon became clear that the information was erroneous, and the cruiser returned to base. However, it became known that the Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen were fully prepared for combat. The British increased their forces in the area of ​​the northern straits, and on May 1, Hood and four destroyers were again sent to Hval Fiord to cover convoys traveling south of this island.

Hood's last voyage began on Thursday, at 00:50 on May 22, 1941, when she, majestic, proud and elegant, together with the battleship Prince of Wales and the destroyers Antelope, Anthony, Achatos , "Echo", "Electra" and "Ikarus" left through Hawks Gate from Scapa Flow, heading to the Hvalfjord area to patrol the Denmark Strait. None of those remaining on the shore were destined to see this ship again. The connection proceeded at a speed of 26 knots. The commander of the formation, Vice Admiral Lancelot Holland, held his flag on the Hood. The task of the formation was, after replenishing fuel reserves in Iceland, to patrol a position southeast of the coast of the island, equidistant from both exits to the Atlantic Ocean in order to prevent the breakthrough of the battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen into Allied transport communications in the Atlantic. , which the Germans tried to carry out as part of their planned Operation Reinubung (Rhine Exercises).

For his part, on May 22, the commander of the German raider formation, Admiral G. Lutyens, before breaking through the Denmark Strait, due to saving time and difficult weather conditions, refused to refuel at sea from a supply tanker, hoping to do this after passing through the Denmark Strait, which forced the Germans to save fuel , limited to a 24-knot speed. By maintaining this course for a long time, the German ships gave Vice Admiral Holland the opportunity to cross their course. Around midnight on May 23, the German ships were 200 miles north of Iceland. By morning they reached the border of the pack ice and began to descend along it to the south.

Of all the formations of British ships, the closest to the Germans was the formation of Vice Admiral Holland, consisting of Hood, Prince of Wales and only four destroyers, since during the transition at 14:00 on May 23, 1941, the destroyers separated from the formation " Anthony" and "Antelope", sent to Iceland to replenish fuel supplies. After leaving Scapa Flow, both large ships carried out reconciliation of rangefinders and compasses and, at the same time, exercised joint maneuvering. The atmosphere in the crews was tense. For two days there was no information about the Germans, and almost everyone was aware that the breakthrough of German ships into the Atlantic would bring a lot of worries to the Krolev Navy. On the other hand, no one knew what a meeting with such a strong battleship as the Bismarck would bring, especially since neither one nor the other of the British ships had yet fought with equal opponents.

At 19:22 on May 23, 1941, the English cruiser Suffolk (Captain Ellis) patrolling in the Denmark Strait suddenly discovered German ships and, using radar, began to follow them, periodically reporting their location, course and speed. At 20:02, the cruiser reported that Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were heading 240° almost directly north and were 302 miles (560 km) from Admiral Holland's formation. At 20:40, the cruiser Norfolk, adjacent to the Suffolk, also sent a report of contact with the Germans. Now both cruisers, continuously conducting radar surveillance, relentlessly followed the enemy: "Suffolk" - on the starboard side, where visibility was excellent, "Norfolk" - on the left side, every now and then disappearing into long strips of fog. Most of the time the Suffolk was visible from the Bismarck, and from time to time both cruisers could be seen.

In the evening of May 23, after the Hood radio station received another report from the Suffolk, Admiral Holland immediately convened a headquarters meeting. Having analyzed the location of the German ships based on the cruisers' reports and charted an interception course, at 20:45 he ordered the formation to set a course of 295° and increase the speed from 26 to 27 knots. At 20:54, Hood and Prince of Wales reached the specified speed, which was the limit for joint navigation in stormy seas. It was especially hard for the destroyers accompanying the formation. Due to significant roughness at sea, it was difficult for them to maintain a given speed. The destroyers were already forced to move at the maximum possible speed in the raging sea, but they could not “keep up” with the steel giants pushing through the waves, falling further and further behind. At 21:05, Holland ordered a signal to the destroyers: “If you are unable to maintain the given speed, I will do it without you. You must follow me to the limits of your capabilities.” Exhausted, the destroyers tried to keep up.

At about 22:00, preparations for battle began on the Hood and Prince of Wales. The gun turret servants were given white fireproof gloves and helmet masks that covered their heads and shoulders. According to the custom dating back to the era of the sailing fleet, sailors off duty began to change into clean linen. Most of the wardrooms and the cinema hall were converted into infirmaries and operating rooms, where orderlies sterilized instruments and dosed morphine. They battened down all the watertight doors, hatches and necks, tested the ammunition supply systems, brought the guns into combat readiness, and checked the means of intra-ship communications. Speakers on all ships told the crews that meeting with the enemy was a matter of a few hours.

The Hood was preparing for what it was built to do. It was now that his real baptism of fire should come, since neither in the interwar period nor during the two years of the war did he encounter a battleship on his way with which he was supposed to engage in battle. The previously accumulated combat experience was limited to endless patrols, repelling air raids, or, as was the case in Mers-El-Kerib, firing at ships standing still or slowly moving in the harbor waters. This time, somewhere over the horizon, a large and modern German battleship was sailing, and the Hood’s task was to prevent its further voyage.

Shortly before midnight, from the continuing stream of reports from the cruisers tracking the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen, Vice Admiral Holland concluded that the German ships were only 100 miles away. If we continue to adhere to the existing course and speed, the British admiral assumed, his formation would be able to cross the course of the Germans in about 2 hours 30 minutes, 60 miles ahead, reliably blocking their path to the Atlantic. The sun set at 1 hour 51 minutes, so the battle would have to be fought after dark. This was something the admiral wanted to avoid, and since radar at that time was a far from perfect device, a battle using flare shells would lead to mistakes and confusion, during which the Germans would have an easy escape. After conferring with his officers, Holland decided to slightly change course to the right, which would lead to the intended rendezvous at 2:00 am. An additional advantage would be the excellent visibility of the German ships against the sunset, while the British ships would be hidden by the encroaching darkness, remaining in the dark part of the horizon at a distance from which the Bismarck's guns could inflict serious damage on the Hood. In addition, the Germans did not expect an attack from this particular direction at all, and the surprise factor could be another advantage.

According to this plan, at 00:12, Holland ordered the Prince of Wales to signal a course change of 45° to the right and a reduction in speed to 25 knots. Five minutes later, after receiving another report from the Suffolk from its commander, Captain Ellis, sent at 00:09 a.m. and saying that the Bismarck was covered by a snow charge and that the Suffolk was again heading from a southwestern course to a southern , Holland changed the course of his ships another 15° to the right, assuming that Bismarck would also turn south. From that moment on, the ships of the formations of both opponents approached each other on collision courses. On the Hood and the Prince of Wales, battle flags flew up, flying only when the Royal Navy went into battle.

According to the entry in the logbook of the battleship Prince of Wales on Saturday, May 24: “Weather at 00:01: north wind force 4-5; visibility moderate; sea and waves 3-4. A report was received from the cruisers that the enemy at a distance of 120 miles (223 km) from the British formation, the enemy's approximate heading was 200°. At 00:08 minutes the formation's speed was reduced to 25 knots, at 00:12 minutes the course was changed to 340° and at 00:17 minutes to 360. °. At 00:15, the ship was put on alert No. 1, the crew took up combat positions, final preparations for battle were made and the battle flag was raised. It is expected that the first contact with the enemy will take place shortly after 1:40. snow charge, the cruisers lost contact with the German ships."

At 00:31, the formation commander, Vice Admiral Holland, ordered a signal to the Prince of Wales: “If the enemy is not in sight, at 2:10 I intend to change course to 180° and will stick to it until the cruisers will not detect the enemy." At 01:47, an order was issued regarding the battle plan: “Both battleships strike the battleship Bismarck; Norfolk and Suffolk attack the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen.” However, Holland did not notify those on board about his battle plan. Norfolk" of the commander of the cruiser detachment, Rear Admiral Frederick Wake-Walker, apparently fearing, by breaking radio silence, to reveal his presence to the enemy.

However, the implementation of the plan had to be postponed for several hours. Visibility deteriorated quickly, especially over the next half hour. An unexpected snow charge, which coincided with an increase in the speed of the German ships, led to the loss of radar contact with the British cruisers. Having received a report about this, Holland decided that if the Germans were not found before 2 hours 10 minutes, his formation would turn directly south and go to the shores of Greenland.

The German ships could not be found at the scheduled time. At 2:03 a.m., Admiral Holland reluctantly turned Hood and Prince of Wales onto a course of 200°, that is, to the southwest - exactly the course that the Bismarck was on when the cruisers lost contact with it, and , intending to expand the search area, sent four escort destroyers in the same northern direction. Indeed, Admiral Holland’s intuition did not let him down: Lutyens deviated slightly to the west, and his formation at a certain moment found itself only 10 miles away from the British destroyers, remaining unnoticed in the darkness. On British ships, readiness number 1 was canceled and the crew was allowed to rest. The speed was increased from 26 at 2 hours 14 minutes to 27 knots. at 2 hours 22 minutes. At this moment visibility was only 5 miles.

At 2 hours 47 minutes, the Suffolk, heading south at a speed of 30 knots, again discovered German ships at a distance of about 15 miles and reported their course and speed. From his report it followed that the enemy ships were some 35 miles northwest of the British formation. At the moment of restoration of radar contact, both formations followed slightly divergent courses (Holland - 200°, Lutyens - 220°), constantly increasing the distance from each other, and the German ships were moving with some anticipation.

It now became clear to Holland that the German ships were not changing course. From that moment on, the British commander continuously received information about enemy actions. At the same time, on the Prince of Wales, the location of the Wake-Walker cruisers was clarified by direction finding the operation of their radio installations. From the Prince of Wales, this information was transmitted via ultra-short wave communication to the Hood, which was now able to accurately determine the location, course and speed of the enemy ships and all its forces.

The battle became inevitable, although the loss of contact by Suffolk and the change of course by Bismarck to the west deprived the British of their planned advantages. The enemy was far ahead, and one had to forget about a quick rush towards him from the darkened part of the horizon. The situation deteriorated further when, at 3:20 a.m., Suffolk reported that the enemy had taken even further to the west, so that the two formations were actually on parallel courses. The British changed course from 220° at 3 hours 21 minutes to 240° at 3 hours 42 minutes. At 3 hours 53 minutes Holland ordered the speed to be increased to 28 knots. The pursuit continued.

Another quarter of an hour passed. Reports from the Norfolk and Suffolk showed that the distance between the opponents was gradually decreasing. At 4:00 a.m., Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were already only 20 miles northwest of the English cruisers, and an hour later - 15 miles. The approach continued, however, very slowly, and in the past hour the distance had decreased by only 3-4 miles. Starting at 2:00 a.m., visibility began to improve and at 4:30 a.m. it was about 12 miles.

At 5:10 a.m., on Holland's orders, the combat alarm was sounded again on the Hood and the Prince of Wales. The loudspeaker announced that the battle would begin within a quarter of an hour, after which the ship's priests read a short prayer. The Hood was in full swing ahead - its propellers furiously foamed the water, creating a powerful wake behind the stern. On its masts huge British battle flags fluttered in the wind. "Prince of Wales" took a position with a ledge 740 m (4 cabins) behind the flagship at a heading angle of 135° on the starboard side.

Finally, the horizon became more distinct, and the masts began to appear against the sky, and then the upper parts of the superstructures of first one and then another large ship. At 5 hours 35 minutes at a heading angle of 335° and a distance of 38,000 m (205 cables), the British discovered the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen heading 240°. At 5 hours 37 minutes the British ships changed course 40° to the right and at 5 hours 49 minutes by another 20 degrees, arriving on a course of 300 degrees and having the German ships in the right forward quarter. "Prince of Wales" took place 900 m (about 5 cabins) from the flagship at a heading angle of 135°, thus being on the starboard side. It was impossible for British ships to stay at such a long distance for a long time, since they were vulnerable to shells falling at a high angle. This was especially dangerous for the thin decks of the Hood. It was necessary to get closer to closer fire range as soon as possible.

Holland knew well that at a distance of 12,000 m (65 cables), large-caliber shells would not cause serious damage to the Prince of Wales and that at a firing range close to 11,000 m (59 cables), the Hood was the least vulnerable. Turning around, Hood and Prince of Wales began to approach the enemy at a sharper angle. The distance was quickly closing. The battle was supposed to begin in a matter of minutes.

Unfortunately for the British, they were somewhat late and came out on the bow corners from the port side of the German ships, closing the distance too quickly, as a result of which they lost the initial tactical advantage when their ships could fire with their entire side along the centerline of the enemy ships, which they would have had if provided they maintain their original course. If the British formation had approached the battlefield before the Germans, the situation would have been reversed, and the British, essentially, would have blocked their path, having the opportunity to operate with artillery on the entire side.

As a result, the Germans managed to get somewhat ahead. At the same time, the British could only fire from the bow turrets, while the Germans could fire full volleys. Thus, the British lost their main advantage (8,381 mm and 10,356 mm guns against the Germans’ 8,380 mm and 8,203 mm). Later, the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty would speak of this decision as a decision to “fight with one hand while having two.” However, on the other hand, this decision exposed the vulnerable upper deck of the Hood to enemy fire only for a minimal time. To bring the guns of the stern turrets into action, Vice Admiral Holland ordered Hood and Prince of Wales to be turned to port by about 20°.

At the same time, the cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk, under the command of Rear Admiral Wake-Walker, were supposed to approach from the stern corners of the German ships to engage the Prinz Eugen in battle. And they had sixteen 203-mm guns, which were a serious threat to the Prinz Eugen, not to mention the possibility of distracting the Bismarck’s aft gun turrets. In addition, these ships were armed with torpedo tubes, and there was some chance of hitting German ships with a well-aimed torpedo. Unfortunately, Vice Admiral Holland, observing radio silence in order to achieve surprise, at a certain moment did not coordinate his actions with the actions of the Wake-Walker cruisers, which, due to the great distance, remained mute witnesses to the dramatic battle. Wake-Walker himself simply did not know about this decision or even about the quick approach of Holland's connection. And if you consider that at the beginning of the battle his cruisers were 15 miles behind the enemy ships, it becomes clear why they were not able to solve the problem envisaged by Vice Admiral Holland’s plan.

On the evening of May 23, while firing at the Norfolk, the Bismarck, with a shock wave from a salvo of its own main-caliber guns, damaged the bow radar antenna, as a result of which the battleship was “blind” in the direction of the bow. In this regard, Admiral Lütjens ordered the Prinz Eugen to go forward and use its radar to observe the situation directly ahead. German ships, using radar and sensitive hydrophones, sometimes detected British cruisers following on their heels at a distance of 12 miles.

On the Prinz Eugen, at about 5:00 a.m., operators of unusually sensitive hydrophones that record the noise made by the propellers reported that they could hear the work of the propellers running on the port side on the approaching course of two fast-moving ships. For Lutyens and his staff, this report seemed incredible, since nothing was visible on the radar screen of the Prinz Eugen, which is not surprising - the Hood and the Prince of Wales were more than 30 miles over the horizon.

At about 5 hours 45 minutes, the rising sun colored the horizon when the rangefinder of the main caliber fire control post saw a strip of smoke rising from the horizon to the left along the course. It was impossible for the British cruisers pursuing the Germans to suddenly appear on the port side. Meanwhile, the strip of smoke split, and now two spots were visible on the horizon, and then the tops of the masts of two ships. The mysterious ships were at full speed, but it was still impossible to determine what class they belonged to. The alarm was sounded. Long trills of bells indicated the detection of surface ships.

On the Prinz Eugen, the ships that appeared were mistaken for cruisers or destroyers. The Bismarck also failed to correctly identify the British ships - the senior gunner, frigate captain Adalbert Schneider, mistook them for two cruisers. If they had not been mistaken, Lutyens would have had to prevent Prinz Eugen from participating in the battle, since the orders clearly prohibited engaging a heavy cruiser in a collision with battleships.

The British, due to the similarity of the silhouettes of a battleship and a heavy cruiser, also made a mistake in determining the classes of enemy ships. For Holland it seemed illogical that the Bismarck, a stronger ship, did not take the leading place in the ranks. The admiral did not know that the German ships had changed places after the failure of the bow radar on the Bismarck, nor did he know that the lead Prinz Eugen did not pose any particular danger to the British ships.

At 5 hours 49 minutes, Holland gave the order: “Prepare to open fire. The target is the ship on the left!”, Believing that the target was a battleship.” However, the commander of the Prince of Wales artillery combat unit correctly identified the German ships and, in full in accordance with the admiral's intentions, he aimed his ship's bow guns at the second pennant in the enemy formation.

The British were the first to open fire. At 5 hours 52 minutes, simultaneously with Captain Kerr’s order to open fire, a signal flag flew down from the Hood’s mast, which was a signal for the immediate execution of the command. At the same minute, the four bow guns of the battle cruiser spewed fire and smoke, throwing four shells weighing about 900 kg each toward the enemy at a distance of 24,100 m (130 cables). A minute later, the six bow guns of the battleship Prince of Wales roared.

According to the entry in the logbook of the battleship Prince of Wales on Saturday, May 24: “On approach at 5:52 a.m., Hood, at the moment of opening fire, raised a signal and fired the first salvo at the lead German ship, the distance was approximately 22,500 m (121 cabs) .). Having recognized it as the "Prince Eugen", the Hood's gunners transferred fire to the second ship in the ranks - the "Prince of Wales" opened fire at 5:53 a.m. immediately on the "Bismarck".

Immediately before opening fire on the Hood, they figured out an error in identifying enemy ships, and literally a few seconds before the first salvo, a flag flew up on its mast, indicating that fire was being transferred to a target located to the right. However, the first salvo had already been fired at a secondary target.

Lutyens seemed to hesitate in starting the battle. He didn't like the new situation at all. During the campaign, his ships were supposed to sink Allied transport ships in the Atlantic, avoiding, if possible, collisions with large enemy warships. The worst thing was that, judging by the size of the flashes from the salvoes fired, these were battleships. In addition, two black dots were constantly visible behind the stern of the Bismarck, indicating that the cruisers were not releasing their prey. Having an ice field stretching along the coast of Greenland on the starboard side, two battleships on the left, and two cruisers astern, the admiral worriedly thought about the troubles awaiting him. It was beginning to feel more and more like a noose tightening around his ships. Changing course and trying to avoid battle was not a solution to the situation, since the cruisers were closely following the Germans and could attract a much larger Royal Navy force. All that remained was to take the fight, although, to the extent that the Bismarck could without fear measure its strength with any British battleship, a heavy shell hitting the thin decks of the Prinz Eugen could have ended in tragedy.

At 5:55 a.m., both German ships returned fire at the Hood, firing four-gun salvoes. However, a little earlier, 30-meter columns of water rose around the Prinz Eugen - a sign that the first salvo of the Hood missed the target. The Prince of Wales had an even worse result, whose shells fell short of “some” half a mile from the Bismarck. In turn, at the very beginning of the battle, the Prince of Wales remained unfired and could calmly take aim. But after the second salvo at the Hood, the Prinz Eugen received an order to transfer fire to it and quickly took aim.

The first shells from the Bismarck landed with exceptional accuracy near the bow of the Hood, flooding its deck with fountains of rising water. The landing of the shells from the first salvo, both in distance and in the rear sight, was very successful. The first salvo of the Prinz Eugen fell slightly short. It is not known what the German artillerymen used to determine the firing range - radars or optical rangefinders. One thing is clear: the Germans have always paid great attention to the creation of rangefinder devices.

Meanwhile, weather conditions were not favorable to the British. Their ships sailed against the wind, so the spray whipped up by the stems, as well as shells falling into the water, fell on the lenses of rangefinders and sights. Located relatively close to the surface of the water, the lenses of the largest rangefinders of the two bow main caliber gun turrets were so flooded with water that they were impossible to use. In addition, Holland kept the Prince of Wales too close to him, limiting his freedom of maneuver, thereby preventing him from accurately determining the fall of his own shells and making it easier for the enemy to zero in on him.

From the bridge of the German heavy cruiser, its commander, Captain Zur See Helmut Brinkmann, together with the journalist Frigate Captain Busch, watched through binoculars as the second salvo of the Prinz Eugen hit the target, and heard confirmation of this from the artillery officer Korvetten Captain Jasper. Two minutes after the opening of fire, the projectile from the second salvo of the Prinz Eugen hit the target.

At the same time, on board the Bismarck, the junior artillery officer, Lieutenant Baron Burchard von Müllenheim-Rechberg, who was at the aft fire control post, heard through his headphones from the senior artilleryman Schneider, who was monitoring the flight of the Bismarck's shells, that he said "undershot" . Schneider clarified the distance and ordered a salvo with a 400-meter correction in order to make a fork, repeated the salvo with a delay, and then repeated the close salvo. He defined the first salvo as “overflight”, the second as “covering!” He immediately ordered: “Rapid fire in full volleys.”

The Bismarck's second salvo fell near the Hood's stern. The third, although none of its shells hit the target, closely surrounded the battle cruiser with splashes. The salvos of the German battleship hit. Simultaneously with the second salvo of the Bismarck, a 203-mm shell from the second salvo of the Prinz Eugen exploded on the spardeck of the Hood, approximately midway between the mainmast and the rear chimney. On the battlecruiser, a fire broke out on the left side of the boat deck next to the aft 102-mm anti-aircraft gun. Fregatten-Captain Busch from the Prinz Eugen saw the flames "...rising in a blood-red rectangle framed by black smoke." To the commander of the Prince of Wales, Captain John Leach, it seemed like “... a sudden flash of a blowtorch,” and to Captain Phillips from the Norfolk, “... a pulsating glow, like a tropical sun rising.” Immediately after the hit, Prinz Eugen received an order to transfer fire to Prince of Wales.

With the opening of fire, Holland decided to change course to the left by 20°, reducing the speed of approach, and at the same time, in order to take a position allowing the stern towers to be brought into battle, he ordered the raising of a preparatory signal from two “blue” pennants.

On the bridge of the Prince of Wales, a minute earlier, watching how a wall of water grew around the flagship, raised by the fourth salvo of the Bismarck, this order was received by everyone with relief. And while the executive signal was expected, and the Hood’s bow had already turned several degrees to the left, its silhouette again disappeared behind the water columns of the Bismarck’s fifth salvo.

At 5:55 a.m., after raising two “blue” pennants, indicating preparations to carry out the order to change course to port by 20°, the Prince of Wales had the opportunity to reach a full salvo position. By this time, the battleship had already fired nine salvos from two bow turrets at the Bismarck. At first, the volleys fell with flights and only the sixth one gave a fork. At this time, the Prince of Wales was firing five 356 mm guns, since after the first salvo one 356 mm gun in the bow turret was out of action.

During the same time, the Hood managed to fire five or six salvos at the Bismarck, but no hits were recorded. Here, without a doubt, the transfer of fire to a new target had an effect.

Hood continued to hold her two blue pennants aloft when, after five salvos from the Bismarck, an explosion of enormous force occurred between her mainmast and her rear funnel. Then, on the Hood, problems probably occurred in the Y tower, near which a strong explosion occurred at 6:00 a.m. The flame rose to the height of the mainmast. The Hood ceased to exist, its sides reared up - “like the spire of a giant church,” as observers from the German ships noted, and three minutes later the ship disappeared.

The horrific scene of the death of the Hood took place in front of many witnesses, primarily from the crew of the Prince of Wales. The battleship was sailing some 900 m to the right astern of the flagship. The helmsman and commander of the Prince of Wales, together with the signalmen, watched this from the forward conning tower. Since both ships were firing on the starboard side, most of the crew not engaged in combat clustered on the left side, hiding from the falling fragments. Numerous crews of combat posts and the left, undamaged side of the Prince of Wales witnessed this gigantic tragedy from a short distance.

Hundreds of eyes watched the last seconds of Hood's life. German observers peered into the eyepieces of the rangefinders and sights aboard the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. The British watched the developments from aboard a battleship nearby and cruisers many miles from the battlefield.

On the bridge of the Prince of Wales, its commander, Captain Leach, saw: “... the salvo clearly pierced the cruiser somewhere in the area of ​​the mainmast. In this salvo there were, in my opinion, two shells with instantaneous fuses and one delayed, although It could have been the other way around. I got the impression that the hit was in the Hood’s spardeck right behind the mainmast and closer to the starboard side. At first I was surprised that the result of the hit was invisible, but after 1-2 seconds I noticed that it was there. too large, especially considering the place where the shell hit. It seemed that at that very moment something exploded on the Hood’s spardeck, somewhere in the area of ​​the mainmast and somewhat closer to the starboard side.” According to him, what happened next looked like “... a very strong, upward-directed column of flame in the form of a pipe, or rather a thin pipe, and almost immediately the entire ship was covered in smoke from bow to stern.”

The Prince of Wales's navigating officer, Lieutenant Commander William Rovell, also on the Prince of Wales's bridge, saw three splashes and two hits. Rovell came to the conclusion that in this last salvo for the Hood, “... it was hit by not one, but two shells.” In this he could not come to the same opinion with Leach. To William Rovell, the explosion looked like "...a vertical tongue of flame...I might say egg-shaped." Later, he more accurately indicated the places where the shells hit on the ship's plan - on the port side, about 275 frames next to the twin installation of 102-mm guns.

When the splash from the fifth salvo of the German battleship that pierced the Hood subsided, the ship seemed to tremble, after which there was a few seconds of pause, and suddenly, because of the falling water, a bright orange column of fire rose up.

The explosion occurred between the mainmast and the rear chimney, that is, in a place already engulfed in fire caused by a shell from a German cruiser. The fiery tongue rose high, above the ship's masts, and then suddenly died down. Enveloped in a billowing cloud of yellowish smoke and steam, the Hood disappeared from the sight of all observers. Then the curtain surrounding him suddenly sparkled with explosions following each other. Fragments of superstructures, lifeboats, and pieces of the mainmast flew upward.

The huge amount of explosives contained in its powder and shell magazines combined their monstrous force in a gigantic explosion. Thousand-ton gun turrets were torn from their barbettes. The 381-mm shells thrown up by the explosion began to explode above the ship, giving everything the frantic spectacle of Christmas fireworks. However, it was a terrible sight. It was not enough to say that the stern sank. It simply ceased to exist, torn apart by exploding gunpowder and shells.

It seemed that the explosion should have been accompanied by a deafening roar. However, what turned out to be a surprise to all witnesses to the tragedy, the world's largest warship exploded almost silently, only in the first moment of the explosion some kind of muffled rumble was heard, or rather, a knock coming from the depths of the hull. After which silence fell on the ship.

The crippled Hood, or rather its middle part and nasal tip, still stayed afloat for some time, sinking deeper and deeper. Unobstructed, the water quickly filled the interior. Suddenly the nasal tip rose up, standing almost vertically. At that moment, its stem was much higher than the bridge of the Prince of Wales, crowded with people numb with horror. In this position, she froze for a second or two, and then quickly and silently went under the water, taking with her several hundred surviving people, forever imprisoned in this steel coffin. Three minutes - 180 seconds passed from the moment of the fatal hit, during which the waves of the Atlantic swallowed the more than 250-meter hull of a large ship and fourteen hundred lives of sailors.

The Bismarck fired four-gun salvoes all the time. It is certain that his first salvo landed in front of the bow on the starboard side of the Hood. On the upper bridge of the Hood, Midshipman William Dundas noted the first German shells landing on the starboard side.

Petty-Officer Blockley, who was at the fire control post (port foremast support) of the Prince of Wales, also noticed their fall in front of the Hood and noted the accuracy of the fall in distance. Observers aboard the Prince of Wales saw the Hood pass directly through the rising fountains where the shells of the first salvo fell.

Blockley’s chief, Sub-Lieutenant John Womersley, who was at the same fire control post with him, noted that the delayed salvo fired by the Bismarck landed “...on the left quarter of the Hood with a flight of about 180 m, after which, according to his testimony , a flame appeared on the boat deck. It is curious that the cause of this flame could hardly have been hits from the Bismarck. With a certain degree of confidence, we can say that the cause of this was a hit from a shell from the Prinz Eugen, which was also firing at the lead British ship. Like many other British eyewitnesses, Womersley was misled by the simultaneous fall of shells from the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.

Witnesses' impressions of the hit that caused the flames are consistent.

Petty officer Lawrence Sutton, who was on the left side of the Prince of Wales in the area of ​​the admiral's cabin on the spardeck, noted that “... the salvo from the Prince Eugen hit approximately the middle of the Hood, in addition, there was also an undershot. This there were shells of a smaller caliber than the shells of the previous two salvos." The second salvo from the Bismarck ... seems to have gone overboard,” he said, “and at that time a flame appeared right in front of the mainmast. First, clouds of black smoke appeared, which then turned gray... my attention was attracted by a narrow strip of flame that suddenly burst out and quickly disappeared into the air behind the mainmast and in front of tower X, ... a huge flame flared up in the air in the area of ​​​​tower Y , and... a terrible roar... mixed with the roar of the Y tower's salvo."

Chief Petty Officer William Mackridge from the Prince of Wales, who in 1940. was setting up a 102-mm anti-aircraft gun and training its crew, saw flames bursting out and came to the conclusion that they meant the ignition of ammunition for these guns, stored in the fenders of the first shots in easily accessible places. He stated: "I saw a very bright flash. It was so bright that it looked like a magnesium flash." Although Mackridge then moved his rangefinder forward and missed the moment of the fatal explosion, he noted that if the flames had erupted ten seconds later, he would have had time to deploy his rangefinder.

The flames on the spardeck continued to flare during the next hit, which destroyed the Hood. It apparently did not penetrate too far down the ship, since the Hood's engine rooms remained intact, which follows from the fact that it maintained its previous speed until the last moment. This flame probably could not destroy the ship.

Royal Marine Sergeant Charles Brookes, who was part of the crew of the first port turret of the 133-mm Prince of Wales guns, saw the results of firing through the periscope: “It seemed to me that the second salvo of the Bismarck fell as follows: two shells raised fountains of water on the port side, one hit the deck next to the 102-mm gun (in fact, it was a shell from a German cruiser). Immediately after that, the 102-mm gun on the deck, on the port side closer to the stern, went up. an unusual column of fire. Before this, I noticed that the crews of the 102-mm guns had gathered at the railings leading down on the starboard side of the Hood. After this, there was a huge flash of flame up to the top of the mainmast and none of the crews of the 102-mm guns appeared. never saw again..."

He continued: “In my opinion, one shell from the fifth salvo of the Bismarck went inside the ship through the boat deck behind the rear smokestack, and the second through the barbette of the X turret. When the Hood received the second hit, the rear smokestack collapsed on left side. I also saw a yellow tongue of fire escaping from the barbette of the "X" turret. A huge flash blinded me for a while... When I looked through the periscope again, I saw clouds of black smoke from which 381-mm barrels were sticking up. guns, what could have happened if the roof of the tower was destroyed."

Sailor Leonard Burchell, from the crew of the 40-mm Pom-Pom anti-aircraft gun located on the roof of the turret of the 133-mm Prince of Wales guns, noted that he saw sailors on the spardeck who had only a few minutes to live. They tried to extinguish the growing flames using fire brigade guns.

Lieutenant Commander Cecil Lawson, who watched what was happening from aboard the Prince of Wales through the periscope of turret A, which was in a deployed position, said: “... Most of all... what was striking was that from the superstructure on the spardeck all over it Huge clouds of smoke erupted for a long time."

Senior sailor Hubert Fakrvel, talking with the Hood through a signal searchlight, saw “... a fire with bright flashes of blue color, and it seemed to me then that it was cordite that had ignited. The flames were very long and strong...”

Petty-Officer Cyril Coates from the Prince of Wales was struck by “... a hail of sparks on the spardeck, appearing somewhat aft of the rear chimney, near the ship’s midsection, after which a flurry of smoke and flame burst out through the fence of the aft superstructure, which soon engulfed the "X" and "Y" towers. It also showed that "... the doors of the superstructure opened and released steam and clouds of smoke and flame, which spread further aft."

Sailor John Boyle, who observed the turret of the 133-mm guns of the Prince of Wales through the periscope, said that “... the fire illuminated everything on the aft superstructure and the flames rose on both sides.” At the same time, sailor-artilleryman Walter Marshall, from the crew of the Pom-Pom anti-aircraft gun, noted that “... the flame appeared where, as it seems to me, the ventilation shaft was located, that is, somewhere in the area of ​​​​the left side of the boat deck , between the mainmast and the "X" tower.

Aboard the Hood, Chief Seaman Robert Tilburn was in perhaps the best position - on the port side of the spardeck - just next to the forward non-rotating rocket launcher, right at the level of the forward smokestack. When the shell from the Prinz Eugen hit the spardeck, he was lying prone on the deck, which was the safest position for crew members not on duty. He clearly saw the explosion of the first shell of the German cruiser, which occurred on the edge of the port side immediately in front of the aft launcher of anti-aircraft missiles, and heard the sailor standing next to him say: “This is a hit for us...” According to Tilburn, “... the shell was medium-sized, and the deck in this place is thin,” and, in his opinion, “... a large-caliber projectile could pierce through it.”

A few minutes later, Tilburn clearly felt that the ship began to turn to the left. At this moment, the Bismarck's fifth salvo hit the Hood. A concussion ran through the hull, much stronger than after the first hit. The deck around Tilburn was covered in debris. The explosion scattered the bodies of the sailors nearby.

Subsequently, at a commission investigating the circumstances of the death of the Hood, Tilburn was asked the question: “Can you answer which of these two shells penetrated the deck and which did not?” He could not give an exact answer to this question, but he was sure that the flash of flame after the explosion was due to the ignition of cordite. A fire broke out immediately in front of the mainmast. The flame was alive and bright, as if cordite was burning. This was quite possible, since the fenders of the first shots of 102-mm anti-aircraft guns and 40-mm Pom-Pom anti-aircraft guns were located here.

However, Tilburn could not say for sure which of the two shells set fire to the boats' gasoline tanks, "... two or three dozen gallons in barrels and a large barrel on the slip." In his opinion, the source of the fire was closer to the stern of the ship. The flame spread a little further into the nose, also due to the ignition of gasoline. The order was given to immediately extinguish this flame. They immediately began rolling out fire hoses, but almost immediately this order was canceled as ammunition began to explode. Other shells detonated from the exploding shells. The explosions were of small force, “like a Chinese firecracker,” probably Pom-Pom ammunition, and could not have been the cause of the fire that spread further. "Was the 102mm round feed tube cover open or closed?" - he was asked a question, to which the answer followed: “It was closed. The officer ordered me to close it.”

The destruction of the hull, which looked so terrible from the Prince of Wales, seemed absolutely harmless to Tilburn. He did not feel the blast wave at all; the sound of the explosion itself, which tore the stern end of the Hood into pieces, sounded no louder to the sailor than an ordinary gun shot. However, what seemed most crazy and amazing to him was the stunning silence that fell on the ship after the explosion.

Pressing his whole body against the steel deck, he heard strong vibrations coming from inside the hull. The sudden calm that reigned on the deck encouraged Tilburn to dare to turn over and look around. The bodies of his dead comrades lay nearby. Through the creeping smoke he saw the wounded trying to get up. Others, sheltered in sheltered places from the falling debris, silently looked around in complete helplessness. The survivors had no idea that these were their last moments. The explosion itself seemed incredibly harmless to him. To the commission’s question: “Did you feel anything significant from the explosion?” - he answered: “No. The noise was... just like when guns were firing,” and “... there was dead silence after the explosion.”

Tilburn stood up, staggered over to the side and saw that the water was almost reaching the deck below. The ship tilted first to one side, then to the other. Tilburn managed to throw off his helmet and gas mask before he jumped overboard, trying to swim as far as possible. When he turned around, the Hood was almost submerged in the water. Suddenly Tilburn felt something grab his legs. The sinking body began to pull him down. Once under water, the sailor managed to get a folding knife and with a few cuts get rid of the shoe lacing that was caught on the antenna. When he emerged to the surface, greedily gulping air, his ship began to lift its nose up, almost reaching the vertical. Without waiting for the finale, Tilburn swam like mad in the opposite direction. He managed to avoid the funnel, which sucked in those few who survived the explosion and were in the water. When he turned around again, the Hood was no longer on the surface. There were a lot of brown pipes plugged at the ends floating around, and he grabbed one of them. Surprisingly little debris floated on the surface next to it, and a fuel oil slick was burning not far away. Then Tilburn saw a small life raft nearby and, swimming closer, climbed onto it. The signalman, Seaman Edward Briggs, was at the time of the battle on the compass platform of the Hood's forward superstructure, from where he could see Vice Admiral Holland, and word for word conveyed the contents of the commands and negotiations that were conducted here. When the first shell from the Prinz Eugen hit the Hood in the spardeck, a slight tremor ran through the hull. A moment later, the officer on watch reported to the admiral: “We received a hit in the spardeck, we have a fire in the universal artillery ammunition in the fenders of the first shots.” “Leave it before the ammunition explodes. Leave everything until it burns out,” the admiral ordered. Immediately after this, contact with the central guidance control posts at the top of the foremast was interrupted.

From his post, Briggs did not see exactly where the shell from the Bismarck hit, but when the Hood began to turn to the left, an unexpected shake threw everyone on the bridge to the right. At the commission of inquiry, Briggs stated that in his opinion, the hit was most likely on the starboard side: "... because we all fell on the starboard side." The ensuing explosion was not particularly felt here. He later recalled that "the explosion was not terrifying."

A few seconds later, the officer on watch reported to the admiral that the gyrocompass was out of order, and the admiral ordered him to move to the aft deck on the upper deck. This was a very bad sign, since it meant a breakdown of the main gyrocompass, located deep inside the hull. There was a moment of dead silence on the bridge. Suddenly the helmsman shouted that the ship was not obeying the helm. Holland ordered the replacement steering to be switched to, not yet knowing that neither the steering wheel nor the cruiser's propellers no longer existed.

“The Hood at that moment “...heeled to starboard by 6-7 degrees, then briefly to port, and then shook like a collapsing house, and immediately after that the admiral said that the ship was starting to heel too quickly.” “I fell on my face and the others were scattered in different directions,” Briggs testified.

The sudden upward movement of the ship's bow threw Briggs face down. The last thing he remembered about the admiral was the calm appearance of Holland, as if not perceiving the approaching end. And his headquarters also did not try to seek salvation. Once in the water, Briggs came across a small life raft and climbed onto it. Another one came into his field of vision, and then another one of the same kind, each with a surviving sailor. All three began to vigorously row with their hands in order to bring the rafts one to the other.

The third chosen one of fate who managed to survive the disaster was midshipman William Dundas, who, according to the combat schedule, was on the upper bridge of the Hood. When the ship tilted, he jumped from his post through the window and, like the others, tried to move away from the sinking ship, fearing to fall into the whirlpool. At the commission, Dundas testified that the torpedo officer stationed on the right wing of the bridge reported that a cordite flame appeared on the starboard side of the spardeck.

Rear Admiral Wake-Walker, who observed the battle at a distance of 15 miles from the cruiser Norfolk, recalled: “... the flame spread so that at the end its width exceeded its height. Then the flame fell and quickly disappeared. After it fell “,” he said, “I saw the bow towers firing, and the thought came to me that they would cope. Suddenly the fire appeared near the aft towers, and it seemed to me that a shell had hit there.”

Immediately after this, at 6:01 a.m., the Hood exploded.

Other observers around repeated approximately the same thing. Most observers were unanimous that the explosion was immediately cause for concern. Prince of Wales signalman Alan Cutler testified that he and others took cover on the signal deck, waiting for shrapnel to fall on the ship, which, however, turned out to be completely unnecessary, since nothing fell on board.

Others were not at all frightened by the explosion. For Lieutenant Peter Slade and Seaman Richard Scott from the Prince of Wales, who were at the catapult and preparing the plane for flight, the explosion was silent and looked like a red glow reflected from the bulkheads. Many others felt the same way. Almost everyone agreed that the explosion was silent, or at least quite quiet, since it was drowned out by the roar of artillery and the noise of the Prince of Wales's ship's machinery.

The very moment of the explosion of the Hood's ammunition magazines, although it looked terrifying, was difficult for most observers to hear. Esmont Knight, who was on the upper bridge of the Prince of Wales and observed what was happening over the next few minutes of the battle, later recalled: “... I remember the explosion, which seemed large and terrible to me, but I do not remember whether I heard the sound of the explosion ".

David Boyd of the Prince of Wales testified that "...the Hood exploded with a blast, no louder than the explosion of a shell." Others described the explosion as a "deep, muffled rumble" or "a large matchbox igniting." For some, it most likely resembled “hitting a tin ventilation duct with your palm.” Percy Cooper, who was part of the crew of the forward anti-aircraft gun on the port side of the Prince of Wales, recalled the sounds of the Hood firing, but did not hear the sound of an explosion or feel the shock wave.

Factory engineer Gorras Jarrett, who was in engine room "B" of the Prince of Wales, which had not fully completed testing, also did not feel anything special. Later he told the commission that “... only now, after some time has passed, I can say that I did not feel any effect from the explosion.”

Senior Seaman Winston Littlewood, who was at the gun control post on the port side of the cruiser Suffolk, saw how “... a huge orange column of flame rose into the sky and black smoke swirled. The flame looked like a narrow column that rose very high. When it rose to the tops of the masts, then it spread out to the sides,” Littlewood recalled. He noted that the explosion “...sparkled with bright stars, similar to those that appear when working in a forge.”

William Westlake saw plumes of smoke appear in five or six places just before the explosion. Petty Officer Frederick French noted of the Hood's final seconds: "...suddenly the spardeck bulged midway between the rear smokestack and the mainmast, and all that I can call the products of cordite combustion came out from inside the ship from the stern and around the funnel, looking like the top of a hat turned up from the inside."

On the Prince of Wales, almost all witnesses placed the epicenter of the explosion between the mainmast and the rear chimney, that is, somewhere above the engine rooms. Some began to run to the other side, or to seek shelter from the falling fragments. In fact, not a single fragment fell onto the deck of the battleship.

The assertions of many authors that the Prince of Wales changed course to avoid a collision with the remains of the Hood are not true. Both ships did not sail in wake formation, and the Prince of Wales did not begin the 20° turn to port. It follows that there was no need to change its course to avoid the sinking flagship. The battleship passed the dying cruiser on the port side, without ceasing to fire, and itself became the main target of the German ships.

"Prince of Wales" could not afford to stop the cars and begin a rescue operation. The battle continued, and difficult moments came for the battleship. By this time, the battle distance had been reduced to 16,500 m (89 cables). The Prince of Wales received three hits with 380 mm shells and one 150 mm from the Bismarck and four 203 mm from the Prinz Eugen. Under these conditions, the ship's commander, Captain Leach, decided to stop the battle and at 6:13 a.m., under the cover of a smoke screen, left the battle.

Based on the principle of seniority, Rear Admiral Wake-Walker, who was on the cruiser Norfolk, took command of the British ships. He also could not send the Suffolk to the site of the tragedy, for fear of losing contact with German ships.

Not very far away, however, were the four destroyers that formed the escort of Holland's force and separated during the night by order of the admiral, when the battleships changed course. They were no more than 30 miles from the scene of the tragedy, and they were actually ordered by Wake-Walker to begin rescuing the remnants of the Hood crew. They received guidance from the pilot of the Hudson aircraft, who was constantly observing the battle from the air. The destroyers began to prepare to receive the surviving sailors. Lines and nets were thrown overboard, which could be used to climb onto the ships. A large amount of hot soup and coffee was prepared in the galleys, and aid stations for the wounded were set up.

Four destroyers turned around in front formation and headed south at the highest possible speed. An hour later, at about 8:00 a.m., the Electra saw the first traces of the disaster. Fuel oil stains spread on the surface of the sea, pieces of wood floated, and some kind of box filled with documents. Nearby, not far from each other, three life rafts were rocking on the wave, each with one person. Besides this - nothing more, no remains, not a single body, in a word, nothing that could tell us that two hours ago here, at a point with coordinates 63°20"N and 31°50"W. , the world's largest British battlecruiser sank with more than 1,400 people on board. The destroyers walked around at low speed for another hour, but the result of their search was a lonely capless cap. Apart from the three sailors brought aboard, no one else escaped from the cruiser.

The sailors raised from the water, wrapped in pea coats and drunk with hot drinks, could tell a little. When they managed to bring their rafts closer together, they tried to hold each other by holding hands. However, my hands became increasingly dull from the cold and could not withstand the effort. Eventually the waves scattered them, but they remained within sight of each other the entire time. Soon a Sunderland flying boat flew over the scene of the massacre, but the pilot did not notice them, although the sailors beat their hands on the water, trying to attract attention to themselves. Help in the form of destroyers arrived in time, since at such a low temperature they could not hold out for long. At 9:00 a.m. the destroyers stopped searching and left for Iceland.

Brighe, Dundas and Tilburn were the only ones who escaped from the entire crew. It is difficult now to give the exact number of victims of the Huda tragedy. They are represented, one might say, with a high degree of reliability by the 43-page summary of the dead, published daily in Great Britain during the war and published on the second day after the sinking of the ship. According to it, Vice Admiral Holland, the commander of the cruiser Captain Kerr, 92 officers, 1152 sailors, 161 marine soldiers serving artillery and ammunition cellars in the Royal Navy, 4 sailors of the Australian Navy and 7 representatives of other services - healthy and strong men - died along with the ship. , strong and brave, and at the same time so helpless against the mechanism of destruction created by people. It turned out that 1,421 crew members went on the last trip. Meanwhile, many sources indicate that three out of 1415, or even out of 1418 people were saved. According to Brayer, 1,338 people died with the ship, three were saved.

The death of "Hood" was perceived by the English people as a national tragedy. It is believed that the true cause of his death will never be established.

They remembered the Hood again in 1969. Then the British embassy in Oslo received the pay slips of the Hood crew. The way they were obtained was unusual: in 1942, a Norwegian fisherman caught them from the sea and, due to military circumstances, buried them in the ground. Long after the end of the war, he remembered them and handed them over to the Norwegian authorities.