October 1, 1550 is considered in Russia the day of the birth of the Ground Forces (ST). On this day, Tsar Ivan IV issued a document that laid the foundations for the first permanent army in the Russian state. A military formation of 1,078 provincial nobles was established.
By the end of the year, Ivan IV had six rifle regiments of 500 people at his disposal. In 1647, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich ordered the establishment of a regular army in the state. However, it was possible to create a centralized army only under Peter I.
Until the end of 1917, the Russian Ground Forces consisted of infantry (infantry), cavalry and artillery. During the Soviet years, several new military branches appeared: tank, missile, anti-aircraft, engineering troops, and army aviation. The cavalry disappeared, and the infantry units were reinforced with armored vehicles and were renamed motorized rifle units.
- Artillery soldiers during field training. Development of standards by personnel of self-propelled artillery installations. Group of Soviet troops in Germany. 1987
- RIA News
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The Ground Forces of the Russian Federation were formed on May 7, 1992. They included ground units stationed on the territory of the RSFSR, as well as military facilities in the post-Soviet space, in Germany, Cuba, Mongolia and a number of other states. At that time, the total strength of the Army was approximately 1.4 million people.
During the 1990s, personnel were reduced several times. In 2001, there were about 300 thousand people in the Ground Forces. In the mid-2000s, 395 thousand people served in the Army.
The Russian Ministry of Defense does not disclose the exact number of Ground Forces. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in its Military Balance report for 2017, estimated the number of military personnel in the Russian Ground Forces at 270 thousand people.
The Intelligence Agency of the US Department of Defense in the report Russia military power reports the number of ground forces at 350 thousand people. Most Russian experts suggest that about 400 thousand people serve in ground units.
From open data it follows that the Army has 12 armies, an army corps, 8 divisions and more than 140 brigades.
Western analysts believe that in connection with the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the Russian leadership is paying almost paramount attention to the development of the Ground Forces.
The Russian Ministry of Defense notes that the main striking force of the Army is tank troops, which are the largest in the world. According to IISS, the Russian army has 2,700 tanks at its disposal: 1,900 - T-72; 450 - T-80 and 350 - T-90.
The Ministry of Defense considers artillery to be a powerful means of fire defeating the enemy. The Army is armed with about 4,500 artillery pieces, including various types of self-propelled guns. Russia is also the world champion in the number of multiple launch rocket systems: 3,600 units.
According to representatives of the military department, the “backbone” of the Russian Armed Forces are motorized rifle units. The Russian Army has a rich arsenal of armored vehicles. According to IISS, Russian troops have about 21,400 tracked and wheeled armored vehicles on the move.
Structural changes
Despite the impressive numbers, not all problems of the domestic Ground Forces have been solved at the moment. Thus, at the end of 2016, the share of modern equipment in the Army was 42%, with the average figure in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation being 58.3%. It is expected that the situation will improve with the adoption of the State Armament Program (GAP) for the period from 2018 to 2025. Of the 17 trillion rubles planned for the purchase and repair of weapons, the Ground Forces should receive 4.2 trillion (1.6 trillion more compared to the previous GPV).
However, the share of modern technology will increase by the end of this year. This opinion was expressed in an interview with the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Oleg Salyukov.
“This year, the Ground Forces will receive more than 2.5 thousand units of basic weapons and equipment. Our level of provision with modern weapons will be reached by more than 42%,” Salyukov said.
According to the Army Commander-in-Chief, at the current stage the troops will receive new BMP-3 and BTR-82A, and from 2018 - BMP-2 with the Berezhok combat module installed.
In the coming years, judging by the plans of the Russian leadership, all infantrymen will receive “Ratnik” equipment, and the fleet of ground forces will be replenished with new generation vehicles: T-14 tanks, T-15 infantry fighting vehicles, “Kurganets” and “Boomerang”, self-propelled artillery units ( Self-propelled guns) "Coalition".
- A set of combat equipment "Ratnik" in variants for reconnaissance, including with KRUS "Strelets", as well as a protective set for crews of armored vehicles 6B48 "Ratnik-ZK"
- vitalykuzmin.net
In Washington, the structural changes taking place in the Ground Forces are seen as “a serious challenge to American strategists.” It is argued that Russia is partially returning to the Soviet manning system, although it is not creating such powerful strike forces.
The Pentagon Intelligence Directorate estimates the number of military personnel in one motorized rifle division of the Russian Federation at 9 thousand people (in the Soviet period - 12 thousand). The department believes that Russia is capable of quickly deploying 40 brigades and all eight divisions.
The Russia military power report indicates that the optimal combination of mobility and power lies in the Russian motorized rifle brigade. The strength of the unit is 4521 people. The brigade is armed with 41 T-72B3 tanks, 129 BMP-2, 129 BMP-3, 129 BTR-82A, 129 multi-purpose tractors, 18 Msta-S self-propelled guns and 18 BM-21 Grad.
- Armored personnel carriers BTR-82A
- RIA News
Also of concern to the United States are battalion tactical groups—highly mobile units of the Ground Forces that are capable of effectively carrying out expeditionary missions. The emergence of such units was the result of a reform that began about 10 years ago.
Strengthening foundation
Military expert Dmitry Litovkin believes that, in general, the conclusions of Western analysts correspond to reality. Despite the relatively small share of modern equipment, the combat effectiveness of the Ground Forces has increased significantly.
“It was the battalion tactical groups that took control of Crimea, and the motorized rifle formations demonstrated excellent results in the exercises of recent years. In this context, the Zapad-2017 maneuvers became a kind of result of the rapid development of the capabilities of our army,” Litovkin told RT.
The expert is confident that the foundation for strengthening the Russian Ground Forces was the experience gained in August 2008. Currently, the structure and armament of ground forces is changing under the influence of geopolitical challenges and current military threats.
“NATO’s unfriendly behavior and the tense situation in Ukraine force us to maintain larger formations on our western borders. Therefore, the Ground Forces began to play a major role. The Ministry of Defense decided to recreate several divisions and one tank army. This is an absolutely justified measure in the current situation,” Litovkin emphasized.
And they form the basis of troop groupings in strategic directions. They are intended to ensure and protect our country from external aggression on land, as well as to protect Russia within the framework of its international obligations to ensure collective security.
In terms of their combat capabilities, the Ground Forces are capable, in cooperation with other branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, of conducting an offensive in order to defeat the enemy group and seize its territory, deliver fire strikes to great depths, repel the invasion of the enemy, his large airborne assault forces, and firmly hold occupied territories and areas and boundaries.
The ground forces organizationally consist of (Fig. 1) motorized rifle and tank troops, missile troops and artillery, air defense troops, which are the branches of the military, as well as special troops (reconnaissance, communications, electronic warfare, engineering, radiochemical defense, technical support, rear security, units and logistics organizations). The basis of their combat strength consists of motorized rifle, tank divisions and brigades (including mountain ones), brigades (regiments) of military branches and special troops, organizationally consolidated in the army and front-line (district) groupings of troops (forces).
Associations and formations of the Ground Forces are the main component of the military districts: Moscow (MVO), Leningrad (LenVO), North Caucasus (SKVO), Volga-Ural (PUrVO), Siberian (SibVO), Far Eastern (FE).
Motorized rifle troops- the most numerous branch of the military, forming the basis of the Ground Forces and the core of their combat formations. They are equipped with powerful weapons to destroy ground and air targets, missile systems, tanks, artillery and mortars, anti-tank guided missiles, anti-aircraft missile systems and installations, and effective reconnaissance and control equipment.
Rice. 1. Structure of the Ground Forces
Tank forces- branch of the military and the main striking force of the Ground Forces. They are used primarily in the main directions to deliver powerful cutting blows to great depths against the enemy.
Possessing great stability and firepower, high mobility and maneuverability, tank forces are able to make fullest use of the results of nuclear and fire strikes and achieve the final results of a battle and operation in a short time.
Rocket Forces and Artillery- a branch of the Ground Forces, which is the main means of fire and nuclear destruction in front-line and army (corps) operations and in combined arms combat. Designed to destroy nuclear attack weapons, manpower, artillery, and other fire weapons and enemy targets.
Air defense troops- a branch of the Ground Forces designed to repel enemy air attacks and protect troop groups and rear facilities from air strikes.
The successful implementation by combined arms formations of the tasks facing them is ensured by special troops (engineering, radiation, chemical and biological protection, etc.) and services (weapons, logistics).
Special troops- military formations, institutions and organizations designed to support the combat activities of the Ground Forces and solve their special tasks.
In addition to small arms (Fig. 2-5), the Ground Forces are armed with tanks (T-90 - Fig. 6, T-80U, T-72, T-64, T-62, T-54/55), armored personnel carriers ( BTR-60/70/80 - Fig. 7), infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1/2/3 - Fig. 8), combat reconnaissance and patrol vehicles (BRDM), howitzers (Fig. 9) and 122-caliber guns 203 mm, mortars of 82 caliber (Fig. 10), 120, 160 and 240 mm, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS of 122, 140, 220, 240 and 300 mm caliber - Fig. 11), anti-tank weapons (anti-tank hand grenade launchers, anti-tank missile systems, guns), military air defense systems (self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, anti-aircraft missile systems, man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems), Tochka-U operational-tactical missiles, Mi-8 helicopters (Fig. 12), Mi-24, Mi-26.
Rice. 2. Makarov pistol (PM): caliber - 9 mm; barrel length - 93 mm; magazine capacity - 8 rounds; weight with loaded magazine - 810 g; sighting range - 25 m; combat rate of fire - 30 rounds/min; initial bullet speed - 315 m/s
Rice. 3. Dragunov sniper rifle (SVD): caliber 7.62 mm; length - 1220 mm: barrel length - 620 mm; initial bullet speed - 830 m/s; magazine capacity - 10 rounds; weight with loaded magazine - 4.51 kg; sighting range - 1300 m
Rice. 4. Kalashnikov assault rifle (LK-74M): caliber - 5.45 mm; magazine capacity - 30 rounds; weight without bayonet and cartridges - 2.71 kg; rate of fire - 600 rounds/min; sighting range - 1000 m
Rice. 5. Machine gun NSV-127 “Kord”: caliber - 12.7 mm; weight - 25 kg; belt capacity - 50 rounds; combat rate of fire 650-750 rounds/min; initial bullet speed - 820-860 m/s; sighting range - 2000 m
Rice. 6. Tank T-90 “Black Eagle”: length - 9.5 m; height - 2.225 m; width - 3.78 m; weight - 48 t; power - 840 l. e.; maximum speed - 70 km/h; range - 550-650 km; armament - 125 mm smoothbore gun, 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine gun, 7.62 mm PKT machine gun, ATGM; ammunition - 43 shells, 300 rounds of 12.7 mm caliber, 2000 rounds of 7.62 mm caliber; crew - 3 people
Rice. 7. Armored personnel carrier BTR-80: combat weight - 13.6 g; length - 7.6 m; width - 2.9 m; height - 2.3 m; armament - 14.5 mm coaxial machine gun, 7.62 mm anti-aircraft machine gun; maximum speed on the highway (afloat) - 80 (9) km/h; highway range - 600 km; engine power - 260 hp. e.; combat crew - 10 people (3 people - crew, 7 people - landing force)
Rice. 8. BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle: combat weight - 18.7 tons; length - 6.7 m; width - 3.3 m; height - 2.65 m; engine power - 500 hp. e.; maximum highway speed (afloat) - 70 (10) km/h; highway range - 600 km; rate of fire - 300 rounds/min; firing range - 4000 m; armament - 100 mm cannon; ammunition - 40 ATGM rounds; combat crew - 10 people (3 people - crew, 7 people - landing force)
Rice. 9. Self-propelled howitzer "Acacia": caliber - 152 mm; combat weight - 27.5 tons; mass of high-explosive fragmentation projectile (cumulative) - 43.56 (27.4) kg; initial projectile speed - 655 m/s; armor penetration of a cumulative projectile - 250 mm; maximum firing range - 17400 m; rate of fire - 4 shots/min; ammunition - 46 rounds; engine power - 520 hp. e.; highway speed - 60 km/h; Power reserve - 500 km; crew (crew) - 6 (4) people
Rice. 10. Mortar 2B14-1 “Tray”: caliber - 82 mm; firing range - 4270 m; rate of fire - 24 rounds/min; calculation - 4 people; weight - 39 kg; ammunition - 120 rounds
Rice. 11. Multiple launch rocket system "Smerch": caliber - 300 mm; number of guides - 12; projectile weight - 800 kg; firing range - 20-70 km; area affected by one salvo - 67.2 hectares; full salvo time - 40 s; power reserve - 900 km; calculation - 4 people
Rice. 12. Transport combat helicopter Mi-8: length - 18.22 m; height - 5.65 m; main propeller diameter - 21.29 m; maximum take-off weight - 12200 kg; cruising speed - 225 km/h; range - 465 km; ceiling - 4500 m; crew - 2-3 people; payload - 4000 kg in the cabin or 3000 kg on the suspension; armament - 7.62 mm or 12.7 mm machine gun; combat load - 1000 kg (PU, bombs or ATGM)
Tank troops are a branch of the army in the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the main striking force of the Ground Forces and a powerful means of armed warfare, designed to solve the most important tasks in various types of combat operations.
Tank troops are a branch of the army in the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the main striking force of the Ground Forces and a powerful means of armed warfare, designed to solve the most important tasks in various types of combat operations.
They are used primarily in the main directions to deliver powerful and deep blows to the enemy. Possessing great firepower, reliable protection, high mobility and maneuverability, tank forces are able to make full use of the results of fire strikes and achieve the final goals of a battle and operation in a short time.
Organizationally, TV consists of connections, parts, and divisions. They also include motorized rifle, missile, artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft missile, special, as well as rear units and subunits.
The combat capabilities of tank formations and units allow them to conduct active offensive operations day and night, in a significant separation from other troops, destroy enemy groups in oncoming battles and battles, and overcome vast zones of radioactive contamination and water obstacles on the move. They are also capable of quickly creating a strong defense and successfully resisting the advance of superior enemy forces.
The TV is armed with highly mobile tanks with powerful armor protection and weapons equipped with a stabilization system, automatic loading, and effective sights that allow accurate fire from a standstill and on the move, day and night.
The history of armored forces in the Russian army begins from 195-17, when tanks of foreign designs were adopted into service by the Russian Imperial Army, and it was also planned to begin mass production of the Porokhovshchikov “All-terrain vehicle” tank.
In the 1920s, our country began producing its own tanks, and with it the foundations for the concept of the combat use of these vehicles were laid. In 1927, the “Combat Manual of the Infantry” paid special attention to the combat use of tanks and their interaction with infantry units. So, for example, in the second part of this document it is written that the most important conditions for success are: the sudden appearance of tanks as part of the attacking infantry, their simultaneous and massive use over a wide area in order to disperse artillery and other anti-armor weapons of the enemy; echeloning tanks in depth while simultaneously creating a reserve from them, which makes it possible to develop an attack to great depth; close interaction of tanks with infantry, which secures the points they occupy.
The issues of using these armored vehicles were most fully discussed in the “Temporary Instructions for the Combat Use of Tanks,” issued in 1928. It provided for two forms of participation of tank units in battle: for direct support of infantry and as an advanced echelon operating outside of fire and visual communication with it. Subsequently, this Soviet concept, rejected in our country at the end of the 1930s, was taken as a basis, refined and developed by the German “tank commander” Heinz Guderian, who studied the intricacies of tank art in Kazan.
Tank brigades began to be created for the first time in 1935 as separate tank brigades of the reserve of the High Command. In 1940, tank divisions were formed on their basis and became part of the mechanized corps. But due to the huge losses in tanks suffered by the Soviet troops at the beginning of the war, and the insufficient production of tanks by the USSR industry, it was decided to make significant adjustments to the organizational structure of the armored forces. In accordance with the directive letter of the Supreme Command Headquarters dated July 15, 1941, the abolition of mechanized corps began, which continued until the beginning of September 1941. In connection with their disbandment, tank divisions were transferred to the subordination of army commanders, and motorized ones were reorganized into rifle divisions. Because of these reasons, it was necessary to move from the divisional to the brigade organization of the armored forces, established by NKO order No. 0063, and in September 1941 - to the creation of separate tank battalions of various staff sizes (from 29 to 36 tanks per battalion). Tank brigades and separate tank battalions became the main organizational forms in the Soviet armored forces. On December 1, 1941, the Soviet Army had 68 separate tank brigades and 37 separate tank battalions, used mainly for direct infantry support. Such an organization was forced in the conditions of 1941. In 1942, in connection with the restoration of tank corps, and then mechanized corps, tank brigades were formed and became part of them. The brigade included 2 tank and 1 motorized rifle and machine gun battalions, as well as a number of separate units (53 tanks in total). Subsequently, the organizational and staffing structure of tank battalions was improved in order to increase its independence, strike and firepower. Since November 1943, the brigade had 3 tank battalions, a motorized battalion of machine gunners, an anti-aircraft machine gun company and other units (a total of 65 T-34 tanks). For military merits, 68 tank brigades received the title of guards, 112 were given honorary titles, and 114 were awarded orders. In 1945-46, tank brigades were reorganized into tank regiments.
In 1942-54. these troops became known as armored and mechanized forces. They consisted of tank (from 1946 - mechanized) armies, tank, heavy tank, mechanized, self-propelled artillery, motorized rifle brigades (from 1946 - regiments). Since 1954 they began to be called armored forces; they included tank and mechanized units.
Currently, the Russian army is armed with 3,500 T-80 tanks of various modifications, 4,000 T-64, 9,000 T-72, 8,000 T-62, 1,100 PT-76 (light amphibious tank), as well as a number of T-54/55 , which are mainly in service with marine units, and about 300 T-90s, which are concentrated mainly in the Siberian Military District.
Russian Civilization
At one time, we started discussing the reasons for the defeats in that war in order to understand how to win a future war and thereby prevent it. I have already written about the interaction of forces and means in battle. But I also made a purely professional conclusion for myself, because by military profession I am the commander of a platoon of medium tanks.
This sounds paradoxical, but I came to the conclusion that tank troops, as such, have no combat meaning and modern tanks like the T-80 are expensive toys that do not give anything for victory,
First, let me explain which tank troops I mean.
In our country, and in any army, the basis (the main force) of the ground forces is the infantry, or, as it is commonly called in modern times, motorized rifles. Tank troops are considered the main striking force of the ground forces.
Today (strictly speaking, as of 1972, when I went through training, but I think no significant changes have occurred since then) our rifle troops are essentially rifle-tank troops. In a rifle regiment with 3 rifle battalions, which move on armored personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles, there is also a tank battalion. The tankmen of these battalions have red buttonholes, just like the riflemen.
In addition to these tankers, there are tank troops themselves. In purely tank regiments there are only 3 tank battalions; there are no more or less serious rifle units in tank regiments and divisions. The tank crews of these troops wear black buttonholes, and when I say that tank troops have no meaning, I mean precisely these tank regiments, divisions and their formations.
I came to this idea while trying to follow the thoughts of the Germans who were building their army on the eve and during the Second World War. It is important here not just to note what they had, but the reason why they had it, why and what they wanted to get from it. This is important to understand because they did not always have enough of everything, and they often proceeded not from an ideal, but from specific possibilities. But at the same time, the Germans remained sober in the question of how to win in battle (The more you get to know the Germans, the more respect you have for your fathers and grandfathers, who managed to defeat such a powerful enemy.)
In our Soviet understanding, tank troops are only ganks; in the German (that war) understanding, they are mobile infantry armed with tanks with mobile artillery and other types of troops. Looking ahead, I will say: our today's motorized rifle troops are, in Guderian's understanding, tank troops. A division containing only tank battalions is stupid from a German point of view. Unnecessary and harmful. Why?
Because the Germans clearly understood what victory in a land battle meant - when the area was captured and cleared of the enemy. Only infantry can capture and clear the area, and tanks have no meaning without it. Therefore, the development of German tank divisions went in the direction of increasing the number of motorized infantry in relation to one tank.
If at the beginning of the Second World War the German tank division had a tank brigade, consisting of two tank regiments of two battalions (an average of 324 tanks) and one motorized infantry brigade, consisting of one motorized infantry regiment and a motorcycle battalion, then by the beginning of the war with the USSR in the tank The German division already had two motorized infantry regiments per tank regiment. That is, if in 1939 the ratio between tank and motorized infantry and motorcycle battalions was on average 1:1, then by 1942 it became 1:3, and the number of tanks in tank divisions was reduced to 149–209 units. In relation to motorized rifles, our current motorized rifle division has the same number of its own tanks.
Moreover. The German tank corps also had motorized infantry divisions that had no tanks at all. Sometimes there was one motorized infantry for two tanks, and sometimes two motorized infantry for one tank. That is, in our current motorized rifle corps there are more tanks in relation to infantry than in the German tank corps of that war.
Then the question is: why did the Germans call their motorized infantry with tanks tank troops - tank divisions, corps, armies?
Due to economic difficulties. They did not have enough cars, tractors, self-propelled guns and armored personnel carriers to equip all their ground divisions with them. On the eve of the war with France, they demotorized the ground forces - they confiscated the combat units' vehicles from all infantry divisions and transferred them to tank and motorized infantry divisions, and equipped the infantry divisions with horse-drawn vehicles.
Consequently, the division of German divisions into infantry and tank divisions is a forced measure; according to their original idea, all Wehrmacht divisions were supposed to be tank divisions in the German sense, i.e., like our current motorized rifle divisions.
Based on the meaning of what victory in battle is, our current tank troops (regiments and divisions) are meaningless, since the tank itself is not able to clear the territory of the enemy, therefore, it cannot win the battle.
They will tell me that no one tasked our tank forces with winning on their own; they must act together with motorized rifles. I know, even though I am a reserve officer, I was taught tactics, and I remember with whom I should go on the attack.
When, having deployed my platoon into a battle line, I go on the attack, a motorized rifle company should follow me into the attack. All this is correct, and everything is good, but the question arises: if my tanks burn out in this attack and the crews die, who will be to blame for this? Me or the commander of a motorized rifle company who did not destroy the grenade launchers? If I am assigned to this company commander, then it seems like he is, but he also has arguments - maybe my tankers burned because I poorly prepared them for battle or poorly commanded them in battle? That is, it’s my own fault.
I'll digress. Lieutenant Colonel N.I. read the tactics to us then. Byvshev, veteran, tanker. I remember a lesson in tactics - I am the commander of a tank going on an attack with infantry, I need to give commands to the crew. I command the loader: “Armour-piercing!” To the gunner: “Landmark two to the right, 10 tank in trench 1100!” And to the loader’s confirmation “Ready!” and the gunner “I see the target!” I give the command to the driver: “Short!” But to command “Fire!” Nikolai Ivanovich didn’t let me: “You can’t stop!” (On the “Short” command, the driver must stop for a while while the gunner points the gun at the target and fires, i.e. for 3–5 seconds). "Why? - I was surprised. “After all, from a standing position you’ll aim more accurately and it’s more likely that you’ll hit.”
“Because,” explained a real tanker who went on such attacks during the war, “the infantry, seeing that you have stopped, will immediately lie down, and since bullets will whistle above it, it will be impossible to raise it and then you will go on the attack alone.” . This is about the question of how several branches of the military interact in a real war.
But let's return to the example with the burnt tanks. And the company commander can prove that he is not guilty, and I can. And if no one is to blame, then there is no one responsible for the battle, and if there is no one responsible, then there is no unity of command, and there is no unity of command, then this is no longer an army, but a mess.
You say - what about the Germans? After all, they also had tankers in a tank regiment, and infantry in a motorized infantry regiment. Even if in one division, they are still divided into types of troops.
This division was not caused by the needs of combat, but by economic opportunity. On June 22, 1941, German ground forces attacked us with 121 divisions, of which only 17 were tank divisions. But infantry divisions also faced problems that required tanks to solve them. And the tank divisions temporarily sent their units (accompanied by repair and evacuation) to the infantry divisions. For this reason alone, it was impossible to include tanks in the infantry. For this reason, heavy Tiger tanks were not included in the army tank divisions at all, but comprised 14 separate battalions and several companies in separate and SS divisions. That is, the fact that the Germans also had tank units did not come from their principle of combat, but from necessity: the legs need to be stretched over the clothes.
But we need to pay attention to the question that no one among our historians raises - this is the exclusive military partnership that existed in Hitler’s army. After all, the Germans helped each other out at the cost of their lives, regardless of what branches of the army they were in. Here, for example, is a line from G. Guderian’s notes: “On September 3, I drove past the rear units of the 10th motorized division and the bakery company that took part in the battle to the motorcycle units of the SS division “Reich.” How do you like this “baking company”?
Or the chief of staff of the German 20th Tank Division reports on the battles to block the formations of our 33rd Army near Vyazma. Reports that from February 1 to February 26, 1942, he repelled 65 attacks of more than a battalion with tank support and 130 attacks of less than a battalion, while destroying 26 tanks with the division's forces and 25 tanks with batteries of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns attached. A tank division is a ground force subordinate to its commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Brauchitsch. 88-mm anti-aircraft guns were Luftwaffe, subordinate to Reich Marshal Goering. And the 88-mm anti-aircraft gun is a large weapon and weighs 8 tons. Rolling it out for direct fire against our tanks is a big risk for anti-aircraft gunners, whose job is to shoot down planes. But they rolled out and knocked out our tanks. The Germans somehow knew how to unite their army in a single impulse.
In Grozny, Chechen militants destroyed strongholds of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and nearby army units did not lift a finger. You will say that this is a betrayal of the Kremlin. Yes, but what did it mean? The fact is that on the same battlefield there were two types of troops with the same task, but subordinate to different commanders. After all, if both the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were subordinate to the same commander, if this commander was equally responsible for every killed soldier and policeman, then this would not have happened.
Such reflections once again brought me to the first conclusion that no one needs tank troops in the form in which we have them today. Not only is their idea inconsistent with the idea of winning ground combat, but it also creates difficulties in command and control.
However, what is written above are trifles, trifles, and would not be worth mentioning if not for more serious circumstances. Let's remember the history of tank forces.
After their birth during the First World War and adolescence, tank forces reached their peak with the Germans.
In 1939, the then still small tank divisions went ahead of the then still fairly young German army and ensured the defeat of the million-strong Polish army in two weeks.
In 1940, German tank armies ensured the encirclement and defeat of the superior army of the Franco-British allies in almost two weeks.
In 1941, four German tank armies at the head of the ground forces ensured resounding victories for German weapons near Minsk, Smolensk, Vyazma, and Kiev. And in 1942 - near Kharkov with access to the Volga and the Caucasus. That same year, Soviet tank troops punched holes to encircle the Germans at Stalingrad, and then Soviet tank crews formed the fists of the blows with which the Red Army drove the Germans back to Berlin.
But then everything went wrong. The Second World War ended, tank forces in all countries were continuously developing towards a sharp increase in the cost of tanks and the maintenance of these troops. They seemed to be getting stronger and more effective. But…
The Arab-Israeli wars, in which the Egyptians and Syrians had superior tank forces and our advisers, ended in defeat for the Arabs. The presence of tank troops did not lead to victory.
The Afghan war showed the uselessness of these troops even against a fairly weak enemy.
The war in Chechnya showed the same thing.
It turned out that the side with developed tank troops and “ultra-modern” tanks would not cost anything to lose the war.
They will tell me that Arabs are bad soldiers, that it is inconvenient for a tank to fight in the jungle, that it is inconvenient for it to fight in the mountains, that it is inconvenient for it to fight in cities. And why? Why are there such tanks today that they are not comfortable fighting anywhere? Why can’t a tank covered by 100 mm of armor fight in a city, but an infantryman covered only by his own tunic can? Why are we building tanks that cannot fight where they need to fight?
And who said that they are capable of fighting where they supposedly can fight - in an open field? After all, even there, from camouflaged trenches, they can be hit with a grenade launcher no worse than from the window of a building in the city. Moreover, what awaits them in the open field is something that cannot be used in the city - anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).
So the point is not that tanks are used where, according to armchair theorists, they “cannot be used,” but that the current tanks are not suitable for any kind of combat - these are useless expenses made by society.
How current experts look at the use of tanks can be clearly seen from the article by V. Ilyin and M. Nikolsky “Modern tanks in battle” from the magazine “Equipment and Weapons” No. 1, 1997. Although the article is generally devoted to comparing ours and Israeli tanks, but it also shows specific examples of battles.
"Lebanon, 1982. The first tanks of the new generation to take part in real battles were the T-72 of the Syrian army and the Israeli Merkava Mk.1. On June 6, 1982, the fifth Arab-Israeli war began. In Operation Peace for Galilee, the Israeli army, supported by heavy air strikes, invaded southern Lebanon and began advancing towards Beirut, smashing the Syrian-backed Palestine Liberation Organization camps.
For the first two days of fighting, the Israelis were opposed only by the Palestinian brigades "Ain Jalut", "Khatyn" and "El Qadissiya", armed with outdated Soviet weapons (in particular, T-34 and T-54 tanks). The main forces of the Syrian group in Lebanon - three divisions in the first echelon and two in the second - were in reserve areas at the beginning of the Israeli offensive. In the defense zone, only covering forces remained, as well as decoys - inflatable “tanks”, “guns” and “anti-aircraft missile launchers” camouflaged to match the color of the terrain, covered with metallic paint and equipped with thermal emitters simulating the operation of engines. Therefore, the first air and artillery strike of the Israelis before crossing the Zahrani River fell on practically empty ground.
The main tank battle unfolded on the morning of June 9: overnight, Syrian troops moved out of reserve areas and occupied pre-equipped defensive zones. At dawn, four Israeli divisions on a front more than 100 km wide - from the Mediterranean coast to the Garmon mountains - moved towards the enemy. About three thousand tanks and infantry fighting vehicles took part in the battle on both sides. The battle lasted all day and did not bring any clear success to any of the opponents. On the night of June 9-10, the Syrians carried out a powerful artillery counterattack on the enemy’s forward positions, and at dawn the Syrian barrage of fire fell on the second echelon of the Israelis. On June 10, their offensive practically ran out of steam along the entire front.
During these battles, Syrian ground forces destroyed more than 160 Israeli tanks. A significant contribution to achieving success in the battles of June 9-10 was made by the T-72 tanks, which only recently entered service with the Syrian army. They were opposed by modernized M60A1 tanks (some of which were equipped with Israeli-made Blazer reactive mounted armor), as well as the latest Israeli Merkava Mk.1 vehicles (at the beginning of hostilities, Israel had 300 tanks of this type).
As a rule, tank battles began at ranges of 1500–2000 m and ended at the line of approach to 1000 m. According to the chief military adviser to the Syrian Ministry of Defense, General G.P. Yashkin, who personally took part in directing the fighting in Lebanon, T-72 tanks showed their complete superiority over enemy armored vehicles. The greater mobility, better protection and high firepower of these vehicles had an effect. Thus, after the battle, up to 10 dents from the enemy’s “blanks” were counted in the front plates of some “seventy-twos,” however, the tanks remained combat-ready and did not leave the battle. At the same time, 125-mm T-72 shells confidently hit enemy vehicles head-on at a range of up to 1,500 meters. Thus, according to one of the eyewitnesses - a Soviet officer who was in the battle formations of the Syrian troops - after a D-81 TM cannon shell hit a Merkava tank from a distance of approximately 1200 m, the latter’s turret was torn off its shoulder strap.
...The Israeli front faced the threat of collapse, but on June 11 at 12 o'clock hostilities were suspended: American emissaries Shultz and Habib, who arrived in Damascus, convinced the Syrian leadership to stop the counter-offensive, guaranteeing that Israel would withdraw troops from Lebanon within 10 days and enter in negotiations with Syria.
However, peace never came to Galilee. The fighting resumed on July 18, when the Israelis again attempted a large-scale offensive, and the fighting was extremely fierce. Only the 21st brigade of the 3rd tank division of the Syrians destroyed 59 enemy armored vehicles in battles on the approaches to the Damascus plateau. This time, in addition to the T-72 tanks, the Fagot mobile anti-tank missile systems, which were armed with urgently created mobile anti-tank platoons of tank brigades of the Syrian army, have proven themselves to be excellent. 120 anti-tank systems were airlifted from the USSR (with an ammunition load of six missiles each). Already in Syria, the systems were mounted on jeep-type vehicles. Over the course of several days of fighting, they burned more than 150 enemy tanks (they got it from the Fagots and Merkavas).
...The Israeli Merkava Mk.1 tank has also proven itself well, providing excellent protection for the crew. This is evidenced, in particular, by the memoirs of one of the participants in the battles, who was part of the Syrian army. According to him, a battalion of Syrian T-72s, making a night march, unexpectedly “jumped out” at the Merkav unit, which was waiting for the arrival of tankers. A fierce night battle ensued at a short distance. Syrian tanks, which developed a high rate of fire, quickly fired their ammunition in the drums of automated ammunition racks. However, to the chagrin of the Syrian tank crews, the results of their shooting were not visible: the enemy tanks did not burn or explode. Deciding not to tempt fate any longer, the Syrians, having suffered virtually no losses, retreated. After some time, they sent reconnaissance, which discovered a truly amazing picture: a large number of enemy tanks, abandoned by their crews, were blackened on the battlefield. Despite the holes gaping in the sides and turrets, not a single Merkava actually caught fire: this was due to the perfect fast-acting automatic fire extinguishing system with IR sensors and the Halon 1301 fire extinguishing agent, as well as the excellent protection of the ammunition stowage located in the rear part of the fighting compartment with spaced reservation."
From this description of the battles it is not at all clear that the current tank troops interact with the riflemen to even the slightest extent. Tank battles are fought only by tanks and somehow separately from the rest of the war.
But let's get back to the tank. Based on the general philosophy of ground combat, what qualities should a tank have? A tank, and not an expensive trophy, for which today’s shooters begin hunting at 3000 m.
The tank is blind, and a brave infantryman will always seize the moment to shoot at a tank located on a strong point protected by a shooter. Therefore, and above all, the tank must be invulnerable from the fire of weapons available to the shooters. Otherwise, it is not a tank: it will not be able to protect its infantry from losses and will not provide anything for victory in battle.
Second. The tank must have a weapon with which it is convenient to destroy enemy infantrymen. This is understandable, otherwise, even being safe and sound in a strong point, he will not be able to keep enemy riflemen from firing at his infantry. Such a tank will also not fulfill its purpose and is also not needed.
In terms of tank weapons, several questions arise.
A tank cannot drive into an enemy stronghold and stand up: a stationary target is a very good target. In addition, a strong point is one or more trenches dug in a zigzag pattern, and firing points in the depths of the strong point. Enemy shooters will hide at the bottom of trenches and fortifications and will not be visible. The tank must pass over trenches and fortifications and sweep the enemy out of them with fire. When he turns along the trenches at a strong point, he will have his own troops on one side and the enemy on the other. This enemy must also be kept from firing at the tank and its infantry with the fire of the tank’s weapons. Therefore, the tank must be able to fire simultaneously in at least two directions.
The tanks of the beginning of that war had this ability. They could walk along the trench, and a machine gunner in the front plate of the tank would shoot into the trench in front of the tank. And the turret gunner (the gunner of the cannon and the coaxial machine gun), having deployed the turret, shot through the rear of the enemy. (When German tanks walked over our trenches, in some cases they opened the hatch in the bottom of the tank and the radio operator shot through the trenches from top to bottom with a machine gun).
Current tanks are not capable of this - they have only one firing point - a cannon and a coaxial machine gun in the turret.
One more moment. Let’s imagine that during an attack, when your tank is ironing the main trench of a strong point, a retreating enemy machine gunner, 300–500 m from you, jumped over some highway and settled down behind its embankment. You can only see his head and a machine gun, from which he will fire a burst and hide behind an embankment, and then emerge 10 meters to the right or left and fire again. And the German MG-42 machine gun spat out 250 rounds of ammunition in 10 seconds. With such a burst it is not difficult to kill about 10 of your infantrymen running to attack.
If you are in a modern tank, then you need to manage, by controlling the mechanisms that rotate the multi-ton turret and raise and lower the multi-ton cannon with a coaxial machine gun, to place the aiming mark directly under the chin of the nimble machine gunner before he disappears. It is not simple. A cannon or a machine gun, but you only need to shoot him directly in the head, since you won’t be able to reach him any other way, and here’s why.
A modern tank has a very powerful 125 mm caliber cannon, which sends a projectile weighing about 30 kg with enormous speed. This projectile flies over a long distance almost in a straight line (along a flat trajectory). If the shell deviated downwards by 20 cm from the machine gunner's head (even if he did not have time to remove it), it will explode in the outer embankment of the highway. The shells of a powerful cannon fall flat on the ground and produce almost no lethal fragments. The machine gunner might be hit by a blast wave, but that's all. If a shell deviates upward by 20 cm from the machine gunner’s head, it will explode 200 meters from behind him. To hit such a machine gunner with a modern cannon, you have to be a marksman, hitting a squirrel in the eye offhand.
But if you have a cannon on your tank, as on the first releases of the German T-III and T-IV tanks (low-power, with a barrel length of only 24 calibers), then, despite its small caliber (75 mm), you are this machine gunner you will get it very quickly. The projectile of this cannon already flies over short distances along a steep trajectory, that is, first up and then down. With such a trajectory, the highway embankment is not an obstacle for you - you will throw a shell across the highway onto the head of even a hidden machine gunner. In addition, with such a trajectory, the projectile no longer falls flat, but at an angle to the ground and produces a lot of lethal fragments. So, if the machine gunner runs away from the place where you shot, the fragments will catch up with him.
That is why Guderian regretted when such short-barreled guns on tanks had to be replaced with powerful ones - there was nothing to shoot at the infantry.
In addition, it is impossible to shoot from the guns of modern tanks for a long time. If the main tanks of the warring parties in that war had a reserve of at least 80 rounds for the gun, or even more than 100, then the modern T-80U tank has 45 rounds of ammunition for the gun. A quarter of them is considered NZ (emergency reserve) and is spent only with the permission of the command. With three dozen shots you won't shoot much.
We've dealt with tank weapons, now let's deal with anti-tank weapons. In order to disable a tank and its crew, you need to penetrate its armor. There are two types of projectiles for this.
The first type is the actual armor-piercing shells, which, hitting the armor from the outside, push it apart, push part of the armor in front of them inside and themselves fly into the armored space of the tank, breaking the equipment and killing the crew. (Inside the tank, armor-piercing shells can also explode if an explosive charge is placed in them).
Breaking through armor in this way is a very big job, so an armor-piercing projectile approaching a tank must have very high kinetic energy. This energy, as should be known from school, is proportional to the mass of the projectile and the square of its speed. Hence, the thicker the armor that needs to be penetrated, the heavier the projectile must be, or, more effectively, the higher its speed. In practice, they take a heavy projectile, and try to give it as high a speed as possible.
For example, a German rifle of 7.92 mm caliber with an armor-piercing bullet weighing about 8 g with a steel core, flying out of the barrel at a speed of 895 m/sec, penetrated 10 mm of armor at a distance of 100 m. At the same distance, but with a bullet with a tungsten core , flying out of the barrel at a speed of 930 m/sec, pierced a sheet of armor 13 mm thick. An anti-tank rifle of the same caliber, 7.92 mm, but firing a bullet weighing 14.5 g, with an initial speed of 1210 m/sec, pierced armor 30 mm thick at a distance of 100 m. With distance, the speed of the bullet decreases, so at a distance of 300 m the anti-tank rifle penetrated 20–25 mm of armor.
The same goes for guns. Our 76-mm cannon, mounted on the T-34 and KV-1 tanks, with an armor-piercing projectile weighing 6.3 kg, flying out of the barrel at a speed of 662 m/sec, penetrated 69 mm of armor at a distance of 500 m, and with a special armor-piercing projectile (sub-caliber ) weighing 3 kg, but having an initial speed of 965 m/sec, penetrated 92 mm armor at this distance. And the 152-mm howitzer gun mounted on self-propelled guns, with its 49-kg projectile fired at a speed of 600 m/sec, penetrated 100 mm of armor even at a distance of 2 km.
In short, in order to pierce thick armor with an armor-piercing projectile, you need a powerful cannon with a long barrel that gives the projectile as much speed as possible - this is the first thing. Secondly, the thicker the armor, the larger the caliber the gun should be. Well, the further the gun is from the tank, the less likely it is that it will penetrate its armor due to the drop in the projectile’s flight speed.
But there is another type of projectile - cumulative. The main thing in them is an explosive substance, usually of a cylindrical or conical shape, in which a cumulative (collecting, accumulating) spherical or conical recess is made at the end facing the armor. During an explosion, the shock wave moves perpendicular to the surface of the explosive. In a cumulative notch, waves from the surface of a sphere or cone converge at one point, forming a jet with very high pressure. If the point of formation of this jet is placed on the armor, then the pressure pushes through it, throwing a shock wave, gases and fragments of the armor itself inside the tank. The hole itself, punched in the armor, is sometimes small in diameter, but the fragments and shock wave are enough to disable the tank’s crew and mechanisms. (When destroyed, the steel of the armor heats up so much that it partially melts. That’s why cumulative shells used to be called armor-piercing shells.)
For a cumulative projectile, neither its speed nor the distance from which it arrived matters. You can shoot it from a cannon, or you can throw it with your hand - the effect will be the same. The main thing is that relatively little explosives are required to penetrate tank armor.
In 1943, Soviet soldiers received the RPG-6 cumulative anti-tank hand grenade, which weighed 1.1 kg. The TNT weight in it was 620 g, and it penetrated 120 mm of armor. The German Faustpatron, weighing about 5 kg, fired a grenade weighing about 3 kg at a distance of up to 70 m. The weight of the shaped charge was 1.7 kg, which provided armor penetration of 200 mm. And even today a tank cannot afford such armor; it can only be placed on the front, but even heavy tanks have 60–80 mm armor plates on the sides and rear.
Cumulative grenades (grenade launchers and their varieties) solved the issue of infantry fighting tanks - the infantry stopped being afraid of them.
But a cumulative projectile has one feature - it must explode in a strictly oriented manner and strictly on the armor. If it falls flat on the armor, then the cumulative jet will pass by the armor or slide along it and will not be able to penetrate it. If a cumulative projectile explodes before reaching the armor, the cumulative jet will dissipate and will not break through the armor.
Now let's look at where the tankers started and how they got to the current state of affairs.
It is difficult to say whether the generals of the Red Army before the war understood the philosophy of future battles (their principle). For example, in his famous report “The Nature of a Modern Offensive Operation” at the Meeting in December 1940, G.K. Zhukov taught that rifle corps should break through enemy defenses, and placed tank corps in the rear for a future rush into the gap made by riflemen. Apparently, he looked at tanks as if they were self-propelled carts that went faster than a tarantass.
Strictly speaking, the tanks that corresponded to the philosophy of future battles were the T-35 (five-turret) and T-28 (three-turret). These tanks had a low-power cannon, and their firing points made it possible to fire not only in two, but also in three and five directions. But they had very thin armor, they were low-powered and, most importantly, the Germans did not have to knock them out - the vast majority of them broke down before reaching the battlefield. Having received these trophies, the Germans did not use them in battle (they used the T-34 and KV-1), however, one captured T-28 was in service with the Finnish army.
The light tanks of the Red Army (T-26 and BT) did not correspond to the battle philosophy in any respect - their armor was penetrated by a rifle, there was only one firing point, and the 45-mm cannon was relatively powerful with a flat firing trajectory.
The best tanks were the T-34 and KB - even guns could hardly penetrate their powerful armor, and the German infantry was powerless against it. There were two firing points - enough. But their gun was powerful, anti-tank. Nevertheless, the T-34 aroused the envy of even Guderian, and the Germans used KB heavy tanks in their battalions when our artillerymen and tankmen knocked out the Tigers from them.
The Germans prepared their equipment for battle absolutely precisely - their main tanks T-III and T-IV and even the light 38-t had armor, against which our riflemen had no weapons, except for bundles of anti-personnel grenades and bottles of gasoline. All of the above German tanks could fire simultaneously in two directions, the main tanks had short-barreled, low-power anti-personnel guns, and only the 38-t had a long-barreled 37-mm cannon, but simply because it was impossible to install anything else on this light tank.
Let me remind you of what I already wrote about - the Germans did not intend to use their tanks to fight ours. Our tanks had to be destroyed by their artillery and aviation, which they, unfortunately, succeeded in doing.
Having attacked our troops with their tank divisions on June 22, 1941, the Germans began a rapid advance, during which our artillery became the main target. Our historians write about the losses of aviation and tanks, but they are somehow silent about the losses of the material part of the artillery regiments. But here the situation was no less catastrophic. Here, let’s say, I have before me data on the presence of artillery in our 43rd Army at the beginning of 1942, before this army tried to go on the offensive and break through to the rescue of the formations of the 33rd Army encircled near Vyazma.
In our division, in two artillery regiments and in the batteries of rifle regiments, there should have been 90 artillery barrels of 76 mm caliber and higher. In 7 divisions and one rifle brigade of the 43rd Army, on average, there were not 90, but 23 guns per formation - a quarter of the standard number.
By the beginning of the war, artillery regiments had 36 guns throughout the state. In the 6 howitzer and cannon artillery regiments of the 43rd Army (corps and RGK) there were an average of 15 guns each - a little more than 40%.
Even according to the pre-war states, each division should have had 54 45-mm anti-tank guns. In the formations of the 43rd Army, on average, there were 11 guns, and this was with captured 20- and 37-mm cannons, i.e., barely a fifth of not even the required, but the regular number.
But this is the state of the artillery of the army, which was advancing since December 1941, and what was it like during the endless retreats of summer and autumn?
The Germans armed their Marder anti-tank self-propelled guns with our Grabin 76-mm F-22 cannons and produced a total of 555 of these self-propelled artillery units. But even with this number of guns, more than 15 of our divisions were previously armed, but how many of these guns were destroyed or disabled by the surviving crew numbers before abandoning them? (The Germans themselves believe that in the offensive of 1941 they took half of our artillery.)
Our troops, left without artillery, had nothing with which to destroy German tanks, and the command was forced to use Soviet tanks against them, that is, use these tanks not to reduce the losses of Soviet infantry in attacks, but as anti-tank guns on tracks. Fortunately, all our tanks were armed with powerful guns, even forty-five light BT and T-26 tanks were capable of destroying any German tank of that time at close range. We began to force tank battles on the Germans, and with success.
And when such a battle is imposed on tanks, it is very difficult for them to evade. In defense, the tank could hide behind anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, but in the offensive it goes ahead of all branches of the army - how can you evade, and even from our fast BT and T-34? Guderian wrote:
“Our T-IV tank with its short-barreled 75-mm cannon was able to destroy the T-34 tank only from the rear, hitting its engine through the blinds. This required great skill. Russian infantry advanced from the front, and tanks launched massive attacks on our flanks. They've already learned something. The severity of the fighting gradually had its impact on our officers and soldiers... Therefore, I decided to immediately go to the 4th Panzer Division and personally familiarize myself with the situation. On the battlefield, the division commander showed me the results of the battles on October 6 and 7, in which his combat group performed important tasks. The tanks, knocked out on both sides, were still in place. The Russian losses were significantly less than our losses... It was disconcerting that the latest battles had an effect on our best officers.”
By this time it became clear that the blitzkrieg was over, and the Urals would build tanks in ever-increasing quantities. Consequently, it became clear to the Germans that our command would continue to consider the tank as the main means of fighting German tanks.
The Germans had nowhere to go, and they began to deteriorate their tanks - they began to install powerful long-barreled guns on them to fight our tanks. Why did this make the tanks worse?
Because to fight tanks you only need a cannon. If a tank is intended to fight tanks, then it is pointless to carry two more machine guns, a rifleman, and ammunition - after all, none of this is required to fight tanks.
A self-propelled artillery mount (SPG) is optimal for fighting tanks. Her only weapon is a powerful cannon. The installation is lighter than a tank, since it does not need a turret, so, by the way, you can install thicker frontal armor.
Look here. The Germans installed a powerful 75-mm cannon on the T-IV tank and Hetzer self-propelled guns. The T-IV had almost vertical frontal sheets with a thickness of 50 mm, while the Hetzer had a frontal sheet inclined to the horizontal at an angle of 30°, but had a thickness of 60 mm. Nevertheless, the T-IV weighed 24 tons, and the Hetzer - 16 tons.
It must be said that the Germans were fighting: some of the tankers insisted that the new Tiger and Panther tanks be equipped with a low-power cannon or howitzer. But the fear of facing Soviet tanks was so great that both Hitler and Guderian still defended powerful guns.
True, they were always looking for compromise options. Thus, a company (14 vehicles) of old T-III tanks with a short-barreled gun was added to the heavy tank battalions of the Tigers, usually consisting of 43 vehicles, but in general it was no longer possible to stop the emerging trend towards installing a powerful gun on the tank.
In response to the T-34, the Germans installed a long-barreled 75 mm caliber gun on their tanks and increased the frontal armor to 80. In response, we increased the armor to 90 mm on the T-34 and installed a powerful 85 mm caliber gun. The Germans installed 100 mm armor and a powerful 88 mm cannon on the Tiger. In response, we increased the armor on the IS-2 heavy tank to 120 mm, and installed a 122 mm gun.
And this race in tank building continues to this day. In the 60s we had a T-55 medium tank with a powerful 100 mm cannon. The West Germans installed a smoothbore 105 mm cannon on their Leopard. In response to the T-62, we supplied a 115 mm smoothbore. I don’t remember who aimed us at the next feat, maybe the English “Chieftain” with its 120-mm cannon, but we already installed a 125-mm smoothbore fool on the T-64.
The weight of the tank is constantly growing. For the sake of the gun and armor, we already removed the directional gunner from the tanks in 1944, the tanks lost the ability to fire in two directions and completely turned into an anti-tank gun on a trolley. The Germans held out on this issue only until the end of the war.
The armor also continuously grew, raising the overall weight of the tank - in the latest models, multi-layer armor exceeds half a meter. If in 1941 an average tank weighed 20–25 tons, today its weight is close to a 50-ton Tiger.
When I had already written this article, I bought the magazine “Equipment and Armament” No. 7/98 with a problematic article by M. Rastopshin “What are our tanks like today?”
Our T-80U tank, with a weight of 46 tons, carries armor protection weighing 23.5 tons and is still inferior to the American M1A2 tank, which has an armor protection weight of 30 tons, but the American itself already weighs 59 tons.
Moreover, these tanks only have really thick armor at the front. If you place the tanks in the center of the circle, then in a sector of 30 degrees to the right and left, their front armor protection reaches a thickness equivalent to 500–700 mm of homogeneous steel armor. In the remaining sector of 300 degrees and on top there is 40–60 mm of armor.
The American 120-mm cannon penetrates the frontal armor of our T-80U, and therefore our designers have an idea to create a Black Eagle tank with even thicker armor. American designers are already developing a 140 mm caliber gun for this idea. The designers are not despondent. In response to their foolishness of 140 mm, we are already figuring out the layout of our tank with a 152 mm gun.
With such armor and a gun, current tanks can be placed on a barge and safely sent into battle with battleships, but it is dangerous to let these tanks near the infantry - the infantry quickly turns them into scrap metal.
Indeed, from 1943 to the present time, Faust cartridges with a cumulative warhead have also developed into numerous lightweight, cheap, mobile weapons capable of penetrating any, even the thickest, armor. The infantry today is so armed that the tank becomes a tasty prey for it.
Here is an episode of a specific battle. In Chechnya, our riflemen approached the village, but came across heavy fire from the Chechens and lay down. Two T-80 tanks came to their aid. Before the tanks had time to approach the village within 1.5 km, the Chechen ATGM operator launched two anti-tank guided missiles (with a cumulative warhead) at them one after another and burned them instantly. This is an example of using tanks in open areas.
Today, only tanks penetrate the armor of tanks with an armor-piercing shell, and even then they also have cumulative ammunition in their ammunition. All other branches of the military, including artillery and aviation, switched to fighting tanks only with this type of projectile.
The tank completely lost its invulnerability and, combined with the loss of other combat properties, ceased to determine anything in battle - it became an expensive toy of the generals.
Where is the way out? Is it possible to protect yourself from a cumulative projectile? Yes, you can. At least with the same screen. Then the question is, why haven’t the designers shielded the tank yet?
Because a cumulative projectile is an explosive of considerable weight. It not only creates a cumulative jet that penetrates armor, but also blows everything around with a shock wave. It follows that in order to withstand several dozen hits on the screen likely in battle, the screen must be very durable and, therefore, heavy. But there is no place to make the tank heavier; it will not cross every bridge anyway. The designers used the entire weight of the tank to create thick armor - protection from armor-piercing projectiles. There was no weight left to protect against cumulative projectiles.
The designers did what they could - they hung screens on the chassis, and attached containers with explosives (reactive armor) to the armor. When it hits this container, the cumulative jet detonates the explosives in the container, and its explosion scatters this jet, preventing it from penetrating the armor. But the weight of the explosive in the projectile is added to its weight in the container - only thick armor can withstand such a blow. Therefore, such containers protect tanks in places where the armor is already thick. The sides, roof and rear are left unprotected, and these are precisely the directions along which the infantry approaches the tank. No one will hit him in the forehead with a grenade launcher - after all, there is a machine gun and observation devices located in the front of the turret. And from the sides and rear the tank is both blind and defenseless.
Is it possible to reliably protect a tank from cumulative shells available to infantry? Undoubtedly. But it is necessary to free the designers from the ridiculous requirement to install armor on the tank that can withstand the impact of an armor-piercing projectile. Remove the requirement to have a ridiculous naval gun on a tank. The tank would immediately return to its original weight of 15–20 tons, and it could be fitted with a durable, anti-HEAT screen, be able to fire in two directions, and be loaded with hundreds of rounds to do so.
As an engineer, my hands were itching to discuss a couple of proposals that had arisen regarding the design of this tank, but I resisted - the chapter was already long, and the tank designers could handle this work without me, and much better than me. The main thing is to give them the right task.
And it should sound like this: create SOMETHING that, once in the enemy’s strong point, will not allow his infantry to fire at their own riflemen occupying this strong point. And that's it, that's enough. There is no need to even demand that the designers create a “tank”. Maybe they will give what they construct a different name, a more accurate one.
Let me explain the idea of this “something”. This is what Afghanistan war veteran A. Chikishev writes in the magazine “Soldier of Fortune” No. 6/99:
“An attack on the enemy in its classical sense during the war in Afghanistan was an extraordinary phenomenon. If Soviet troops had launched frontal attacks on enemy machine guns, as happened during the Great Patriotic War, then our losses in Afghanistan would not have been fifteen thousand killed, but a much larger number. As a rule, no one went on the attack. The only exception was special forces.
His interaction with helicopter pilots reached such a degree that it made it possible to attack Mujahideen positions even in open areas. This happened as follows: the helicopter approached the target and opened fire on it from all machine guns, cannons and cassettes with NURS. The nerves of the Mujahideen, who had previously fired from a heavy machine gun and felt invulnerable, could not stand it. The Mujahideen were in a hurry to hide from death in shelters. At this moment, the special forces made a dash, approaching the target. Then they lay down when the helicopter, coming out of a dive, was making a turn to again approach the enemy’s machine-gun position. Having made several dashes, the special forces pelted the machine gun crew with grenades if it did not have time to escape, throwing away its weapon, or was not destroyed by the fire of the helicopter pilots.
Having received helicopters at their disposal, the special forces were now doing things that they could not even think of before.”
That is, the functions that a tank performed for the Germans at the beginning of World War II were performed by a helicopter in Afghanistan, but this, of course, was only because the enemy infantry did not yet have mobile means of combating air targets. With this example, I wanted to show that this “something” does not necessarily have to look like a tank, but in this case we are talking about a ground vehicle.
I believe that our designers will certainly cope with this work, but, for the sake of clarity of conclusions, let’s assume that they won’t. And even in this case, we must say goodbye to what we call tank troops - this is a useless waste of effort and money for Victory...
What conclusions emerge from all this? The existing tank divisions need to be reorganized into rifle divisions. And this is how I see the organization of rifle regiments.
The rifle platoon must include the tank that our designers create. We have 3 infantry fighting vehicles or 3 armored personnel carriers in this platoon, and there will also be 1 tank. And the regiment should include a self-propelled gun division with a powerful cannon, or, as a last resort, a T-80 company.
Then the idea of combat is formulated as follows. Artillery and aviation are plowing up enemy strongholds. When they transfer fire to the second line of defense, the strong points are attacked by infantry platoons, launching their tanks in front of them. Behind the infantry are batteries of self-propelled guns, which, if the terrain and visibility allow, use their fire to destroy visible targets on the battlefield and behind enemy lines.
If the enemy counterattacks with tanks, then their tanks and infantry retreat behind the self-propelled gun line, and they, in cooperation with ATGMs and aircraft, deal with the enemy tanks.
In essence, this is a demand for a return to the specialization of military branches. We cannot repeat the mistake of the Germans, who, under our pressure, began to make universal tanks from vehicles specialized for fighting infantry, supposedly to fight both infantry and tanks at the same time. This universalism is good only in theory, but in practice the vehicles turned out to be neither for fighting tanks nor for fighting infantry.
Specialization is needed: tanks for fighting infantry, self-propelled guns for fighting tanks.
Home Structure Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Ground Forces Structure Tank
Tank forces
Tank forces- branch of the military and the main striking force of the Ground Forces. They are used primarily in conjunction with motorized rifle troops in the main directions and perform the following main tasks:
. in defense — for direct support of motorized rifle troops when repelling an enemy offensive and launching counterattacks and counterstrikes;
. on the offensive - to deliver powerful cutting strikes to great depths, develop success, and defeat the enemy in oncoming engagements and battles.
The basis of the tank forces are tank brigades and tank battalions of motorized rifle brigades, which have great resistance to the damaging effects of nuclear weapons, firepower, high mobility and maneuverability. They are able to make fullest use of the results of fire (nuclear) destruction of the enemy and in a short time achieve the final goals of the battle and operation.
The combat capabilities of tank formations and subunits allow them to conduct active combat operations day and night, in a significant separation from other troops, crush the enemy in oncoming battles and battles, overcome vast zones of radioactive contamination on the move, force water obstacles, and also quickly create strong defenses and successfully resist the advance of superior enemy forces.
Further development and increase in the combat capabilities of tank forces is carried out mainly through equipping them with more advanced types of tanks, which optimally combine such important combat properties as high firepower, maneuverability and reliable protection. In improving organizational forms, the main efforts are concentrated on giving them a combined arms character, which is most consistent with the content of modern operations (combat operations).
