Original taken from tiomkin to Rhodesia || South African Special Forces and Rhodesian SAS. Part II

The story of Colonel Jan Breytenbach

In October 1961 I retired from the Royal Navy Naval Air Service and re-joined the South African Armed Forces with the 1st Parachute Battalion. I was lucky - I came under the command of an outstanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Willem Lauv, known by the nickname "Sir William". When I presented to him my thoughts on the idea that 1st Pdb should be transformed into a commando unit on the SAS model, he read them carefully, and, as subsequent events showed, he not only read them, but thought deeply about them.

Later "Sir William" was promoted. He was already a brigadier general heading the Northern Transvaal Command, and I was still a simple captain - and unexpectedly he invited me to his home in Voortrekkehucht. It was there that I first met a real SAS officer - who at that time commanded a Rhodesian SAS battalion. I was natural plaasjapie(a Boer hillbilly), even if he had already served in the Royal Navy - and this officer, Major Dudley Coventry, seemed to me to be a rather exotic type: a sort of snob (judging by his clear British accent) and an aristocrat, who was exiled for some unsightly affairs into the depths of the African bush. Who knows, I decided, judging by his appearance and manners, he could equally well be an aristocrat and a former officer of the Foreign Legion.
I was pleasantly surprised when “Sir William” informed me that Coventry was in South Africa at the request of the Army Commander in order to select a place where a new unit of the South African Army, created along the lines of the SAS, would be stationed. Apparently, things have finally begun to take a serious turn. However, I remembered that the commander of the South African armed forces was initially categorically against “all these senseless special forces” and realized that, apparently, he had not yet been informed about Coventry’s visit. Coventry traveled the length and breadth of the country and eventually submitted a report that the best place for the new part would be Oudshoorn. After that, he returned back to Rhodesia, and I returned to my place, to my fairly understaffed second parachute company. The army routine irritated me, like any energetic officer, and I longed for at least some action. And soon it came - we, the paratroopers, along with a group of police officers were thrown into clearing a rebel camp located in the wilderness of Ovamboland. This was the beginning of the Border War. Then we landed troops from helicopters - three attack groups and several mixed stop groups consisting of paratroopers and police. The police, naturally, were eager to capture the militants in order to interrogate them later. We, in turn, were no less passionate about destroying the terrorists - in other words, shooting them. We even had a command helicopter in the air - this would later become a standard and extremely effective tactical procedure, used with success from Kunene to Mozambique. (Operation Blue Wildebeest- attack on the SWAPO militant camp in Ongulumbash on August 26, 1966. The operation was considered a police operation, but to strengthen the police, army units were assigned, which were commanded by Captain Breytenbach. Two terrorists were killed and several were captured).
Five paratrooper captains were invited to the SAS selection course in Rhodesia - Boity Viviers, Barry Ferreira, Eddie Webb, Frank Bestbeer and myself. In addition, there were two officers from other units there. (They, like one of the paratroopers, did not complete the course). Non-commissioned officers were also invited to this course: staff sergeants Johnny Kruger and Pep Fan Sile and sergeants Tilly Smith and Mike Potgieter, nicknamed “Yogi”. The rest were given nicknames ouboet, boet And Kleinboet(“bro”, “bro” and “little brother”).
The beginning was quite calm - we were introduced to the official (and more unofficial) culture of SAS, to the club Winged Stagger(“Winged Spottykach”, a play on words based on the SAS emblem Winged Dagger- “Winged Dagger”) and its regulars. And it should be noted that Saturday evenings turned into harsh survival exams - which we passed more and more successfully each time. (Percy Johnson and Mike Curtin were especially harsh examiners, who did not forget to load us with lectures on how an SAS member should behave, both in and out of formation). But all jokes aside, our weeks were filled with intensive initial training, which included explosives (including the handling of special charges), radio and various types and methods of communications, an advanced first aid course, tactical training, especially in small units and mobile groups , rock climbing and, naturally, an incredible amount of physical fitness. A unique person was responsible for the latter - outwardly he looked like a nice, kind-hearted pensioner from a London suburb, but in fact, he was a seasoned veteran of many campaigns. His name was Jock Hutton, he wore the shoulder straps of a warrant officer and served as a battalion sergeant major. The course officer, if I remember correctly, was Captain Ken Phillipson.
All the instructors on the course were staff sergeants or sergeants - SAS veterans with years of service behind them. I think that at that time they were the best specialists in the world. Their names were Rob Johnston, Yanni Boltman, Danny Hartman and Stan Hornby. They were with us constantly. Others, such as Brian Robinson, Harry Harvey and Barney Bentley, appeared for a while - either to give separate lectures on individual subjects, or simply to monitor how the Boers were absorbing SAS traditions. Dudley Coventry managed to greet us when we arrived, but then suddenly disappeared somewhere for a long time. He showed up later - when his wound (a bullet in the leg) had healed. It turned out that Coventry and a group of SAS fighters stopped a suspicious van for transporting furniture somewhere near the border with Zambia. Terrorists rushed from there - and a bullet from one of them hit Dudley. So, yes, there was already a war in Rhodesia - albeit not as intense as it was in the 1970s.
Finally, the most terrible day came - the test day, when we had to demonstrate all our knowledge that the instructors tried to invest in us. We left for Inyangu - there, in the reserve, we set up a temporary camp. Jock Hatton drove us mercilessly and now I appreciated his severity in physical training. We were already in excellent shape, but I decided to test myself again and arranged an additional forced march to the top of Inyangani. After that, I was thrown into the group that remained from the previous qualifying stage - it was still a company that was distinguished by its amazing diversity. They came from all over the world and from different social classes. I remember one Englishman - at first glance he was no more than fifteen years old (although in fact, of course, about 20 years old) and he weighed, God forbid, 50 kilograms. But he, like us, carried all the equipment (I I suspect it weighed as much as he did) explosives, magazines, machine gun belts, spare batteries for the radio, one or two anti-tank missiles, hand grenades, smoke bombs, two weeks' rations, spare uniforms, a sleeping bag, a raincoat, etc. d. and so on.
Packed like mules, we trudged from one point to another - and we had to meet a certain time, go to all control posts, not just walk in a meaningless heap, but “move using tactical techniques” and avoid being spotted by instructors, located on hidden NPs. Let's add rugged terrain and far from comfortable weather conditions. As a result, I climbed to the top of Inngani for the second time, exhausted to the limit, but managed to pass this stage. Already standing at the top, I saw how one of the parachute officers surrendered - although he only had 100 meters to go, and he had time to spare for this distance. This entire selection stage was built with the expectation that the candidates would come to the top, where the instructors were waiting for them. As far as I remember, most of us passed this stage - with the exception of three officers who received the “VCH” (direction “Back to Unit”).
We returned to Cranbourne, and after a short rest, began further preparations. Dudley Coventry decided that we would take part in an evasion and escape exercise in Matabeleland South. I was already familiar with this, but for other South Africans these exercises became an unforgettable event. In addition, almost all of the non-operational SAS non-commissioned officers were involved in these exercises. The beaters were guys from a company of Rhodesian African Rifles under the command of Major Dizzy Danes - and they were skilled trackers.
The exercises began with the fact that we (30 people) were locked in a cell at the Brady garrison guardhouse for three days - more precisely, they were stuffed there like sardines in a can. Each day, everyone was given half a plate of stew and half a cup of tea. There was one bucket for everyone - for natural needs. All these three days, the jailers entertained us with a constant monstrous cacophony from huge speakers - with the goal of turning our brains into jelly. Finally we were bundled into a cattle wagon and driven east towards Figtree. We fled from this truck - we rushed into the bush, to a pre-agreed point. As soon as the escape happened, our pursuers were immediately informed about it. We were informed that those caught would be interrogated by military intelligence officers - and the interrogation methods would be the most realistic. It is clear that these exercises were planned to be extremely tough - especially if special forces from the SAS or patrols of the African Rifles were hunting for you.
The SAS officers caught me and my partner just as we were approaching the appointed place. While the trial is pending, they decided to temporarily place me at the location of the RAS company. Danes immediately jumped at the opportunity to conduct his own interrogation. I decided that the best interrogation tactic would be to “turn on the fool” and not answer a single question, even the most legitimate ones, such as “name-rank-personal-number”. At such stubbornness of the South African parachutist, Dizzy was amazed and seriously decided to break me - hanging me by my thumbs from a tree. Luckily, it was at that moment that the SAS men returned and took me away. Danes was extremely disappointed.
I was taken to a “torture center” - a military intelligence base. It was in the evening, they immediately put a bag over my head, stripped me to the waist and left me like that all night. Naturally, they did not let me sleep - sometimes they suddenly poured ice water on me, sometimes they simply kicked me or shouted something in my ear. This torture continued the next morning until the evening of the next day. After that, I was taken to a cozy room - where the interrogation actually took place. When they pulled the bag off my head, I saw my investigator. According to the script, it was assumed that it would be some kind of cruel psychopath. Instead, I stared at my old friend, artillery officer Major Alan Slater, whom I had not seen in a thousand years. He did his best to pretend that he didn’t know me - and I did the same. I bravely declared that I was not going to utter a single word - period! By the end, this “interrogation” almost descended into comedy, as Alan and I kept winking at each other. But after that, I found myself in the company of truly gloomy and unpleasant investigators who really wanted to milk the necessary information from me. And I very quickly came to the same conclusion as before - the best interrogation tactic, from my point of view, is “if I hear nothing, I won’t say anything.”
I again “went on the run” (this was provided for in the exercise plan) - but this time alone. These interrogations had an incredible influence on me - neither before nor after this, and in general never again in my life have I had the opportunity to learn so many new things about myself as during the interrogation. Among other things, I visited Dizzy Danes' field kitchen and picked up as many dry rations as I could carry. The composition of the rations sounded like the sweetest music to me: cheese, chocolate, coffee, tea, condensed milk... In general, now for me the escape turned into a kind of hike from one picnic to another - through the wild bush south of the Matopos Mountains. (After this stage was over, the “survivors” were gathered at a hotel in Gwanda and fed to their heart’s content).
Half of the South Africans returned back to the south, the rest were transferred to the Zambezi Valley, to the Chivore River - there we learned the art of reading other people's tracks, camouflaging our own, and also surviving in the wild bush. Our instructors were Brian Robinson, Henny Pretorius and Alan Franklin, whom everyone knew as “Lanky”. After completing the training in Chivor, we left for Lake Kariba to learn how to handle small vessels, especially kayaks, as well as combat diving. Rob Johnston, Danny Hartman and Yanni Boltman joined us there. It was my first time in the Caribbean - before that I had no idea that reservoirs and dams could be so huge. The dam on the Vaal, compared to the Kariba, looked like a shallow puddle.
And finally, when it was all over, we were given the famous beige berets and blue SAS uniform belts. I still keep them, and on those (unfortunately rare) occasions when I had to take part in operations with the Rhodesians, I wore these insignia with pride. We returned home, and I was looking forward to the fact that a special forces unit was about to be deployed in our army. But nothing happened - weeks, months passed, and the situation did not move from a dead point. Brigadier General Lauv received a second star on his shoulder straps and became commander of the ground forces. I in turn received an appointment to the headquarters in Windhoek in SWA.
And then suddenly I and several other of my colleagues found ourselves in a war - in Biafra. This was a top secret operation - we secretly trained Biafrian rebels, sometimes led them into battle, and sometimes we ourselves organized sabotage in the Nigerian rear. Those. We were finally doing some real special forces work. Our participation in that war was one of the most closely guarded secrets in South Africa - the fact that the Republic secretly provided assistance to the Biafrans became known long after the fall of the apartheid regime. When the Nigerians launched a decisive offensive and it became clear that Biafra’s days and hours were numbered, we barely had time to fly out of there - literally at the last minute and on the last plane. But the experience we gained in the rear of the Nigerian troops once again proved that it was simply vital for South Africa to have its own unit like the SAS - generals Lauw and Lutz even without this understood the importance of special operations, but the head of the armed forces of the Republic, General Hiemstra, believed that all this “secret war” is a whim and nonsense.
Sir William, at his own peril and risk, gave me the unspoken go-ahead for me to begin forming a still unofficial special forces unit under the roof of the Infantry School in Oudshoorn. The project was called the Special Warfare Division, later renamed the Experimental Task Force. There were 12 of us, and it was quite natural that we were immediately dubbed the “Dirty Dozen”: Jan Breytenbach, Dan Lamprecht, “Yogi” Potgieter, “Kernas” Conradie, “Fires” fan Feuren, Koos Moorcroft, John Mohr, Trevor Floyd, Dewald de Beer, "Hoppy" Fourie, "FC" fan Cyle and Malcolm Kinghorn. It was they who later became those who founded and deployed the 1st Reconnaissance and Sabotage Detachment. We conducted one selection course, then another, and after that we began combat operations in Angola and Zambia. In 1970, I underwent additional training at the 1st Infantry Brigade in Bloemfontein and qualified as a high-altitude paratrooper. I was 39 years old at the time and became the oldest serviceman in age to successfully pass the skydiving exam. We were divided into two covert penetration groups - air and sea - and, by secret agreement with Paris, we were sent to the French special forces bases of Cercotte and Ajaccio. There we received additional training in the field of covert penetration into enemy territory from water and air. Later, these skills came in handy: we carried out an operation to destroy coastal objects in one famous port in East Africa - where sabotage groups in kayaks were landed from a submarine. An indescribable feeling: swinging on small boats in the ocean, waiting for a submarine to pick you up, and watching as explosions roar through the city and it plunges into darkness.
By 1973, when the 1st RDO was already officially included in the Armed Forces, a shortage of specialists with experience in conducting in-depth reconnaissance and special operations behind enemy lines began to be felt. I approached General Lutz (then Special Operations Officer at Army Headquarters) with a proposal to assign us to the Rhodesian SAS battalion - they were already operating in full force in Zambia and Mozambique at that time, and I wanted to gain first-hand combat experience. Brian Robinson, the battalion commander at that time, often visited South Africa, and on one of these visits we met him. In the Mozambican province of Tete, the war waged by the Portuguese against the rebels was in full swing. sitzkrieg(trench warfare), and Rhodesia secretly but intensively took part in it on the side of Lisbon. The problem was that there were very few SAS members, and Robinson, having heard my proposal, jumped at the opportunity to get himself extra eyes, ears and skillful hands.
Almost this entire region, on both sides of the Zambezi, from the Rhodesian border in the south to the Zambian in the north, from Zumbo in the west to Tete in the east, was under the complete control of FRELIMO - for the simple reason that the Portuguese troops openly gave up on this war and occupied the attitude of “keep your head down and you’ll live to see demobilization.” They preferred to sit in aldeamentos- so-called "protected villages" - which they turned into a certain semblance of safe forts, and preferred not to take risks. And everything that happened behind the barbed wire fence along the perimeter did not bother them at all. ZANLA immediately appreciated the benefits of this status quo - in fact, the militants received direct and free access to the northern part of Rhodesia. And very soon the region was covered with a network of paths along which terrorists rushed from Zambia, through Tete, to the north of Rhodesia. It is clear that the Rhodesians wanted to cut these routes, and to do it as far as possible from their borders. But FRELIMO, which actually occupied this province and flooded it with well-armed and well-organized militants, granted ZANLA most-favoured-nation treatment. Figuratively speaking, the Freds covered them with a blanket. And the Rhodesians were faced with the task of tearing this blanket into small pieces.
Brian Robinson sensibly reasoned that to achieve this goal, the SAS must return to the good old methods of conducting deep reconnaissance - and the physical destruction of ZANLA militants and FRELIMO camps will fall on the shoulders of aviation and airborne troops, which will be called and directed at the target by SAS patrols. Accordingly, the SAS had to deploy a whole network of camouflaged OPs north of the Zambezi, which would be attended by small reconnaissance groups. The offer of assistance received from the 1st RDO meant that the SAS could count on a larger number of fighters and, accordingly, cover a much larger territory. For us South Africans, this had its own benefit - we did not have experience in long-term long-distance patrols and long-term reconnaissance from hidden OPs.
If I remember correctly, our first patrol in Tete was in early 1974. The rainy season was already in full swing. But before going on the mission, we spent some time at the SAS base in order to work together with the Rhodesians and get used to each other - a vital process if you have two special forces of different armies at your disposal. We were brought up to date, educated about all aspects of the operation, and we once again practiced landing techniques, both with forced deployment of the parachute and long jumps with self-deployment. In addition, we were given notebooks with SAS codes - an incredibly necessary thing: with the help of these codes we could do anything: report on the movement of the enemy, the losses of our own and others, not to mention the fact that with their help we could order the supplies we needed from warehouse.
The SAS forward tactical base was located at Makombe, on the south bank of the Zambezi. Actually, it was a garrison in which there was a company of African Rifles (later they were replaced by light infantry), and the SAS simply occupied a piece of territory from them. Nearby there was a small field airfield that could only receive light aircraft. The joint group on our side included Warrant Officers Fan Sile and Floyd, Corporals Wannenburg, Tippett and Oberholzer, and myself as an ordinary member of the group (the commander was Fan Sile). It’s an incredibly interesting feeling for an officer - to trail behind and watch how all the carrots and bumps go to the warrant officer, and you decide nothing and are not responsible for anything. As an ordinary soldier, I was stuck at the OP, stood on guard and, like everyone else, fought with the ungodly environment - which in fact turned out to be no easy task.
Firstly, it poured incessantly - as a result, everything that was possible was thoroughly saturated with moisture. Our daytime uniform consisted of a T-shirt and shorts - always damp. At night, we pulled on trousers and shirts - but they were damp, as were our sleeping bags. The grass stood as tall as a man, it was constantly flowing and dripping - it was like walking waist-deep in a river. In addition, all the time I had to wade through the web - there was simply no escape from these sticky threads. Trees and dense bushes, on the one hand, provided us with excellent shelter, but on the other hand, the crushed wet grass immediately revealed our stopping places and rest stops. We could not use the techniques of covering our tracks due to the senselessness of these actions - it was not a heavy downpour that washed away our tracks, but what is called in Rhodesia guti, an incessant soft rain that irritated us incredibly. In principle, there were enough hills to set up hidden NPs ( gomo), but we still had to get close to them - because of the rains, streams and rivulets overflowed profusely, the water in some of them reached up to our chests. Unlike southwestern Zambia or southeastern Angola, where the population was scarce, this territory was quite densely populated - and besides, there was enough so-called. "militias", i.e. not regular FRELIMO cadres, but those who sympathized with them. The "militia" were the ears and eyes of the "Freds", and half of them carried weapons, mostly SKS carbines. As a rule, in each small valley about half kimbo(kraals) who in one way or another helped the local “Fred” base (the militants set up a camp in the distance and carefully camouflaged it). "Freds" often used the local population as porters to transfer something from Zambia to Rhodesia - simply at gunpoint. We called it “safari express”: a stretched column of locals, heavily laden, wanders along the valley, and “militia” march parallel to it with carbines at the ready. Cargo was stored on the northern bank of the Zambezi, and at night mokoros(boats) were secretly transported to Rhodesia. Having identified the routes of movement of the Terrans, as well as the main bases of the militants (the smoke from the morning fires gave them away), we coordinated attacks on the Terrans from our hidden OPs. In theory - nothing complicated. Helicopter landings of African riflemen fell on the camps, the militants suffered losses - but this operation also had another side: the Terrans sometimes managed to spot us. Most often we were given away mujibas, shepherd boys who hung around almost around the clock everywhere, and in particular around the hills. If they noticed tracks leading to the top of the hill, the Terrans immediately became aware of this. We, accordingly, had to abandon illuminated OPs - more than a couple of times we spotted militants, “Freds” and “militia” in time, approaching our positions, clearly not in order to invite us to a friendly cup of tea. The Air Force helped us out every now and then: while the information reached the headquarters, while it was possible to come to an agreement with the Air Force headquarters, while this and that - the militants disappeared. Brian, I remember, was quietly furious.
One day we urgently changed the location of our NP - at night. At night it was generally more convenient for us to move - along the same paths that the Terrans used. As a rule, we walked barefoot - in this case, our tracks often mixed with those of the militants (few of the Terrans could afford to wear shoes). Trevor Floyd walked in the vanguard. He carefully walked around a large bush that stood in his way, ducked under the branches, quietly entered under this natural tent and was dumbfounded: it was the most natural hut created by nature and terrorists slept there! The head of one of the militants was just a few centimeters from Floyd’s mud-stained feet. With utmost care, Trevor moved back. When he finally got out onto the path, we all quietly moved away as far as possible - after all, we were engaged in covert operations, and not shock-search raids.
Another time, I unexpectedly found myself in the role of commander of one of the SAS mini-groups - the militants who were escaping pursuit were firmly on the tail of the militants, one of the special forces was seriously wounded. What was even worse, the group's radio operator was also out of action - when they were boiling water, he managed to knock over a pot of hot water on himself. As a result, the group was quickly evacuated by helicopter to Macomb. I was flying with two SAS men in one of the helicopters, when suddenly the pilot spotted the Terrans in the kraal below us. Without hesitation, he parked his car right in the middle of the huts. We immediately unloaded, the helicopter immediately took off and disappeared towards Makombe. The Terras fled, but I had no doubt that they would now come to their senses, regroup and attack us. We didn’t have a radio - it was left in another helicopter, along with a wounded soldier and an incapacitated radio operator. Our immediate future, apparently, was in great doubt. So I decided that the best solution would be a heroic defense in the style of the defenders of the Alamo. I quickly deployed the defense - if you can call it that: three fighters (including me) are holding their own sector of fire, but you can’t count on each other’s support, there are too few of us and each has his own area. The locals slowly calmed down and returned to their business - although they glanced warily in our direction. The Terras never showed up: either they ran off to hell, or they decided that they would soon let us in for mince anyway, so why bother. I won’t hide it, with great relief after a while I heard the familiar rumble of blades - the helicopter had returned to pick us up. Returning to the base, I again stood in formation, in my usual place as a private - no discounts for the fact that I was actually a lieutenant colonel, no liberties... it says in formation, then in formation.
We were soon replaced by another group from the 1st RDO, commanded by Major Nick Visser, deputy detachment commander. With him also came Koos Moorcroft, Kernas Conradi, Dewald de Beer, Fingers Kruger and Chilli du Plessis. They also had adventures. During one of the operations, de Beer single-handedly destroyed 12 terrorists from the vanguard of a large group that had been following on our heels for half a day. The most remarkable thing is that de Beer spent only 12 rounds on them. And he killed them with his trusty automatic rifle R1- for some reason, de Beer stubbornly refused to take Kalashnikovs to operations.
As a result, ZANLA and FRELIMO were forced to abandon the established paths, in particular from the Cabora Bassa Canyon to Zumbo, and look for new paths in the eastern part of the region (which was categorically unprofitable for them). In addition, the Rhodesians were able to detect and confiscate all the boats, thus blocking penetration into the Hurricane operational sector. But after some time, a pro-communist coup took place in Portugal, followed by the “expulsion” of Rhodesia from Mozambique. The war began with renewed vigor, significantly increasing the burden on the already small Rhodesian armed forces.
The 1st RDO found itself in Mozambique again a few years later to help take control of the province of Gaza. During joint special operations with the Rhodesians, 6 special forces from South Africa were killed. But by that time, I had already left the special forces. I served in the 32nd battalion, and later was again transferred to the airborne units - to form the 44th parachute brigade. As the commander of this unit, at least I could at least sometimes help the Rhodesians - by launching tactical landings in the Gwanda area in order to surround and block the militants. But this ultimately did not help Rhodesia - the governments of the USA, Great Britain and South Africa forced Ian Smith to lay down his arms, in the naive hope that a new democratic country would be born in Africa.
I will never forget my most recent visit to Rhodesia. I personally accompanied the last group of South African paratroopers leaving Gwanda. We were all dressed in Rhodesian uniform, and on my head, in addition to this, I proudly wore a crooked beige beret with the Rhodesian SAS emblem. I remember Major Roy Mankowitz of the 1st Brigade - we were taking off and he was standing next to the runway, furious, stunned and betrayed. He shook his fist at the sky in rage, as if he wanted to say a few unparliamentary expressions to someone (in general, it’s clear to whom and what). I have never been to Zimbabwe again, but this image of a lonely officer in a state of impotent rage from vile betrayal has remained in my soul forever.

S. Kolomnin "The last battle of the Rhodesian SAS..."

Sergey KOLOMNIN

Operation Beanbag

Rhodesian last standSAS

After the disappearance of Southern Rhodesia from the political map and the formation of the state of Zimbabwe in its place, most of the Rhodesian special forces fighters (Selous Scouts, SAS and Southern Rhodesian Light Infantry) moved to South Africa and entered service in the South African armed forces. On their basis, two new reconnaissance and sabotage detachments of South African commandos were created: the 3rd, which included mainly black Selous Scouts, and the 6th, which was based on former Rhodesian Sasovites. However, these two divisions did not last long, just over a year. By mid-1981, the majority of Rhodesian special forces, having completed 12-month contracts with the South African Armed Forces, left the South African reconnaissance and sabotage formations - Reconnaissance commando (Recces). At the heart of the disagreements between the Rhodesians and South Africans was a different approach to the methodology of conducting special operations, as well as the excessive, in the opinion of the command of the South African Armed Forces, the desire of the Rhodesians for independence.

Linguistic and even religious differences also played a role. English-speaking Rhodesians were not very willing to learn the official language of the Recces, Afrikaans. And the religious beliefs of the descendants of the Boers (reformed Dutch church) were in conflict with the beliefs of the majority of Rhodesians who professed other religious movements. All this taken together eventually led some senior Recces officers to declare “the fundamentally different cultures of Rhodesian and South African special forces.”

However, before their departure, the Rhodesians were still able to “slam the door” thoroughly: through their efforts, Operation Beanbag was carried out in Mozambique, which had far-reaching consequences and caused a lot of noise in the international press.

Using the experience of the Rhodesian war

In the early 80s of the twentieth century, several educational centers and institutions of the opposition African National Congress operated in the territory of Mozambique, neighboring South Africa. In the Mozambican province of Nampula in the north of the country, for example, there was a camp where up to 150 fighters from the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, were trained. Umkhonto units, using Mozambique as a base, conducted operations in South Africa. In the capital of Mozambique, Maputo and its suburbs, the ANC owned over 30 houses and apartments, used by both the political and military structures of the ANC. Several such ANC residences in the Maputo suburb of Matole became the target of Operation Beanbeg.

The South Africans believed that in Matola, which was located 16 km from the Mozambican capital, there was “a large headquarters of the ANC and SACP (South African Communist Party - S.K.) for planning military operations in South Africa.” The commandos were to attack three targets in Matola, capture or destroy the ANC activists located there, and remove documentation of intelligence value. The headquarters of the special forces of the South African Armed Forces also counted on the capture of the leader of the South African Communist Party and member of the ANC leadership, Joe Slovo, whom the South African special services considered a colonel of the Soviet KGB. Joe Slovo was responsible in the ANC leadership for planning military operations and, having received information that Slovo periodically visited Matola, the South Africans decided to strike. The task of developing and implementing the operation was entrusted to the former Rhodesian SAS soldier, commander of the 6th Recces reconnaissance detachment, Colonel Garth Barrett.

The action was conceived as a secret raid by special forces, and not a military operation. Among the means of delivering commandos to the target were discussed: an airplane with a drop of paratroopers, a helicopter landing, a sea landing on the coast from a surface ship or a submarine. However, the latter option was rejected immediately, since the submarine could not provide the delivery of either a sufficient number of special forces or heavy weapons (machine guns, grenade launchers), which the Rhodesians insisted on. For the same reason, they refused to land an air assault group on the coast. The drop of paratroopers and a helicopter landing were also rejected as unable to ensure the secrecy of the mission.

In the end, the choice was made in favor of a convoy of trucks camouflaged as Mozambican military vehicles, which was supposed to secretly deliver special forces to the site. As the operation was entrusted to the 6th Rhodesian Recces, it was decided to rely on the wealth of experience the Selous Scouts and SAS had acquired during the Rhodesian War.

Scouts and Sasovites have already carried out similar actions in Mozambique. So in May 1976, about two dozen Rhodesians, most of them black, posing as soldiers of the government army, crossed the border with Mozambique in four trucks and went deeper into the country for more than a hundred kilometers. They secretly surrounded the base of the Zimbabwean ZANLA guerrillas, attacked and destroyed it, destroying warehouses where large quantities of weapons and ammunition were stored. In June of the same year, the Selous Scouts carried out another similar operation in Mozambique. It was codenamed "Long John". During the action, 58 special forces in four trucks camouflaged as Mozambican government army vehicles entered the city of Mapai and destroyed 19 ZANLA members and a dozen buses and trucks used by the guerrillas to transport personnel and weapons.

Therefore, the Rhodesian special forces, who formed the basis of the 6th South African reconnaissance detachment, had experience in covertly infiltrating Mozambique by car. And the South Africans had at their disposal Soviet-made GAZ and ZIL trucks, as well as armored vehicles BRDM, BTR-152 and BTR-60PB, captured during the fighting in Angola. The Mozambican army was armed with similar equipment, so it was enough to deliver several of these serviceable vehicles from Namibia from captured warehouses and put on them the identification marks of the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FPLM).

Attempt number "one"

The Rhodesians wanted every vehicle prepared for a secret raid to be equipped with heavy weapons, including automatic weapons. They were supposed to be hidden under a layer of tarpaulin in the bodies and used for fire support for special forces when storming buildings. The South Africans objected, rightly believing that there was no need for unnecessary noise for such an operation. In the end, a compromise was reached between the Rhodesians and South Africans: each truck was to be equipped with 12.7 mm or 14.5 mm Soviet-made machine guns, and some were equipped with 106 mm recoilless rifles. And yet, on one of the trucks, the former Sasovites, secretly from the Recces command, installed a 20-mm rapid-fire cannon taken from an old Rhodesian Air Force Vampire fighter.

Operation Beanbeg was commanded by the commander of the 6th reconnaissance detachment Recces, former Southern Rhodesian SAS officer Colonel Garth Barrett. In order to isolate Matola, he planned to place the so-called on all roads. stop groups dressed in Mozambican army uniforms. At the same time, barriers and signs with the words “Stop, no passage!” were to be installed at the entrance and exit from Matola. in Portuguese. Only black special forces who spoke Portuguese were included in the cordon. They were to act under the guise of Mozambican military patrols and, if necessary, use both small arms and grenade launchers. These groups were tasked with isolating Matola from the outside world. They were supposed to cut all telephone lines leading to Maputo. To give such groups mobility, they were equipped with Hercules bicycles.

At the end of November 1980, preparations for the operation were largely completed. Special forces and transport vehicles transported from Namibia concentrated 25 km from the Komatipurt border point, through which the highway connecting South Africa with Mozambique passed. A point several tens of kilometers south of the highway was chosen to cross the border. At the appointed hour, the column crossed the border through a pre-made passage in the barbed wire fences and rushed to the highway, which was more than 40 km away. The terrain was a wild African savannah, and from the very first hours of the march, the special forces began to be plagued by failures. Soviet-made vehicles delivered from Namibia were in extremely poor technical condition and broke down every now and then. To top it all off, there were communication problems. When the odometer of Colonel Barrett's commanding BRDM marked the 43rd kilometer from the border, he was informed that the two trucks had finally stopped.

Barrett contacted the command post and reported his decision to end the operation. Just a hundred meters from the treasured highway to Matola, the column turned around and headed back. The emergency vehicles had to be towed: abandoning them on Mozambican territory meant immediately exposing the entire operation.

For the next two months, the special forces detachment and the repairmen assigned to it were engaged in restoring faulty equipment, testing communications, and training in storming and clearing buildings. It was possible to achieve a stable “internal radio network” in the column. The specialists even had to replace the Soviet radio station on the commander’s BRDM with another, “more reliable” one. The convoy also included two South African-made Samil trucks.

Disagreements are growing

Barrett continually had friction with the command of the special forces of the South African Armed Forces. The former Rhodesian Sasovo member was reproached for neglecting the technical side of the matter and arrogance. He was also accused of “excessive reliance on the Rhodesians alone.” However, Barrett managed to defend his plan for the operation, although he agreed to include several South Africans in the team and replace a number of commanders.

Finally, in the second half of January 1981, the commando reconnaissance team was ready to repeat the raid on Matola. Before the second invasion, the South African intelligence services conducted thorough reconnaissance. She showed that there was no indication that the first infiltration of special forces into Mozambican territory had been uncovered. Therefore, Special Forces Headquarters gave Operation Beanbag the green light.

In the cab of each truck in the convoy there were two black drivers (primary and backup) who spoke Portuguese. The entire special forces detachment was divided into three operational groups (according to the number of objects attacked) and a mobile headquarters, which included the commanding BRDM of Colonel Barrett and a GAZ-66 truck covered with a tarpaulin, in the back of which there was a medical center and several armed soldiers. The only armored vehicle in the column, the command BRDM, was supposed to take the main blow in the event of an open clash with units of the Mozambique Armed Forces, ensuring the withdrawal of the remaining vehicles.

Team A, composed of seventeen special forces, was led by legendary Rhodesian special forces soldier Captain Robert McKenzie, a man who was "the most decorated American to serve in Rhodesia." In particular, Mackenzie was awarded the Bronze Cross "for gallantry and determination in action" and was later awarded the Silver Cross for exceptional service to Rhodesia. Robert McKenzie's team followed in a Samil truck and a Soviet GAZ-66. In addition to the task of destroying her facility, she was responsible for the safety of the convoy’s movement.

Troop B, commanded by Major Chris Steinberg, consisted of 22 men. It traveled on three Soviet trucks and was the main striking force of the sabotage detachment. Team C, led by Lieutenant Mike Rich, consisted of 17 6th Recce operators in two vehicles. Thus, the commando column ready to cross the South African border with Mozambique consisted of 68 commandos in eight trucks and one armored vehicle. All of them were dressed in camouflage uniforms of the Mozambican army, armed with assault rifles and Kalashnikov machine guns, pump-action shotguns, RPG-7 grenade launchers, hand grenades and pistols with silencers. On board the trucks with Mozambican military license plates there was the necessary supply of explosives and ammunition, and a radio station for communication between the groups and the command.

At 8 o'clock in the evening on January 29, 1981, a line of vehicles disguised as a Mozambican military transport convoy left its temporary base near Komatipurt towards the border. At 9:30 pm she reached the crossing point and, through a passage made in the barbed wire, entered the territory of Mozambique. The cars and the lead BRDM moved with their headlights off, guided by the signals from the flashlights of the foot patrols sent ahead. They conducted reconnaissance of the savannah, helping drivers choose the right road and avoid possible populated areas and minefields. At about 1 a.m., Garrett's armored vehicle drove onto the asphalt road leading to Matola. The column lined up in marching order and, with headlights on, rushed towards the target. When meeting with military vehicles, the black commandos sitting behind the wheel greeted them with gestures customary in such cases or with an exclamation in Portuguese.

Before entering Matola, the cars crossed a bridge over the river. To Barrett’s surprise, the crossing was not guarded by anyone, and he decided to correct this “oversight” by setting up his own checkpoint there, disguised as soldiers of the Mozambican army. The stop group on the bridge was well armed and, if necessary, could easily hold out for some time. However, the commandos received instructions from Barrett to allow all civilian vehicles to pass freely for the time being, so as not to make too much noise for the time being. A similar checkpoint was installed on the road leaving Matola towards Maputo. The cordon should have been completely “worked” at Barrett’s command, at the moment when the first special forces began to storm their facilities.

The mobile operation headquarters, led by Barrett, who monitored the situation by radio, were located on the highway at the entrance to Matola. Before the attack, the assault groups of special forces split into threes, many of whom put steel helmets on their heads. The commanders of the troikas had fairly accurate plans of the buildings in which the ANC members were located. At Barrett's command, special forces groups began a simultaneous assault on all objects.

“Your own” or “someone else’s”?

The first attack was successful - during an attack on one of the ANC buildings, special forces managed to capture nine ANC members who were going out into the street at that moment. However, taking advantage of the shootout and the confusion that followed, seven of them managed to escape. As it turned out later, among them was the famous commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe, Mosto Mokgabudi. While fleeing, he was wounded by a burst from a machine gun and subsequently died in a Maputo hospital.

The special forces stormed buildings in a standard “police” manner: they knocked down doors and threw grenades at the premises. In response, bursts of machine gun fire from ANC fighters guarding the buildings were heard from the darkness. According to the recollections of the Rhodesians, participants in the raid on Matola, the most difficult thing during the night assault was the identification of “friend or foe.” Most of the commandos, as well as the ANC guards, were armed with Soviet-made weapons. Therefore, it was impossible to determine by the sound whether it was our own shot or an enemy shot. In the ensuing confusion during the storming of one of the ANC houses, Captain Robert McKenzie's partners were wounded: Lieutenant Rich Stannard, Sergeant Mike Smith and Medical Sergeant Andy Johnston. Sergeant Lan Steele was killed, and Corporal Jim Parkes was mortally wounded and later died in South Africa.

Team C, under the command of Lieutenant Mike Rich, managed to enter the building undetected and kill six ANC members who did not have time to offer any resistance. The Umkhonto command later admitted that these “activists were taken by surprise and shot dead in their beds.” Group “B” had the hardest time. The object she stormed was the largest and was a two-story house with outbuildings and a garage. Expecting that this is where the most fierce resistance would be offered, the special forces drove a truck with a 106-mm recoilless rifle in the back and a 14.5-mm machine gun mounted on the cab to the entrance to the building. If the assault failed, the residence was simply supposed to be shot. However, this was not required.

The lead SWAT team, led by Captain Corrie Meerholz, immediately encountered a guard armed with a machine gun. Apparently, mistaking the people in camouflage uniforms for soldiers of the Mozambican government army, he did not open fire. But, even realizing that there was an enemy in front of him, the taken aback guard for some reason hesitated to open fire. Then the commander of the assault group, trying to gain time, entered into negotiations with him. Only when Meerholz was convinced that the guard would not surrender did he throw a grenade into the doorway. In response, a long burst of machine gun fire was heard. Meanwhile, the second part of the assault group, taking advantage of the ongoing negotiations, surrounded the building. The first shots served as the signal for a general assault. The special forces combed room by room, destroying everyone who resisted. The wounded and stunned were taken prisoner. The found documents were carefully collected, taking small arms as trophies. In particular, an English STAN submachine gun was captured during the assault, which was later taken to the Recces headquarters and displayed there as a trophy.

According to South Africa, during the storming of the ANC residences in Matola, thirteen ANC members were killed and five were captured. According to the ANC, 15 people were killed and three activists “were kidnapped and taken to South Africa.” However, SACP leader Joe Slovo was not among them. As it turned out later, he left one of the buildings just a few hours before the assault. Among the dead was one person who had nothing to do with the ANC. This was the Portuguese engineer Jose Ramos, who worked in Mozambique under a contract with the government. He did not obey the demands of the special forces from the stop group and tried to drive his car around the barriers placed on the road. He was killed by a burst from a machine gun. In Operation Beanbeg, the special forces lost three people killed and several operators were wounded.

The entire operation to storm and seize three buildings in Matola lasted eighteen minutes, which was three minutes longer than planned. At about four o'clock in the morning, all assault groups concentrated on leaving Matola and moved along the highway in a forced march towards the border. There was no pursuit and, a few hours later, the convoy was already on the territory of South Africa.

Operation Beanbag was the last operation of the 6th Rhodesian Reconnaissance Squad of the South African Commandos. Shortly after its completion, Colonel Garth Barrett resigned. He was followed by about 60 special forces who did not want to renew their contract with the South African special forces. There were just over twenty soldiers left in the 6th Recces detachment, therefore, as part of the ongoing reform of the special forces of the South African Army, it was disbanded in May 1981, and personnel who expressed a desire to continue serving in the South African special forces were transferred to the command of the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment . Following Barrett and his comrades, some of the former Selous Scouts followed. Those who wanted to stay were enlisted in the 5th Reconnaissance Regiment of the South African Armed Forces. In order not to “dissolve” among the South Africans and to preserve the memory of the Rhodesian special forces, in particular the Selous Scouts, their symbol - an image of a parachute surrounded by “wings” symbolizing the fishing eagle, a bird common throughout Southern Rhodesia - was included in the emblem 5 of the South African Special Forces Reconnaissance Regiment. The soldiers of the regiment were also given the banner and the legendary Rhodesian Selous Scouts for safekeeping.

The Selous Scouts, like most units of the Rhodesian army, were part of an integrated regiment - both black and white soldiers served side by side in the regiment, with the number of the latter varying from 15 to 30%. (Only the SAS and Light Infantry were pure “white” units in the RDF). Since the majority of the soldiers were black, the question of their recruitment arose in the first place. Since the Scouts were a secret unit from the moment of their creation until almost the end of the war, which few people knew about, African personnel were never recruited directly through army recruiters. A different method was used for this.

When there was a need for recruits, a unit of African soldiers was sent to the region. On arrival at the site, plainclothes soldiers (local natives) were sent to their native places, while their commander arranged with the regional commissioner (the civil administration official in charge of the area) that potential candidates would report to his office for registration.

Soldier recruiters never admitted to their neighbors and fellow countrymen that they were military personnel. Sometimes, if it was completely impossible to hide it, they confirmed that they had served, but were no longer serving. Usually they worked under the “legends” of seasonal workers, or unemployed people who returned to stay in their native lands.

Further, in their conversations, they mentioned that they had heard out of the corner of their ears how some army officer from one very special and very secret unit would one day come to the office of the regional commissar. And it seems, according to them, there were rumors that this officer would be looking for people to serve - but not just anyone, but special people: strong, hardy, those who know how to read tracks well and feel at home in the bush. Then there was a conversation about how in this special unit the salary is much higher than in ordinary units. In the end, the recruiter began to brag and declared that he would try his hand himself and go see what was there and how it was. And he invited his friends with him.

When the unit commander arrived at the commissioner’s office on the appointed day, there were usually ten to twelve people waiting for him there. In order not to reveal the “legends” of his subordinates, the officer interviewed them in the same way as real candidates. The local population and relatives of the recruits were sure that the soldiers were being recruited into ordinary army units - the Selous Scouts were not mentioned even once.

After this, the selected recruits were taken to the Inkomo barracks, where they awaited the arrival of the remaining parties from other parts of the country. They were given standard camouflage cotton clothing and were in the position of ordinary army recruits - until they were told in no way that they would be undergoing a Scout selection course. When a sufficient number of people were finally recruited, usually about 60, the course of the young fighter began. In principle, it differed from the usual army course in slightly greater intensity. For example, a recruit to the Rhodesian African Rifles regiment (a black unit with white officers) was sent to a combat unit after four months of training. But a potential candidate for Scouts must have completed at least 6 months of training. As for the disciplines, it was the usual army training - drill, weapons techniques, physical training, shooting, etc. After six months, about 40 of the candidates remained - the rest were eliminated and discarded as unsuitable material for the army.

When this six-month training of African recruits was nearing its end, announcements began to be sent throughout the RDF structure that the next recruitment into the Selous Scouts was starting and European volunteers, as well as African non-commissioned officers, were invited to take part.

Due to the specifics of the Scouts, there was a constant need for black non-commissioned officers from the African Rifles - firstly, supervision was needed for the newcomers, and secondly, someone had to train potential sergeants.

When applications closed, there were usually about 15 corporals and lance-corporals from the African Rifles among the applicants - rarely among them were sergeants. As for the white volunteers, they represented almost the entire spectrum of the RDF, including the national police, units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Security Corps, the Rhodesian Rifles, the SAS and the Light Infantry. 90% of them, as a rule, were military personnel of “territorial units” (i.e., militia) and only 10% were military personnel of the regular army. This was explained by the fact that the Scout selection course was extremely tough, and few of the soldiers of the regular units liked the idea of ​​​​starting all over from scratch in a new unit. Especially if it includes a course for a young fighter.

From Reid-Daly's point of view, a special forces soldier must embody a special type of soldier. The required qualities include intelligence, courage, fortitude, loyalty, commitment, a sense of professionalism, responsibility and self-discipline. Age limits are from 24 to 32 years.

When Ron Reid-Daly thought about what the selection course should be like, he deliberately wanted to contrast it with a similar stage in another special forces - the SAS. Despite the fact that Reid-Daly himself came from the ranks of the SAS, he believed that the SAS and the Scouts had different tasks and different methods of accomplishing them. In this regard, in his opinion, SAS and Scout employees should be fundamentally different. In other words, what is suitable for CAS is not suitable for Scouts and vice versa. True, life later showed that in fact this is not so: many soldiers, having served in the SAS, later passed selection and became Scouts - and it happened that Scouts transferred to the SAS.

But there was no great love between these divisions. Each elite unit in the RDF considered itself exceptional, confident that it was they who were doing the main work of the war. The professionalism of others was praised, colleagues were treated with respect, since they often had to work side by side, but deep down, each special forces considered itself more important. From the Scouts' point of view, the Light Infantry paratroopers were only capable of crude butchery work - flying in and chopping up corpses. The SAS saboteurs were of a higher rank, but they were still treated as lone maniacs, and besides, the Scouts believed that the SAS, as an operational unit, was too formalized. (It should be noted that the light infantrymen, in turn, considered the Scouts to be maniacs: from the point of view of the paratroopers, only mentally damaged people were capable of living in the bush for weeks, eating maggots and rotten meat, masquerading as terrorists. As for the SAS, for the average it was much more interesting for the paratrooper to jump from the Alouettes - they rarely walked with their feet - falling on the Terrans out of the blue, instead of patiently planning and carrying out long ambushes or blowing up bridges. Well, the SAS, like the Scouts, considered the RLI to be excellent attack aircraft, but no longer fit for anything. The SAS members treated the Scouts a little condescendingly, believing that the Scouts were not able to repeat 80% of the SAS operations). In general, to paraphrase the Rhodesian writer Wilbur Smith, “The Selous Scouts were the best unit of the Rhodesian government army; True, if you had said this in the presence of, say, paratroopers of the Light Infantry, or the Special Air Service, or the Rhodesian Regiment, your skull would have been split on the spot.”

Reid-Daly believed that the special forces soldier the SAS needed was a loner, a person not infected with group spirit. Even the SAS qualifying course was evidence of this - SAS instructors wanted to see how the candidate would behave under extreme stress: whether he could adequately assess the situation, make the right decisions, and most importantly, complete the task. And all this - relying only on your own strength. This, from the point of view of the Scout commander, was the weak point of the SAS selection course - sometimes the cadet was left without the supervision of instructors and comrades for a long time, as a result of which he was tempted to follow the path of least resistance. Although the selection for SAS was quite strict, SAS instructors sometimes turned a blind eye to violations of discipline. SAS candidates sometimes managed to shorten the time spent on the route - during foot marches - by voting cars, buses with Africans, bicycles, etc. Of course, if they were caught, they were immediately expelled from the course, but if they managed to remain undetected, then all was well.

That's why Reid-Daly relied on collectivism. He believed that most soldiers are able to perform their duties exceptionally well when they are among their comrades - it is a shame to fail, and you are charged with a positive spirit. In addition, the “group syndrome,” as the Scout command believed, allows a soldier to avoid feelings of loneliness, which easily turns into a desire to give up, to give up everything halfway. And in conditions of danger, such feelings can lead to losses. So people who tended to be alone were undesirable candidates for the Scouts. In addition, the future Scout, due to the specifics of his tasks, had to be almost constantly among people - either among his comrades or among terrorists. And he needed to get along with others.

But on the other hand, a soldier who is capable of acting well ONLY if he is in a team was still not suitable. Sometimes Scouts were required to act in small groups of two or three people, and sometimes alone - in situations involving special risk. So the ability to get by alone was welcomed, but within limits.

So the selection course was structured in order to identify similar soldiers among the candidates - who would successfully combine the ability to work in a team and at the same time alone.

On the day the selection course began, all candidates lined up on the parade ground at the Inkomo barracks. There was no division by race or rank: Europeans, Africans, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates stood in the same formation. By that time, the initial training of African soldiers had already been completed - this was done with the expectation that they, along with the Europeans, could take part in the selection. Everyone was required to come to the formation with their belongings - however, nothing was deliberately said to the applicants about rations or food. After roll call, the unit commander, Major Ron Reid-Daly, addressed the candidates. As a rule, the greeting was brief. The major emphasized that the Scouts did not need supermen. We need normal soldiers who are simply capable of doing their duty, but better than the rest. He also especially emphasized that any volunteer has the right to announce his resignation from the course at any time, and there will not be any complaints against him, but simply sidelong glances and chuckles behind his back. The fact that someone will not be able to become a Scout does not mean at all that this someone is a bad soldier, quite the opposite. In other units, more suitable for service, such a person will make an exemplary warrior, of which, as Reid-Daly noted, there are many examples among officers, sergeants and privates. At the end of the speech, he thanked the candidates on behalf of the regiment for the fact that they voluntarily decided to take part in the tests, since some of the Scouts were staffed exclusively by volunteers. The major especially emphasized the moment of leaving the course - after all, not a single person likes to consider himself a failure, and in order to lift the spirits of the candidates a little, he suggested that they should not feel inferior upon returning back to their unit: “If anyone make fun of you for something that, supposedly, they couldn’t, then this mockingbird can be answered - at least I had the courage to try, but I didn’t see you there.”

Next, the candidates were given a daily ration, as it was called “rat food.” Applicants were warned that meals during the course would be irregular and hinted that rations should not be destroyed on the spot. After this, the candidates were dismissed until the evening, but they were not informed of further plans or when the next meal would be. The recruits wandered absentmindedly around the area, minding their own business. At the same time, such an atmosphere of “army chaos” was deliberately maintained, when no one really knows anything and cannot give a clear answer.

Towards the evening, when the candidates had completely relaxed, the command “Form up!” was suddenly heard. After the formation, the applicants were ordered to immediately load onto trucks standing at the gates of the camp. Candidates were required to have all their belongings and equipment with them. The instructors, grinning, advised them to take civilian clothes with them - they say, the training camp is located on Lake Kariba, not far from the resort towns, and the cadets will sometimes have the opportunity to go play in a casino or grab a couple of beers in pubs. Many took it.

From that moment on, the candidates were commanded by an instructor group consisting of 8 people - one officer and seven sergeants, four of the instructors were white, four were black. At each new selection course, the role of instructors was played by new Scouts - units seconded their officers and sergeants in turn. From the moment they were loaded into the vehicles, all recruits, regardless of their rank, were required to obey their instructors. At the same time, officers of regular and territorial units, as well as sergeants of the regular army, retained their ranks - they were addressed by their uniform. As for sergeants and ordinary territorial units, regardless of their ranks, during the selection process they were addressed as “fighter.”

The selection phase deliberately began with the creation of stressful situations. First, the cadets were given the opportunity to relax, after which they were abruptly thrown back into the wait-there-go-there atmosphere. The fact that Corporal Scouts was barking at, say, a signal lieutenant, also did not add courage to the latter. So, on the way to the camp in shaking Mercedes, the cadets plunged into an atmosphere of thoughtfulness and tension. Many people began to think that the coming weeks would most likely be difficult.

The departure of trucks with candidates was precisely timed. A few minutes before darkness fell (and in Africa it comes almost instantly, as if the sun had simply been turned off), the trucks stopped at the turn to Charara, five kilometers from Kariba airport, and the cadets were ordered to unload. All things were thrown into one pile, after which the officer-instructor addressed the candidates: “The Scout training camp is located nearby, on the road to Charara, just a couple of tens of kilometers away. And you must run this distance. Naturally, you must take all your things with you. Yes, yes, everything you collected, suitcases, bags, etc. If one of you decides that it’s hard to run with things, then you can throw them away - however, in this case, say goodbye to them forever, since no one will pick them up. We will be waiting for you at the camp with great interest - today, to commemorate the first day of the course, our chef has specially prepared selected steaks and has already put the beer on ice. Naturally, this treat applies only to instructors - but if anyone expresses a desire to quit the course, they may well join us.”

After this, the officer and several sergeants departed in trucks for the camp. Only the cadets remained at the scene, and two sergeants in one of the vehicles - in case they had to rush up the stragglers. And the candidates began a 23-kilometer run, carrying all their belongings on themselves, trying to keep up and show the best possible result upon arrival at the camp.

The camp itself was located in one of the most picturesque corners of the Zambezi Valley, on the shores of Lake Kariba. This place was one of the last untouched by civilization - a piece of wild, pristine African nature. Lions, buffaloes and elephants roamed in the immediate vicinity of the camp. As one Scout candidate, a former Royal Marine from London, said in amazement as he watched an elephant burst through the bush 50 meters from camp: "It's like being in a zoo... without the cages." And this was, perhaps, the most unusual specialist training camp in all of subequatorial Africa.

The camp was named Wafa Wafa Wasara Wasara. This phrase, roughly translated from the Shona language, meant “who died, died, who survived, stayed.” At least all the Scouts agreed with this interpretation. Those 10-15% of candidates who completed the course and subsequently received the coveted brown beret with the emblem of an attacking osprey (as well as those who dropped out as a result of the selection) considered this place to be the real embodiment of purgatory.

Wafa Wafa in Chishona meant “I died, I died!” - this name alone made any serviceman treat a place with a similar name, at least, with suspicion. Wasara Wasara, in turn, did not have a clear translation. It rather meant panicked cries - when, for example, a pack of angry lions was discovered in the center of the kraal, this is exactly what the villagers screamed. Put together, these words suggested that something absolutely terrible awaits the candidate for Scouts - if the camp bears such a name.

When the candidates finally arrived at the camp - some were eliminated while jogging - an incredible picture met their eyes. There were no barracks or tents in the camp - only a few primitive bashas, ​​huts - and nothing more. It was in them that the cadets had to live. Next to the huts there was a small area of ​​trampled earth, with a pile of smoked stones and coals - this was the kitchen. True, neither that evening nor the next few were the candidates offered any food. The cadets were exhausted from running - the Zambezi Valley was famous throughout the country as a place where it is always hot - they felt a feeling of hunger and, moreover, witnessed how some of their comrades had already “broke.”

From that moment on, as the instructors caustically joked, the candidates said goodbye to their past life forever. Candidates were deliberately exhausted, driven to extreme limits by petty nagging, starved and provoked to a nervous breakdown. Anyone who could not bear it or did not want to endure it was free to declare his departure from the course at any second. The main factor - for the instructors - was how a person behaves in any situation. All reactions of the candidates were carefully noted. When a person is very tired and at the same time hungry, then everything superficial quickly flies away from him, and only what remains is his true essence. From the very beginning, the cadets were subjected to just such conditions - starting with an unexpected evening run to the camp - and the instructors deliberately continued to increase the amount of stress in order to break the spirit of resistance in the candidates. In fact, this was torture by hunger, physical exertion and moral pressure, calculated in such a way that a person did not have a moment to take a breath and think.

The first five days of the program followed the following schedule. Candidates were woken up just before dawn and until 7 a.m. they were engaged in physical training - running or exercising. This was followed by verification and immediately followed by combat training: handling weapons and shooting. They shot at everything, sparing no ammo: with both hands, with automatic weapons, with pistols, aimless shooting. Particular attention was paid to the method that the Scouts called “indiscriminate” shooting - a method adopted by almost all RDF units, which has proven itself well in enemy ambushes.

Its essence was that each soldier on patrol concentrated his attention on the firing sector in front of him, constantly analyzing and calculating. The soldier paid attention to boulders, dense places in the bushes, protruding tree roots - and fired in short bursts (two rounds each) at those likely places where, in his opinion, terrorists could be hiding. Each time, the instructors chose new places for “ambush,” placing targets in likely terrorist hiding places. As a result, in a very short time, the cadets developed a kind of sixth sense - they subconsciously figured out where the “terrorists” were sitting and managed to plant a couple of bullets there, even before their eyes fell there. Each day ended with assault training - overcoming natural and artificial obstacles, climbing ropes, and every day the height only increased. As darkness fell, training continued - candidates were taught how to move at night, work with a compass and map, night shooting and basic tactics.

For the first five days, the cadets were not given any food - absolutely nothing. The instructors reminded them that, in fact, back in Inkomo the cadets were given a daily ration, but the “rat food” was usually eaten either then, or on the first day upon arrival, or was thrown by some during the first run to the camp (in the hope that there will be food in the camp). The cadets ate what they could get in the bush - edible berries, wild spinach, roots, small birds or rodents. But getting this food was also problematic - free time was needed, but the candidates did not have it. On the third day, one of the instructors shot a baboon. After which the monkey’s carcass was hung high on a tree in front of the candidates’ huts. The dead baboon was not skinned or its belly was cut open - it was left as is. In the humid and unbearably hot air, the carcass very soon began to rot. After a couple of days, the baboon was removed, skinned, the entrails thrown out, cut into pieces and thrown into a cauldron to cook. Other pieces of meat also flew there from game that had been shot by the instructors and deliberately brought to such a state that the meat turned from red to green. Naturally, worms and larvae deposited in the meat by flies also went into the cauldron.

This was the first real meal for the candidates since their arrival in Wafa-Wafa. Not a single person refused it, although the smell and taste, according to the same Reid-Daly, “were such that a vulture and a hyena would vomit.”

When journalists were allowed into a Scout training camp in the late 1970s, they were dumbfounded. One of them accused Reid-Daley of deliberately trying to kill potential candidates. To which the major (by that time a lieutenant colonel) replied: “Nothing of the kind, this is being done for their own good. Scouts on a mission deep in enemy territory, such as Mozambique, can go for weeks without supplies being delivered (unlike the SAS). And they can survive only on what they have at hand. It happened that during an operation the Scouts came across the carcass of an antelope, which had been killed by a lion, but had not yet had time to be devoured by the hyenas. If they only know in theory that they can eat it, then they will never eat it.” The Medical Scouts then explained to reporters that, contrary to popular belief, rotten meat was perfectly edible if thoroughly boiled - although allowing it to cool and reheat could kill a person. In the first stages of decay, it still contains protein and is quite nutritious - in extreme situations, such food will save a person’s life. Civilization has polished man and dulled his senses - if an ordinary person is offered such a dish, he will vomit from just the sight. But for the hungry and exhausted cadets, the stew made from rotten monkey meat was equivalent to a steak from the best marbled beef in the restaurant of the Monomotapa hotel - they had absolutely no problems with food, and many even asked for more.

As a rule, it was on these days that the largest screening of candidates occurred - about forty people dropped out. The cadets were constantly kept in the dark about the class schedule - this was done deliberately; if a person wanted to quit, he was not prevented. After the first five days, candidates began to be given food - in limited quantities. At the same time, the instructors encouraged the cadets' initiatives to obtain edible material in the bush. True, killing large animals was strictly prohibited.

After fourteen days, which the candidates lived under conditions of severe stress and constant hunger, a three-day “march to exhaustion” followed. The distance was usually chosen by the instructors taking into account the terrain, but was always within 90 - 100 kilometers. That is, during the day the cadets had to walk about 30 kilometers, but these 30 kilometers were marked on the map. In reality, the distance was a little longer, because candidates had to walk over hills, cross streams and rivers, wade through dense bushes, etc. Before the march, the cadets were divided into small groups, each of which was accompanied by an instructor who carefully monitored the behavior of each candidate. Each candidate was given a 30-kilogram backpack with cobblestones. All the stones were painted with bright green paint so that the cadet would not be tempted to replace some of the stones along the way. Also, before the start of the march and immediately after its end, the backpacks were carefully weighed - again, in order to check whether the candidate had unnoticed a couple of cobblestones. Backpacks were specially filled with stones - the effect was designed to make the candidate constantly remember that he was carrying a meaningless and useless load, which reduced his fighting spirit. In addition, the cadet naturally carried his weapons and equipment. So the total useful - or rather useless weight - of each cadet was from 35 to 40 kilograms.

To this it must be added that the route of the march was laid in the Zambezi Valley with its constant extreme heat, which could bring an unprepared person to heatstroke in three minutes. The poetic name “valley” should not be confusing either - it was strewn with boulders, small but impassable hills, ravines, gullies and pits. For the march, the cadets were given a strictly limited amount of water. If we add to this the fact that the valley was located in the “tsetse belt”, where the bites of these flies, as well as mosquitoes, mopani flies and other insects can drive a person to frenzy, then it is not surprising that those who conquered the march subsequently called it highway to hell, road to hell For all three days of the march, the cadets were given a 125-gram can of meat and a 250-gram bag of corn grits.

The last 20 kilometers - although the cadets were unaware that these were the last 20 kilometers - the march turned into a forced march: alternating running and rapid walking. Before this stage, the candidate’s backpack filled with stones was taken away, but in return he was given a bag of sand of slightly less weight. It was proposed to cover twenty kilometers in 2.5 hours - which was possible under the condition of almost constant running. As a rule, the unit commander, Ron Reid-Daly, always tried to be present for this moment.

When the cadets reached the finishing point, instructors suddenly appeared from the bushes and congratulated them on successfully passing the qualifying course. Most candidates refused to believe the words of the Scouts, believing that this was yet another insidious trick of the instructors, designed to break the spirit and force them to give up. The candidates, barely able to stand, cursed and hurled choice curses at the laughing instructors until it finally dawned on them that all the exams had actually been passed. After which many cried, and according to Reid-Daly, at such moments, having observed this many times, his heart nevertheless always ached with pride for those who passed.

After three days of rest to allow their legs to recover—by this point, all cadets' feet were a dermatologist's nightmare—the cadets began a two-week course in bush tracking and survival. At the end of it, newly minted Scouts from territorial units went home, awaiting a call to a mission. Those who were in regular units were sent to another camp to study anti-terrorist operations themselves, the so-called. "dark phase". The camp copied, down to the smallest detail, a typical terrorist camp in Mozambique. Former ZANLA and ZIPRA militants worked there as instructors, many of whom defected to the RDF and were selected for the Scouts. For two weeks, instructors taught new Scouts the techniques of pseudo-terrorist operations, the ability to impersonate real terrorists, customs, dialect, songs, manners, etc. After this, the Scouts underwent 3 weeks of parachute training at New Sarum and Grand Reef Base. Some of the Scouts additionally underwent light diving training and learned to jump from great heights. On average, it took about six months to train a qualified Scout. After another six months, filled with constant training and combat operations, the soldier turned into the most formidable fighting machine of the Rhodesian armed forces, a man capable of surviving anytime and anywhere, a scout who could conduct multi-day surveillance, a shooter who could hit any target, an operative who could there was any task - Scout Selous.

Rhodesian security forces resisted the onslaught of terrorists for fifteen years, from 1965 to 1979, during which time the state of Rhodesia itself was almost completely isolated. But the history of the Rhodesian army began much earlier, at the end of the 19th century - and from that time on, Rhodesians took part in almost all the wars of the British Commonwealth.

Origins: from the British South Africa Company police to the Boer War volunteers

The founding date of the Rhodesian Army can be considered October 29, 1889, when Queen Victoria granted permission to the British South Africa Company to "research and management" lands lying north of the Limpopo River. Soon the column of pioneers moved north, accompanied by five hundred former members of the Bechuanaland Frontier Police. The detachment, called the British South Africa Company Police, is considered the prototype of the Rhodesian armed forces.

Officers accompanying the column of pioneers

By 1892, the BSACP consisted of several units: the Mashonaland Cavalry, the Mashonaland Mounted Police and the Mashonaland Constables.

In 1893, a war broke out with the Matabele tribe, which required an increase in the armed forces by another thousand people. The volunteers formed several new units: the Salisbury Cavalry, the Victoria Rangers and the Raaf Rangers. Within three months of the war, the Matabele forces were completely defeated. The most heroic moment of this war was the battle of a patrol detachment of 34 people, pressed by the enemy to the Shangani River. The battle lasted all day, and by the end of it all the soldiers on the patrol were dead. The Matabele were paid tribute to their courage and buried with honors.

The last stand of the Shangani patrol

After the end of the war in December 1893, the voluntary regiments were disbanded, and from part of their personnel one regiment was formed - the Rhodesian Cavalry.

In 1895, a British uprising against Boer rule began in the Transvaal. The Rhodesians, in a patriotic outburst, staged a raid on the territory of this state. The detachment under the leadership of Dr. Jameson consisted of a small detachment of cavalry and several cannons. The forces were not equal, and Jameson and his men were captured by the Boers. As a result, the colony was left almost defenseless, which led to the uprising of the Matabele and Mashona tribes in 1896. It lasted until 1898, and it was only possible to suppress it with the participation of British units from Natal and the Cape Colony who arrived to help the besieged possession.

Soon the Rhodesian Mounted Police was formed, which in 1909 became the British South Africa Police (BSAP). This department was the basis of the Rhodesian police force until the very end of the country's existence and was disbanded only in 1980.

With the expansion of the territory, it was decided to create military units directly. In 1898, the Southern Rhodesia Volunteers were formed. It consisted of the Eastern Division, based in Salisbury, and the Western Division, based in Bulawayo.

The regiment took part in the Boer War, coming with the Mounted Police to the aid of the British during the Siege of Mafeking. At the same time, in Rhodesia itself, the Rhodesian Regiment (Rhodesia Regiment) was formed to protect its internal borders.

Southern Rhodesian Volunteers are sent to the Boer War. 1899

After the end of the Boer War, the armed forces of the colony became permanent parts of the British army, and the Southern Rhodesian Volunteer Regiment received a banner and insignia.

Rhodesian armed forces in the world wars

The Rhodesian regiment, in turn, was disbanded after the siege of Mafeking. But in 1914, with the outbreak of the First World War, it was recreated. The small colony in southern Africa was able to raise two full-fledged regiments for the British Commonwealth troops, sending 5,000 white men (which was no less than 25% of the white population of Rhodesia at that time) and 2,000 black men to the war. These regiments fought in German South-West and East Africa. They were later sent to France.

During the same period, the Rhodesian Native Regiment, consisting of Africans, was formed. After the end of the First World War, he received the distinctive "East Africa 1916–1918" insignia on his banner. These insignia would later be transferred to the Rhodesian African Rifles. The Southern Rhodesia Volunteers were disbanded in 1920, although a few rifle companies were retained in Rhodesia's main towns.

Rhodesian Regiment on the streets of Cape Town, 1914

The Defense Act, adopted in 1927, determined the need to create permanent armed forces in the colonies and dominions of the British Commonwealth. By 1939, compulsory conscription was introduced in Rhodesia, and the police (BSAP) were finally separated from the army.

In 1934, the Rhodesian Air Force was created (initially as part of the Rhodesian Regiment). In 1936 they were withdrawn into a separate unit, and in 1937 the fledgling air force was given an airfield and base at Cranebourne Barracks in Salisbury. In September 1939 they began to bear the name "Southern Rhodesian Air Force", and in 1940 they were officially incorporated into the Commonwealth Air Force.

With the outbreak of World War II, there was a need to increase the armed forces. The 1st Battalion of the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), an artillery detachment, an armored vehicle detachment, and training centers at Gwelo and Umtali were created. Rhodesians served in many British units - in order not to risk extermination of all the men of the colony of military age, they were not brought together into one unit, but were distributed among different ones. Two conscript battalions were left behind to defend Rhodesian territory. A flight training center was also established at Thornhill Air Base, and almost 2,000 people trained there before the end of the war.

Air Force Training Center at Thornhill AFB

The Rhodesians fought in most of the theaters of war. In North Africa, there was a Deep Desert Reconnaissance Group, Long Range Desert Patrol - “Desert Rats”. In Burma and Indochina, Rhodesian African Rifles served with the King's African Rifles in the 22nd (East African) Independent Brigade. This unit first saw action in April 1945 and performed well in Burma.

The Rhodesians fought in artillery and tank units, as well as in commando saboteur units (the prototype of the SAS). After the war, the Rhodesian Regiment received the "Royal" prefix for its merits, which would only be removed in 1970, after the declaration of independence.

Rhodesians of the Royal Fusiliers in North Africa

Three squadrons in the Royal Air Force deserve special mention: the 237th and 266th Fighter Squadrons and the 44th Bomber Squadron, which were staffed for the most part by residents of Southern Rhodesia. They took part in the Battle of Britain, battles in North Africa and Europe. In total, 2,300 people fought in these squadrons, of whom every fifth died.

The 237th and 266th squadrons were disbanded at the end of the war, the 44th existed until 1957. It is noteworthy that Ian Douglas Smith, the future Prime Minister of Rhodesia, fought in 237 Squadron. He was shot down in the skies over Italy in 1944, but managed to get out to the Allies, crossing from Italy to France through the Alps.

Final years under the British Colonial Empire

In 1947, the Rhodesian Air Force became an independent unit. In 1952 they moved permanently to the air base at New Saruma and were renamed the Federation Rhodesian Air Force (referring to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland).

In 1948, conflict began in Malaya between communist guerrilla forces and the British government. The fighting took place mostly in the jungle, and special soldiers were required who could track down the enemy while away from their bases. In 1951, a group of Rhodesian volunteers join British forces in Malaya. They took part in operations with the Malayan Scouts and subsequently, in 1961, became C Troop of the 22nd SAS, Britain's most elite special forces unit. In 1952, Rhodesia again assisted Commonwealth forces in the Suez Canal Zone conflict.

C Troop, 22nd SAS, during the Malaya conflict, 1953

During the existence of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (now three independent African states - Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi), the army was completely reorganized, and each unit received the name "Rhodesia and Nyasaland". In 1955, rotating African Rifles units were sent to Malaya to replace the Northern Rhodesian Regiment. In 1961, the second purely “white” unit of Rhodesia was formed (the first was Squadron “C” SAS) - the 1st Battalion of the Rhodesian Light Infantry.

In 1964, the federation collapsed, and in 1965, Prime Minister Ian Douglas Smith unilaterally proclaimed the independence of Rhodesia from Great Britain. Naturally, this again causes changes in the army.

Rhodesia under siege

Since April 1966, militant groups began to infiltrate Rhodesia from neighboring Zambia. But the official beginning of the “War of Independence” (Bushwar, “Second Chimurenga”) is considered to be 1972 and the attack on the Altena farm in Centenary County.

The course of the war required non-standard solutions. The terrorists knew the terrain very well, worked in small groups and, if detected by security forces, disappeared into the bush. Some captured fighters from among them went over to the side of the Rhodesians, which made it possible to subsequently introduce agents and “pseudo-terrorists” into the nationalist camps. Based on this experience, a pathfinder course was created, which was taken by members of the SAS, a special unit of police and criminal investigation. As a result, the Tracking Combat Unit arose. TCU fighters tracked down terrorists, infiltrated their structures, found out the necessary information, and then either transferred it to the special operations center, or called in the light infantry infantry and African riflemen, who destroyed the enemy.

Selous Scouts disguised as terrorists

In the period from 1973 to the beginning of 1977. with their help, directly or indirectly, about 1,200 of the 2,500 terrorists who entered Rhodesian territory were destroyed. The successes of the “pseudo-terrorists” were so great that in 1974 the number of TCU groups was increased to six. They were later reorganized into a special unit - the Selous Scouts.

The Selous Scouts were 70% black. It included former members of ZANLA and ZIPRA, police, African Rifles, light infantry and SAS. The fighters were taught to survive in the bush, read tracks, disguise themselves as terrorists and much more. To this day, selection for Selous Scouts is considered one of the toughest in the world - less than 10% of those who began training reached the end.

Terrorists very often hid in rugged and inaccessible terrain. To ensure greater infantry mobility, a mounted infantry unit was created - Gray's Scouts. His fighters were not cavalry in the full sense of the word, but used horses only as transport. The main tasks of the unit were patrolling, reconnaissance and pursuit of the enemy. Patrolling the territory, on an average day, Gray's scouts examined the area within a radius of 40 kilometers.

When the command of the Rhodesian armed forces realized that it was virtually useless to wage war on its territory, because... More and more terrorist detachments are penetrating across the borders with Zambia and Mozambique, it became clear that the war must be transferred to enemy territory.

Four De Havilland Vampire fighters from the 2nd Squadron of the Rhodesian Air Force in the Victoria Falls area

Since 1976, rapid raids were carried out in the territories of Zambia and Mozambique to destroy enemy camps by forces of the Selous Scouts, SAS, light infantry, air force and armored car corps. So, for example, Operation Gatling was a response to the destruction of a civilian Rhodesian airliner (Vickers Viscount, flight 825, tail number 782D) on September 3, 1978. The airliner was shot down by a Strela-2 MANPADS near Lake Caribou. Eighteen people who survived the fall were killed by terrorists. In response to this, the Rhodesian Air Force carried out an unprecedented raid on Zambian territory: Air Force bombers bombed the training camps, and the troops that landed after them cleared the terrorist camps.

On February 12, 1979, another airliner (flight 827) was shot down by freedom fighters. In response to these actions, the Rhodesian Air Force conducted Operation Vanity, a raid on Angola. Having successfully bombed the training camps, the Rhodesian pilots returned to their bases without losses. The Selous Scouts and SAS raided the ZIPRA headquarters in Zambia, nearly killing ZIPRA leader Joshua Nkomo in the raid.

Light infantry soldiers are loaded into a helicopter

It is worth mentioning the “mercenaries” in the Rhodesian army. As part of its units, people from all over the world fought - the French, the British, the Americans (there were especially many of them in the light infantry). However, they received the same salary as ordinary soldiers and did not have any privileges or concessions compared to the Rhodesians. Despite their merits and titles, they were all first selected for the desired units, and then enrolled there on a general basis.

This, by the way, caused a wave of discontent among many newly arrived experienced soldiers, and they often went back without even unpacking their things. From the point of view of the international law of military conflicts, these foreign military personnel were volunteers rather than mercenaries.

End of the Rhodesian Army

Despite partial successes in waging the war, it became clear that the Rhodesians would not be able to overcome the endless stream of nationalist partisans supplied with Soviet and Chinese weapons. Economic sanctions against Rhodesia also played a role. Trade with the whole world “under the counter” in valuable minerals could not compensate for the unacceptably high costs of the war. By 1979, they reached 1 million US dollars a day, which was a very significant amount for small Rhodesia.

Foreign observers (in olive uniform) who arrived to verify the legality of the elections in Rhodesia

Peace negotiations began in 1979, during which civilians continued to die from mines and bullets. Based on their results, it was agreed that free elections would be held in the country in 1980 under the supervision of the international community.

Despite all this, the Rhodesian military prepared Operation Quartz, whose goal was to destroy the leadership of ZANLA, kill Robert Mugabe and prevent a Marxist coup in Rhodesia by force of arms. When it became clear that Mugabe had won a decisive victory in the elections, the military was forced to cancel the operation so as not to start a new round of war and to avoid unnecessary casualties.

Last parade of the Rhodesian Light Infantry

1980 marked the virtual destruction of the Rhodesian security forces. Lieutenant General Peter Walls was dismissed by the new president. Fearing reprisals from the new authorities, many white residents left Zimbabwe with their entire families.

The Selous Scouts, SAS and Rhodesian Light Infantry caused the greatest hatred among the former guerrillas. Most of the Selous Scouts secretly left the country, crossing the border into South Africa and enlisting in 5 Recce (South African reconnaissance and sabotage unit). All documentation, lists of personnel and methods of training scouts were classified or destroyed by former Rhodesians.

Soldier Memorial erected in Great Britain

At 11:00 on July 25, 1980, Rhodesian light infantrymen marched along the regimental parade ground past the soldier’s monument, cast from spent cartridges, in solemn formation for the last time, greeting their fallen comrades. Lists of the dead were read out, and the battalion chaplain read a prayer. A bagpiper played "The Last Post" and wreaths were laid at the memorial and regimental colors were folded. On July 28, the statue was removed from its pedestal and transported to South Africa. She is currently based in the UK. The 1st Battalion Rhodesian Light Infantry was finally disbanded on 31 October 1980.

The SAS held a simple farewell ceremony and folded the unit's colours. However, this was not the end - they carried out Operation South of the Border. During its course, a memorial slab was taken across the border with South Africa, on which were carved the names of the operatives who died in the war against terrorists (the government that came to power, naturally, first of all began to fight the monuments of the “white regime”). This stove is now installed on the farm of one of the SAS veterans near Durban in South Africa. All documents of the unit were destroyed.

Memorial plaque of the Rhodesian SAS

The Rhodesian African riflemen held out the longest in the “whirlwind of change.” In 1980, they took part in suppressing protests by groups opposing the new government. In November 1980 and February 1981, African riflemen took part in suppressing the uprisings. While the unit of the new army of Zimbabwe (5th brigade) was formed and trained under the guidance of North Korean instructors, in fact the only fighting force in the country remained the Rhodesian African riflemen.

By December 1981, the situation in the army and the nature of the orders given to it had deteriorated so much that most of the old soldiers simply deserted. On December 31, 1981, an order was given for the inclusion of the remnants of the Rhodesian African Rifles into the newly created units of the Zimbabwe Army.

Emblem of the Rhodesian Army

This was the end of the history of the armed forces of Rhodesia, a country that supported Great Britain throughout its history and was then betrayed by it. The Rhodesian army, which fought even when the whole world was against it, was never defeated by force of arms. Politicians put an end to it.

Literature:

• Blog of Sergei Karamaev (http://tiomkin.livejournal.com)
• Brief History of the Rhodesian Army by R. Allport
• OSPREY MEN AT ARMS No. 018 – Modern African Wars (I): Rhodesia 1965–1980

The war in Rhodesia (since 1980 - the Republic of Zimbabwe) took place in conditions that can hardly be called suitable for the creation of a purely experimental army unit. Survival, their own and that of their comrades, was what primarily concerned Rhodesian soldiers and officers. This is especially true of the first stage of the long (1966-1980), which had neither fronts nor rules of war in the bush and savannah against black rebels who enjoyed the support of the countries of the socialist camp, mainly the USSR and the PRC. Indeed, at the beginning of the war, the strength and capabilities of the Rhodesian troops were extremely limited, and the conservative government of the white minority of Prime Minister Ian Smith (by the way, a pilot in the Royal Air Force of Great Britain during the Second World War) simply did not have enough human, material and other resources to patrol the borders of Rhodesia stretching for thousands of miles and 150 thousand square miles of its outback.
However, there would have been no happiness, but misfortune helped: it was the chronic lack of everything for the normal conduct of a counter-insurgency war that became one of the main reasons for the Rhodesians to conduct bold experiments and experiments (which turned out to be extremely successful) in the field of military development, tactics and strategy. During this process, among other things, a not entirely unique, but very effective unit of combat trackers (PBS) of the Rhodesian army (in English - Tracker Combat Unit, TCU) arose, which made an invaluable contribution to the defense of its native country.

Truly outstanding warriors passed through this detachment. So, Andre Rabier and Allan Franklin in 1973, after serving in the PBS, founded (together with Ron Reid-Daly) another innovative unit: the legendary and deadly for all enemies of Rhodesia, the Selous Scouts.
Brian Robinson in the 1970s first headed the Rhodesian pathfinder school, and then commanded the Rhodesian Special Airborne Service (SAS) (founded in 1959-1961 on the basis of the British SAS squadron consisting of Rhodesian volunteers, and in the late 1940s - the early 1950s, which took part in the Malayan War) precisely during the period when the SAS was almost continuously involved in hostilities against terrorists. Joe Conway, the owner of the farm on which the PBS training center was located, was awarded for capturing four rebels at once, armed only with a bayonet.
“TC” Woods, another outstanding Rhodesian commando and tracker, survived an underwater battle with a bloodthirsty man-eating crocodile, but lost half of his scrotum. The last commander of the PBS, British David Scott-Donelan, went down in the modern history of Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia as one of the most brilliant officers of the armed forces of these countries.
Having emigrated to the United States, he opened and to this day heads a school of combat pathfinders in the state of Nevala.
So, seasoned veterans served in the PBS, soldiers to the core, without exaggeration, tough and fearless guys who had considerable combat experience, common sense, and strong survival skills in the African wilderness.
PBS arose only on the skeleton of a theoretical concept and extreme necessity, and therefore an important condition for service in it was a love of bold innovation and constant experimentation.
Experiencing a serious deficit in resources, but never in initiative, ingenuity and resilience, the Rhodesians, as researcher John Keegan writes about them in the monograph Armies of the World, “fought the enemy at such a high professional level that their contribution to theory and practice modern warfare must be carefully and seriously studied in military schools around the world."
The main problem of the Rhodesians during the war of 1966-1980. began to conduct combat operations against partisans over a vast area, using extremely small (by African standards) army and police.
Patrolling is an important form of tactical military action, but in the vast bush of Southeast Africa it was a largely useless and very ineffective method of finding, pursuing and destroying the enemy. If you were unlucky or lacked high-quality and timely intelligence information, then, as a rule, government forces did not have contact with the enemy, especially if for one reason or another they were supported by the local population. Rhodesian soldiers and police, both white and black, were immeasurably superior to the rebels in all respects. It was not difficult to fight terrorists, but only if they could be drawn into a fight! Finding an enemy who was constantly evading and avoiding battle was the most difficult and most important task for the military, and this is precisely the main reason for the birth of the combat tracker unit.
In 1965, the year of the declaration of independence of Rhodesia, the army command in Salisbury, foreseeing the imminent and inevitable outbreak of civil war, decided in advance to solve the associated fundamental problem of covering a vast territory and controlling it with a small armed force in the unfavorable climatic conditions of the tropical savannah , where the heat sometimes exceeds 45 degrees Celsius in the shade. During the preparation for the war, by the way, the implementation of a theoretical plan began, carefully developed by the former hunter and huntsman (ranger) Allan Savory, who, having retired, became a well-known ecologist in the country. Having spent many years in the savannah and knowing it like the back of his hand, several years earlier he had developed a very effective system of tracking down and neutralizing (in extreme cases, destroying) brutal poachers armed to the teeth, exterminating elephants and rhinoceroses in huge Rhodesian reserves, and personally participated in its implementation “in pale conditions”.
And now Savory proposed experimenting with trained and prepared for war pathfinders, who were supposed to quickly respond to any incident related to the actions of not poachers, but terrorists, or at least their obvious presence in a certain area.
We have all repeatedly read about skilled trackers from different countries of the world. Russian Cossacks, Siberian taiga warriors, and American Indians not only deftly tracked down their prey during the hunt, but also constantly fought, and also helped government security services maintain law and order. The Australian police, for example, have employed Aboriginal trackers since the 19th century and continue to serve today, and the British actively used trackers from the Iban tribe belonging to the Dayak ethnic group during the war against communist terrorists in Malaya (1947-1962). The Dayaks, by the way, are famous headhunters and, let’s be careful, by the middle of the 20th century they had not completely gotten rid of the rudiments of ritual cannibalism, which gave a very dark flavor to the already cruel, bloody and little-known Malay War.
In this case, it is Savory who has the greatest credit for the fact that the Rhodesians were able to transform the art of African trackers and hunters into a form of military science and, on the basis of their strictly scientific developments, destroyed many terrorists who were completely unaware that the tracks in the bush were theirs, wearing Cuban boots. or Chinese army foot boots are an excellent guide for the merciless and cold-blooded hunters of two-legged game.
Savory was always convinced that a good soldier, who had firmly mastered the skills of tactical maneuver in battle, ambush and patrol action, was excellent human material for turning him into a qualified tracker - through intensive and very specific training.

It's hard to study.

Appointed by the government to run a course to train military trackers based on the experience of African hunters and guides, Savory selected the cadets for the test group (8 in total) from the ranks of the Rhodesian SAS: it was the commandos, he believed, that had the necessary potential to firmly grasp his lessons life in the savannah and jungle.
All together they went to the Sabie Valley (near the border with Mozambique), where they settled in a pre-equipped camp. According to the obligatory condition of their strict mentor, the life of the cadets was absolutely Spartan. Savory, without wasting a day, subjected the paratroopers to severe and severe tests to ensure that they fully met the high standards he personally developed. For eight weeks in a row, he did not give the special forces a break and drilled them in the field, teaching them everything that he had learned over many years of dangerous wanderings through the bush, mountains and jungles of Southeast Africa. This was followed by two weeks of relative rest in a nearby town, and again eight weeks of grueling training in the bush.
Savory released the first group of cadets (among whom were Scotg-Donelan and Robinson), absolutely confident that he had “fashioned” from them the really cool specialist trackers that Rhodesia needed so much for the coming war. And he did it just in time: in 1966, the Rhodesian military’s predictions about the imminent start of a large-scale uprising of black nationalists supported by international communism were completely justified.
The war broke out on April 28, 1966, when in the capital of Zambia, Lusaka, the leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union Joshua Nkomo and the leaders of the Zimbabwe African National Union Ndabaningi Sitole, Robert Mugabe, Moton Malianga and Leopold Takaviara announced the beginning of the “Second Chimurenga” against the “regime of the white oppressors” "
On this day, 70 terrorists, divided into three groups, were sent to Rhodesia from Zambia. One detachment, consisting of militants from the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (the armed wing of ZANU) and the African National Congress of South Africa, entered into battle with a unit of the British South African Police (BSAAP - this was the name of the Rhodesian police from the time of colonization until 1980), supported by local police reservists and Rhodesian Air Force helicopters, in the town of Sinoia, which is located in the Wankie National Park (northwest of the country). The terrorists were well armed (small arms from the PRC, hand grenades from the USSR), trained by qualified specialists in waging revolutionary guerrilla warfare in special camps in Red China, and also ideologically savvy (then the Rhodesians discovered a large amount of communist literature on the battlefield). The clash at Sinoia ended with the complete defeat of the band of rebels (seven of them were killed, 33 were captured, while no one was killed on the Rhodesian side, only a few people were seriously injured). Nevertheless, on this significant day the Rhodesians made a number of gross miscalculations, and in battle they acted surprisingly stupidly. Salisbury quickly learned lessons from what happened. So, it became obvious that, firstly, priority in the war against the rebels should be given not to the BYAP, but to the army (officially called the Rhodesian Security Forces), because, whatever one may say, a policeman is still not a soldier; and secondly, that it is vital for the troops to have full-time specialists trained to track down militants, accurately determine the location of partisan gangs, etc. So, the command decided to organize a unit of combat pathfinders in the ranks of the ground forces, giving it a permanent character.
Savory, of course, was right there. Not wanting to quarrel with the commanders of certain army units, who began to seriously fear that the famous ranger might entice their best guys to join him, he began to recruit the personnel of the PBS from civilians who nevertheless had the vital and professional experience. Since Savory worked for several years in the Rhodesian hunting department, it is not surprising that he turned first of all to his former colleagues, inviting them to transfer to military service. Over the course of several months, from dozens of candidates, he selected 12 excellent experts on the African bush, who were also sharp shooters and had experience in the army or police. Thus was born the Combat Pathfinder Unit of the Rhodesian Security Forces.
The original methodology used to train eight SAS paratroopers in 1965 was greatly improved by the wealth of South African wilderness experience brought to the SAS by its first dozen men. The training and exercise program itself has undoubtedly become more severe, tough, sophisticated and focused.
First of all, they mastered the exercise of tracking each other: one soldier followed the trail of a colleague, then they changed roles, and the search distance constantly increased.
A lot of time was spent hiking in the jungle, while additional classes were conducted on instinctive shooting and on the correct use of conditioned and unconditioned reflexes, if necessary. Particular emphasis was placed on learning how to move silently through the forest, savannah and bush. The fighters used only hand signals as a means of communication. They also learned to deftly use special dog whistles (like the one shown in the recent British film adaptation of “The Hound of the Baskervilles”): they whistled in such a way that the quiet sound produced was very similar to the buzzing of a local beetle, and the fact that it was a person whistling was only clear “ to his own,” and the “stranger” passed by, not noticing anything special.
As soon as each PBS fighter had firmly established the skills of a pathfinder individually, Savory moved on to the next stage of training - team work. For this purpose, three groups were formed, each consisting of four people: the controller, the main, right-flank and left-flank trackers. Going on a mission, three trackers were positioned in the form of the Latin letter V: the left flank and the right flank were located slightly ahead and to the side, securing and covering, if necessary, the main one, who, in fact, followed the trail, concentrating all his attention on it. The controller was located behind his comrades, and his task was to coordinate the actions of the group members and control their movement. All PBS fighters were trained to work in all four roles. In addition, in order to avoid routine and getting used to the style, manners and character of the same colleagues, the composition of each group was subject to periodic rotation.
One of the most effective and useful exercises was that a group of “fugitives” made a very long trek through the bush and, armed with slingshots, ambushed a group of “pursuers” (with similar weapons) who were following on their trail. Carrying out this task, the fighters, on the one hand, learned to identify probable enemy ambush sites, and on the other, how to properly set up ambushes and skillfully camouflage themselves. Painful bruises from being hit by stones from slingshots perfectly weaned them from the slightest carelessness when performing a combat mission.
With each week, the search distance increased more and more, in the end the cadets, having acquired the endurance of a mule, so necessary for their service, could follow the trail for several days in a row, without experiencing any particular difficulties and making only short rests.
The penultimate stage of the program was training soldiers in ways to hide and cover their tracks, confuse the enemy in every possible way, avoid detection and hide securely in the bush.
The final tactical exercise was a competition between all three groups of rangers. Each fighter (dressed, by the way, in the usual uniform, consisting of shorts, a shirt, a wide-brimmed hat and high-top army boots) was given an extremely meager ration (four bags of tea and a little more than one hundred 1 grams of rice cereal in a bag; water had to be found independently ). Each group was given several topographic maps of the surrounding area, on which approximate routes of movement of all groups were outlined, and so that they intersected several times. The total duration of the maneuvers was 7 days, but in practice they managed it in less time. According to the rules of the game, one group had to find and neutralize the other two; Moreover, if one group managed to “destroy” (“capture”) its rivals, then the winners could take anything they wanted from the vanquished. Therefore, Savory and important officials from Salisbury, who were following the progress of the exercises, witnessed a couple of times a picture that was not entirely usual for Africa, when the “pale-faced brothers,” completely naked, annoyed and upset, wandered through the bush, trying to find at least some of their uniforms. By the way, during this last phase of training, it was no longer slingshots that were used, but rifles with live ammunition, in order to accustom the cadets to the harsh realities of real war.
After completing the training course, the first 12 PBS fighters were transferred to the active reserve. They went home, returned to serve in the hunting department and began to patiently wait for the country to need their high professionalism, honed skills and unique knowledge.
They didn't have to wait long. For the first time, a unit of combat pathfinders took part in an operation to neutralize terrorists already in 1967.

People safari in the Zambezi Valley.

That year, a tense situation developed in Mashonaland North (Mashonaland is a region inhabited by the Shona people), where militants infiltrated in significant numbers from their bases in Zambia. About 110 rebels, who managed to sneak across the border unnoticed, set up several camps and bivouacs in the wilds of the Zambezi River valley. Their presence was discovered by local gamekeeper David Scammell (he would later go on to military service, enlisting in the PBS), checking the traces that aroused his suspicion in his section of the jungle. The entire personnel of the PBS was immediately alerted and received orders to accurately determine the location of the rebels. Transferred to the Zambezi Valley, the fighters secretly carried out a thorough reconnaissance of the territory, discovered the rebels, waited for the approach of the infantry unit and took part in the attack on the enemy base camp. The majority of the fighters were either killed or captured, but those who were able to escape in the confusion of the battle rejoiced in vain at their good fortune. The second phase of the operation began: the infantry thoroughly combed the area, and the PBS soldiers took up their main craft - tracking down terrorists.
It was during this operation that tracker Joe Conway doggedly pursued four rebels for three days and nights over rough terrain, covering a distance of 60 miles. The chase ended successfully: completely demoralized, stunned and driven almost to death, the militants eventually simply lost their strength, stopped, raised their hands and surrendered to the mercy of the tireless white hunter. Later, during their trial, the four prisoners complained that Conway had driven them mercilessly and in cold blood, like wild animals on safari. And for Joe and all his colleagues, these complaints sounded like pleasant music and were better than any praise and awards.

Excursion to Victoria Falls.

Two years passed before PBS was again sent in search of terrorists. In December 1969, the partisans carried out a well-coordinated operation, simultaneously attacking the Victoria Falls airport (near the world famous Victoria Falls) and the local BYUAP barracks, and also blew up the Rhodesian-Zambian railway track here. Eight hours later, two PBS teams deployed from Salisbury to this tourist attraction area conducted a thorough search of the area, concluding that the Otrad that attacked Victoria Falls consisted of exactly 22 people. The trackers did not have time to go hunting on the very first day, as a heavy downpour with hurricane winds swept over the area, and all traces were washed away.
A few days later, a BYUAP patrol discovered fresh suspicious tracks near the city, and a second PBS group urgently left to inspect the area.
The soldiers followed the tracks for several miles and finally reached the place where the person who left them made a not very successful attempt to erase them. The soldiers determined that, firstly, it was traces of this type that they had discovered in Victoria Falls before the storm, and, secondly, the terrorists were most likely hiding in a deep ravine covered with dense forest nearby. Holding automatic rifles at the ready, the four fighters carefully moved forward. Before they had time to walk thirty steps in the dense thickets, one of them found a Soviet army duffel bag, hastily stuffed into an animal hole. Upon further exploration of the ravine, the Rhodesians discovered exactly 22 couches and another 20 duffel bags containing ammunition, grenades, food and clothing. By all indications, the rebels decided to quickly leave the camp, having learned that a group of professional military trackers was on their trail, and assuming that the main forces of the Rhodesians would follow it.
Despite the lack of any contact with the enemy, the PBS had already won an important victory, since the militants not only lost their secret lair, but were also forced to retreat, divided into small groups, which, in turn, made them extremely vulnerable to the army and police patrols.

However, the adventures did not end there.

Heavy clouds were gathering in the sky, so the rangers decided that in such weather it was useless to pursue the enemy, and at a fast pace, before the rain, they reached their own. Soon a heavy downpour began, which continued all night and subsided a little only at dawn.
The infantrymen who went on patrol early in the morning, having discovered fresh tracks near the city, immediately called the PBS teams. The fighters followed the trail for several miles until they reached an abandoned quarry, which was, in all likelihood, a meeting place for terrorists. One group of trackers, examining a suspicious path, soon discovered three partisans squatting under a thick tree, thus sheltering from the continuing rain. Remembering all the relevant lessons of the Savory school, the fighters silently approached the terrorists at a distance of 20 steps, three of them slowly raised their rifles, took careful aim, and. three shots, three dead!
Over the next few days, all the rebels who attacked Victoria Falls were discovered and neutralized, and the success of the operation was primarily a consequence of the high professionalism of the PBS soldiers.

Then, for almost five years, the unit of combat pathfinders took part in almost all operations related to stopping the movement of rebels into the territory of Rhodesia.
Security forces, armed with expert intelligence provided by trackers, conducted up to a hundred successful raids against the insurgents. Thanks to the direct intervention of a handful of PBS fighters, a large number of terrorists were killed, while only one military tracker was killed.
However, ironically, it was precisely such successful actions of the pathfinders that became the main reason for the disbandment of their detachment (however, this often happens in the armies of various countries around the world). Due to the fact that the tactical and technical developments first tested by PBS fighters turned out to be very effective, the Rhodesian government decided to extend their methods to the entire army, and not limit it to just one unique special forces unit. First, in 1974, an order came to merge the P BS with the Selous Scout, and then several veteran trackers received an order to organize the “Rhodesian School of Pathfinders and African Wilderness Survival Specialists” (the famous “Wafa-Wafa”) on the shores of Lake Kariba. ), Hundreds of Rhodesian soldiers, both white and black (who trained mainly for the Sluss Scout), as well as several dozen military personnel from South Africa and a number of Western countries friendly to Rhodesia, passed through this renowned center for the most comprehensive special forces training.
The Combat Pathfinder unit is, as it were, in the shadow of such glorious Rhodesian units as the Gray Scouts and Black Devils, the Light Infantry and Selous Scouts, the African Rifles and the SAS. However, none of the real Rhodesians now scattered around the world forgets that their country for so long and successfully resisted the cruel and treacherous partisans from ZANU and ZAPU, in no small part thanks to the foresight of the wise Allan Savory and the great professionalism of the few graduates of his virtually personal specialized school of military and hunting art.